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Author: 


Clarkson,  Grosvenor  B. 


Title: 


Industrial  America  in  the 
world  war 

Place: 

Boston 

Date: 

1 923 


COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY  LIBRARIES 
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Clarkson,  Grosvenor  B  1882- 

Industrial  America  in  the  world  war;  the  strategy  behind 
the  line,  1917-1918,  b}^  Grosvenor  B.  Clarkson  ...  with  an 
introduction  by  Georges  Clemenceau  ...  Boston  and  New 
York,  Houghton  Mifflin  company,  1923. 

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INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA 
IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

The  Strategy  Behind  the  Line 

1917-1918 

By  GROSVENOR  B.  CLARKSON 

LATE  DIEECTOE  OF  THE  OmiED  8TATE3  COUNCIL  OP  NATIONAL  DEFENSE 

WITH  AN  INTRODUCTION  BY 

GEORGES  CLEMENCEAU 


I 


And  with  Illustrations 


Her  [America's]  brilliant,  if  pitiless,  tear  industry  had  entered  the  service  of  patriot- 
ism and  had  not  failed  it.  Under  the  compulsion  of  military  necessity  a  ruthless 
autocracy  was  at  work  and  rightly,  even  in  this  land  at  the  portals  of  which  the 
Statue  of  Liberty  flashes  its  bUnding  light  across  the  seas.  They  understood  war. 

VON  HINDENBCBO 


BOSTON  AND  NEW  YORK 

HOUGHTON  MIFFLIN  COMPANY 

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ALL  RIGHTS  RESERVED 


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To  the  Memory  of  my  Father 
'  JAMES  S.  CLARKSON 


CAMBRIDGE  •  MASSACHUSETTS 
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PREFACE 


This  volume  deals  with  the  final,  culminating,  and  decisive 
phase  of  America's  mobilization  and  use  of  her  industrial  and 
economic  resources  in  the  World  War. 

This  phase,  of  necessity,  has  to  do  with  the  United  States 
War  Industries  Board  in  the  full  flower  of  its  powers  and 
performance.  No  attempt  has  been  made  to  depict  the  pre- 
liminary industrial  mobilization  under  the  Council  of 
National  Defense  other  than  to  describe  in  high  relief  the 
evolutionary  process,  often  dramatic,  out  of  which  came  the 
War  Industries  Board  in  its  final  form. 

Similarly,  little  or  no  appraisal  has  been  made  of  the 
achievements  or  personalities  of  the  hurried  war  prepara- 
tions under  the  Council  of  National  Defense  and  its  subor- 
dinate bodies  from  six  weeks  before  the  entrance  of  the 
United  States  into  the  war  until  the  autumn  of  1917.  This 
period  may  be  treated  in  another  volume,  which  would  also, 
of  course,  include  an  account  of  the  great  field  forces  of 
the  Council  of  National  Defense  under  which  operated  the 
184,000  units  of  the  state,  county,  community,  and  munic- 
ipal councils  of  defense  throughout  America,  a  machinery 
which  transmitted  to  the  people  of  the  country  the  war  meas- 
ures and  needs  of  the  National  Administration,  sent  back 
to  Washington  the  moods  and  aspirations  of  the  people,  and 
maintained  the  morale  of  American  citizenship  from  begin- 
ning to  end  of  America's  participation  in  the  war.  It  would 
likewise  contain  a  recital  of  the  stirring  and  fruitful  contri- 
bution of  the  women  of  America  organized  under  the  Council 
of  National  Defense. 

In  the  present  work,  the  writer  has  not  only  devoted  many 
months  of  research  into  the  ofiicial  records  to  supplement 
and  verify  his  own  knowledge  of  the  events  described;  he 
has,  in  addition,  taken  nearly  700,000  words  of  statements 
from  the  pivotal  figures  in  the  administration  of  the  War 
Industries  Board  dealing  with  things  and  rendering  conclu- 
sions of  a  substance  and  color  that  no  official  record  ever 


Vlll 


PREFACE 


PREFACE 


IX 


contains.  Throughout,  the  greatest-  possible  care  has  been 
exercised  in  statements  of  facts,  a  precaution  imperative  in 
the  interpretative  analysis  of  industrial  and  economic  matters. 

The  present  volume  is  in  no  sense  a  special  pleading  for 
anything  or  anybody.  The  writer  has  earnestly  tried  to  deal 
with  this  particular  bit  of  history  in  a  just,  detached,  and 
objective  manner.  He  has  eliminated  himself  as  much  as 
possible  from  the  narrative,  departing  from  this  course  only 
when  it  has  seemed  useful  to  do  so. 

The  writer  acknowledges  with  much  gratitude  the  coopera- 
tion extended  to  him  by  the  great  company  of  business  men 
who  moulded  the  work  of  which  he  writes.  They  have,  with- 
out exception,  given  him  the  underlying  facts  that  he  desired, 
and  given  them  to  him  candidly  without  seeking  to  influence 
his  own  analysis  and  appraisal  of  the  events  and  achieve- 
ments described. 

The  writer  was  irresistibly  impelled  to  this  recital  because 
nowhere,  in  the  Government  or  out  of  it,  could  he  discern 
any  adequate  recognition  of  the  services  of  these  men  — 
the  doUar-a-year  men,  if  the  reader  please  —  with  whom  he 
was  associated  in  what  were  to  him  the  most  worth-while 
years  of  his  life.  The  lack  of  appreciation  of  what  they  did 
and  of  the  spirit  that  underlay  their  contribution  is,  in  the 
writer's  judgment,  supremely  unjust.  He  trusts  that  the  fol- 
lowing pages  will  in  some  measure  illumine  their  quiet 
unselfishness  and  their  tremendous  deeds. 

Finally,  it  is  a  matter  of  regret  that  in  a  history  of  this 
kind  it  is  not  possible  to  do  justice  to  all  of  the  personalities 
of  the  action.  Their  mere  number  precludes  that,  and  the 
technical  and  specialized  nature  of  the  duties  of  very  many 
of  them  would  shroud  any  account  in  dullness  and  weariness 
for  the  general  reader.  The  men  who  did  the  real  work  of 
the  War  Industries  Board  must,  like  the  common  soldiers 
in  battle,  remain  largely  unknown  and  unhonored. 

The  military  historian  has  no  choice  in  the  tale  of  a  battle 
but  to  italicize  the  victorious  general  and  pass  by  and  bury 
the  individual  soldier  in  the  sum  of  casualties.  So  it  is  in 
this  recital.  Highly  important  but  more  obscure  and  unpre- 
tentious achievements  must  be  unnoticed.  Little  can  be  done 
to  ofi'set  this  inevitable  inequality  than  to  preserve  in  the 


Appendix  the  roll  of  the  personnel  of  the  War  Industries 
Board  and  of  vital  bodies  directly  concerned  with  its  work. 
These  men  were  singularly  heedless  of  praise  or  recognition, 
and  they  will  understand.  They  worked  as  the  best  soldiers 
fought,  pro  patria;  the  strong  and  poignant  satisfaction  of 
honest  service  in  an  impelling  hour  was  their  chief  reward, 
and,  after  all,  there  is  no  reward  equal  to  that. 

Grosvenor  B.  Clarkson 


(( 


I  I 
7i 


CONTENTS 

t 

CHAPTER  I 

THE  CRISIS  AND  HOW  IT  WAS  MET 

The  inexorable  demands  of  modem  war  —  A  contest  of  peoples  and  indus- 
tries as  well  as  of  armies  —  America  the  last  reservoir  of  resources  —  The 
untold  tale  of  the  war  —  The  Nation's  inertia  before  the  storm  —  Staging 
the  huge  industrial  drama  —  Approximating  autocracy 3 

CHAPTER  II 

THE  COUNCIL  OF  NATIONAL  DEFENSE 
AND  ITS  ANTECEDENTS 

Preparedness  in  a  democracy  —  The  roots  of  industrial  defense  —  The 
Council's  birth  —  Early  gropings  —  First  contacts  with  industry  —  The  cry 
for  concentrated  power  —  The  mass  begins  to  move 10 

CHAPTER  III 

THE  WAR  INDUSTRIES  BOARD  EMERGES 

The  objective  in  sight  —  Synchronizing  the  civilian  dollar-a-year  man  with 
the  military  —  The  machine  lags  —  The  bitter  price  of  unpreparedness  — 
The  President  acts  —  Enter  Baruch  —  Review  of  the  drifting  period  — 
Baker  and  Baruch  —  The  new  dispensation  —  Industry  now  stripped  for 
war .....:...     ^ 


40 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE  PERSONAL  ELEMENT 

Baruch  —  Conscripting  the  brains  of  industry  —  The  dollar-a-year  man 
arrives  —  Seeking  the  industrial  doer  —  Willard  —  Scott  —  Legge  —  Peek 
—  Replogle  —  Parker  —  Brookings  —  Summers  —  Frayne  —  Fletcher  — 
Johnson 65 

CHAPTER  V 

THE  SOURCE  OF  POWER 

From  the  acorn  the  oak  —  Administration  by  request  —  The  right  to  com- 
mandeer —  Cooperation  the  supreme  power  —  Discipline  through  public 
opinion  —  Baruch  and  Wilson  —  Baruch  in  the  saddle  —  Tying-in  the 
executive  agencies  for  a  common  will  to  war 94 

CHAPTER  VI 

THE  DRAMA  OF  REQUIREMENTS  AND  RESOURCES 

L    General  Considerations  and  "Clearance" 

War  on  the  modern  scale  —  America  asleep  —  The  awakening  —  The  cry 
of  the  Allies  —  Doing  the  impossible  —  Chaos  in  the  War  Department  — 
Harnessing  the  flood  of  orders  —  Clearance  and  its  workings 107 


xii  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  VII 

THE  DRAMA  OF  REQUIREMENTS  AND  RESOURCES 

(continued) 

II.    The  Broader  Phase 

**Business  as  usual*'  to  the  scrap-heap  —  Taking  the  long  view  —  "Require- 
ments'* a  central  coordinator  —  Demanding  team-work  of  the  star  players 

—  General  March  and  the  War  Industries  Board  —  Through  the  neck  of 
the  bottle  to  victory  —  The  stupendous  military  programme  —  Baruch  and 

a  cablegram  from  Pershing  —  The  lesson  of  a  disaster  averted 121 

CHAPTER  VIII 

DISCIPLINING  A  NATION: 
PRIORITIES  IN  PRINCIPLE  AND  IN  ACTION 

The  torrential  demand  for  goods  —  Visualizing  a  nation's  need  — The 
making  of  an  explosive  shell  —  Everybody  for  himself  —  What  priority  is 

—  Priority  becomes  a  center  of  power  —  "Essential'*  versus  "non-essential** 
industries  —  Rationing  a  people  and  their  commerce  —  The  parable  of  the 
eggs  —  "Class  AA"  to  "Class  D"  —  Business  and  the  spirit  of  common 
service  —  The  army  calls  for  underwear  —  The  national  policing  of  in- 
dustry—  Locomotives,  steel,  brass,  nitrate,  acetone,  coal,  cotton  —  Which 
first  in  the  race  against  time?  —  Saving  the  French  75*8  —  Pershing  wants 
mules  —  Priority  supreme. 


138 


CHAPTER  IX 

THE  CONTROL  OF  PRICES 

Public  justice  and  price-fixing;  but  above  all,  production  for  war  —  Raw 
materials  the  heart  of  the  problem  —  Forestalling  the  profiteer  —  The 
famous  copper  agreement  —  Checking  the  rising  prices  —  Steel  control-- 
Price-regulation  in  a  democracy  —  Wilson  and  prices  —  An  isolated  judi- 
cial body  —  Baruch's  conception  of  industrial  control  —  The  mechanics  of 
the  question  —  Avoiding  rigid  policies  —  Sense  and   sentiment   in  prices 

—  Judge  Gary  queries  Judge  Lovett  —  General  results  of  controL    .    .    .  160 

CHAPTER  X 

BALANQNG  SUPPLY  AND  DEMAND 

The  twilight  zone  between  essential  and  non-essential  industries  —  Looking 
beyond  the  war  —  Jewelry  and  automobiles  —  An  industrial  operating 
clinic  —  What  happened  to  the  building  trade  —  Baruch  writes  Mayor 
Hylan  —  Politics  adjourned  —  Rifles,  artillery,  gun  mounts  —  Ferreting  out 
hoarded  goods  —  Housing  fifty  army  divisions  —  The  Board  and  the  rail- 
yfoys  —  Breaking  a  great  transportation  jam  —  The  searchlight  of  statistics 

—  The  War  Trade  Board  ties  in  — The  legal  factor 181 


CONTENTS 


Xlll 


Curtailing  the  capricious  customer  —  Paper  wrappers  for  wooden  cases  — 
Excising  the  dead  matter  of  industry  —  Nine  lines  of  approach —■  Ambas- 
sador Jusserand  and  the  modistes  —  Shaw  attacks  corset  steel,  tin,  spool 
thread,  typewriter  ribbons,  farm  wagons,  buggy  axles,  trace  chains,  motor- 
cycles, alarm  clocks,  tinfoil  —  Salvaging  wool  for  nine  hundred  thousand 
uniforms— Peace-time  benefits  —  Shaw  meets  Baruch  —  Conservation  with- 
out  destruction  succeeds  —  Lessons  for  to-day  and  to-morrow 209 

CHAPTER  XII 
CONVERSION:  THE  METAMORPHOSIS  OF  INDUSTRY 

What  France  learned  —  Our  own  peculiar  problem  —  Making  haste  slowly 

—  Converting  regions  as  well  as  plants  —  Should  our  industries  have  been 
pooled  with  the  Allies*?  — The  early  days  of  conversion  —  Peek  arrives  — 
Otis  goes  into  action  —  He  converts  Baruch  —  The  regional  system  is  born 

—  Conversion  by  long-distance  telephone  —  Applying  the  continental  vision 

of  industry  —  Those  who  also  served  —  Graphic  forms  of  conversion.    .    .  232 

CHAPTER  XIII 

DISBURSING  FIFTEEN  BILLION  DOLLARS: 
THE  INTER-ALLIED  PURCHASING  COMMISSION 

The  New  World  succors  the  Old  —  A  golden  key  for  the  Allies  —  Estab- 
lishing a  central  control  —  Legge's  way  —  The  traditional  obstacles  — 
Mastering  the  common  problems  of  supply  —  A  great  coalition  at  work  — 
Fifty-two  million  dollars  for  one  item  —  Northcliffe,  Brand,  Tardieu,  and 
Tozzi.      •••■••••••     ••     • •     ••••  250 

CHAPTER  XIV 

AMERICA  AND  WORLD  WAR  ECONOMICS: 
THE  FOREIGN  MISSION  AND  INTERNATIONAL  EXECUTIVES 

Buttressing  the  world's  economic  structure  —  Baruch  demands  reciprocity 
from  the  British  —  The  Foreign  Mission  lays  its  plans  —  The  British  Gov- 
ernment meets  Summers  —  Austen  Chamberlain  and  Winston  Churchill 
cooperate  —  Seventy-five  million  dollars  saved  —  Summers  takes  charge  of 
a  meeting  —  Conserving  steel  for  war  —  The  story  of  two  million  shoes.    .  261 

CHAPTER  XV 

THE  CONTROL  OF  LABOR 

The  human  understanding  of  labor  —  Obtaining  workers  for  war  industries 

—  Salvaging  waste  man  power  and  materials  —  Gompers  in  the  war  —  His 
call  to  lai)or  —  Scrutinizing  the  I.W.W. —  Some  early  history  —  The  Taft- 
Walsh  Board  —  The  War  Labor  Policies  Board  —  Employment  management 

—  Labor  after  the  war  —  Priorities  in  labor 276 


CHAPTER  XI 
CONSERVATION:  REDUCING  AMERICA'S  SURPLUS  TISSUE 

Thrift  at  the  source  —  Shaw  projects  his  plan  —  First,  economy;  second, 
economy;  third,  economy  —  Bread  for  two  hundred  thousand  persons  saved 
—  The  chemistry  of  voluntary  cooperation  —  The  technique  of  procedure  — 


CHAPTER  XVI 

IN  THE  SEAT  OF  POWER 

Pacifism  and  the  dollar  expended  —  Industry  in  a  blind  alley  —  The  trans- 
formation—  A  one-man  authority  arises  —  Should  it  have  been  expanded 
further?  —  The  Board's  hard  road  to  power 293 


k< 


xiv  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  XVII 

THE  BACKBONE  OF  THE  BOARD: 
THE  COMMODITY  SECTIONS 

Banich  taps  three  hundred  and  fifty  industries  —  Administrative  organiza- 
tion at  its  height  —  The  mechanism  vizualized  —  The  Board's  genesis  — 
The  discarded  committee  plan  —  Dissecting  the  commodity  sections  —  The 
appetite  for  facts  —  A  head  center  for  producer  and  consumer  —  Guess- 
work annihilated  —  Industry  mobilized,  drilled,  and  militant  —  Coordinated 
industry  at  the  service  of  coordinated  consumption  —  The  philosophy  of 
business  in  Government  —  Dreams  of  an  ordered  economic  world.    .    .    .  299 

CHAPTER  XVIII 
STEEL:  AN  EPIC  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

I.  A  conflict  of  blood  and  iron  —  The  super-demand  for  steel  —  A  nation's 
industries  rock  —  The  Board  a  storm  center  —  Demand  breeds  demand  — 
The  attitude  of  the  steel  producers  —  Replogle's  faith  —  Baruch  and  Gary 
negotiate  steel  for  the  navy  —  Wilson  demands  reasonable  prices  —  Legge, 
Replogle,  and  Summers  lay  a  foundation  —  The  Board  threatens  to  seize 
the  steel  plants  —  An  historic  meeting  follows  —  Analysis  of  price  elements 
—  Production  drops  —  Replogle  repeatedly  summons  producers —- Master- 
ing the  facts  of  steel  —  Baruch  demands  a  show-down  —  The  crisis  is  met 
• — Details  of  the  Steel  Administration. 

II.  The  automobile  industry  fights  control  —  The  Board  and  the  industry 
meet  —  The  industry  denounces:  Baruch,  Replogle,  et  al.y  reply  —  A  steno- 
graphic report  —  Legge  states  a  desperate  case  —  The  Board  takes  a  per- 
emptory stand  —  A  great  industry  pleads  for  its  life  —  The  final  agreement. 

ni.  The  steel  industry's  contribution  to  the  war  — The  Federal  adminis- 
tration of  steel  appraised. 315 


CHAPTER  XIX 

THE  STORY  OF  COPPER,  BRASS,  AND  OTHER 
NON-FERROUS  MUNITIONS  METALS 

The  myriad  needs  for  copper  —  The  copper  producers  fall  into  line  — 
Forty-five  million  pounds  for  the  army  and  navy  —  Further  price  agree- 
ments—  The  copper  mines  deliver  —  Brass  for  the  merchant  ships  and 
navy  —  Zinc  —  ^uminum  at  the  Government's  price  —  Antimony  for 
shrapnel  bullets  —  Lead  —  Nickel  —  Quicksilver. 345 


CHAPTER  XX 

PLATINUM  AND  TIN 

I.  Smuggling  platinum  from  Bolshevik  Russia  —  Bartering  with  the  Brit- 
ish for  tin. 

II.  Where  the  world's  tin  is  —  Tin  and  the  "ring  merchants"  of  London 
—  Driving  down  the  price  and  saving  millions  —  Tin  cans  and  the  eco- 
nomics of  war  —  Tin  for  bombs,  fuses,  and  flares  —  A  moral  to  be  drawn. 

III.  Platinum  the  indispensable  —  Twenty  thousand  ounces  under  ambas- 
sadorial seal  —  Requisitioning  platinum,  iridium,  and  palladium.    .    .    .  364 


CONTENTS  XV 

CHAPTER  XXI 

FERRO-ALLOYS  AND  WAR  MINERALS 

The  steel  industry  jeopardized  —  Manganese  and  the  lost  collier  Cyclops  — 
Sailing  vessels  bring  chrome  metal  from  Rhodesia  —  Basic  policies  of  raw 
materials  procurement  —  Their  operation  vital  to  national  defense  —  Tung- 
sten and  vanadium  —  Henry  Ford,  Baruch,  and  zirconium  —  Other  precious 
minerals :.:.:.: 376 


CHAPTER  XXII 

THE  WAR  IN  THE  NITRATES  AND  POTASH  SECTOR 

The  vital  need  for  nitrates  —  Why  Von  Spee  sought  Craddock's  squadron 

—  America  ignores  lack  of  nitrates  —  In  the  war,  and  no  nitrate  reserves 

—  Baruch  and  Summers  take  bold  steps  —  The  navy  intercepts  a  message 
to  Berlin  —  Baruch  and  Summers  beat  down  the  price  —  Securing  control 
of  Chilean  sources  —  Nitrate  shortage  a  constant  specter  of  defeat  —  Devel- 
oping potash  from  brine  —  Potash  for  powder,  optical  glass,  and  gas- 
masks —  Ogden  Armour  asks  McDowell  a  question  —  The  nitrate  lesson  — 
Have  we  learned  it? , , 387 


CHAPTER  XXIII 

EXPLOSIVES  AND  CHEMICAL  WARFARE 

Chemical  action  in  modem  war  —  The  Board  takes  control  of  sulphur  pro- 
duction—Five hundred  thousand  tons  of  sulphuric  acid  monthly  attained 
—  Nitric  acid,  caustic  soda,  chlorine  —  The  mighty  cotton  linter  —  The 
role  of  alcohol  —  Summers  warns  of  the  T.N.T.  need,  and  the  army  learns 
a  lesson  —  Our  powder  on  the  Western  Front  —  America's  explosive  prob- 
lem and  programme  —  The  plant  at  Muscle  Shoals  —  Pershing  cables 
imperatively  — The  Board  protests  the  Du  Pont  contract  —  Baruch  calls 
m  Jacklmg  — What  civilian  experts  did  in  producing  smokeless  powder.    .  397 

CHAPTER  XXIV 

ARTIFICIAL  DYES:  THEIR  CRITICAL  RELATION  TO  THE 
WAR -OTHER  CHEMICAL  AND  AUXILIARY  MINERALS 

The  wonders  of  synthetic  chemistry  — We  develop  a  dye  industry  —  Driv- 
*V^u"^  i*^^*^°^  ^^^  phenol  production  — Sulphide  of  soda  for  olive-drab 
cloth  — Acetone  for  aircraft  dope  and  high  explosives  —  Substitutions  and 
adaptations  — A  mosaic  of  brilliant  chemical  and  commercial  eflfort.    .    .  412 


CHAPTER  XXV 

THE  FORESTS  DO  THEIR  BIT: 
LIKEWISE  THE  PITS  AND  QUARRIES 

Mobilizing  the  lumbermen  —  Edgar  meets  an  emergency  —  Lumber  for  the 
cantonments  — Pershing  calls  for  timber;  the  forests  answer  —  Filling 
demands  unforeseen  and  gigantic:  warehouses,  docks,  construction  in 
*  ranee,  wooden  ships,  aircraft,  hospitals  —  Agreeing  on  prices  —  Curtailing 
news  print  — Building  materials "       *-  e 


xvi  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  XXVI 

LEATHER  AND  RUBBER  GO  TO  WAR 

A  million  sets  of  harness  —  Fifty  million  pair  of  shoes  —  Regulating  the 
shoe  trade  —  What  might  have  happened  —  Rubber  an  economic  freak.    .  432 

CHAPTER  XXVII 

WAGING  WAR  WITH  TEXTILES 

Blotting  out  Civil  War  scandals  —  The  early  Rosenwald  Committee  — 
Clothing  the  fighting  millions  —  The  final  stupendous  requirements  —  The 
reign  of  wool  —  The  story  of  "shoddy"  —  Mobilizing  the  cotton  goods  — 
Eight  hundred  million  yards  for  the  army  —  The  industry  falls  into  step 
—  Gingham-makers  produce  uniforms  —  Cromwell  cracks  the  whip,    .    .  439 

CHAPTER  XXVIII 

THE  IMPLEMENTS  OF  WAR  BEHIND  THE  LINES 

Quantity  production  in  a  machine-made  war  —  No  grinding  machines,  no 
airplanes  —  Reducing  standardization  fever  —  One  of  the  industrial  heart- 
breaks—  Anchor  chains  for  merchant  ships 452 


CHAPTER  XXIX 

POWER  AND  TRANSPORTATION  AS  FIGHTING  FACTORS 

The  power-fuel  problem  —  Conserving  electrical  power  in  congested  centers 

—  The  riddle  of  steam  turbines  —  Automotive  engineers  in  the  war  game 

—  Creating  the  heavy-duty  truck  —  Nine  thousand  locomotives  demanded.  459 


CHAPTER  XXX 

THEY  ALSO  FOUGHT 

Begging,  borrowing,  commandeering  optical  glass — A  new-bom  industry 
—  Surgical  needles,  aspirin,  artificial  eyes,  and  soldiers'  beds  —  Tobacco 
for  the  doughboy  —  Saluting  the  commodity  sections 470 


CHAPTER  XXXI 

APPRAISAL  — WITH  A  FEW  COMMENTS  ON 
PUBLIC  ADMINISTRATION 

The  unsung  men  in  mufti  —  Dropping  the  reins  of  power  —  Democracy 
and  decision  joined  —  Private  life  versus  public  life  —  A  panorama  of  the 
task  and  the  achievement  —  The  philosophy  of  priority  —  The  trend  toward 
general  control — The  Board  reaches  its  zenith — Lessons  for  another  war — 
Industrial  aftermath  —  Industrial  strategy,  in  war  and  peace  —  The  curtain 
rings  down  —  The  Board  becomes  history  —  Its  organism  in  perspective  — 
Industrial  democracy  vindicated 475 


CONTENTS 


xvii 


APPENDICES 


I.    Section  2  of  the  Army  Appropriation  Act,  approved  August  29,  1916.  491 
XL    The  Overman  Act 493 

III.  Committees  under  and  cooperating  with  Mr.  Baruch,  in  his  capacity 
of  member  of  the  Advisory  Commission  of  the  Council  of  National 
Defense :    .     :    .     :    .     : 495 

IV.  The  War  Industries  Board,  with  its  main  divisions 501 

V.    Regional  Advisors 508 

VI.    Members  of  the  War  Industries  Organization 509 

Vn.    War  Service  Committees  of  the  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  the  United 

States,  and  members  thereof 532 

Index :.:.:.:.: 545 


ILLUSTRATIONS 

The  General  Staff  of  American  Industry  in  the  World 
War:  The  United  States  War  Industries  Board  in  Ses- 
sion Frontispiece 

The  United  States  Council  of  National  Defense  and  Its 
Advisory  Commission  in  Joint  Meeting  in  the  Great 
Anteroom  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  Spring  of  1917         16 

Major-Gen.  George  W.  Goethals  36 

Member  of  the  War  Industries  Board  representing  the  Army 

Rear-Admiral  Frank  F.  Fletcher  36 

Member  of  the  War  Industries  Board  representing  the  Navy 

Brig.-Gen.  Palmer  E.  Pierce  36 

Representing  the  Army  in  the  early  organization  of  the  War  Indus- 
tries Board 

Bernard  M.  Baruch 

Chairman  of  the  War  Industries  Board 

Daniel  Willard 

Chairman  of  the  Advisory  Commission  of  the  Council  of  National 
Defense  and  the  second  Chairman  of  the  War  Industries  Board 

Frank  A.  Scott 

The  first  Chairman  of  the  War  Industries  Board 

Samuel  Gompers 

Member  of  the  Advisory  Conmiission  of  the  Council  of  National  De- 
fense representing  Labor 

Robert  S.  Lovett 

Member  of  the  War  Industries  Board  in  its  early  organization 

Alexander  Legge 

Vice-chairman  of  the  War  Industries  Board,  Manager  of  the  Allied 
Purchasing  Commission,  etc. 

George  N.  Peek 

Member  of  the  War  Industries  Board  and  its  Commissioner  of  Fin- 
ished Products 

J.  Leonard  Replogle 

Member  of  the  War  Industries  Board  and  Director  of  Steel  Supply 


66 


80 


80 


80 


80 


84 


88 


88 


tmmami 


Mto 


XX 


ILLUSTRATIONS 


Edwin  B.  Parker 

Member  of  the  War  Industries  Board  and  Priorities  Commissioner 

Leland  L.  Summers 

Technical  Advisor  to  the  War  Industries  Board  and  Chairman  of 
the  Foreign  Mission 

The  "  War  Cabinet  " 

Price-fixing  Committee  of  the  War  Industries  Board 

Conservation  Division  of  the  War  Industries  Board 


88 
92 

128 
168 
210 


Finished  Products  Division  of  the  War  Industries  Board  240 


Albert  C.  Bitchie 

General  Counsel  of  the  War  Industries  Board 


266 
266 
266 


Hugh  Frayne 

Member  of  the  War  Industries  Board  representing  Labor 

BoBERT  S.  Brookings 

Member  of  the  War  Industries  Board  and  Chairman  of  its  Price-fix- 
ing Committee 

Electrical  and  Power  Equipment  Section  of  the  War 
Industries  Board,  Washington,  November  11,  1918         306 

Chemical  Division  of  the  War  Industries  Board  394 

Building  Materials  Division  of  the  War  Industries 


Board 


430 


V 


INTRODUCTION 

Here  is  a  good  and  useful  book.  There  is  no  better  school 
for  nations  than  the  school  of  truth,  and  it  is  never  too  early 
to  lead  them  to  it.  The  industrial  history  of  the  war  has 
never  yet  been  written.  To  it,  Mr.  Grosvenor  B.  Clarkson 
makes  a  first  and  most  authoritative  contribution.  It  is  cer- 
tain that  no  one  of  the  victorious  armies  could  have  con- 
quered but  for  the  support  of  its  industries.  It  is  no  less 
clear  that  no  European  industry  could  have  survived  but 
for  the  support  of  American  industry. 

All  of  us,  without  exception,  make  mistakes.  Had  we  been 
better  prepared  for  war,  victory  would  have  come  sooner 
and  cost  less.  As  to  military  preparedness,  our  army  was 
magnificent  and  admirably  trained.  But  there  was  another 
kind  of  preparedness  which  had  everywhere  been  neglected, 
that  of  the  productive  forces  essential  to  the  existence  of  the 
soldiers.  One  of  the  prime  movers  of  American  industrial 
mobilization  spoke  the  truth  when  he  said  that  "twentieth- 
century  warfare  demands  that  the  blood  of  the  soldier  must 
be  mingled  with  from  three  to  five  parts  of  the  sweat  of  the 
man  in  the  factories,  mills,  mines,  and  fields  of  the  nation 
in  arms."  Germany,  which,  living  only  for  the  war,  under- 
stood its  requirements  better  than  we  did,  had  to  pay  dearly 
for  unpreparedness.  In  the  first  quarter  of  1915,  she  passed 
through  a  munitions  crisis  which  was  not  far  from  being 

fatal. 

America,  despite  the  power  of  her  production,  only 
escaped  the  common  danger  by  the  magnificent  effort  of 
which  Mr.  Clarkson  tells  the  story.  As  he  so  rightly  says, 
America  was  the  "last  reservoir."  We  in  Europe,  when  we 
lacked  steel  or  high  explosives,  had  only  her  to  turn  to.  She, 
however,  was  obliged  to  find  everything  within  herself,  to 
meet  her  own  requirements  and  satisfy  the  demands  of  her 

allies. 

The  competition  of  European  and  American  needs  was 
our  constant  anxiety.  To  cope  with  the  danger,  there  was  but 


XXll 


INTRODUCTION 


one  hope :  strong  and  constructive  organization.  Is  there  any 
need  to  add  that  in  a  nation  of  individualists  like  the  United 
States  such  organization  met  with  strong  opposition  from  the 
very  first?  It  will  be  the  imperishable  glory  of  President 
Wilson,  Mr.  Bernard  M.  Baruch,  and  their  distinguished 
co-workers,  that  they  were  able  to  create  it,  as  much  by  their 
convincing  persuasiveness  as  by  the  exercise  of  unbending 
authority.  The  cables  of  my  friend  Andre  Tardieu,  who 
for  two  long  years  was  responsible  for  the  French  side  of 
Franco-American  cooperation,  had,  from  the  beginning  of 
the  struggle,  brought  home  to  me  the  immense  complexity 
of  the  difficulties  encountered,  the  efforts  made,  and  the 
results  obtained.  It  is  right,  now  that  victory  has  been  won, 
that  history  should  speak  through  a  book  at  once  clear, 
interesting,  and  full  of  proof. 

The  United  States  declared  war  in  April,  1917.  It  was 
only  in  March,  1918,  that  their  industrial  mobilization  found 
its  final  form.  Even  in  the  land  of  quick  decisions,  the 
routine  of  peace  days  struggled  hard  to  live.  But  the  High 
Command  of  Industry  was  created.  It  was  a  splendid  com- 
pany of  men  who  at  the  call  of  their  country  had  come  from 
all  parts  of  the  United  States.  It  had  no  congressional  birth 
certificate;  a  mere  decision  of  the  President,  and  in  a  few 
weeks  resources  were  perfectly  adapted  to  needs,  the  whole 
coordinated  by  the  War  Industries  Board,  which  was  supreme 
in  all  matters  of  production,  priority,  and  distribution.  It 
was  really,  according  to  Mr.  Clarkson's  forceful  expression, 
nationally  integrated  industry. 

Production,  priority,  distribution,  was  no  easy  task,  and 
often  strange  and  dramatic  problems  called  for  solution. 
To  give  but  one  instance:  What  was  to  be  done  with  the  lot 
of  locomotives  just  ready  for  delivery?  Were  they  to  be 
sent  to  Pershing  to  carry  his  troops  to  the  front,  or  were  they 
to  be  sent  to  Chile  to  hasten  the  delivery  of  nitrates  without 
which  to-morrow  the  artillery  would  be  dumb? 

This  book  bears  witness  to  what  America  achieved.  Who- 
ever reads  it  will  know.  But,  leader  of  fighting  France,  I 
have  a  duty  to  fulfill.  It  is  to  recall  here  what  in  those 
immortal  days  the  United  States  did  for  my  country.  That, 
too,  would  be  worth  a  book,  which  has  so  far  not  yet  been 


INTRODUCTION 


XXlll 


.^ 


^) 


written.  Meanwhile,  here  are  some  eloquent  figures.  In 
eighteen  months,  the  United  States  sent  us  five  million  tons 
of  food  supplies  and  five  million  tons  of  war  material.  The 
steel  they  sent  us  represented  the  raw  material  for  a  hundred 
and  sixty  million  "75"  shells.  The  foodstuffs  they  sent  us 
fed  twelve  million  Frenchmen  for  a  year  and  a  half.  If  this 
help  had  not  been  forthcoming,  our  army  could  not  have 
held,  the  army  of  the  United  States  could  not  have  fought. 
Mr.  Clarkson  is  right:  the  men  who  won  the  war  behind 
the  lines  —  on  which  victory  at  the  front  depended  —  are 
entitled  to  the  gratitude  of  the  nations,  and  the  nations  do 
not  even  know  their  names.  It  is  time  that  justice  should  be 
done  these  men,  and  this  book  hastens  that  day.  We  French- 
men, who  are  eternally  thankful,  despite  the  troublous  times 
through  which  we  have  lately  passed,  to  our  good  comrades 
in  arms  from  beyond  the  seas,  remember  with  gratitude  the 
organizers  of  the  industrial  victory,  who  made  military  vic- 
tory possible.  They  have  modestly  gone  back  to  their  offices 
and  factories,  with  the  sole  reward  of  duty  well  done.  Let 
them  receive  our  cordial  thanks;  they  have  deserved  well 
of  the  Allied  and  Associated  Nations. 


G.  Clemenceau 


Paris,  13  December,  1922. 


INDUSTRIAL  AMEMCA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


!' 


:^a£Z&i£^A&S 


uiSBsaiia£ii^r> 


Industrial  America  in  the  World  War 


...  I  advise  that  the  Congress  declare  the  recent  course  of  the  Imperial 
German  Government  to  be  in  fact  nothing  less  than  war  against  the  Govern- 
ment and  people  of  the  United  States;  that  it  formally  accept  the  status  of 
belligerent  which  has  thus  been  thrust  upon  it  and  that  it  take  immediate 
steps,  not  only  to  put  the  country  in  a  more  thorough  state  of  defense,  but  also 
to  exert  all  its  power  and  employ  all  its  resources  to  bring  the  Government 
of  the  German  Empire  to  terms  and  end  the  war.  .  .  . 

WooDRow  Wilson 
War  Message  to  Congress,  2  April,  1917 

Modem  wars  are  not  won  by  mere  numbers.  They  are  not  won  by  mere 
enthusiasm.  They  are  not  won  by  mere  national  spirit.  They  are  won  by  the 
scientific  conduct  of  war,  the  scientific  application  of  industrial  forces. 

WooDRow  Wilson 

Modem  wars  make  terrible  demands  upon  those  who  fight.  To  an  infinitely 
greater  degree  than  ever  before,  the  outcome  depends  upon  long  preparation 
in  advance,  and  upon  the  skillful  and  unified  use  of  the  nation's  entire  social 
and  industrial  no  less  than  military  power. 

Theodore  Roosevelt 

When  this  war  comes  to  be  reviewed  in  proper  perspective,  its  social  and 
economic  aspects  will  be  found  at  least  as  remarkable  as  the  military  events, 
and  perhaps  more  instructive.  And  among  them,  the  influence  of  war  on 
industry  and  the  converse  influence  of  industry  on  war  will  take  a  prominent 
place.  We  are,  indeed,  witnessing  a  phenomenon  so  extraordinary  and  unex- 
pected that  we  can  only  see  its  surface  as  we  pass,  and  are  hardly  able  to 
comprehend  even  that.  There  has  not  been  time  to  look  beneath  and  try  to 
read  the  deeper  meaning  of  it  all.  But  some  lessons  present  themselves 
which  he  who  runs  may  read.  Never  before  has  the  supreme  concerted  effort 
demanded  by  war  been  so  fully  brought  out  and  the  inscrutable  mystery  of 
human  conduct  been  so  clearly  posed  as  in  this  prodigious  conflict  of  indus- 
trial nations. 

Shadwell 
Foreword  to  Readings  in  the  Economics  of  War. 
The  University  of  Chicago  Press,  1918. 


1 


CHAPTER  I 
THE  CRISIS  AND  HOW  IT  WAS  MET 

The  inexorable  demands  of  modern  war  —  A  contest  of  peoples  and  industries 
as  well  as  of  armies  —  America  the  last  reservoir  of  resources  —  The  untold 
tale  of  the  war  —  The  Nation's  inertia  before  the  storm  —  Staging  the  huge 
industrial  drama  —  Approximating  autocracy. 

War  is  no  longer  a  phenomenon  to  which  the  military  alone 
are  called.  It  is  no  longer  chiefly  a  pageant  of  marching 
troops  and  tragic  fields.  War  to-day  is  a  contest  of  all  the 
powers  of  the  antagonists  —  intellectual,  moral,  and  indus- 
trial. To  the  romance  of  armed  men  moving  upon  the  stage 
of  history  has  been  joined  the  drama  of  industry  militant, 
of  titanic  economic  forces  loosed  and  then  governed  to  the 
need  of  the  nation  in  arms. 

America  sent  oversea  the  last  reserves  of  men.  That  was 
well  and  superbly  done.  But  it  would  have  been  merely  a 
magnificent  gesture  if  America  had  not  been  the  last  reser- 
voir of  resources  for  the  supply  not  only  of  herself  but  of 
the  Allies. 

The  story  of  our  changing  and  growing  military  pro- 
gramme and  strength  has  been  told  by  others,  but  the  account 
of  the  industrial  mobilization  for  war  of  an  unwarlike,  unpre- 
pared, and  undisciplined  people  remains  for  this  book.  It 
is  the  untold  tale  of  the  war. 

It  is  the  record  of  how  all  the  people  and  all  their  activities 
were  drafted  quite  as  importantly  as  were  the  four  million 
youths  who  wore  the  uniform  of  the  Republic. 

It  is  a  narrative  of  the  gradual  and  unflinching  conscrip- 
tion of  the  whole  population  for  the  manifold  activities  of 
modern  war. 

It  is  a  story  of  the  conversion  of  a  hundred  million  com- 
batively individualistic  people  into  a  vast  cooperative  effort 
in  which  the  good  of  the  unit  was  sacrificed  to  the  good  of 


4      INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

the  whole,  and  of  how  the  entire  industrial  power  and 
machinery  of  the  Nation  were  focused  on  war  ends. 

Through  the  draft  the  army  imperatively  called  to  the 
colors  the  physically  fit  of  the  land.  Through  the  War 
Industries  Board,  in  embryo,  in  full  form  and  vigor,  and 
through  its  ever-growing  and  controlling  ramifications  with 
other  war  agencies,  the  whole  productive  capacity  —  even 
the  whole  civil  life  —  of  the  Nation  was  just  as  certainly, 
if  less  imperatively,  summoned  to  the  ordeal. 

At  the  head  of  the  army  in  arms  was  the  General  Staff;  at 
the  head  of  the  armies  of  industry  was  the  War  Industries 
Board. 

So  unobtrusively  and  so  unconsciously  did  this  powerful 
agency  grow  with  doing,  so  naturally  did  it  emerge  with 
the  environment,  that  it  was  never  dignified  with  an  organic 
act  by  Congress.  The  greatest  exercise  of  national  authority 
as  applied  universally  and  individually  was  entrusted  to  an 
instrumentality  that  was  virtually  unknown  to  the  statutes, 
and  it  was  not  until  the  war  had  been  over  for  some  months 
that  an  investigating  Congress  began  to  understand  some- 
thing of  the  nature  of  the  mechanism  that  in  the  end  directed 
the  sweeping  appropriation  of  the  commerce  and  industry 
of  the  most  powerful  of  all  nations  more  effectively  and  less 
timorously  dian  like  functions  had  been  performed  in  the 
military  nations  of  Europe. 

It  is  of  record  that  the  reports  of  our  military  observers 
with  the  armies  of  the  belligerents  in  Europe  lay  unread  in 
the  archives  of  the  General  Staflf  up  to  the  time  of  our  own 
entry  into  the  World  War.  Funds  had  not  been  provided  to 
furnish  the  military  intelligence  service  with  enough  person- 
nel to  examine  what  little  it  was  able  to  collect.  As  an 
organization  our  army  had  not  been  equipped  to  study  the 
greatest  of  wars  going  on  beneath  its  eyes.  The  cadets  at 
West  Point  were  still  absorbing  Jomini  and  Clausewitz,  and 
the  eyes  of  the  General  Staff  were  on  the  trivial  Mexican 
Border,  whilst  the  fate  of  the  world  was  turning  on  the  intro- 
duction of  novel  implements  of  war  and  unprecedented 
phenomena  involved  in  a  struggle  that  had  become  one  of 
whole  populations  pitted  against  each  other  with  the  massed 
resources  and  facilities  of  peoples. 


' 


THE  CRISIS  AND  HOW  IT  WAS  MET  5 

For  at  least  two  years  we  had  been  almost  daily  on  the 
verge  of  being  drawn  into  the  war,  but  we  had  learned 
nothing  from  its  military  lessons  in  the  narrow  sense,  and 
even  less  in  the  important  sense  of  war  as  a  conflict  of 
nations.  It  is  futile  to  attempt  to  place  the  blame  for  this 
lethargy  in  any  other  than  the  ultimate  quarter  of  our 
confirmed  and  sentimental  pacifism.  Always  believing  that 
we  shall  have  no  wars,  we  have  gone  on  having  them  without 
preparation  ever  since  the  war  that  founded  the  Republic. 
Even  the  upbuilding  of  the  navy  we  have  used  as  an  excuse 
for  no  further  preparation  —  saying  that  no  war  will  ever  be 
fought  on  our  soil  and  that  we  shall  never  have  need  to  fight 
overseas.  That  theorem  has  been  demonstrated  over  and 
over  again  to  the  satisfaction  of  our  stubborn  devotion  to 
peace;  and  is  even  now  being  explained  to  applauding 
audiences,  though  scarce  four  years  have  passed  since  we  had 
two  million  fighting  men  in  Europe. 

Whether  or  not  we  have  learned  from  our  violent  experi- 
ence in  the  World  War  anything  that  will  tend  to  make  the 
trials  of  some  future  war  less  violent  is  an  interesting  field 
for  dubious  speculation,  but,  whatever  may  be  the  con- 
clusion, it  cannot  divert  interest  from  the  history  of  what  we 
did  when  war  became  an  actuality  and  we  had  to  suspend  our 
absorption  in  pacifism  to  deal  with  a  war  that  came  despite 
our  determination  that  it  should  not  be. 

Even  if  we  had  been  a  military  people,  we  should  never 
have  grasped  the  universal  involvements  of  modern  war 
until  we  were  actually  in  it.  Germany  alone  among  the 
nations  had  long  ago  seized  in  a  powerful  degree  upon  the 
idea  that  the  army  is  but  the  sword  of  the  nation,  as  ineffec- 
tive in  itself  as  a  simple  sword  without  a  wielder.  France 
was  fully  imbued  with  the  conception  of  a  nation  in  arms, 
but  )  ad  not  accepted  its  industrial  implications.  England 
was  as  laggard  as  we  were  when  her  hour  struck. 

Yet  even  Germany  did  not  understand  the  full  significance 
of  a  war  of  peoples.  It  is  perhaps  true  even  of  her  that  she 
anticipated  everything  but  what  ultimately  happened.  She 
had  long  coordinated  her  internal  life  to  the  foreseen  require- 
ments of  armies  of  unprecedented  magnitude  and  fully 
understood  the  sequences  of  huge  military  efforts  in  the 


I 


y 


6      INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

industrial  field,  and  conversely  of  the  effects  of  industrial 
mobilization  on  military  enterprises  on  the  modem  scale; 
but  even  she  came  short  in  her  calculations  as  to  the  require- 
ments of  her  armies  from  her  industries  and  failed  in 
foresight  for  civilian  needs.  Notwithstanding  forty  years 
of  deliberate  planning,  she  found  herself  improvising, 
reorganizing,  and  frantically  starting  to  restore  the  disturbed 
balance  as  early  as  the  first  battle  of  the  Marne. 

For  almost  three  years  of  the  World  War,  our  allies  to  be 
were  so  far  from  fully  grasping  the  nature  of  the  struggle 
that  they  were  at  first  as  uncertain  as  we  were  as  to  what 
should  be  our  part  in  it.  They  hesitated  as  to  whether  we 
should  be  the  store-house  and  power-house  of  the  line  or 
whether  we  should  take  a  place  in  the  line  itself.  It  soon 
developed  that  we  should  have  to  play  both  parts,  though 
not  until  the  spring  of  1918  did  it  become  evident  that  in 
both  soldier-power  and  material-power  we  should  be  com- 
pelled to  play  a  large  and  decisive  role. 

Owing  to  our  lack  of  preparation  as  well  as  to  the  partic- 
ularistic attitude  of  our  industries,  partly  due  to  the  peculiar- 
ities of  the  American  genius  and  partly  to  the  operation  of 
statutes  that  discouraged  alliances  of  industrial  units,  the 
United  States  faced  a  very  difficult  task,  even  if  it  had  been 
undertaken  deliberately  and  long  in  advance  of  the 
emergency.  There  was  no  close  cooperation  in  industry  and 
no  effective  mingling  of  the  national  power  with  the 
industrial  power.  The  American  policy  had  been  to  repress 
interlocking  industrial  organization  rather  than  to  control  it. 

Trusts  had  been  broken  up  and  the  tendency  of  the  rail- 
ways to  unite  had  been  vigorously  opposed.  All  contacts 
of  productive  units  were  discouraged.  There  was  an  almost 
grotesque  lack  of  centralized  information  concerning 
resources  and  facilities,  and,  of  course,  no  prepared  plan 
for  devoting  them  to  a  struggle  in  which  the  military  arms 
and  the  Nation  itself  were  not  to  be  distinguished.  Even 
had  there  been  an  orderly  and  quickly  available  inventory  of 
industrial  power,  there  was  no  schedule  of  requirements 
against  which  to  balance  it.  The  measure  of  the  application 
of  our  military  and  industrial  power  to  the  combat  in  Europe 
was  the  capacity  of  ocean  transport,  and  that  was  an  unknown 


I 


THE  CRISIS  AND  HOW  IT  WAS  MET  7 

quantity.  Moreover,  the  length  of  this  line  of  supply 
necessitated  the  accumulation  of  far  greater  reserves  than  was 
the  case  with  Germany,  England,  and  France,  which  were  in 
the  theater  of  war.  The  transoceanic  conduit  must  be  filled 
and  then  kept  full. 

Our  task  was  further  complicated  by  the  fact  that  we  did 
not  have  the  single  problem  of  mobilizing  our  latent  power 
into  the  power  of  arms  backed  by  all  the  resources  of  the 
Nation.  We  were  the  last  reservoir  of  energy  and  materials 
available  to  the  Allies.  Speaking  in  a  broad  way,  we  could 
not  go  elsewhere  to  obtain  the  things  not  immediately  avail- 
able at  home.  We  had  to  find  or  produce  them  here 
without  interfering  with  the  flow  of  supplies  to  the  Allies 
without  which  they  would  have  been  compelled  to  abandon 
the  great  struggle  before  we  entered  it.  Not  only  that,  but 
we  had  to  attend  to  the  enormous  task  of  financing 
domestically  our  whole  war  enterprise  and  that  part  of  the 
Allies'  activities  which  depended  upon  American  resources. 

Upon  us  devolved  the  herculean  work  not  only  of  meeting 
the  special  military  requirements  of  ourselves  and  our  allies, 
but  of  meeting  the  large  alimentary  deficits  of  the  allied 
world  and  to  some  extent  of  the  neutrals,  besides  seeing  to 
it  that  our  own  people  were  adequately  fed,  fueled,  and 
clothed.  Our  problem  of  industrial  mobilization  and 
application  was  thus  vaster  and  more  complex  than  that  of 
any  of  the  other  nations  at  war.  And  it  was  thrust  upon  a 
people  less  prepared,  by  tradition,  training,  economic  struc- 
ture, political  organization  and  control,  and  by  forethought, 
to  undertake  it  than  was  any  other. 

Even  had  all  these  elements  been  favorable,  even  had  we 
already  a  large  standing  army  well  articulated  to  the 
"second  line  of  defense,"  the  vast  area  of  the  country,  the 
long  distances  over  which  materials  had  to  be  moved  in  the 
process  of  preparation  and  for  shipment  to  Europe,  provided 
particular  phases  of  the  problem  most  difficult  of  solution. 
It  is  probable  that  no  previously  conceived  and  worked-out 
paper  organization  would  have  been  able  to  meet  a  situation 
so  novel  and  so  permeating  the  whole  life  of  the  Nation, 
with  incidence  and  repercussion  not  to  be  foreseen.  It  is 
even  possible  that  such  a  preconceived  organization  might 


I 


8      INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

have  failed  as  much  from  its  rigidity  and  formalism  as  our 
lack  of  system  failed  us  at  first. 

It  may  even  be  that  had  we  created,  immediately  upon  our 
entry  into  the  war,  a  department  of  munitions  or  its  equiv- 
alent, it  would  have  been  too  angular  and  inelastic  success- 
fully to  meet  the  emergency,  too  autocratic  for  the  liking  of 
the  country  and  of  business,  and  far  less  adaptable  and 
responsive  to  the  facts  of  an  ever-changing  situation  than  the 
natural  growth  —  the  War  Industries  Board  —  which  finally 
came  to  be  the  supreme  instrumentality  of  the  exertion  and 
application  of  the  power  for  war  of  the  most  powerful  nation 
of  all.  There  was  an  insistent  demand  for  the  establishment 
of  a  department  of  munitions,  and  it  will  long  be  an  open 
question  whether  such  a  course  would  have  been  wiser  than 
die  one  that  was  defined  by  the  tread  of  events. 

However,  we  are  now  concerned  with  history  rather  than 
with  criticism.  In  the  end  the  Republic  met  its  problem  — 
and  effectively  —  through  an  institution  that  admirably 
complemented  the  genius  of  our  people  for  the  inductive 
method  of  thought  and  action.  On  the  whole,  we  learn  by 
doing  instead  of  doing  by  learning.  We  act  first  and 
consider  afterwards. 

Lack  of  plan  in  no  way  interfered  with  energetic  action 
when  the  war  began.  We  plunged  furiously  into  activity. 
Congress  appropriated  stupendous  sums  of  money  on  the 
merest  guesses  as  to  requirements,  inflated  war  establishments 
gave  orders  as  fast  as  duplicating  machines  could  copy  them 
and  telephone  and  telegraph  transmit  them.  We  struck 
blindly,  we  became  enmeshed  in  our  own  complex  web  of 
activities,  we  stumbled  and  fell.  And  then,  around  a  little 
nucleus  of  observation  and  reflection  in  the  Council  of 
National  Defense  that  had  sought  to  think,  plan,  and  foresee 
from  the  late  part  of  1916,  the  lessons  of  experience  were 
gradually  deposited,  and  there  grew  up  solidly  and  adapta- 
tively,  finding  final  expression  in  the  War  Industries  Board, 
a  war  machine  that  was  our  own  and  that  articulated  with 
the  decentralization  that  characterizes  the  Republic, 
economically  and  politically,  and  that  fitted  like  a  glove  the 
national  devotion  to  individualism. 

While  the  critics  were  still  crying  the  need  of  system,  the 


f 


THE  CRISIS  AND  HOW  IT  WAS  MET  9 

system  was  evolving;  and  when  coordination  was  still  a 
sweet  word  to  mouth  in  the  way  of  advice,  the  manifold  and 
inconceivably  complex  and  interpenetrating  demands  and 
functions  of  war  had  been  subdued,  tamed,  and  harnessed 
in  an  efficient  team.  Through  a  fabric  of  reflex  actions, 
responding  to  the  multitudinous  war  stimuli,  tempered  by 
observation  and  thought,  our  war  machine  grew.  Doubtless 
there  might  have  been  a  better  one,  but  this  one  did  the  job. 
It  roped  the  wild  horses  of  American  economic  and  political 
tradition  and  habit  and  tied  them  into  a  mechanism  of  pur- 
poseful control  that  was  not  surpassed  by  the  superimposed 
systems  with  which  the  Allies  met  the  crisis  of  confronting 
for  the  first  time  in  the  history  of  the  world  a  nation  that  was 
an  army  from  the  military  front  to  the  remoteness  of  the 
fields.  Through  it  the  huge,  imwieldy,  easy-going,  individ- 
ualistic, careless  Colossus  of  the  North  became  an  army  from 
its  coasts  to  its  placid  farms,  and  learned  to  put  into  its  blow 
the  whole  weight  of  its  incomparable  strength. 

So  gradual  was  the  growth  of  this  mechanism,  so  gently 
did  it  apply  its  powers,  so  lacking  was  the  authoritative 
definition  of  them,  so  frequently  did  it  request  and  so  rarely 
did  it  command,  so  human  were  its  engineers,  so  careful  to 
protect  the  essential  framework  of  the  national  economic 
strength  while  straining  it  to  the  utmost,  so  little  was  the 
emphasis  of  boastful  publicity  used,  that  but  few  of  our 
people  understand  even  now  that  the  end  of  the  war  found 
the  United  States  as  complete  a  military  machine  throughout 
its  whole  industrial  and  economic  life  as  the  world  has  ever 
seen. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE  COUNCIL  OF  NATIONAL  DEFENSE  AND  ITS 

ANTECEDENTS 

Preparedness  in  a  democracy  —  The  roots  of  industrial  defense  —  The 
Council's  birth  —  Early  gropings  —  First  contacts  with  industry  —  The  cry 
for  concentrated  power  —  The  mass  begins  to  move. 

The  United  States  was  unprepared  for  the  World  War  in  a 
governmental  and  military  sense,  but  there  had  long  been  a 
ferment  of  preparation  stirring  among  the  non-official 
leaders.  There  is  in  this  country  a  singular  divorce  at  times 
between  the  public  opinion  and  will  and  the  acts  of  the 
Congress.  Perhaps  the  divorce  is  more  apparent  than  real, 
and  that  what  we  commonly  call  public  opinion  because  it 
is  so  articulate  is  not  the  real  opinion  of  the  Nation. 

At  any  rate,  it  has  happened  time  and  again  that  Congress 
has  been  obdurate  to  the  appeals  of  the  public  as  reflected 
by  the  views  of  the  metropolitan  press  and  symposiums  of 
opinions  of  what  we  call  the  best  minds.  Judged  by  these 
indicia  —  and  no  historian  should  accept  them  without  great 
reservation  —  it  was  the  will  of  the  people  from  1914  on 
that  the  Nation  should  prepare  for  war.  Yet  it  was  not 
until  1916  that  the  Government  felt  justified  in  showing  an 
active  interest  in  military  preparedness.  Even  in  that  year 
Congress  thought  that  an  army  of  two  hundred  thousand  was 
enough. 

It  is  a  fair  conclusion  that  the  divorce  between  con- 
gressional action  and  public  opinion  is  only  between  the 
former  and  apparent  public  opinion.  Usually  this  apparent 
opinion  eventually  becomes  the  actual  opinion  —  but  a  long 
time  afterwards.  After  all,  the  controlling  motive  of  most 
Congressmen  is  to  shape  their  records  to  win  the  approval 
of  their  home  people.  Hence  they  watch  their  local  public 
opinion  most  intently,  and  on  any  deliberately  considered 
legislation  are  likely  to  represent  the  mass  mind  of  the 
country. 

Public  opinion  in  New  York,  in  Chicago,  in  Washington, 


3 


THE  COUNCIL  OF  NATIONAL  DEFENSE       11 

in  the  Capitol  itself,  and  the  public  opinion  of  the  Nation 
are  two  different  things.  We  are  a  sprawled-out,  decen- 
tralized nation,  spread  thinly  over  a  continent,  with  the  bulk 
of  civil  lawmaking  and  administration  in  the  hands  of  local 
bodies.  To  the  home  districts  State  capitals  usually  loom 
larger  than  Washington  and  a  county-seat  fight  is  apt  to  be 
of  more  interest  than  a  war  in  Europe.  Under  these  con- 
ditions public  opinion  on  national  matters  breaks  up  and 
recrystallizes  slowly.  When  the  provincial  public  mind  is 
once  made  up,  it  tends  to  stay.  It  is  not  mobile.  The 
Federal  democracy  follows  its  leaders  at  a  distance.  These 
leaders  are  not,  as  a  rule,  in  Congress  or  in  Government. 
Government  depending  upon  popularity  for  its  power  seeks 
to  follow  rather  than  lead  public  opinion. 

So,  with  war  threatening  for  many  years  and  impending 
for  several,  with  the  intelligently  keen  part  of  public  opinion 
favoring  preparedness  and  taking  volunteer  and  non-official 
steps  in  that  direction,  we  find  little  official  action.  While 
the  agitation  for  action  was  largely  fruitless  in  the  immediate 
view,  it  had  a  great  significance  in  that  it  did  awaken 
thoughtful  men  everywhere  to  view  the  future  with  concern 
and  to  consider  what  could  and  should  be  done.  By  reason 
of  this  long  impotent  activity  of  minority  opinion,  the  Nation 
was  readier  for  heroic  action  when  the  time  for  preparedness 
had  passed  and  that  for  action  had  come.  It  had  glimpsed 
the  stupendous  scale  of  modem  warfare  and  its  intimate 
union  with  the  whole  life  of  the  Nation,  and  so  was  in  some 
measure  ready  to  rally  around  the  Council  of  National 
Defense  as  nucleus  for  the  evolution  of  the  supply  machinery 
of  the  army  and  navy,  which  it  was  already  vaguely  under- 
stood meant  the  whole  economic  mechanism  of  the  Nation. 
As  far  back  as  1910  the  idea  of  a  Council  of  National 
Defense  had  begun  to  take  root  in  the  minds  of  men  who 
perceived  how  helpless  the  country  would  be  in  the  event  of 
war,  for  lack  of  forethought  and  planning,  and  General 
Leonard  Wood  and  other  army  men  were  emphasizing  the 
need  even  before  that  of  more  extensive  military  system. 
As  long  ago  as  1902,  General  Crozier,  as  chief  of  the 
Ordnance  Bureau,  had  urged  the  wisdom  of  a  great  enlarge- 
ment of  the  artillery  arm.     Had  the  advice  of  the  officers 


12    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

been  taken,  and  had  the  Government  set  about  to  plan  for  the 
expansion  of  the  peace-time  forces  into  an  army  of  the  size 
that  was  contemplated  in  Europe  even  before  the  revelations 
of  the  World  War,  the  corollaries  of  such  a  course  would 
have  led  to  a  large  degree  of  industrial  preparedness,  though, 
as  we  now  know,  almost  grotesquely  inadequate.  It  really 
required  a  year's  observation  of  the  war  in  Europe  for  an 
understanding  of  the  fact  that  modern  wars  are  fought,  not 
by  armies,  but  by  nations,  and  that  the  whole  moral, 
spiritual,  and  physical  energy  of  the  Nation  must  be  sum- 
moned to  the  struggle. 

In  the  latter  part  of  1915  there  began  to  be  many  popular 
manifestations  of  a  tendency  toward  military  and  industrial 
preparedness,  and  many  associations  began  to  take  form  that 
had  as  their  objectives  some  phase  of  preparedness. 
General  Wood's  "Plattsburgh  plan"  for  training  officers 
caught  the  imagination  of  the  country  and  was  later 
embodied  in  law.  It  is  perhaps  significant  to  note  that  the 
head  of  the  war  agency  with  which  this  volume  deals  was  an 
early  financial  supporter  of  this  plan. 

All  of  the  volunteer  striving  toward  war  preparation  had 
at  least  a  moral  value  in  that  they  were  preparing  the  mind 
of  the  Nation  to  face  the  war  that  was  coming.     One  of 
them,  at  least,  had  a  moral  value,  and  that  was  the  Industrial 
Preparedness  Committee  of  the  Naval  Consulting  Board. 
The  first  stirrings  of  the  feeling  of  apprehension  that  we 
might  be  engulfed  in  the  World  War  had  their  immediate 
reflexes  in  the  naval  establishment.     It  was  obviously  the 
first  line  of  defense,  and  it  was  hard  to  conceive  of  any  war 
that  would  require  us  to  send  large  armies  overseas.     More- 
over, for  thirty  years  the  public  had  become  accustomed  to 
an  expanding  navy  and  mounting  appropriations  for  naval 
ships  and  establishments.     So,  in  1915,  President  Wilson 
unequivocally  declared  for  a  navy  second  to  none,  and  there 
was  laid  down  the  ambitious  building  programme  of  1916 
which  pointed  to  supremacy  for  the  American  navy.     The 
extensive  industrial  involvements  of  this  programme  were 
obvious.     With  Edison  at  its  head,  the  Naval  Consulting 
Board,  created  to  deal  with  them,  consisted  of  two  members 
each  from  eleven  of  the  great  scientific  societies  of  America. 


I* 


THE  COUNCIL  OF  NATIONAL  DEFENSE        13 

Responding  to  the  growing  apprehensions  of  the  hour,  this 
Board  soon  concentrated  its  important  activity  in  the  Com- 
mittee on  Industrial  Preparedness,  which  extended  the  scope 
of  its  work  to  include  industrial  preparedness  as  viewed 
from  the  whole  military  requirement,  not  that  of  the  navy 
only.  Although  acting  under  helpful  public  auspices  and 
with  the  emphatic  approval  of  the  President,  the  Industrial 
Preparedness  Committee  was  virtually  a  popular  rather  than 
a  governmental  organization.  It  was  almost  wholly  financed 
by  private  contributions.  The  chief  work  of  the  committee, 
under  the  chairmanship  of  Howard  E.  Coffin,  of  Detroit, 
was  to  make  an  inventory  of  manufacturing  plants  of  the 
country  that  were  capable  of  making  munitions. 

The  State  committees,  hand-picked  from  the  joint  member- 
ship in  each  State  of  the  five  leading  engineering  bodies  of 
the  country,  took  up  the  work  with  vigor  and  enthusiasm,  and 
the  enterprise  proceeded  so  rapidly  that  by  September,  1916, 
some  twenty  thousand  manufacturing  plants  had  supplied 
data  bearing  on  their  war  service  capabilities.  This  canvass 
revealed  a  very  general  feeling  on  the  part  of  manufacturers 
that  America  would  be  drawn  into  the  World  War.  They 
sensed  the  strain  that  would  be  put  upon  the  country's 
industries  and  (doubtless  in  some  cases  stimulated  as  the 
result  of  Allied  contracts)  cheerfully  cooperated  in  the 
census  of  preparedness.  Yet  it  must  be  noted  tliat  there 
were  a  few  exceptions.  Some  concerns  refused  to  give  the 
desired  information,  and  curtly  stated  that  they  cared  for 
no  governmental  patronage  either  in  war  or  in  peace.  This 
exceptional  attitude  revealed  a  considerable  lack,  in  the  year 
before  the  war,  of  that  unity  of  will  to  serve  the  Nation  that 
was  essential  to  the  fusing  of  the  fagots  of  individualism 
into  the  unbreakable  bundle  of  national  unity. 

Whatever  may  have  been  the  value  of  the  committee's 
industrial  inventory,  to  Mr.  Cofiin,  more  than  any  other 
individual,  is  due  the  evocation  of  the  pre-war  movement 
for  industrial  preparedness,  so  far  as  its  popular  aspect  was 
concerned.  He  gave  his  time,  energy,  and  resources  with- 
out stint.  He  was  filled  with  the  consciousness  of  the  pre- 
ponderant role  of  industry  in  modem  warfare,  expressed  in 
his  phrase:  "Twentieth  century  warfare  demands  that  the 


14    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

blood  of  the  soldier  must  be  mingled  with  from  three  to  five 
parts  of  the  sweat  of  the  man  in  the  factories,  mills,  mmes, 
and  fields  of  the  nation  in  arms." 

The  information  collected  by  this  private  endeavor  to 
fill  the  gap  that  Congress  had  long  ignored  was  later  trans- 
ferred to  the  Council  of  National  Defense  and  War  Industries 
Board  —  the  latter  expanding  the  inventory  threefold;  but 
still  more  important  was  the   awakening  of  the   men   of 
industry  and  the  thoughtful  citizenry  that  resulted  from  the 
canvass  and  the  knowledge  of  the  importance  of  the  articula- 
tion of  arms  and  industry  in  modem  war  that  was  widely 
disseminated.     The  phrase  "industrial  preparedness"  was 
bom  of  this  campaign.    The  press  of  the  Nation  gave  many 
thousand  columns  of  space  to  the  committee's  work  durmg 
the  summer  of  1916.     Magazine  editors  like  Albert  Shaw, 
of  the  "Review  of  Reviews,"  daily  newspaper  executives  like 
George  McAneny,  of  the  "New  York  Times,"  made  themselves 
one    with    the    movement.     The    billboards    gratuitously 
blazoned  the  idea,  and  such  powerful  national  organizations 
as  the  Associated  Advertising  Clubs  of  the  World  and  the 
American  Press  Association  contributed  generously  of  their 
talent  and  experience,  as  did  a  number  of  the  leading  artists 
of  the  country.     In  no  small  measure  was  the  ground  thus 
prepared  for  the  seed  that  was  to  be  so  vigorously  planted 
in  the  following  year. 

The  feeling  for  industrial  preparedness  that  was  fostered 
undoubtedly  had  its  effect  in  Congress  when,  in  the  spring 
of  1916,  bills  were  again  introduced  into  the  House  and 
Senate  for  the  creation  of  a  Council  of  National  Defense. 
The  idea  was  now  in  the  air.  The  President,  now  become  an 
ardent  advocate  of  preparedness,  had  made  a  swing  around 
the  circle  to  promote  the  enlarged  naval  and  military  pro- 
grammes, and  the  people,  realizing  how  near  war  came  after 
the  sinking  of  the  Lusitania  and  again  after  that  of  the 
Sussex,  understood  that  some  new  incident  might  precipitate 
it  almost  any  day.  The  German  intrigues  for  the  support 
of  pacifism  and  for  the  destruction  of  munitions  plants 
stirred  national  resentment,  and  helped,  as  did  much  of 
Germany's  policy,  to  contribute  to  her  undoing.  Yet,  even 
now,  so  pacific  was  the  Congress  that  the  section  of  the 


* 


THE  COUNCIL  OF  NATIONAL  DEFENSE       15 

Military  Appropriations  Act  creating  the  Council  of  National 
Defense  was  drawn  with  a  view  rather  to  leisurely  industrial 
preparation  for  some  far-off  emergency,  and  the  trifling  sum 
of  $200,000  was  the  amount  held  sufficient  for  a  beginning. 
Under  consideration  in  Congress  for  near  six  months,  the 
plan  became  law  only  of  August,  1916,  and  it  was  not  until 
December  6th  that  the  Advisory  Commission  of  the  Council 
held  its  first  meeting. 

Many  men  and  many  currents  of  thought  contributed  to 
this  first  enactment  of  a  measure  designed  to  enlist  the 
economic  forces  of  the  country  for  some  distant  emergency. 
The  apical  effective  touch  was  apparently  given  by  Dr.  Hollis 
Godfrey,  president  of  the  Drexel  Institute  of  Philadelphia, 
and  Dr.  Henry  E.  Crampton,  an  eminent  scientific  man,  who 
as  thoughtful  citizens  sought  an  analogy  between  corporate 
coordination  and  the  coordination  of  the  political  power  and 
the  industrial  strength  in  an  emergency  that  would  demand 
their  closest  union. 

Dr.  Godfrey  states^  that  the  sources  of  his  thought  on 
this  subject  had  their  origin  in  a  trip  abroad  in  1906  during 
which  he  met  Sir  Henry  Campbell-Bannerman  and  Mr. 
Winston  Churchill,  who  were  then  "working  on  a  council  of 
imperial  defense"  for  Great  Britain.  He  watched  with 
interest  the  course  of  the  Hobson  proposals  in  Congress  for 
a  Council  of  National  Defense,  and  then  in  May,  1916,  made 
up  his  mind  that  he  must  do  something  to  promote  the  idea 
of  management  of  industry  in  relation  to  war,  for  the 
purpose,  as  he  put  it,  of  getting  "product  and  service  at  a 
minimum  of  cost  and  time."  He  conferred  with  General 
Leonard  Wood.  "Three  cheers;  this  is  exactly  what  we 
need,"  was  the  comment  of  the  great  proponent  for 'military 
preparedness  in  the  United  States.  "There  is  nothing  that 
is  more  necessary." 

In  several  conferences  with  General  Wood,  the  whole 
preliminary  plan  was  worked  out,  and  General  Wood 
recommended  that  Dr.  Godfrey  confer  with  Secretary  of 
War  Garrison.  Before  calling  on  Secretary  Garrison,  how- 
ever, Dr.  Godfrey  conferred  with  Secretary  of  Commerce 

^Testimony  before  Select  Committee  on  Expenditures  in  the  War  Depart- 
ment, Serial  3,  Part  15,  October  20,  1919. 


16    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


Redfield  and  Dr.  Crampton,  and  there  resulted  a  working 
model  of  the  Council  of  National  Defense.  When  the  plan 
was  submitted  to  Mr.  Garrison,  he  said,  "This  is  the  most 
amazing  baby  that  was  ever  put  on  the  War  Department 
steps;  I  am  going  to  shut  everything  else  off  and  talk  to 
you  the  rest  of  the  day."  After  many  other  consul- 
tations the  project  was  submitted  to  Elihu  Root,  former 
Secretary  of  War,  who  examined  existing  statutes  and 
informed  Mr.  Garrison  that  there  was  no  existing  organ  of 
Government  that  could  carry  out  the  plan,  and  then  "outlined 
the  bill  which  afterwards  formed  the  fundamental  principles 
of  the  bill." 

The  next  step  was  the  submission  of  the  basic  bill  to 
Representative  Sanford,  of  New  York,  and  then  to  Senator 
Weeks.  Senator  Chamberlain,  chairman  of  the  Senate 
Committee  on  Military  Affairs,  and  Representative  Hay, 
chairman  of  the  House  Committee  on  Military  Affairs,  gave 
earnest  attention  to  the  project.  Colonel  House  reviewed 
it  with  valuable  results  and  then  the  plan  was  laid  before 
President  Wilson,  who  said:  "This  is  admirable;  this  is 
extraordinary,  this  composite  work.  It  is  exactly  the  putting 
of  this  theory  of  education  into  government.  I  am  heartily 
for  it."  Secretary  of  War  Baker  was  consulted  frequently 
by  Crampton  and  Godfrey  and  he  agreed  with  the  whole 
situation. 

The  provisions  of  the  Army  Appropriations  Act  creating 
the  Council  of  National  Defense  were  drawn  by  Major- 
General  Crowder  acting  under  instructions  from  Mr.  Baker. 
The  first  draft  was  brought  to  the  Secretary,  changed  by  him 
in  several  ways,  then  restudied  and  redrawn  by  General  Crow- 
der, and  in  its  final  form  was  the  result  of  further  confer- 
ences between  General  Crowder  and  Mr.  Baker.  The  original 
basic  blue-print  work  in  connection  with  the  Council  was 
apparently  done  by  Dr.  Crampton  and  his  staff.  It  should 
be  said  that  in  the  course  of  his  thinking  and  planning  Dr. 
Crampton  received  the  views  of  such  men  as  Benjamin 
Strong,  governor  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  at  New  York; 
Nicholas  Murray  Butler,  president  of  Columbia  University, 
and  Elihu  Root.  In  view  of  later  critical  discussion,  it  is 
significant  that  Dr.  Godfrey  testifies  that  it  was  Mr.  Root's 


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INTENTIONAL  SECOND  EXPOSURE 


16    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


Redfield  and  Dr.  Crampton,  and  there  resulted  a  working 
model  of  the  Council  of  National  Defense.  When  the  plan 
was  submitted  to  Mr.  Garrison,  he  said,  "This  is  the  most 
amazing  baby  that  was  ever  put  on  the  War  Department 
steps;  I  am  going  to  shut  everything  else  off  and  talk  to 
you  the  rest  of  the  day."  After  many  other  consul- 
tations the  project  was  submitted  to  Elihu  Root,  former 
Secretary  of  War,  who  examined  existing  statutes  and 
informed  Mr.  Garrison  that  there  was  no  existing  organ  of 
Government  that  could  carry  out  the  plan,  and  then  "outlined 
the  bill  which  afterwards  formed  the  fundamental  principles 
of  the  bill." 

The  next  step  was  the  submission  of  the  basic  bill  to 
Representative  Sanford,  of  New  York,  and  then  to  Senator 
Weeks.  Senator  Chamberlain,  chairman  of  the  Senate 
Committee  on  Military  Affairs,  and  Representative  Hay, 
chairman  of  the  House  Committee  on  Military  Affairs,  gave 
earnest  attention  to  the  project.  Colonel  House  reviewed 
it  with  valuable  results  and  then  the  plan  was  laid  before 
President  Wilson,  who  said:  "This  is  admirable;  this  is 
extraordinary,  this  composite  work.  It  is  exactly  the  putting 
of  this  theory  of  education  into  government.  I  am  heartily 
for  it."  Secretary  of  War  Baker  was  consulted  frequently 
by  Crampton  and  Godfrey  and  he  agreed  with  the  whole 
situation. 

The  provisions  of  the  Army  Appropriations  Act  creating 
the  Council  of  National  Defense  were  drawn  by  Major- 
General  Crowder  acting  under  instructions  from  Mr.  Baker. 
The  first  draft  was  brought  to  the  Secretary,  changed  by  him 
in  several  ways,  then  restudied  and  redrawn  by  General  Crow- 
der, and  in  its  final  form  was  the  result  of  further  confer- 
ences between  General  Crowder  and  Mr.  Baker.  The  original 
basic  blue-print  work  in  connection  with  the  Council  was 
apparently  done  by  Dr.  Crampton  and  his  staff.  It  should 
be  said  that  in  the  course  of  his  thinking  and  planning  Dr. 
Crampton  received  the  views  of  such  men  as  Benjamin 
Strong,  governor  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  at  New  York; 
Nicholas  Murray  Butler,  president  of  Columbia  University, 
and  Elihu  Root.  In  view  of  later  critical  discussion,  it  is 
significant  that  Dr.  Godfrey  testifies  that  it  was  Mr.  Root's 


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■■  i 


THE  COUNCIL  OF  NATIONAL  DEFENSE       17 

suggestion  that  the  Council  of  National  Defense  should  con- 
sist exclusively  of  certain  Cabinet  members. 

William  G.  McAdoo,  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  bore  a 
distinct  part  in  the  Council's  creation.  He  was  keenly  inter- 
ested in  it.  At  his  summer  home  in  New  Jersey,  the  writer 
discussed  with  him  at  great  length,  in  September,  1916, 
the  personnel  of  the  Advisory  Commission  shortly  to  be 
appointed,  the  writer  having  been,  with  Walter  S.  Gifford 
(the  first  director  of  the  Council),  one  of  the  working  heads 
of  Mr.  Coffin's  Committee  on  Industrial  Preparedness.  Fol- 
lowing this  meeting  the  writer  informed  Mr.  McAdoo  that 
he  could  not  accept  the  directorship  of  the-  Council  and 
Advisory  Commission  and  advised  the  selection  of  Mr.  Gif- 
ford for  that  post,  one  which  held  potentialities  limited  only 
by  the  vision,  practical  ability,  and  courage  of  its  incumbent. 
(Mr.  McAdoo  told  the  writer  then  that  he  had  had  the  Secre- 
tary of  the  Treasury  as  a  member  of  the  Council  kept  out 
of  the  act  because  he  did  not  feel  he  could  assume  the 
additional  work.)  Mr.  Gifford  seemed  to  be  a  logical  selec- 
tion to  undertake  the  preliminary  organization  of  the  Coun- 
cil. As  supervising  director  of  Mr.  Coffin's  committee,  he 
had  organized  and  driven  through  the  details  of  the  work 
in  an  orderly  and  precise  manner  that  was  wholly  admirable. 
He  was  besides  possessed  of  considerable  business  experi- 
ence as  chief  statistician  of  the  American  Telephone  and 
Telegraph  Company. 

The  Advisory  Commission,  which  was  the  characteristic 
feature  of  and  became  the  Council  in  action  and  was  the 
essential  part  of  its  mechanism,  is  represented  by  Dr.  God- 
frey as  being  "the  joint  growth  of  the  entire  situation;  the 
Advisory  Commission  was  to  bring  out  the  principle  of 
having  trained  experts  in  diflferent  lines.  It  had  never  been 
very  effectively  brought  into  an  executive  body  before." 

It  is  important  to  note  that  the  legislative  roots  of  the 
Council  of  National  Defense  idea  go  back  as  far  as  1910. 
In  that  year,  in  response  to  a  resolution  of  the  House  of 
Representatives,  the  General  Staff  of  the  army  submitted  to 
the  House  a  confidential  report  on  the  military  situation 
which  included  a  recommendation  for  the  creation  of  a 
Council  of  National  Defense,  "in  order  to  stabilize  the  mili- 


I 


18    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

tary  policy  of  the  United  States."  Even  then  there  seemed 
to  be  an  understanding  in  the  army  that  there  must  be  a 
body  to  unite  the  military  and  civil  forces. 

Immediately  after  this  report  was  received,  Richmond 
Pearson  Hobson,  of  the  House  Committee  on  Military 
Affairs,  introduced  a  bill  providing  for  a  Council  of  National 
Defense  to  consist  of  the  Secretaries  of  War  and  Navy,  two 
technical  officers  each  from  the  army  and  navy,  and  six 
members  of  Congress.  This  early  idea  that  the  Council 
should  primarily  unite  the  military  arms  of  the  Government 
with  the  Congress  persisted  right  down  to  1917.  Mr.  Hob- 
son  brought  his  bill  up  again  in  the  Sixty-Second  Congress 
in  1912,  but  it  never  reached  a  final  vote.  The  matter  was 
considered  important  enough  even  to  be  included  in  the 
Democratic  national  platform  in  1912,  which  had  a  clause 
expressing  approval  of  such  a  body.  The  proposal  was 
unavailingly  renewed  in  the  Sixty-Third  Congress,  and  the 
matter  was  discussed  in  newspapers  and  magazines  in  1913 
and  1914. 

The  outbreak  of  the  war  in  Europe  with  its  early  emphasis 
on  the  industrial  incidence  of  war  shifted  interest  from  the 
earlier  conception  of  a  council  that  would  unite  the  army, 
the  navy,  and  the  Congress  in  a  military  coordinating  body 
to  one  that  would  deal  rather  with  the  relations  of  the  mili- 
tary arms  to  industry.  Thus  arose  the  Naval  Consulting 
Board;  the  National  Advisory  Committee  on  Aeronautics, 
created  in  March,  1915;  the  National  Research  Council,  cre- 
ated in  July,  1916,  both  by  acts  of  Congress,  and  in  April 
of  the  same  year  the  establishment  of  the  National  Com- 
mittee of  Physicians  for  Medical  Preparedness. 

The  growth  of  interest  in  the  industrial  background  of 
military  operations  was  reflected  also  in  section  120  of  the 
National  Defense  Act,  which  gave  the  President  the  power 
to  "place  orders  for  war  material  directly  with  any  source 
of  supply"  and  also  endowed  him  with  the  power  to  com- 
mandeer plants  if  necessary  and  appoint  an  industrial 
mobilization  board.  The  same  section  directed  the  Secretary 
of  War  to  cause  to  be  made  a  complete  list  of  all  privately 
owned  plants  equipped  to  manufacture  arms  or  munitions, 
etc.    The  power  here  given  was  intended  to  be  used  through 


THE  COUNCIL  OF  NATIONAL  DEFENSE       19 

the  War  Department,  but  another  act  gave  similar  powers  to 
the  navy.  Section  120  was  worked  out  by  the  War  College 
Division  of  the  General  Staff  Corps. 

Preliminary  to  the  final  adoption  of  the  section  creating 
the  Council  of  National  Defense  in  the  Military  Appropria- 
tions Act  of  1916,  four  separate  bills  for  such  a  body  were 
introduced  —  two  by  Senator  Chamberlain,  one  by  Repre- 
sentative Hay,  and  one  by  Representative  Britten.  In  sub- 
stance Mr.  Hay's  bill  (the  Godfrey  plan)  was  finally 
adopted,  as  it  appeared  to  represent  the  more  modem  con- 
ception. Senator  Chamberlain's  measures  inclined  to  the 
earlier  tradition  of  a  sort  of  fusion  of  the  legislative  and 
executive  branches. 

Nevertheless,  the  measure  as  finally  adopted  attracted 
little  attention  from  Congress  as  a  whole,  and  nobody  seems 
to  have  thought  that  there  was  any  duplication  of  legislation 
involved  in  the  above-mentioned  paragraph  of  the  National 
Defense  Act,  passed  by  the  same  session  of  Congress  which 
authorized  the  President  to  appoint  a  board  of  industrial 
mobilization  in  his  discretion.  Had  there  been  any  general 
adequate  thought  given  to  the  subject,  the  two  measures  would 
have  been  merged  logically  in  the  National  Defense  Act,  but 
in  fact  it  was  the  Military  Appropriations  Act  that  provided 
for  the  Council  of  National  Defense.  It  is  a  curious  f^ct 
that  there  is  no  record  that  the  authorization  of  an  agency 
for  industrial  mobilization  was  ever  invoked  by  the  Execu- 
tive, though  that  provision  has  been  noted  since  as  one  of 
the  elements  that  built  up  the  extraordinary  war  powers  of 
the  President  and  supplied  the  sources  of  authority  for  much 
that  was  done  later  by  the  Council  of  National  Defense  and 
the  War  Industries  Board.  It  seems  entirely  to  have  escaped 
the  attention  of  those  unfriendly  critics  who  have  sought  to 
show  that  there  was  virtually  no  legislative  foundation  for 
the  exercise  of  such  vigorous  executive  power  as  the  War 
Industries  Board  came  to  exercise  in  the  fulfillment  of  its 
evolution. 

Necessity  knows  no  law,  as  President  Lincoln  telegraphed 
to  Governor  Ramsey,  of  Minnesota,  when  the  latter  besought 
him  to  suspend  the  draft  in  Minnesota,  which  sparsely  settled 
frontier  commonwealth  was  at  the  moment  confronted  by  one 


20    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


V 


III 


f» 


of  the  bloodiest  Indian  wars  in  our  history.  Congress  never 
contemplated  that  the  Council  of  National  Defense  and  its 
lusty  child,  the  later  all-powerful  War  Industries  Board, 
should  become  the  partners  of  the  army  and  navy  in  waging 
war,  but  it  did  sow  the  legislative  seeds  from  which  those 
bodies  grew  great  and  mighty  when  endowed  with  the  vir- 
tually unlimited  authority  that  the  President  in  war-time 
could  and  did  confer  upon  them.  In  any  event,  the  evolu- 
tion had  the  tacit  approval  of  Congress,  for,  though  definite 
legislation  covering  the  field  of  industrial  control  in  connec- 
tion with  the  war  enterprise  was  proposed,  it  was  never 
adopted. 

Perhaps  it  is  just  as  well  that  the  instrumentality  of 
primary  industrial  control  was  left  to  grow  instead  of  being 
created.  Being  always  in  some  measure,  superficially  at 
least,  dependent  on  the  voluntary  cooperation  of  the  people, 
it  never  aroused  the  deep-seated  antagonism  and  open  or 
passive  defiance  that,  in  a  democracy,  so  often  cripples  arbi- 
trary and  unpopular  ordinances.  Moreover,  by  reason  of 
its  indefiniteness,  the  system  that  finally  met  the  emergency 
was  so  adaptive  and  fluid  that  it  fitted  into  all  the  crannies 
and  crevices  of  the  war  machine  which  was  called  upon  to  do 
more  in  two  feverish  years  than  the  one  Germany  built  with 
thought  and  care  in  forty  deliberate  years.  A  formal  instru- 
mentality legislatively  created  ab  initio  might  have  accom- 
plished less  by  severe  edicts  than  the  War  Industries  Board 
did  by  its  polite  "requests."  Edicts  might  have  been  nulli- 
fied, but  the  requests  were  ever  cheerfully  complied  with. 
By  the  legislatively  informal  method  the  necessary  measures 
were  always  taken  by  "us"  instead  of  by  "you."  And  there 
is  a  world  of  psychological  philosophy  in  the  diff'erence.  It 
matters  not  that  recipients  of  the  requests  for  cooperation 
knew  that  behind  them  there  was  inexorable  will  and  the 
means  of  compulsion;  the  request  form  made  them  feel  that 
the  sources  of  power  and  compulsion  were  ultimately  in 
them  as  an  integral  part  of  the  Nation  from  which  the 
requests  proceeded. 

The  act  creating  the  Council  plainly  reveals  that  it  was 
intended  as  a  peace-time  body  which  should  prepare  the 
country  for   an   emergency  —  by  thought   rather   than   by 


THE  COUNCIL  OF  NATIONAL  DEFENSE       21 


action,  by  study  rather  than  by  performance.  Doubtless  it 
was  expected  that  its  recommendations  should  be  the  basis 
of  legislation  that  would  create  instrumentalities  for  the 
purpose  of  realizing  its  plans.  The  war  caught  the  new  body 
in  the  formative  state  and  wrought  it  by  the  imperious  force 
of  events  and  the  white  heat  of  necessity  into  an  executive 
agency.  Instead  of  planning  the  initial  mobilization  of 
industry  and  resources,  it  directed  the  mobilization.  Instead 
of  sitting  serenely  apart  in  a  deliberate  council  chamber,  it 
was  thrust  by  forced  evolution  into  events  that  could  not  be 

stayed. 

Congress  never  saw  fit  to  change  the  organic  act  when  the 
emergency  arrived;  it  was  satisfied  to  let  evolution  take  its 
course.  The  job  of  the  early  war  days  had  to  be  done 
and  the  Council  was  doing  it,  better  perhaps  than  if  execu- 
tive powers  had  been  conferred  on  it  by  precise  and  rigid 
statute;  though  the  men  of  action  who  were  ultimately  to 
direct  its  indispensable  functions  often  deplored  the  lack  of 
"teeth"  behind  their  eff"orts.  Although  overemphasizing  the 
peace-time  value  of  the  Council,  doubtless  because  he  did 
not  wish  to  emphasize  preparatory  war  measures  in  the  deli- 
cate days  of  the  latter  part  of  1916,  President  Wilson,  in 
announcing  the  appointment  of  the  Advisory  Commission  of 
the  Council,  broadly  stated  the  purposes  of  the  Coimcil  in 
the  following  words: 

The  Council  of  National  Defense  has  been  created  because  the 
Congress  has  realized  that  the  country  is  best  prepared  for  war 
when  thoroughly  prepared  for  peace.  From  an  economical  point 
of  view  there  is  now  very  little  difference  between  the  machinery 
required  for  commercial  efficiency  and  that  required  for  military 
purposes.  In  both  cases  the  whole  industrial  mechanism  must  be 
organized  in  the  most  effective  way.  Upon  this  conception  of  the 
national  welfare,  the  Council  is  organized  in  the  words  of  the  act 
for  "the  creation  of  relations  which  will  render  possible  in  time  of 
need  the  immediate  concentration  and  utilization  of  the  resources 
of  the  Nation." 

The  organization  of  the  Council  likewise  opens  up  a  new  and 
direct  channel  of  communication  and  cooperation  between  business 
and  scientific  men  and  all  departments  of  the  Government,  and  it 
is  hoped  that  it  will,  in  addition,  become  a  rallying  point  for  civic 


22    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


THE  COUNCIL  OF  NATIONAL  DEFENSE       23 


!M 


II 


!l 


bodies  working  for  the  national  defense.    The  Council's  chief  func- 
tions are: 

1.  The  coordination  of  all  forms  of  transportation  and  the 
development  of  means  of  transportation  to  meet  the  military, 
industrial,  and  conunercial  needs  of  the  Nation. 

2.  The  extension  of  the  industrial  mobilization  work  of  the  Com- 
mittee on  Industrial  Preparedness  of  the  Naval  Consulting 
Board.  Complete  information  as  to  our  present  manufactur- 
ing and  producing  facilities  adaptable  to  many-sided  uses  of 
modem  warfare  will  be  procured,  analyzed,  and  made  use  of. 

One  of  the  objects  of  the  Council  will  be  to  inform  American 
manufacturers  as  to  the  part  they  can  and  must  play  in  national 
emergency.  It  is  empowered  to  establish  at  once  and  maintain 
through  subordinate  bodies  of  specially  qualified  persons  an 
auxiliary  organization  composed  of  men  of  the  best  creative  and 
administrative  capacity,  capable  of  mobilizing  to  the  utmost  the 
resources  of  the  country. 

The  personnel  of  the  Council's  advisory  members,  appointed 
without  regard  to  party,  marks  the  entrance  of  the  non-partisan 
engineer  and  professional  man  into  American  governmental  affairs 
on  a  wider  scale  than  ever  before.  It  is  responsive  to  the  increased 
demand  for  and  need  of  business  organization  in  public  matters 
and  for  the  presence  there  of  the  best  specialists  in  their  respective 
fields.  In  the  present  instance,  the  time  of  some  of  the  members  of 
the  Advisory  Board  could  not  be  purchased.  They  serve  the  Gov- 
ernment without  remuneration,  efficiency  being  their  sole  object  and 
Americanism  their  only  motive. 

The  men  thus  appointed  to  the  Advisory  Commission  — 
Daniel  Willard,  president  of  the  Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railroad ; 
Bernard  M.  Baruch,  financier;  Howard  E.  Coffin,  vice-presi- 
dent of  the  Hudson  Motor  Company;  Julius  Rosenwald, 
president  of  Sears,  Roebuck  &  Company;  Dr.  HoUis  Godfrey, 
president  of  the  Drexel  Institute  of  Philadelphia;  Samuel 
Gompers,  president  of  the  American  Federation  of  Labor; 
Dr.  Franklin  Martin,  secretary-general  of  the  American  Col- 
lege of  Surgeons,  Chicago  —  little  thought  that  they  were  so 
soon  to  become  the  head  center  of  the  thought  and  action  of 
the  Nation  on  its  civil  side,  nor  that  they,  serving  without 
pay,  would  soon  be  marshaling  the  forces  of  the  world's 
greatest  industrial  nation. 

In  the  nature  of  things  the  Advisory  Commission  of  the 


Council  of  National  Defense  became  the  real  executive 
branch  of  the  Council.  The  Council  proper  was  made  up 
of  the  Secretary  of  War,  who  was  elected  chairman,  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy,  the  Secretary  of  the  Interior,  the 
Secretary  of  Agriculture,  the  Secretary  of  Commerce,  and 
the  Secretary  of  Labor.  It  is  true  that  the  Council  early 
distinctly  affirmed  that  the  duties  of  the  Advisory  Commis- 
sion were  advisory  and  that  the  power  of  decision  lay  with 
the  Council,  thus  conforming  to  the  letter  of  the  law;  but 
the  initiative  lay  with  the  members  of  the  Commission  and 
the  Council  inevitably  came  to  accept  its  advice,  and  it  was 
then  charged  with  the  execution  of  the  things  decided  upon. 
Counsel  and  action  united  usually  have  their  way  under  any 
executive.  Hence  it  is  true  that  in  effect  the  seven  members 
of  the  Commission,  continuously  occupied  with  the  business 
side  of  war,  were  really  the  men  who  primarily  shaped  and 
directed  the  illimitable  and  multitudinous  contacts  of  the 
Government  with  industry,  business,  and  the  daily  life  of 
all  the  people. 

The  minutes  of  the  Council  and  of  the  Commission  show 
that  in  the  beginning  no  member  foresaw  what  was  to  eventu- 
ate from  the  early  gropings  of  this  group  of  men,  who 
vaguely  realized  that  something  vast  and  far-reaching  must 
be  done  if  the  untrained  strength  of  the  sleeping  giant  of 
America  was  to  be  concentrated  in  the  effort  that  should  win 
the  war.  From  being  a  body  of  thinkers  and  directors  of 
research,  compilers  of  data  and  makers  of  inventory,  who 
knew  that  in  some  way  the  things  they  recommended  must 
be  done,  the  Commission  became  the  nucleus  of  ramifying 
committees,  commissions,  and  boards  which  proceeded  to  do 
the  things  advised. 

It  would  be  interesting  to  trace  all  the  way  through  the 
evolution  of  the  Commission  from  a  group  of  somewhat 
bewildered  men  drawn  from  private  life  (meeting  for  the 
first  time  in  a  hotel  room  December  7,  1916)  and  with  little 
experience  in  or  knowledge  of  the  workings  of  the  machinery 
of  government;  but  that  would  be  to  write  a  history  of  the 
Council  of  National  Defense,  and  we  are  here  concerned 
directly  only  with  the  Council's  early  history  in  so  far  as  what 
subsequently  became  the  War  Industries  Board  was  then 


i 


'9/ 


II 


I 


^ 


24    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

embryonically  acting.  But,  inasmuch  as  the  War  Industries 
Board  in  all  commercial  and  industrial  matters  eventually  be- 
came the  master  key  of  all  the  economic  functions  that  grew 
out  of  the  Council  or  the  Advisory  Commission,  it  is  well  to 
consider  what  it  did  in  those  early  days  of  growth  and  differ- 
entiation. Perhaps  the  most  striking,  concise  account  of 
the  Advisory  Commission  in  the  first  three  months  of  its 
existence  was  made  by  a  partisan  critic,  the  Honorable 
William  J.  Graham,  who,  after  examining  the  minutes  of 
the  Council  and  of  the  Advisory  Commission  of  the  Council, 
which  up  to  that  time  had  been  regarded  as  confidential,  but 
which  the  writer  turned  over  to  him  on  request,  reported  to 
the  Select  Committee  of  the  House  of  Representatives  on 
Expenditure  in  the  War  Department  (of  which  he  was  chair- 
man) what  he  called  a  "startling  disclosure"  of  the  "secret 
government  of  the  United  States."^ 

An  examination  of  these  minutes  [he  said]  discloses  the  fact  that 
a  commission  of  seven  men  chosen  by  the  President  seem  to  have 
devised  the  entire  system  of  purchasing  war  supplies,  planned  a 
press  censorship,  designed  a  system  of  food  control  and  selected 
Herbert  Hoover  as  its  director,  determined  on  a  daylight-saving 
scheme,  and  in  a  word  designed  practically  every  war  measure  which 
the  Congress  subsequently  enacted,  and  did  all  this  behind  closed 
doors,  weeks  and  even  months  before  the  Congress  of  the  United 
States  declared  war  against  Germany.  ... 

It  appears  from  the  minutes  of  the  Advisory  Commission  and  the 
Council,  which  were  kept  separately,  that  practically  all  of  the 
measures  which  were  afterwards  considered  as  war  measures  were 
initiated  by  this  Advisory  Commission,  adopted  by  the  Council,  and 
afterwards  acted  upon  by  Congress.  In  many  cases,  a  considerable 
period  before  the  actual  declaration  of  war  with  Germany,  this 
Advisory  Commission  was  discussing  matters  which  were  thought 
to  be  new  legislation  by  reason  of  the  necessities  of  war.  For 
instance,  on  March  3d,  over  a  month  before  the  war  declaration,  the 
Advisory  Commission  endorsed  to  the  Council  of  National  Defense 
a  daylight-saving  scheme  and  recommended  a  Federal  censorship  of 
the  press.  .  .  . 

On  February  15th,  about  two  months  before  the  declaration  of 
war.  Commissioners  Cofl&n  and  Gompers  made  a  report  as  to  the 
exclusion  of  labor  from  military  service,  and  the  draft  was  dis- 

Uuly  7,  1919,  Serial  1,  Part  7,  of  the  Committee's  hearings. 


THE  COUNCIL  OF  NATIONAL  DEFENSE       25 

cussed;  the  draft  was  also  discussed  on  other  occasions  before  any 
one  in  this  country  except  the  Advisory  Commission  and  those  who 
were  closely  affiliated  with  the  Administration  knew  that  a  declara- 
tion of  war  was  to  be  later  made.    At  a  meeting  on  February  1 5th 
this  same  commission  of  seven  men  (none  of  whom  had  any  official 
authority  except  as  advisers)    recommended  that  Herbert  Hoover 
be  employed  by  the  Government  in  connection  with  food  control 
It  was  generally  understood,  as  appears  from  the  minutes,  that 
Mr.  Hoover  was  to  be  in  control  of  the  matter,  although  the  war 
was  two  months  in  the  future Almost  the  first  thing  the  Com- 
mission did  was  to  take  up  the  matter  of  arranging  an  easy  method 
of  communication  between  the  manufacturers  and  the  Government. 
.  .  .    In  several  meetings  long  before  the  war  was  declared  this 
Advisory  Commission  of  seven  men  met  with  the  representatives  of 
the  manufacturing  industries  and  formed  an  organization  of  them 
for  selling  supplies  to  the  Government,  which   organization  was 
well  perfected  before  the  war  was  declared.    This  method  consisted 
of  having  the  representatives  of  the  various  businesses,  producing 
goods  which  the  Government  would  have  to  buy,  form  themselves 
mto  committees  so  that  they  might  be  able  to  sell  to  the  Govern- 
ment the  goods  direct,  which  their  industries  produced.    In  almost 
every  meetmg  that  this  Advisory  Commission  held  before  the  decla- 
ration of  war,  they  discussed  and  recommended  to   the   Council 
(which  consisted  of  six  Cabinet  members)   these  plans  for  fixing 
pric^  and  selling  to  the  Government.    When  war  was  declared  on 
April  6th  the  machinery  began  to  move,  headed  by  the  Advisory 
Commission  of  seven  men,  who  were,  in  effect,  as  shown  by  these 
minutes,  the  active  government  of  the  United  States  so  far  as  the 
purchase  of  supplies  was  concerned.    So  far  as  I  can  observe,  there 
was  not  an  act  of  the  so-called  war  legislation  afterwards  enacted 
that  had  not  before  the  actual  declaration  of  war  been  discussed  and 
settled  upon  by  this  Advisory  Commission. 

It  is  an  interesting  commentary  on  the  responsibility  of 
statesmen  m  a  democracy  that  a  distinguished  Congressman 
should  affect  to  think  that  he  was  making  a  startling  sensa- 
tion  out  of  a  presentation  of  the  obviously  necessary  prepa- 
rations for  a  war  that  was  apparently  inevitable  months 
Delore  the  formal  declaration.  According  to  Mr.  Graham, 
While  It  was  reprehensible  enough  to  have  done  anything  a 
day  before  Congress  formally  decided  that  there  was  to  be 
war,  the  miquity  of  the  proceeding  was  that  the  Advisory 
Commission,  m  addition  to  advising,  took  steps  to  see  that 


1 « 

1 


*^ 


r# 


26    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

its  recommendations,  after  approval  by  the  Council,  were 
put  into  execution. 

The  only  fault,  aside  from  its  bitterly  depreciative  tone, 
to  be  found  with  Mr.  Graham's  summary  of  the  achieve- 
ments of  the  Advisory  Commission  before  and  in  the  early 
days  of  the  war,  is  that,  broad  as  it  is,  it  does  not  tell  the 
whole  story.  And  it  might  be  added  that  the  only  cause  the 
Nation  has  for  regretting  what  was  then  done  is  that  it  was 
not  even  more  inclusive,  specific,  and  compelling. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  might  be  inferred,  from  Mr.  Gra- 
ham's graphic,  if  unfriendly,  summary,  that  the  Advisory 
Commission  had  from  the  very  first  a  deep  and  orderly 
understanding  of  the  national  problem,  a  clear  conception 
and  an  adequate  programme  of  how  to  undertake  its  solution. 
Such  was  not  the  case.  In  fact  the  minutes  show,  as  might 
be  expected,  a  distinctly  experimental,  tentative,  and  cau- 
tiously explorative  attitude  through  the  first  two  months  (and 
permanent  organization  waited  for  three  months).  Save  in 
one  or  two  directions,  a  month  passed  before  the  commis- 
sioners began  to  get  hold  of  concrete  phases  of  the  problem. 

At  the  meeting  of  January  8th,  out  of  much  talk  and 
many  suggestions  came  two  practical  suggestions  that  were 
destined  to  grow  into  great  realities.  Commissioner  Daniel 
Willard  "brought  to  the  attention  of  the  meeting  the  impor- 
tance of  the  development  of  ideas  about  railroad  transporta- 
tion and  suggested  that  an  investigation  should  be  under- 
taken through  such  means  as  seemed  most  appropriate  for 
the  purpose  of  developing  in  what  way  the  railroads  can  be 
beneficial  to  the  Government."  This  recommendation  was 
adopted  and  Mr.  Willard  was  appointed  to  make  the  investi- 
gation. This  was  the  first  seed  of  the  Government  Railroad 
Administration. 

The  other  suggestion  came  from  Commissioner  Baruch, 
and  was  really  the  first  stirrings  of  life  in  what  was  to  be 
the  War  Industries  Board  of  a  year  later.  Commissioner 
Baruch  stated  that  he  had  been  making  a  study  of  the  steel 
and  metal  industries,  and  wanted  to  consult  further  with  the 
authorities  in  those  trades  if  the  Commission  felt  that  it  was 
perfectly  proper  for  him  to  go  ahead.  He  had  not  been 
doing  it  as  a  member  of  the  Commission  and  would  not 


THE  COUNCIL  OF  NATIONAL  DEFENSE       27 

necessarily  need  authority,  but  he  wanted  to  feel  that  the 
Commission  desired  him  to  go  ahead  and  bring  from  the 
suggestions  of  those  trades  an  understanding  of  what  they 
could  do  —  how  to  get  their  resources  together^  The  sug- 
gestion was  approved  and  Mr.  Baruch  was  authorized  to 
proceed. 

In  a  broad  way  of  speech  that  was  the  task  of  the  manage- 
ment  of  industry  in  the  war  -  to  get  the  country's  resources 
together.    The  logical  place  for  the  initiation  of  the  getting 
together  was  in  the  basic  industries  —  the  industries  thai 
produced  raw  materials.     Until  the  proper  point  of  starting 
was  generally  understood,  the  control  of  industry  was  never 
rationally  approached.     The  War  Industries  Board  in  its 
intermediate  and  final  forms  was  the  lineal  descendant  of 
the  Council  s  dealings  with  raw  materials,  though  chrono- 
logically It  took  its  first  recognized  form  in  the  General 
Mumtions  Board.    It  took  time  for  the  fundamental  concep- 
tion  to  prevail,  and  that  meant  the  losing  of  time      Yet 
nothing  seems  more  obvious  than  that  in  the  last  analysis 
everything  pertaining  to  production  rests  upon  the  supply 
of  raw  materials  and  the  methods  of  utilizing  them.    As  an 
expert  appraiser  of  the  values  of  securities,  Mr.  Baruch  had 
early  learned  in  a  successful  business  career  to  go  to  the 
roots  of  all  enterprises  that  sought  the  investors'  dollars 
His  experience  and  turn  of  mind  naturally  prompted  him  to 
seek  for  the  control  of  the  mobilization  of  national  industrial 
strength  m  the  first  sources  -  in  the  primary  materials  and 
m  transportation. 

It  was  not  easily  to  be  foretold,  in  the  early  days  when 
^LfT  *'!''«J"«trial  mobilization  had  just  been  created, 
what,  if  anything,  worth  while  would  come  out  of  it.  None 
oresaw  that  the  "Wall  Street  speculator"  who  manifeS 
such  an  interest  m  raw  materials  would  eventually  become 
Ae  head  of  the  controlling  body  of  th,  whole  industrial  side 

IS  diverted  as  easily  as  a  rivulet  by  a  snag.    Time  and  chanc^ 

fuX  me"    ''''■  '^"'''  ^'^  *^  "'"  ^"-^  *^  ''PP- 

The  easiest  and  most  direct  route  of  evolution  would 

^Italics  are  the  author's. 


» 


I. 


i! 


28    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

seem  to  have  been   for  the   chairman   of   the   AdW 
Commission  or  the   director  of  the  Council  of   National 
Defense  to  have  shed  his  associates  and  emerged  as  the 
industrial  dictator  at  a  time  when  every  one  was  weary  ot 
conferences  and  committees  and  longmg  for  some  strong 
man,  with  temperament  suited  to  the  times,  to  take  the  rems. 
The  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  the  United  States  at  one  time, 
perceiving  that  there   should   be   an   industrial   command 
co-equal  with  the  military  command,  recommended  to  Con- 
gress  that  the  director  of  the  Council  should  be  given  power 
and  authority  in  the  economic  field  analogous  to  that  of  the 
chief  of  staff  of  the  military  field.     If,  in  the  summer  ot 
1917,  an  executive  genius  had,  with  or  without  permission, 
injected   himself   into   the   situation,   he   might   well   have 
become  the  man  of  the  hour,  and  the  tedious  and  agonizing 
evolutionary  process  would  have  been  shortened  by  at  least 

'\rth?joint  meeting  of  the  Council  and  the  Advisory 
Commission,  held  on  February  12   1917,  we  find  m  a  reso- 
lution  originating  with  Secretary  Lane  the  first  formal  state- 
ment  of  the  idea  of  direct  contact  with  the  chief  men  m 
industry  that  Mr.  Baruch  had  already  been  applymg  m  his 
voluntarily  undertaken  work  and  which  he  had  been  orally 
presenting  to  his  Federal  associates      This  resolution  Pro- 
vided  for  the  calling  of  a  series  of  conferences     with  the 
leading  men  in  each  industry  fundamentally  necessary  to 
the  defense  of  industry  in  the  event  of  war,  at  which  con- 
ferences  these  men  shall  be  asked  to  organize  themselves  so 
as  to  deal  with  the  Council  through  one  man  or  through  a 
committee  of  not  more  than  three  men  to  whom  the  Council 
shall  submit  such  problems  as  may  affect  such  industries. 
That  the  Secretary  of  War  shaU  designate  one  or  more  mem- 
bers  of  the  Council  or  Commission  to  meet  with  such  con- 
ferences  and  set  forth  the  desire  of  the  Government  and  its 

prospective  needs."  -   , 

This  resolution  resulted,  at  a  subsequent  meeting  ot  the 
Commission  the  same  day,  in  a  recommendation  that  the 
Commission  be  organized  into  committees,  each  member 
being  a  chairman  of  one  committee  and  the  other  members 
being  designated  by  him  "from  either  governmental  or  civil 


THE  COUNCIL  OF  NATIONAL  DEFENSE       29 

life,  or  both."    Here  we  have  the  first  definite  step  toward 
the  system  of  committees  and  sub-committees  which  brought 
the  Government  into  contact  with  the  whole  productive  and 
distributive  life  of  the  Nation  and  became  the  basis  of  the 
system  of  democratic  control  of  industry  through  personal 
conference  and  discussion,  which  reached  its  mature  form 
in  the  commodity  sections  of  the  War  Industries  Board  in 
connection  with  the  complementary  committees  from  indus- 
try.    The  Commission  was  accordingly  divided  into  com- 
mittee chairmanships  as  follows: 
Daniel  Willard,  transportation  and  communication. 
Bernard  M.  Baruch,  raw  materials,  minerals,  and  metals. 
Howard  E.  Cofl&n,  munitions  and  manufacturing  (including  stand- 
ardization) and  industrial  relations. 
Julius  Rosenwald,  supplies  (including  clothing),  etc. 
Dr.  Hollis  Godfrey,  engineering  and  education. 
Samuel  Gompers,  labor  (including  conservation  of  health  and  wel- 

fare  of  workers). 
Dr.  Franklin  Martin,  medicine  and  surgery  (including  general  sani- 
tation). 

Three  of  these  committee  assignments  were  many  months 
afterward  to  merge  in  whole  or  in  part  into  the  War  Indus- 
tries Board;  namely,  that  of  raw  materials,  minerals,  and 
metals,  that  of  munitions,  manufacturing  and  industrial  rela- 
tions, and  that  of  supplies.  Out  of  the  labor  assignment 
came  the  Labor  War  Administration  of  the  Department  of 
Labor;  out  of  transportation  and  communication  came  the 
war  administration  of  railways  under  governmental  control 
and  operation.  In  addition,  out  of  these  or  other  committees 
or  determinations  of  the  Council  grew  the  Food  Administra- 
tion, the  Fuel  Administration,  the  Aircraft  Production  Board, 
and  other  extraordinary  war-time  agencies  of  Government. 

The  next  step  in  the  evolution  of  what  was  to  be  the  War 
Industries  Board  was  taken  when  Commissioner  Baruch 
reported  to  the  joint  meeting  of  the  Council  and  Commission, 
on  March  24th,  a  synopsis  of  the  committees  he  had  deter- 
mined upon  in  his  department,  some  of  the  members  of 
which  were  already  named. 

The  committee  designations  reported  at  that  time  were 
leather,  rubber,  steel,  wool,  nickel,  oil,  zinc,  coal,  and  spruce 
wood.    At  the  same  time  Mr.  Baruch  reported: 


rn 


I 


30    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

As  a  result  of  your  committee's  discussion  with  the  Secretaries 
of  War  and  Navy  and  the  copper  producers,  a  contract  is  about  to 
be  entered  into  between  these  departments  and  the  copper  producers 
for  the  copper  that  they  state  as  their  requirements  at  what  your 
committee  considers  a  very  fair  and  reasonable  price. 

The  committee  is  also  in  the  process  of  negotiations  with  other 
producers  of  raw  materials  which  are  to  be  used  for  the  Govern- 
ment, that  we  believe  will  result  in  most  favorable  terms  to  the 
Government,  such  as  zinc,  lead,  and  steel  products. 

The  committee  has,  at  the  request  of  Secretary  Redfield,  taken  up 
the  matter  of  increased  output  of  cans  and  tin  plate.  The  canning 
and  tin  plate  people  have  given  assurances  of  their  active  cooperation. 


This  report  shows  the  Advisory  Commission  in  practical 
business  contact  with  industry  for  the  first  time.  It  is  note- 
worthy, too,  that  at  the  same  time  Mr.  Baruch's  report  showed 
how  rapidly  his  dealing  with  raw  materials  was  bringing 
him  into  contact  with  all  of  the  elementary  phases  of  indus- 
trial control  for  war  purposes.  Referring  to  transportation 
as  he  had  come  across  it  in  his  work,  he  said,  'This  industry 
is  basic  to  all  others." 

The  report  also  dwelt  on  the  fact  that  "there  are  certain 
raw  materials  which  are  absolutely  necessary  which  are  not 
produced  in  this  country,  and  which  I  think  should  be  kept 
in  sufficient  quantities  by  the  Government  itself.  Among 
these,  it  is  of  prime  importance  that  we  have  a  two  years' 
supply  of  nitrate  of  soda  until  the  artificial  production  of 
nitric  acid  is  proven.  Rubber,  none  of  which  is  produced 
in  the  United  States,  and  for  which  no  substitute  has  yet 
been  found,  is  another." 

As  we  are  about  to  proceed  on  the  evolutionary  tangent 
that  takes  us  away  from  the  Council  of  National  Defense, 
it  will  not  be  out  of  place  to  note  how  hard  the  Advisory 
Commission  strove  to  awaken  the  Government  and  energize 
it  into  thought  and  planning  for  the  impending  conflict,  and 
to  give  some  glimpse  of  the  obstacles  that  it  had  to  contend 
with. 

The  National  Defense  Act  of  1916  was  in  some  respects 
rather  a  national  off^ense.  Purporting  to  be  a  preparedness 
measure,  it  included  the  narrow  provision  that  not  more 
than  half  of  the  officers  of  the  General  Staflf  should  be  in 


THE  COUNCIL  OF  NATIONAL  DEFENSE       31 


Washington  at  one  time.  The  fear  that  officers  might  be 
located  in  Washington  for  personal  and  social  reasons  rather 
than  the  needs  of  the  service  moved  Congress  to  provide  that, 
with  war  menacingly  booming  on  the  horizon,  the  military 
planning  body  could  not  even  mobilize  itself.  This  limita- 
tion of  the  Staff  in  numbers  only  to  officers  and  in  funds  next 
to  nothing  undoubtedly  resulted  in  the  almost  incredible 
circumstance  that  even  six  weeks  before  war  was  declared 
the  army  had  not  even  hypothetical  plans  for  the  organization 
and  equipment  of  a  force  of  any  size.  Not  only  that,  but 
it  did  not  even  have  a  formula  for  undertaking  such  a  task. 
It  actually  remained  for  the  Council  of  National  Defense's 
Advisory  Commission,  a  purely  civilian  body,  to  take  the 
initiative  (February  15,  1917)  in  calculating  what  the 
raising  of  an  army  of  one  million  men  would  involve  in  the 
way  of  material. 

It  appeared  that  it  was  impossible  to  get  the  information 
from  the  army  in  the  desired  detail,  and  so,  at  the  instance 
of  the  Advisory  Commission,  a  retired  officer.  Colonel  J.  F. 
Reynolds  Landis,  made  a  rough  estimate  for  submission  to 
the  General  Staff  for  review  and  revision,  which  was  made 
by  General  Joseph  E.  Kuhn,  then  head  of  the  War  College, 
on  March  15th  —  just  three  weeks  before  war  was  declared. 
The  General  made  this  comment,  which  reflects  at  once  the 
financial  timidity  of  those  holding  the  purse-strings  on  the 
eve  of  war  and  that  officer's  comprehensive  perception  of  the 
incidence  of  modem  warfare: 

It  should  always  be  remembered  that,  although  the  cost  of  the 
original  equipment  for  one  million  men  may  seem  excessive,  in  fact 
nearly  prohibitive,^  it  will  only  represent  a  small  percentage  of 
the  maintenance  cost  in  the  field.  The  important  problem  before 
this  country  will  be  how  to  organize  its  industrial  resources  so  that 
the  supplies  required  can  be  produced  as  rapidly  as  needed  and  in 
the  proper  proportions. 

With  the  astounding  figures  before  it,  and  recalling, 
perhaps,  that  the  Council  proper  had  deferred  action  on 
its  request  of  a  month  earlier,  that  "an  immediate  study 
be   made   of  what,   if  any,   legislation    should   be   passed 

^Italics  are  the  author's. 


I 


I 


32    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

designed  to  empower  the  Government  to  deal  effectively  with 
any  emergency  that  might  arise,"  the  Advisory  Commission 
took  a  bold  stand.  On  March  24th  it  said  to  the  Council: 
"The  Advisory  Commission  feels  that  it  would  be  delinquent 
in  its  duty  to  the  Council  of  National  Defense  if  it  did  not  at 
this  time  bring  to  the  attention  of  the  Council  certain  matters 
which  we  deem  of  great  importance,  together  with  such 
definite  recommendations  in  connection  therewith  as  rep- 
resent the  views  of  the  Commission."  After  voicing  the 
public  misgivings  as  to  what  was  being  done  or  not  done  to 
prepare  for  the  looming  emergency,  the  Advisory  Com- 
mission then  specifically  recommended  the  immediate  raising 
and  equipping  of  an  army  of  at  least  one  million  men  and 
the  bringing  of  the  navy  to  full  war  strength. 

The  feeling  of  the  Commission  that  the  Government  was 
not  awake  to  the  perils  of  the  crisis  was  reflected  in  three 
concluding  paragraphs,  which  seem  to  have  been  an  after- 
thought expressed  in  extenuation  of  the  plain  speaking  of  the 
Commission  to  the  Council,  whose  personnel  so  largely  made 
up  the  executive  administration  of  the  Government. 

The  people  of  the  country,  as  we  see  it,  are  very  deeply  concerned 
over  the  possibilities  that  might  develop  following  the  declaration 
of  a  state  of  war  in  the  United  States.  They  are  looking  to  and 
waiting  for  the  Council  of  National  Defense  to  direct  their  efforts, 
and  to  take  such  other  steps  as  may  be  necessary  to  provide  for  the 
security  of  the  Nation. 

We  feel  very  deeply  impressed  by  the  responsibility  which  rests 
upon  us  in  this  grave  situation,  and  we  feel  that  you  are  entitled 
not  only  to  know  our  general  views,  but  to  have  as  well  our  definite 
recommendations.    We  appreciate  that  we  may  be  misinformed,  or 
more  probably  uninformed,  concerning  the  real  state  of  the  Nation, 
with  reference  to  the  matter  of  preparedness,  and  that  the  fears 
which  we  entertain  and  the  recommendations  which  we  have  made, 
may  not  in  fact  be  justified,  and  nothing  would  give  us  greater 
personal  satisfaction  and  relief  than  to  have  such  assurance  from 
you.    We  feel  also  that  the  public,  which  is  very  deeply  concerned 
in  this  matter,  and  which  so  far  has  been  willing  to  leave  the  ques- 
tion entirely  in  your  hands,  should  also  receive  some  assurance 
either  that  sufficient  and  definite  steps  to  protect  them  against  pos- 
sible contingencies  have  actually  been  taken  or  are  about  to  be 
immediately  inaugurated. 


THE  COUNCIL  OF  NATIONAL  DEFENSE       33 

We  bring  this  matter  before  you  with  the  full  realization  that 
under  the  law  this  Commission  is  certainly  not  definitely  charged 
with  responsibility  in  these  matters.  We  do  not  seek  to  initiate  or 
direct  policies  which  may  have  been  decided  upon  and  worked  out 
by  those  who  by  official  appointment  are  a  part  of  the  Administra- 
tion. We  wish  rather  to  lay  before  you  for  your  information  and 
consideration  our  innermost  thoughts  and  fears  concerning  the  seri- 
ous situation  which  we  believe  confronts  the  country,  because  we 
would  feel  condemned  by  our  own  conscience  and  sense  of  responsi- 
bility if  we  failed  to  do  so. 

The  writer,  who  was  then  secretary  of  the  Council  and 
Advisory  Commission,  recalls  very  vividly  the  tenseness  of 
this  joint  meeting  and  the  impersonal  dignity  and  precision 
with  which  Chairman  Willard  in  behalf  of  the  Advisory 
Commission  presented  these  views  to  the  Council.  It  was 
only  one  of  a  number  of  similar  dramatic  incidents  in  which 
Mr.  Willard  was  the  spokesman. 

Just  how  much  resulted  from  this  initiative  of  the  Advisory 
Commission  is  problematical,  but  it  is  true  that  the  supply 
departments  of  the  army  attacked  the  problem  of  obtaining 
the  funds  that  would  be  required  for  an  army  of  one  million 
men,  after  war  had  been  declared,  in  every-man-f or-himself 
fashion.  There  was  no  guiding  principle  or  controlling 
rule.  The  Quartermaster  figured  one  way,  the  Ordnance 
Bureau  another,  the  Medical  Corps  still  another,  and  so  on. 
Nobody  knew  what  would  be  the  proportions  of  the  diff"erent 
arms,  there  was  no  accepted  factor  of  wastage  and  replace- 
ment. Even  the  numerical  strength  of  companies,  batteries, 
regiments,  and  divisions  was  undetermined.  So  it  was  a 
case  of  each  department  head  figuring  a  guess  to  suit  him- 
self. The  sum  of  the  guesses  totaled  $1,250,000,000;  but 
its  components  were  so  unrelated  to  each  other  that  the  War 
Department  finally  gave  up  in  despair  and  asked  Congress 
to  vote  the  sum  "in  lump,"  which  was  the  right  thing  for 
Congress  to  do,  even  if  the  War  Department  had  had  a  clear 
understanding  of  its  needs.  True  to  its  retail  traditions, 
which  it  took  more  than  the  first  few  weeks  of  the  war  to  over- 
throw, Congress  insisted  on  a  meticulous  division  and 
subdivision  of  appropriations,  with  no  provision  whatever 
for  diversion  of  funds  from  one  bureau  to  another  or  even 


!f 


m 


1 


( 


34    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

from  one  item  to  another.     Weeks  passed  in  haggling  with 
Congress  over  these  matters. 

When  it  was  explained  to  the  chairman  of  the  Senate 
Appropriations  Committee  that  it  was  absolutely  impossible 
for  the  War  Department  to  tell  how  much  money  it  would 
require,  because  "nobody  on  earth  can  make  a  reasonable 
guess  of  what  it  would  cost  to  equip  a  soldier  and  put  him 
on  the  battle-fields  of  France,"  he  exclaimed,  "My  God! 
You  don't  intend  to  send  men  over  there,  do  you?"  A  hazy 
idea  prevailed  that  the  declaration  of  war  was  merely  a 
dramatic  gesture  —  after  which  the  United  States  would  get 
very  busy  supplying  the  Allies  with  war  material  —  at  a 
price. 

With  such  a  start  the  wonder  is,  not  that  there  were  many 
blunders  and  agonizing  delays,  but  that  things  were  done  as 
well  as  they  were  in  the  early  days.  How  much  the  fore- 
thought of  the  Advisory  Commission  of  the  Council  of 
National  Defense,  and  the  thinking,  planning,  and  acting  of 
its  individual  members  and  their  reactions  on  the  Govern- 
ment through  the  Cabinet  members  who  made  up  the  Council, 
on  army  officers,  on  the  Congress,  and  on  uncrystallized 
public  opinion,  contributed  to  definition  of  purposes,  clari- 
fication  of  ways,  and  energetic  effort  to  resolve  the  tangle 
into  straight  lines  will  doubtless  never  be  appreciated. 

By  March  31st  the  Council  and  the  Advisory  Commission 
had  got  to  the  point  where  it  was  obvious  that  the  require- 
ments of  war  would  necessitate  a  comprehensive  programme 
of  control  and  coordination  of  buying  and  manufacturing. 
A  resolution  was  adopted  by  the  Council  on  that  day,  follow- 
ing the  recommendation  of  the  Commission,  providing  that 
the  Secretary  of  War,  as  chairman  of  the  Council  of  National 
Defense, 

shall  appoint  a  Purchasing  Board,  Council  of  National  Defense,  to 
be  composed  of  Army  and  Navy  Department  heads  or  officers 
appointed  by  them  and  representatives  appointed  by  the  Advisory 
Commission,  the  purpose  being  to  coordinate  the  buying  of  the 
several  departments;  assist  in  the  acquirement  of  raw  materials  and 
manufacturing  facilities;  the  establishing  of  precedence  of  orders, 
etc.,  including  the  ordinary  commercial  and  industrial  needs  and 
the  military  requirements  of  the  Nation.     Such  committees  shall 


THE  COUNCIL  OF  NATIONAL  DEFENSE       35 

have  no  authority  at  this  time  to  issue  purchase  orders,  make  con- 
tracts, or  bind  the  Government  in  its  purchases;  all  these  things 
to  be  done,  as  at  present,  by  the  respective  departments.  The 
chairman  of  the  Committee,  however,  shall  have  authority  to  require, 
when  necessary,  that  certain  (conflicting)  purchases  be  not  made 
until  the  same,  with  a  full  statement  of  the  facts,  have  been  sub- 
mitted to  the  Secretary  of  War  or  Navy. 

It  was  further  set  forth  that  the  chairman  of  the  Pur- 
chasing Committee  should  be  designated  by  the  chairman 
of  the  Advisory  Commission;  that  the  army  should  be  rep- 
resented by  the  chiefs  of  Ordnance,  Quartermaster  Depart- 
ment, Engineer  Corps,  Signal  Corps,  Medical  Corps,  and 
General  Staff;  that  the  navy  should  be  represented  by  the 
chiefs  of  Ordnance,  Construction  and  Repairs,  Medicine 
and  Supplies,  Marine  Corps,  Supplies  and  Accounts,  Steam 
and  Engineering,  Yards  and  Docks.  It  was  further  provided 
that  the  Advisory  Commission  should  be  represented  on  the 
proposed  committee  by  appointees  of  Messrs.  Baruch,  Coffin, 
Rosenwald,  and  Martin. 

Mr.  F.  A.  Scott,  a  well-known  manufacturer  of  Cleveland, 
was  subsequently  appointed  chairman  of  this  committee, 
whose  name  was  changed  to  that  of  the  General  Munitions 
Board.  Messrs.  Coffin,  Rosenwald,  and  Martin  were  the 
representatives  of  the  Advisory  Commission,  Mr.  Summers 
representing  Mr.  Baruch  and  the  Raw  Materials  Committee. 
The  General  Munitions  Board  had  been  preceded  by  a 
Munitions  Standards  Board  which  virtually  died  with  the 
birth  of  the  General  Munitions  Board. 

The  new  board  proceeded  to  appoint  a  number  of  sub- 
committees on  army  vehicles,  armored  cars,  emergency  con- 
struction contracts,  optical  glass,  storage  facilities,  machine 
guns,  priority,  and  accountancy. 

The  General  Munitions  Board  endeavored  to  direct  its 
efforts  toward  the  coordinating  of  purchases  by  the  army  and 
navy  and  assisting  in  the  acquisition  of  raw  materials  in 
establishing  the  precedence  of  orders  between  the  army  and 
navy  and  between  the  industrial  needs  of  the  country.  The 
Board's  authority  and  scope  of  action  were  on  the  whole  but 
vaguely  defined.  It  necessarily  dealt  with  raw  materials, 
and   yet   there  was   a  Raw   Materials   Committee   of   the 


M 


Ill 


I 


36    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Advisory  Commission.  Similarly  it  had  to  do  with  require- 
ments of  such  supplies  as  cotton,  woolen  goods,  and  shoes 
and  of  the  numerous  articles  required  by  the  armed  forces 
of  the  country,  yet  the  Advisory  Commission  had,  under  a 
general  Committee  on  Supplies,  of  which  Commissioner 
Rosenwald  was  president,  a  host  of  cooperative  committees 
on  cotton  goods,  woolen  manufactures,  shoe  and  leather 
industries,  knit  goods,  and  canned  goods.  At  this  time,  too. 
Commissioner  Baruch  had  established  sub-committees  on 
alcohol,  aluminum,  asbestos,  magnesium  and  roofing,  brass, 
cement,  chemicals  (nine  sub-committees),  copper,  lead, 
lumber,  mica,  nickel,  steel  and  steel  products  (eleven  sub- 
committees), oil,  rubber,  wool,  and  zinc. 

The  General  Munitions  Board  was  not  a  month  old  before 
the  members  of  the  Advisory  Commission  began  to  see  that 
it  did  not  meet  the  demands  of  the  hour.  Instead  of  pro- 
gressing toward  centralization,  the  Commission  found  that 
too  many  committees  were  being  appointed.  The  Com- 
mission found  itself  constantly  involved  in  talking  about  and 
recommending  things  that  it  jfelt  some  energetic,  resourceful 
executive  body  should  be  doing.  On  June  13th,  Director 
Giflford  suggested  to  the  Council  a  draft  of  a  plan  for 
reorganizing  the  committees,  the  Council  having,  on  June 
8th,  called  a  halt  on  the  multiplication  of  committees.  On 
July  9th,  Chairman  Willard,  of  the  Advisory  Commission, 
urged  on  the  Council  that  something  be  done  to  develop  new 
and  substitute  sources  of  supply,  such  as  toluol,  oil,  and 
nitrates,  to  follow  up  orders  after  placing,  to  distribute  raw 
and  manufactured  materials  in  accordance  with  the  relative 
urgency  of  demand,  to  improve  the  use  of  shipping,  to  deal 
with  the  question  of  prices  on  certain  raw  materials  and 
finished  products,  and  (the  next  day)  to  provide  for  ''central 
authority  and  decisive  information." 

Finally  after  six  weeks  of  consideration,  the  Council 
voted  on  July  8th  to  establish  the  War  Industries  Board. 

In  place  of  the  twenty-two  members  of  the  General 
Munitions  Board,  the  War  Industries  Board  was  made  up  of 
Frank  A.  Scott,  chairman;  Bernard  M.  Baruch,  Com- 
missioner of  Raw  Materials;  Robert  S.  Brookings,  Commis- 
sioner  of   Finished   Products;   Robert   S.   Lovett,   Priority 


•i 


i 


Coftt/right  bp  Underwood  If  Underwood,  X, }'. 
MAJOR-GEN.  GEORGE  W.  GOETHALS 

Member  of  the  War  Industries  Board  represent- 
ing the  Army 

REAR-ADMIRAL  FRANK  F.  FLETCHER  BRIG.-GEN.  PALMER  E.  PIERCE 

Member  of  the  War  Industries  Board  representing        Representing  the  Army  in  the  early  organization 
the  Navy  of  the  War  Industries  Board 


INTENTIONAL  SECOND  EXPOSURE 


f 


36    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Advisory  Commission.  Similarly  it  had  to  do  with  require- 
ments of  such  supplies  as  cotton,  woolen  goods,  and  shoes 
and  of  the  numerous  articles  required  by  the  armed  forces 
of  the  country,  yet  the  Advisory  Commission  had,  under  a 
general  Committee  on  Supplies,  of  which  Commissioner 
Rosenwald  was  president,  a  host  of  cooperative  committees 
on  cotton  goods,  woolen  manufactures,  shoe  and  leather 
industries,  knit  goods,  and  canned  goods.  At  this  time,  too. 
Commissioner  Baruch  had  established  sub-committees  on 
alcohol,  aluminum,  asbestos,  magnesium  and  roofing,  brass, 
cement,  chemicals  (nine  sub-committees),  copper,  lead, 
lumber,  mica,  nickel,  steel  and  steel  products  (eleven  sub- 
committees), oil,  rubber,  wool,  and  zinc. 

The  General  Munitions  Board  was  not  a  month  old  before 
the  members  of  the  Advisory  Commission  began  to  see  that 
it  did  not  meet  the  demands  of  the  hour.  Instead  of  pro- 
gressing toward  centralization,  the  Commission  found  that 
too  many  committees  were  being  appointed.  The  Com- 
mission found  itself  constantly  involved  in  talking  about  and 
recommending  things  that  it  felt  some  energetic,  resourceful 
executive  body  should  be  doing.  On  June  13th,  Director 
Gilford  suggested  to  the  Council  a  draft  of  a  plan  for 
reorganizing  the  committees,  the  Council  having,  on  June 
8th,  called  a  halt  on  the  multiplication  of  committees.  On 
July  9th,  Chairman  Willard,  of  the  Advisory  Commission, 
urged  on  the  Council  that  something  be  done  to  develop  new 
and  substitute  sources  of  supply,  such  as  toluol,  oil,  and 
nitrates,  to  follow  up  orders  after  placing,  to  distribute  raw 
and  manufactured  materials  in  accordance  with  the  relative 
urgency  of  demand,  to  improve  the  use  of  shipping,  to  deal 
with  the  question  of  prices  on  certain  raw  materials  and 
finished  products,  and  (the  next  day)  to  provide  for  '^central 
authority  and  decisive  information," 

Finally  after  six  weeks  of  consideration,  the  Council 
voted  on  July  8th  to  establish  the  War  Industries  Board. 

In  place  of  the  twenty-two  members  of  the  General 
Munitions  Board,  the  War  Industries  Board  was  made  up  of 
Frank  A.  Scott,  chairman;  Bernard  M.  Baruch,  Com- 
missioner of  Raw  Materials;  Robert  S.  Brookings,  Commis- 
sioner of   Finished   Products;   Robert   S.   Lovett,   Priority 


Co/ii/riif/it  bj/  Underwood  If  UndeniooJ,  3'. }'. 
MAJOR-GEN.  GEORGE  W.  GOETHALS 
Member  of  the  War  Industries  Board  represent- 
ing the  Army 

EEAR-ADMmAL  FRANK  F.  FLETCHER  BRIG. -GEN.  PALMER  E.  PIERCE 

Member  of  the  War  Industries  Board  representing        Representing  the  Army  in  the  early  organization 

the  Navy  of  the  War  Industries  Board 


THE  COUNCIL  OF  NATIONAL  DEFENSE       37 


f 
I  < 

f 


<< 


Commissioner;  Hugh  A.  Frayne,  Labor  Commissioner; 
Colonel  Palmer  E.  Pierce,  representing  the  army;  and  Rear 
Admiral  F.  F.  Fletcher,  representing  the  navy. 

The  duties  of  the  new  board  were  officially  defined  as 
follows: 

The  Board  will  act  as  a  clearing-house  for  the  war-industry  needs 
of  the  Government,  determine  the  most  effective  ways  of  meeting 
them,  and  the  best  means  and  methods  of  increasing  production, 
including  the  creation  or  extension  of  industries  demanded  by  the 
emergency,  the  sequence  and  relative  urgency  of  the  needs  of  the 
different  Government  services,  and  consider  price  factors  and,  in 
the  first  instance,  the  industrial  and  labor  aspects  of  problems 
involved  and  the  general  questions  affecting  the  purchase  of  com- 
modities. 

On  this  Board  Mr.  Baruch  will  give  his  attention  particularly  to 
raw  materials,  Mr.  Brookings  to  finished  products,  and  Mr.  Lovett 
to  matters  of  priority.  These  three  members,  in  association  with 
Mr.  Hoover  so  far  as  foodstuffs  are  involved,  will  constitute  a  com- 
mission to  arrange  purchases  in  accordance  with  the  general  policies 
formulated  and  approved. 

The  Council  of  National  Defense  and  the  Advisory  Commission 
will  continue  unchanged  and  will  discharge  the  duties  imposed  upon 
them  by  law.  The  committees  heretofore  created  inmiediately 
subordinate  to  the  Council  of  National  Defense,  namely,  Labor, 
Transportation  and  Communication,  Shipping,  Medicine  and  Sur- 
gery, Women's  Defense  Work,  Cooperation  with  State  Councils, 
Research  and  Inventions,  Engineering  and  Education,  Commercial 
Economy,  Administration  and  Statistics,  and  Inland  Transportation, 
will  continue  their  activities  under  the  direction  and  control  of  the 
Council.  Those  whose  work  is  related  to  the  duties  of  the  War 
Industries  Board  will  cooperate  with  it.  The  sub-committees  advis- 
ing on  particular  industries  and  materials,  both  raw  and  finished, 
heretofore  created,  will  also  continue  in  existence  and  be  available 
to  furnish  assistance  to  the  War  Industries  Board. 

The  purpose  of  this  action  is  to  expedite  the  work  of  the  Gov- 
ernment, to  furnish  needed  assistance  to  the  departments  engaged  in 
making  war  purchases,  to  devolve  clearly  and  definitely  the  impor- 
tant tasks  indicated  upon  direct  representatives  of  the  Government 
not  interested  in  commercial  and  industrial  activities  with  which 
they  will  be  called  upon  to  deal,  and  to  make  clear  that  there  is  a 
total  disassociation  of  the  industrial  committees  from  the  actual 
arrangement  of  purchases  on  behalf  of  the  Government.     It  will 


\  \ 


\\ 


38    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

lodge  responsibility  for  effective  action  as  definitely  as  possible 
under  existing  law.  It  does  not  minimize  or  dispense  with  the 
splendid  service  which  representatives  of  industry  and  labor  have 
so  unselfishly  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  Government. 

The  Council,  then,  through  the  attrition  of  events  was 
proceeding  to  educe  action  from  advice. 


4 


ll 
f 

f 


4 


NOTE 

The  writer,  who  happens  to  be  a  Republican,  wishes  to  make  the 
following  statement  with  regard  to  Secretary  of  War  Baker  and  his 
five  Democratic  Cabinet  associates  forming  the  Council  of  National 
Defense: 

Looking  back  on  the  three  years  in  which  he  served  the  Council, 
he  is  unable  to  recall  a  single  instance  in  which  Mr.  Baker  or  the 
Council  requested  him  to  make  an  appointment  or  take  an  adminis- 
trative action  on  a  personal  or  political  basis.  He  believes  this  to 
be  the  experience  as  well  of  Mr.  Gifford,  who  was  Director  of  the 
Council  during  the  critical  early  period,  when  the  writer  was  its 
secretary.  The  writer  always  felt  as  free  as  air  with  Mr.  Baker  on 
this  score,  after  the  armistice  as  well  as  before. 

During  the  crowded  vital  days  in  which  the  Council's  Advisory 
Commission,  a  majority  of  which  was  composed  of  Republicans, 
was  almost  daily  nominating  to  the  Council  boards  or  committees 
of  industrial  and  scientific  experts  —  was,  in  short,  creating  the 
dollar-a-year  men,  the  greater  portion  of  whom  were  Republicans 
—  there  was  not  an  instance,  so  far  as  the  writer's  memory  serves, 
of  an  appointment  being  swayed  by  the  political  equation.  The 
question  was  not  raised  at  all.  It  was  a  clean  business  throughout 
in  this  respect,  and  a  demonstration  of  non-partisanship  in  a 
crisis  that  the  writer  would  not  have  believed  possible  before  going 
to  Washington.  And  it  is  something  that  in  common  decency  needs 
saying  —  particularly  when  there  is  taken  into  account  the  tremen- 
dous unexpected  task  that  was  thrust  upon  the  Council,  composed 
of  six  work-driven  heads  of  as  many  great  Executive  departments, 
in  the  early  months  of  our  participation  in  the  war. 

To  Secretary  of  War  Baker  undoubtedly  should  go  the  credit  for 
making  possible  this  state  of  affairs,  which  did  honor  to  the 
Government  and  the  country  alike.  The  credit  is  no  less  due  Mr. 
Baker  by  reason  of  the  fact  that  his  attitude  reflected  the  policy  of 


THE  COUNCIL  OF  NATIONAL  DEFENSE       39 

the  President  with  respect  to  enlisting  the  best  industrial  and 
scientific  brains  of  the  country  regardless  of  party  affiliation. 

Republicans  comprised  easily  seven  eighths  of  the  personnel  of 
the  working  executives  of  both  the  Council  of  National  Defense  and 
the  War  Industries  Board  and  their  subordinate  bodies.  The 
writer's  immediate  office  staff  and  that  of  his  predecessor  was  made 
up  exclusively  of  Republicans,  not  because  any  one  ever  inquired 
as  to  the  politics  of  an  appointee,  but  because  it  happened  to  be  so. 

So  far  as  the  writer's  knowledge  is  concerned,  and  he  was 
reasonably  in  a  position  to  know,  politics  simply  did  not  enter  into 
the  make-up  of  the  American  industrial  war  machine. 

Impartial  analysis  of  the  personnel  structure  of  other  vital  emer- 
gency war  bodies  will  tend  to  further  interesting  reflection  in  this 
field.  All  of  which  is  something  for  those  to  ponder  who  attacked 
Mr.  Wilson's  administration  for  not  establishing  a  coalition  war 
government.^ 

*See  page  189. 


CHAPTER  III 


i 


f 


i 


THE  WAR  INDUSTRIES  BOARD  EMERGES 

The  objective  in  sight  —  Synchronizing  the  civilian  dollar-a-year  man  with  the 
military  — The  machine  lags  — The  bitter  price  of  unpreparedness  —  The 
President  acts  — Enter  Baruch  —  Review  of  the  drifting  period  — Baker  and 
Baruch- The  new  dispensation  —  Industry  now  stripped  for  war. 

The  creation  of  the  War  Industries  Board  marked  a  great 
step  forward.  Coordination,  the  long-sought,  was  not  yet 
overtaken,  but  it  was  in  sight.  It  was  now  perceived  that 
civilians  must  assume  control  of  the  general  direction  of 
industry.  It  was  no  longer  a  matter  of  advising  about 
immediate  munitions  and  helping  the  army  and  navy  in 
buying.  It  was  now  a  matter  of  deciding  on  the  manipu- 
lation of  the  whole  of  the  resources  of  the  Nation.  The 
objective  had  definitely  emerged. 

The  new  board  replaced  the  General  Munitions  Board  and 
the  Munitions  Standards  Board,  whose  very  designations, 
as  contrasted  with  that  of  the  new  board,  showed  how  com- 
pletely new  a  dispensation  it  was  to  be.  It  logically  took 
over  the  numerous  raw  material  and  supply  committees, 
heretofore  in  separate  compartments  under  Commissioners 
Baruch  and  Rosenwald,  respectively,  which  were  really  the 
larger  of  the  affluent  sources  united  in  the  new  board. 

The  concept  of  the  functions  of  a  civilian  agency 
cooperating  with  the  army  and  navy  for  the  control  and 
direction  of  industry  to  war  needs  and  purposes  was  now 
well  defined  and  the  agency  for  bringing  it  about  somewhat 
compacted.  Most  of  the  functions  of  the  Advisory  Com- 
mission  that  related  to  materials  and  goods  had  been  brought 
together  under  one  head,  but  there  was  lacking  a  sufficient 
degree  of  either  legislative  or  executive  authority,  and  the 
organization  was  anomalous  in  that  the  chairman  was  not  a 
member  of  the  Advisory  Commission  and  yet  had  such 
members  serving  under  him. 

The  stage  of  intelligent  understanding  had  been  reached, 
but  the  technique  of  executive  direction  remained  to  be 


THE  WAR  INDUSTRIES  BOARD  EMERGES      41 


perfected  and  the  Board  was  not  accorded,  in  the  view  of 
the  army  and  navy  and  other  war  instrumentalities,  so  high 
an  estimate  of  its  own  importance  as  it  rightly  held  of  itself. 
Theoretically,  coordination  of  requirements  and  purchases 
had  been  effected.  Often,  even  generally,  this  was  true,  but 
the  supply  departments  of  the  army  and  navy  largely  looked 
upon  the  War  Industries  Board  as  a  sometimes  helpful  but 
usually  meddlesome  agency.  They  valued  it  highly  as  a 
source  of  information,  esteemed  its  advice  when  they  sought 
it;  but  felt  no  imperative  necessity  of  yielding  to  it  as  the 
central  clearing-house  of  the  business  activities  of  war. 

It  took  time  for  professional  military  men,  even  for  the 
amateurs  but  lately  commissioned,  to  concede  that  even  in 
modern  war  there  is  a  province  for  the  man  from  civil  life 
in  which  he  must  be  superior  to  the  man  in  uniform.  The 
age-old  tradition  of  war  as  a  water-tight  compartment  in 
national  life,  instead  of  being  that  life  itself,  was  hard  to 
shake  off.  The  time  for  fighting  had  come  —  the  moment 
for  which  officers  had  spent  years  of  preparation.  War  had 
the  stage,  and  the  fighting  man,  after  years  of  obscurity  and 
humility,  had  the  spotlight  and  wanted  to  run  the  whole 
machine.  Volunteer  helpers  in  civilian  clothes  at  dollar- 
a-year  pay  were  apt  to  appear  as  interlopers  desirous  of 
holding  the  stage  in  war  as  well  as  in  peace. 

If  the  subsequent  practice  had  been  equal  to  the  spirit  of 
the  first  meeting,  the  War  Industries  Board  would  have  got 
into  full  function  eight  months  before  it  did.  Secretary 
Baker  was  there  and  stated  that  he  and  the  Secretary  of 
the  Navy  would  accept  all  recommendations  made  by  the 
Board.  He  also  declared  that,  if  necessary  to  support  the 
War  Industries  Board  in  respect  of  its  decisions  regarding 
the  requirements  of  the  Allies,  he  would  use  the  com- 
mandeering power  to  seize  and  pay  for  goods  and  would 
then  sell  them  to  the  Allies  at  cost.  Yet  the  army  went  on 
independently  with  the  huge  Du  Pont  contract,  the  immense 
storage  and  embarkation  base  at  South  Brooklyn,  and  scores 
of  other  projects  that  were  bound  to  react  disturbingly  on 
the  whole  industrial  balance.  Its  officers  often  ignored  or 
were  contemptuous  of  the  Board,  reckless  commandeering 
flourished,  and  the  navy  in  placid  serenity  pursued  its  own 


I 


'  *} 


42    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


way.  This  is  set  down,  not  in  censure,  but  in  emphasis  of 
the  fact  that,  though  there  was  much  crying  of  cooperation, 
there  was  a  dearth  of  practice.  Perhaps  in  despair  of  the 
Board's  lack  of  vigor,  Mr.  Baker  found  his  promise  invalid, 
surrendered  to  the  steam  roller  of  the  army's  eager  will  to 
dominate,  and  thus  came  to  seek  a  way  out  in  that  plan  of 
military  replacement  of  the  War  Industries  Board  by  an 
organization  within  the  army  with  which  Mr.  E.  R.  Stettinius 
was  connected. 

Under  such  circumstances  no  amount  of  organization  of 
the  committee  and  board  projections,  under  whatever 
impressive  names  —  such  as  War  Industries  Board  and 
Aircraft  Production  Board  —  proceeding  from  a  body 
organically  labeled  as  purely  advisory,  could  begin  to  effect 
in  attainment  the  perfection  of  its  paper  scheme.  The  only 
ways  out  of  this  situation  were  those  of  legislation,  evolution, 
or  devolution.  Chairman  Scott  broke  down  under  the 
multitude  of  cares  and  strains  of  the  infinitely  detailed  work 
resulting  partly  from  a  lack  of  unassailable  authority  on 
which  a  smoothly  functioning  executive  could  be  built  up. 

At  this  time  the  Council  and  all  its  brood  were  under 
something  of  a  cloud  of  public  obloquy  and  eclipse  of 
prestige  resulting  from  the  basically  sound  but  hysterically 
overemphasized  criticism  of  the  fusion  (eliminated  when  the 
War  Industries  Board  was  formed)  of  active  business  with 
membership  of  committees  having  to  do  with  advice  relating 
to  purchases.  The  dual  relation,  the  result  of  a  hasty  short 
cut,  was  undoubtedly  wrong  in  principle,  but  it  is  a  tribute 
to  human  nature  at  its  best  that  there  was  in  fact  so  little,  if 
any,  abuse  of  it.^ 

The  American  press  is  as  mercurial  and  as  given  to 
emotional  outburst  as  are  the  people  themselves.  It  arrives 
at  its  final  judgments  only  after  voicing  the  most  conflicting 
opinions,  but  the  "revelations"  of  the  period,  and  the  skepti- 
cism of  the  public  as  to  the  integrity  of  any  man  placed  in  a 
position  of  buyer  and  seller  in  one,  resulted  in  a  great 
reaction  of  opinion  concerning  the  Council  and  its  subsidiary 
bodies.     It  had  been  the  spoiled  child  of  popular  favor,  and 

^The  Raw  Materials  Division  avoided  this  rock.  The  chairman  and  his 
assistants  were  always  representing  the  Crovemment,  and  the  committees  the 
industries. 


II* 


THE  WAR  INDUSTRIES  BOARD  EMERGES      43 

it  now  was  sent  into  Coventry.  Its  moral  authority  on  its 
industrial  side,  as  opposed  to  its  work  as  the  unifier  of  the 
national  thought  and  will  to  victory,  was  impaired.  The 
general  public  feeling  at  this  time  was  that  the  American  war 
eff'ort  was  fumbling  both  militarily  and  industrially.  There 
was  much  talk  of  a  coalition  government,  and  the  idea  of  a 
Munitions  Department  was  in  high  favor.  Thus  there  came 
a  period  of  doldrums.  The  men  in  the  Council's  organiza- 
tion worked  no  less  hard  than  before  and  made  much 
progress  in  efficiency,  but  the  impetus  to  rapid  evolution  was 
distinctly  checked. 

Daniel  Willard,  president  of  the  Baltimore  &  Ohio 
Railway,  a  noted  and  forceful  executive  and  chairman  of  the 
Advisory  Commission,  succeeded  Mr.  Scott  in  the  midst  of 
this  period  of  uncertainty  and  eventually  resigned  because 
he  felt  that  he  could  do  more  as  an  active  and  powerful 
railway  president  than  he  could  as  head  of  an  organization 
that  had  such  great  authority  to  advise  and  so  little  to  act. 
Individual  functions  of  the  Board  continued  to  perform 
services  of  the  highest  value,  but  there  was  lacking  coordina- 
tion within  what  was  supposed  to  be  the  great  coordinator. 
In  plain  truth  the  War  Industries  Board  was  not  meeting  the 
demands  of  the  hour.  Its  members  knew  what  should  be 
Its  function,  but  the  power  of  authority  and  action  was 
lacking. 

So,  it  must  be  conceded  that  in  the  latter  part  of  1917  and 
first  part  of  1918,  the  evolution  of  the  basic  war  control 
halted  and  stumbled.  There  was  even  a  period,  following 
Mr.  Willard's  resignation,  when  there  was  no  chairman. 
It  was  at  this  time  that  the  so-called  War  Council  was  created 
by  the  Council  of  National  Defense.  It  was  a  weekly  con- 
ference of  the  Council,  the  director  thereof,  the  Secretary  of 
the  Treasury,  the  chairman  of  the  Shipping  Board,  the  Food 
Admmistrator,  the  Fuel  Administrator,  and  the  chairman 
ot  the  War  Industries  Board.  Some  progress  resulted  from 
these  conferences,  but  the  tendency  of  the  time  was  too  much 
toward  the  seeking  of  coordination  through  vocal  confer- 
ences. What  was  needed  was  an  autocrat  over  all  suddIv 
matters.  ^^  ^ 

The  conferences  were  almost  always  harmonious  and  full 


Ill  t 


(.  I 


i'  i 


44    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

of  assurances  of  coordination.  The  executive  spirit  was 
willing,  but  somehow  the  effecting  flesh  did  not  respond. 
There  was  need  of  a  powerful  personality  who  would  assume 
power  and  responsibility,  who  would  decide  and  stand  by 
his  decisions  and  wrench  his  power  from  necessity.  It  may 
be  that  it  required  time  and  disappointing  experience  to 
bring  the  War  Industries  Board  to  the  climax  of  its  poten- 
tialities, but,  in  view  of  the  simplicity  of  the  organization  that 
finally  accomplished  the  end,  and  the  fact  that  it  never  had 
more  statutory  power  at  the  last  than  at  the  first,  it  is  the 
matured  judgment  of  the  writer,  who  lived  at  close  quarters 
with  the  events  of  this  period,  as  well  as  with  those  of  the 
preceding  and  successive  phases,  that  the  evolutionary 
process  could  have  been  compressed  greatly. 

The  fact  is  that  in  the  formative  months  of  the  Board,  the 
true  principle  of  executive  success  was  not  applied  —  the 
principle  of  centralization  of  responsibility  and  decentraliza- 
tion of  authority.  Mr.  Scott's  tendency  was  to  centralize 
both,  and  Mr.  Willard  was  disgusted  with  the  lack  of  specific 
authority.  All  along  the  line  everybody  was  either  waiting, 
or  needed,  to  be  told  what  to  do  by  some  one  who  could  make 
it  "stick."  We  are  forced  to  the  conclusion,  then,  that 
development  of  the  War  Industries  Board  halted  for  lack 
of  the  right  man  at  the  head.^ 

This  involves  no  depreciation  of  Mr.  Scott  or  Mr.  Willard 
as  executives.  The  situation  not  only  demanded  a  great 
executive,  but,  more,  it  required  one  whose  environment  in 
life  was  such  that  he  would  be  under  no  compulsion  of  men, 
traditions,  contacts,  or  things.  It  called  for  a  man  whose 
environment  had  made  him  so  independent  that  he  could,  in 
the  words  of  the  late  Paul  Morton,  "look  any  man  in  the  eye 
and  tell  him  to  go  to  hell,"  if  need  be.  Such  a  man  could 
have  done  in  the  middle  of  1917  what  was  done  in  the  spring 
of  1918.  On  the  other  hand,  it  must  be  remembered  that 
each  passing  month  of  failure  to  arrive  at  the  much-talked- 

^t  is  known  that  the  President  himself,  throughout  this  terrible  drifting 
period  that  depressed  all  of  us,  was  seeking  for  what  he  called  a  "superman" 
to  head  the  War  Industries  Board.  The  position  was  oflFered  to  Homer  Fergu- 
son,  then  president  of  the  Newport  News  Shipbuilding  Company,  and  later 
head  of  the  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  the  United  States;  and  to  John  D.  Ryan, 
later  in  charge  of  aircraft  production.  Both  declined,  doubtless  because  of  the 
inhibitions  surrounding  the  post. 


THE  WAR  INDUSTRIES  BOARD  EMERGES      45 

of  coordination  in  a  sense  made  the  job  easier  for  the  right 
man.  The  functions  of  the  Board  were  developing  all  the 
while,  and  there  was  much  that  was  possible  of  accomplish- 
ment in  the  then  mood  of  industry  and  the  war  agencies  that 
did  not  need  to  be  backed  by  a  central  will. 

The  functional  instrumentalities  of  the  Board  developed 
rapidly  after  the  formation  of  the  War  Industries  Board  in 
August,  1917.  The  principle  of  priorities  was  well  estab- 
lished, as  also  its  administration.  Conservation  was  in  full 
swing.  Clearance,  on  paper  at  least,  was  working  smoothly. 
The  vital  Inter-Allied  Purchasing  Commission  had  been 
firmly  established.  Price-fixing  was  making  a  good  start. 
The  appraisement  of  resources  was  steadily  going  on  and 
headway  was  being  made  in  the  massing  and  systematization 
of  requirements.  The  labor  division  was  functioning  effec- 
tively. The  commodity  sections  were  busily  at  work,  as  far 
as  they  had  been  created.  While  the  machine  as  a  whole 
was  not  yet  filling  the  void  in  the  great  structure  of  industrial 
unification  in  support  of  the  army  and  navy  and  the  main- 
tenance of  the  national  industrial  fabric,  it  was  already 
taking  much  the  final  form  in  which  it  was  later  welded  so 
successfully.  Time  was  lost  in  the  gradual  growth,  but  at 
the  same  time  each  functional  activity,  as  a  result  of  the 
gradual  process,  met  with  little  opposition  when  proposed. 
The  machine  was  one  that  was  developed  rather  than  pro- 
jected. It  was  the  child  of  experience  and  of  obvious 
necessity,  and  not  the  product  of  theory.  Each  part  worked 
when  introduced  because  it  was  manifestly  needed. 

By  this  time  there  was  a  well-crystallized  conception  of 
the  objectives  of  the  War  Industries  Board's  work.  How- 
ever defective  the  attainment  of  them  remained  until  the 
spring  of  1918,  they  continued  to  be  the  established  goals. 
Briefly  stated,  the  functions  of  the  Board  were  (1)  to 
allocate  commodities  of  which  there  was  or  was  likely  to  be 
a  deficit,  to  encourage  their  increased  production  and  effect 
their  orderly  flow  "into  channels  most  conducive  to  the 
purposes  of  the  war,"  which  necessitated  "priority"  and 
price-fixing;  (2)  to  analyze,  bring  together,  measure,  alter, 
and  restrain  the  demands  of  the  Government,  of  the  Allies 
and  of  the  public;  (3)  to  ascertain  to  what  extent  and  in 


< 


46    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

what  manner  the  supplies  could  meet  the  requirements;  and 
to  take  the  action  thereby  indicated. 

The  essential  nature  of  the  War  Industries  Board  was 
lucidly  stated  in  an  address'  by  Mr.  Baruch  before  the  War 
College  in  Washington,  when  he  said: 

The  War  Industries  Board  was  a  method  of  control  devised  by 
the  President  to   equalize   the   strain   placed   upon   the  American 
mdustnal  structure  by  the  war.     It  endeavored  to  stimulate  and 
expand  production  of  those  materials  essential   to  the  war  pro- 
gramme, and  at  die  same  time  to  depress  and  curtail  production  of 
those  things  not  of  a  necessitous  nature.     This  was  done  by  regu- 
lation in  consonance  with  other  executive  branches  of  the  basic 
economic  elements:    (a)    facilities,    (b)    materials,    (c)    fuel,    (d) 
transportation,  (e)  labor,  (f)  capital.    The  method  of  control  was 
through  a  preference  list  upon  which  were  placed  those  industries 
whose  output  was  essential  to  the  war's  progress.     The  priority 
indicated  by  the  preference  list  was  the  master  key  to  the  six 
elements  named. 

It  should  be  said  that,  although  it  was  the  exchange  of  the 
Government  agencies  involved  in  the  prosecution  of  the  war 
—  the  universal  meeting-place  of  requirements,   resources 
and  facilities,  maker  of  prices,  moulder  of  contracts,  accel- 
erator and  brake  of  industry  — it  was  not  a  purchasing 
agency  m  the  strict  sense.     Except  for  its  own  expenses  it 
never  spent  a  cent  of  Government  money.     It  made  agree- 
ments  with  the  trades,  but  it  did  not  sign  contracts.     Actual 
purchases,  contracts,  and  all  the  details  of  business  trans- 
actions were  attended  to  by  the  proper  agencies  within  the 
departments  that  were  statutorily  charged  with  purchasing 
functions.     In  a  broad  sense  it  was  certainly  a  comptroller 
of  purchases,  but  it  did  not  make  them.     This  lack  of  actual 
purchasing  power  was  sometimes  a  very  serious  handicap, 
but  it  was  offset  by  a  detachment  from  an  infinitude  of 
details  and  personal  contacts  that  made  for  added  power  in 
dealing  with  the  fundamentals  of  Government  relations  to 
industry. 

The  functional  divisions  of  the  Board's  work  and  the  solid 
base  of  the  commodity  sections  on  and  through  which  the 
functions  were  largely  exercised  will  be  considered  as  to 

^March  12,  1921. 


THE  WAR  INDUSTRIES  BOARD  EMERGES      47 

both  origin  and  composition  and  nature  at  a  later  time.  In 
recording  the  achievements  of  the  War  Industries  Board,  how- 
ever, no  special  effort  will  be  made  to  distinguish  between 
the  war  industrial  measures  taken  directly  under  the  Council 
of  National  Defense,  under  the  General  Munitions  Board, 
under  the  first  phase  of  the  War  Industries  Board,  or  under 
its  second  and  final  phase.  From  the  beginnings  of  the 
Council  the  functions  of  the  War  Industries  Board  were 
exercised.  In  essence  the  Board  or  what  it  stood  for  was 
born  with  the  Council. 

As  the  long-heralded  German  drive  of  the  spring  of  1918 
came  nearer,  it  was  more  and  more  borne  in  on  the  men  in 
the  Council  and  in  the  War  Industries  Board,  and  among 
all  who  were  in  touch  with  the  progress  of  the  war  effort, 
that  America  must  speed  up  and  tighten  up  its  war  machine. 
It  was  evident  that  the  country  was  not  yet  in  effective  fight- 
ing trim  —  that  its  vast  strength  was  not  yet  being  applied; 
that  it  was  still  entangled  in  the  coils  of  disordered  efforts; 
that  the  army,  engaged  in  the  stupendous  task  of  organizing 
the  personnel  of  the  actual  fighting  forces,  which  time  and 
again  were  expanded  beyond  the  early  estimates,  was  not 
able  to  rise  above  its  immediate  absorptions  far  enough  to 
gain  a  comprehensive  view  of  the  industrial  incidence  and 
indispensable  corollaries  of  its  own  plans  and  necessities. 
This,  of  course,  was  the  inevitable  result  of  the  blind  policy 
of  unpreparedness  which  has  dominated  the  Nation  from 
time  immemorial. 

Considering  the  circumstances,  it  is  amazing  that  the  army 
so  smoothly  and  so  vastly  expanded  from  a  handful  of  men 
to  trained  millions  in  arms.  To  meet  the  concomitant  indus- 
trial expansion  and  conversion  it  was  indispensable  that  men 
who  understood  commerce  and  production  as  the  military 
chiefs  understood  their  peculiar  field  must  find  a  way  to 
dominate  the  army  in  relation  to  those  bases  of  army  strength 
which  were  to  be  found  primarily  in  civilian  management. 
It  was  evident  that  no  mere  advisory  body  could  withstand 
the  initiative  of  the  compact  authoritative  army  organization, 
burning  with  zeal  and  sparkling  with  energy  in  its  rush  to 
perfect  and  expand  itself,  without  due  regard  to  an  impair- 
ment of  the  sources  of  ultimate  supply  and  power  that  was 


I 


I 


4a    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

certain  to  follow.  The  army  did  not  adequately  comprehend 
the  greater  strategy  of  modern  war,  the  industrial  strategy, 
with  its  colossal  scale,  which  involves  the  maneuvering  and 
directing  of  all  the  forces  and  resources  of  the  Nation ;  which 
is  a  matter  of  factories  and  mines  and  labor,  of  coal  and 
wheat  and  steel,  of  transportation  and  civil  morale  as  much 
as  of  regiments,  divisions,  corps,  and  armies. 

The  time  had  come  when  there  must  be  created  a  power 
that  would  be  able  to  harness  the  purely  military  organiza- 
tion and  the  war  industrial  forces  into  an  harmonious  team. 
Either  the  War  Industries  Board  must  rise  to  this  eminence 
or  there  must  be  an  entire  reconstruction  of  the  central 
control.  The  former  course  was  decided  upon  by  the  Pres- 
ident, probably  because  it  was  merely  a  step  forward  with  an 
existing  mechanism  which  could  be  taken  without  upset  of 
what  was  being  done  well  and  without  resort  to  Congress  for 
new  legislation.  It  required  only  an  Executive  order  that 
would  impart  to  the  War  Industries  Board  such  share  of  the 
well-nigh  universal  war  powers  of  the  President  as  com- 
mander-in-chief of  the  army  and  navy,  as  would  make  it 
supreme  in  the  contacts  of  military  and  industrial  depart- 
ments of  the  armed  Nation. 

So,,  it  came  about  that  on  March  4,  1918,  the  President 
issued  the  Executive  order  which  endowed  the  War  Industries 
Board  with  authority  proceeding  directly  from  the  supreme 
source  of  the  executive  power.  The  war  was  henceforth  to 
be  conducted,  not  only  by  the  army  and  the  navy,  but  by  them 
with  the  War  Industries  Board,  and  in  its  field  the  last  was 
to  be  supreme.  While  the  Board  was  thus  brought  into  a 
position  of  unquestionable  potency  in  relation  to  the  army 
and  navy,  it  would  have  required  legislation  to  strengthen 
its  original  power  over  industry.  It  had,  however,  such  a 
grip  on  industry  by  reason  of  its  now  more  intimate  cohesion 
with  the  Executive  and  military  establishments  and  its  free- 
dom of  resort  to  the  powers  invested  in  them  by  reason  of 
various  acts,  which  will  be  reviewed  later,  as  well  as  with 
the  transcendent  war  powers  of  the  President,  that  legislation 
was  neither  necessary  nor  advisable. 

The  President's  letter  of  March  4,  1918,  did  not  work  any 
fundamental  change  in  the  evolved  structure  of  the  War 


THE  WAR  INDUSTRIES  BOARD  EMERGES      49 

Industries  Board. ^  It  simply  appointed  a  new  chairman  of 
the  Board  and  gave  him  the  prestige  and  substance  of  direct 
Presidential  authority  that  made  him  independent  of  the 
military  arms.  The  machinery  remained  much  the  same, 
but  it  was  henceforth  dominated  by  civilians,  was  now  suf- 
fused with  power,  and  was  happily  placed  in  the  control  of  a 
man  peculiarly  fitted  for  the  task,  Bernard  M.  Baruch.  It 
should  not  be  overlooked  that  the  Executive  order  did 
remarkably  tend  to  unify  and  coordinate  the  Board  itself. 
With  the  exception  of  the  price-fixing  function,  the  whole 
authority  of  the  Board  was  centralized  in  the  new  chairman, 
which  gave  him  an  advantage  that  neither  of  his  predecessors 


*The  text  of  the  letter  is  as  follows: 


The  White  House 
Washington,  March  4,  1918 


My  dear  Mr.  Baruch:  I  am  writing  to  ask  if  you  will  not  accept  appointment 
as  Chainnan  of  the  War  Industries  Board,  and  I  am  going  to  take  the  liberty 
at  the  same  time  of  outlining  the  functions,  the  constitution  and  action  of  the 
Board  as  I  think  they  should  now  be  established. 
The  functions  of  the  Board  should  be: 

(1)  The  creation  of  new  facilities  and  the  disclosing,  if  necessary,  the 
opening  up  of  new  or  additional  sources  of  supply; 

(2)  The  conversion  of  existing  facilities,  where  necessary,  to  new  uses; 

(3)  The  studious  conservation  of  resources  and  facilities  by  scientific, 
commercial,  and  industrial  economies; 

(4)  Advice  to  the  several  purchasing  agencies  of  the  Government  with 
regard  to  the  prices  to  be  paid; 

(5)  The  determination,  wherever  necessary,  of  priorities  of  production  and 
of  delivery  and  of  the  proportions  of  any  given  article  to  be  made 
immediately  accessible  to  the  several  purchasing  agencies  when  the 
supply  of  that  article  is  insufficient,  either  temporarily  or  permanently; 

(6)  The  making  of  purchases  for  the  Allies. 

The  Board  should  be  constituted  as  at  present  and  should  retain,  so  far  as 
necessary  and  so  far  as  consistent  with  the  character  and  purposes  of  the 
reorganization,  its  present  advisory  agencies;  but  the  ultimate  decision  of  all 
questions,  except  the  determination  of  prices,  should  rest  always  with  the 
Chairman,  the  other  members  acting  in  a  cooperative  and  advisory  capacity. 
The  further  organization  of  advice  I  will  indicate  below. 

In  the  determination  of  priorities  of  production,  when  it  is  not  possible  to 
have  the  full  supply  of  any  article  that  is  needed  produced  at  once,  the  Chair- 
man should  be  assisted,  and,  so  far  as  practicable,  guided,  by  the  present 
priorities  organization  or  its  equivalent. 

In  the  determination  of  priorities  of  delivery,  when  they  must  be  determined, 
he  should  be  assisted,  when  necessary,  in  addition  to  the  present  advisory 
priorities  organization,  by  the  advice  and  cooperation  of  a  committee  consti- 
tuted for  the  purpose  and  consisting  of  official  representatives  of  the  Food 
Administration,  the  Fuel  Administration,  the  Railway  Administration,  the  Ship- 
ping Board,  and  the  War  Trade  Board,  in  order  that,  when  a  priority  of  delivery 
has  been  determined,  there  may  be  common,  consistent,  and  concerted  action 
to  carry  it  into  effect. 

In  the  determination  of  prices  the  Chairman  should  be  governed  by  the 
advice  of  a  committee  consisting,  besides  himself,  of  the  members  of  the  Board 


I 


II 


,1 


/{ 


I 


50    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

had.  The  Board  as  a  whole  and  its  subsidiary  bodies 
remained,  but  the  sole  right  of  decision  was  placed  in  the 
hands  of  the  chairman.  Authority  and  responsibility  were 
centered  in  one  man,  to  do  with  them  as  he  pleased.  He 
wisely  chose  to  delegate  the  authority  and  retain  the  responsi- 
bility. To  each  of  his  boards  he  transmitted  all  of  the  power 
in  that  particular  direction  that  the  President  had  conveyed 
to  him  and  at  the  same  time  he  imdertook  to  shoulder  all 
responsibility. 

The  exception  of  price-fixing  from  direct  control  by  the 
chairman  of  the  Board,  while  a  seeming  violation  of  the 
long-awaited  application  of  the  principle  of  the  centraliza- 
tion of  power  and  responsibility,  was  really  a  lubricant  for 

immediately  charged  with  the  study  of  raw  materials  and  of  manufactured 
products,  of  the  labor  member  of  the  board,  of  the  Chairman  of  the  Federal 
Trade  Commission,  the  Chairman  of  the  Tariff  Commission,  and  the  Fuel 
Administrator. 

The  Chairman  should  be  constantly  and  systematically  mformed  of  all 
contracts,  purchases,  and  deliveries,  in  order  that  he  may  have  always  before 
him  a  schematized  analysis  of  the  progress  of  business  in  the  several  supply 
divisions  of  the  Government  in  all  departments. 

The  duties  of  the  Chairman  are: 

(1)  To  act  for  the  joint  and  several  benefit  of  all  the  supply  departments 
of  the  Government. 

(2)  To  let  alone  what  is  being  successfully  done  and  interfere  as  little  as 
possible  with  the  present  normal  processes  of  purchase  and  delivery 
in  the  several  departments. 

(3)  To  guide  and  assist  wherever  the  need  for  guidance  or  assistance  inay 
be  revealed;  for  example,  in  the  allocation  of  contracts,  in  obtaining 
access  to  materials  in  any  way  preempted,  or  in  the  disclosure  of 
sources  of  supply. 

(4)  To  determine  what  is  to  be  done  when  there  is  any  competitive  or 
other  conflict  of  interest  between  departments  in  the  matter  of  sup- 
plies; for  example,  when  there  is  not  a  sufficient  immediate  supply 
for  all  and  there  must  be  a  decision  as  to  priority  of  need  or  delivery, 
or  when  there  is  competition  for  the  same  source  of  manufacture  or 
supply,  or  when  contracts  have  not  been  placed  in  such  a  way  as  to 
get  advantage  of  the  full  productive  capacity  of  the  country. 

(5)  To  see  that  contracts  and  deliveries  are  followed  up  where  such 
assistance  as  is  indicated  under  (3)  and  (4)  above  has  proved  to  be 
necessary. 

(6)  To  anticipate  the  prospective  needs  of  the  several  supply  departments 
of  the  Government  and  their  feasible  adjustment  to  the  industry  of 
the  country  as  far  in  advance  as  possible,  in  order  that  as  definite  an 
outlook  and  opportunity  for  planning  as  possible  may  be  afforded  the 
business  men  of  the  country. 

In  brief,  he  should  act  as  the  general  eye  of  all  supply  departments  in  the 
field  of  industry. 

Cordially  and  sincerely  yours 

WooDROW  Wilson 
Mr.  Bernard  M.  Baruch, 
Washington,  D.C. 


I » 


THE  WAR  INDUSTRIES  BOARD  EMERGES      51 

the  whole  organism.  Price-fixing  was  a  ticklish  business  and 
miffht  easily  cause  more  misapprehension  and  arouse  more 
public  censure  of  the  Board  than  anything  else  it  could  do. 
If  prices  were  thought  too  liberal  by  the  general  public,  the 
Board  —  if  it  had  had  the  ultimate  responsibility  for  hxing 
them  — would  have  been  accused  of  being  the  tool  of  the 
"interests,"  which  was  a  calumny  that  was  always  lurking  in 
the  background  and  frequently  voiced.  If  considered  too 
close  by  the  manufacturing  public,  the  opposite  charge  ot 
persecution  of  business  would  have  been  hurled  at  it.  by 
having  the  prices  suggested  by  a  committee  that  was  in  the 
Board,  but  was  appointed  directly  by  the  President,  who 
passed  personally  on  its  decisions,  the  responsibility  was 
placed  on  a  too  lofty  eminence  for  successful  assault  by 
scandalmongers  or  profiteers.  ,    ,    j     •  i 

The  War  Industries  Board  was  now  an  entity,  clothed  with 
ample  authority  and  commanded  by  a  seasoned  captain,  who 
had  had  fifteen  months  of  arduous  experience  in  the  difficult 
art  of  making  "requests"  as  effective  as  orders.  He  had  been 
through  the  mill.  He  had  helped  build  the  machine  in  every 
part  from  the  earliest  days  and  the  general  plan  had  been 
originated  by  him.  He  now  proceeded  to  perfect  and  extend 
the  machine,  change  and  add  to  personnel  to  make  it  conform 
to  the  organic  conception  of  expert  civilian  intermediation 
between  the  war-making  and  war  supply. 

It  would  be  pleasing  to  say  that  the  evolutionary  process, 
though  tedious,  was  a  steadily  progressive  one,  but  the  dismal 
truth  is  that  it  was  intermittent,  with  a  long  period  that  came 
near  to  devolution  and  dissolution.  The  defect  of  the  War 
Industries  Board,  as  at  first  created,  was  that  it  was  a  com- 
mittee. Committees  are  good  for  counsel,  but  poor  for 
action,  and  especially  so  when  their  authority  is  nebulous, 
and  for  lack  of  leadership  they  do  not  stretch  it  and 
strengthen  it  by  use.  So,  all  through  the  fall  of  1917  and 
winter  of  1918  we  find  the  War  Industries  Board  talking 
much  and  postponing  or  refusing  decision. 

"There  is  a  tendency  to  too  much  looseness  and  getting 
tired  once  in  a  while,"  says  an  entry  in  Mr.  Baruch's  diary 
in  November.     "The  more  committees,  the  more  lack  of 


r     • 


52    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


N 
't 

I 


m 


coordination,"  reads  another  entry.  "No  one  wants  to  give 
the  power  to  one  man.  This  makes  them  less  powerful,  and 
they  think  it  makes  him  too  powerful.  Fiddle  while  Rome 
bums.    It  will  go,  but  time  is  the  essence." 

Referring  to  another  delay  in  passing  on  a  powder  plant 
project,  the  skeletonized  diary  asks,  "Will  this  be  a  case  of 
too  late,  as  in  another  instance,  of  one  man  authority  and 
responsibility  needed?" 

"All  these  men  get  everybody's  advice,  and  then  take  the 
wrong  advice,"  runs  another  comment  on  the  committee  sys- 
tem. "I  would  rather  do  the  wrong  thing  than  wait  till  the 
right  thing  becomes  the  wrong  thing  and  the  wrong  action 
would  have  been  the  right  one."  And  again:  "What  is 
everybody's  job  is  nobody's  job." 

"The  confusion  is  greater  and  not  less  here,"  says  an 
entry  on  January  19th.  "No  one  has  a  plan  and  all' seem 
too  tired  to  do  anything  except  to  criticize." 

At  this  time  it  appears  that  the  Secretary  of  War  was 
considering  some  sort  of  a  law  to  centralize  the  administra- 
tion of  munitions.  Referring  to  this  fact,  the  diary  says: 
"In  the  meantime,  the  greatest  disorganization  is  going  out 
and  grabbing  right  and  left  for  men  to  strengthen  themselves, 
with  no  thought  of  the  thing  as  a  whole."  Coordination  was 
still  an  iridescent  dream.  For  lack  of  a  powerful  centralized 
control,  every  department  was  seeking  to  do  its  best  in  its 
own  way;  making  itself  internally  efficient,  while  rendering 
the  improvement  nugatory  by  destroying  team-work. 

Of  many  records  that  might  be  cited  to  show  how  many 
twilight  zones  of  overlapping  authority  there  were,  it  will 
suffice  to  take  one  relating  to  imported  raw  materials.  A 
letter  from  Baruch  to  Dr.  Edwin  F.  Gay,  then  associated  with 
the  Shipping  Board  as  head  of  the  Bureau  of  Planning  and 
Statistics,  written  on  February  23,  1918,  sets  forth  that  after 
nearly  a  year  imported  raw  materials  were  definitely  under 
the  control  of  no  one  agency.  The  Shipping  Board,  the  War 
Trade  Board,  and  the  War  Industries  Board  were  all  inter- 
ested in  this  subject,  and  whatever  the  last-named  did  in  its 
efforts  to  make  the  best  use  of  all  available  supplies  was 
subject  to  review  and  revision  by  the  others. 


If 


mf 


THE  WAR  INDUSTRIES  BOARD  EMERGES      53 

Either  you  must  have  confidence  in  the  War  Industries  Board's 
findings  or  the  War  Industries  Board  must  have  confidence  in  your 
findings.  If  each  department  of  the  Government  has  an  agency  to 
review  the  findings  of  the  other,  interminable  delays  will  follow, 
responsibility  will  rest  nowhere,  and  the  work  cannot  and  will  not 
be  done.  Therefore,  as  I  have  said  to  you  on  many  occasions  before, 
you  can  depend  upon  my  hearty  and  active  cooperation,  but  I  beg  of 
you  not  to  pass  by  the  suggestions  I  make  to  you.  There  is  too 
much  duplication  already,  business  is  being  harrowed  by  their 
increasing  questionnaires  and  the  multiplying  of  committees.  There 
is  no  one  organization  to  which  business  can  look  for  aid  and 
instruction. 

On  paper,  the  War  Industries  Board  was  the  clearing- 
house of  materials,  but,  evidently,  it  was  not  functioning. 
At  this  time  the  Board  was  even  without  a  chairman.  On 
February  2d,  Baruch's  diary  records  a  solemn  warning  to  the 
Board  of  the  necessity  of  clearing  raw  materials  through  one 
channel.  Both  the  diary  and  correspondence  between  mem- 
bers of  the  Board  and  heads  of  departments  and  war  agencies 
show  that  all  through  this  period  the  War  Industries  Board 
was  far  from  accomplishing  its  purpose.  In  spite  of  the 
fact  that  the  word  "coordination"  was  worn  threadbare  from 
much  use,  there  was  no  central  power  driving  to  that  end. 
It  would  be  inaccurate  to  give  the  impression  that  there  was 
not  a  great  amount  of  correlation  and  cooperation,  but  it  was 
clumsily  eflfected,  irregular  and  uncertain.  There  is  authori- 
tative documentary  evidence  that  as  late  as  February,  1918, 
the  various  bureaus  of  the  War  Department  had  not  suc- 
ceeded even  in  coordinating  themselves  in  the  matter  of 
purchase  to  effect  which  the  Advisory  Commission  of  the 
Council  of  National  Defense,  the  General  Munitions  Board, 
and  the  War  Industries  Board  had  successively  addressed 
themselves. 

It  was  not  only  to  effect  this  internal  harmonization,  but 
probably  to  become  independent  of  the  War  Industries 
Board,  that  E.  R.  Stettinius,  a  partner  in  the  banking  firm  of 
J.  P.  Morgan  &  Co.,  was  brought  into  the  War  Department  at 
the  end  of  January,  1918,  as  Surveyor-General  of  Supply. 
He  did  not  accomplish  much  in  the  way  of  eliminating  the 
War  Industries  Board  because  the  men  he  needed  were  with 


I 


54    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Banich  and  because  the  Secretary  of  War  recognized  that 
he  must  work  with  the  War  Industries  Board.  Back  of 
Stettinius's  appointment  there  seems  to  have  been  an  idea 
that,  as  the  War  Industries  Board  was  dwindling  instead  of 
growing,  it  was  incumbent  upon  the  War  Department  to  rely 
upon  itself,  and  to  take  up  anew  the  burdens  of  which  it  had 
not  been  effectively  relieved. 

The  thought  the  Secretary  of  War  was  giving  to  the  subject 
of  reorganizing  the  industrial  relations  of  the  Government 
and  Baruch's  growing  disgust  with  the  way  things  were  drift- 
ing in  the  headless  War  Industries  Board  brought  them  into 
conference  on  February  1,  1918,  though  it  must  be  remem- 
bered that  Baruch  was  then  only  one  among  the  members 
of  the  Board.  While  it  seems  to  be  pretty  well  established 
that  Baruch  and  Secretary  Baker  were  not  closely  attuned, 
and  the  latter  was  opposed  to  the  former's  appointment  as 
chairman  of  the  War  Industries  Board,  the  Secretary  was 
favorably  impressed  by  Baruch's  draft  of  a  scheme  for  a 
creation  of  a  Director  of  War  Industries  and  Raw  Materials. 

Incidentally,  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  a  month  or  so 
before  this  conference  of  February  1st,  the  Secretary  of  War, 
in  discussing  with  Baruch  the  filling  of  the  vacant  chairman- 
ship of  the  Board,  informed  him  that,  while  he  (Baruch) 
had  done  the  best  work  of  any  of  the  civilian  executives 
called  into  service  by  the  emergency,  he  (the  Secretary)  did 
not  consider  that  Baruch  was  fitted  for  the  place  of  executive 
in  a  large  organization.  It  was  the  Secretary's  idea  to 
appoint  to  the  headship  of  the  new  organization  a  great 
industrialist  not  then  connected  with  the  Board.  Baruch  was 
to  be  a  sort  of  under-secretary  to  the  new  man  and  the  real 
power  behind  the  throne. 

This  was  the  supreme  test  of  the  quality  of  patience  and 
the  policy  of  submergence  of  self  that  had  stood  Baruch  in 
such  good  stead  in  all  the  months  in  which,  despite  untold 
discouragements  and  humiliating  rebuffs,  he  had  steadily 
driven  ahead  with  the  work  in  hand,  doing  each  task  as  it 
arose  or  as  he  created  it.  Had  the  President  requested  it,  it 
is  likely  that  Baruch  would  have  stood  even  this  test.  Just 
what  finally  directed  the  President's  choice  to  Baruch  is  not 
known,  but  it  is  suspected  that  Secretary  McAdoo  had  some- 


THE  WAR  INDUSTRIES  BOARD  EMERGES      55 

thing  to  do  with  the  matter,  for  it  is  known  that  he  informed 
Baruch  that  if  his  position  in  the  War  Industries  Board 
became  intolerable  he  "could  come  over  and  run  the  rail- 
ways." It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  at  this  time  Baruch,  as 
a  member  of  the  War  Industries  Board,  which  was  still  a 
part  of  the  Council  of  National  Defense  organization,  was 
really  subordinate  to  Secretary  Baker,  who  was  chairman 
and  dominant  member  of  the  Council,  and  that  the  Secretary 
was  entirely  within  his  rights  in  taking  it  upon  himself  to 
name  or  recommend  the  new  chairman  of  the  Board. 

A  brief  draft  of  the  proposed  reorganization  submitted  by 
Baruch  to  Baker  afforded  a  basis  for  the  conference  between 
them.    The  following  is  a  copy  of  it: 

Director  of  War  Industries  and  Raw  Materials 

This  should  be  a  legal,  authoritative,  responsible,  centralized 
agency  for  the  purpose  of  coordinating  the  demands  of  the  fighting 
forces.  The  object  should  be  to  mobilize  the  resources  of  the 
country,  to  create  new  facilities  and  additional  sources  of  supply, 
not  alone  for  the  military  and  naval  requirements,  but  civilian  needs 
with  as  little  dislocation  of  industry  as  possible.  This  agency 
should  have  the  power,  subject  to  the  approval  of  the  President,  to 
commandeer  plants,  products,  equipment,  manufacturing  facilities, 
mines  and  materials,  and  the  additional  power  not  now  granted  of 
reselling  and  distributing  materials  thus  commandeered. 

He  should  be  appointed  by  the  President.  In  no  way  is  he  to 
have  anything  to  do  with  naval  or  military  matters,  but  only  fur- 
nishes requirements  for  the  military  and  naval  forces.  He  should 
decentralize  his  authority  by  appointing,  subject  to  the  approval  of 
the  President  (if  he  so  desires),  heads  of  various  departments 
subdivided  substantially  as  outlined  below;  new  departments  or 
subdivisions  to  be  added  from  time  to  time,  as  found  necessary. 
These  departments  are  not  arranged  in  the  order  of  their  relative 
importance. 

Explosives. 

Guns,  Shells  and  Components?     (Doubtful,  for  discussion.) 

Supplies. 

Conversion  of  Industries. 

Creation  of  New  Facilities. 

Priority  Division. 

Various  Raw  Material  Divisions,  as  Steel,  Non-Ferrous  Metals, 
Chemicals,  Lumber,  Miscellaneous,  etc. 


56    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


I 


,1 


Statistics. 

Power  Controller. 

Board  of  Compensation  and  Price-Fixing  (five,  one  of  whom 
shall  be  a  labor  man). 

This  last-named  board,  in  cooperation  with  the  Federal  Trade 
Commission,  shall,  subject  to  approval  of  the  President,  fix  the 
prices  of  all  materials.  It  will  act  in  all  large  or  important  con- 
tracts in  case  of  disagreement.    This  eliminates  delays. 

All  requirements  to  be  submitted  to  his  chiefs  for  allocation 
and  determination.  Good  judgment  will  dictate  as  to  what  he 
should  direct  and  what  he  should  not.  Contracts  to  be  signed  by 
the  departments,  as  now,  which  shall  also  determine  the  technical 
questions,  inspection,  follow-up,  and  receiving.  Under  the  reorgan- 
ized system  the  Director  of  Supplies  for  the  Army,  the  Paymaster- 
General  for  the  Navy,  the  Purchasing  Agent  or  other  designated 
ofl&cer  of  the  Shipping  Board,  the  Purchasing  Agent  of  the  Aircraft 
Production  Board,  and  the  Allied  Purchasing  Commission  submit 
requirements  through  the  Director  to  the  subdivisions. 

If  necessary  to  create  new  facilities  or  sources  of  supply,  the 
technical  men  of  the  departments  involved  must  necessarily  be 
used. 

On  February  1st,  Secretary  Baker  sent  to  the  President 
a  letter  setting  forth  the  joint  conceptions  of  himself  and 
Banich  regarding  a  reorganization  of  the  War  Industries 
Board,  which  deserves  quotation  in  full,  as  follows: 

My  dear  Mr.  President: 

Mr.  Baruch  and  I  have  discussed  at  length  the  suggestion  of  a 
reorganization  of  the  War  Industries  Board.  Mr.  Baruch  believes 
that  the  body  should  be  a  legal,  authoritative,  responsible,  cent- 
ralized agency  for  the  purpose  of  coordinating  the  demands  of  the 
fighting  forces.  Its  object  should  be  to  mobilize  the  resources  of 
the  country,  to  reveal  new  facilities  and  additional  sources  of 
supply,  not  alone  for  the  military  and  naval  requirements;  but 
also  to  the  end  that  the  civilian  needs  be  supplied  with  as  little 
dislocation  of  industry  as  possible;  that  this  agency  should  have 
power,  subject  to  the  approval  of  the  President,  to  commandeer 
plants,  products,  equipment,  manufacturing  facilities,  mines  and 
materials,  and  the  additional  power  not  now  granted  of  distributing 
materials  thus  commandeered. 

In  this  general  statement  I  concur.  Mr.  Baruch  believes  with 
me  that  it  takes  in,  in  general  terms,  the  whole  programme,  and 
that,  in  all  likelihood,  some  of  the  features  cannot  be  immediately 


» 


THE  WAR  INDUSTRIES  BOARD  EMERGES      57 

accomplished;  but  that  ultimately  this  agency  whatever  its  form 
will  have  to  exercise  substantially  these  functions. 
We  agree  that  the  following  functions  are  to  be  performed: 

1.  Procurement  of  military  supplies. 

2.  Conservation  of  general  industrial  condition  of  the  country. 

3.  The  determination  of  prices  and  compensation. 

In  order  to  carry  out  these  purposes,  it  seems  to  us  that  the 
present  plan  of  organization  of  the  War  Industries  Board  is  ill- 
adapted,  for  the  reason,  first,  that  its  numbers  lead  to  debate  and 
delayed  decision,  and,  second,  because  its  power  is  at  present 
consultative  and  not  final,  except  by  consent. 

We  recognize  that  the  present  question  is  the  appointment  of 
a  successor  to  Mr.  Willard,  and  that  the  redistribution  of  power  will 
have  to  be  delayed  until  the  President  is  empowered  by  legislatioVi; 
but  the  immediate  reorganization  could  begin  and  suitable  distribu- 
tions of  power  could  then  be  made  when  the  legislation  is  secured. 

Our  suggestions,  therefore,  would  be  that  a  chairman  of  the 
War  Industries  Board  be  appointed;  that  he  be  directed  immedi- 
ately to  reorganize  the  institution  so  as  to  bring  about  a  compre- 
hensive survey  by  him  of  the  war  needs  of  the  Government,  with 
power  in  the  Chairman  to  allocate  supplies  of  material  and 
manufacturing  facilities,  and  to  determine  conversions  of  industry, 
both  for  apportionment  to  the  several  war  needs  reported  to  him 
by  the  purchasing  departments  of  the  Government,  and  also  with 
a  view  to  the  adjustment  of  the  industrial  needs  of  the  Government 
to  the  general  industrial  situation  of  the  country,  so  as  to  prevent 
undue  dislocation;  and  to  have  in  view  constantly  the  distribution 
of  labor,  transportation  facilities  of  the  country,  and  the  general 
maintenance  of  industrial  standards  and  facilities,  both  during  and 
after  the  war. 

Second,  the  creation  of  a  committee  to  work  in  cooperation 
with  the  Federal  Trade  Commission,  and  to  report  directly  to  the 
President,  for  the  semi- judicial  determination  of  questions  of  com- 
pensation and  price.  The  questions  to  be  considered  by  this  body 
to  be  referred  to  it  by  the  chairman  of  the  War  Industries  Board, 
and  its  general  administrative  procedure  subject  to  his  general 
direction. 

Such  an  organization  as  is  herein  suggested  would,  of  course, 
leave  the  Allied  Purchasing  Commission  in  its  present  state,  unless 
the  reorganization  of  it  was  deemed  advisable;  but  that  could 
later  be  determined. 

Mr.  Baruch  believes  that  it  would  be  easily  possible  to  concen- 
trate this  entire  purchasing  function  in  one  man.  If  that  could  be 
done,  and  the  power  were  vested  in  the  chairman,  the  agencies 


58    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


I 

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now  established  could  continue  to  perform  all  of  tlie  work,  except 
the  final  decisions  which  would  then  go  to  an  individual. 

The  civilian  members  of  the  War  Industries  Board  as  now  com- 
posed would  be  assigned  functions  in  connection  with  compensation 
and  price  determination,  and  the  military  and  naval  members  of 
the  Board  would,  of  course,  in  any  event  be  replaced  by  those 
persons  who  under  the  reorganizations  which  have  taken  place  are 
more  appropriate  as  aids  to  the  chairman  in  the  solution  of  his 
problems  affecting  the  several  departments. 

By  this  process  the  single  representatives  of  the  War,  Navy, 
Allied,  and  Shipping  Boards  could  meet,  clear  the  difficulties, 
coordinate  their  needs,  and  in  consultation  with  the  chairman  of 
the  War  Industries  Board  submit  their  programme  for  his  final 
allocation,  distribution,  and  judgment. 

This  plan  does  not  contemplate  the  actual  moulding  of  specifi- 
cations and  contracts,  the  industrial  follow-up,  inspection,  delivery, 
storage,  or  distribution  of  by  the  director  of  War  Industries;  but 
leaves  those  functions  to  the  strongly  organized  agencies  already 
established  in  the  several  departments,  except  to  the  extent  which 
the  performance  of  any  of  these  functions  aflfects  the  entire  pro- 
gramme. Where  any  such  question  arose,  the  chairman,  by  con- 
sultation, could  easily  arrange  conditions  to  overcome  the 
difference. 

The  foregoing  letter  was  satisfactory  to  Baruch,  except 
that  he  feared  that  it  "was  not  definite  enough  as  to  our 
thoughts  that  this  agency  should  be  an  individual  who  decen- 
tralizes the  execution  of  his  authority.  In  this  letter  you 
speak  of  it  as  a  body,  which  gives  the  impression  that  we 
thought  it  should  be  a  board,  whereas  I  understood  we  were 
both  agreed  it  should  be  one  man."^  In  response  to  this 
suggestion  Mr.  Baker  replied  that  he  was  sending  the  Presi- 
dent a  note  which  would  "clear  up  any  doubt." 

A  month  later,  on  March  4th,  the  President  took  the  action 
which  reconstituted  the  War  Industries  Board,  instead  of 
creating  a  director  of  War  Industries  and  Raw  Materials. 
But  while  the  name  remained,  power  was  centralized  in  the 
chairman,  except  as  to  price-fixing.  As  this  was  purely  an 
executive  act,  in  anticipation  of  the  passage  of  the  Overman 
Bill  giving  the  President  broad  powers  of  delegation  and 
redistribution  of  executive  authority,  it  is  a  justifiable  infer- 

^Letter  to  Mr.  Baker,  February  4,  1918. 


I 


THE  WAR  INDUSTRIES  BOARD  EMERGES      59 


ence  that  the  President  preferred  the  use  of  an  existing 
designation  to  one  which  might  raise  a  question  as  to  whether 
he  was  entrenching  upon  the  legislative  field.  Another  con- 
sideration might  have  been  the  relation  of  the  determined 
executive  reorganization  to  the  bills  for  the  creation  of  a 
Department  of  Munitions,  which  had  been  introduced  into 
Congress  and  widely  discussed. 

Names  do  make  a  difference,  after  all,  and  a  vitalized 
War  Industries  Board  might  be  all  that  a  Munitions  Depart- 
ment could  be,  in  practical  results,  and  yet  be  the  child  of  an 
evolving  executive  policy  instead  of  a  creation  enforced  by 
Congress  in  response  to  hostile  criticism.  It  might  be  added 
that  the  designation  proposed  by  Mr.  Baruch  would  have 
made  it  easier  for  him  to  exercise  the  powers  that  were  con- 
ferred upon  him.  "Director"  has  a  more  impressive  sound 
than  "Chairman  of  the  War  Industries  Board,"  and  it  took 
some  time  for  all  who  were  affected  to  understand  that  the 
chairman  after  March  4th  was  as  little  like  the  chairman 
before  that  day  as  a  lion  is  like  a  lamb.  Historically,  the 
change  of  name  would  have  been  important  because  it  would 
have  emphasized  and  marked  the  emerging  of  a  great,  new 
war  control,  greater  than  any  of  the  other  special  war  agen- 
cies. The  public  would  have  perceived  at  once  what  was 
then  only  plain  to  close  observers  that  the  instrumentality 
of  industrial  control  for  war  purposes  had  been  revolution- 
ized and  that  a  tired,  bored,  and  discouraged  committee  had 
been  replaced  with  an  industrial  dictator,  surrounded,  it  is 
true,  by  a  board,  but  a  board  with  no  more  real  authority 
over  the  dictator  than  the  Cabinet  has  over  the  President;  in 
fact,  designedly  occupying  precisely  a  similar  relation. 

It  is  an  interesting  fact  that  on  May  30,  1917,  nine  months 
before,  Mr.  Baruch  submitted  to  the  President  a  draft  of  a 
proposed  general  purchasing  agency,  which  was  to  have 
essentially  the  same  powers  that  the  War  Industries  Board 
eventually  received,  but  with  a  more  authoritative  contact 
with  the  Food  Administration  and  the  Shipping  Board  (other 
special  war  agencies  had  not  then  been  created)  than  it 
finally  arrived  at.  In  practice,  the  lack  of  close  adminis- 
trative articulation  between  the  War  Industries  Board  and 
the  Food  Administration  was  not  harmful,  as  their  spheres 


% 


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I 


60    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

being  quite  distinct  they  always  cooperated  amicably.  But 
the  records  of  the  War  Industries  Board  are  strewn  with  dis- 
tressing instances  of  failure  to  utilize  the  always  inadequate 
shipping  facilities  in  the  best  interests  of  the  war  programme 
as  a  whole,  because  it  was  the  Shipping  Board  itself  instead 
of  the  industrial  control  agency  that  determined  how  ship- 
ping should  be  allocated. 

It  is  not  to  be  implied  that  there  was  any  conflict  between 
the  two  bodies,  but  they  were  so  interwoven  in  their  fields 
that  the  War  Industries  Board  should  have  had  the  initiative 
in  the  disposition  of  available  shipping  according  to  the 
degree  of  necessity  indicated  by  its  survey  of  the  whole 
internal  and  external  war  situation.  Although  there  was 
much  improvement  in  coordination  between  the  two  agencies 
as  time  went  on,  it  is  an  indisputable  fact  that  the  great 
principle  of  priority  according  to  national  need  was  never 
fully  applied  to  shipping,  with  the  result  that  the  Shipping 
Board  was  always  confronted  with  conflicting  demands  for 
tonnage,  which  it  met  in  piecemeal  fashion;  frequently  satis- 
fying new  demands  by  withdrawing  ships  from  more  neces- 
sary services. 

The  Railroad  Administration  seems  to  have  comprehended 
so  fully  the  basic  idea  that  the  railways  were  merely  an 
intra-mural  transport  instrumentality  for  the  Nation,  con- 
ceived as  a  single  producing  unit  for  war,  that  there  was  no 
necessity  for  any  formal  conveyance  to  the  War  Industries 
Board  of  final  power  over  them.  McAdoo  and  Hines 
promptly  shaped  transportation  to  all  requirements  of  the 
War  Industries  Board. 

The  Fuel  Administration  should  have  been  directly  under 
the  War  Industries  Board,  for,  while  there  was  remarkable 
team-work  and  absolutely  no  conflict  between  them,  the  sepa- 
ration of  authority  over  coal  production  and  distribution 
from  the  general  industrial  executive  resulted  in  a  degree  of 
lost  motion  and  lost  time. 

The  War  Trade  Board  was  eventually  fairly  efi'ectively 
tied  into  the  War  Industries  Board,  but  it  is  now  plain  that 
there  was  a  succession  of  confusions  of  function  and  powers 
between  these  two  bodies  which  occupied  a  field  that  was  in 
its  nature  not  divisible. 


THE  WAR  INDUSTRIES  BOARD  EMERGES      61 

These  defects  in  the  general  war  machine  were  the  inevit- 
able result  of  evolution  mixed  with  definite  legislation.  The 
ofi'setting  advantage  is  the  probability  that  no  a  priori  statute 
could  have  efi'ected  so  adaptive  a  composite  as  was  finally 
achieved. 

The  work  of  the  Board  finally  resolved  itself  into  twelve 
well-defined  functional  parts  or  implements  of  utilization  of 
its  various  powers  and  discharge  of  its  duties.  These  were 
"Priorities,"  the  Clearance  Office,  the  Conservation  Division, 
the  Resources  and  Conversion  Section,  the  Industrial  Inven- 
tory Section,  the  Facilities  Division,  the  Advisory  Committee 
on  Plants  and  Munitions,  the  Labor  Division,  the  Technical 
and  Consulting  Section,  the  Purchasing  Commission  for  the 
Allies,  the  Division  of  Planning  and  Statistics,  and  Price- 
Fixing.  The  direction  of  these  functional  implements  found 
its  data  and  its  media  of  contact  with  industry  in  (ultimately) 
some  sixty  commodity  sections  corresponding  to  as  many 
groups  of  industries.  Thus  the  field  of  the  Board's  work 
was  divided  into  twelve  agencies  of  purpose  on  the  one  side 
operating  through  sixty  "action"  sections. 

Coming  now  to  the  administrative  method  by  which  func- 
tions were  exercised  and  tied  in  with  the  chairman  at  one 
end  and  the  commodity  sections  at  the  other,  we  have  first 
a  Board  of  ten  members,  which  at  the  signing  of  the  armis- 
tice consisted  of  Mr.  Baruch,  chairman;  Alexander  Legge, 
vice-chairman;  E.  B.  Parker,  Priorities  Commissioner;  R.  S. 
Brookings,  chairman  of  the  Price-Fixing  Committee;  G.  N. 
Peek,  Commissioner  of  Finished  Products;  Rear  Admiral 
Fletcher,  representing  the  navy;  Major-General  George  W. 
Goethals,  representing  the  army;  J.  L.  Replogle,  Steel 
Administrator;  Hugh  Frayne,  Labor  Commissioner;  L.  L. 
Summers,  technical  adviser.  H.  P.  Ingels  was  secretary  of 
the  Board,  and  H.  B.  Swope,  Clarence  Dillon,  Harrison 
Williams,  and  Harold  T.  Clark,  assistants  to  the  chairman. 
Harry  P.  Bingham  preceded  Mr.  Ingels  as  secretary.  As 
administrators  all  members  of  the  Board  except  the  army 
and  navy  members  (whose  function  was  not  at  all  adminis- 
trative) and  the  chairman  of  the  Price-Fixing  Committee 
were  directly  subordinate  to  the  chairman,  who,  however, 


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62    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

was  a  member  of  the  Price-Fixing  Committee.  Under  Com- 
missioner Parker  were  the  Priorities  Board  and  the  Priorities 
Committee  and  the  non-war  construction  section.  The 
Price-Fixing  Committee  had  no  directly  subsidiary  bodies, 
but  worked  with  the  diflferent  commodity  sections  regardless 
of  their  administrative  location.  Mr.  Legge  had  the  Require- 
ments Divisions,  the  Clearance  Office,  the  Allied  Purchasing 
Commission,  certain  raw  materials  sections,  a  number  of 
other  sections,  and  the  special  advisory  committee  on  plants 
and  munitions.  Mr.  Peek  had  five  groups  or  divisions  of 
commodity  sections  and  the  Facilities  Division;  Mr.  Frayne 
had,  besides  the  duty  naturally  falling  to  his  office,  the  War 
Prison  Labor  and  National  Waste-Reclamation  Section;  Mr. 
Replogle  had  certain  sections  relating  to  steel;  Mr.  Summers 
had  all  technical  matters.  The  Conservation  Division  was 
not  headed  by  a  member  of  the  Board,  but  operated  directly 
through  its  chairman,  Mr.  A.  W.  Shaw,  under  Mr.  Baruch. 

It  will  be  observed  that  there  is  considerable  conflict  of 
nomenclature  in  respect  of  sections  and  divisions  and  that 
the  administrative  chart  shows  such  an  important  function 
as  that  of  resources  and  conversion  far  away  from  the  head, 
but  that  is  the  fault  of  the  chart  rather  than  of  the  fact.  The 
different  phases  of  function  and  commodity  organization  will 
be  discussed  and  analyzed  in  the  chapters  devoted  to  the 
functional  divisions  and  commodities,  but  an  important  gen- 
eral concept  to  keep  in  mind  is  that  the  War  Industries  Board 
was  not  a  neat  little  administrative  bureau  trimly  set  apart. 
Through  membership  in  the  Board  or  its  committees,  in  its 
divisions  and  its  sections,  virtually  every  department  of  the 
Government  and  all  the  other  special  war  agencies  were 
directly  connected  with  the  chairman  of  the  War  Industries 
Board.  Every  civil  ramification  of  the  tentacular  war 
machine  thus  came  under  his  influence  if  not  his  control  — 
for  by  helpful  courtesy  if  not  by  authority  some  of  the 
functions  of  every  department  of  the  Government  were  made 
subsidiary  to  the  judgment  of  the  War  Industries  Board. 

It  thus  became  the  central  "control"  of  finance,  internal 
commerce,  foreign  commerce,  domestic  industry,  foreign  and 
neutral  industry,  shipping,  railways,  fuel  and  food,  and  the 


THE  WAR  INDUSTRIES  BOARD  EMERGES      63 

army  and  the  navy  whenever  the  discharge  of  its  basic  func- 
tions made  it  necessary  for  it  to  be  such.  Herein  was  the 
finest  fruit  of  an  evolved  rather  than  legislatively  created 
organism.  Being  without  statutory  definition  and  limitation, 
it  grew,  fed  by  what  it  did  or  must  do,  into  the  direction  of 
all  things  pertaining  to  the  prosecution  of  the  war.  Wherever 
it  penetrated,  it  was  so  much  its  own  manifest  justification 
that  it  never  gave  off'ense.  No  formally  created  department 
of  the  Executive  could  have  been  so  adaptive,  so  permeating, 
so  all-inclusive  without  friction  and  without  off'ense. 

So  quiet  and  unobtrusive  were  the  extensions  and  pro- 
jections of  this  central  control  that  to  this  day  there  is  little 
general  understanding  that  through  the  War  Industries  Board 
the  United  States  had  in  the  end  a  system  of  concentration  of 
commerce,  industry,  and  all  the  powers  of  government  that 
was  without  compare  among  all  the  other  nations,  friend  or 
enemy,  involved  in  the  World  War. 

It  was  both  the  peculiar  characteristic  and  the  high  merit 
of  this  organization  that  it  was  so  interwoven  with  the  supply 
departments  of  the  army  and  navy,  of  the  Allies,  and  with 
other  departments  of  the  Government  that,  while  it  was  an 
entity  of  its  own,  exercising  virile  authority,  its  decisions  and 
its  acts,  if  not  always  representing  the  unanimous  judgment 
of  all  officials  and  agencies  of  Government  involved,  were 
always  based  on  a  conspectus  of  the  whole  situation.  At 
the  same  time,  through  the  commodity  divisions  and  sections 
in  contact  with  responsible  committees  of  the  producers  of 
the  commodities  dealt  with,  the  War  Industries  Board 
extended  its  antennae  into  the  innermost  recesses  of  industry. 
Never  before  was  there  such  a  focusing  of  knowledge  of  the 
vast  field  of  American  industry,  commerce,  and  transporta- 
tion. Never  was  there  such  an  approach  to  omniscience  in 
the  business  aff*airs  of  a  continent. 

Thus  the  War  Industries  Board  knew  currently  all  that 
could  be  known  of  war  demand  and  all  that  it  was  humanly 
possible  to  gather  concerning  the  resources  and  facilities  with 
which  to  meet  it.  This  universal  understanding  was  amal- 
gamated with  an  executive  administration  which,  by  the  exer- 
cise of  clearly  defined  functions,  effected  the  orderly  meeting 


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64    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

of  supply  and  demand,  of  resources  and  requirements.  All 
comprehensive  in  its  knowledge  and  understanding,  coopera- 
tive and  tolerant  in  its  relations,  clear  and  definite  in  pur- 
poses and  the  means  thereto,  prompt  and  firm  in  execution, 
the  War  Industries  Board  stood  forth  in  its  final  form  as 
the  supreme  incarnation  of  the  economic  power  of  the  Repub- 
lic, disciplined,  coordinated,  and  stripped  for  war. 


I 

ill 


CHAPTER  IV 
THE  PERSONAL  ELEMENT 

Banich  — Conscripting  the  brains  of  industry  — The  dollar-a-year  man  arrives 

—  Seeking  the  industrial  doer  —  Willard  —  Scott  —  Legge  —  Peek  —  Replogle 

—  Parker  —  Brookings  —  Summers  —  Frayne  —  Fletcher  —  Johnson. 

Administrative  and  executive  organizations  susceptible  of 
beautiful  charting,  that  shows  each  duty,  authority,  and  func- 
tion as  definitely  defined  and  as  reciprocally  articulated  to 
each  other  and  the  controlling  head  center  as  the  parts  of 
physical  mechanism,  do  not  make  such  entities  any  more  than 
finely  phrased  constitutions  make  nations.  The  Constitution 
of  the  United  States  did  not  make  the  great  Republic  and  the 
constitutions  of  its  many  imitators  have  not  sufficed  to  remake 

them. 

Full-fledged  in  the  end  in  its  endowment  of  effective  power, 
however  miscellaneous  and  piecemeal  that  endowment  was, 
the  War  Industries  Board  would  have  failed  had  it  not  been 
for  the  exceptional  quality  of  its  personnel.  The  writer  came 
out  of  war  work  with  no  more  definite  belief  than  that.  It 
was  undoubtedly  the  greatest  gathering  of  able  business  men 
into  a  single  public  enterprise  necessitating  energetic  and 
continuous  effort  by  each  and  all  that  this  country,  and, 
indeed,  the  world,  has  ever  known.  If  you  can  visualize  a 
convention  of  able,  if  not  the  ablest,  men  of  affairs  of 
America  —  not  so  much  the  presidents  and  chairmen  of 
boards,  whose  hard-working  days  are  over,  but  the  keen, 
dynamic,  forceful,  purposeful,  transilient  vice-presidents  and 
managers  and  superintendents;  not  the  men  who  are  reputed 
to  be  doers,  but  the  real  doers  of  the  colossal  deeds  of  the 
titanic  American  industrial  scene  —  removing  their  coats, 
rolling  up  their  sleeves,  and  marching  in  a  body  to  take 
agreeable,  assigned  positions  in  a  super-corporation,  you 
will  view  the  War  Industries  Board. 

When  one  reflects  that  it  was  such  a  unique  group  that  for 
months  on  end  thought  and  toiled  for  the  public  welfare, 


/ 


1.^ 


J 


I 


66    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

without  pay  or  thought  of  substantial  reward,  he  is  prompted 
to  speculate  on  what  might  be  accomplished  by  the  collec- 
tively powerful  but  feebly  acting  machinery  of  the  State  if 
such  men  were  to  administer  its  affairs.  Manning  the  War 
Industries  Board,  led  by  a  man  with  a  touch  of  genius,  they 
bridged  with  the  personal  element  all  its  organic  lapses  and 
filled  with  intelligent  initiative  all  hiatuses  of  power. 

Somewhat  anomalously,  it  might  be  thought  at  first  glance, 
the  man  finally  chosen  to  direct  this  supreme  executive  of 
industry  was  not  himself  an  industrialist.  Baruch  was  pri- 
marily a  speculator  and  later  a  creative  investor.  He  was 
neither  a  captain  of  industry  nor  a  merchant  prince.  He 
had  never  created  a  great  industrial  organization  nor  admin- 
istered a  large  business.  He  had  had  no  complex  executive 
experience.  Great  as  was  the  wealth  he  had  amassed,  he 
virtually  kept  no  books.  Vast  as  was  his  information  of 
American  economic  matters,  the  principal  repository  of  it 
was  in  the  card  index  of  his  mind. 

But  though  Baruch  was  not  of  industry,  he  knew  it  and 
had  that  very  substantial  proof  of  knowledge  —  a  fortune 
gained  in  applying  it.  From  an  external  coign  of  vantage 
in  the  Congress  of  American  business  in  Wall  Street,  he  had 
studied  American  business  with  the  cold  detachment  of  one 
seeking  to  profit  from  knowledge.  He  had  examined  indus- 
try as  a  biologist  scrutinizes  life  —  organically  and  func- 
tionally. He  developed  a  somewhat  startling  ability  to 
deduce  facts  from  figures  and  the  event  from  the  process. 
Facts  gathered,  deductions  made,  he  was  unswerving  in  back- 
ing his  judgment;  he  was  immune  to  panic  and  impervious 
to  the  excesses  of  enthusiasm.  Unaffected  by  the  street 
gossip  that  rallies  or  disperses  the  common  run  of  specu- 
lators, Baruch  was  as  sensitive  as  mercury  to  heat  and  cold 
to  all  the  elemental  facts,  rising  from  a  continent  of  industry, 
that  in  the  long  run  determine  all  values.  Cool  in  judgment, 
remorseless  in  decision,  methodical  in  action,  he  is  never- 
theless a  man  of  susceptible  emotions,  impulsive,  kindly, 
sympathetic,  of  extremely  catholic  human  interests  and  com- 
pletely devoid  of  pride  of  purse.  He  made  his  money  in 
Wall  Street,  but  he  took  neither  his  politics  nor  his  economics 
from  it. 


I 


Chairman  of  the  United  States  War  Industries  Board;  Member  of  the  Advisory  Commission 
ot  the  Council  of  National  Defense  in  charge  of  Raw  Materials,  Minerals,  and  Metals; 
Member  of  the  Allied  I'urvhdsiug  Commission;  Member  of  the  Supreme  Economic  Council 


IL 


INTENTIONAL  SECOND  EXPOSURE 


I 


66    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

without  pay  or  thought  of  substantial  reward,  he  is  prompted 
to  speculate  on  what  might  be  accomplished  by  the  collec- 
tively powerful  but  feebly  acting  machinery  of  the  State  if 
such  men  were  to  administer  its  affairs.  Manning  the  War 
Industries  Board,  led  by  a  man  with  a  touch  of  genius,  they 
bridged  with  the  personal  element  all  its  organic  lapses  and 
filled  with  intelligent  initiative  all  hiatuses  of  power. 

Somewhat  anomalously,  it  might  be  thought  at  first  glance, 
the  man  finally  chosen  to  direct  this  supreme  executive  of 
industry  was  not  himself  an  industrialist.  Baruch  was  pri- 
marily a  speculator  and  later  a  creative  investor.  He  was 
neither  a  captain  of  industry  nor  a  merchant  prince.  He 
had  never  created  a  great  industrial  organization  nor  admin- 
istered a  large  business.  He  had  had  no  complex  executive 
experience.  Great  as  was  the  wealth  he  had  amassed,  he 
virtually  kept  no  books.  Vast  as  was  his  information  of 
American  economic  matters,  the  principal  repository  of  it 
was  in  the  card  index  of  his  mind. 

But  though  Baruch  was  not  of  industry,  he  knew  it  and 
had  that  very  substantial  proof  of  knowledge  —  a  fortune 
gained  in  applying  it.  From  an  external  coign  of  vantage 
in  the  Congress  of  American  business  in  Wall  Street,  he  had 
studied  American  business  with  the  cold  detachment  of  one 
seeking  to  profit  from  knowledge.  He  had  examined  indus- 
try as  a  biologist  scrutinizes  life  —  organically  and  func- 
tionally. He  developed  a  somewhat  startling  ability  to 
deduce  facts  from  figures  and  the  event  from  the  process. 
Facts  gathered,  deductions  made,  he  was  unswerving  in  back- 
ing his  judgment;  he  was  immune  to  panic  and  impervious 
to  the  excesses  of  enthusiasm.  Unaff'ected  by  the  street 
gossip  that  rallies  or  disperses  the  common  run  of  specu- 
lators, Baruch  was  as  sensitive  as  mercury  to  heat  and  cold 
to  all  the  elemental  facts,  rising  from  a  continent  of  industry, 
that  in  the  long  run  determine  all  values.  Cool  in  judgment, 
remorseless  in  decision,  methodical  in  action,  he  is  never- 
theless a  man  of  susceptible  emotions,  impulsive,  kindly, 
sympathetic,  of  extremely  catholic  human  interests  and  com- 
pletely devoid  of  pride  of  purse.  He  made  his  money  in 
Wall  Street,  but  he  took  neither  his  politics  nor  his  economics 
from  it. 


I 


III 


ii 


-I 


^^^.^t^t^yC^t^y^-^^    >^^^ 


<  - 


Chairman  of  the  I  niterl  Ftates  War  Industries  Board;  Member  of  the  Advisory  Commission 
ot  the  Council  of  Nationnl  Defense  in  charpe  of  Raw  Materials.  Minerak,  and  Metals; 
iviember  of  the  Allied  I'urvhasi.ig  Commission;  xMember  of  the  Supreme  Economic  Council 


Wit 


* 


THE  PERSONAL  ELEMENT 


67 


\W  m 


[I  I 


1 


M 


I 


As  with  the  source  of  his  ability,  so  was  his  ultimate 
interests  in  things  and  in  people.  He  was  a  Roosevelt  adher- 
ent when  Roosevelt  was  anathema  in  the  high  places  of 
business;  he  was  an  early  supporter  of  Woodrow  Wilson 
and  "the  New  Freedom"  when  big  business  was  scornful. 
A  conservative  at  twenty-five,  he  was  a  liberal  at  forty.  His 
substream  seems  to  have  been  Americanism.  Apprehensive 
that  war  was  on  the  cards,  he  began  as  early  as  1915  to 
reflect  on  the  relations  between  modern  war  and  that  huge 
camp  of  industry  with  which  he  was  so  familiar  from  coast 
to  coast.  He  was  the  first  subscriber  to  Leonard  Wood's 
Plattsburgh  Training  Camp,  and,  in  that  same  year,  he  called 
on  President  Wilson  and  made  suggestions  regarding  the 
shaping  of  industry  for  its  part  in  the  shock  of  battling 
nations  that  went  to  the  very  roots  of  the  matter.  It  is  char- 
acteristic of  him  that,  though  he  had  supplied  generously 
sinews  of  war  for  the  Democratic  national  campaign  of  1912, 
'  his  first  call  at  the  White  House  was  purely  impersonal  and 
on  the  business  of  the  public. 

His  appointment  in  October,  1916,  to  serve  on  the  Advi- 
sory Commission  of  the  Council  of  National  Defense  was  as 
welcome  as  it  was  unsolicited.  He  began  forthwith  to  apply 
to  the  inevitabilities  of  the  hour  all  his  great  knowledge  and 
understanding  of  the  resources  of  America,  much  as  he  had 
formerly  applied  them  to  the  conflicts  of  Wall  Street.  He 
gravitated  naturally  in  the  Commission  to  the  ultimate 
sources  of  economic  power  —  to  raw  materials  and  facilities 
of  their  conversion  to  use.  With  his  grasp  of  them, 
with  his  wide  and  deep  understanding  of  industrial  processes, 
ramifications,  and  interdependences,  he  was  peculiarly  quali- 
fied from  the  beginning  for  the  place  of  power  that  ulti- 
mately came  to  him. 

Baruch  reveres  facts.  He  applied  laboriously  collected 
and  carefully  digested  knowledge  to  a  Wall  Street  that  ebbs 
and  flows  to  the  impulse  of  rumors  and  reports,  and  netted 
his  fish  indiff'erently  with  the  outward  or  the  inward  current. 
In  a  Washington  of  "guess"  and  "estimate,"  "think"  and 
"about,"  he  pursued  the  definite  decimal-point  fact.  His 
great  conception  of  the  commodity  sections  came  from  his 
profound  belief  that  first  of  all  there  must  be  reliable  knowl- 


I 

in 


I 


v^  ' 


I      I 

> 


68    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


1 


I 


edge  of  the  factors  of  all  war-time  problems.  With  the  com- 
modity sections  behind  him,  he  had  the  facts,  as  nobody  else 
had  them.  Digested  by  his  penetrating  power  of  analysis 
and  applied  with  his  airline  judgment,  he  had  a  grasp  of 
everything  he  dealt  with  in  Washington  that  really  put  him 
in  a  higher  rank  than  any  of  the  great  captains  of  industry. 

It  is  something  of  a  mystery  that  the  President,  knowing 
and  appreciating  Baruch  as  he  did,  did  not  lean  more  on 
him  and  advance  him  more  rapidly  to  the  high  command  of 
industry  mobilized  for  war.  The  truth  probably  is  that  he 
feared  that  in  public  estimation  Baruch  was  too  fresh  from 
Wall  Street.  On  the  other  hand,  Baruch,  though  ardently 
ambitious  to  participate  in  the  world  of  effort,  is  not  a  good 
self-promoter.  Whether  it  proceeds  from  affectation  or 
modesty,  the  one-time  brilliant  Wall  Street  operator  seems 
to  be  positively  timid  in  his  first  mingling  with  a  new  environ- 
ment. Assigned  to  raw  materials,  of  which  coal  is  perhaps 
chief,  he  unprotestingly  surrendered  it  to  Secretary  Lane, 
from  whom  Secretary  Baker  took  it  away,  with  the  result  that 
a  separate  coal  administration  arose.  He  excused  this  sur- 
render later  by  saying  that  coal  was  a  "porcupine  that  he 
was  glad  to  let  go  of."  He  must  many  times  have  wished 
that  same  porcupine,  quills  and  all,  back  in  his  hands. 
Whatever  the  cause,  the  fact  remains  that  the  man  who  could 
certainly  have  done  in  the  fall  of  1917  what  he  did  in  the 
spring  of  1918,  was  passed  over  for  many  months  after  he 
had  demonstrated  to  all  close,  unprejudiced  observers  that 
he  was  marked  for  leadership. 

There  is  some  unwritten  history  here  that  has  never  been 
and  may  never  be  told.  It  is  known  that  early  in  the  war 
President  Wilson  had  the  intention  of  making  Mr.  Baruch 
general  purchasing  agent  for  the  Government.  Yet,  in  the 
latter  part  of  1917  and  early  part  of  1918,  when  Baruch  was 
the  logical  man  to  have  thrown  into  the  industrial  gap,  and 
the  War  Department  was  beginning  to  utilize  Mr.  Stettinius, 
the  President  waited  and  deliberated  for  months.  It  was 
not  only  that  he  did  not  raise  up  the  man,  but  that  he  let  the 
place  drift  and  disintegrate,  though  Mr.  Willard,  with  clear 
insight,  had  pointed  out  to  him  that  the  one  thing  to  do  was 
to  amputate  the  War  Industries  Board  from  the  Council  and 


THE  PERSONAL  ELEMENT 


69 


launch  it,  surcharged  with  authority,  against  the  menacing 
disorders  of  the  period. 

The  indecision  was  likely  the  product  of  tangled  congeries 
of  doubts  and  conflicting  policies  and  personalities.  There 
was  the  pull  for  a  Department  of  Munitions,  there  were  antip- 
athies to  Baruch,  aroused  among  many  close  to  the  Presi- 
dent by  Baruch's  original  ways  of  getting  things  done  —  and 
there  was  still  the  bogey  of  Wall  Street  origin,  which  had 
not  been  dissipated  by  the  unparalleled  success  of  Baruch  m 
effecting,  by  appealing  to  the  patriotism  of  Wall  Street, 
slashes  in  the  prices  of  copper,  nickel,  tin,  lead,  and  steel, 
that    set   the    fashion    and    moulded    the    motive    of    war 

cooperation. 

The  President's  hesitation  is  all  the  more  perplexmg  when 
it  is  considered  that  Baruch  was  near  to  him  and  that  he  was 
near  to  Baruch.  The  chances  are  that  Baruch  could  have 
tipped  the  scales  to  action  by  a  single  picturesgue  sentence 
in  his  own  behalf.  It  is  probably  to  be  put  down  to  his 
debit  that  he  did  not  submerge  personal  advancement  in  the 
cause  of  the  public  good.  In  a  time  of  clashing  worlds  and 
smashing  customs  there  was  no  place  for  personal  diffidences, 
however  honorable  to  their  possessor.  He  knew  the  crying 
demand  for  leadership,  and  was  conscious  of  his  own  capac- 
ity for  it.  He  was  by  then  attuned  to  public  life,  and  yet  he 
did  not  push  himself  forward  when  to  do  so  was  public  duty. 

Besides  his  natural  qualities  and  his  peculiarly  fitting 
experience,  Baruch  had  certain  advantages  when  he  did  come 
into  power  that  none  of  his  predecessors  had.  His  great 
wealth  was  a  distinct  asset.  It  made  him  independent  of  the 
material  considerations  that  would  have  harassed  a  poor 
man  in  his  place.  The  nature  of  its  acquisition  made  him 
independent  of  all  bias  or  obligation  to  the  "interests."  The 
bigness  of  it  put  him  on  a  plane  of  equality  and  familiarity 
with  all  comers.  Sixty  million  dollars,  incarnate  in  Judge 
Gary,  opulently  set  in  the  two  billions  of  the  Steel  Corpora- 
tion, in  Baruch's  eyes  bred  none  of  the  dignity  that  doth 
hedge  kings.  He  had  no  past  favors  to  reward  or  future 
benefits  to  cultivate.  His  fortune  was  stuck  to  none  of  the 
great  interests.  He  had  never  drawn  a  huge  or  any  salary  or 
emolument  from  any  of  them.     He  looked  forward  to  no 


1'  ■  <r 


>« 


.1 


'  I, 


m 


1 


70    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

associations  with  them.  He  was  of  Wall  Street,  but  he  was  its 
Ishmael.  He  had  made  his  money  by  pitting  his  knowledge 
of  men  and  things  and  his  judgment  of  events  against  those 
of  the  greatest  masters  of  industry  and  commerce.  He 
respected  the  monarchs  and  nobles  of  the  realm  of  industry 
and  finance,  but  they  had  no  fears  or  favors  for  him.  For 
him  they  wore  no  halos  and  emitted  no  sanctities.  Perhaps 
it  was  because  he  accumulated  his  wealth  by  raiding  their 
preserves  that  he  became  a  Democrat  in  politics  and  some- 
thing of  a  radical  in  economics. 

But  regardless  of  his  unafraidness,  his  practice  of 
equality,  there  was  an  advantage  to  Baruch  derived  from  his 
wealth  and  his  business  success.  Poets  esteem  each  other 
according  to  the  merit  of  their  verses;  men  of  affairs  measure 
each  other  by  dollars.  The  chairman  of  the  War  Industries 
Board  was  rated  high  by  that  standard.  Although  he  was 
on  the  opposite  side  of  the  table,  big  business  men  liked  to 
deal  with  him  because  he  talked  their  language,  even  if  he 
did  it  to  their  disadvantage.  He  was  not  saturated  with 
theories  lacking  the  heat  treatment  of  practice.  He  dealt 
with  facts  and  with  experience.  Instead  of  preaching  he 
traded,  instead  of  commanding  he  bargained. 

The  peculiar  quality  of  his  bargaining  as  a  Government 
representative  was  that  he  was  able  to  invoke  sentiment.  In 
more  sordid  times  it  might  or  not  have  worked.  In  the  war 
it  circulated  at  par.  Cynics  scoffed  then  and  will  scoff 
now  —  but  it  is  a  fact  that  business  came  to  serve  partly  for 
the  meed  of  service.  This  was  truer  of  the  basic  industries 
—  with  which  Baruch  primarily  dealt  —  than  it  was  of  the 
secondary  ones.  He  would  not  tolerate  profiteering. 
Placed  at  the  head  of  another  War  Industries  Board  in 
another  war,  Baruch,  as  his  report  says,^  would  draft  dollars 
as  well  as  men  from  the  start.  As  it  was,  his  drafts  of 
industry  were  extensive. 

Here,  too,  his  hands  were  free.  He  had  drafted  himself 
and  his  dollars.  He  so  arranged  his  affairs  that  not  a  dollar 
of  profit  came  to  him  out  of  the  war.  If  there  was  doubt, 
he  gave  the  Government  the  benefit  and  turned  the  dubious 
item  over  to  the  Red  Cross.     In  the  case  of  one  great  industry 

^American  Industry  in  the  War,  p.  81. 


I 


THE  PERSONAL  ELEMENT 


71 


m 


in  which  he  had  a  large  interest,  an  industry  that  was  making 
a  product  which  the  Government  must  have,  he  directed  that 
the  company  should  supply  the  Government  on  an  absolute 
cost  basis.  He  gave  the  Government  all  his  time  without 
compensation  and  retired  altogether  from  active  business. 
When  he  might  have  doubled  his  fortune  in  Wall  Street  in 
years  that  were  open  doors  of  speculative  opportunity,  he 
was  as  out  of  it  as  if  he  had  never  been  in  it  and  was 
spending  his  reserves  —  in  more  than  one  instance  —  in 
paying  bills  that  were  really  Government  charges.  Nothing 
was  delayed  because  of  a  lack  of  appropriation  if  Baruch 
knew  it.  An  example  in  point  will  be  related  later  in  con- 
nection with  that  lively  and  super-efficient  projection  of  the 
War  Industries  Board,  the  Foreign  Mission. 

Baruch  had  one  very  important  external  advantage  that 
his  predecessors  did  not  have.  He  had  warm  supporters 
in  high  places.  Not  only  was  the  President  for  and  with 
him,  but  McAdoo,  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  and  Director- 
General  of  Railroads,  with  one  hand  on  the  till  of  the 
mightiest  of  all  treasuries  and  the  other  on  the  throttle  lever 
of  the  greatest  of  all  transport  agencies,  always  stood  behind 
Baruch  like  a  brother.  In  any  moment  of  doubt  or  weak- 
ness, McAdoo,  speaking  for  vast  powers,  was  there  with 
substantial  reinforcements. 

All  who  came  in  contact  with  Baruch  when  he  was  chair- 
man of  the  War  Industries  Board  were  impressed  by  his 
simplicity  of  motive.  Inspired  by  patriotism  of  the  highest 
and  intensest  order,  he  had  one  single  objective  —  the 
winning  of  the  war.  His  mind  had  no  room  for  intrigue 
and  the  advancement  of  personal  ambitions,  large  or  small. 

Aside  from  the  contributive  value  of  his  environment  and 
experience,  Baruch  possessed  inherent  qualities  that  fitted 
him  for  his  great  office.  One  of  these  was  his  unfailing, 
good-natured,  tolerant  patience.  All  of  his  associates  com- 
ment on  his  patience.  His  good-humor  was  unfailing.  His 
smile  was  perennial;  he  was  never  too  tired  or  too  engrossed 
to  smile.  Optimist  that  he  is,  that  smile  must  many  times 
have  masked  a  profound  depression.  Baruch's  power  of 
swift  and  unqualified  decision,  which  was  one  of  the  greatest 
factors  in  his  success  with  the  War  Industries  Board,  is  the 


II   • 


V 


72    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


I 


It 
I 


child  of  his  courage.  He  never  quailed  before  any  responsi- 
bility of  decision  no  matter  how  momentous.  Reference 
and  deference  are  the  curses  of  lumbering  bureaucracies. 
Impressed  with  the  importance  of  decision,  it  was  Baruch's 
habit  swiftly  to  assemble  the  facts  and  arguments  and 
quickly  decide.  President  Wilson  was  not  lacking  in 
decision,  but  he  was  wont  to  wait  for  events  to  unfold  more 
data.  Baruch  took  the  current  data  and  decided,  well  under- 
standing that  paralysis  is  more  dangerous  than  error. 

Simplicity  of  manner  was  another  quality  that  helped  him 
greatly.  He  took  on  no  airs  with  power.  A  certain  boy- 
ishness marked  all  his  doings.  He  worked  with  zest  and  not 
with  carking  care.  He  liked  it.  He  was  never  too  pre- 
occupied to  ignore  small  talk.  Whenever  possible,  he 
renewed  his  strength  from  social  intercourse.  Not  much 
given  to  press-agenting  his  own  activities  (too  little  so  for 
his  official  impact,  in  the  writer's  judgment) ,  he  delighted  in 
the  daily  meeting  with  the  newspaper  men.  With  them  he 
chaffed  and  was  chaffed.  The  strain  was  great,  but  it  was 
a  great  game. 

Wall  Street  was  a  little  thing  to  playing  with  the  resources 
and  facilities  of  a  nation  and  of  nations.  Negotiating  with 
Chile  for  nitrates  or  with  Spain  for  mules  for  Pershing  was 
high  adventure.  To  get  the  nitrates  he  "beared"  them  with 
plans  for  synthetic  nitrate;  to  get  the  mules  he  "bulled"  the 
ammonia  that  was  exchanged  for  them.  Jute  could  not  be 
obtained  from  India,  it  seemed,  because  India  was  an 
independent  empire  which  could  not  be  controlled  from 
London;  but  London  found  a  way  to  control  when  it  was 
made  plain  that  America  might  not  be  able  any  longer  to 
pour  silver  into  the  Indian  mints.  Truly  this  was  an  absorb- 
ing role  for  a  prince  of  traders. 

Life  in  the  War  Industries  Board  was  a  succession  of 
big  things,  full  of  thrills.  Baruch,  nervous  and  impulsive, 
found  full  outlet  for  his  impetuous  energies  and  the  outgo 
kept  him  cool  and  calm.  The  procession  of  great  enterprises 
left  no  opening  for  staleness.  With  no  natural  talent  for 
detail,  indeed,  with  a  distinct  dislike  of  it,  Baruch  had  devel- 
oped a  great  capacity  for  it.  His  photographic  memory, 
which  is  automatic  and  records  without  concentration,  leads 


THE  PERSONAL  ELEMENT 


73 


him  to  a  neglect  of  even  systematic  personal  records  and  files. 
Lost  papers  in  the  War  Industries  Board  were  usually  found 
in  Baruch's  pockets  after  futile  search  had  been  made  every- 
where else.  He  knew  their  contents,  but  had  forgotten  that 
they  were  in  his  pocket. 

His  passion  for  accuracy  might  have  led  to  his  undoing 
through  a  blinding  absorption  in  detail,  if  he  had  not 
surrounded  himself  with  able  lieutenants.  But  here  another 
quality  came  to  his  aid,  and  that  is  his  almost  unfailing 
judgment  of  men.  He  picked  masterful  minds  to  be  his 
coadjutors,  and  so  great  was  his  confidence  in  his  judgment 
that  he  conveyed  to  each  of  them  in  his  particular  field  all 
the  authority  he  had  received  —  and  more.  And  this  sug- 
gests a  diversion.  Baruch  was  deeply  impressed  with  the 
idea  that  a  nation  at  war  has  so  much  at  stake  that  the 
rigidity  of  laws  and  conventions  of  peace  are  automatically 
and  necessarily  suspended  —  that  the  preservation  of  the 
nation  becomes  a  law  above  constitutions.  He  found  his 
justification  in  Lincoln,  who  thought  it  more  incumbent  upon 
him  to  preserve  the  Nation  than  the  integrity  of  the  Consti- 
tution. Baruch  gave  authority  and  credit  and  took  all  the 
responsibility  without  hedging  or  reneging.  His  lieutenants 
never  feared  a  fire  from  the  rear. 

They  were  all  well  adapted  to  the  central  idea  of  industrial 
self-control  for  patriotic  purposes.  They  were  from  indus- 
try and  would  have  resented  dictatorial  methods  had  they 
remained  in  it.  They  knew  just  how  the  men  at  home  felt. 
They  were  also  simple,  democratic  Americans.  A  surpris- 
ingly large  number  of  them  came  from  the  Middle  West, 
Legge,  Peek,  and  Shaw,  for  example.  Naturally  they  would 
have  favored  regulation  of  industry  by  consent  rather  than 
by  rigid  rule,  even  if  the  evolution  of  the  War  Industries 
Board  from  the  nucleus  of  voluntary  help  instead  of  from 
superimposed  law  had  not  given  it  that  character  long  before 
it  had  teeth.  They  fitted  admirably  into  the  conception  of 
industry  imposing  from  its  best  judgment  its  own  rules  and 
regulations  and  self-administering  them. 

The  War  Industries  Board  was  the  least  bureaucratic  of 
organizations.  It  was  really  the  town  meeting  of  American 
industry  curbing,  disciplining  and  devoting  itself.     There 


)    I 


'*>« 


f 


I 


1 


I 


74    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

was  the  result  that  the  greatest  of  the  industrial  nations 
eventually  exercised  a  more  far-reaching  and  compelling 
control  of  industry  than  did  any  other  of  the  warring  coun- 
tries, and  yet  accomplished  it  at  a  comparative  trifle  of 
overhead  and  v»ith  a  mere  handful  of  executives  and  a  few 
hundred  clerical  helpers  —  not  as  many  persons  on  the 
official  roll,  all  told,  as  a  single  bureau  of  the  British  wool 
control  had.  American  industry  virtually  imposed  on  itself, 
through  the  clearing-house  of  the  War  Industries  Board,  its 
own  rules  and  then  policed  itself  with  a  view  to  their  enforce- 
ment. It  is  to  the  everlasting  honor  of  American  business 
and  to  the  vindication  of  our  democracy  that  the  rules  were 
better  for  the  public  interest  and  better  enforced  than  like 
ones  among  friends  or  enemies. 

When  the  end  of  the  war  came,  it  did  not  find  American 
industry  enmeshed  in  war-time  laws  and  regulations  which 
it  would  take  years  to  shake  off.  On  the  contrary,  about  all 
it  had  to  do  was  to  relax  its  own  rules  and  change  its 
objectives  from  those  of  war  to  those  of  peace.  In  the 
writer's  opinion,  the  change  was  made  too  abruptly,  but  that 
is  another  story.  It  cannot  be  said  too  often  —  and  there 
will  be  reiteration  of  it  in  this  book  —  that  the  original 
feature  of  the  War  Industries  Board  was  its  successful, 
cooperative,  democratic,  self-control  of  industry  for  national 
purposes. 

Baruch  had  an  instinct  for  management  that  more  than 
made  up  for  any  lack  of  executive  experience  in  connection 
with  great  administrative  machines  that  might  have  been  his. 
Having  entrusted  power  to  his  chiefs  and  sections,  he  kept 
out  of  sight.  He  discouraged  any  tendency  to  pass  matters 
on  to  him  for  the  final  visa.  He  absented  himself  from 
committee  and  subdivision  meetings  where  he  might  well  be 
expected  to  appear  because  of  the  major  importance  of  the 
things  under  consideration.  Even  in  such  cases  he  did  not 
reserve  the  right  of  veto.  Only  in  the  event  that  his  lieu- 
tenants could  not  decide  because  they  could  not  agree  did 
Baruch  intervene.  These  methods  of  procedure  worked 
wonders  in  putting  driving  power  into  the  work  of  the  War 
Industries  Board.  The  paralyzing  fear  of  reversal  by  a 
higher  authority  was  removed.    Decision  being  concentrated 


^ 


THE  PERSONAL  ELEMENT 


75 


became  strong.  Not  participating  in  the  work  of  his 
department  chiefs,  Baruch  remained  detached;  advantage- 
ously placed  to  view  the  whole  machine,  see  its  external 
contacts  and  steer  its  general  course.  Not  brought  into 
personal  friction  with  champions  of  conflicting  or  obstructive 
business  interests,  Baruch  in  the  background  was  the  bogey 
man,  the  final  repository  of  power,  the  Zeus  of  the  Olympus 
of  Industry  who  was  to  be  propitiated  by  settlements  instead 
of  appeals;  whose  portentous  potentialities  were  not  to  be 
lightly  invoked. 

People  soon  learned  that  with  Baruch  at  the  head  of  the 
War  Industries  Board,  it  was  useless  to  insist  on  seeing 
the  man  higher  up  in  preference  to  a  divisional  chief.  It 
was  not  hard  to  see  Baruch,  if  they  insisted,  but  they  learned 
that  it  was  a  waste  of  time  —  for  in  this  organization  the  men 
lower  down  did  not  merely  interview;  they  decided,  not  as 
the  basis  of  an  appeal,  but  as  finality  itself.  Sub-executives 
who  are  forever  subject  to  appeal  and  frequently  to  reversal 
cease  to  be  executives  in  initiative  as  well  as  in  performance. 
Preferring  error  to  inaction,  Baruch  did  not  expect  per- 
fection of  his  associates;  but  incompetence  was  met  with 
elimination,  not  with  correction.  It  was  the  only  system 
that  would  command  the  devoted  loyalty  and  best  eff'orts  of 
strong  and  able  men,  of  men  who  are  willing  to  sink  or  swim 
on  their  records,  but  who  insist  on  a  clear  field  in  their 
departments. 

From  this  system,  which  Baruch  describes  as  decentraliza- 
tion of  authority  (which  is,  however,  predicated  on  the 
primary  establishment  of  an  unquestioned  source  of  author- 
ity and  responsibility),  flowed  a  remarkable  product  of 
energetic  action.  "Here  is  a  job,"  Baruch  would  say,  or 
indite  a  hasty  memorandum  to  one  of  his  "boys."  He  might 
cite  some  of  the  elements  and  indicate  the  objective,  but  as 
to  how  the  job  was  to  be  done  he  gave  no  hint.  "I'm  on  the 
job,"  would  be  the  answer  —  and  nine  times  out  of  ten  that 
was  the  last  Baruch  would  have  to  do  with  that  matter.  It 
was  off  his  mind  and  he  was  free  to  go  on  with  his  assign- 
ments. In  this  way  Baruch,  as  the  great  coordinator  of 
governmental  instrumentalities,  did  not  fall  into  the  error  of 
littering  up  his  own  establishment. 


II 


u 


i 


7 

I 

i 


I 


I' 

I 


lU 


76    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

With  such  a  company  around  him  enjoying  such  a  whole- 
sale delegation  of  authority,  Baruch's  mind  was  free  to  its 
impulses  and  intuitions.  He  could  move  rapidly  at  will 
around  the  Washington  scene,  receptive  to  suggestions,  open 
to  thought,  and  with  free  outlet  and  prompt  application  of 
the  plans  that  struck  fire  in  his  luminous  mind.  He  may  be 
fairly  called  a  great  executive.  He  is  essentially  a  creator, 
and  yet  he  has  a  marked  talent  for  inspiring  action  and 
devoted  loyalty. 

Baruch  could  not  have  succeeded  as  he  did,  however,  if 
he  had  been  merely  mind  without  character.  The  writer 
does  not  always  agree  with  his  mental  processes  —  though 
they  are  always  arresting  —  but  no  one  who  knows  Baruch 
could  ever  question  the  integrity  that  runs  like  a  sensitive 
current  throughout  his  entire  make-up.  When  the  last  word 
is  said,  it  was  Baruch's  character  that  saw  him  through,  that 
and  his  incessant  courage,  marvelous  intuitive  judgment,  and 
patience.  The  writer  freely  confesses  that  he  was  one  of 
those  who,  in  the  early  days  of  the  war,  doubted  the  capacity 
of  Baruch  to  master  a  situation  so  full  of  dynamic  and  loose 
ends,  and  he  finds  a  certain  intellectual  pleasure  in  thus 
recording  his  final  judgment  of  Baruch's  contribution  to  the 
war. 

The  executives  of  the  War  Industries  Board  were  mostly 
young  —  scarcely  any  were  over  fifty  —  and  coming  rather 
than  going  men.  Their  names^  did  not  always  mean  much 
to  the  public,  but  they  were  impressive  in  industry.  They 
were  men  in  the  active  middle  of  their  careers;  men  who 
were  then  doing  the  things  that  would  make  them  famous 
later.  To  a  large  extent,  too,  they  were  independent  of 
patronage  for  the  development  of  their  careers.  Either  they 
were  not  salaried  men,  or  their  ability  was  so  conspicuous 
that  they  had  no  cause  for  worry  about  their  futures.  They 
were  able  to  cut  loose  from  and  rise  above  their  previous 
associations  in  serving  the  public. 

It  should  not  be  inferred  from  this,  however,  that,  in 
choosing  these  yoimger  and  more  virile  executives  to  act 
officially  for  the  Government,  the  counsel  and  influence  of 

*Sec  Appendix  for  list  of  War  Industries  Board  executives,  giving  their 
business  aMiiations  as  of  the  war  period. 


I 

4 


THE  PERSONAL  ELEMENT 


77 


the  men  who  loomed  greater  in  the  public  eye  was  lost. 
These  older  men,  these  greater  figures,  at  any  rate,  were  of 
the  greatest  assistance  to  the  Government  on  or  through  the 
trade  committees  which  represented  industry  in  its  manifold 
contacts  with  the  War  Industries  Board.  In  the  beginning, 
in  the  early  days  of  the  Council,  it  will  be  remembered,  they 
represented  the  Advisory  Commission  directly.  The  Council 
and  the  Advisory  Commission  did  many  great  things,  but 
they  never  did  a  greater  one  than  enlisting  the  so-called 
dollar-a-year  men.  They  thus  opened  the  door  for  ingress 
to  Government  of  the  truly  able  men  of  the  Nation,  who  in 
ordinary  times  are  in  business  and  not  in  Government. 

The  ineradicable  belief  that  no  man  is  great  enough  to 
rise  above  the  selfish  impulses  of  his  own  business  kept  them 
in  the  background  to  a  large  extent,  especially  in  the  early 
days  of  the  war.     There  resulted  a  terrible  waste  of  time 
and  ability.     Men  of  the  rarest  capacity  were  doing  clerical 
work  in  Washington;  others  were  not  there  at  all.     But  the 
business  committee  system  made  them  emergently  available, 
even  though  not  in  a  publicly  conspicuous  way.     It  did  more 
than  that.     Even  when  the  war   service   committees   were 
strictly  segregated  on  the  private  side  of  the  fence  and  were 
frankly  acting  for  industry  rather  than  for  the  Government, 
every  one  of  them  had  a  great  consciousness  of  an  over- 
topping public  duty.     First  to  last,  through  this  invocation 
of  the  great  ability  of  America,  all  the  knowledge,  all  the 
experience,  all  the  energy  of  the  greatest  pool  of  strong  men 
to  be  found  in  the  whole  world  was  available.     As  the  war 
went  on,  the  public  came  to  demand  the  services  of  these 
men,  regardless  of  the  ancient  prejudice  —  and  so  men  like 
Baruch,  Stettinius,  Lovett,  Schwab,  Franklin,  John  D.  Ryan, 
and  many  others  of  their  caliber  were  called  to  the  front-line 
trenches  of  industry  in  the  war.     The  reluctance  at  first  to 
give  power  to  those  who  could  use  it,  for  fear  they  would 
abuse  It  (and  delegating  it  to  those  who  did  abuse  it  because 
they  could  not  use  it),  is  one  of  the  reasons  why  the  war 
machine  took  time  to  evolve.     It  is  doubtful,  though,  the 
popular  mmd  being  what  it  is,  whether  either  Mr.  Willard 
or  Mr  Baruch  could  have  "got  away"  with  the  appointment 
ot  Judge  Gary  as  steel  administrator,  so  conspicuously  the 
master  was  he  of  his  great  industry. 


4 


II 


) 


ll 

I 


78    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

It  was  in  the  coming  out  of  these  men  —  the  private  earn- 
ing capacity  of  their  kind  in  the  War  Industries  Board  alone 
was  said  to  have  been  $35,000,000  a  year  —  that  democracy 
was  vindicated.  Germany  was  collectively  efficient  and 
ready  for  war  because  she  was  ruled  by  an  oligarchy  that 
took  thought  and  pains.  The  United  States  was  collectively 
—  meaning  the  State  —  inefficient  and  unready  because  it 
was  ruled  in  peace  by  the  crowd,  which  does  not  take 
thought.  The  best  minds  of  Germany  were  in  the  State  in 
time  of  peace;  the  best  minds  in  America  were  not  in  the 
State.  But  the  State  did  the  thinking  for  all  Germany  and 
attended  to  all  initiative;  hence  there  were  slender  reserves 
of  ability  outside  the  bureaucracy  and  the  talent  within  had 
become  mechanized  by  discipline  and  routine. 

The  United  States,  on  the  other  hand,  had  an  almost 
unlimited  reserve  of  executive,  technical,  and  professional 
ability  which  was  of  exceptional  value  just  because  it  had 
not  hitherto  served  the  State.  In  the  emergency  it  turned  to 
the  work  of  the  State  with  zest,  refreshing  originality,  and 
keen  vigor.  If  we  could  always  have  such  men  in  public  life 
and  service,  we  should  be  blessed  with  a  government  efficient 
and  beneficial.  But  it  is  the  paradox  of  the  problem  that, 
if  we  had  them  there,  we  should  not  have  them  swarming 
in  industry  and  building  up  reserves  of  talent  subject  to 
call.     Democracies  pay  for  private  efficiency  with  public 

inefficiency. 

There  were  many  men  in  the  Government  service,  not 
technically  doUar-a-year  men,  who  were  of  the  same  type 
and  whose  sacrifice  was  greater.  These  were  able  men  of 
large  earnings  or  salaries,  but  without  sufficient  savings  to 
stand  a  long  period  without  income.  They  accepted  the 
small  salaries,  rarely  ever  more  than  three  thousand  to  six 
thousand  dollars,  that  it  was  possible  to  pay  them,  and 
reduced  their  living  scale  accordingly.  One  man,  for 
example,  who  had  been  drawing  a  salary  of  twenty-five 
thousand  dollars  a  year,  lived  in  a  hall  room  in  Washington 
and  patronized  the  cheap  restaurants  in  order  to  serve  the 
War  Industries  Board.  For  some  of  the  doUar-a-year  men 
there  was  no  great  personal  sacrifice.  Some  had  independ- 
ent fortunes  and  others  had  their  burden  assumed  by  their 


THE  PERSONAL  ELEMENT 


79 


former  employers.  Some  of  the  men  who  were  able  to 
carry  themselves  did,  however,  make  a  trernendous  sacrifice 
in  that  they  not  only  gave  a  year  or  two  of  time  in  the  best 
periods  of  their  lives,  but  deprived  themselves  of  unequaled 
opportunities  to  make  fortunes.  In  Washington  they  lost 
opportunity,  worked  in  obscurity,  and  in  some  instances 
suffered  undeserved  disgrace.  One  such  executive  gave  .up 
salaries  amounting  to  eighty-five  thousand  dollars  a  year 
and  certain  profits  several  times  as  large. 

It  was  one  of  the  important  functions  of  the  Advisory  Com- 
mission that  it  served  as  a  clearing-house  for  the  services  of 
men  who  were  eager  to  help.  The  man  and  the  place  were 
brought    together  —  not    only    in    the    Commission's    own 
sphere,  but  throughout  the   Government;   for  in   the  war 
establishments   and    in    all   the    regular   departments    and 
special  war  agencies  there  was  an  almost  unlimited  demand 
for  executive  ability  that  could  not  be  met  through  civil 
service   channels.     For   many  months  the  Advisory   Com- 
mission was  about  the  only  center  in  Washington  where 
there  was  anything  like  a  clear  general  view  of  the  multi- 
tudinous activities  of  Government  in  the  great  emergency, 
and  it  was  thus  of  vast  assistance,  not  only  in  supplying 
needed   men,   but   also   in   giving   needed   information   to 
thousands  of  bewildered  persons  who  were  endeavoring  to 
find  out  how  they  could  assist  in  their  private  capacities  as 
manufacturers  and  professional  men.     To  depart  a  little 
from  the  clear  course  of  this  discussion,  it  might  be  added 
that  the  Advisory  Commission  acted  similarly  as  a  clearing- 
house of  information,   suggestion,  and   inspiration  to   the 
whole  country. 

"History  will  never  be  in  a  position,"  says  an  editorial  in 
the  "New  Republic,"  "to  chronicle,  because  these  last  four 
years  have  glutted  it  with  centuries  of  material,  all  the 
heroic  deeds  at  the  front,  or  all  the  sacrifices  behind  the 
lines;  and  while  our  dreams  may  never  become  more  tangible 
than  dreams,  and  the  'Business  Administration'  still  be  a 
goal  for  the  aspiration  of  future  generations,  the  foundation 
has  been  laid  and  the  material  proved  to  be  available  in  the 
existence  in  our  national  fabric  of  the  qualities  which  are 
personified  these  days  in  the  'dollar-a-year  man.' " 


M' 


II 


:i 


80    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Daniel  Willard  deserves  a  high  place  on  the  record  of 
personalities.  In  a  way,  and  consciously,  too,  he  made  a 
supreme  personal  "sacrifice  hit"  for  the  War  Industries 
Board.  It  has  been  explained  how  in  the  "dead  center" 
times  of  the  fall  of  1917,  when  evolution  was  not  evolving, 
this  executive,  displeased  with  the  lack  of  progress,  the 
delay  in  centralization,  the  ooziness  of  industrial  control, 
and  his  failure  to  secure  the  authority  that  he  knew  was 
indispensable  to  success,  decided  to  resign  and  go  back  to 
the  president's  office  of  the  Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railway.  The 
great  thing  about  this  resignation  was  that  it  was  a  personal 
sacrifice.  He  left  the  office  to  make  it.  He  could  not  get 
authority,  and  no  big  man  would  therefore  take  it,  as  it  was, 
for  the  same  reason  that  Willard  left  it. 

It  has  been  said  that  one  reason  why  the  President  did 
not  accept  the  suggestion  of  the  creation  of  a  Department  of 
Munitions  was  that  it  required  a  superman  at  its  head  — 
and  he  could  not  find  one.  If  there  were  no  supermen, 
there  were  some  exceptional  men,  and  they  would  not  accept 
positions  of  super-names  and  inferior  authority.  By  his 
resignation  Mr.  Willard  thus  forced  the  caliber  of  the  War 
Industries  Board  chairmanship  up  to  an  equality  with  great, 
if  not  superman,  ability  pending  the  discovery  of  the  super- 
man.    So  Baruch  got  what  was  denied  to  Willard. 

The  masterly  manner  in  which  Willard,  as  chairman  of 
the  Advisory  Commission,  initiated  and  directed  the  preven- 
tion of  the  threatened  general  strike  of  railway  men  on  the 
eve  of  the  war,  and  his  work  in  mobilizing  voluntarily  the 
transportation  facilities  of  America  under  private  manage- 
ment, are  enough  to  give  him  a  great  place  in  the  history  of 
the  war  behind  the  lines.  As  the  railways  were  taken  over  by 
the  Government  at  the  end  of  1917,  the  railway  men  have  not 
been  given  latterly  so  much  credit  as  they  deserve  for  what 
they  did  voluntarily  in  promoting  the  successful  waging  of 
the  war. 

Despite  the  representations  of  the  Attorney-General,  who 
was  intent  upon  enforcement  of  the  laws  that  operated  to 
keep  the  railways  from  acting  together  in  the  manner 
demanded  by  the  necessity,  the  railways  achieved  wonders 
in  unification  of  transportation.     On  the  slightest  suggestion 


III 


'i 


DANIEL  WILLARD 

Chairman  of  the  Advisory  Commission  of  the  Council 

of  National  Defense  and  the  second  Chairman  of  the 

War  Industries  Board 


FRANK  A.  SCOTT 

The  first  Chairman  of  the  War  Industries  Board 


SAMUEL  GOMPER8 

lyfembsr  of  the  Advisory  Commission  of  the  Council 

of  National  Defense  representing  Labor 


ROBERT  S.  LOVETT 

Member  of  the  War  Industries  Board  in  its  early 

organization 


INTENTIONAL  SECOND  EXPOSURE 


/ 


( 


I 

I 


I, 


80    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Daniel  Willard  deserves  a  high  place  on  the  record  of 
personalities.  In  a  way,  and  consciously,  too,  he  made  a 
supreme  personal  "sacrifice  hit"  for  the  War  Industries 
Board.  It  has  been  explained  how  in  the  "dead  center" 
times  of  the  fall  of  1917,  when  evolution  was  not  evolving, 
this  executive,  displeased  with  the  lack  of  progress,  the 
delay  in  centralization,  the  ooziness  of  industrial  control, 
and  his  failure  to  secure  the  authority  that  he  knew  was 
indispensable  to  success,  decided  to  resign  and  go  back  to 
the  president's  office  of  the  Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railway.  The 
great  thing  about  this  resignation  was  that  it  was  a  personal 
sacrifice.  He  left  the  office  to  make  it.  He  could  not  get 
authority,  and  no  big  man  would  therefore  take  it,  as  it  was, 
for  the  same  reason  that  Willard  left  it. 

It  has  been  said  that  one  reason  why  the  President  did 
not  accept  the  suggestion  of  the  creation  of  a  Department  of 
Munitions  was  that  it  required  a  superman  at  its  head  — 
and  he  could  not  find  one.  If  there  were  no  supermen, 
there  were  some  exceptional  men,  and  they  would  not  accept 
positions  of  super-names  and  inferior  authority.  By  his 
resignation  Mr.  Willard  thus  forced  the  caliber  of  the  War 
Industries  Board  chairmanship  up  to  an  equality  with  great, 
if  not  superman,  ability  pending  the  discovery  of  the  super- 
man.    So  Baruch  got  what  was  denied  to  Willard. 

The  masterly  manner  in  which  Willard,  as  chairman  of 
the  Advisory  Commission,  initiated  and  directed  the  preven- 
tion of  the  threatened  general  strike  of  railway  men  on  the 
eve  of  the  war,  and  his  work  in  mobilizing  voluntarily  the 
transportation  facilities  of  America  under  private  manage- 
ment, are  enough  to  give  him  a  great  place  in  the  history  of 
the  war  behind  the  lines.  As  the  railways  were  taken  over  by 
the  Government  at  the  end  of  1917,  the  railway  men  have  not 
been  given  latterly  so  much  credit  as  they  deserve  for  what 
they  did  voluntarily  in  promoting  the  successful  waging  of 
the  war. 

Despite  the  representations  of  the  Attorney-General,  who 
was  intent  upon  enforcement  of  the  laws  that  operated  to 
keep  the  railways  from  acting  together  in  the  manner 
demanded  by  the  necessity,  the  railways  achieved  wonders 
in  unification  of  transportation.     On  the  slightest  suggestion 


i 


DANIEL  WILLARD 

Chairman  of  the  Advisory  Com  mission  of  the  Council 

of  National  Defense  and  the  second  Chairman  of  the 

War  Industries  Board 


FRANK  A.  SCOTT 

The  first  Chairman  of  the  War  Industries  Board 


I 


!;! 


^.^11 


ill. 


li 


I  !) 


i'll 


I     '    / 


SAMUEL  GOMPERS 

Member  of  the  Advisory  Commission  of  the  Council 

of  National  Defense  representing  Labor 


ROBERT  S.  LOVETT 

Member  of  the  War  Industries  Board  in  its  early 

organization 


THE  PERSONAL  ELEMENT 


81 


I 


w   i 


I 
1 


I 

J 


from  Mr.  Willard,  631  railway  companies,  operating 
262,000  miles  of  line,  were  devoted  primarily  to  Govern- 
ment service  —  and  the  general  administrative  expense 
involved  was  met  by  them.  For  eight  months,  an  executive 
committee  that  came  to  be  known  as  the  Railroads  War 
Board  sat  continuously  in  Washington,  ready  to  respond 
to  every  suggestion  that  might  be  made  by  Mr.  Willard 
acting  as  contact  officer  for  the  Government  —  and  this 
board,  with  Mr.  Willard  and  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
missioner E.  E.  Clark  added  to  it,  was  also  the  central 
committee  of  the  Council  of  National  Defense  on  railroad 
transportation.  There  were,  besides,  six  regional  and  other 
committees  continuously  on  the  job. 

The  war  was  but  five  days  old  when  this  committee  was 
created  at  a  meeting  of  the  executives  in  Washington  called 
by  Mr.  Willard  in  response  to  a  resolution  adopted  by  the 
Council  of  National  Defense  introduced  by  Secretary  Lane. 
Without  delay  or  consultation  with  directors  and  stock- 
holders the  executives  that  same  day  adopted  this  resolution: 

Resolved,  That  the  railroads  of  the  United  States,  acting  through 
their  chief  executive  officers  here  and  now  assembled,  and  stirred 
by  a  high  sense  of  their  opportunity  to  be  of  the  greatest  service 
to  their  country  in  the  present  national  crisis,  do  hereby  pledge 
themselves,  with  the  Government  of  the  United  States  and  with 
the  Government  of  the  several  States,  and  one  with  another,  that  dur- 
ing the  present  war  they  will  coordinate  their  operations  in  a  con- 
tinental railway  system,  merging,  during  such  period,  all  their 
merely  individual  competitive  activities  in  the  effort  to  produce  a 
maximum  of  national  transportation  efficiency.  To  this  end  they 
hereby  agree  to  create  an  organization  which  shall  have  general 
authority  to  formulate  in  detail  and  from  time  to  time  a  policy  of 
operation  of  all  or  any  of  the  railways,  which  policy,  when  and  as 
announced  by  such  temporary  organization,  shall  be  accepted  and 
earnestly  made  effective  by  the  several  managements  of  the  indi- 
vidual railroad  companies  here  represented. 

This  is  not  the  place  to  go  into  the  history  of  the  great 
achievements  of  the  railways  thus  unified  for  war  service, 
but  the  prompt  and  comprehensive  manner  in  which  it  was 
done  does  great  credit  to  the  patriotism  of  the  railway 
executives  and  throws  light  on  what  manner  of  executive 


lit 


IM 


i* 


II 


f 


82    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Daniel  Willard  was  in  the  Government  service.  The 
country  was  profoundly  stirred  by  the  speedy  and  friction- 
less  mobilization  of  the  railways.  It  was  dramatic  in 
gesture  and  practical  in  action.  It  must  not  be  forgotten  that 
it  was  all  done  before  the  military  establishments  had  given 
any  thought  to  the  transportation  involvements  of  war.  One 
wonders  if  it  would  not  have  been  better  in  the  end  if  the 
principle  of  democratic  cooperation  and  control  had  been 
applied  throughout  to  the  railways,  as  it  was  to  industry. 

It  was  largely  due  to  Willard's  good  temper  and  steadi- 
ness of  purpose  that  the  Advisory  Commission  had  no 
destructive  dissensions  and  that  able  men  were  held  in  the 
War  Industries  Board  in  the  period  of  doubt  and  delay,  and 
it  is  chiefly  due  to  his  recommendation,  supported  later  by 
his  sacrificial  resignation  (there  was  literally  nothing  peev- 
ish or  disgruntled  about  it,  as  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  at 
the  request  of  the  President  he  continued  as  chairman  of  the 
Advisory  Commission),  that  the  War  Industries  Board  was 
made  independent  of  the  Council  and  infused  with  power. 
It  was  not  for  Mr.  Willard  to  have  the  honor  of  being  in 
at  the  "kill"  in  the  War  Industries  Board's  long  struggle 
to  dominate  the  economics  of  the  war,  but  a  study  of  the 
records  of  the  Council  and  the  Advisory  Commission  and 
the  accounts  of  his  associates  reveal  that  in  many  funda- 
mental ways  he  prepared  the  foundation,  even  outside  his 
special  domain  of  transportation  —  which  is  the  supreme 
"facility"  of  the  utilization  of  material  and  materiel  —  for 
the  later  eff'ective  functioning  of  the  War  Industries  Board. 

Trail-blazers  usually  experience  more  hardship  than 
honor.  Often  their  mistakes  in  an  uncharted  field  are  as 
honorable  as  the  accomplishments  of  their  successors.  The 
superstructure  is  more  obvious  than  the  foundation.  Frank 
A.  Scott,  chairman  of  the  Munitions  Standards  Board, 
chairman  of  the  General  Munitions  Board,  and  first  chair- 
man of  the  War  Industries  Board,  was  one  of  the  pioneers 
in  building  the  American  war  machine,  and  he  was  one  of 
the  sacrifices  to  its  grinding  labors.  His  health  failed 
before  the  machine  was  complete.  He  would  not  have  been 
the  best  man  to  direct  the  finished  War  Industries  part  of 
the  machine.     He  himself,  with  a  singular  and  somewhat 


THE  PERSONAL  ELEMENT 


83 


moving  generosity,  has  said  that  probably  it  was  an  excellent 
thing  that  he  broke  down  to  be  succeeded  eventually  by 
Baruch.  However  that  may  be,  he  was  thought  to  be 
peculiarly  well  adapted  to  the  pioneer  work  that  fell  to  him. 

A  student  of  military  matters  from  boyhood,  he  became, 
as  a  manufacturer,  deeply  interested  in  the  industrial  impli- 
cations of  war.  He  knew  what  such  an  efficient  nation  as 
Germany  would  logically  do  in  an  industrial  way  to  prepare 
for  war.  On  three  different  trips  to  Europe  before  1914, 
he  carefully  studied  the  production  of  military  materiel  in 
England,  Russia,  Germany,  France,  and,  in  a  minor  way,  in 
Italy.  As  early  as  1909  he  came  to  the  conclusion  that 
Germany  was  preparing  for  a  war  of  conquest,  and  that  she 
would  so  overtop  her  immediate  enemies,  owing  to  her 
industrial  preparedness,  that  the  United  States  would  be 
forced  to  join  the  league  against  her  in  order  to  prevent 
Germany  from  becoming  the  world's  dictator. 

The  extraordinary  development  of  by-product  coke  ovens 
in  Germany,  and  even  in  England  by  German  capital, 
indicated  that  Germany  was  planning  far  ahead  for  a  great 
supply  of  the  ingredients  of  high  explosives.  Scott  found 
like  signs  in  the  development  of  the  dye  industry  and  the 
building  of  plants  for  the  fixation  of  nitrate.  The  dis- 
covery in  the  winter  of  1914  that  Germany  had  placed 
orders  for  a  certain  type  of  turret  lathe,  used  in  the  pro- 
duction of  fuses,  on  such  a  scale  that  it  would  have  absorbed 
the  entire  annual  capacity  of  the  United  States,  absolutely 
confirmed  in  his  mind  the  opinion  arrived  at  in  1913  that 
the  war  would  begin  in  1914  —  an  opinion  that  was  even 
then  so  near  a  judgment  that  Mr.  Scott  caused  his  own 
company's  turret  lathe  plant  to  be  made  ready  for  the  orders 
that  he  was  sure  would  soon  be  coming  from  Germany's 
enemies. 

When  the  war  came,  he  shipped  lathes  to  England  without 
waiting  for  orders.  He  became  one  of  the  Ohio  committee 
members  of  the  Industrial  Preparedness  Committee  of  the 
Naval  Consulting  Board,  and  was,  therefore,  in  the  midst 
of  an  enterprise  that  dovetailed  into  the  munitions  pro- 
gramme of  the  Council  of  National  Defense  when  the  United 
States  entered  the  war.     He  undertook  the  duties  of  chair- 


I» 


i 


I 


II 

•i 


84    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

man  of  the  Munitions  Standard  Board  and  of  the  General 
Munitions  Board  with  the  greatest  zeal  and  performed  them 
with  boundless  energy,  finally  paying  the  price  of  collapse, 
and  becoming  one  of  the  many  and  little  honored  civilian 
casualties  of  the  war. 

A  man  with  such  an  experience  and  such  a  foresight  was 
presumably  specially  qualified  to  cooperate  with  the  army 
and  navy  in  planning  and  stimulating  the  production  of 
munitions  in  this  country.     He  may  have  put  munitions 
proper  out  of  perspective  with  the  general  industrial  back- 
ground, but  it  required  a  tremendous  emphasis  on  the  source 
of  requirements  to  bring  out  the  basic  effects.     These  soon 
emerged  and  then  the  General  Munitions  Board  was  merged 
in    the    greater    War    Industries    Board.     Mr.    Scott    was 
throughout  a  firm  believer  in  the  creation   of  a  civilian 
organization  that  would  complement  the  army  supply  system 
instead  of  superseding  it.     It  is  probable  that  it  was  due 
to  him  that  the  Executive  decision  did  not  swing  to  a  depart- 
ment of  munitions  in  the  first  two  or  three  months  of  the 
war.     He  had  a  high  opinion  of  the  capacity  of  the  regular 
army  officers,  and  his  consequent  friendly  relations  with 
tfiem  did  much  to  cause  them  to  welcome  in  an  increasing 
degree  the  assistance  of  the  War  Industries  Board.     The 
eventual  evolution  of  the  Board  conformed  to  his  original 
conception    of   a    civilian    organization   that    would    be    a 
coordinating  body  standing  between  the  army  and  navy  and 
other  war  instrumentalities  and  industry,  but  went  farther, 
because  in  its  field  it  became  commanding. 

With  all  his  understanding,  Scott  did  not  achieve  complete 
success  in  the  War  Industries  Board  and  could  not  have 
succeeded,  because  he  was  too  respectful  of  the  army. 
A  uniform  to  him  was  the  equivalent  of  a  certificate  of 
superiority  in  military  matters.  He  clearly  perceived  the 
dire  need  of  the  army  for  civilian  assistance,  but  he  did  not 
fully  grasp  the  need  of  civilian  domination  in  supply 
matters.  Baruch  is  open  to  the  criticism  that,  perceiving 
this  need,  he  did  not  force  the  issue  in  those  dreary  months 
when  the  Board  was  drifting  and  dying  of  anaemia;  and 
Secretary  Baker  was  letting  the  army  run  wild  through  the 
supply  pastures  and  was  planning,  with  the   aid   of  Mr. 


ALEXANDER  LEGGE 

Vice-chairman  of  the  War  Industries  Board.  Manager  of  the  Allied  Purchasing  Commission 
and  Baruch's  Chief  of  Staff.  Now  President  of  the  International  Harviter  Company 


INTENTIONAL  SECOND  EXPOSURE 


1/ 


I 


IJ 


I 


84    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

man  of  the  Munitions  Standard  Board  and  of  the  General 
Munitions  Board  with  the  greatest  zeal  and  performed  them 
with  boundless  energy,  finally  paying  the  price  of  collapse, 
and  becommg  one  of  the  many  and  little  honored  civilian 
casualties  of  the  war. 

A  man  with  such  an  experience  and  such  a  foresight  was 
presumably  specially  qualified  to  cooperate  with  the  army 
and  navy  in  planning  and  stimulating  the  production  of 
munitions  in  this  country.     He  may  have  put  munitions 
proper  out  of  perspective  with  the  general  industrial  back- 
ground, but  it  required  a  tremendous  emphasis  on  the  source 
of  requirements  to  bring  out  the  basic  effects.     These  soon 
emerged  and  then  the  General  Munitions  Board  was  merged 
m    the    greater    War    Industries    Board.     Mr.    Scott    was 
throughout  a   firm  believer  in   the   creation   of  a   civilian 
organization  that  would  complement  the  army  supply  system 
instead  of  superseding  it.     It  is  probable  that  it  was  due 
to  him  that  the  Executive  decision  did  not  swing  to  a  depart- 
ment of  munitions  in  the  first  two  or  three  months  of  the 
war.     He  had  a  high  opinion  of  the  capacity  of  the  regular 
army  officers,   and  his  consequent  friendly   relations   with 
them  did  much  to  cause  them  to  welcome  in  an  increasing 
degree  the  assistance  of  the  War  Industries  Board.     The 
eventual  evolution  of  the  Board  conformed  to  his  original 
conception    of   a    civilian    organization   that    would    be    a 
coordinating  body  standing  between  the  army  and  navy  and 
other  war  instrumentalities  and  industry,  but  went  farther, 
because  in  its  field  it  became  commanding. 

With  all  his  understanding,  Scott  did  not  achieve  complete 
success  m  the  War  Industries  Board  and  could  not  have 
succeeded,  because  he  was  too  respectful  of  the  army. 
A  uniform  to  him  was  the  equivalent  of  a  certificate  of 
superiority  in  military  matters.  He  clearly  perceived  the 
dire  need  of  the  army  for  civilian  assistance,  but  he  did  not 
fully  grasp  the  need  of  civilian  domination  in  supply 
matters.  Baruch  is  open  to  the  criticism  that,  perceiving 
this  need,  he  did  not  force  the  issue  in  those  dreary  months 
when  the  Board  was  drifting  and  dying  of  aiicemia;  and 
Secretary  Baker  was  letting  the  army  run  wild  through  the 
supply  pastures  and  was  planning,  with  the  aid  of  Mr. 


*  I 


^  \ 


;• 


ALEXANDER  LEGGE 

ana  iiaruch  s  Chief  of  Staff.  Now  President  of  the  International  Harvester  Company 


_    ■III, 


II 


r 


THE  PERSONAL  ELEMENT 


85 


I 


II 


KH 


11 


'I 


Stettinius,  to  create  the  needed  agency  through  a  munitions 
department  within  the  army,  that  would  have  left  the  War 
Industries  Board  a  shell. 

The  discovery  of  Alexander  Legge,  and  his  conscription 
for  the  Allied  Purchasing  Commission  and  the  War  Industries 
Board,  constitute  a  striking  example  of  the  chairman's  policy 
of  searching  out  the  little  known  big  men  of  industry.  Even 
in  this  age  of  advertising  and  publicity,  it  frequently  happens 
that  the  key  men  in  many  great  corporations  are  not  known 
to  the  world.  It  is  too  true  that  about  the  time  a  great  execu- 
tive becomes  known  to  the  world,  his  best  days  are  past. 
Reputation  trails  performance.  The  War  Industries  Board 
had  to  be  vital  and  laborious  throughout  in  order  to  meet 
the  pressing  emergency.  It  could  not  afford  the  lost  motion 
of  great  names  and  vicarious  deeds.  Its  executives  must  be 
men  still  in  the  winning  periods  of  their  lives;  men  who 
'  were  still  business  workers  rather  than  business  authorities. 

On  a  list  of  twelve  names  that  Mr.  Baruch  made  up  from 
answers  he  got  to  inquiries  for  "coming  men,"  who  would 
be  good  material  for  the  general  management  of  the  Allied 
Purchasing  Commission,  appeared  the  name  of  Legge. 
Baruch  had  never  heard  of  him.  When  the  list  was  shown 
to  one  of  the  chairman's  associates,  he  pointed  to  Legge's 
name  and  said:  "There  is  your  man,  but  you  can't  get  him. 
He  knows  Europe,  he  knows  human  nature,  he  is  a  very 
shrewd  trader,  he  is  as  straight  as  a  die,  and  an  unbeatable 
fighter.  His  is  the  best  head  in  the  International  Harvester 
Company.  He  is  a  rare  combination  of  talent  for  leadership 
and  gentleness." 

Cyrus  McCormick,  then  president  of  the  International 
Harvester  Company,  which  Legge  now  heads,  did  not  see  how 
he  could  spare  Legge  in  such  troublous  times  for  business. 
The  harder  McCormick  clung  to  Legge,  the  more  Baruch 
wanted  him.  But  in  those  days  there  was  no  resisting  the 
appeal  of  the  country's  need.  So  Legge  came  to  Washing- 
ton—  from  the  troubles  of  a  great  corporation  to  those  of 
the  world.  His  remarkable  success  in  the  larger  field  was 
partly  due  to  his  wide  experience  in  international  business, 
but  more  to  his  profundity  of  perception  and  comprehen- 
siveness of  analysis.     He  could  tell  unerringly  and  almost 


It 


t 


i 


86    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

immediately  two  things  about  every  man  he  dealt  with, 
namely,  whether  he  knew  what  he  was  talking  about  and 
whether  he  was  sincere  —  that  is,  believed  in  his  own  propo- 
sition or  contention.  He  thus  saved  an  immense  amount  of 
time  that  men  less  keen  in  analysis  must  inevitably  lose. 

The  members  of  the  various  commissions  representing  the 
Allies  soon  appreciated  that  it  was  useless  to  try  to  wheedle 
out  of  Legge  something  that  was  not  essential.  But  when 
they  had  a  real  need  Legge  knew  it,  and  they  could  always 
count  on  him  to  help.  Their  confidence  in  his  ability  to 
meet  their  requirements  eventually  became  so  sublime  as  to 
be  almost  pathetic  —  for  those  were  days  when  all  men  met 
at  least  occasional  defeat  at  the  hands  of  circumstances. 

Legge  was  as  good  at  analyzing  problems  as  at  sizing  up 
men.  His  mind  went  unerringly  to  the  key  to  every  situation. 
Not  only  could  he  see  a  problem  in  its  simplest  terms,  but 
he  had  the  faculty  of  stating  his  views  in  die  clearest  and 
most  convincing  way.  When  he  spoke,  debate  ended,  for 
somehow  it  almost  always  appeared  to  all  that  he  was  right. 
Besides,  it  was  soon  known  to  all  with  whom  he  dealt  that 
his  decisions  were  ultimate,  unless  the  circumstances  under 
which  they  were  made  were  fundamentally  altered.  Then, 
too,  with  him  finality  was  never  asperity.  A  decision  clothed 
in  inevitability  and  gently  stated  wins  willing  acquiescence. 
Such  were  Legge's  decisions — and  always  Impersonal.  They 
were  never  felt  or  seen  as  personal  triumphs  in  a  contest 
of  wits  and  words;  they  were  oracles  of  the  predestined. 

Talents  are  cast  in  many  moulds.  Legge  had  his  kind, 
but  he  knew  that  there  were  others.  Asked  to  recommend 
the  right  man  for  the  Board's  production  department  — 
known  as  that  of  finished  products — ^Legge  unhesitatingly 
named  his  chief  personal  rival  in  private  life,  George  N. 
Peek,  of  Deere  &  Company,  Moline,  Illinois,  and  of  a  per- 
sonality that  was  the  very  antithesis  of  Legge's.  The  calm, 
cool,  deliberate  man  recommended  Peek,  impetuous,  impa- 
tient, impulsive,  explosive.  The  easy-going  type  of  executive 
recommended  the  restless,  driving  type.  Peek  was  perhaps 
not  such  an  analyst  as  Legge,  but  he  was  a  photographic 
observer.  His  mind  comprehended  every  element  of  a  situ- 
ation and  his  reactions  were  instantaneous.    It  never  idled; 


I 


THE  PERSONAL  ELEMENT 


87 


it  never  saw  dimly.  For  Peek  the  world  was  a  sharp  black- 
and-white  drawing.  His  decisions  were  as  clear-cut  as  were 
Legge's,  but  they  somewhat  offended;  and  all  the  more  be- 
cause they  were  right.  Those  who  were  overborne  by  them 
felt  the  pangs  of  defeat.  But  note  that  the  consequences 
were  not  harmful.  You  resented  the  sting  of  Peek's  com- 
manding dictum,  but  at  the  same  time  you  were  impelled  to 
go  right  out  and  put  your  shoulder  into  the  collar  —  "just 
to  show  him."    He  put  you  on  your  mettle. 

Peek  is  the  type  of  executive  that  has  an  immense  capacity 
for  detail  without  getting  lost  in  it.  He  sees  the  trees,  but 
does  not  overlook  the  forest.  His  energy  is  infectious.  Some 
energetic  men  tire  out  their  associates,  but  Peek  seemed  to 
radiate  energy  in  the  War  Industries  Board.  Legge  made 
you  feel  that  tangled  matters  would  come  out  all  right;  Peek 
made  you  feel  that  he  would  untangle  them  himself  in  a 
jiffy.  Clear-eyed  and  dynamic  —  George  Peek  is  the  type 
of  the  best  in  American  business  life. 

J.  Leonard  Replogle  had  a  hard  place  to  fill.  A  young  man 
of  high  renown  in  the  world  of  iron  and  steel,  he  was  called 
upon  to  take  a  position  that  necessarily  brought  him  into 
opposition  with  the  chief  men  and  interests  of  his  calling. 
In  serving  the  Government  he  stood  to  block  his  own  career. 
In  such  a  position  a  man  might  err  on  either  side;  he  might 
drive  too  hard  bargains  for  the  Government  or  he  might  be 
too  considerate  of  the  industry.  From  beginning  to  end, 
Replogle  made  the  public  interest  first,  but  he  was  fair  to 
business.  When  he  entered  the  Government  service  he  had 
only  one  minor  interest  that  could  be  directly  affected  by  his 
position  as  director  of  steel;  that  interest  lost  money  through- 
out the  war.  As  the  conserver  as  well  as  the  producer  of 
steel,  Replogle  gave  a  rare  exhibition  of  courage  when  he 
resolutely  directed  the  whole  steel  output  of  the  country  to 
direct  or  indirect  war  purposes.  Often  he  had  to  defend  his 
policy  against  the  great  steel  corporations  as  well  as  against 
the  great  users  of  steel.  His  complete  knowledge  of  every 
angle  of  the  business  qualified  him  for  this  important  posi- 
tion. Specious  arguments  and  manipulated  cost-sheets  meant 
nothing  to  him.  His  position  duly  taken  and  fortified  with 
the  facts,  he  stood  like  a  rock  against  both  assaults  and  impor- 


88    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


I) 


If 


tunities.    He  forced  down  prices  and  increased  production; 
things  that  the  steel  men  said  could  not  go  together. 

Judge  Parker  had  a  maddening  job,  but  always  kept  his 
temper.  An  able  lawyer,  yet  his  genius  leaned  to  concilia- 
tion rather  than  strife.  As  the  absolute  lord  of  priority,  his 
task  made  his  days  a  continual  round  of  meetings  with  angry 
and  outraged  men.  It  was  as  hard  for  the  individual  manu- 
facturer to  see  the  whole  scheme  of  things  in  the  war  as  for 
the  individual  doughboy.  Both  were  inclined  to  think  through- 
out the  war  that  they  existed  to  be  discriminated  against.  It 
was  for  Judge  Parker  to  show  the  suffering  individual  how 
his  trouble  became  the  general  good.  Almost  invariably  he 
succeeded.  With  all  of  a  lawyer's  respect  for  law  and  statu- 
tory authority,  he  was  in  an  office  where  he  had  to  use  a  vast 
authority  that  could  quote  no  statutes.  He  had  to  derive  his 
authority  from  those  to  whom  he  applied  it  —  and  he  suc- 
ceeded admirably.  He  impressed  all  with  his  sincerity  and 
lofty  purpose  and  won  them  by  his  unfailing  courtesy  and 
good-temper. 

Mr.  Brookings  was  the  only  executive  of  the  War  Indus- 
tries Board  who  was  well  along  in  years;  but  measured  by 
endurance  and  energy  he  was  the  equal  of  the  youngest.  A 
retired  business  man  who  had  always  cultivated  a  devotion 
to  the  service  of  the  general  welfare,  he  naturally  grasped  the 
conception  early  in  the  war  that  it  meant  the  complete  sub- 
jection of  the  individual  to  the  general  interest.  From  the 
first,  he  was  a  firm  believer  in  price-fixing  as  indispensable 
to  the  satisfactory  conduct  of  the  war.  A  protege  of  Secre- 
tary Houston,  there  is  little  doubt  that  his  insistence  on  the 
importance  of  controlling  prices  had  its  effect  in  the  White 
House.  An  associate  says  of  him  that  his  fundamental  hon- 
esty is  one  of  his  strongest  characteristics.  "He  is  so  honest," 
savs  this  associate,  "that  he  is  honest  with  himself."  United 
to  this  honesty,  which  was  so  obvious  that  it  invited  equal 
honesty,  was  an  exceptional  ability  to  grasp  the  essentials 
of  the  most  complex  contract  or  other  business  relation.  Add 
courage  to  honesty  and  ability  and  you  have  the  qualities 
that  made  Brookings  the  right  man  in  the  right  place. 

Leland  L.  Summers,  who  was  the  technical  adviser  of  the 
War  Industries  Board  and  head  of  the  Chemical  Division, 


M.    K       f"!!" ''w''^  ""/  '^^^'^  '•  LEONARD  REPLOGLE 

EDWIN  B.  PARKER 

Member  of  the  War  Industries  Board  and 
Priorities  Commissioner 


INTENTIONAL  SECOND  EXPOSURE 


f 


Ij 


I  I 


88    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

tunities.  He  forced  down  prices  and  increased  production; 
things  that  the  steel  men  said  could  not  go  together. 

Judge  Parker  had  a  maddening  job,  but  always  kept  his 
temper.  An  able  lawyer,  yet  his  genius  leaned  to  concilia- 
tion rather  than  strife.  As  the  absolute  lord  of  priority,  his 
task  made  his  days  a  continual  round  of  meetings  with  angry 
and  outraged  men.  It  was  as  hard  for  the  individual  manu- 
facturer to  see  the  whole  scheme  of  things  in  the  war  as  for 
the  individual  doughboy.  Both  were  inclined  to  think  through- 
out the  war  that  they  existed  to  be  discriminated  against.  It 
was  for  Judge  Parker  to  show  the  suffering  individual  how 
his  trouble  became  the  general  good.  Almost  invariably  he 
succeeded.  With  all  of  a  lawyer's  respect  for  law  and  statu- 
tory authority,  he  was  in  an  office  where  he  had  to  use  a  vast 
authority  that  could  quote  no  statutes.  He  had  to  derive  his 
authority  from  those  to  whom  he  applied  it  —  and  he  suc- 
ceeded admirably.  He  impressed  all  with  his  sincerity  and 
lofty  purpose  and  won  them  by  his  unfailing  courtesy  and 
good-temper. 

Mr.  Brookings  was  the  only  executive  of  the  War  Indus- 
tries Board  who  was  well  along  in  years;  but  measured  by 
endurance  and  energy  he  was  the  equal  of  the  youngest.  A 
retired  business  man  who  had  always  cultivated  a  devotion 
to  the  service  of  the  general  welfare,  he  naturally  grasped  the 
conception  early  in  the  war  that  it  meant  the  complete  sub- 
jection of  the  individual  to  the  general  interest.  From  the 
first,  he  was  a  firm  believer  in  price-fixing  as  indispensable 
to  the  satisfactory  conduct  of  the  war.  A  protege  of  Secre- 
tary Houston,  there  is  little  doubt  that  his  insistence  on  the 
importance  of  controlling  prices  had  its  effect  in  the  White 
House.  An  associate  says  of  him  that  his  fundamental  hon- 
esty is  one  of  his  strongest  characteristics.  "He  is  so  honest," 
says  this  associate,  "that  he  is  honest  with  himself."  United 
to  this  honesty,  which  was  so  obvious  that  it  invited  equal 
honesty,  was  an  exceptional  ability  to  grasp  the  essentials 
of  the  most  complex  contract  or  other  business  relation.  Add 
courage  to  honesty  and  ability  and  you  have  the  qualities 
that  made  Brookings  the  right  man  in  the  right  place. 

Leland  L.  Summers,  who  was  the  technical  adviser  of  the 
War  Industries  Board  and  head  of  the  Chemical  Division, 


I  '  \ 


'4 


I 


h        •> 


■f     1 


GEORGE  N.  PEEK 

Member  of  the  War  Industries  Board  and  its 

Commissioner  of  Finished  Products 

EDWIN  B. 


J.  LEONARD  REPLOGLE 

Member  of  the  War  Industries  Board  and  Director 
of  Steel  Supply 

PARKER 


Member  of  the  War  Industries  Board  and 
Priorities  Commissioner 


11 


: 


r 

f 


1 


I'i 


I 


I     , 


THE  PERSONAL  ELEMENT 


89 


had  a  profounder  insight  into  the  industrial  bases  of  modem 
armament  than  any  other  man  associated  with  the  beginnings 
of  the  War  Industries  Board.  He  was  the  first  technician 
called  into  conference  by  Mr.  Baruch  —  in  November,  1916; 
and  it  was  the  exposition  of  the  primary  sources  of  weapons 
and  explosives  that  he  then  made  that  gave  Baruch  his  initial 
understanding  of  how  modern  war  is  rooted  in  industry  — 
even  in  forms  of  industry  that  are  in  the  highest  degree 
peaceful.  It  was  from  Summers  that  Baruch  learned  how 
correct  was  his  own  judgment  that  there  was  no  successful 
dealing  with  the  problem  that  did  not  begin  with  raw  mate- 
rials. As  the  engineer  unfolded  one  line  after  another  of 
sequences  leading  back  to  raw  materials,  Baruch  was  stunned 
by  the  immensity  of  the  task  that  would  confront  the  United 
States  in  the  event  of  war.  He  could  see  no  possible  way  of 
coping  with  it  except  through  the  virtual  incorporation  of  all 
industry  into  the  Government,  and  from  that  moment  the  idea 
of  securing  the  cordial,  voluntary  cooperation  of  industry 
was  the  idea  that  informed  all  of  Baruch's  plans  for  utiliza- 
tion of  the  resources  and  facilities  of  the  Nation. 

Baruch  never  had  greater  luck  than  when  he  found  Sum- 
mers. Digging  into  the  nitrogen-fixation  and  coal-tar  indus- 
tries of  Europe  for  years.  Summers  had  struck  his  pick  on 
the  roots  of  the  war  as  far  back  as  1911.  He  uncovered  them 
in  the  fertilizer  and  synthetic  chemistry  industries  and  found 
them  in  the  hearts  of  the  German  people.  Away  back  then 
he  saw  that  Germany  was  amassing  materials  and  strength- 
ening her  industries  for  something  grimmer  than  commercial 
war  in  dyes  and  fertilizer.  Long  before  August,  1914, 
Summers  knew  what  a  terrible  part  high  explosives  would 
play  in  the  war  that  as  early  as  1911  he  had  warned  his 
clients  was  coming. 

More  than  any  other  man  in  America  he  knew  the  relations 
of  industrial  synthetic  chemistry  to  warfare.  Moreover,  for 
the  first  three  years  of  the  war  he  was  identified  with  the 
material  reinforcement  of  the  Allies  in  America  and  from 
their  procurement  officers  had  learned  all  that  was  known  to 
them,  as  the  war  progressed,  of  guns  and  explosives.  He 
had  been  in  daily  touch  for  three  years  with  the  manufac- 
turers who  were  striving  to  meet  the  Allies'  requirements  for 


'f 


,1 


90    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

munitions.    He  knew  what  had  been  learned  by  Americans 
in  that  period  and  he  personally  knew  the  men  who  knew. 

Summers  had  watched  artillery  development  for  years; 
saw  the  Bulgarians  hammer  the  Turks  to  shreds  with  their 
French  guns  against  the  Krupps  of  the  Turks,  and  knew  that 
the  Germans  were  planning  an  extensive  artillery  recrudes- 
cence. All  the  lore  of  the  chemistry  ballistics  and  dynamics 
of  war  was  at  his  finger-tips  and  he  saw  deeply  into  the 
remote  economic  and  industrial  implications.  Called  into 
consultation  with  British  artillery  officers  in  1915,  General 
Pease,  sometime  commandant  of  the  Woolwich  Arsenal, 
casually  asked  Summers  what  artillery  regiment  he  had 
served  with  when  in  the  army. 

All  through  our  participation  in  the  war.  Summers  was 
in  touch  with  every  phase  of  artillery  development,  keeping 
a  particular  eye  on  the  incomparable  French  artillerists. 
He  was  as  enthusiastic  as  a  boy  with  his  first  gun  when  the 
French  sprang  a  "75"  coup  in  1918  that  appears  never  to 
have  been  made  public.  They  had  found  that  merely  by 
altering  the  shape  of  the  shell,  without  changing  the  gun, 
the  range  could  be  increased  from  eight  thousand  to  eleven 
thousand  yards.  While  most  of  their  plants  went  on  with  the 
former  type  of  shell,  they  concentrated  a  number  of  their 
best  plants  on  the  new  type  and  secretly  transported  immense 
numbers  of  them  to  the  front.  On  a  fixed  date  the  75's  all 
along  the  French  front  opened  up  with  the  new  ammunition 
and  the  Germans  found  supposedly  safe  positions  well  within 
the  range  of  the  redoubtable  75's. 

Summers  was  the  War  Industries  Board's  alchemist  of  the 
wizardry  of  war.  In  him  Baruch  found  a  man  who  knew  it 
all  or  knew  where  to  get  what  he  did  not  know.  As  the 
former  glimpsed  from  the  latter  the  dependence  of  modern 
war  on  applied  chemistry  and  visioned  victory  in  materials, 
as  the  two  strolled  in  the  woods  on  Baruch's  South  Carolina 
estate,  talking  of  the  struggle  that  was  over  there  and  was 
coming  to  America,  Baruch  offered  the  chemical  engineer, 
out  of  his  own  pocket,  the  same  salary  he  was  then  receiving 
to  come  with  him  into  the  Advisory  Commission. 
'How  much  do  you  get?"  asked  Summers. 
'Nothing  —  and  pay  my  own  expenses." 


THE  PERSONAL  ELEMENT 


91 


(41 


641 


"I'll  go  with  you  on  the  same  terms,"  decided  Summers. 
And  he  was  not  a  rich  man. 

Summers  and  other  men  who,  like  him,  had  been  in  the 
war  for  three  years,  constituted  a  group  of  experts  of  whom 
the  War  Department  was  ignorant.  On  this  group  the  Raw 
Materials  Division  of  the  Advisory  Commission  drew  freely 
and  with  unerring  judgment. 

It  was  Summers  who  first  laid  stress  on  the  need  of  an 
adequate  supply  of  nitrates,  platinum,  aluminum,  toluol,  and 
many  other  things.    At  that  time  the  Ordnance  Department 
was  not  even  interested  in  toluol  and  could  not  be  interested, 
but  Summers,  Baruch  backing  him  up,  later  arranged,  with- 
out any  authority  whatever,  and  independently  of  the  army 
and  navy,  to  have  the  Du  Ponts  begin  at  once  to  assemble  a 
supply  of  toluol,  as  the  Allies  then  had  control  of  virtually 
the  entire  production  of  that  chemical  in  the  United  States. 
Yet  toluol  meant  T.N.T.,  the  greatest  of  high  explosives,  with 
which  the  Germans  well-nigh  battered  their  way  to  victory 
before  the  Allies  could  reply  in  kind.    Thanks  to  Summers, 
when  the  army  found  out  that  it  would  require  immense 
quantities  of  T.N.T.,  the  toluol  was  available.     There  was 
so  little  understanding  of  the  material  corollaries  of  war  by 
the  army  as  late  as  December,  1916,  that  Summers  informed 
Baruch  that  it  was  a  waste  of  time  even  to  propose  prepara- 
tory technical  measures  until  our  own  entrance  into  the  war 
should  be  imminent.    In  March,  1917,  Baruch  declared  the 
time  had  come,  and  Summers  then  took  up  the  work  which 
he  did  not  relinquish  until  after  the  war  was  over. 

Hugh  Frayne,  the  labor  member  of  the  War  Industries 
Board,  carried  into  that  body  the  important  factor  of  labor 
representation  which  had  been  an  outstanding  feature  of  the 
Council  of  National  Defense,  of  the  Advisory  Commission 
of  which  Samuel  Gompers,  president  of  the  American  Fed- 
eration of  Labor,  was  an  efficient  and  tireless  member.  In 
passing,  it  should  be  said  that,  while  Mr.  Gompers  was  always 
on  guard  to  see  that  the  war  enterprise  did  not  become  a 
means  of  oppressing  labor,  he  was  second  to  none  in  the 
breadth  of  his  patriotic  devotion  and  thought.  He  was  never 
a  class-champion  obstructionist  in  the  councils  of  the  Advi- 
sory Commission.    He  was  a  strong  believer  in  the  scheme 


1 


I 


il 


k 


92    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

of  close  cooperation  with  industry  and  was  one  of  the  first 
to  endorse  the  programme  of  industrial  group  committees  to 
facilitate  Government  dealings  with  private  business.  Some- 
what inclined  to  consider  favorably  the  exception  of  skilled 
labor  from  military  service,  he  was  an  early  and  whole- 
souled  convert  to  the  principle  of  selective  service.  It  will 
do  no  harm  at  this  late  date  to  say  that,  when  the  question 
of  recommending  to  the  President  the  principle  of  universal 
service  came  before  the  Advisory  Commission,  Mr.  Gompers 
frankly  told  his  associates  that,  while  he  personally  favored 
it,  he  considered  that  it  would  be  inexpedient  for  him  to  vote 
for  it.  The  result  was  that  no  vote  was  taken,  but  the  Sec- 
retary of  War  was  authorized  to  interpret  the  Commission's 
views  to  the  President. 

With  Mr.  Gompers  on  the  Advisory  Commission  and  Mr. 
Frayne  on  the  War  Industries  Board,  there  were  no  dealings 
with  "big  business"  or  any  other  kind  of  business  in  which 
labor  was  not  consulted  and  represented.  Labor  was  thus 
on  the  inside  of  the  Government's  economic  policy,  and  the 
business  of  war  was  not  conducted  with  an  eye  single  to 
inanimate  things  and  to  the  neglect  of  the  human  element. 
Frayne  knew  labor's  point  of  view  and  how  to  manage  it. 
He  understood  the  human  factor  in  production.  In  conse- 
quence the  War  Industries  Board  took  no  measures  in  which 
the  labor  factor  was  overlooked.  If  prices  were  fixed  at 
levels  which  yielded  profits  that  would  stimulate  production, 
it  was  always  provided  that  labor  should  have  a  share.  It 
is  true  that  the  War  Labor  Administration  was  placed  in  the 
Department  of  Labor  and  not  in  the  War  Industries  Board, 
but  Frayne  played  an  indispensable  part,  for  he  was  on  the 
spot,  at  the  beginning  of  things,  shaping  economic  policies 
so  that  labor  problems  as  to  supply  and  remuneration  might 
be  so  founded  that  there  would  be  a  minimum  later  need 
of  governmental  adjustment.  Thanks  to  his  work  the  cor- 
rective functions  of  the  War  Labor  Administration  were  not 
generally  required. 

Like  Gompers,  Frayne  was  for  labor,  but  in  the  war  he 
was  for  the  country  first  and  for  groups  second.  He  was  a 
conciliator  and  moderator  rather  than  a  protagonist.  At 
the  same  time  Frayne  was  no  colorless  labor  mugwump. 


LELAND  L.  SUMMERS 

Technical  Advisor  to  the  War  Industries  Board  and  Chairman  of  the  Foreign  Mission 


INTENTIONAL  SECOND  EXPOSURE 


i 


\] 


? 


92    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

of  close  cooperation  with  industry  and  was  one  of  the  first 
to  endorse  the  programme  of  industrial  group  committees  to 
facilitate  Government  dealings  with  private  business.  Some- 
what inclined  to  consider  favorably  the  exception  of  skilled 
labor  from  military  service,  he  was  an  early  and  whole- 
souled  convert  to  the  principle  of  selective  service.  It  will 
do  no  harm  at  this  late  date  to  say  that,  when  the  question 
of  recommending  to  the  President  the  principle  of  universal 
service  came  before  the  Advisory  Commission,  Mr.  Gompers 
frankly  told  his  associates  that,  while  he  personally  favored 
it,  he  considered  that  it  would  be  inexpedient  for  him  to  vote 
for  it.  The  result  was  that  no  vote  was  taken,  but  the  Sec- 
retary of  War  was  authorized  to  interpret  the  Commission's 
views  to  the  President. 

With  Mr.  Gompers  on  the  Advisory  Commission  and  Mr. 
Frayne  on  the  War  Industries  Board,  there  were  no  dealings 
with  "big  business"  or  any  other  kind  of  business  in  which 
labor  was  not  consulted  and  represented.  Labor  was  thus 
on  the  inside  of  the  Government's  economic  policy,  and  the 
business  of  war  was  not  conducted  with  an  eye  single  to 
inanimate  things  and  to  the  neglect  of  the  human  element. 
Frayne  knew  labor's  point  of  view  and  how  to  manage  it. 
He  understood  the  human  factor  in  production.  In  conse- 
quence the  War  Industries  Board  took  no  measures  in  which 
the  labor  factor  was  overlooked.  If  prices  were  fixed  at 
levels  which  yielded  profits  that  would  stimulate  production, 
it  was  always  provided  that  labor  should  have  a  share.  It 
is  true  that  the  War  Labor  Administration  was  placed  in  the 
Department  of  Labor  and  not  in  the  War  Industries  Board, 
but  Frayne  played  an  indispensable  part,  for  he  was  on  the 
spot,  at  the  beginning  of  things,  shaping  economic  policies 
so  that  labor  problems  as  to  supply  and  remuneration  might 
be  so  founded  that  there  would  be  a  minimum  later  need 
of  governmental  adjustment.  Thanks  to  his  work  the  cor- 
rective functions  of  the  War  Labor  Administration  were  not 
generally  required. 

Like  Gompers,  Frayne  was  for  labor,  but  in  the  war  he 
was  for  the  country  first  and  for  groups  second.  He  was  a 
conciliator  and  moderator  rather  than  a  protagonist.  At 
the  same  time  Frayne  was  no  colorless  labor  mugwump. 


H 


f  I 


i  il 


u 


LELAND  L.  SUMMERS 

Technical  Advisor  to  the  War  Industries  Board  and  Chairman  of  the  Foreign  Mission 


II' 


i 


(I 


1! 


THE  PERSONAL  ELEMENT 


93 


He  was  of  the  heart  of  organized  labor,  and  was  in  a  sense 
elected  to,  rather  than  selected  for,  his  position. 

As  the  representative  of  the  navy  on  the  War  Industries 
Board,  Admiral  Fletcher  was  most  successful.  He  is  a  man 
of  few  words,  a  good  listener  and  a  good  "understander.'* 
His  great  value  to  the  War  Industries  Board  was  that  he  was 
able  to  rise  above  his  profession  and  take  the  broader  view. 
He  did  not  conceive  that  his  duty  was  to  be  the  protagonist 
of  the  navy,  but  rather  to  make  it  a  part  of  an  harmonious 
whole.  Through  him  it  was  often  possible  to  secure  the 
cooperation  of  the  navy  in  the  general  scheme  against  the 
opposition  of  officers  who  felt  that  the  navy  was  always  com- 
petent to  pass  judgment  on  all  that  concerned  it  without  out- 
side suggestion  or  assistance. 

General  Hugh  S.  Johnson  was  the  active  representative 
of  the  War  Department  on  the  War  Industries  Board,  though 
General  Goethals  held  the  title.  He  was  in  full  sympathy 
with  the  purposes  of  the  Board  and  considered  it  indispen- 
sable. His  mind  is  as  clear  as  a  crystal  and  as  orderly  as  an 
alphabetical  file.  It  is  logic  energized.  Before  its  faculty 
of  analysis,  the  most  chaotic  disorderliness  dissolved  into 
order.  His  inevitable  logic  not  only  clarified  the  business 
of  the  War  Department  with  industry,  and  cleanly  articulated 
the  procurement  agencies  of  the  army  to  the  War  Industries 
Board,  but  even  interpreted  the  latter  to  itself.  It  was  John- 
son, by  the  way,  who,  while  attached  to  General  Crowder, 
took  it  upon  himself  to  have  the  draft  regulations  printed 
and  in  hand  before  the  War  Congress  authorized  the  action 
or  the  expenditure.    That  expresses  Johnson. 


THE  SOURCE  OF  POWER 


95 


n 


II 


I  1 


CHAPTER  V 
THE  SOURCE  OF  POWER 

From  the  acorn  the  oak  —  Administration  by  request  —  The  right  to  com- 
mandeer— » Cooperation  the  supreme  power  —  Discipline  through  public  opinion 
—  Baruch  and  Wilson  —  Baruch  in  the  saddle  —  Tying-in  the  executive 
agencies  for  a  common  will  to  war. 

The  records  of  Congress  will  be  searched  in  vain  for  the 
organic  act  of  the  War  Industries  Board.  There  is  none. 
The  most  powerful  executive  agency  for  correlating  civil  and 
military  life  in  the  greatest  of  wars  has  no  legislative  incep- 
tion. It  grew  from  small  beginnings,  and,  just  as  its  func- 
tional branches  penetrated  and  entwined  the  whole  structure 
of  administration  affected  by  war,  its  roots  and  radicles  of 
power  tapped  virtually  every  permanent  or  emergency  execu- 
tive power  and  the  unwritten  will  of  the  people.  Its 
authority,  being  without  the  implied  limitations  of  legislative 
definition,  was,  under  the  stress  of  necessity,  an  ever-growing 
thing  which  it  was  diflScult  to  resist.  While  none  could  point 
to  any  precise  definition  of  its  powers  by  act  of  Congress,  it 
was  equally  true  that  nobody  could  confidently  assert  that  it 
was  without  authority  to  do  what  it  undertook  to  do.  But 
because  the  War  Industries  Board  could  not  point  to  any 
specific  act  of  Congress,  it  must  not  be  supposed  that  it  was 
an  extra-legal  body  or  that  in  its  mature  form  it  did  not  have 
ample  authority. 

On  the  other  hand,  because  it  began  with  no  executive 
authority  and  had  to  proceed  by  permission  in  its  early 
days,  it  built  up  a  certain  authority  that  was  based  on  the 
"consent  of  the  governed,"  and,  in  general,  until  the  end  of 
its  days,  acted  on  the  assumption  that  what  it  did  was  willed 
by  those  aflfected.  Its  government  was  by  request  rather 
than  by  mandate.  It  is  true  that  few  chose  to  resist  those 
requests,  but  compliance  was  based  as  much  upon  the  com- 
pulsion of  reasonableness  and  the  pressure  of  opinion  as 
upon  fear  of  governmental  power. 

The  powers  of  the  War  Industries  Board,  which,  by  a 


system  of  interlocking  functions  that  attached  to  themselves 
the  powers  of  all  executive  instrumentalities,  eventually  be- 
came coincident  with  Government  itself,  can  be  traced  to 
three  general  sources: 

I.  Certain  acts  of  Congress  relating  to  preparedness  for  or  the 
conducting  of  the  war. 
II.  Ordinary  Executive  authority  and  the  extraordinary  powers 
entrusted    by    Congress    to    the    Presidency    for    the    war 
emergency. 

III.  The  formulated  and  implied  war  powers  of  the  Executive. 

IV.  The  consent  and  cooperation  of  industry  and  of  the  public. 

The  first  included  the  act  creating  the  Council  of  National 
Defense   (the  Military  Appropriations  Act  of   1916)    and 
the  National  Defense  Act  of  the  same  year.     The  former 
act,  while  it  related  only  to  advisory  right,  nevertheless  con- 
tained ample  authority  for  the  original  creation  of  such  a 
body  as  the  War  Industries  Board,  as  the  act  gave  the  Council 
authority  to  "organize  subordinate  bodies  for  its  assistance 
in   special  investigations."    Section    120   of   the   National 
Defense  Act  also  gave  the  President  discretionary  authority 
to  appoint  "a  board  on  mobilization  of  industries  essential 
for  military  preparedness,  non-partisan  in  character."     As 
mentioned  elsewhere,  this  section,  so  far  as  the  writer  knows, 
was  not  specifically  referred  to  by  the  Council,  the  Board, 
or  the  President  at  any  time,  and  it  is  to  be  noted  that  no 
power  of  executive  action  was  conferred  on  this  possible 
body.    As  a  part  of  the  Council  of  National  Defense  organi- 
zation the  War  Industries  Board  could  legally  perform  any 
of  the  functions  assigned  to  it  by  the  latter.    In  an  advisory 
way  these  covered  an  extensive  field,  as  an  examination  of 
the  act,  elsewhere  printed  in  this  volume,  will  show.     It  is 
true  that  the  Council  was  to  make  recommendations  only  to 
the  President  and  heads  of  Executive  departments,  but  by 
general  consent  in  practice,  after  the  war  began,  the  Advisory 
Commission  and  its  creatures  communicated  directly  with 
subordinate  officials  of  the  Executive  departments,  so  that 
they   had    a    certain   degree    of   influence    on   the    active 
functionaries. 

The  acceptance  of  such  advice  by  the  Executive  depart- 


^-v  ->  *  ^, 


<yM    r*    I  k   . 


96    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


THE  SOURCE  OF  POWER 


97 


f 


ments  tended  to  identify  the  originally  powerless  adviser 
with  the  powerfully  advised  and  gave  the  former  access  to 
the  latter's  authority.  Thus,  if  the  army,  the  navy,  the  Ship- 
ping Board,  or  any  other  Executive  body  was  moved  to 
action  by  advice  coming  from  the  Council,  it  would  follow 
that  it  would  use  all  its  authority  to  eflFect  such  action.  So, 
in  an  indirect  manner  and  all  too  weakly,  until  injected  with 
directly  delegated  presidential  power,  the  War  Industries 
Board  was  in  a  position  to  invoke  the  authority  of  virtually 
all  acts  of  Congress  conferring  war  powers  that  in  any  way 
related  to  its  field.  It  could  not  wield  these  powers  itself, 
but  it  could  in  a  measure  cause  them  to  be  wielded. 

The  National  Defense  Act  gave  to  the  War  Department 
(Section  120)  the  right  to  supplement  the  customary  award- 
ing of  contracts  for  supplies  by  competitive  bids  with  direct 
orders  which  were  in  the  nature  of  a  command.  Refusal 
to  give  such  orders  precedence  over  all  other  business  was 
put  under  penalty  of  seizure  of  the  plant,  and  compensation 
was  left  to  later  determination  with  the  proviso  that  it  should 
be  fair  and  just. 

The  Naval  Emergency  Fund  Act  authorized  the  navy  to 
requisition  raw  materials  for  the  navy  and  for  aircraft  uses 
for  the  army  also. 

By  virtue  of  the  Emergency  Shipping  Act  the  President 
could  requisition  material  needed  in  shipbuilding. 

The  Lever  Act  relating  to  food  and  fuel  control  granted 
requisitory  powers  over  foods,  fuels,  and  other  supplies  neces- 
sary to  the  maintenance  of  the  army  and  navy  or  any  other 
purpose  related  to  national  defense  and  over  storage  and 
production  facilities  and  plants,  including  coal  mines  and 
distributing  plants  and  over  coke  and  distilled  spirits.  The 
Lever  Act  also  conferred  special  powers  of  regulation, 
license,  and  price-fixing. 

The  Transportation  Priority  Act  of  August  19,  1917,  was 
of  great  importance  until  the  Government  took  over  the  rail- 
ways and  could  then  allocate  transportation  as  it  pleased. 
The  control  of  the  railways  by  the  Government  gave  the 
War  Industries  Board,  by  reason  of  the  unfailing  cooperation 
it  always  received  from  the  Railroad  Administration,  a 
strangle-hold    on    recalcitrant    industries   which    might   be 


minded  to  question  its  authority.  The  same  was  true  of  the 
Fuel  Administration.  When  finally  clothed  in  the  presidential 
authority  that  flowed  from  these  conditions,  the  Board  had 
implements  with  which  to  move  almost  any  obstacle  in  its 
path.  The  Espionage  and  Trading-with-the-Enemy  Acts  also 
contributed  important  powers. 

All  of  these  powers  were  subject  to  a  varying  degree  of 
use  prior  to  the  separation  of  the  War  Industries  Board  from 
its  advisory  parentage,  but  that  separation,  reinforced  by 
the  comprehensive  powers  conferred  upon  the  President  by 
the  Overman  Act,  which  authorized  him  to  use  the  whole 
body  of  the  Executive  power  without  regard  to  previous 
statutes  establishing  fixed  agencies  and  processes  of  admin- 
istrative action,  made  it  possible  for  him  to  give  the  War 
Industries  Board,  specifically  or  generally,  all  the  "teeth'* 
it  needed. 

Besides  definite  grants  of  emergency  powers  to  the  Presi- 
dent, Congress,  in  declaring  war  on  Germany,  had  pledged 
him  the  support  of  all  the  resources  of  the  Nation.  This 
may  have  amounted  in  reality  to  nothing  more  than  a  gran- 
diloquent expression  of  a  good  intention,  but  in  a  time  when 
men  were  not  disposed  to  split  hairs  it  was  possible  to  load 
it  with  meaning.  As  commander-in-chief  of  the  army  and 
navy,  the  President  has  directly  and  morally  almost  unlim- 
ited implied  powers  in  time  of  war  in  all  matters  that  relate 
to  the  attainment  of  war  purposes.  Aside  from  legal  powers, 
actual  or  implied,  that  flowed  to  the  War  Industries  Board 
from  the  presidential  fount  of  authority,  there  were  the  com- 
mercial influence  and  compulsion  arising  from  the  fact  that 
the  Government  was  in  the  market  as  the  greatest  buyer  of 
all  times  —  and  in  many  lines  the  sole  buyer.  The  seller  — 
the  producer  —  is  likely  to  be  amenable  to  reason  under 
such  conditions. 

Beyond  laws  and  trade  advantages,  the  War  Industries 
Board  had  a  power  that,  when  stiffened  by  them,  was  the 
greatest  of  all  powers  —  the  patriotic  cooperation  of  manu- 
facturers, merchants,  and  the  public.  This  power,  sedulously 
fostered  when  the  War  Industries  Board  was  legally  power- 
less, supported  it  magnificently  when  it  came  to  hold  the 
whiphand  —  so  fully,  indeed,  that  there  was  rarely  any  need 


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98    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

for  coercion.  It  carried  the  spirit  of  democracy  into  an 
autocratic  emergency.  It  resulted  in  a  voluntary  obedience 
to  the  will  of  the  Board  in  a  spirit  of  partnership  that  effected 
results  that  could  never  have  been  attained  by  the  whip  of 
authority  and  the  spur  of  penalty.  The  free-will  and  devoted 
outpouring  of  energy  in  a  common  cause  is  as  superior  to 
conscripted  energy  as  free  labor  is  to  slave  labor.  It  is  one 
of  the  greatest,  if  not  the  greatest,  and  certainly  the  most 
characteristic  of  achievements  of  the  War  Industries  Board 
that  it  maintained  throughout  both  a  democratic  spirit  and 
practice  of  partnership  with  the  people. 

Industry,  under  this  benign  stimulus,  strove  not  under 
abhorrent  compulsion  or  only  for  pecuniary  profit,  but  also 
strove  for  its  own  greater  self  —  the  Nation.  Through  the 
commodity  sections  on  the  side  of  Government  and  the  war 
service  committees  on  the  side  of  business,  all  industry  was 
merged  in  the  War  Industries  Board.  Subject  to  the  veto 
of  the  chairman  of  the  Board,  as  the  supreme  interpreter  of 
the  national  good,  industry  imposed  its  own  emergency  laws 
and  regulations  and  assumed  nine  tenths  of  the  burden  and 
responsibility  of  enforcing  them.  Subjected  to  the  test  of 
patriotic  service,  the  most  sordid  business  men,  even  the 
branded  ghouls  of  the  under-world  of  business,  did  their  duty 
rather  than  face  the  contempt  of  the  trade.  They  conformed, 
it  is  true,  to  be  in  the  fashion;  but  even  so,  they  enjoyed  an 
inspiration  that  would  have  been  lacking  under  the  prod  of 
a  bayonet. 

Of  course,  disciplinary  measures  were  sometimes  neces- 
sary, but  the  War  Industries  Board  never  used  its  legal 
power  in  such  a  way  as  to  destroy  its  moral  power.  When  it 
did  apply  punitive  measures,  they  were  welcomed  by  the 
majority  of  the  business  community,  were  salutary  in  their 
eflfect  on  the  minority,  and  without  reactive  vindictiveness 
on  the  part  of  the  culprit.  Almost  without  exception  the 
announcement  of  an  intention  to  resort  to  stern  measures 
was  sufficient,  not  only  for  the  individual  case,  but  for  its 
class.  For  such  an  expression  of  intention  led  to  a  revela- 
tion of  unsuspected  powers  in  a  body  that  had  none  in  the 
beginning,  but  had  drawn  to  itself  all  those  of  a  determined 
nation  grimly  at  war. 


THE  SOURCE  OF  POWER 


99 


On  one  occasion  a  great  automobile  manufacturer,  who 
was  undoubtedly  of  the  opinion  that  in  restricting  the  auto- 
motive industry  the  Board  was  acting  arbitrarily  and  not  in 
the  true  public  interest,  refused  to  comply  with  the  "request" 
for  limitation  of  production.  Having  ample  supplies  of  coal 
and  raw  materials  on  hand,  he  felt  that  he  was  independent 
and  could  do  about  as  he  pleased.  He  flatly  refused  to 
comply  with  the  request.  The  chairman  called  in  a  naval 
officer  on  duty  with  the  Board,  and  asked  him  to  see  that  the 
manufacturer's  stores  of  coal  were  commandeered. 

"You  wouldn't  do  that,  would  you?"  asked  the  amazed 
automobile  man. 

"So  far  as  I  am  concerned,"  was  the  answer,  "it  is  already 
done.    So  far  as  you  are  concerned,  it  will  be  accomplished 
to-morrow  morning." 
That  was  enough. 

On  another  occasion  a  dissenting  lumber  manufacturer 
defied  the  chairman  even  to  the  extent  of  challenging  him  to 
commandeer  his  mills,  saying  that  he,  the  chairman,  knew 
perfectly  well  that  the  Government  could  not  conduct  them 
efficiently. 

"Quite  true,"  responded  the  chairman,  "but  by  the  time 
we  commandeer  those  mills  you  will  be  such  an  object  of 
contempt  and  scorn  in  your  home  town  that  you  will  not  dare 
to  show  your  face  there.  If  you  should,  your  fellow  citizens 
would  call  you  a  slacker,  the  boys  would  hoot  at  you,  and 
the  draft  men  would  likely  run  you  out  of  town." 
That,  too,  was  enough. 

While  it  was  not  necessary  for  the  War  Industries  Board 
to  draw  its  gun  very  often,  the  fact  that  it  had  a  high-powered 
one  in  its  holster  was  of  immense  value  in  invigorating  its 
administration,  after  many  months  of  more  or  less  ineffectual 
attempts  to  borrow  powers  tliat  it  had  no  right  to  command. 
When  the  new  chairman  —  with  new  powers  —  came  in,  in 
March,  1918,  the  executives  of  the  Board,  almost  to  a  man, 
inquired  what  authority  they  had  to  make  the  discharge  of 
their  functions  effective. 

"All  that  I  myself  have,"  was  the  answer,  "and  if  that 
isn't  enough,  I'll  get  more." 

The  possession  of  power  and  courage  to  use  it  usually  pre- 


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II! 


100    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

elude  the  invocation  of  its  ultimate  implications.  Fear  and 
timidity  fathered  more  procrastination  and  indecision  in  gov- 
ernmental departments  during  the  war  than  did  the  lack  of 
power.  But  when  courage  and  ample  power  came  together, 
the  impossible  became  possible.  That  happened  when  the 
third  chairman  of  the  War  Industries  Board  took  oflSce. 

It  is  a  singular  fact  that  the  Overman  Act  did  not  mention 
the  War  Industries  Board,  the  strengthening  of  which  was 
its  chief  object.  The  status  of  the  Aircraft  Production  Board 
had  theretofore  been  much  the  same  as  that  of  the  War 
Industries  Board,  but  the  Overman  Act  specifically  gave  the 
President  authority  to  make  it  an  independent  administrative 
agency.  The  much  more  important  War  Industries  Board 
was  not  even  referred  to  indirectly.  It  seems  to  be  a  fair 
inference  that,  in  consequence  of  the  bitter  criticism  that  had 
been  discharged  at  the  Government  because  of  its  desultory 
method  of  dealing  with  war  supplies,  the  President  did  not 
care  to  advertise  that,  in  his  own  way,  he  was  attaining  the 
thing  he  had  been  condemned  for  not  doing  directly. 

The  power  finally  vested  in  the  War  Industries  Board  and 
the  scope  of  applicability  of  that  power  were  so  great  that 
there  is  danger  that  they  may  be  thought  to  be  greater  than 
they  were.     It  became  the  general  manager  of  American 
industry  whether  engaged  in  production  for  civil  or  military 
purposes.    That  is  so  stupendous  a  thing  that  the  mere  state- 
ment of  it  in  unpretentious  language  is  weak.    Not  only  did 
it  have  the  office,  but  it  filled  it.    Directly  or  indirectly  all 
industry  and  commerce  existed  but  for  war  purposes,  and 
the  War  Industries  Board  saw  to  it  that  they  were  held  to  the 
objective.    Great  as  it  was,  however,  it  served,  but  did  not 
direct,  the  making  of  war.    It  did  not  pretend  to  judgment 
or  criticism  in  military  matters,  and  Mr.  Baruch  always 
sought  to  keep  safely  on  his  side  of  the  line  of  demarcation. 
It  was  for  the  army  to  say,  for  example,  how  many  big  guns 
it  needed  and  of  what  type.    The  War  Industries  Board  had 
nothing  to  say  about  that.    If  a  new  plant  were  needed  for 
their  manufacture,  it  was  for  the  army  to  determine  its  size 
and  cost.    The  War  Industries  Board  did  not  even  attempt  to 
say  where  it  should  be  established.    It  was  not  for  the  War 
Industries  Board  to  say  how  many  men  should  be  sent  to 


ll 


THE  SOURCE  OF  POWER 


101 


France,  but  it  was  its  business  to  see  that  production  and 
distribution  were  shaped  to  their  maintenance  when  once  it 
had  learned  what  the  requirements  were.  In  a  word,  with 
the  determination  of  military  policies  and  munitions,  the  War 
Industries  Board  had  nothing  to  do.  It  was  charged  with 
meeting  the  eventuating  requirements  in  goods. 

Before  its  final  reorganization,  the  Board  had  nothing  to 
do  with  the  relations  between  the  War  Department  or  the 
navy  and  a  contracting  plant.  It  could  not  intervene  to  cut 
red  tape,  perfect  organization,  or  stimulate  production  and 
hasten  delivery.  After  March  4,  1918,  however,  and  par- 
ticularly after  the  reorganization  then  begun  had  the  ratify- 
ing sanction  of  the  Overman  Act  (approved  May  20,  1918), 
the  War  Industries  Board  became  a  sort  of  inspector-general 
of  the  other  war  agencies,  and  as  such  was  more  or  less 
resented.  While  the  remarkable  letter  (which,  by  the  way, 
will  repay  the  closest  scrutiny)  of  the  President  to  Mr. 
Baruch,  authorizing  the  new  regime,  directed  the  latter  to 
leave  alone  what  was  being  well  done,  it  also  directed  him 
personally  "to  guide  and  assist  wherever  the  need  for  guide 
or  assistance  may  be  revealed,"  and  in  brief  to  ^''act  as  the 
general  eye  of  all  supply  departments,  in  the  field  of 
industry^* 

These  were  such  far-reaching  powers  that  it  is  certain  that 
had  the  war  gone  on  Mr.  Baruch  would  have  been  the  virtual 
head  of  all  the  supply  departments  of  the  Government  relat- 
ing to  the  war  enterprise.  Once  the  purely  military  decisions 
were  made  and  the  contracts  placed  through  the  legally 
designated  agencies,  it  would  have  devolved  upon  Baruch  to 
see  that  they  were  expeditiously  complied  with.  That  func- 
tion would  have  led  inevitably  to  some  modification  of  mili- 
tary determinations  in  so  far  as  they  involved  incompatibility 
with  available  resources  and  facilities.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
Baruch  did  begin  almost  immediately  to  take  a  hand  in 
artillery  production,  but  as  the  War  Department  had  then 
established  a  Director  of  Munitions  for  the  purpose  of  cen- 
tralizing and  ordering  the  direction  of  production,  the  matter 
was  allowed  to  drift  for  some  months.  Just  before  the  armis- 
tice, however,  Baruch  was  again  directing  his  attention  to 
this  matter,  for  it  was  admitted  that  progress  in  the  produc- 


! 


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I'ij 


102    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

tion  of  artillery  was  most  unsatisfactory.  Similar  exercise 
of  the  "guide  and  assist"  functions  in  other  directions  was 
rapidly  making  the  chairman  of  the  War  Industries  Board 
the  head  center  of  production  in  all  its  phases. 

Being  an  individual  rather  than  a  committee,  the  chairman 
could  decide  quickly  and  act  promptly.  Realizing  that  his 
powers  either  in  origin  or  in  adaptation  proceeded  from  the 
President,  he  kept  in  close  touch  with  Mr.  Wilson,  usually 
asking  the  President's  sanction  in  some  form  for  each  new 
acquisition  of  applied  power  within  the  general  boundaries 
of  his  sphere.  For  example,  as  the  test  of  whether  there 
was  a  shortage  of  a  given  material  revealed  additional  exten- 
sions of  control,  the  chairman,  in  writing  to  the  President 
for  a  grant  of  funds  to  provide  quarters  for  an  increased 
staff,  was  able  to  say  with  truth:  ''Since  you  recently  granted 
me  the  power  to  take  over  or  control  the  steel,  woolen, 
lumber,  and  rubber  industries,  the  War  Industries  Board  is 
in  practical  control  of  the  whole  field  of  industry  in  this 
country"^ 

The  correspondence  between  the  "industrial  dictator"  and 
the  President  reveals  an  unfailing  promptness  on  the  part  of 
the  President  to  concur  in  every  undertaking  of  the  former 
and  an  unexpected  closeness  of  the  President  to  all  the 
supply  problems.    In  passing,  the  writer  is  prompted  to  say 
that,  in  the  course  of  the  preparation  of  this  book,  he  has 
interviewed  some  twoscore  of  the  executives  of  the  War 
Industries  Board  and  the  Council  of  National  Defense,  and 
that  all  of  them,  regardless  of  party  affiliation,  who  had  any 
personal  contact  with  President  Wilson,  united  in  expressing 
appreciation  of  his  quick  grasp  of  the  fundamentals  of  the 
most  abstruse  and  technical  industrial  problems  that  were 
laid  before  him.     It  is  possibly  true  that  the  President  did 
too  long  defer  a  determination  of  the  problem  of  industrial 
centralization  for  war  purposes;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  once 
he  had  decided  his  course  and  mapped  it  in  the  lucid  and 
comprehensive  letter  of  authority  to  Mr.  Baruch,  the  support- 
ing decisions  were  always  prompt  and  clear-cut. 

It  would  be  tedious  to  follow  the  whole  process  of  actual 
occupation  of  the  field  laid  out  by  that  letter,  but  one  or  two 

^Italics  are  the  author's. 


THE  SOURCE  OF  POWER 


103 


points  are  of  special  interest.  After  the  Overman  Act  was 
approved,  the  President  transmitted  to  all  departments  and 
agencies  concerned  copies  of  his  Executive  order,  formally 
confirming  his  anticipatory  action,  in  order  that  there  might 
be  no  misunderstanding  of  the  important  fact  that  the  War 
Industries  Board  had  become  "a  separate  administrative 
agency  to  act  for  me  and  under  my  direction,"  with  "func- 
tions, duties,  and  powers  ...  as  outlined  in  my  letter  of 
March  4,  1918,  to  Bernard  M.  Baruch,  Esquire." 

On  September  3d,  the  President  took  a  step  that  really 
transferred  to  the  chairman  of  the  War  Industries  Board  sole 
authority  over  the  chief  disciplinary  and  punitive  power  of 
war-time  regulation  of  industry,  namely,  the  commandeer- 
ing power.    On  that  day  he  wrote  to  all  the  heads  of  inter- 
ested Executive  agencies  a  "request"  that  the  "commandeer- 
ing power  should  not  hereafter  be  exercised  over  any  of  the 
agencies  of  the  country  without  first  consulting  the  chairman 
of  the  War  Industries  Board."     This  put  an  end  to  indis- 
criminate commandeering  for  particular  purposes  of  mate- 
rials that  were  in  general  demand  and  should  have  been 
rationed  and  allocated,  and  at  the  same  time  gave  to  the 
chairman  a  sharp  sword  of  force  to  supplement  the  scepter 
of  authority.    It  was  also,  in  effect,  a  gentle  reminder  to  all 
Executive  departments  that  the  authority  conveyed  to  the 
War  Industries  Board  and  to  its  chairman  in  the  letter  of 
March  4th  was  very  real  and  affected  them  all.    It  was  a  far 
cry  from  the  former  days  when  the  War  Industries  Board 
functioned  only  by  invitation  and  tolerance  through  advice 
that  was  often  never  sought  and  as  frequently  ignored. 

The  abuses  of  the  uncoordinated  commandeering  power  - 
had  been  appalling.  The  railways  were  paralyzed  by  the 
commandeering  of  transportation  in  the  form  of  "expedited 
shipments"  by  agents  of  the  army,  navy,  Shipping  Board, 
and  what  not  —  all  of  them  insisting  on  preferential  treat-  - 
ment,  until  there  was  nothing  that  was  not  preferred.  It  was 
Ais  every-man-for-himself  priority  that  was  attributed  to 
Judge  Lovett,  whereas  he  had  nothing  to  do  with  it.  The 
War  Department  got  its  first  hard  bump  in  its  career  of  ruth- 
less commandeering  when  it  commandeered  the  Southern 
Pacific  coast-line  ships  between  New  York  and  New  Orleans 


!■ 


II 


»( 


104    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

and  Galveston,  just  after  McAdoo  had  become  Director  of 
the  Railroads.  He  directed  that  the  commandeering  order 
be  disregarded  and  announced  that  the  ships  were  under  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  Treasury  Department.  In  the  flush  days 
of  rampant  commandeering  the  departments  even  gayly  com- 
mandeered each  other's  goods. 

It  would  be  painting  altogether  too  rosy  a  picture  to  say 
that  when  the  armistice  came  the  War  Industries  Board  had 
every  power  that  it  should  have  had,  especially  over  other 
agencies  of  the  Government,  and  that  under  its  control  the 
whole  complex  and  intricate  war  plant  was  functioning  as 
smoothly  and  coordinately  as  the  Board  was  functioning 
internally.  It  was  no  easy  matter  to  harness  the  many  execu- 
tive agencies,  long  accustomed  to  going  their  own  way.  To 
have  attempted  it  quickly  and  violently  might  have  resulted 
in  more  friction  than  progress,  but  the  War  Industries  Board 
was  clearly  far  advanced  on  the  road  to  such  a  position  of 
control  of  the  industrial  forces  as  the  Secretary  of  War  and 
the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  had  over  the  military  forces.  On 
the  one  hand,  the  President  had  the  army  and  navy,  on  the 
other,  the  War  Industries  Board;  the  former  to  wield  the 
mailed  arms  of  the  Nation;  the  latter  to  mass  and  mobilize 
the  material  power  of  the  Nation  for  their  unfailing  support 
and  its  own  conservation. 


THE  SOURCE  OF  POWER 


105 


NOTE 

A  good  conception  of  the  Board's  far-reaching  powers  can  be 
gained  by  a  perusal  of  the  outline  of  its  purposes  and  functions, 
which  was  issued  by  the  chairman  as  a  guide  to  his  personnel  and 
for  the  information  of  industry.    A  copy  of  it  follows: 

Wars  are  fought  and  won  —  or  lost  —  on  the  land,  on  the  water,  in  the 
air,  and  on  those  battle  lines  behind  the  front  where  the  civilian  forces  stand. 

It  is  not  enough  to  mobilize  the  Nation's  military  strength.  There  must  be 
a  mobilization  of  her  full  economic  resources  —  industrial,  agricultural,  and 
financial.  These  must  be  organized,  coordinated,  and  directed  with  the  same 
strategy  that  goveras  the  operations  of  the  purely  military  arms  of  service. 

The  prodigious  strain  upon  the  world's  productive  capacity  must  be  met 
and  balanced  to  provide  the  means  of  warfare  and  to  maintain  the  civilian 
population  as  well  as  to  preserve  the  economic  fabric. 

America  to-day  is  the  chief  source  of  strength  to  the  forces  engaged  in  th« 


conflict  against  German  world  domination.  That  strength  is  expressed  in 
terms  of  man  power  and  material  —  the  one  military,  and  the  second  industrial. 
To  control  and  regulate  industry  in  all  its  direct  and  indirect  relations  to 
the  war  and  to  the  Nation,  the  President  has  created  the  War  Industries  Board 
and  placed  the  responsibility  for  its  operation  in  the  hands  of  the  chairman. 
The  letter  of  March  4,  1918,  delegating  Executive  powers,  follows. 

The  War  Industries  Board  is  charged  with  the  duty  of  procuring  an 
adequate  flow  of  materials  for  the  two  great  war-making  agencies  of  the  Gov- 
ernment—  the  War  and  Navy  Departments  —  and  for  the  two  agencies  in 
immediate  afiBliation  with  these  military  arms  —  the  Emergency  Fleet  Corpora- 
tion  and  the  Railroad  Administration. 

Also,  the  Board  provides  supplies  necessary  to  the  military  needs  of  our 
associates  in  the  war,  and  those  commodities  required  by  neutrals  in  exchange 
for  materials  essential  to  us. 

Finally,  and  of  paramount  importance,  the  Board,  in  alliance  with  the  Food, 
Fuel,  and  Labor  Administrations,  provides  for  the  country's  civilian  needs,  the 
protection  of  which  is  a  particular  duty  of  the  organization. 

It  is  not  only  the  duty  of  the  War  Industries  Board  to  stimulate  and  expand 
production  in  those  industries  making  war  essentials;  it  is  equally  the  Board's 
duty  to  protect,  as  far  as  may  be,  those  industries  not  immediately  essential 
to  the  war  programme. 

It  is  the  policy  of  the  Board,  where  retrenchment  and  curtailment  are  nec- 
essary, to  keep  alive,  even  though  it  be  necessary  to  skeletonize,  the  enterprises 
in  this  group,  and  not  to  destroy  them. 

Whenever  possible,  conversion  of  industries  from  a  non-war  production  to 
an  essential  output  is  effected. 

The  War  Industries  Board  is  a  method  of  control  devised  by  the  President 
to  equalize  the  strain  placed  upon  the  American  industrial  structure  by  the 
war. 

It  stimulates  and  expands  the  production  of  those  materials  essential  to* 
the  war  programme  and  at  the  same  time  it  depresses  and  curtails  the  produc- 
tion of  those  things  not  of  a  necessitous  nature.  This  is  done  by  regulation, 
in  consonance  with  other  Executive  branches,  of  the  basic  economic  elements: 
(a)  facilities,  (b)  materials,  (c)  fuel,  (d)  transportation,  (e)  labor,  and 
(f)  capital 

The  method  of  control  is  through  a  preference  list,  on  which  are  placed - 
those  industries  whose  output  is  essential  to  the  war's  progress.    The  priority 
indicated  by  the  preference  list  is  the  master  key  to  the  six  elements  named. 

Further,  the  Board  regulates  all  and  controls  certain  other  industries  of  - 
first-rate  war  importance,  it  fixes  prices  through  the  price-fixing  committee,  it 
creates  new  and  converts  old  facilities,  it  clears  the  national  business  require- 
ments, and  it  leads  to  conservation,  which  is  needed  to  bridge  the  gap  between 
the  extraordinary  demand  and  the  available  supply  — a  gap  which  exists  in 
almost  all  the  great  commercial  staples. 

The  War  Industries  Board  embraces  all  and  each  of  the  Nation.  Food  and 
fuel  are  separately  administered,  but  with  every  other  article  of  military  need 
and  of  ordinary  life  the  Board  has  a  direct  connection,  and  it  has  a  basic 
relationship  with  food  and  fuel,  too,  for  both  require  in  production  and  distri- 
bution the  materials  that  the  War  Industries  Board  provides.  Its  strength  lies 
in  the  full  and  patriotic  cooperation  that  American  business,  including  both 
the  employers  and  the  employees,  gives  in  working  out  the  problems  common 
to  us  all. 

The  abnormal  conditions  of  the  war  demand  sacrifices.  It  is  the  price  of 
victory. 


m 


i  I 


!l( 


106    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Only  actual  needs,  not  fancied  wants,  should  and  can  be  satisfied. 
To  save  heavy  and  long  privation,  temporary  deprivation  must  be  the  rule. 
Americans   willingness   to   accept   these   conditions   marks   her   ability   to 
quicken  the  end  of  the  conflict. 


i 


|i 


I  . 


* 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE  DRAMA  OF  REQUIREMENTS  AND  RESOURCES 

I.  General  Considerations  and  "Clearance'* 

War  on  the  modem  scale  —  America  asleep  —  The  awakening  —  The  cry  of  the 
Allies  —  Doing  the  impossible  —  Chaos  in  the  War  Department  —  Harnessing 
the  flood  of  orders  —  Qearance  and  its  workings. 

Only  a  state  shaped  and  organized  for  war  can  approximate 
the  material  requirements  of  modem  warfare  and  meet  them 
by  the  simple  procedure  of  honoring  a  predetermined  draft 
on  its  resources. 

Germany  was  the  first  of  the  nations  to  plan  war  on  a 
scale  corresponding  to  the  exertion  of  the  maximum  physical 
force  of  the  nation,  which  involves  the  orderly  concentration 
on  the  war  objective  of  the  entire  man  power  and  material 
resources  of  the  nation.  France  crumbled  in  1871  before 
the  hammer  blows  of  a  yet  incomplete  application  of  this 
conception  of  the  entire  energies  of  the  State  directed  to  war. 
Between  1871  and  1914,  Germany  had  carried  the  concep- 
tion of  the  State  as  primarily  a  unified  war-making  agency 
to  the  highest  possible  degree  short  of  the  improvements  that 
might  be  made  in  the  light  of  experience  that  could  come 
only  from  the  actual  test  of  the  first  grapple  of  peoples. 

Before  Germany  led  the  way,  no  modem  nation  had  ever 
thought  of  war  as  the  application  of  every  ounce  of  its  poten- 
tial strength.  Hitherto  wars  between  civilized  nations  had 
been  more  in  the  nature  of  limited  international  duels  than 
rough-and-tumble  stmggles  to  the  death.  The  nations  had 
their  standing  armies  and  navies  of  a  size  that  would  not 
unduly  strain  the  resources  of  states  primarily  devoted  to  the 
cultivation  of  peaceful  pursuits.  In  time  of  war  these  were 
somewhat  augmented,  but  never  in  a  volume  corresponding 
to  the  utmost  capacity  of  the  nation.  The  issue  was  then  left 
to  these  fighting  agencies,  and  there  was  no  thought  of 
exhausting  the  nation  in  supporting  them  beyond  a  certain 
varying  but  never  all-embracing  draft  on  national  resources. 


i 


108    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

The  armed  forces  lost  or  won  their  battles  in  the  course  of  a 
year  or  several  years  during  which  the  internal  life  of  the 
nation  went  on  pretty  much  as  in  time  of  peace.  When  the 
prescribed  means  of  ofiFense  or  defense  were  exhausted  on 
one  side  or  on  both,  the  nations  made  peace,  accepting  the 
test  of  a  limited  wager  of  battle  rather  than  putting  all  in  the 
balance. 

Germany's  example,  of  using  peace  as  a  period  in  which 
to  prepare  for  war  rather  than  as  an  end  in  itself,  forced 
other  Continental  nations  to  follow  suit,  but  none  of  them 
did  so  with  German  thoroughness.  Britain  was  prepared 
upon  the  sea,  but  for  her  that  did  not  involve  a  shadow  of 
the  universality  of  the  German  plan.  But  of  all  the  great 
nations  that  were  drawn  into  the  furnace  of  the  universal 
conflict,  the  United  States  was  the  most  remote  in  practice 
and  understanding  from  the  modem  sort  of  war. 

Germany  was  simply  all  army  —  all  fighting  men  or  sup- 
ply  organization.  All  its  manhood  was  in  the  army  —  active 
or  reserve;  all  its  commerce  and  industry  were  organized 
and  directed  to  function  as  parts  of  the  fighting  nation. 
When  war  came,  it  was  only  necessary  for  the  Government  to 
make  conversions  and  adaptations  that  had  long  been  planned 
in  the  greatest  detail  in  the  presence  of  a  complete  knowledge 
of  resources  and  facilities.  That  the  event  demanded  more 
than  had  been  foreseen,  and  that  the  machine  broke  down  in 
some  respects,  is  beside  the  question.  Germany  knew  that 
a  certain  number  of  millions  of  men  in  arms  could  be  trans- 
ported to  the  seat  of  war  in  a  certain  time,  and  that  facilities 
for  supplying  them  were  ready  and  suflScient  for  that  certain 
length  of  time  that  would  be  required  to  achieve  victory. 
She  dealt,  therefore,  with  definite  requirements  to  be  met 
from  exactly  known  resources  and  by  adequately  provided 
facilities.  Germany  prepared  for  the  expected  and  later 
improvised  for  the  unexpected:  we  improvised  for  the 
expected  and  later  prepared  for  the  unexpected. 

With  us  every  factor  in  the  war  problem  was  an  unknown 
quantity.  We  did  not  have  our  resources  and  facilities 
catalogued  and  correlated.  In  terms  of  war  we  did  not  even 
know  what  they  were.  We  did  not  know  how  large  an  army 
the  necessities  of  the  Allies  would  require  from  us,  and  we 


I 


REQUIREMENTS  AND  RESOURCES  109 

did  not  know  the  capacity  of  the  "ocean  conduit"  from 
America  to  France  for  men,  equipment,  and  supplies.  Ship 
tonnage  was  manifestly  the  measure  of  our  effective  partici- 
pation in  the  war  whether  as  an  active  combatant  or  as  the 
steward  of  the  battle  line.  We  did  not  know  what  the  limi- 
tations  of  tonnage  were  when  we  entered  the  war,  and  we 
did  not  know  what  they  were  at  the  end  of  the  war. 

Moreover,  though  we  knew  neither  our  own  requirements 
nor  resources,  and  though  the  former  came  to  exceed  the 
wildest  guess  of  the  early  days  of  the  war,  we  had  also  to 
deal  with  certain  requirements  of  the  Allies  which  varied  and 
expanded.    At  first,  it  was  assumed,  not  only  by  ourselves, 
but  by  our  Allies,  that  our  decisive  contribution  to  the  war 
would  be  one  of  supplies  and  materiel.     When  Marshal 
Jottre  came  to  the  United  States  in  June,  1917,  he  talked 
about  one  division  of  troops  at  once,  as  a  convincing  symbol 
of  alliance   and  "perhaps"  400,000  or  500,000  soldiers  in 
France  at  the  most.    One  year  later  the  most  unmilitary  of 
the  great  nations  had  2,000,000  soldiers  in  France  and  more 
than  3,600,000  actually  under  arms;  was  preparing  to  put 
and  maintain  5,000,000  men  in  France  and  conduct  the  war 
singJe-handed  against  Germany,  three  thousand  miles  distant. 
It  both  France  and  England  should  be  prostrated. 

Under  such  circumstances  there  was  no  such  thing  as  a 
logistically  balanced  war  scheme.  We  never  did  know  our  - 
requirements  either  potentially  or  as  measured  by  the  capac- 
ity of  ocean  transport.  All  we  know  now  is  that  the  require- 
ments always  got  larger,  always  overran  the  shipping  capac- 
ity,  and  yet  that  the  latter  grew  so  amazingly  under  stress 
that  we  could  never  say  for  certain  how  great  it  might  be 
on  the  critical  morrow. 

The  situation  was  bewildering  and  chaotic,  and  while  pre- 
organization  would  have  led  to  systematic  and  much  eariier 
adaptation  to  the  demands  of  the  unknown,  it  could  not  have 
made  It  knowable.  The  army  and  navy,  stumbling  forward 
into  the  unknown  wilderness  of  war's  tangled  demands,  were 
criticized  by  critics  who  were  still  more  ignorant  of  the  vast 
variants  of  the  problem.  On  the  same  editorial  page  one 
could  read  frantic  demands  for  an  expansion  of  the  army 
Deyond  the  published  plans,  and  convincing  calculations  that 


110    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


il 


shipping  could  not  be  supplied  for  even  a  moderate  army. 
In  the  late  fall  of  1917  and  the  early  winter  of  1918,  when 
it  had  become  understood  by  the  Allies  and  ourselves  that 
the  winning  of  the  war  would  necessitate  an  American  army 
of  millions  in  France  instead  of  hundreds  of  thousands,  the 
War  Department  was  stupefied  by  the  status  of  transport. 

"To  equip  and  maintain  even  the  disappointingly  small 
army  which  our  available  troopships  could  put  in  France 
by  the  summer  of  1918,"  says  a  then  "secret"  statistical 
report  to  the  General  Staff,  "would  require  double  the  cargo 
capacity  and  three  times  the  animal  transport  now  available." 
It  seemed  impossible  then,  because  of  lack  of  ships,  to  put 
more  than  500,000  men  in  France  by  July,  and  quite  impos- 
sible, for  the  same  reason,  to  maintain  that  many  once  they 
were  there.  France  was  declaring  that  its  army  would  be 
paralyzed  unless  we  could  provide  400,000  tons  of  shipping 
in  addition  to  what  we  were  then  giving;  Italy  saw  only  defeat 
unless  we  could  give  her  1,250,000  tons.  The  navy  de- 
manded 350,000  tons.  Including  troopships,  cargo  ships, 
tankers  —  everything  in  and  out  of  Government  service  — 
there  were  then  only  4,000,000  tons  in  sight. 

It  seemed  certain  that  the  war  would  be  lost  in  "the  neck 
of  the  bottle."  Yet  within  four  months  the  sturdy  divisions 
of  the  last  reserves  of  fighting  manhood  of  the  white  races 
were  pouring  through  the  same  neck,  monstrously  enlarged, 
at  the  rate  of  225,000  men  a  month  and  with  an  equipment 
of  weapons  and  supplies,  outside  of  artillery  and  projectiles, 
never  surpassed  or  even  equaled  by  much  smaller  armies  so 
far  from  the  home  base. 

Great  Britain,  mistress  of  the  seas,  had  thought  it  a 
colossal  enterprise  to  put  250,000  men  into  South  Africa  in 
the  course  of  the  Boer  War.  We  put  more  than  that  in 
France  in  a  single  month,  supplied  them  liberally,  and  at 
the  same  time  poured  out  in  unstinted  quantities  the  food, 
fuel,  materials,  and  munitions  that  kept  the  Allied  armies 
going.  And  yet,  in  the  welter  and  rush  of  the  intense  and 
triumphant  struggle,  the  failures  and  disappointments  loomed 
so  large  that  many  a  conmientator  achieved  passing  vogue 
as  a  propher  by  branding  the  struggle  as  doomed. 

Under  such  conditions  the  task  of  mobilizing  and  directing 


REQUIREMENTS  AND  RESOURCES  11] 


industry  for  war  purposes  became  one  of  gigantic  improvi- 
sation. When  Pelion  is  piled  on  Ossa  again  and  again,  there 
is  no  measuring  of  requirements.  The  industrial  army  of 
America  could  only  be  driven  at  higher  and  higher  speed  as 
requirements  vaulted  and  ships  multiplied;  and  be  switched 
round  and  round  as  demands  rose  and  fell  and  changed  in 
nature.  To  an  unknown  demand  there  was  nothing  to  do 
but  to  oppose  an  unknown  effort.  "It  can't  be  done  —  but 
here  it  is"  became  the  cool  word  of  the  hour. 

Our  small  army  was  of  the  old  type  —  separate  from  the 
Nation  and  in  no  way  integrated  with  it.    In  consequence  our 
so-called  General  Staff  was  a  purely  military  group;  not  a 
Great  General  Staff.    It  had  made  no  study,  and,  as  a  body, 
had  no  comprehension,  of  the  fact  that  in  modem  war  the 
whole  industrial  activity  of  the  Nation  becomes  the  commis- 
sariat of  the  army.     It  had  no  affiliations  with  the  complex 
and  fecund  industrial  life  of  the  Nation.     It  understood 
nothing  of  the  intertwining  ramifications  of  production.     It 
knew  nothing  of  the  economic  sequences  of  new  demands, 
so  vast  as  to  exceed  existing  supplies.    Its  sole  experience  in 
business  was  the  placing  of  orders  for  comparatively  small 
quantities  of  goods  in  a  market  so  well  stocked  and  so  volu- 
minously supplied  that  they  had  no  appreciable  effect  on 
reserves  or  prices.     In  the  army  alone  there  were  at  first 
five  and  later  eight  departments  exercising  the  purchasing 
function,  and  altogether  there  were  twenty-two  spigots  for 
the   diffusion  of  emergency  funds.     Bound   by  inflexible 
statutes,  supported  by  long  usage,  they  operated  independ- 
ently of  each  other  even  within  the  army  and  yet  bought,  in 
some  instances,  the  same  classes  of  supplies. 

At  the  same  time  none  of  them  had  any  adequate  knowl- 
edge of  the  immediate  or  remote  productive  capacity  of  the 
country  in  any  line.  Some  of  these  departments  not  only 
bought  for  themselves,  but  for  other  departments.  There  was 
no  central  purchasing  agency  or  even  a  central  clearing 
office.  The  Signal  Corps,  for  example,  purchased  certain 
kmds  of  blankets,  horse  equipment,  and  vehicles.  The  Med- 
ical Corps  bought  beds  and  blankets  and  certain  personal 
?Jp^P™ent,  not  only  for  itself,  but  for  troops  of  the  line. 
The  Ordnance  Department,  outside  of  purchases  for  its  own 


112    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


Jl 


iii 


III 


proper  uses,  bought  horse  blankets  for  the  cavalry,  but  not 
the  blankets  for  the  soldier's  bed.  What  the  other  depart- 
ments did  not  buy  for  themselves  or  for  each  other  the 
Quartermaster's  Department  bought  for  -all. 

Though  the  same  department  was  nominally  in  charge  of 
transportation,  each  bureau  had  its  own  system  of  trans- 
portation and  storage  all  the  way  from  first  sources  to  ulti- 
mate distribution;  and  regardless  of  the  needs  of  other 
departments  each  bureau  "maintained  its  own  system  of 
warehouses  and  distribution  from  the  hintermost  interior  to 
the  very  battle  line,  and  the  barriers  between  the  quintupli- 
cate  system  of  purchase,  production,  inspection,  storage, 
and  distribution  were  almost  impregnable."  Each  of  the 
supply  agencies  had  a  dififerent  coefficient  of  unitary 
demands,  with  the  result  that  for  an  army  of  a  given  size 
one  would  demand  supplies  out  of  all  proportion  to  what 
the  others  would  hold  sufficient.  Each  placed  its  orders 
virtually  without  consulting  the  others.  There  was  neither 
centralized  knowledge  of  requirements  nor  groupings  of 
purchases  according  to  commodities. 

The  result  in  the  World  War  was,  of  course,  disastrous 
competitive  buying,  conflict  of  orders,  congestion  of  pur- 
chases, waste  of  transportation.  To  make  matters  worse, 
there  was  no  well-thought-out  plan  for  the  supply,  say,  of 
an  army  of  a  million  men  or,  in  fact,  for  an  army  of  any 
size  beyond  that  then  in  existence.  So,  these  multiplex  and 
conflicting  agencies  did  not  even  have  a  general  scheme  to 
work  to.  If  they  had  had  one,  they  were  not  adapted  to 
harmonious  cooperation,  and,  finally,  their  groupings  of 
required  supplies  did  not  correspond  to  industrial  groupings. 
They  did  not  buy  by  commodities,  but  by  technical  military 
uses  of  commodities.  It  was  difficult,  therefore,  to  interpret 
military  requirements  even  when  determined  in  military 
phraseology  into  the  language  of  business.  Consequently, 
there  was  no  means  of  close  articulation  with  industry,  which 
is  not  divided  into  groups  for  the  production  of  engineer 
supplies,  quartermaster  supplies,  medical  supplies,  etc.,  but 
for  the  production  of  commodities  which  may  fall  into  any 
or  all  of  the  military  classifications. 

Now,  add  to  the  archaic  army  supply  system,  which  was 


,/ 


REQUIREMENTS  AND  RESOURCES  113 

a  house  divided  against  itself,  the  demands  of  the  navy, 
of  the  Red  Cross,  of  the  Shipping  Board,  of  the  Housing 
Corporation,  of  the  Railroad  Administration,  of  the  Public 
Health  Service,  of  the  Food  Administration,  of  the  Allies, 
and  various  other  emergency  requirements  —  all  with 
plethoric  purses,  all  with  a  common  conviction  that  they 
needed  immediately  more  than  they  could  possibly  get. 
Then  turn  them  loose  to  buy  goods  of  literally  more  than 
one  hundred  thousand  diff*erent  sorts  —  many  of  them  of 
novel  design  and  material  —  in  a  market  that  was  already 
overburdened  because  of  domestic  prosperity  and  booming 
foreign  trade  growing  out  of  the  war,  and  you  cannot 
fail  to  have  stupendous  confusion,  congestion,  and  sky- 
rocketing prices.  Each  order,  when  split  into  commodities, 
and  the  commodities  into  terms  of  raw  materials  and 
facilities  of  manufacture,  ran  into  multitudinous  feeders 
and  concentrated  unheard-of,  uncalculated,  and  incalculable 
demands  upon  remote  and  unconsidered  sources  that  were 
of  infinitely  small  capacity  compared  with  the  demand.  At 
the  beginning  of  the  war  the  Government  knew  nothing  of 
procuring  supplies  beyond  giving  orders.  Notwithstanding 
the  red  tape  of  the  ordering  instrumentalities,  they  soon 
developed  vast  energies  with  which  to  dispense  the  billions 
that  were  placed  at  their  disposal. 

Our  machinery  for  determining  requirements  was,  of 
course,  the  worst  imaginable;  but  even  if  it  had  been  per- 
fected long  before  the  war,  it  could  never  have  produced 
a  reliable  bill  of  requirements,  because  the  volume  and  the 
nature  of  the  requirements  was  changing  from  day  to  day 
and  was  unforeseeable,  hardly  even  guessable.  It  would 
have  needed  such  an  intimate  and  compelling  association 
with  science  and  industry  and  such  a  deep  comprehension 
of  economic  inter-relations  as  is  scarcely  conceivable  under 
our  form  of  government,  in  order  to  put  out  an  estimate  of 
requirements  that  could  be  relied  upon.  Even  the  making 
of  intelligent  requirement  estimates  —  to  say  nothing  of 
meeting  them  —  involves  a  thorough  knowledge  of  resources, 
for  there  can  be  substitutes  and  revisions  of  needs  as  much 
as  of  goods.  / 

Had  the  United  States  Government  maintained  only  the 


k 


114    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

statistical  organization  that  the  efficient  conduct  of  manu- 
factures, agriculture,  and  commerce  requires,  there  would 
have  been  a  solid  foothold  from  which  to  explore  the  field 
of  potential  resources.  The  census,  taken  once  in  ten  years, 
and  the  survey  of  manufacturing  industries,  taken  once  in 
five  years,  are  old  and  stale  before  they  are  published.  It 
became  necessary  for  the  War  Industries  Board  to  make  its 
own  survey  of  resources  before  it  could  intelligently  com- 
pare them  with  the  war  demands.  It  had  inherited  the 
schedules  of  the  Committee  on  Industrial  Preparedness  and 
it  was  able  to  draw  upon  the  statistical  information  of 
various  trade  groups;  but  at  first  its  information  was  at  best 
fragmentary  and  it  took  time  to  get  it  into  integral  and 
usable  form. 

However,  without  a  comprehensive  knowledge  of  either 
requirements  or  resources,  the  flood  of  orders  which 
necessarily  converged  upon  a  limited  number  of  final-form 
producers  automatically  provided  data  for  a  degree  of 
provisional  relief  from  the  increasing  disorder.  It  required 
but  a  rough  knowledge  of  the  current  situation  to  see  that 
certain  industrial  sections  and  certain  plants  and  certain 
portions  of  the  railway  systems  were  or  were  about  to  be 
overwhelmed  with  immediate  orders.  If  competitive  buy- 
ing among  the  various  departments  of  the  Government  could 
not  be  eliminated  at  once,  it  was  at  least  possible  to  under- 
take to  stop  the  flow  of  buying  where  the  channel  was  hope- 
lessly clogged  and  divert  it  to  other  channels. 

So  the  first  effort  of  the  War  Industries  Board  to  inject 
some  kind  of  order  into  Government  buying  was  the  creation 
of  a  clearance  agency,  which  first  appeared  as  the  Clearance 
Committee  of  the  General  Munitions  Board.  It  was  com- 
posed of  a  chairman,  a  representative  of  the  navy,  a 
representative  of  the  General  Staff  of  the  army  and  of  each 
of  its  supply  bureaus,  of  the  main  divisions  of  the  Board, 
and  of  the  Shipping  Board  and  the  Food  Administration; 
and,  later,  of  a  representative  of  the  Allied  Purchasing 
Commission. 

Even  before  a  clearance  agency  was  formally  established, 
there  was  a  certain  amount  of  clearing  going  on  in  con- 
sequence of  the  summoning  of  the  leaders  of  industry  to 


REQUIREMENTS  AND  RESOURCES  115 

Washington  and  the  forming  of  the  business  group  com- 
mittees. This  was  particularly  true  of  the  work  of  the  Raw 
Materials  Committee  of  the  Council, 

In  response  to  the  pressing  need,  manufacturers,  instead 
of  accepting  all  the  orders  that  were  showered  upon  them, 
began  to  initiate  a  sort  of  volunteer  clearance.  A  notable 
instance  of  this  sort  is  that  of  the  action  of  the  manu- 
facturers of  electric  wire  and  cable.  Mr.  Le  Roy  Clark  was 
chairman  of  their  trade  committee.  Beginning  with  con- 
certed action  in  regard  to  naval  requirements  four  days 
after  war  was  declared,  Mr.  Clark  soon  found  himself  the 
clearing-house  for  virtually  all  Government  orders  for 
electric  wire  and  cable.  The  facilities  of  the  entire  industry 
were  known  to  him  and  were  at  his  call.  He  knew  just 
when,  where,  and  how  an  order  could  be  met,  if  at  all.  In 
this  case  clearance  began  at  the  beginning  and  there  was  no 
confusion. 

It  was  to  the  happy  thought  of  the  Advisory  Commission 
of  the  Council  of  National  Defense  in  establishing  liaison 
between  industrial  groups  and  the  Government  through  the 
Council  that  such  voluntary  clearance  agencies  received  an 
official  standing.  Bad  as  the  early  confusion  was,  it  would 
have  been  infinitely  worse  but  for  these  trade  committees  — 
damned  as  they  were  by  those  who  were  more  concerned  with 
impeccable  instrumentalities  than  with  results.  Later  they 
evolved  into  the  essential  implements  of  the  War  Industries 
Board  in  the  performance  of  its  functions,  producing  on 
the  side  of  the  Government  the  commodity  sections  of  the 
Board  and  on  the  side  of  industry  representative  committees 
through  which  the  former  made  their  contacts  with  business. 

How  natural  and  informal  this  birth  of  clearance  was  may 
be  gathered  from  the  fact  that  Mr.  Clark  never  received 
formal  recognition  from  the  Council  or  War  Industries  Board 
until  the  latter  was  separated  from  the  Council. 

As  he  was  performing  a  public  function,  he  could  not 
carry  on  correspondence  on  the  stationery  of  his  company, 
so  he  asked  Commander  John  Hancock  what  standing  his 
committee  had. 

"I  should  say,"  answered  tlie  Commander,  "that  this 
committee   was   the   Wire   and    Cable   Committee    of   the 


p 


i  f 


461 


i«i 


116    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Advisory  Commission  of  the  Council  of  National  Defense," 
and  authorized  Clark  to  put  it  on  his  letter-heads. 

About  six  months  later,  after  Clark  had  cleared  millions 
of  dollars'  worth  of  business,  a  member  of  the  director's 
office  sent  for  him  and  inquired:  "Where  did  you  get  the 
authority  to  use  that  letter-head?" 

Clark  explained,  and  asked:  "What  is  the  trouble?" 

"There  is  no  such  committee  of  the  Council  of  National 
Defense,  and  some  day  we  are  going  to  get  into  a  Con- 
gressional investigation  and  this  thing  will  look  pretty  raw," 
the  officer  explained. 

'If  you  want  us  to  stop,  say  so,"  said  Clark. 
'Oh!  no,  for  Heaven's  sake,  no:    I  will  go  over  and  see 
John  Hancock." 

When  an  appeal  was  made  to  the  Council  to  legitimize 
its  firstborn  clearance  child,  it  was  found  that  the  edict  had 
gone  forth  that  there  must  be  no  more  committees.  So 
Clark's  committee  never  did  exist  officially,  though  it  had 
kept  its  field  as  clear  as  a  billiard  table  and  handled  millions 
of  dollars'  worth  of  Government  business  without  friction, 
confusion,  or  delay. 

The  fact  is  that  the  really  efficient  clearing  was  always 
done  through  the  commodity  sections  and  the  war  service 
committees  of  industry.  The  general  clearance  committee 
functioned  beneficially  for  a  short  time,  but  soon  became 
hopelessly  bogged  in  a  multiplicity  of  clearance  demands. 
It  set  up  a  general  clearance  list,  which  was  a  list  of  all 
materials  of  which  there  was  a  shortage.  Government 
supply  agencies  were  requested  not  to  place  orders  for  any 
of  these  materials  without  getting  clearance  from  the  com- 
mittee. This  request  was  obeyed  in  varying  degrees.  Tlie 
committee  undertook  to  pass  on  applications  for  clearance 
of  orders  with  several  factors  in  mind.  One  was  to  prevent 
the  placing  of  orders  with  plants  that  were  already  over- 
whelmed with  business,  another  was  to  determine  their 
relative  importance  with  respect  to  time  of  delivery,  and 
another  was  to  prevent  the  causation  of  abnormal  prices. 

The  method  of  procedure  was  for  the  representative  of 
each  purchasing  agency  to  read  his  proposed  orders.  If 
there  was  no  objection,  his  orders  were  cleared;  if  there 


REQUIREMENTS  AND  RESOURCES  117 

was,  they  were  held  up  until  an  adjustment  could  be  made 
by  the  proper  agency.  It  was  soon  found,  however,  that 
it  was  physically  impossible  to  give  intelligent  clearance 
merely  by  listening  to  the  tedious  reading  of  hundreds  of 
orders  each  morning.  No  member  of  the  committee  felt 
competent  to  grant  or  deny  clearance  to  lists  thus  presented. 
A  few  items  might  stand  out  as  plain,  but  most  of  the 
heterogeneous  lists  were  in  obscurity.  Shortages  developed 
over  pretty  much  the  whole  field  of  supplies,  and  it  would 
have  required  encyclopaedic  knowledge  and  a  phenomenal 
memory  to  have  checked  off  free  items  in  the  ponderous 

lists. 

As  a  committee,  the  clearance  committee  broke  down  in 
trying  to  pass  on  the  numerous  deadlocks  that  arose, 
especially  when  it  attempted  to  exercise  that  phase  of 
clearance  which  meant  preference  or  priority,  as  where  two 
army  bureaus  insisted  on  having  the  right  of  way.  This 
failure  magnified  the  specialized  function  of  priority,  under 
another  committee.  And  when  it  was  found  that  the  clear- 
ance process  had  little  effect  on  prices,  the  creation  of  a 
price-fixing  agency  followed. 

But  clearance  was  an  indispensable  service,  and  when  the 
committee  began  to  degenerate,  because  of  the  hopelessness 
of  the  task  as  it  came  before  it,  and  because  purchasing 
officers  had  begun  to  take  the  short  cut  to  the  commodity 
committees  or  sections,  leaving  figureheads  to  attend  the 
committee  meetings,  the  War  Industries  Board  took  the 
short  cut  itself.  It  diverted  the  clearance  function  from  a 
general  committee  to  specific  committees  which  eventually 
became  commodity  sections  or  divisions,  retaining  merely  a 
distributing  center  imder  the  name  of  the  Clearance  Office. 
To  this  office  came  all  applications  for  clearance  and  by 
it  they  were  referred  to  the  proper  committee  or  section. 
Thus,  in  the  later  form,  fifty-seven  units  split  up  the  clear- 
ance problems  among  themselves,  and  each  proposed  order 
went  to  the  one  that  knew  all  that  there  was  to  know  that 
bore  on  the  clearing  of  that  particular  order. 

Prompt  and  intelligent  action  resulted.  The  Clearance 
Office  became  the  one  place  in  the  Washington  complex  of 
war-time  where  it  was  possible  to  find  the  actual  drain  on 


118    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


REQUIREMENTS  AND  RESOURCES  119 


p 


industry  and  resources.  Here,  theoretically,  and  to  an 
increasing  degree,  in  fact,  came  all  Government  requisitions 
for  goods,  and  here  they  were  compiled  into  commodity 
classes.  The  clearance  function,  intended  to  apply,  at  first, 
only  in  case  of  a  shortage  of  materials,  and  to  equalize  the 
pressure  on  industry,  was  eventually  extended  to  all  orders 
intended  for  placement  in  the  congested  district  north  of  the 
Potomac  and  east  of  the  Ohio  and  to  all  orders  that  implied 
the  creation  of  new  instrumentalities  of  production. 

In  the  last  stage  clearance  was  a  very  definite  process. 
An  application  for  leave  to  purchase  might  be  cleared  with 
comment,  cleared  with  restrictions  as  to  territory  in  which 
the  order  might  be  placed,  with  restrictions  as  to  the  power 
or  fuel  system  that  might  be  used,  with  inhibitions  as  to 
certain  plants  or  the  creation  of  new  facilities,  with  actual 
designation  of  a  particular  source  of  supply  or  with  advice 
relating  thereto. 

Frank  A.  Scott  was  the  first  chairman  of  the  clearance 
committee.  He  was  followed  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  C.  C. 
Bolton;  and  after  the  reorganization  of  the  War  Industries 
Board  in  the  spring  of  1918  Admiral  F.  F.  Fletcher  con- 
ducted the  Clearance  OflSce.  With  the  emergence  of  the 
Requirements  Division,  the  Clearance  OflSce  ultimately 
became  a  clerical  appendage  to  it. 

Clearance  was  the  first  implement  used  by  the  evolving 
War  Industries  Board  in  dealing  with  its  huge  and  vague 
task.  It  was  not  a  fundamental  measure,  but  it  was 
urgently  necessary  because  the  fundamentals,  which  might 
have  been  organized  in  years  preceding  the  war,  could  not 
be  encompassed  in  the  war.  The  fundamental  thing  would 
have  been  a  scientific  balancing  of  requirements  and 
resources  with  an  orderly  flow  of  supplies  into  needs  that 
would  have  made  clearance  unnecessary. 

Clearance  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  basic  problems  of 
requirements  and  resources.  It  was  the  agency  by  which 
the  jam  of  immediate  demands  or  current  orders  was  cleared 
up  and  by  which  thereafter  the  day-to-day  needs  were  met 
in  hand-to-mouth  fashion.  Clearance  was  not  a  budget;  it 
was  merely  a  check-book.  It  was  an  emergency  measure, 
but  it  set  in  train  greater  things.     It  became  a  meeting- 


ground  of  oflScers  and  civilian  cooperators  and  a  clearing- 
house of  ideas.  The  civilians  in  the  War  Industries  Board 
learned  all  sides  of  the  army  supply  problem  and  the  army 
and  navy  men  had  their  eyes  opened  to  the  intricacies  of 
conunerce  and  industry  and  to  the  great  importance  of 
civilian  assistance.  When  an  overworked  army  oflScer  dis- 
covered, for  instance,  that  he  had  been  buying  cement  five 
hundred  miles  away  from  the  point  of  its  use,  when  he  could 
have  bought  it  at  a  mill  ten  miles  away,  and  that  there  was 
a  keen  business  man  at  his  command  who  knew  everything 
about  cement,  who  could  prevent  all  such  errors,  he  was 
likely  to  look  with  favor  on  the  extension  of  civilian 
cooperation.  Clearance  cleared  the  way  for  the  civilian 
management  of  industry  devoted  to  war. 

'The  manner  in  which  clearance  was  handled  in  the 
latter  months  of  the  war  was  an  inspiration,"  writes  General 
Hugh  S.  Johnson.  "In  a  single  department  27,371  requests 
for  clearance  were  handled  between  July  23  and  November 
30,  1918;  13,677  within  twenty-four  hours  after  receipt, 
and  of  13,694  others  ninety-five  per  cent  were  cleared  within 
forty-eight  hours  after  receipt.'* 

The  clearance  system  had  a  very  valuable  by-product  in 
its  eflfect  on  current  purchases.  It  brought  the  various 
purchasing  agents  face  to  face  with  the  realities  of  the 
situation.  While  it  did  not  deal  with  requirements  in  the 
larger  sense,  it  induced  a  distinction  between  immediate 
and  ultimate  needs  that  had  a  profound  eflfect  on  the  equi- 
table distribution  of  materials.  A  restraint  was  placed  upon 
the  tendencies  of  the  buying  agencies  virtually  to  eflfect  a 
temporary  comer  in  diflferent  materials  by  buying  at  once 
enough  to  meet  programmes  of  production  that  might  extend 
over  a  year  or  more,  thus  denying  the  current  needs  of  other 
agencies.  At  the  same  time  clearance  contact  emphasized 
the  need  of  forecasting  ultimate  requirements  and  massing 
resources,  so  that  when  the  time  came  for  deferred  purchases 
the  doors  to  supply  would  open  freely. 

Theoretically,  the  clearance  function  was  achieved  in 
perfection  when  the  War  Industries  Board  finally  came  into 
its  own.  It  fell  short  in  practice  because  it  was  never 
possible  to  send  the  whole  stream  of  Government  orders 


i 


120    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


n 


'a  • 

[0 


through  it,  and  because,  when  its  machinery  had  been  built 
up  and  put  in  running  order,  it  had  to  deal,  not  with  a  clean 
slate,  but  with  an  industrial  situation  that  had  already  been 
thrown  out  of  balance.  Nevertheless,  if  the  War  Industries 
Board  had  never  performed  any  function  but  that  of  clear- 
ance, it  would  have  justified  its  existence.  It  turned  a  wild 
and  frantic  stampede  of  eager  buyers  and  hospitable  sellers 
to  get  together  with  a  rush,  into  a  rational  routine;  pro- 
portioned orders  to  productive  capacity,  eliminated  the 
speculator  and  the  shoestring  manufacturer,  harnessed 
demand,  and  husbanded  materials  and  facilities. 


i  i 


lift 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE  DRAMA  OF  REQUIREMENTS  AND  RESOURCES 

(  {continued) 

II.  The  Broader  Phase 

"Business  as  usual"  to  the  scrap-heap  —  Taking  the  long  view  —  "Requirements'' 
a  central  coordinator  —  Demanding  team-work  of  the  star  players  —  General 
March  and  the  War  Industries  Board  —  Through  the  neck  of  the  bottle  to 
victory  — The  stupendous  military  programme  —  Baruch  and  a  cablegram  from 
rershing  —  The  lesson  of  a  disaster  averted. 

In  those  tense  and  stirring  days  of  the  spring  and  summer 
of  1918,  when  the  miracle  happened  and  the  fresh  and 
rugged  divisions  of  the  armed  youth  of  America  poured 
through  the  Atlantic  bridge  of  ships  in  hosts  that  were  awe- 
some to  the  Germans  and  inspiring  to  the  Allies,  the 
Republic  began  to  see  the  war  in  its  true  perspective. 

"Business  as  usual,"  once  the  universally  accepted  philos- 
ophy of  the  shaking  times,  which  served  as  a  malign 
anaesthetic  for  the  Nation  in  the  strain  of  complete  reversal 
of  economic  life  from  production  for  use  to  production  for 
destruction,  had  gone  its  way  to  the  grave  of  ephemeral 
and  superficial  slogans.  The  whole  people  now  understood 
that  all  its  business  was  radically  unusual  — that  nothing 
could  be  done  that  did  not  contribute  directly  or  indirectly 
to  the  winning  of  the  war. 

The  understanding  of  modem  war  was  sinking  deep. 
All  the  people  saw  that,  whether  they  wished  it  or  not,  they 
had  been  drafted  into  a  combatant  force  that  was  coincident 
with  the  whole  life  of  the  Nation.  A  few  millions  of  young 
men  were  set  apart  for  the  wielding  of  the  weapons  and  the 
powers  of  the  Nation,  and  all  the  rest  of  the  population  was 
employed  in  the  continental  commissariat  which  forged  the 
weapons  and  generated  the  power. 

With  this  understanding  of  war  as  the  only  business  of  all 
and  a  business  that  might  monopolize  national  energies  for 
years,  came  the  time  when  the  leaders  could  take  the  long 
view  and  begin  to  husband  and  develop  resources,  to  rise 


J 


122    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

above  the  absorbing  demands  of  the  moment  and  survey  the 
requirements  of  years,  to  pass  from  preoccupation  with 
industrial  tactics  to  the  measured  manipulation  of  industrial 
strategy.  From  a  frenzy  of  effort  to  define  and  fill 
immediate  demands  they  passed  to  a  period  of  cool  cal- 
culation in  which  they  appraised  the  facilities  and  resources 
of  America  as  the  only  salvation  of  the  world,  and  began  to 
utilize  them  in  such  ways  that  the  maximum  outflow  would 
not  exceed  the  maximum  inflow. 

They  looked  upon  America  as  a  giant  of  vast  reserve 
forces,  soft  and  flabby  in  places,  which  must  be  exercised, 
trained,  and  recuperated,  made  and  kept  fit,  shaped  to 
deliver  sledgehammer  blows  day  after  day  without  fatigue 
or  exhaustion.  They  knew  that  he  must  not  be  overstrained 
to-day  lest  he  become  stale  on  the  morrow.  They  were 
indiff'erent  to  local  weaknesses  and  occasional  ineptitudes, 
provided  they  could  see  that  from  month  to  month  the 
Colossus  became  ever  stronger  and  more  supple.  They 
sought  to  regulate  his  tasks  according  to  his  growing 
strength,  but  not  beyond  it. 

It  is  true,  as  has  been  said  before,  that  it  never  was 
possible  to  ascertain  what  the  American  requirements  would 
be;  but  the  time  came  when  every  eff'ort  was  made  to 
appraise  them  in  the  face  of  a  struggle  so  titanic  and  erratic 
that  to-day  was  often  no  forerunner  of  to-morrow.  It  is 
at  this  point,  too,  that  we  find  one  of  the  chief  flaws  in  the 
War  Industries  Board  organization,  which  even  at  the  sign- 
ing of  the  armistice  had  not  reached  the  estate  for  which  it 
was  pointed. 

The  interlocking  of  the  direction  of  supply  with  the 
sources  of  demand,  which  may  be  accepted  as  a  brief  denom- 
ination of  the  fimctions  of  the  War  Industries  Board,  was 
never  so  gripping  and  compelling  as  it  should  have  been. 
The  gears  of  demand  and  supply  did  not  accurately  mesh. 
It  is  true  that,  as  the  War  Industries  Board  evolved,  the 
chief  factor  of  demand  —  the  army  —  also  evolved  recipro- 
cally, and  the  two  came  more  and  more  to  complement  each 
other,  but  the  army  had  not  become  fully  accustomed  to 
systematic  cooperation  with  its  great  supporter  when  the 
struggle  suddenly  ended.    To  the  last  day  the  army  was 


H 


REQUIREMENTS  AND  RESOURCES  123 

too  much  absorbed  in  the  tense  present  to  give  adequate 
thought  in  a  harmonizing  way  to  the  inevitable  morrow. 
In  all  fairness,  it  must  be  said  that,  while  on  the  side  of  the 
War  Industries  Board  the  problem  was  viewed  in  its  true 
perspective,  it  had  not  yet  provided  the  mechanisms  with 
which  to  perform  its  functions  to  the  fullest  degree.  They 
were  not  the  sort  of  mechanisms  that  could  be  made  as 
easily  as  they  could  be  sketched. 

The  Requirements  Division  of  the  War  Industries  Board 
was  not  created  until  June,  1918.    Alexander  Legge,  general 
manager    (now  president)    of  the   International  Harvester 
Company  of  Chicago,  vice-chairman  of  the  War  Industries 
Board,  and  formerly  business  manager  of  the  Allied  Pur- 
chasing Commission,  was  made  chairman  of  the  division, 
which  was  designed  to  be  representative  of  all  the  buying 
agencies  of  the  Government.   The  supply  departments  of  the 
army  and  navy  had  each  a  common  representative,  and  the 
General  Staff"  of  the  former  and  the  latter  as  a  unit  were  also 
separately  represented.     There  were  besides  representatives 
of  the  Emergency  Fleet  Corporation  (Shipping  Board),  of 
the  Allied  Purchasing  Commission,  of  the  Red  Cross,  of  the 
Railroad  Administration,  of  the  Food  Administration,  and 
of  the  Marine  Corps.    The  War  Industries  Board  was  rep- 
resented by  its  chairman  and  eight  of  its  functional  and 
commodity  chiefs,  in  addition  to  Mr.  Legge. 

Each  of  the  consuming  agencies  of  the  Government  was  - 
requested  to  present  at  the  daily  meetings  of  the  division 
Its  requirements  for  as  long  a  period  as  possible,  preferably 
six  months  or  a  year.     After  general  discussion  and  exam- 
ination  from   the   composite   point   of  view,   the   digested 
requirement   schedules   were   referred   to   the    appropriate 
commodity  sections  for  detailed  study  and  comparison  with 
the  resources   and  facilities  on  which  they  would   draw. 
I-rom   the   commodity   sections   the   projected    requirement 
estimates  went  back  to  the  departments  from  which  they 
originated,  with  memoranda  concerning  the  ways  and  means 
01   supplying  the   requirements.     Clearance   of  immediate 
demands  was  so  involved  with  future  needs  that  eventually 
even    orders   for   current    consumption   went    first    to    the 
Requirements  Division  for  preliminary  clearance. 


124    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


REQUIREMENTS  AND  RESOURCES  125 


|i' 


»      \ 


Opinion  diflFers  as  to  the  potency  of  the  Requirements 
Division.  To  some  of  the  energetic  executives  who  were 
members  of  this  division  the  hour  or  two  spent  daily  in 
conference  seemed  largely  lost  time.  They  were  intent  upon 
the  performance  of  the  very  pressing  and  very  concrete 
immediate  tasks,  for  which  the  days  were  never  long  enough, 
and  they  had  a  certain  contempt  for  all  formal  conferences. 
General  discourse,  they  thought,  never  got  anywhere.  They 
were  all  great  individualists  and  one-man  men. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  may  be  contended  that  the  Require- 
ments Division  was  really  the  great  central  coordinator  of 
the  whole  complex  war  effort,  more  important  than  the  War 
Council  of  the  War  Cabinet,  besides  which  the  latter  were 
merely  conversazioni  which  served  to  keep  the  heads  of  war 
agencies  and  the  President  informed  of  what  was  going  on. 
Assembled  under  the  aegis  of  the  War  Industries  Board, 
the  representatives  of  the  departments  were  in  the  presence 
of  action.  The  active,  functioning  executives  of  all  war 
agencies,  the  men  who  were  in  actual  touch  with  reality  and 
engaged  in  shaping  it,  were  daily  brought  together.  Here 
each  of  them  learned  to  see  the  limitations  of  his  own  proj- 
ects in  the  requirements  of  other  projects.  Here  they  all 
rose  to  the  common  commanding  point  of  view.  Here  they 
perceived  how  true  it  was  in  the  long  run  that  the  undue 
current  success  of  one  was  the  ultimate  impairment  of  that 
one  and  of  all.  In  the  conferences  of  the  Requirements  Divi- 
sion they  learned  the  necessity  of  and  in  a  very  large  way 
determined  the  budget  of  war  shaped  to  the  hard  actualities 
of  available  supplies  of  materials  and  of  labor.  In  a 
degree  they  learned  the  importance  of  looking  ahead. 

Broadly  speaking,  the  various  supply  departments,  con- 
sidered as  a  whole,  never  arose  to  the  opportunity  that  the 
Requirements  Division  presented.  This  was  partly  due  to 
the  hopelessness  of  attempting  to  forecast  requirements  in 
some  lines,  in  view  of  the  peculiarities  of  a  war  so  vast  and 
novel;  partly  to  the  failure  of  responsible  officials  to  set 
themselves  diligently  to  the  task,  and  partly  to  the  lack  of 
an  authoritative  intelligence  and  reporting  service  on  the 
part  of  the  Board  that  could  have  represented  it  throughout 
the  supply  departments. 


fl 


The  War  Industries  Board  should  not  have  been  content 
with  having  the  departments  represented  in  its  organization, 
but  conversely  it  should  have  been  represented  in  the  depart- 
ments. It  was  entitled  to  direct  knowledge  of  all  that  was 
being  done  everywhere  that  would  eventually  add  to  its 
burdens.  To  a  certain  extent  this  was  done,  notably  in  the 
case  of  the  Emergency  Fleet  Corporation  in  respect  of  steel 
requirements,  though  this  contact  was  more  in  the  field  of 
clearance  than  in  that  of  requirements  proper.  The  Steel 
Division  of  the  Board  sent  its  own  men  to  the  different  ship- 
yards to  ascertain  whether  they  were  over-  or  under-supplied 
with  steel,  and  even  had  President  James  A.  Farrell,  of  the 
United  States  Steel  Corporation,  make  a  survey  of  the  whole 
steel  supply  situation  for  the  Pacific  Coast  yards.  Another 
instance  of  converse  interlocking  was  the  designation  of 
Clarence  M.  Woolley  as  the  member  of  the  War  Trade  Board 
specially  charged  with  looking  after  the  matters  before  that 
Board  that  wer^  of  interest  to  the  War  Industries  Board. 

On  the  whole,  the  navy  outshone  all  the  other  consuming 
departments  in  its  forecasts  of  requirements.  This  was  to  be 
expected  in  view  of  the  fact  that  basically  the  navy  must 
always  be  approximately  ready  for  war,  because  it  is  not 
susceptible  of  rapid  expansion;  and  because  its  peace-time 
organization  was  simpler  and  more  compact  than  that  of  the 
army.  Its  purchasing  was  centralized,  and  as  a  corollary 
its  requirements  were  more  easily  known  and  calculable. 
The  navy  did  not  have  to  rebuild  in  war,  but  only  to  build. 
Its  organization  was  centralized;  that  of  the  War  Depart- 
ment at  the  beginning  was  in  separate  water-tight  compart- 
ments, erected  by  Congress  and  reinforced  by  usage,  hedged 
about  with  exclusiveness,  and  defended  with  jealousy. 

The  Requirements  Division,  although  fimdamental  in  its 
functions  and  inherent  in  the  progress  of  events,  was 
actually  born  of  an  effort  on  the  part  of  War  Industries 
Board  executives  to  break  the  news  to  the  war  agencies  that 
a  new  and  superior  power  had  risen  in  the  field  of  supply. 
Speaking  with  only  that  approach  to  accuracy  that  is 
reserved  for  general  statement,  it  may  be  said  that  the  war- 
making  agencies  did  not  relish  the  President's  letter  of 
March  4,  1918.   They  knew  that  team-work  was  necessary. 


t  ] 


126    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

but  they  all  considered  themselves  star  players.  Each 
agency  could  show  you  just  how  it  was  winning  the  war 
single-handed.  The  navy  resented  the  newcomer  because  it 
was  proud  of  its  business  efficiency  and  somewhat  spoiled  by 
popularity;  the  army  was  sore  as  a  boil  from  relentless 
criticism,  and  had  retired  into  its  shell  and  was  seeking  to 
accomplish  within  itself  what  the  War  Industries  Board  was 
undertaking  to  do  as  an  independent  agency.  The  Food 
Administration,  bom  under  a  lucky  star  and  sharing  the 
spotlight  of  popular  favor  with  the  navy,  headed  by  a  man 
who  was  a  power  unto  himself,  was  distant  to  any 
approaches  that  might  be  construed,  even  remotely,  as  modi- 
fying its  ways.  The  Shipping  Board  wanted  to  be  left  alone 
because  conditions  that  were  insuperable  gave  it  all  the 
friction  it  needed.     And  so  on. 

Proceeding  along  the  lines  of  easy  informality  which  was 
one  of  the  roots  of  the  War  Industries  Board's  success  in  a 
world  of  shoulder-straps,  salutes,  and  rank  —  an  infor- 
mality that  had  little  respect  for  place  and  much  for  the 
man  —  the  War  Industries  Board  executives  proceeded  to 
interpret  the  new  dispensation  to  the  powerful  depart- 
mental heads  with  whom  they  must  cooperate.  A  less 
politic  group,  after  the  many  months  of  patient  effort  to 
eflfect  results  by  moral  suasion  and  the  force  of  competency, 
come  at  last  into  power,  would  have  proceeded  abruptly  to 
use  it.  Instead  of  resorting  to  cold  correspondence  and 
formal  notices,  the  new  order  was  discussed  around  luncheon 
and  dinner  tables  as  between  friends  with  a  common  interest 
and  not  as  between  rival  contenders  for  power.  The  War 
Industries  Board  men  laid  much  stress  on  the  fact  that  they 
intended  to  give  the  fullest  interpretation  to  the  President's 
injunction  to  let  alone  what  was  being  well  done,  but  that  it 
was  evident  to  all  that  there  was  much  which  was  not  being 
done  well  because  of  lack  of  harmonious  and  understanding 
cooperation.  Since  all  were  agreed  that  team-work  must 
be  effected,  why  not  take  up  the  work  with  a  frank  intention 
of  accomplishing  it  without  friction? 

Due  largely  to  the  influence  of  General  Hugh  S.  Johnson, 
who  was  then  in  charge  of  the  army's  recently  created 
Bureau  of  Purchase,  Storage,  and  Traffic,  and  who  was  a 


I 


REQUIREMENTS  AND  RESOURCES  127 

,  strong  believer  in  the  enlarged  authority  of  the  War  Indus- 
tries Board,  the  army  chiefs,  in  principle  at  least,  came 
quickly  into  line. 

The  navy  was  somewhat  reluctant.  The  navy  men  had 
been  forehanded  and  were  proud  of  their  success.  Mutual 
sacrifice  for  the  common  good  was  too  often  at  the  sole 
expense  of  the  navy.  It  meant  that  the  naval  bureaus  would 
often  have  to  give  up  advantages  that  were  the  fruit  of 
efficiency.  The  navy's  pride  was  placated,  however,  by 
earnest  invitations  to  tell  the  War  Industries  chiefs  how  they 
should  do  their  job.  The  army  men  were  asked  to  do  like- 
wise. Out  of  these  suggestions  and  the  discussions  that 
followed  arose  a  decision  to  reveal  frankly  to  each  other 
plans  and  intentions  and  to  discard  competition. 

Thus  was  bom  the  Requirements  Division  wherein,  if 
nothing  more,  there  was  a  candid  revelation  of  projects. 
Therein  each  supply  department  head  became  acquainted 
with  the  problems  and  troubles  of  the  others  and  came  to 
view  them  with  sympathy  instead  of  jealousy.  In  this 
friendly  atmosphere  many  conflicts  were  adjusted  basically 
on  the  spot,  leaving  only  details  to  be  worked  out  by  the 
commodity  sections  where  officers  of  inferior  rank  repre- 
sented the  army  and  navy.  The  big  men  saw  the  advantage 
of  being  at  the  fountain-head,  and  the  Requirements 
Division  was  a  meeting-place  of  chiefs  rather  than  of 
delegates. 

Although  an  outline  of  its  composition  has  been  given 
above,  it  was  an  elastic  body.  At  times  there  would  be  as 
many  as  five  officers  present  from  each  the  army  and  navy. 
Presently  official  Washington  began  to  sense  the  fact  that 
the  real  control  of  coordination  was  firmly  in  the  hands  of 
the  Wiar  Industries  Board;  that  that  was  the  place  to  go  to 
get  things  done,  and  that  the  Requirements  Division  was  the 
starting-point.  The  Department  of  Commerce  asked  for 
representation;  the  Capital  Issues  Committee  discovered  that 
the  Requirements  Division  was  indispensable  to  its  function 
of  rationing  capital;  the  War  Finance  Corporation  found  it  a 
head  center  of  information  as  to  what  war-work  plants  were 
entitled  to  governmental  assistance  in  financing  their  opera- 
tions; the  Panama  Canal  Commission  "sat  in,"  and  eventu- 


i^ 


126    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


REQUIREMENTS  AND  RESOURCES  127 


J 


|M 


^r 


I' 


?  1 


but  they  all  considered  themselves  star  players.  Each 
agency  could  show  you  just  how  it  was  winning  the  war 
single-handed.  The  navy  resented  the  newcomer  because  it 
was  proud  of  its  business  efficiency  and  somewhat  spoiled  by 
popularity;  the  army  was  sore  as  a  boil  from  relentless 
criticism,  and  had  retired  into  its  shell  and  was  seeking  to 
accomplish  within  itself  what  the  War  Industries  Board  was 
undertaking  to  do  as  an  independent  agency.  The  Food 
Administration,  bom  under  a  lucky  star  and  sharing  the 
spotlight  of  popular  favor  with  the  navy,  headed  by  a  man 
who  was  a  power  unto  himself,  was  distant  to  any 
approaches  that  might  be  construed,  even  remotely,  as  modi- 
fying its  ways.  The  Shipping  Board  wanted  to  be  left  alone 
because  conditions  that  were  insuperable  gave  it  all  the 
friction  it  needed.     And  so  on. 

Proceeding  along  the  lines  of  easy  informality  which  was 
one  of  the  roots  of  the  War  Industries  Board's  success  in  a 
world  of  shoulder-straps,  salutes,  and  rank  —  an  infor- 
mality that  had  little  respect  for  place  and  much  for  the 
man  —  the  War  Industries  Board  executives  proceeded  to 
interpret  the  new  dispensation  to  the  powerful  depart- 
mental heads  with  whom  they  must  cooperate.  A  less 
politic  group,  after  the  many  months  of  patient  effort  to 
effect  results  by  moral  suasion  and  the  force  of  competency, 
come  at  last  into  power,  would  have  proceeded  abruptly  to 
use  it.  Instead  of  resorting  to  cold  correspondence  and 
formal  notices,  the  new  order  was  discussed  around  luncheon 
and  dinner  tables  as  between  friends  with  a  common  interest 
and  not  as  between  rival  contenders  for  power.  The  War 
Industries  Board  men  laid  much  stress  on  the  fact  that  they 
intended  to  give  the  fullest  interpretation  to  the  President's 
injunction  to  let  alone  what  was  being  well  done,  but  that  it 
was  evident  to  all  that  there  was  much  which  was  not  being 
done  well  because  of  lack  of  harmonious  and  understanding 
cooperation.  Since  all  were  agreed  that  team-work  must 
be  effected,  why  not  take  up  the  work  with  a  frank  intention 
of  accomplishing  it  without  friction? 

Due  largely  to  the  influence  of  General  Hugh  S.  Johnson, 
who  was  then  in  charge  of  the  army's  recently  created 
Bureau  of  Purchase,  Storage,  and  Traffic,  and  who  was  a 


Or 
•I 


,  strong  believer  in  the  enlarged  authority  of  the  War  Indus- 
tries Board,  the  army  chiefs,  in  principle  at  least,  came 
quickly  into  line. 

The  navy  was  somewhat  reluctant.  The  navy  men  had 
been  forehanded  and  were  proud  of  their  success.  Mutual 
sacrifice  for  the  common  good  was  too  often  at  the  sole 
expense  of  the  navy.  It  meant  that  the  naval  bureaus  would 
often  have  to  give  up  advantages  that  were  the  fruit  of 
efficiency.  The  navy's  pride  was  placated,  however,  by 
earnest  invitations  to  tell  the  War  Industries  chiefs  how  they 
should  do  their  job.  The  army  men  were  asked  to  do  like- 
wise. Out  of  these  suggestions  and  the  discussions  that 
followed  arose  a  decision  to  reveal  frankly  to  each  other 
plans  and  intentions  and  to  discard  competition. 

Thus  was  bom  the  Requirements  Division  wherein,  if 
nothing  more,  there  was  a  candid  revelation  of  projects. 
Therein  each  supply  department  head  became  acquainted 
with  the  problems  and  troubles  of  the  others  and  came  to 
view  them  with  sympathy  instead  of  jealousy.  In  this 
friendly  atmosphere  many  conflicts  were  adjusted  basically 
on  the  spot,  leaving  only  details  to  be  worked  out  by  the 
commodity  sections  where  officers  of  inferior  rank  repre- 
sented the  army  and  navy.  The  big  men  saw  the  advantage 
of  being  at  the  fountain-head,  and  the  Requirements 
Division  was  a  meeting-place  of  chiefs  rather  than  of 
delegates. 

Although  an  outline  of  its  composition  has  been  given 
above,  it  was  an  elastic  body.  At  times  there  would  be  as 
many  as  five  officers  present  from  each  the  army  and  navy. 
Presently  official  Washington  began  to  sense  the  fact  that 
the  real  control  of  coordination  was  firmly  in  the  hands  of 
the  War  Industries  Board;  that  that  was  the  place  to  go  to 
get  things  done,  and  that  the  Requirements  Division  was  the 
starting-point.  The  Department  of  Commerce  asked  for 
representation;  the  Capital  Issues  Committee  discovered  that 
the  Requirements  Division  was  indispensable  to  its  function 
of  rationing  capital;  the  War  Finance  Corporation  found  it  a 
head  center  of  information  as  to  what  war-work  plants  were 
entitled  to  governmental  assistance  in  financing  their  opera- 
tions; the  Panama  Canal  Commission  "sat  in,"  and  eventu- 


I 


^ 


128    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

ally  about  all  the  war  agencies,  great  and  small,  that  had 
need  of  real  information  or  cooperative  assistance  had  their 
representatives  at  the  meetings  of  the  Requirements  Division. 
The  advantage  that  this  division,  but  little  known  to  the 
public,  had  over  the  more  impressive  War  Cabinet  and  War 
Council  was  in  the  composition  of  its  personnel.  They  were 
neither  the  Cabinet  members  nor  the  heads  of  the  great 
emergency  agencies,  prone  to  abstract  discussions  and  har- 
monious agreements  in  principle  who  were  so  lost  in  a  welter 
of  pressing  duties;  they  were  the  working  executives  —  the 
men  to  whom  action  was  second  nature.  An  undertaking 
expressed  by  such  a  man  in  the  presence  of  a  group  of  his 
fellows  who  would  keenly  hold  him  to  account  meant  con- 
crete results.  These  officers,  like  their  civilian  confreres  in 
the  War  Industries  Board,  were  doers,  not  dignitaries. 

The  weakness  of  the  Requirements  Division  was  that,  after 
all,  it  was  not  supreme  over  all  requirements.    It  passed  on 
requirements  as  they  came  within  the  scope  of  the  War  Indus- 
tries Board.  It  did  not  draft  them.  It  sought  to  modify  them, 
but  in  the  last  analysis  it  did  not  have  the  right  to  say  that 
from  the  general  viewpoint  they  were  fundamentally  wrong. 
It  was  not  at  the  apex  because  it  was  part  of  an  organization 
that  was  originally  subjective,  and  that  established  functions 
to  deal  with  its  own  field.    These  functional  implements  were 
the  great  war-control  instrumentalities,  but  it  was  sought  to 
use  them  within  one  agency  to  direct  others.     Necessarily, 
even  with  the  best  of  spirit  and  with  the  use  of  interlocking 
devices,  they  did  not  have  the  supremacy  that  would  have 
flowed  from  complete  detachment.    Food,  fuel,  the  Shipping 
Board,  the  Railroad  Administration,  etc.,  were  agencies  co- 
equal in  rank  with  the  War  Industries  Board,  each  with  cer- 
tain subjects  to  deal  with.    It  was  not  logical  to  seek  to  direct 
them  from  within  the  War  Industries  Board.     They  were 
responsible  to  the  President,  and  in  the  sense  of  authority 
they  could  be  reached  only  through  him.    It  was  a  cumber- 
some arrangement,  but  it  worked  because  it  was  an  organic 
growth  rather  than  a  made-to-order  machine. 

The  army  was  always  the  requirements  riddle  of  the  War 
Industries  Board.  Not  only  was  it  the  chief  consumer  and 
the  great  originator  of  requirements  whose  nature  and  volume 


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1 


128    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

ally  about  all  the  war  agencies,  great  and  small,  that  had 
need  of  real  information  or  cooperative  assistance  had  their 
representatives  at  the  meetings  of  the  Requirements  Division. 
The  advantage  that  this  division,  but  little  known  to  the 
public,  had  over  the  more  impressive  War  Cabinet  and  War 
Council  was  in  the  composition  of  its  personnel.  They  were 
neither  the  Cabinet  members  nor  the  heads  of  the  great 
emergency  agencies,  prone  to  abstract  discussions  and  har- 
monious agreements  in  principle  who  were  so  lost  in  a  welter 
of  pressing  duties;  they  were  the  working  executives  —  the 
men  to  whom  action  was  second  nature.  An  undertaking 
expressed  by  such  a  man  in  the  presence  of  a  group  of  his 
fellows  who  would  keenly  hold  him  to  account  meant  con- 
crete results.  These  officers,  like  their  civilian  confreres  in 
the  War  Industries  Board,  were  doers,  not  dignitaries. 

The  weakness  of  the  Requirements  Division  was  that,  after 
all,  it  was  not  supreme  over  all  requirements.    It  passed  on 
requirements  as  they  came  within  the  scope  of  the  War  Indus- 
tries Board.  It  did  not  draft  them.  It  sought  to  modify  them, 
but  in  the  last  analysis  it  did  not  have  the  right  to  say  that 
from  the  general  viewpoint  they  were  fundamentally  wrong. 
It  was  not  at  the  apex  because  it  was  part  of  an  organization 
that  was  originally  subjective,  and  that  established  functions 
to  deal  with  its  own  field.    These  functional  implements  were 
the  great  war-control  instrumentalities,  but  it  was  sought  to 
use  them  within  one  agency  to  direct  others.     Necessarily, 
even  with  the  best  of  spirit  and  with  the  use  of  interlocking 
devices,  they  did  not  have  the  supremacy  that  would  have 
flowed  from  complete  detachment.    Food,  fuel,  the  Shipping 
Board,  the  Railroad  Administration,  etc.,  were  agencies  co- 
equal in  rank  with  the  War  Industries  Board,  each  with  cer- 
tain subjects  to  deal  with.    It  was  not  logical  to  seek  to  direct 
them  from  within  the  War  Industries  Board.     They  were 
responsible  to  the  President,  and  in  the  sense  of  authority 
they  could  be  reached  only  through  him.    It  was  a  cumber- 
some arrangement,  but  it  worked  because  it  was  an  organic 
growth  rather  than  a  made-to-order  machine. 

The  army  was  always  the  requirements  riddle  of  the  War 
Industries  Board.  Not  only  was  it  the  chief  consumer  and 
the  great  originator  of  requirements  whose  nature  and  volume 


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\\ 


REQUIREMENTS  AND  RESOURCES  129 

were  violently  variant,  but  its  administrative  organization 
was  archaic  and  bureaucratically  decentralized.  As  has  been 
said  heretofore,  the  War  Department  did  not  know  its  require- 
ments even  at  the  end  of  the  war.  That  was  partly  inherent 
in  the  circumstances  of  the  war,  but  even  so  there  never  came 
a  time  when  any  one  office  in  the  War  Department  was  the 
pool  into  which  led  all  estimates  of  requirements.  Conse- 
quently, the  War  Department  was  ij/ever  able  to  give  the  War 
Industries  Board  even  a  compreh^sive  estimate  that  was 
worthy  of  the  name.  From  the  beginning  of  the  war  until 
the  last  shot  was  fired,  the  War  Department  was  struggling 
with  internal  reorganization  intended  to  cure  its  business 
defects.  Before  the  reinvigoration  of  the  War  Industries 
Board  in  March,  1918,  the  War  Department  seems  to  have 
had  a  sort  of  dual  programme  of  traveling  along  with  that 
body  and,  at  the  same  time,  of  solving  its  business  problems 
in  an  internal  manner;  that  is  to  say,  of  building  up  its  own 
system  of  contact  with  industry.  This  cannot  be  positively 
affirmed  as  being  an  intention;  perhaps  it  was  rather  a  tend- 
ency promoted  by  the  long  period  of  lethargy  in  the  War 
Industries  Board.  At  any  rate,  the  War  Department  was 
very  backward  in  developing  the  War  Industries  Board. 

However,  most  of  the  officers  who  represented  the  War 
Department  in  the  War  Industries  Board  in  various  capacities 
were  believers  in  the  vigorous  development  of  the  Board. 
The  contacts  they  there  made  with  each  other,  with  repre- 
sentatives of  other  departments,  and  with  the  competent 
civilians  of  the  Board  convinced  them  that  all  the  Board 
needed  to  help  them  solve  their  most  pressing  problems  was 
a  much  larger  scope  of  authority  than  it  had  at  first.  Through 
them  the  War  Industries  Board  was  influential  in  promoting 
the  reorganization  and  tightening  up  the  supply  agencies  of 
the  army.  They  found  that  the  Board,  adapting  its  organi- 
zation to  the  natural  classifications  of  industry,  communicated 
with  industry  through  commodity  sections,  and  they  pro- 
ceeded to  devise  an  informal,  cooperative  grouping  of  the 
officers  engaged  with  supply  matters  into  like  groups. 

Partly  by  voluntary  consent  and  partly  by  pressure  all  the 
officers  of  the  diflFerent  bureaus  and  corps  concerned  in  the 
buying  of  the  same  commodity  came  together  and  pooled 


I 


1 1 ' 


I 


130    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

their  immediate  demands  and  their  requirements  so  far  as 
they  knew  them.  Then  a  single  oflBcer  was  delegated  to  act 
for  the  army  in  respect  of  this  commodity  in  dealing  with  the 
War  Industries  Board.  This  process  was  facilitated  by  the 
fact  that  the  different  buying  agencies  had  been  forced  to 
adapt  themselves  to  industry  by  classifying  their  needs 
according  to  commodities,  which  was  a  lesson  largely  learned 
from  association  with  the  War  Industries  Board. 

Aside  from  this  rather  informal  readjustment  of  purchas- 
ing, the  War  Department  itself  was  endeavoring  to  effect 
such  restriction  of  the  bureaus  and  such  aggrandizement  of 
the  General  Staff  functions  as  rather  rigid  statutory  limita- 
tions would  permit.  By  way  of  diversion  from  the  immedi- 
ate subject,  it  is  worth  while  to  remark  that  if  Congress  had 
let  Elihu  Root  have  his  way  when  he  was  Secretary  of  War, 
the  General  StaflF  would  have  been  endowed  with  ample 
authority  over  the  hard  and  knotty  bureaus.  But  Congress 
was  so  afraid  of  militarism  that  it  insisted  on  the  retention 
of  the  bureaus  with  the  deliberate  purpose  of  making  the 
War  Department  many-headed  and  centrally  weak.  It  suc- 
ceeded so  well  that  it  almost  lost  the  World  War.  After- 
wards it  spent  several  millions  of  dollars  through  a  partisan 
House  Select  Committee  on  Expenditures  in  the  War  Depart- 
ment in  endeavoring  to  prove  that  the  war  enterprise  was  a 
failure  in  every  respect  except  in  the  minor  item  of  winning 
the  war.  As  yet  Congress  has  appointed  no  committee  to 
investigate  its  own  responsibilities  for  the  mistakes  and 
blunders  of  the  conduct  of  the  war. 

On  January  18,  1918,  General  Palmer  E.  Pierce,  who  had 
been  representing  the  army  on  the  War  Industries  Board,  was 
made  Director  of  Purchase,  and  thereafter  every  commodity 
which  was  handled  by  more  than  one  bureau  had  to  be 
cleared  through  the  Director  of  Purchase.  About  the  same 
time  the  Quartermaster  Corps  was  reorganized  on  a  com- 
modity basis  into  the  following  procurement  divisions: 
Clothing  and  Equipage,  Fuel  and  Forage,  Hardware  and 
Metals,  Remounts,  Subsistence,  Vehicles  and  Harness,  and 
Motors  (later  the  Motor  Transport  Corps). 

This  centralization  of  buying  was  not,  however,  authori- 
tatively eflfected  and  eflScient  until  after  the  passage  of  the 


REQUIREMENTS  AND  RESOURCES  131 

Overman  Act,  which  gave  the  President  power  to  switch 
Government  bureaus  and  functions  around  as  he  pleased. 
The  General  Staff  Division  of  Purchase,  Storage,  and  Traffic 
was  then  created,  and  the  reform  instituted  by  General  Pierce 
carried  on  to  a  centralization  of  purchase,  storage,  distribu- 
tion, and  finance  in  that  division  under  Major-General  George 
W.  Goethals.  Thus  the  Quartermaster  Corps  faded  away 
to  a  minor  operating  agency  in  the  field.  These  major 
administrative  reorganizations  of  the  army  were  going  on 
simultaneously  with  the  reorganization  of  the  War  Industries 
Board  in  anticipation  of  or  under  the  Overman  Act,  at  which 
time,  of  course,  the  War  Department  had  abandoned  any 
plan  it  may  have  had  of  working  out  its  own  supply  salva- 
tion independently  of  the  War  Industries  Board. 

General  Hugh  S.  Johnson,  who  succeeded  General  Pierce 
when  the  latter  went  to  France,  although  formerly  sharing 
the  prevailing  army  view  of  the  War  Industries  Board  as  an 
agency  of  more  or  less  obnoxious  civilian  interference  in 
military  matters,  soon  became  a  zealous  convert  to  its  prin- 
ciple and  exerted  himself  energetically,  both  as  army  repre- 
sentative on  the  Board  and  within  the  War  Department,  to 
bring  about  a  full  functioning  of  the  Board  in  relation  to 
the  army.  At  this  time  General  Goethals,  who  had  been 
recalled  from  retirement  to  become  head  of  the  Division  of 
Purchase,  Storage,  and  Trafiic,  was  the  member  of  the  War 
Industries  Board  representing  the  army,  but  General  Johnson 
was  charged  with  the  performance  of  the  duties  of  the  repre- 
sentation. To  a  profound  belief  in  the  functions  of  the  War 
Industries  Board  he  brought  the  assistance  of  a  mind  of 
exceptional  clarity -and  logical  grasp. 

Colonel  Charles  A.  McKenney,  who  was  first  associated 
with  the  work  of  the  War  Industries  Board  as  representative 
of  the  Engineer  Corps  of  the  army  on  the  General  Munitions 
Board,  became  the  army  priorities  representative,  after  the 
reorganization  of  the  Board  in  the  spring  of  1918.  He,  also, 
was  a  devoted  believer  in  the  War  Industries  Board,  and  was 
greatly  influential  in  interlocking  the  supply  departments  of 
the  army  with  the  Board.  He  was  so  completely  supported 
by  the  Secretary  of  War  that  he  was  able  to  overcome  the 
stubborn  objection  of  army  officers  to  accepting  any  sort  of 


fi, 


±i 


I 


11 


,    I 


132    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

instructions  coming  from  an  inferior  in  rank.  A  brigadier- 
general,  for  example,  would  be  loath  to  accept  priority 
directions  from  a  colonel,  failing  to  see  that  in  such  a  matter 
the  colonel  was  endowed  with  a  special  authority  that  tran- 
scended military  seniority. 

It  is  possibly  true  that  General  Peyton  C.  March,  who  as 
Chief  of  Staff"  has  been  well  and  deservedly  described  as 
the  dynamo  of  the  stupendous  military  eff'ort  America  put 
forth  in  1918,  was  never  in  deep  sympathy  with  the  work 
of  the  War  Industries  Board.  As  a  professional  soldier, 
reared  in  the  restricted  American  military  tradition  of  the 
complete  separation  of  military  and  civil  endeavor,  he  was 
inclined  to  the  view  that  all  war-making  measures  should  be 
primarily  under  military  control.  Assuming  in  the  General 
Staff"  as  complete  an  understanding  of  industry  and  com- 
merce as  it  should  have  of  purely  military  aff"airs,  and 
assuming  also  years  of  preparation  as  a  Great  General  Staff", 
such  would  be  the  logical  relation.  Lacking  these  require- 
ments, as  our  General  Staff"  and  army  did,  the  creation  of 
such  a  universal  joint  as  the  War  Industries  Board  between 
the  military  establishments  and  industry  was  the  better  way. 
On  one  side  it  was  blended  with  industry;  on  the  other  with 
the  military.  It  understood  the  languages  of  both  and  inter- 
preted them  both  ways.  The  slowness  of  its  growth  was 
well-nigh  fatal,  but  it  had  the  advantages  of  growth  over 
those  of  an  a  priori  creation.  For  that  reason  it  was,  on  the 
other  hand,  a  better  supplemental  agency  than  a  statutorily 
created  ministry  of  munitions  would  have  been. 

The  failure  to  approximate  and  coordinate  requirements 
with  respect  to  each  other,  and  the  vital  element  of  time,  led 
to  the  temporary  over-supply  of  some  things  and  the  under- 
supply  of  others;  to  the  production  of  parts  of  military 
equipment  before  their  complementary  parts;  as,  for  ex- 
ample, guns  and  their  carriages.  The  outcome  was  that  in 
the  last  months  of  the  war  millions  of  tons  of  shipping  space 
were  used  to  carry  to  France  materiel  that  would  merely 
cumber  storage  space  at  the  very  time  that  Pershing's  army 
was  on  the  verge  of  ceasing  to  function  for  lack  of  motor 
and  animal  transport.  It  is  quite  true  that  the  programme 
for  the  supply  of  motor  trucks  was  laid  down  before  the 


REQUIREMENTS  AND  RESOURCES  133 


torrential  rush  of  divisions  to  France  was  foreseen  as  pos- 
sible. On  the  then  known  capacity  of  the  "neck  of  the 
bottle,"  there  was  ample  time  for  refinements  of  standardi- 
zation and  other  approximations  of  perfection;  but  when  the 
neck  widened  and  soldiers  sped  through  it  by  the  million  the 
transport  was  not  ready  to  go  with  them.  At  this  stage,  how- 
ever, a  cold-blooded  effort  at  coordination  of  the  eff"ort  in 
man  power  and  in  materiel  would  have  been  paralyzing. 
General  March  concentrated  his  energies  on  a  stupendous 
massing  of  man  power  in  France  and  left  the  rest  to  Provi- 
dence and  the  Allies  who  cried  out  for  infantry  and  machine 
guns  at  any  cost.  The  American  response  was  2,100,000 
soldiers  in  France  when  the  war  ended  and  machine  guns 
enough  complete  for  an  army  of  7,000,000. 

"I  am  apprehensive  that  the  Americans  will  miss  the  1918 
train,"  said  Marshal  Foch  in  February.^ 

Thanks  to  March  they  caught  it. 

With  terrific  energy  March  availed  himself  of  every  troop 
transport  that  could  be  brought  from  the  far  ends  of  earth, 
and  as  fast  as  they  arrived  they  were  loaded  with  fighting 


men. 


i^l 


'How  will  they  get  to  the  front?"  some  one  asked  the 
General.    "Let  them  march,"  was  the  answer. 

And  the  General  was  right.  An  American  soldier  in 
France,  even  three  hundred  miles  from  the  battle  line,  con- 
tributed greatly  to  the  cause  of  victory.  He  presented,  at  the 
very  least,  an  irresistible  moral  unit.  Transport  was  lack- 
ing, but  subsistence  and  the  soldier's  personal  equipment 
seldom  if  ever  failed. 

However,  the  cablegram  from  Pershing  that  his  army 
would  cease  to  function  unless  transport  was  provided  caused 
a  diversion  of  forwarding  energy,  or,  rather,  an  additional 
concentration  of  it  on  transport  equipment. 

As  an  illustration  of  the  impossibility  of  definitely  solving 
the  problem  of  requirements  in  a  uniform  manner,  it  may 
be  said  that  on  January  1st  the  military  programme  called 
for  the  delivery  of  100,000  soldiers  in  France  in  the  month 
of  July,  1918.    The  actual  number  transported  in  that  single 

*Not  a  literal  quotation.  See  America's  Race  to  Victory,  by  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Requin,  page  149. 


ii 


134    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

month  was  306,000.  For  the  spring  of  1919,  which  was 
expected  to  see  the  culmination  of  the  war,  there  were  to  be 
4,000,000  American  soldiers  in  France.  Much  of  the 
materiel  for  this  colossal  force  was  ready  before  certain 
materiel  that  was  currently  needed,  and  the  anticipatory 
goods  represented  a  considerable  portion  of  the  5,153,000 
tons  of  army  cargo  shipped  to  France  during  the  war. 

The  army  transport  fleet  grew  eventually  from  virtually 
nothing  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  to  almost  five  hundred 
ships  of  a  total  tonnage  of  3,800,000  —  more  than  twice  the 
entire  deep-sea  merchant  marine  of  the  United  States  in 
1917.  The  most  optimistic  did  not  consider  such  an  attain- 
ment within  the  realm  of  possibility  a  year  before.  This 
amazing  expansion  of  the  neck  of  the  bottle  upset  all  pro- 
grammes, and  in  the  rush  to  utilize  it  at  the  moment  require- 
ment projections  were  overlooked.  Even  the  troop  reserves 
to  keep  the  Atlantic  conduit  filled  were  overlooked,  and 
General  Crowder,  supplier  of  men,  was  as  much  in  the  dark 
as  to  requirements  as  the  material  supply  agencies  were  as 
to  the  subsistence  programmes. 

The  writer  would  have  it  understood  that  these  matters 
are  set  down  in  no  spirit  of  belittling  criticism,  but  rather  as 
a  statement  of  important  fact,  for  future  reference  and  con- 
sideration. His  remarks  herein  should  always  be  read  with 
their  context.  What  the  army  accomplished  in  supply  and 
transportation,  quite  aside  from  the  proper  military  func- 
tion, would  have  been  remarkable  even  if  it  had  ]peen  mod- 
emly  organized  for  the  task  before  the  war  began  and  had 
had  from  the  beginning  the  support  of  an  efficient  War 
Industries  Board.  To  have  done  what  it  did  whilst  in  the 
throes  of  reorganization  and  expansion  from  less  than  two 
hundred  thousand  men  to  four  million  entitles  it  to  unquali- 
fied praise  without  in  any  way  detracting  from  the  recogni- 
tion that  is  due  the  civilian  agencies  whose  cooperation  was 
indispensable. 

Nevertheless,  the  disposition  of  the  problem  of  current 
requirements  might  have  been  handled  with  more  foresight. 
Officially  the  army  supply  department  was  not  aware  that  the 
programme  of  100,000  men  a  month  for  France  jumped  to 
245,000  actually  transported  in  May.    Not  until  the  middle 


REQUIREMENTS  AND  RESOURCES  135 

of  July  was  the  supply  department  formally  notified  to  take 
care  of  250,000  men  monthly. 

Much  less  was  the  War  Industries  Board  authoritatively 
informed  of  the  new  programme.  When  by  chance  Mr. 
Baruch  did  hear  of  the  Pershing  cablegram,  there  was  a  tre- 
mendous scurrying  to  meet  the  situation,  and  a  great  forward 
step  in  civilian  power  within  the  army.  There  was  a  frank 
interchange  of  views  between  the  Chief  of  Industries  and  the 
Chief  of  Staff  which  made  it  plain  that  the  time  had  come 
when  the  army  must  acknowledge  civilian  supremacy  in  the 
fundamentals  of  supply. 

When  the  war  ended,  more  than  thirty-four  thousand  trucks 
had  reached  France,  and  they  were  going  forward  at  the  rate 
of  ten  thousand  a  month,  besides  a  very  large  number  of 
other  motor  vehicles,  such  as  ambulances,  passenger  cars, 
motor-cycles,  and  tractors.  Fifty-four  thousand  horses  and 
mules  had  arrived  in  France,  and  were  moving  to  the  front 
at  the  rate  of  twenty  thousand  a  month. 

It  is  probably  an  overstatement  of  the  situation,  as  made 
to  the  author  by  a  general  officer  who  was  in  France,  that  the 
armistice  came  just  in  time,  on  account  of  the  maladjustment 
of  supply  transport  to  personnel,  to  prevent  a  "terrible  catas- 
trophe." Had  the  train  of  circumstances  been  different,  this 
maladjustment  probably  would  have  resulted  in  the  passivity 
'  of  the  American  army,  with  the  probable  consequence  of  the 
postponement  of  the  final  scene  of  the  war  to  die  spring  of 
1919,  in  accordance  with  the  Foch  programme  prior  to  the 
great  Marshal's  determination  to  take  advantage  of  German 
weakness  to  impose  a  decision  in  1918. 

This  possible  near  approach  to  a  disaster  should  afford  a 
lesson  not  to  be  rejected,  that  in  any  future  war  on  the  mod- 
ern scale  the  army  must  cordially  entrust  supreme  control  of 
supply  requirements  to  a  civilian  agency,  such  as  the  War 
Industries  Board  or  its  equivalent. 

The  complement  of  the  Requirements  Division  was  in  a 
broad  sense  all  the  rest  of  the  War  Industries  Board,  func- 
tional and  subjective.  The  common  purpose  of  them  all  was 
to  establish  a  balance  between  requirements  and  resources, 
or  between  demand  and  supply.  Theoretically  the  Require- 
ments Division  determined  demand  and  the  rest  amassed 


' 


136    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

resources.    Yet  there  were  certain  units  of  the  organization 
whose  special  function  was  to  study,  develop,  and  manipulate 
resources  in  a  broad  way.    They  dealt  with  internal  indus- 
trial strategy.    They  sought  to  work  out  a  territorial  diffusion 
of  war  industries;  to  overcome  local  congestion;  to  prevent 
the  waste  of  industrial  capacity  tending  to  arise  from  the 
restriction  of  some  less  essential  industries  and  the  complete 
stoppage  of  others  by  the  necessities  of  war;  to  prevent  the 
American  war  programme  from  interfering  with  the  supply 
programme  of  the  Allies;  to  husband  transportation  through 
the  location  of  war  plants  contiguous  to  their  materials  and 
to  labor;  to  guard  the  industrial  fabric  from  unnecessary 
dissolution;  to  see  that,  while  the  limbs  of  the  industrial 
body  were  developed  and  trained  for  war,  the  trunk  was  not 
exhausted;  and,  above  all,  to  increase  all  essential  produc- 
tion; for  war  has  not  only  peculiar  needs  that  involve  new 
production,  but  it  enforces  more  basic  production,  for  what 
it  consumes  must  of  necessity  be  largely  added  production 
of  what  the  nation  ordinarily  uses. 

The  first  agency  in  this  field  was  the  Industrial  Inventory 
Section  of  the  Council  of  National  Defense,  which  took  over 
the  industrial  inventory  compiled  by  the  Committee  on  Indus- 
trial Preparedness  of  the  Naval  Consulting  Board  and  which 
also  utilized  the  Keman  Report.    This  section  undertook  to 
expand  and  revise  its  initial  data,  and  digest  such  other  data 
as  it  could  obtain.    Then,  as  the  War  Industries  Board  grew 
to  its  task,  there  were  created  the  Resources  and  Conversion 
Section,  the  Facilities  Division,  the  Advisory  Committee  on 
Plants  and  Munitions,  and  the  Division  of  Statistics  and 
Planning.     The  commodity  sections  and  divisions  were  the 
best  sources  of  information  as  well  as  the  chief  agencies  of 
its  application  to  the  general  problem  of  marshaling  resources 
and  facilities. 

Outside  of  the  Board  such  governmental  agencies  as  the 
Census  Bureau,  the  Bureau  of  Mines,  the  Geological  Survey, 
Ae  Bureau  of  Standards,  the  Forestry  Service,  the  Statistical 
Bureau  of  the  Department  of  Commerce,  private  commercial 
reports,  and  the  statistical  records  of  corporations  and  busi- 
ness associations  of  various  kinds  were  drawn  on.  The 
Industrial  Inventory  Section  found  that  much  of  its  raw 


REQUIREMENTS  AND  RESOURCES  137 

material  was  not  in  such  form  as  to  give  the  desired  knowl- 
edge. The  Industrial  Preparedness  Survey  showed  the 
capacity  of  manufacturers  to  produce  certain  definite  articles. 
But  what  was  needed  was  knowledge  of  the  industrial  proc- 
esses used,  so  that  it  would  be  possible  to  determine  a  plant's 
adaptability  to  the  manufacture  of  an  article  quite  diflferent 
from  its  normal  output.  By  May,  1918,  the  section  had 
reclassified  factories  according  to  processes  and  had  added 
about  eight  thousand  more  to  the  original  lists,  making  a  total 
of  approximately  twenty-eight  thousand. 

The  creation  of  the  Resources  and  Conversion  Section  in 
the  spring  of  1918  marked  the  beginning  of  the  systematic, 
centralized  use  of  the  information  compiled  by  the  Inventory 
Section.  In  the  fall  of  1918  this  work  was  subdivided  by  the 
creation  of  the  Facilities  Division.  To  formulate  and  digest 
the  statistical  information  that  was  collected  through  so  many 
channels  and  was  subject  to  use  by  so  many  agencies,  it  was 
early  found  advisable  to  establish  a  statistical  division.  This 
division  was  found  to  be  invaluable  by  the  General  Staff, 
and  it  eventually  annexed  it  almost  in  toto  as  its  own  statis- 
tical division,  giving  officers'  commissions  to  Dr.  Leonard 
P.  Ayres,  its  chief,  and  to  most  of  his  assistants.  It  then 
became  necessary  for  the  War  Industries  Board  to  replace 
it  with  a  new  organization  —  somewhat  broader  —  called 
the  Division  of  Planning  and  Statistics  of  the  War  Industries 
Board.  Its  organizer  and  director  was  Dean  Edwin  F.  Gay, 
who  was  already  at  the  head  of  a  like  division  in  the  Ship- 
ping Board  and  of  the  Bureau  of  Research  and  Tabulation 
of  Statistics  in  the  War  Trade  Board. 

The  presentation  of  the  work  of  these  bodies  having  to  do 
specifically  with  resources  and  facilities  will  be  reserved  for 
later  chapters.  With  their  enumeration  and  denomination 
we  complete  the  picture  of  the  overhead  machinery  of  the 
great  task  of  balancing  resources  and  requirements.  In  a 
large  measure  requirements  were  always  represented  by  x, 
and  resources  were  always  capable  of  some  extension.  But 
the  War  Industries  Board  eff'ected  such  a  channel  between 
them  that  Mr.  Baruch  was  able  to  say  in  his  preliminary 
report  that  "not  one  default  was  recorded  on  any  demand 
made  by  the  military  establishments." 


DISCIPLINING  A  NATION 


139 


1 


P 


CHAPTER  VIII 

DISCIPLINING  A  NATION: 
PRIORITIES  IN  PRINCIPLE  AND  IN  ACTION 

The  torrential  demand  for  goods  —  Visualizing  a  nation's  need  —  The  making 
of  an  explosive  shell  —  Everybody  for  himself  —  What  priority  is  —  Priority 
becomes  a  center  of  power  —  "Essential**  versus  "non-essential'*  industries  — 
Rationing  a  people  and  their  commerce  —  The  parable  of  the  eggs  —  "Class 
AA'*  to  "Qass  D"  —  Business  and  the  spirit  of  common  service  —  The  army 
calls  for  underwear  —  The  national  policing  of  industry  —  Locomotives,  steel, 
brass,  nitrate,  acetone,  coal,  cotton  —  Which  first  in  the  race  against  time? 
—  Saving  the  French  75*8  —  Pershing  wants  mules  —  Priority  supreme. 

Within  three  months  after  the  United  States  entered  the 
World  War  the  War  Department  alone  issued,  chiefly  into  a 
limited  industrial  district,  more  than  sixty  thousand  orders 
for  goods  and  materials.  Over  this  initial  flood  there  poured 
uintil  the  end  of  the  war  a  vast  and  violent  stream  of  demands 
for  myriad  products. 

Before  the  raging  torrent  industry  was  swamped.  Unim- 
portant goods  were  made  before  essentials,  freight  was 
produced  without  cars,  and  carloads  were  delivered  at  the 
ocean  front  without  ships;  all  Government  orders  were 
"rush,"  and  thousands  of  army  and  navy  officers  and  flocks 
of  agents  of  the  Emergency  Fleet  Corporation  and  the  Food 
and  Fuel  Administrations  goaded  the  producers  to  a  fury  of 
disordered  efi'ort.  Freight  piled  up  at  the  ocean  terminals 
until  freight  trains  could  no  longer  reach  them  and  had  to 
discharge  their  burdens  in  the  fields,  ten,  twenty,  thirty  miles 
back;  internal  railway  yards  were  so  chaotically  blocked 
that  cars  had  to  be  lifted  off  sidetracks  with  wrecking  cranes 
to  get  them  on  their  way  again. 

Even  as  the  deluge  grew  and  the  disorder  advanced,  two- 
score  Government  purchasing  agencies  beat  the  whirlpool  to 
froth  with  their  bidding  and  scheming  against  each  other, 
each  obsessed  with  a  mad  determination  to  achieve  his  own 
goal.  To  their  able  assistance  scurried  a  cloud  of  specu- 
lators and  jobbers  and  "shoestringers,"  inflating  demand  by 


the  multiplicity  of  their  "middling"  efforts.  Original  orders 
invariably  involved  secondary  orders  for  materials  and  parts 
and,  perhaps,  half  a  dozen  inquiries  for  each  sub-order;  and 
the  sub-orders  were  again  split  and  resplit,  and  each  appeared 
in  the  most  unexpected  places. 

Thus,  even  the  capillaries  of  industry  were  congested,  and 
confusion  arose  in  the  most  remote  and  unexpected  parts  of 
the  industrial  body.  Transportation  was  turned  into  a  hurdy- 
gurdy  by  cross-hauling  and,  above  all,  by  preference.  Every- 
thing for  the  Government  was  preferred  until  there  was  no 
longer  a  semblance  of  preference,  and  the  last  had  a  better 
chance  than  the  first.  Manufacturers  swallowed  orders  and 
yet  more  until  their  files  were  gorged,  and  still  they  accepted 
orders  and  struggled  for  more.  Serious  shortages  arose  at 
the  same  time  that  the  greatest  industrial  community  in  the 
world  was  headed  for  asphyxiation  in  its  own  product. 

Such  was  the  malady  of  the  industrial  body  that  the  War 
Industries  Board  was  called  upon  to  heal.  The  cure  was 
undertaken  by  administering  the  hair  of  the  dog  that  gave 
the  bite.  The  stampede  for  preference  caused  the  conges- 
tion; the  enforcement  of  graded  preference,  which  was  the 
specialized  meaning  the  word  "priority"  came  to  have  in 
war  industry,  eased  if  it  did  not  terminate  the  congestion. 

Modem  war  not  only  taxes  the  resources  of  a  nation  for 
the  production  of  essentially  military  supplies,  of  which  the 
consumption  is  not  large  in  normal  times,  but  at  the  same 
time  puts  a  heavy  additional  strain  on  the  production  of 
many  articles  of  ordinary  use.  Offhand  one  might  think  that 
five  million  men  taken  from  civil  life  and  put  into  the  army 
would  merely  change  the  destination  of  their  usual  personal 
supplies.  In  fact  a  soldier,  if  he  is  always  fit  in  equipment, 
wears  out  shoes  and  clothing,  for  example,  about  five  times 
as  fast  as  a  civilian. 

The  army  purchased  in  1918  far  more  woolen  socks  than 
the  entire  normal  annual  production  of  the  United  States, 
twice  as  many  blankets,  three  times  as  many  part-leather 
gloves;  it  took  all  the  wool  and  all  the  steel.  In  some  lines 
of  commodities  forehanded  bureaus  early  cornered  all  the 
production  for  months,  if  not  for  years.  Add  to  these  abnor- 
malities the  stupendous  demands  for  munitions,  of  which 


;i»i 


*   r 


^ 


140    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

the  peace-time  production  is  negligible;  reflect  that  each  of 
these  war  items  subdivides  into  many  industrial  sources  and 
manifold  processes,  and  that  they  all  converge  on  an  indus- 
trial life  already  disordered  by  increased  demand  for  ordi- 
nary goods  and  the  disruption  of  normal  methods  by  the 
withdrawal  of  men  and  transport,  and  it  is  easy  to  see  that 
the  self-control  of  ordinary  times  will  not  serve  industry  in 
war. 

These  production  strains  in  ordinary  industry  had  to  be 
met  by  sixty-six  men  where  formerly  a  hundred  had  been 
occupied,  with  the  help  of  a  few  women  and  children;  for 
twenty-four  of  each  hundred  of  adult  male  workers  had 
been  diverted  to  production  for  military  purposes,  and  ten 
were  in  the  army  and  navy;  moreover,  the  war  workers  and 
the  fighting  men  were  physically,  at  least,  the  cream  of  the 
hundred. 

A  shell  for  a  gun  requires  scores  of  raw  materials  of  the 
most  diverse  kind,  numerous  processes,  many  finished  mate- 
rials, and  a  great  variety  and  diversity  of  human  and  machine 
work.  The  ore-miner  in  Minnesota,  the  coal-miner  in  Penn- 
sylvania, the  coke-maker  in  West  Virginia,  the  brass-worker 
in  Connecticut,  the  copper-miner  in  Arizona,  the  maker  of 
chemicals  in  New  York,  of  explosives  in  Delaware,  of  milling 
machinery,  of  steel,  of  iron,  the  transport-worker  —  all  these 
and  many  more  must  synchronously  converge  their  eff'orts 
or  there  will  be  no  shell.  Let  even  one  of  them  fail  and  the 
shell  fails. 

A  hundred  thousand  things  besides  shells  were  required 
by  the  Government  in  the  war  work  —  many  of  them  fully  as 
composite  and  complex.  They  intermixed  and  intertwined 
with  each  other  in  materials,  labor,  facilities,  and  transport. 
More  of  one  meant  less  of  another;  the  maximum  of  one 
meant  none  of  many  others. 

Here  was  the  making  of  the  worst  tangle  of  disordered 
effort  the  world  has  known.  All  of  this  turbulent  torrent  of 
production  must  be  regulated  in  velocity  and  volume.  This 
was  accomplished  through  priority  which  was  the  synchroniz- 
ing device  whereby  each  factor  did  its  part  at  the  right  time 
and  the  measuring  device  whereby  it  did  its  part  in  the  right 
volume.    It  was  by  far  the  greatest  mechanism  of  industrial 


DISCIPLINING  A  NATION 


141 


control  the  World  War  produced.  Its  like  was  never  seen 
before  and  will  never  be  seen  again  short  of  the  perfect 
socialistic  state. 

Priority,  with  experience  and  study,  became  the  most  efii- 
cacious  implement  of  Government  ordinance  of  industry.  It 
was  the  sturdy  shovel  with  which  the  War  Industries  Board 
cleared  up  the  blockade  and  kept  the  tracks  open.  It  was 
nothing  less  than  a  great  system  of  industrial  and  transport 
precedence,  automatic  in  the  main,  manipulated  in  the  excep- 
tion, whereby  production  was  ordered,  restrained,  or  stimu- 
lated to  meet  current  and  projected  war  demands  and  prevent 
the  civil  population  from  suffering  destitution  in  the  midst 
of  prosperity.  In  effecting  these  immediate  ends  it  auto- 
matically checked  profiteering  and  repressed  prices. 

In  its  ultimate  effects,  often  under  other  names  —  such  as 
allocation  and  curtailment  —  it  impinged  not  only  upon 
industries,  but  also  upon  persons.  To  some  it  brought 
business  and  prosperity,  to  others  hardship  and  poverty. 
None  escaped  its  mandates.  The  Nation  was  "prioritized" 
—  and  yet  there  was  no  collective  statute  of  priorities. 
Founded  on  limited  legislative  enactment,  it  was  without 
statutory  buttresses  or  punitive  supports,  and  it  pursued  its 
way  from  particular  to  general  and  back  to  particular  power 
by  the  circuitous  route  of  "request,"  instead  of  the  straight 
highway  of  command.  Based  on  reasonableness  and  obvious 
necessity,  few  questioned  its  decisions  and  none  dared  oppose 
them.  It  was  cooperative  democracy  at  its  highest  power, 
even  in  an  institution  which  was  predicated  on  the  "consent 
of  the  governed." 

In  the  beginning  supply  departments  poured  out  orders 
with  as  little  concern  for  the  consequences  as  though  they 
were  merely  dumping  letters  into  mail-boxes.  This  was 
due  to  the  decentralization  of  purchasing  authority  imposed 
by  statute  and  to  the  failure  of  the  army  to  appreciate  that, 
if  in  modern  war  the  Nation's  industry  as  a  whole  is  the 
commissary  department  of  the  Nation  in  arms,  it  is  subject 
to  overstrain  and  exhaustion  just  as  much  as  the  more  par- 
ticular commissary  of  the  tactical  army. 

The  only  rule  of  preference  was  the  good  old  one  of  the 
feeding-trough  —  first  come,  first  served ;  except  that  as  be- 


t"! 


It.; 


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if 

i:  ■ 


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II 


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142    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

tween  the  army  and  the  navy  there  was  an  understanding* 
between  the  two  Secretaries  that  the  navy  was  for  a  time  to 
have  the  right  of  way  over  the  army.  This  understanding  — 
which  was  more  honored  in  the  breach  than  in  the  observance 
—  was  probably  based  on  the  hypothesis  that,  as  the  navy 
was  on  a  near-war  footing  in  time  of  peace,  it  should  be 
allowed  to  complete  the  comparatively  small  effort  that  would 
effect  the  transition  and  thus  get  into  action  at  an  early  date ; 
whereas  the  army  was  so  remotely  distant  from  readiness 
that  early  precedence  for  the  navy  would  not  appreciably 
affect  its  exertions. 

Between  this  preference  of  courtesy  and  what  it  seized  in 
the  ancient  way,  the  navy  had  about  all  the  preference  there 
was  at  first.  The  navy  had  the  advantage  of  a  compact 
organization,  a  very  clear  knowledge  of  what  it  wanted  and 
of  about  where  it  could  get  it.  Indeed,  the  navy  was  so  well 
conditioned  that  it  was  inclined  to  view  with  distrust  the 
injection  of  civilian  assistance  into  the  situation.  Its  own 
good-fortune  inclined  it  to  question  whether  elaborate  direc- 
tion of  the  production  and  delivery  of  supplies  was  neces- 
sary; and  when  it  did  see  the  gravity  of  the  situation,  it 
seemed  that  for  the  navy  to  surrender  any  of  its  advantages 
for  the  prior  benefit  of  others  would  be  merely  to  dissolve 
the  last  solid  support  in  a  slithering  morass  of  confusion. 

Within  the  army,  the  Signal  Service  and  more  especially 
the  aircraft  division  thereof  appears  to  have  got  started  ahead 
of  the  other  bureaus  and  divisions.  In  consequence,  we  hear 
little  of  the  troubles  of  the  aircraft  production  task,  huge  as 
it  was,  in  the  proceedings  of  the  War  Industries  Board.  The 
Aircraft  Board  was  not  lacking  in  foresight  and  the  volume 
of  its  requirements  was  early  established.  It  placed  the 
bulk  of  its  orders  with  the  automobile  industry,  which  was 
particularly  qualified  to  meet  them  with  a  minimum  of  inter- 
ference with  other  supply  processes,  and  its  spruce  problem 
was  so  vast  and  technical  that  it  was  allowed  to  handle  the 
whole  matter  independently  of  the  War  Industries  Board, 
except,  of  course,  as  the  Board  used  its  powers  to  assist  the 
aircraft  managers  in  putting  through  Uieir  projects.     No 


DISCIPLINING  A  NATION 


143 


i««/ 


As  between  the  army  and  the  navy,  priority  should  be  given  to  such 
needs  of  the  navy  as  are  intended  to  be  completed  within  one  year.**  (Minutes 
of  the  Council  of  ^ational  Defense,  April  28,  1917.) 


analysis  or  appraisal  is  here  made,  however,  of  the  American 
aircraft  programme.    That,  indeed,  is  another  story. 

The  Shipping  Board  did  not  get  under  way  with  its  contract 
ships  —  as  distinguished  from  requisitioned  —  as  soon  as 
the  aircraft  people,  and  its  requirements  projected  a  torrent 
of  orders  into  the  already  choked  stream  of  demand. 

We  have  seen  how  clearance,  a  form  of  priority  at  the 
source,  was  introduced  to  check  and  systematize  the  flow  of 
orders,  and  we  have  observed  in  a  general  way  the  efforts  to 
balance  requirements  as  against  compilations  of  resources 
—  of  which  we  shall  see  more  further  on;  but  neither  clear- 
ance nor  the  effort  to  effect  an  equilibrium  in  the  mass 
between  requirements  and  resources  solved  the  problem  of 
precedence  of  production,  though  they  were  important  con- 
tributory factors. 

The  final  and  effective  step  was  the  calling  in  of  the  prin- 
ciple of  priority,  which  like  so  much  else  of  the  war  imple- 
mentry  was  not  so  much  an  invention  as  a  product.  War 
industry  had  not  been  going  very  long  before  manufacturers 
became  bewildered  by  the  clouds  of  Government  orders  for 
which  expedition  was  demanded.  Among  many  first,  which 
should  be  first?  They  turned  to  Washington  for  direction, 
but  who  was  to  decide  among  a  score  of  buyers,  each  of 
whom  could  see  the  issue  of  the  war  pivoting  on  preference 
for  his  particular  supplies? 

The  demand  for  a  programme  or  at  least  schedules  of 
preference  in  production  was  the  natural  complement  of  the 
simultaneously  perceived  need  of  method  in  the  placing  of 
orders.  Indeed,  to  clear  orders  is  merely  to  institute  priority 
at  the  beginning.  However,  the  two  phases  of  one  task  came 
up  as  presentations  from  opposite  directions,  and  both  were 
referred  to  the  Council  of  National  Defense  which  through 
the  General  Munitions  Board  established  a  clearance  com- 
mittee, as  we  have  already  seen,  and  at  about  the  same  time 
—  May  3,  1917  —  set  up  a  priorities  committee. 

At  that  time  the  priority  function,  as  defined  by  W.  S. 
Gifford,  then  director  of  the  Council,  was  that  of  determining 
"priority  of  delivery  of  materials  and  finished  products, 
whenever  there  is  a  conflict  in  delivery,  in  accordance  with 
the  general  policy  of  the  Government."    "It  is  further  under- 


1 


144    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


DISCIPLINING  A  NATION 


145 


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stood,"  this  definition  continues,  "that  at  present  the  priority 
committee  of  the  General  Munitions  Board  has  no  power  in 
regard  to  the  determination  of  priority  in  regard  to  civilian 
needs  in  which  the  army  and  navy  requirements  are  not 
involved.  It  is  further  understood  that,  as  between  the  needs 
of  our  allies  and  of  our  civilian  population,  the  priority 
committee  of  the  General  Munitions  Board  has  no  authority 
to  act." 

The  Board  had  declared  for  a  real  priority  system,  but 
war  was  not  yet  the  paramount  business  of  the  Nation;  and 
a  council  composed  of  the  heads  of  six  great  Executive 
departments,  each  jealous  of  power  and  humanly  ambitious 
for  war  honors,  held  inherently  too  many  of  the  elements 
of  indecision  and  procrastination.  Also,  it  was  reluctant  to 
enter  the  limitless  field  of  general  industrial  control,  which  a 
complete  priority  system  would  have  involved,  in  view  of  the 
vagueness  of  legislative  authority  for  such  an  enterprise.  In 
determining  priority  for  Government  business,  it  was  on  safe 
ground  because  it  was  authorized  to  act  for  the  army,  the 
navy,  and  Shipping  Board,  on  which  priority  rights  had  been 
conferred  by  Congress.  At  that  stage  of  the  development 
of  the  general  public's  war  spirit  or  that  of  industry,  the 
approval  of  those  affected  by  the  Board's  requests  could  not 
have  been  counted  on.  Later  on,  the  War  Industries  Board 
had  the  legal  basis  for  priority  regulations  that  flowed  from 
the  Lever  Food  and  Fuel  Act  and  the  Transportation  Prefer- 
ence Act  of  August  10,  1917. 

Although  in  transportation  only  did  it  have  direct  legisla- 
tive authority  relating  to  priority,  the  pooling  of  the  powers 
by  which  priority  could  be  enforced  gave  the  Board  a  club 
with  which  to  enforce  regulations;  but  in  all  matters  of 
priority  in  civilian  goods  it  was  without  legal  authority  to 
order  the  doing  of  the  necessary  things,  which  it  was  in  a 
position  to  enforce  by  indirect  pressure.  In  these  circum- 
stances the  Board  felt  it  was  more  politic  to  request  than  to 
demand  compliance  with  its  regulations.  It  was  no  offense 
for  an  irate  manufacturer  who  was  far  down  the  priority 
list  to  consign  the  Board  and  its  chairman  to  inferno  and 
flatly  refuse  compliance  with  its  requests;  on  the  other  hand, 
the  Board  was  not  exceeding  its  authority  if  it  arranged  for 


the  Fuel  Administration  to  refuse  coal  to  the  obstructive 
manufacturer,  and  for  the  railways  to  deny  him  cars.  Of 
course,  he  had  to  come  into  camp. 

Yet  it  is  important  to  point  out  that  if  industry  had  not 
early  become  animated  with  the  war  spirit  of  sacrifice  and 
accommodation,  and  had  not  perceived  the  necessity  of  unity 
of  action  and  discipline  in  its  sphere  as  much  as  in  the  purely 
military  sphere,  the  War  Industries  Board's  career  might  have 
been  one  of  endless  bickerings  and  squabbles  to  an  inglorious 
end  by  Congressional  action.  After  the  Government  took 
over  the  railways,  the  occasional  rebel  did  not  have  a  chance 
unless  he  was  absolutely  independent  of  railway  transport 
and  fuel. 

The  War  Industries  Board  was  wise  enough  to  pivot  all 
priorities  on  the  Transportation  Preference  Act.  Under  the 
act  the  President  appointed  Judge  Robert  S.  Lovett,  chairman 
of  the  board  of  the  Union  Pacific  Railway,  as  Director  of 
Transportation  Priorities,  and  he  was  made  Priorities  Com- 
missioner of  the  Board.  A  new  priorities  committee  was  then 
formed  with  Edwin  B.  Parker  as  chairman.  This  was  in  the 
latter  part  of  August,  1917,  so  that  it  may  be  safely  said 
that  priorities  as  a  system  was  not  really  developed  before 
the  fall  of  1917. 

It  came  to  its  zenith  in  the  reorganization  of  the  War 
Industries  Board,  following  Mr.  Baruch's  appointment  as 
chairman.  At  that  time.  Judge  Lovett  having  joined  the 
Railroad  Administration,  Judge  Parker,  as  he  was  familiarly 
known,  had  become  Priorities  Commissioner  and  was  rapidly 
building  up  the  Priorities  Division.  The  Priorities  Commis- 
sioner, besides  having  the  statutory  control  of  preference  in 
railway  transportation,  was  authorized  by  the  President,  the 
Secretary  of  War,  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  the  chairman 
of  the  Shipping  Board,  and  the  president  of  the  Emergency 
Fleet  Corporation  to  exercise  by  himself  and  through  the 
Priorities  Committee  such  powers  as  they  had  respecting 
preference. 

Finally,  the  President's  letter  of  March  4,  1918,  to  Mr. 
Baruch,  which  was  in  effect  an  Executive  order,  conferred  on 
the  War  Industries  Board  for  priority  purposes  all  the 
implied  war-time  powers  of  the  Executive.    At  this  time  the 


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1 


146    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

feeble  and  merely  advisory  priorities  committee  of  the  spring 
of  1917  became  a  stalwart  agency  of  industrial  administra- 
tion by  Government.  It  was  a  potent  factor  in  price-fixing, 
in  conservation,  curtailment,  conversion,  material  rationing, 
regional  dispersion  of  industry  and  general  regulation 
thereof;  and  its  application  shaped  the  draft  on  man  power 
for  the  army  and  navy.  Just  as  the  War  Industries  Board 
mtertwined  itself  among  virtually  all  Government  agencies, 
so  the  priorities  function  and  power  were  mixed  with  almost 
everything  the  Board  did. 

The  Priorities  Division^  consisted,  besides  the  Commis- 
sioner, of  two  bodies,  the  Priorities  Board  and  the  Priorities 
Committee,  of  each  of  which  the  Commissioner  was  chair- 
man, and  three  sections  for  the  special  administration  of 
priority  in  regard  to  transportation,  labor,  and  non-war  con- 
struction. The  Priorities  Board  was  the  moulder  of  policy 
and  the  Priorities  Committee  more  of  an  executive,  especially 
in  routine  and  minor  matters. 

The  Board  contained  in  its  membership  representatives  of 
the  great  purchasing  and  economic  control  bodies  of  the 
Government,  including  the  Emergency  Fleet  Corporation,  the 
Fuel  Administration,  of  the  Allied  Purchasing  Commission, 
of  the  navy,  of  the  Railroad  Administration,  of  the  army, 
and  of  the  War  Trade  Board.  The  committee  was  some- 
thing of  a  mongrel  in  its  composition,  being  made  up  of 
functional  members,  commodity  representatives,  and  repre- 
sentatives of  the  army  and  navy  as  such,  its  composition 

*Major-General  J.  B.  Aleshire  was  chairman  of  the  original  Priorities  Com- 
WH'T^'fi  '^?  ^"^^'^  of  National  Defense.  The  membefsWp  of  thf  PrioSt" 

rh«Ylr.  ^^^^  a'^^^^'  r^-  ^i™  ^'  P^'k«''  Priorities  Commissioner, 
chairman;  Bernard  M.  Baruch,  ex-officio;  Major-General  George  W  GoethaR 
amy  representative;  Qarence  M  WooUey,  representing  the  War  IrkA^Bo^f; 
t^dward  Chambers,  representing  the  Railroad  Administration;  Charles  R.  Pie^ 
representing  the  United  States  Shipping  Board  and  Emergency  Fleet  Corpora- 
tion;  P  F.  Noyes,  representing  the  Fuel  Administration;  T.  F.  Whitmarsh, 
representing  the  Food  Administration;  Alexander  Legge,  vice-chairman  of  the 
War  Industries  Board,  also  representing  the  Allied  Purchasing  Commission; 
and  Felix  Frankfurter,  chairman  of  the  War  Labor  Policies  Board.  H.  O. 
rmiiipps  acted  as  secretary. 

The  following  was  the  personnel  of  the  Priorities  Committee:  Edwin  B. 
Parker,  PnonUes  Commissioner,  chairman;  Charles  K.  Foster,  vice-chairman; 

Hopkins,  Henry  KrumbF  H.  Macpherson,  Rear  Admiral  N.  E.  Mason,  Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel C.  A.  McKenney,  Everett  Morss,  Lucius  P.  Ordway,  T.  C. 
fcn*  1%  Admiral  A.  V.  Zane.  Maurice  Hirsch  acted  as  secretary,  and 
Marcus  a.  Hall  as  assistant  secretary. 


t1 


DISCIPLINING  A  NATION 


147 


being  designed  for  administrative  detail  rather  than  for 

counsels  of  policy.  _ 

Stated  in  the  simplest  terms,  the  functions  of  the  Priorities 
Division  were  "to  determine,  whenever  necessary,  priorities 
of  production  and  of  delivery  and  the  proportions  of  any 
given  article  which  are  to  be  made  accessible  to  the  varying 
demands  for  it."  This  —  the  War  Industries  Board's  own 
definition  —  points  out  that  production  priority  involves  pri- 
ority in  respect  of  plants,  fuel  supply,  electric  energy,  raw 
materials,  finished  products,  labor,  and  transportation  in 
every  form.  The  object  of  the  priorities  system,  it  was 
explained,  was  "by  means  of  its  function  to  resolve  the  con- 
flicts that  arise  in  the  execution  of  the  military  and  industrial 
programmes  over  the  production  and  distribution  of  com- 
modities and  the  use  of  incidental  agencies." 

As  the  interdepartmental  f ormulator  of  "general  plans  for 
the  coordination  of  the  military  programme,  as  presented  by 
the  military  authorities,  and  the  industrial  programme,  in  so 
far  as  such  programmes  demand  priorities,"  and  as  the  desig- 
nator of  the  agencies  for  the  carrying  out  of  the  programmes, 
the  Priorities  Board  became  one  of  the  mightiest  centers  of 
power  in  the  Government.  As  the  Requirements  Division 
brought  all  the  Government  departments  and  agencies  vitally 
interested  in  war  problems  together  to  study  and  order 
requirements  and  to  project  policies  into  the  future;  so  the 
Priorities  Board  brought  them  together  to  coordinate  policies 
in  their  concrete  application  to  production  and  delivery.  The 
former  sought  to  harmonize  future  demand;  the  latter  to 
meet  formulated  and  projected  demand  and  coordinate  them 
in  fact.  The  difference  between  priorities  in  the  early  war 
days  and  priorities  under  the  fully  organized  War  Industries 
Board  was  the  difference  between  night  and  day. 

The  Requirements  Division  and  Clearance  paved  the  way 
for  automatic  priority  for  the  direct  demands  of  the  army, 
the  navy,  and  of  the  Shipping  Board,  but  the  Priorities  Board 
had  to  lay  down  a  large  scheme  of  group  and  individual 
priorities  to  protect  the  ultimate  supplying  of  such  demands 
and  to  restrict  civilian  consumption  of  foods,  materials,  and 
facilities  to  the  barest  minimum  consistent  with  national 
health  and  safety.     Except  as  food  and  fuel  were  already 


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146    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

controlled  by  their  respective  administrations,  the  War  Indus- 
tries Board  now,  through  priority,  came  into  control  of 
virtually  the  whole  industrial  life  of  the  Nation,  and,  through 
the  relation  of  priority  to  the  selective  draft,  in  that  it  deter- 
mined what  were  essential  and  non-essential  industries, 
affected  the  personal  destiny  of  millions. 

General  Crowder  issued  the  dictum:  "Work  or  fight."  The 
War  Industries  Board  determined  the  choice  for  vast  num- 
bers of  men  between  the  camp  and  the  shop  or  office,  for  its 
policy  was  to  close  out  or  curtail  industries  unnecessary  for 
the  time  being.  Even  mere  directly,  the  Board  indicated  to 
General  Crowder  the  occupations  he  could  cull  for  soldiers 
without  danger  of  serious  civil  impairment. 

The  complex  problem  the  priority  function  was  to  solve 
was  fundamentally  the  ordering  of  the  whole  materially  pro- 
ductive life  of  the  country  so  as  to  serve  military  wants  in 
the  order  of  need  to  the  greatest  possible  extent  consistent 
with  the  maintenance  of  the  fabric  of  economic  life  and  of 
the  physique  and  morale  of  the  civilians. 

It  necessarily  involved  not  only  the  application  of  prefer- 
ence as  between  nations,  between  domestic  military  and  civil 
needs  and  among  categories  of  military  requirements,  but 
also  of  discrimination  in  civil  requirements.  It  involved  in  a 
broad  sense  the  rationing  of  all  the  people  and  of  all  the 
industries.  It  was  obvious  that  it  was  physically  impossible 
to  take  each  and  every  one  of  some  thousands  of  commodities 
(though  possible  and  actually  practiced  with  certain  basic 
commodities)  and  determine  a  system  of  fractional  priority 
or  participations,  by  which  every  necessitous  demand  would 
be  met  in  the  degree  considered  advisable.  It  would  have 
been  almost  as  hard,  even  if  the  total  supply  of  commodities 
had  been  directly  under  the  administration  of  the  Board,  to 
assign  to  each  valid  application  for  priority  the  precise 
numerical  order  of  its  participation. 

In  fact,  the  War  Industries  Board  had  to  work  priority 
without  knowing  definitely  just  what  was  the  full  legitimate 
demand  and  what  the  total  supply  with  which  to  meet  it.  It 
had  to  take  a  chance  on  the  unknown  and  lay  down  a  fixed 
rule  of  access  to  materials  and  facilities  in  accordance  with 
the  relative  importance  of  certain  general  requirements  in 


DISCIPLINING  A  NATION 


149 


respect  of  the  big  national  business  of  winning  the  war.  It 
was  quite  prepared  to  see  dispensable  industries  find  the 
stores  exhausted  when  their  turn  came,  but  it  had  to  depend 
on  its  judgment  and  on  the  willingness  of  the  people  to  bear 
privation  as  to  whether  some  of  the  minor  so-called  indis- 
pensable requirements  were  met. 

The  simile  of  eggs  in  a  basket  was  used  by  General  Hugh 
S.  Johnson  to  present  the  solution  of  the  problem  in  a  graphic 
manner.  A,  B,  C,  and  D  have  varying  needs  for  eggs  of 
which  the  basket  contains  an  unknown  number.  Because  of 
uncertainty  as  to  the  number  of  eggs,  it  is  impossible  to  allo- 
cate them  according  to  intensity  of  need  among  the  four 
applicants  for  them.  For  the  same  reason  it  is  not  certain 
that  A  and  B,  as  representing  the  most  pressing  demands, 
can  be  supplied  by  definitely  curtailing  C  and  D.  Assuming, 
however,  that  A's  need  is  paramount,  we  can  say  that  he  shall 
take  the  eggs  so  long  as  he  needs  them,  and  that  thereafter 
B,  C,  and  D  may  indiscriminately  help  themselves  or  have 
singular  access  to  the  balance  according  to  the  relative 
importance  of  their  wants.  If  none  of  the  three  represent 
indispensable  industry,  it  may  be  convenient  to  let  them  help 
themselves;  or,  if  they  vary  in  importance,  it  may  be  advis- 
able to  give  B  first  chance  at  what  A  leaves,  and  so  on.  This 
is  the  skeleton  of  the  priority  system.  It  had  its  dangers, 
but  it  worked  despite  the  fact  that  the  War  Industries  Board 
did  not  attempt  to  police  A,  B,  C,  and  D,  and  further  despite 
the  fact  that  it  did  not  itself  hold  the  eggs,  even  unknown  as 
they  were. 

The  four  groups  of  the  parable  increased  as  the  war  went 
on  until  on  July  1,  1918,  Circular  No.  4  made  them  coinci- 
dent with  the  population  by  saying,  "During  the  war  in  which 
the  United  States  is  now  engaged  all  individuals,  firms,  associ- 
ations, and  corporations  engaged  in  the  production  of  raw 
materials  and  manufactured  products  (save  foods,  feeds,  and 
fuels)  are  requested  to  observe  regulations  respecting  pri- 
ority" —  and,  of  course,  through  the  proper  administrations 
priority  was  applied  to  the  three  exceptions. 

Priority  was  localized  in  the  War  Industries  Board  and 
was  its  creation,  but  the  composition  of  the  Board  made  it 
the  fountain-head  of  the  application  of  the  priority  principle 


\\ 


V  i 


n 


Iff 


fl 


150    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

for  the  Government  as  a  whole.  In  this  aspect  it  had  a  cer- 
tain weakness,  for,  although  presidential  authority  always 
stood  behind  it,  there  was  a  degree  of  lost  power  in  applying 
it  through  bodies  that  were  organizationally  as  supreme  in 
ships,  external  trade,  foods,  feeds,  and  fuel  as  the  War 
Industries  Board  was  in  the  general  field  of  industry.  A 
perfect  organization  would  have  had  the  Board,  or  at  least 
the  priority  administration,  unquestionably  supreme  in  the 
whole  field  of  production. 

The  original  Priorities  Committee  got  under  way  in  a  com- 
prehensive manner  on  September  21,  1917,  when  it  issued 
Priority  Circular  No.  1,  giving  general  directions  and  infor- 
mation as  to  procedure  under  its  authority.  It  directed  that 
iron  and  steel  producers  should  "rate"  their  orders  for  prod- 
ucts. Before  that  time  large  numbers  of  priority  questions 
had  been  decided  individually,  but  thereafter  there  was  a 
formal  system  of  receiving  and  granting  applications  for  cer- 
tificates of  priority.  The  first  certificate  was  issued  on  Sep- 
tember 25th,  and  from  that  time  until  the  suspension  of 
priority  after  the  armistice  more  than  211,000  applications 
were  dealt  with.  On  the  record  day  for  applications  1901 
were  received  and  the  maximum  number  of  certificates 
granted  on  one  day  was  2121. 

The  method  of  rating  established  by  the  first  circular  pro- 
vided for  the  division  of  all  work  and  orders  into  five  classes 
alphabetically  designated  according  to  order  of  precedence. 
Class  AA  comprised  all  urgent  and  exceptional  war  orders; 
Class  A  included  all  other  war  work  in  general,  such  as  arms 
and  ammunition,  naval  and  merchant  ships,  airplanes  and 
locomotives;  Class  B  was  made  up  of  demands  for  produc- 
tion which,  while  not  primarily  for  war  purposes,  were  neces- 
sary to  the  maintenance  of  national  vigor;  Class  C  took  in  all 
orders  and  all  work  not  covered  by  priorities  certificates  or 
by  the  later  established  automatic  ratings  which  contributed 
to  purposes  entitled  to  preferential  treatment,  as  set  out  in 
a  preference  list.  No  certificates  were  required  in  this  class 
nor  in  Class  D,  the  residuary  class. 

There  was  further  subdivision  of  the  classes.  For  example, 
to  start  the  systematic  work  of  administering  priority  with 
a  clean  sheet,  all  orders  for  products  given  by  the  War  and 


\\ 


DISCIPLINING  A  NATION 


151 


Navy  Departments  and  the  Emergency  Fleet  Corporation 
before  September  1st,  were  put  in  Class  Al.  The  applica- 
tion of  priority,  according  to  these  ratings,  did  not  mean  that 
every  order  received  by  a  factory  should  be  first  attended  to 
according  to  its  rating,  but  only  that  the  rating  should  be  so 
observed  as  to  insure  the  completion  of  each  job  in  the  con- 
tract time.  Thus  the  reception  of  an  AA  order  did  not  mean 
the  dropping  of  work  on  other  orders  so  as  to  complete  the 
AA  order  first,  but  only  such  a  modification  of  factory  pro- 
cedure as  would  insure  the  filling  of  the  AA  order  within  the 
prescribed  time.  The  Priorities  Committee  did  not  undertake 
ordinarily  to  issue  precedence  orders  to  each  producer.  The 
holder  of  a  certificate  of  priority  called  for  his  materials  and 
facilities  from  other  manufacturers  and  exhibited  his  certifi- 
cate in  order  to  obtain  the  place  in  their  manufacturing 
schedules  to  which  it  entitled  him. 

In  time,  it  developed  that  automatic  ratings  could  be 
assigned  to  a  considerable  portion  of  orders,  and  when  all 
industries  were  put  under  control  July  1,  1918,  a  scheme  of 
automatic  ratings  was  simultaneously  applied,  which  avoided 
an  administrative  breakdown  from  the  immense  amount  of 
detail  that  would  otherwise  have  been  involved.  Under  this 
scheme  the  recipient  of  an  order  which  would  naturally  fall 
into  certain  of  the  lower  ratings  would  attend  to  his  own 
priority  rights,  supporting  his  orders  under  them  with  an 
aflBdavit  setting  forth  the  facts  entitling  him  to  the  rating 
named. 

The  Priorities  Board  and  the  Priorities  Committee  issued 
circulars  defining  the  classification  of  purposes  demanding 
preferential  treatment,  the  one  issued  by  the  former  on  the 
day  of  its  establishment,  March  27,  1918,  being  the  final  one 
and  having  the  superior  authority  that  came  with  the  wider 
scope  of  the  board  as  distinguished  from  the  committee. 
This  general  classification  of  purposes  was  later  supported 
by  a  list  of  preferred  industries,  divided  into  four  classes  of 
preference,  which  was  extended  until  it  covered  seventy-three 
industries  and  specified  seven  thousand  plants  whose  product 
was  of  such  a  nature  that  it  was  considered  that  they  should 
have  special  ratings  above  or  below  those  into  which  they 
would  fall  according  to  the  classification  of  purposes.    The 


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152    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

first  class  of  industries  had  preference  over  all  others  in  the 
production  and  supply  of  fuel  and  electric  energy,  transpor- 
tation, and  labor.  The  distinction  between  the  three  remain- 
ing classes  was  not  hard  and  fast  in  practice,  but  was  made 
rather  as  a  means  of  giving  a  general  view  of  the  relative 
importance  of  different  kinds  of  industry/  All  four  classes 
enjoyed  precedence  over  unclassified  industries. 

Priority,  of  course,  was  as  inevitable  as  the  force  of 
gravity,  as  a  part  of  any  system  of  industrial  control  for  war 
purposes.  It  was  part  of  the  munitions  administration  of  all 
nations.  A  unique  feature  of  its  American  use  was  that  it 
was  essentially  voluntary  and  cooperative.  The  main  lines 
of  priority  were  virtually  acquiesced  in  by  what  amounted  to 
a  congress  of  industry,  before  they  were  decided  upon.  Indi- 
vidual applications  of  priority  were  almost  invariably 
approved  by  the  judgment  of  those  adversely  affected  when 
they  were  asked  to  decide  for  themselves  in  view  of  the  gen- 
eral need  and  welfare.  The  annals  of  the  War  Industries 
Board  are  replete  with  instances  of  men  and  corporations 
writing  their  own  death-warrants,  as  it  were. 

Objections  to  priority  regulations  almost  without  exception 
proceeded  from  the  isolated,  individual  point  of  view.  When 
a  complainant  came  to  the  War  Industries  Board  bursting 
with  what  seemed  to  him  righteous  indignation,  he  would 
cheerfully  reverse  himself  when  the  public  welfare  point  of 
view  was  presented  to  him.  The  spirit  of  service  for  the 
common  good  was  ultimately  supreme  in  all  men  in  those 
times.  The  American  business  man  never  showed  himself 
more  favorably  than  in  his  relations  with  the  War  Industries 
Board.  When  the  hour  of  sacrifice  came,  he  gave  his  busi- 
ness to  the  Government  as  freely  as  he  gave  his  sons. 

The  writer  believes  that  the  War  Industries  Board,  after 
March,  1918,  had  ample  power  to  effect  anything  it  under- 
took, however  vague,  indirect,  conditional,  legal,  or  non- 
legal  that  power  was.  It  is  true,  however,  that  most  of  the 
big  business  men  in  its  service  hold  the  view  that,  while  its 

Tor  texts  of  circulars  and  orders  of  the  Priority  Board  and  the  Priority 
G>inmittee  and  administrative  details  see  American  Industry  in  the  War  (Gov- 
ernment Printing  Office,  Washington),  being  the  final  report  of  the  War  Indus- 
tries Board;  and  the  War  Trade  Board's  Government  Control  of  Prices,  issued 
in  cooperation  with  the  War  Industries  Board. 


DISCIPLINING  A  NATION 


153 


moral  and  effective  power  was  practically  unlimited,  its  legal 
authority  was  so  precarious  that  it  effected  its  ends  by  suffer- 
ance rather  than  by  authority.  This  position  is  doubtless  due 
to  the  fact  that,  because  of  the  opportunities  for  legalistic 
casuistry  concerning  many  phases  of  the  Board's  work,  and 
because  there  was  a  time  when  it  had  no  authority,  these 
executives  had  got  into  the  habit  of  asking  cooperation.  It 
was  so  freely  granted  that  they  rarely  had  to  think  of  the 
power  behind  them,  and,  in  fact,  they  hated  to  appeal  to  it. 
When  you  do  not  have  to  use  power  to  effect  common  action, 
you  prefer  to  forget  that  you  have  it.  A  reasonable,  flexible, 
human  organization,  like  the  War  Industries  Board,  undoubt- 
edly derived  more  dynamic  force  from  the  spirit  of  coopera- 
tion it  encouraged  than  a  rigid,  statutorily  superimposed 
executive  agency  could  have  commanded.  Such  an  instru- 
mentality might  have  enforced  all  that  the  law  required,  but 
the  cooperative  medium  got  far  more.  All  men  work  better 
"for  us"  than  "for  you." 

Priority  administration  had  an  effect  that  was  somewhat 
beyond  the  domain  of  the  War  Industries  Board  in  the  strict 
conception  of  the  latter.  Even  when  his  powers  were  prac- 
tically unlimited,  Mr.  Baruch  held  the  view  that  the  Board 
was  not  to  interfere  in  purely  military  matters;  that,  broadly, 
it  was  for  the  war-making  agencies  to  determine  what  they 
required  of  industry,  and  for  the  Board  to  see  that  they  got  it. 

But,  in  seeking  to  meet  these  wants  through  priority  and 
allied  functions,  the  Board  was  many  times  forced  to  inquire 
whether  military  demands  could  not  be  modified  or  restricted. 
At  one  time  the  army  actually  called  for  twenty  suits  of 
underwear  for  each  soldier  in  France,  on  the  theory  that 
because  of  vermin  they  would  have  to  be  thrown  away  at  the 
end  of  a  week's  use.  The  strain  of  such  an  order  on  the 
knitting  industry  led  to  inquiry,  the  systematic  use  of  delous- 
ing  apparatus,  and  the  substantial  reduction  of  the  order. 

There  were  many  similar  cases  —  often  leading  to  whole- 
sale cancellations;  but  in  general  the  Board  accepted  mili- 
tary estimates,  with  the  result  that  many  industries  were 
overstrained  in  efforts  to  produce  within  a  short  time  things 
that  would  not  be  used  up  for  a  long  time.  Of  course,  the 
long,  precarious,  and  slowly  operating  supply  line  between 


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154    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

America  and  France  necessitated  that  several  months'  con- 
sumption requirements  should  always  be  en  route,  in  addition 
to  prudent  reserves;  but,  even  so,  there  was  an  insistent  effort 
to  obtain  more  than  the  country  could  produce.  It  was  not 
physically  possible  to  buy  and  obtain  within  a  year  the 
amounts  of  goods  represented  by  army  funds  set  aside  for 
that  purpose  —  more  than  $15,000,000,000  in  1918.  Had 
the  War  Industries  Board  been  projected  a  little  more  into 
the  military  estimates  of  requirements,  there  would  have 
been  a  much  more  equable  flow  of  orders. 

By  the  instrumentality  of  priority  the  War  Industries 
Board  directed  both  production  and  distribution;  it  said 
what  should  be  produced  and  where,  and  it  said  who  should 
have  the  product.  After  the  Board  had  extended  its  control 
to  all  industry  not  otherwise  under  Government  control, 
American  industry  was  for  the  time  being  nationalized  as  to 
management;  and,  through  the  war  and  excess  profits  tax 
and  surtax,  nationalized  as  to  profits.  It  performed  services 
according  to  Government  direction  and  for  the  profit  of  the 
Government. 

Individualistic  American  industrialists  were  aghast  when 
they  realized  that  industry  had  been  drafted,  much  as  man 
power  had  been.  What  none  had  foreseen  had  come  to  pass. 
Had  any  man  said  in  1916  that  the  whole  productive  and 
distributive  machinery  of  America  could  be  directed  success- 
fully from  Washington,  he  would  have  been  called  a  lunatic. 
Yet  in  1918  that  was  being  done.  That  it  was  a  fact  and  not 
a  theory  was  due  to  the  transcendent  spirit  of  the  times. 
Business  willed  its  own  domination,  forged  its  bonds,  and 
policed  its  own  subjection.  There  were  bitter  and  stormy 
protests  here  and  there,  especially  from  those  industries  that 
were  curtailed  or  suspended.  Few  men  are  great  enough  to 
see  with  equanimity  their  factories  silenced  when  all  around 
them  is  the  clamor  of  imwonted  business  activity.  Yet  ninety- 
nine  times  out  of  a  hundred  the  most  resentful  voluntarily 
made  the  sacrificial  choice  when  asked:  "Will  you  take  this 
material  or  will  you  let  the  boys  in  France  have  it?" 

The  administration  of  priority  was  a  complex  and  delicate 
task.  Should  locomotives  go  to  Pershing  to  help  him  get 
ammunition  to  the  front  or  should  they  go  to  Chile  to  haul 


DISCIPLINING  A  NATION 


155 


the  nitrate  without  which  there  could  be  no  ammunition? 
Should  steel  go  to  destroyers  whose  mission  was  to  sink  sub- 
marines or  to  the  merchant  ships  the  submarines  had  thinned 
to  the  point  of  breaking  down  of  the  food  supplies  of  the 
Allies?  Should  brass  go  to  binoculars  without  which  cargo 
ships  could  not  leave  port  or  to  shells  without  which  they 
need  not  go  at  all?  Should  nitrate  go  to  munitions  without 
which  guns  were  useless  or  should  they  go  to  fertilizers  with- 
out which  the  artillerymen  would  be  foodless?  Should  ace- 
tone, indispensable  for  British  explosive,  go  to  the  powder 
mills  or  to  airplanes  which  needed  it  for  their  wings?  Should 
chrome  steel  go  to  indispensable  army  trucks  or  indispen- 
sable army  munitions?  Should  women  be  condemned  to 
steelless  corsets  or  tinless  preserved  vegetables?  Should 
cranes  go  to  American  wharves  for  loading  ships  for  France 
or  to  French  wharves  for  unloading  the  same  ships?  Should 
ships  from  Brazil  bring  coffee  to  bolster  civilian  morale  or 
manganese  for  fighting  steel?  Should  coal  go  to  Italy  to 
power  munitions  plants  there  or  to  coke  here  for  steel  for 
those  plants?  Should  long-staple  cotton  go  to  tires  for  army 
trucks  or  to  fabric  for  airplanes? 

The  wisdom  of  Solomon  could  not  have  infallibly  decided 
all  these  questions  and  thousands  like  them  —  often  posed 
by  strenuous  and  commanding  men,  feverish  with  the  excite- 
ment of  the  productional  race  against  time.  But  they  were 
decided  —  and  a  decision  was  the  main  thing.  No  error  of 
judgment  in  such  matters  could  equal  no  judgment.  Deci- 
sion gave  birth  to  order. 

It  would  be  overstating  the  case  to  give  the  impression  that 
priority  always  worked  like  a  clock.  When  any  organization 
gets  to  that  point  in  growth  where  dispositions  are  made 
automatically  according  to  a  prescribed  routine,  it  enters  the 
red-tape  period,  and  as  yet  nobody  has  discovered  how  exten- 
sive business  or  government  can  be  handled  without  system, 
which  is  the  respectful  name  for  red-tape.  It  is  related  that 
a  priority  order  once  reached  the  Baldwin  Locomotive  Works 
several  weeks  after  the  "rush"  job  for  which  priority  was 
therein  directed  had  been  completed  and  shipped.  In  this 
case  the  Baldwin  people  simply  had  gone  ahead  with  a  task, 
which  their  own  judgment  told  them  was  of  a  preferred 
nature. 


156    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


DISCIPLINING  A  NATION 


157 


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I  < 


The  free-and-easy  methods  of  such  a  democratic  body  as 
the  War  Industries  Board,  which  was  always  emphasizing 
cooperation  and  minimizing  compulsion,  made  it  easy  for 
bold  spirits  to  ignore  the  rules.  One  great  manufacturer 
proudly  told  the  writer  that  he  never  paid  any  attention  to 
official  priority.  "I  always  got  what  I  wanted  and  got  it 
when  I  wanted  it,"  he  said.  However,  as  his  plants  were 
exclusively  occupied  with  war  work,  the  flexible  Priorities 
Division  may  have  provided  for  this  autonomous  administra* 
lion  of  priority. 

Nevertheless,  there  were  many  and  devious  ways  of  beat- 
ing priority,  which  were  sometimes  resorted  to  for  the  gen- 
eral good,  and  at  other  times  for  the  most  sordid  reasons. 
An  instance  of  the  former  was  when,  under  a  district  rail- 
way embargo  put  on  to  clear  up  a  congestion  of  traffic,  a 
large  munitions  plant  was  unable  to  get  shipment  of  an 
essential  machine  from  a  plant  in  another  city.  It  found  a 
way  to  beat  the  rules  and  get  its  machine  when  every  effort 
to  get  a  priority  shipment  right  failed.  Certain  swindling 
jobbers  of  lumber  made  a  fortune  by  taking  advantage  of 
automatic  priority  through  a  scheme  of  getting  railway  trans- 
portation preference  under  false  representations. 

Priority  stepped  on  a  lot  of  toes  besides  those  directly 
banged  by  the  preferential  decisions.  When  demand  exceeds 
supply,  preference  is  in  the  hands  of  the  seller  and  so  the 
purchaser  pays  him  for  priority,  the  priority  that  goes  to  the 
man  with  the  most  money.  Administration  of  priority  by 
the  Government  took  that  element  out  of  prices,  and  a  lot  of 
profiteering  fortunes  that  were  on  the  ways  were  never 
launched.  But  here  priority  merges  into  price-fixing,  a  topic 
to  be  dealt  with  in  another  chapter. 

Notwithstanding  the  profound  effect  of  priority  in  the 
direction  of  price-stabilization  by  establishing  an  orderly 
sequence  of  the  satisfaction  of  demand  and  insuring  supplies 
of  materials  to  the  holders  of  Government  contracts,  the  dour 
critics  who  insist  that  the  United  States  won  the  greatest  war 
in  its  history  by  failing  in  every  department  of  the  war  effort 
now  contend  that  the  Government  should  have  followed  the 
peace-time  method  of  letting  contracts  by  bids.  The  method 
actually  followed  was  that  of  either  negotiated   or  fixed 


prices,  with  priority  as  a  means  of  general  coordination  of 
industrial  sequences  and  interrelations.  Competitive  bidding 
under  war  conditions  with  the  Government  as  an  urgent  buyer 
of  all  that  could  be  produced  would  have  been  a  mockery 
and  with  such  a  continuous  confusion  of  production  and  stim- 
ulation of  prices  as  can  hardly  be  conceived.  Competitive 
bidding  in  such  circumstances  is  incompatible  with  such  an 
indispensable  regulator  as  priority  or  with  such  a  brake  as 
price-fixing. 

After  the  principle  of  priority  had  received  general  recog- 
nition, it  became  the  most  potent  implement  of  industrial 
strategy,  because  with  it  industrial  control  became  flexible; 
and  industrial  forces  could  be  advanced,  retired,  and  shifted 
to  the  flanks  in  the  economic  combat  with  the  Germans  just  as 
surely  as  Foch  could  move  his  divisions  and  armies  in  the 
military  conflict. 

For  example:  In  August,  1918,  the  French  reported  that 
the  draft  of  the  combined  French  and  American  armies  on 
French  75  mm.  shells  was  unexpectedly  greater  than  produc- 
tion and  that  the  reserves  were  being  perilously  depleted. 
They  had  fallen  from  30,000,000  to  13,000,000.  The  Ger- 
mans  were  on  the  run  and  then  was  the  time  to  hammer  them 
without  stint.  No  shells  were  coming  from  America,  and  yet 
the  French  munitions  plants  were  working  only  half-time 
for  lack  of  steel.  Within  five  days  of  the  time  that  the 
French  reported  the  situation  to  the  Foreign  Mission  of  the 
War  Industries  Board,  the  Mission  had  satisfied  itself  of  the 
correctness  of  the  French  representation  and  cabled  the  Board 
for  immediate  assistance.  On  the  sixth  day,  by  direction  of 
the  War  Industries  Board,  the  Lackawanna  Steel  Company 
and  the  Carnegie  Steel  Company  were  diverted  to  the  pro- 
duction of  75  mm.  steel  and  the  first  shipments  arrived  in 
France  within  three  weeks.  The  steel  was  actually  arriving 
in  France  before  the  French  Ministry  of  Munitions  had 
formally  placed  orders  for  it.  It  came  rolling  into  the 
French  shell  plants  in  such  unfailing  quantities  that,  with 
the  ten  thousand  guns  of  the  American  and  French  batteries 
blazing  away  as  never  before,  the  French  reserves  went  up 
to  19,000,000  shells. 

That  is  priority  in  action.    That  is  industrial  strategy  in 


•I 


» 


158    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

war.  Foch's  manipulation  of  his  millions  was  magnificent. 
But  suppose  their  caissons  had  been  empty,  as  they  would 
have  been  but  for  the  industrial  manipulation  in  America  — 
three  thousand  miles  away! 

Anybody  will  tell  you  that  no  American  shells  were  dis- 
charged in  France,  but  nobody  will  tell  you  that  but  for 
American  steel,  rushed  to  the  front  in  the  supreme  emer- 
gency, there  would  soon  have  come  a  time  when  there  would 
have  been  no  French  shells  either.  It  was  much  the  same 
with  airplanes.  We  did  not  get  large  numbers  to  France, 
but,  if  we  had  not  rushed  the  supply  of  steel,  parts,  spruce, 
motors,  and  a  hundred  other  things  to  the  French  and  British 
factories,  there  would  have  been  very  little  Allied  flying  in 
the  last  months  of  the  war. 

Let  us  turn  to  another  form  of  industrial  strategy  made 
possible  through  the  flexibility  of  manipulation  of  industrial 
facilities  by  means  of  priority.  Toward  the  end  of  the  war 
General  Pershing's  artillery  was  on  the  verge  of  quiescence 
because  of  the  lack  of  horses  and  mules  to  drag  guns  and 
supplies  over  the  ruined  roads  and  across  country  at  the  front. 
Spain  had  a  surplus  of  mules,  but  would  not  sell  them. 
The  War  Industries  Board,  through  General  Dawes  and  the 
War  Trade  Board,  found  that  Spain  was  in  desperate  need  of 
ammonia  sulphate  as  an  ingredient  of  agricultural  fertilizers, 
but  could  not  import  it  because  of  the  appropriation  of  the 
entire  supply  by  the  Allies  for  the  manufacture  of  explo- 
sives. America  itself  was  desperately  short  of  ammonia 
sulphate,  but  Pershing  needed  those  Spanish  mules  worse 
than  the  sulphate  was  needed  at  home,  and  the  Spaniards 
needed  it  so  much  that  they  were  willing  to  exchange  for  it 
the  strategic  mules  that  no  gold  could  buy.  The  button  of 
priority  was  touched;  the  embargo  on  the  exportation  of 
ammonia  sulphate  to  Spain  from  the  United  States  was 
raised;  the  Spaniards  got  their  fertilizer  and  Pershing  got 
his  mules.    Industrial  strategy  again. 

With  the  establishment  of  the  Priorities  Board  on  the 
massed  authority  of  the  President  and  of  the  Navy  and  War 
Departments,  the  Shipping  Board  and  the  Emergency  Fleet 
Corporation,  the  War  Trade  Board,  the  Fuel  Administration, 
the  Food  Administration,  the  Allied  Purchasing  Commission, 


DISCIPLINING  A  NATION 


159 


such  direct  Congressional  authority  as  there  was  for  priority, 
and  with  all  the  authority  conferred  on  or  acquired  by  the 
War  Industries  Board,  there  came  into  existence  the  apical 
form  of  industrial  control  known  to  the  United  States  during 
the  war,  a  form  which  eventually  applied  to  all  industry. 
While  its  legislative  authority  was  vague,  partial,  and  of 
patches,  it  put  all  industry  inescapably  into  the  hands  of  the 
War  Industries  Board,  for  there  was  no  appeal  from  the 
decisions  of  the  Priorities  Board  except  to  the  chairman  of 
the  War  Industries  Board  and  the  President.  The  rents  in 
its  garment  of  authority  were  amply  filled  by  the  docile  and 
cooperative  spirit  of  industry.  The  occasional  obstructor  fled 
from  the  mandates  of  the  Board  only  to  find  himself  ostra- 
cized by  his  fellows  in  industry.  Through  the  development 
of  the  principle  of  priority  and  of  its  administration,  the 
long-sought  coordination  was  attained  in  theory  and  in  prac- 
tice to  the  full  degree  that  might  have  been  expected  in  view 
of  the  early  termination  of  the  war  and  the  defect  of  its 
placement  in  the  general  scheme  mentioned  above.  It  was 
the  supreme  implement  of  the  direction  and  discipline  of 
nationally  integrated  industry. 

And,  be  it  noted  anticlimactically  and  bluntly,  priority 
became  what  it  was  only  when  the  President  notified  all  of 
the  war-working  agencies  that  no  priority  order  would  be 
issued  without  the  approval  of  the  chairman  of  the  War 
Industries  Board. 


M 


THE  CONTROL  OF  PRICES 


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CHAPTER  IX 
THE  CONTROL  OF  PRICES 

Public  justice  and  price-fixing;  but  above  all,  production  for  war  —  Raw 
materials  the  heart  of  the  problem  —  Forestalling  the  profiteer  —  The  famous 
copper  agreement  —  Checking  the  rising  prices  —  Steel  control — Price-regula- 
tion in  a  democracy  —  Wilson  and  prices  —  An  isolated  judicial  body  — 
Baruch's  conception  of  industrial  control  —  The  mechanics  of  the  question  — 
Avoiding  rigid  policies  —  Sense  and  sentiment  in  prices  —  Judge  Gary  queries 
Judge  Lovett  —  General  results  of  control. 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  as  a  regulator  of  prices 
through  the  War  Industries  Board  was  not,  contrary  to  popu- 
lar notion,  primarily  the  champion  of  the  oppressed  people 
against  extortion  and  profiteering.  The  dominant  object  of 
the  Board  was  to  support  the  army  and  navy  in  winning  the 
war;  it  was  the  civil  side  of  the  great  engine  of  war.  Price- 
regulation  was  an  instrumentality  of  the  paramount  function 
of  the  Board.  It  and  priority,  which  was  at  the  base  of  clear- 
ance, curtailment,  allocation,  conservation,  etc.,  were  the  two 
great  implements  with  which  the  Board  attained  its  ends. 

In  the  beginning  all  use  of  both  of  these  tools  had  for  its 
immediate  object  the  stimulation  of  production,  for  war 
uses,  under  whatever  guise  they  appeared.  It  is  true  that 
from  the  first  there  was  a  motive  of  public  justice  in  price- 
control  and  that,  as  the  war  went  on,  this  motive  loomed 
larger  and  larger.  But,  even  when  yielding  to  consideration 
of  that  motive,  the  Board  was  always  thinking  of  production 
for  military  purposes,  having  in  mind  that  the  preservation 
of  the  public  morale  and  physical  health  were  essential  to 
the  realization  of 'that  end. 

The  War  Industries  Board  had  no  powers,  direct  or  indi- 
rect, to  regulate  prices  as  a  matter  of  social  justice.  Vague 
and  informal  as  its  legal  power  to  deal  with  prices  was, 
there  was  in  fact  almost  no  limit  to  it  so  long  as  it  was 
exercised  for  war  purposes.  Excessively  high  and  especially 
unstable  prices  interfered  with  production  just  as  much  as 
disorder  in  the  conduct  of  industry.  So  the  War  Industries 
Board  used  that  instrumentality  of  price-control  to  meet  that 


side  of  the  production  problem,  just  as  it  did  the  instrumen- 
tality of  priority  to  meet  the  other.  The  Price-Fixing  Com- 
mittee was  in  effect  the  paymaster-general  of  war  industry 
and  the  Priority  Board  was  the  general  manager.  It  was  all 
purely  a  matter  of  doing  the  Government's  business  of  the 
time,  the  great  business  of  war. 

Like  many  other  things  the  War  Industries  Board  did  in 
the  course  of  its  growth,  the  function  of  price-regulation 
existed  before  the  specialized  agency  thereof.  The  question 
of  prices  was  fundamentally  involved  in  that  of  voluminous 
production,  the  Raw  Materials  Committee  of  the  Advisory 
Commission  of  the  Council  of  National  Defense  was  con- 
cerned with  it  from  the  beginning,  and  on  April  17,  1917, 
the  Secretary  of  War  authorized  the  General  Munitions  Board 
to  determine  fair  and  just  prices  when  asked  to  do  so  by 
department  heads. 

Raw  materials  were  the  roots  of  the  industrial  tree,  and 
it  was  seen  as  necessary  that  they  should  be  fed  with  prices 
that  should  be  neither  too  high  nor  too  low.  After  the  raw 
material  stage  the  Board  merely  as  a  successful  war-making 
agency  was  little  concerned  in  price-regulation  as  a  funda- 
mental thing,  for,  with  its  other  forms  of  control  grouped 
under  priority,  it  could  obtain  its  finished  goods  at  its  own 
prices  without  setting  up  an  elaborate  price-making  mecha- 
nism. This  is  why  the  War  Industries  Board,  so  long  as 
conditions  permitted  it  to  keep  away  from  the  remoter  inci- 
dence of  war,  did  not  concern  itself  with  secondary  and 
retail  prices  of  the  products  for  which  it  fixed  the  primary 
prices.  It  was  not,  like  the  Food  and  Fuel  Administrations, 
designed  from  the  beginning  as  a  protector  of  the  public 
purse  and  the  public  welfare.  It  was  primarily  a  war 
machine;  the  magnified  supply  department  of  the  army  and 
navy. 

It  should  not  be  inferred  that  the  War  Industries  Board 
thought  of  prices  only  as  a  medium  of  stimulating  produc- 
tion. Even  before  war  was  declared,  Mr.  Baruch,  as  chair- 
man of  the  Raw  Materials  Committee  from  which  the  War 
Industries  Board  inevitably  grew,  grasped  the  spiritual  as 
well  as  the  substantial  element  of  the  problem.  A  price, 
excessive  to  the  point  of  public  injustice,  might  stimulate  the 


V 


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162    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

production  of  the  given  commodity,  but  it  would  tend,  he 
perceived,  through  psychologic  reactions  to  weaken  the  war 
spirit,   and   thus  check   production   in   other  commodities. 
Nothing  undermines  the  will  to  war  so  rapidly  as  the  popular 
conviction  of  widespread  profiteering  and  exploitation.  Also, 
the  higher  the  prices,  the  higher  the  Government  expenditures, 
the  higher  the  taxation,  and  the  greater  and  more  difficult 
public  financing,  the  earlier  the  economic  exhaustion  of  the 
Nation ;  again,  the  higher  the  prices,  the  greater  the  inflation 
of  currency  and  credit  and  the  weaker  the  economic  fabric. 
An  early  motive  for  interfering  with  market  prices  was  to 
disabuse  the  crystallizing  war  mind  of  the  idea  that  the  war 
was  being  brought  on  by  the  great  industrialists  for  profiteer- 
ing purposes.     The  army  and  the  navy  had  immediate  use 
for  forty-five  million  pounds  of  copper  in  March,  1917,  at 
which  time  spot  copper  was  selling  as  high  as  thirty-seven 
cents  a  pound.     Mr.  Baruch,  who  for  some  months  had 
already  been  familiarizing  himself  with  the  sources  of  the 
raw  materials  chiefly  needed  in  war,  in  cooperation  with 
Eugene  Meyer,  Jr.,  conceived  the  idea  of  appealing  to  the 
patriotism  of  the  copper  producers  to  make  a  price  on  this 
initial  war  order  that  would  determine  the  plane  of  industry 
as  an  aid  to  Government  in  the  coming  war.    The  outcome  of 
this  appeal  was  a  Government  price  of  sixteen  and  two-thirds 
cents  a  pound,  determined  by  taking  the  average  price  for 
ten  years  preceding  the  war. 

There  was  little  if  any  resistance  on  the  part  of  the  pro- 
ducers to  the  appeal.  They  knew  and  were  told  that  diey 
were  setting  an  example  that  would  be  used  against  their 
selfish  interests  and  those  of  all  industry  throughout  the 
war  that  was  impending.  They  were  establishing  the  cri- 
terion by  which  all  prices  would  be  thereafter  measured; 
the  criterion  of  a  price  that  would  be  in  accord  with  public 
interest. 

The  announcement  of  a  Government  copper  price  fifty  per 
cent  below  the  market  price  did  have  a  most  reassuring  eff'ect 
on  public  opinion.  It  was  not  a  mere  dramatic  gesture  either. 
In  a  broad  way  the  spirit  of  that  copper  price  decision,  made 
so  freely  by  the  copper  interests,  was  the  spirit  of  industry 
throughout  the  war.    The  writer  makes  this  comment  with  the 


THE  CONTROL  OF  PRICES 


163 


full  knowledge  of  large  numbers  of  indisputable  instances 
that  may  be  cited  to  the  contrary,  some  of  which  are  noted 
in  difi'erent  places  in  this  volume,  and  with  full  knowledge 
that  corresponding  to  the  proportion  of  base  and  noble  strata 
in  men  there  were  thousands  of  sordid,  selfish  exploiters  of 
the  war  needs  of  the  Government  and  of  the  people.  On  the 
whole,  the  industrial  side  of  the  war,  both  in  its  administra- 
tion by  and  for  the  Government  and  on  the  part  of  the 
manufacturers  and  merchants,  was  on  a  high  plane  of  duty. 
There  was  almost  no  direct  peculation  and  but  little  conscious 
profiteering  at  Government  cost.  This  was  due  partly  to  the 
spontaneous  action  of  producers  and  partly  to  early  Gov- 
ernment action  through  the  War  Industries  Board  that  made 
the  prices  of  the  chief  materials  subject  to  what  amounted 
to  Government  determination. 

While  the  informally  negotiated  early  copper  price  served 
to  establish  a  precedent  and  a  standard,  it  was  an  example 
rather  than  a  precept  and  was  in  no  sense  automatic  in  its 
efi'ects  on  other  industries.  It  was  many  months  before  the 
priority  principle  was  converted  into  a  system,  so  that  in  the 
beginning  of  the  war  its  stabilizing  influence  was  not  a  factor 
in  prices.  Unregulated  demand  on  an  unparalleled  scale 
was  opposed  to  limited  and  disordered  supply.  The  markets 
had  become  erratic  under  the  eff'ects  of  the  tremendous 
buying  of  the  Allies  in  the  United  States  before  we  entered 
the  war.  Our  exports  to  Europe  had  ascended  from 
$1,500,000,000  in  1914  to  $4,300,000,000  in  1917. 

Price  was  a  minor  consideration  with  the  hard-pressed 
Allies  in  dire  need  of  supplies  from  America.  They  had 
thousands  of  buyers  in  the  field  who  were  eager  to  do  busi- 
ness with  any  one  who  could  promise  delivery.  Large  num- 
bers of  brokers,  speculators,  and  promoters  appeared  in  the 
field  and  there  was  much  wild  buying  and  optioning.  The 
apparent  demand  thus  became  even  larger  than  the  actual 
demand.  Commodities  were  held  up  in  their  usual  channels 
or  diverted  from  them;  all  the  usual  and  orderly  processes 
of  industry  were  disturbed.  There  was  no  foretelling  the 
prices  of  raw  materials,  and  huge  margins  of  safety  were 
added  to  normal  profits  to  say  nothing  of  opportunistic 
profiteering. 


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164    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

With  its  entrance  into  the  war  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment added  to  the  demand  side  of  the  already  unbalanced 
scales  the  weight  of  eight  billions  of  extraordinary  demands 
m  1917  and  fifteen  billion  dollars  in  1918.  Prices  rose 
most  alarmingly,  not  only  for  the  Treasury  and  the  taxpayer, 
but  for  efficient  production.  By  July,  1917,  the  average 
price  of  metals  was  almost  three  and  one-half  times  what  it 
was  in  1913,  and  eighty-six  points  above  the  price  in  March. 
Basic  pig  iron  jumped  from  $32.25  a  ton  in  March  to  $52.50 
m  July;  steel  plates  from  $4.33  to  $9;  wheat  from  $1.98  to 
$2.58;  according  to  weighted  index  numbers  foods  went  up 
twenty-five  per  cent  in  this  short  period. 

As  demand  promised  to  become  larger  and  larger,  and  as 
the  law  of  supply  and  demand  had  been  suspended  because 
Government  buying  for  war  purposes  had  to  go  on  regardless 
of  the  pressure  of  high  prices,  which  in  ordinary  times  create 
their  own  repression  by  curtailing  demand,  it  became  appar- 
ent to  the  authorities  in  Washington  that  the  scales  would 
have  to  be  balanced  by  governmental  control  of  some  sort. 
The  Government,  as  the  author  of  the  disturbing  demand, 
could  not  remain  indifferent  to  its  power  to  deprive  it  of  its 
price-inflating  tendency  by  arbitrary  action. 

Pending  the  determination  of  Congress  and  the  President 
to  meet  the  price  problem,  the  Raw  Materials  Committee  of 
the  Advisory  Commission  and  the  same  division  of  the  War 
Industries  Board  continued  the  informal  price  negotiations 
for  Government  requirements  that  had  begun  with  copper. 
Its  various  commodity  sub-committees  and  the  supply  com- 
mittee and  sub-committees  were  collecting  data  and  generally 
familiarizing  themselves  with  the  situation,  and  through 
clearance,  a  measure  of  allocation,  and  a  study  of  require- 
ments were  beginning  to  get  a  grip  that  gave  them  a  certain 
control  of  prices  without  definitely  and  arbitrarily  fixing 
them. 

The  steel  producers  emulated  the  copper  men  by  agreeing 
to  deliver  five  hundred  thousand  tons  of  steel  at  one  third  less 
than  the  market  price,  and  the  lumber  committee  voluntarily 
quoted  the  Government  prices  for  lumber  considerably  below 
those  of  the  general  market.  The  producers  of  zinc  and  lead 
voluntarily  made  large  concessions  to  the  Government.    The 


THE  CONTROL  OF  PRICES 


165 


union  of  the  General  Munitions  Board,  the  Raw  Materials 
Committee,  and  the  Supply  Committee  of  the  Advisory  Com- 
mission, to  form  the  War  Industries  Board,  just  at  the  time 
that  the  price  problem  was  becoming  insistent,  gave  a  con- 
centration of  the  industrial  side  of  the  Council  of  National 
Defense,  theretofore  lacking,  that  enhanced  its  capacity  to 
deal  with  prices  as  well  as  with  other  phases  of  the  Govern- 
ment's economic  problem. 

The  concentrating  of  the  allocation  of  Government  and 
Allied  purchases  through  the  Commodity  and  Supply  Com- 
mittees took  much  of  the  uncertainty,  and,  therefore,  the 
inflation,  out  of  business  so  far  as  Government  orders  were 
concerned.  In  fact  almost  everything  the  War  Industries 
Board  did  had  an  eff"ect  on  prices.  Nevertheless,  it  became 
more  and  more  evident  that  there  must  be  some  sort  of  direct 
control  of  a  more  drastic  nature. 

Although  the  steel  people  had  given  the  Government  a 
marked  price  concession  early  in  the  war,  the  steel  market 
continued  to  be  a  "runaway"  one;  coal  and  coke  and  many 
other  things  were  on  a  rampage.  The  chairman  of  the  Ship- 
ping Board  threatened  to  commandeer  steel  mills  if  prices 
were  not  aligned  with  the  results  of  a  cost  investigation  then 
under  way  by  the  Federal  Trade  Commission;  the  Secretary 
of  War  declared  that  the  prices  of  steel  and  iron  must  be 
controlled;  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  declared  that  the  Gov- 
ernment would  not  pay  exorbitant  prices  for  steel;  and  the 
President,  on  July  12,  1917,  warned  industry  that  there  must 
be  a  "just  price,"  that  law  "must  of  course  command  the^e 
things,"  and  declared  that  the  Government  was  about  to 
attempt  to  determine  prices.  The  President  also  laid  down 
the  rule  that  prices  for  the  Government  must  be  the  same  as 
for  the  public,  for  "prices  mean  the  same  everywhere  now; 
they  mean  the  efliciency  of  the  Nation,  whether  it  is  the  Gov- 
ernment that  pays  them  or  not;  they  mean  victory  or  defeat." 

Steel  is  as  all-powerful  in  war  as  in  peace.  It  is  the  basis 
of  the  basic  raw  materials.  Control  its  price,  and  you  auto- 
matically control  a  host  of  prices.  It  was  but  natural  that 
it  should  be  the  subject  of  the  first  formal  price-control.  The 
industry  itself,  at  first  opposed  to  control,  came  later  to 
believe  it  to  be  necessary.    All  through  the  middle  and  late 


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166    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

summer  of  1917  the  War  Industries  Board  studied  the  ways 
and  means  of  steel  control,  and  the  passage  of  the  Food  and 
Fuel  Act  in  August,  which  specifically  gave  the  President  the 
right  to  "requisition  foods,  feeds,  fuels,  and  other  supplies 
necessary  to  the  support  of  the  army  or  the  maintenance  of 
the  navy,  or  any  other  public  use  connected  with  the  common 
defense,''  certainly  strengthened  and  broadened  the  requi- 
sitioning phase  of  the  Executive's  war  powers.  It  did  not 
authorize  price-control,  but  it  made  it  easier;  and,  after  all, 
there  is  but  a  nice  and  unneces^ry  distinction  between  taking 
ruthlessly  and  taking  at  a  price.  The  latter  is  certainly  a 
derivative  right  from  the  former. 

Added  to  the  commandeering  powers  already  conferred 
on  the  War  and  Navy  Departments  and  on  the  Shipping 
Board,  the  men  of  action  who  were  in  command  of  the  war 
machine  considered  that  they  had  enough  authority  for  their 
purposes  even  if  Congress  did  still  hesitate  to  create  a  price- 
control  as  such.  As  Congress  left  the  situation,  it  was  sus- 
ceptible to  a  flexibility  and  adjustability  of  control  that  might 
have  been  absent  under  a  law  of  prescription.  The  reluctance 
of  Congress  and  even  of  the  Executive  to  plunge  into  arbi- 
trary price-control  is  now  seen  to  be  wisdom,  even  if  it  were 
the  wisdom  of  indecision.  The  democratic  spirit  of  the 
Nation  held  it  back  from  written  expressions  of  the  firm  con- 
trol that  was  more  or  less  inevitable;  the  stubborn  conviction 
of  the  masses  that  Government  must  not  meddle  with  private 
aff'airs  except  in  extremes  restrained  the  Government  from 
arbitrary  methods  even  when  the  most  sweeping  powers  were 
exercised. 

The  outcome  was  that  virtually  all  Government  measures 
that  entrenched  upon  fields  ordinarily  left  entirely  to  private 
effort  were  approved  by  the  unwritten  will  of  the  people,  and 
such  articulate  form  as  the  measures  did  take  were  looked 
upon  as  aimed  at  the  refractory  minority  rather  than  as  an 
imposition  of  something  detestable  upon  the  majority.  No 
good  citizen  resents  a  law  of  homicide,  because  he  feels  that 
he  is  quite  outside  its  field.  It  is  the  law  he  himself  would 
make  to  control  the  criminally  inclined.  The  grand  result 
of  the  whole  gradual  and  "by  consent"  way  in  which  the 
Government  took  its  economic  measures,  though  it  veiled  for 


THE  CONTROL  OF  PRICES 


167 


a  time  the  stem  and  rude  side  of  war  from  the  popular 
consciousness,  was  such  an  enthusiastic,  voluntary  partici- 
pation of  the  masses  in  the  war  enterprise  as  was,  perhaps, 
unknown  in  the  other  great  nations  involved  in  the  World 
War. 

In  the  case  of  steel,  the  record  shows  that  from  a  rather 
unyielding  and  even  grasping  attitude  at  first  the  steel  pro- 
ducers gradually  softened  and  relaxed  and  came  to  take  the 
public  view.  In  the  end  there  was  not  the  sullen  compliance 
that  would  have  followed  arbitrary  action,  but  the  cheerful 
and  earnest  cooperation  of  partners  dominated  by  reason- 
ableness. Before  the  final  step  was  taken,  there  was  much 
coming  and  going  from  Washington  and  numbers  of  voluble 
and  indecisive  conferences.  The  basic  prices  of  coke,  steel, 
and  iron  were  established  at  a  conference  of  the  War  Indus- 
tries Board  with  sixty-five  representative  iron  and  steel  pro- 
ducers on  September  21st,  though  not  promulgated  by  the 
President  until  September  24th.^  The  copper  price  was  also 
fixed  on  the  former  date.  Although  it  was  not  the  direct 
concern  of  the  War  Industries  Board,  coal  being  under  con- 
trol of  the  newly  established  Fuel  Administration,  it  is  note- 
worthy that  the  price  of  coal  was  fixed  a  month  earlier.^ 

Before  the  establishment  of  the  Price-Fixing  Committee 
in  March,  1918,  the  War  Industries  Board  itself  had  dealt 
initiatively  or  conclusively  with  prices  for  hides  and  skins, 
wool,  munitions,  linters,  harness  leather,  sulphuric  acid, 
nitric  acid,  cotton  textiles,  cotton  linters,  sand  and  gravel, 
manila  fiber,  building  tile,  sole  and  belting  leather,  rags, 
wool  grease,  compressing  rates  for  cotton,  brick,  millwork, 
gypsum  wall  board,  cement,  various  sorts  of  lumber,  zinc 
and  aluminum,  in  addition  to  copper,  iron,  and  steel.  The 
Board  proper  retained  its  informal  control  of  lead,  wood 
chemicals,  nitrate  of  soda,  alkalis,  nickel,  quicksilver,  plat- 
inum, cotton  textiles,  cotton  linters,  wool,  hides,  skins,  and 
leather,  manila  fiber  and  hemp,  burlap,  lumber,  building 
materials,  and  chemicals.  The  reason  of  this  retention  was 
that,  in  the  cases  of  these  materials,  there  were  involved  so 
intimately  other  functions  of  the  Board  with  which  price- 

*See  Chapter  XVIII,  "Steel:  An  Epic  of  the  War." 

The  Fuel  Administration  left  the  price  of  coke  to  the  War  Industries 
Board. 


11 


1. 1 


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168    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

fixing  was  mixed  that  it  was  not  practicable  to  surrender 
price-fixing  to  the  committee.  Particulars  of  the  price-fixing 
of  different  commodities  including  steel  and  iron  will  be 
dealt  with  in  later  chapters. 

The  establishment  of  prices  was  such  a  delicate  matter 
and  so  charged  with  explosive  possibilities  that  it  was  always 
a  matter  for  presidential  analysis  and  approval.  As  time 
went  on,  and  it  became  necessary  to  take  control  over  more 
and  more  commodities  in  which  shortages  developed,  and  as 
the  control  of  prices  of  finished  products  began  to  loom,  the 
price-fixing  function  became  such  a  burden,  in  addition  to 
its  delicacy  and  complexity,  that  the  necessity  arose  for  the 
creation  of  a  new  agency  for  its  administration.  Price-fixing 
was  a  judicial  function,  which  seemed  to  require  a  certain 
detachment  from  the  administrative  functions  of  the  Board. 

It  is  true  that  priority,  which  in  the  last  analysis  was  the 
principle  which  controlled  all  the  other  functional  divisions 
of  the  War  Industries  Board,  affected  prices  and  that  prices 
reacted  on  the  administration  of  priority;  but  between  price- 
fixing  and  the  other  functions  of  the  Board  there  was  such  a 
sharp  distinction  as  was  to  be  found  nowhere  else  in  an 
organization  which  was  remarkable  for  its  lack  of  hard-and- 
fast  boundaries  between  departments.  This  difference, 
indeed,  was  almost  generic  and  led  in  the  final  reorganization 
of  the  War  Industries  Board  to  a  curious  division  of  the 
Price-Fixing  Committee  from  the  Board  proper,  even  in 
authority. 

On  the  recommendation  of  Mr.  Baruch,  prior  to  his 
appointment  to  the  chairmanship  of  the  Board,  the  Price- 
Fixing  Committee  was  named  by  the  President  and  not  by 
the  chairman  of  the  Board.  It  was  the  only  part  of  the  Board 
in  which  the  chairman  was  not  independent  of  committee 
action.  The  President  enjoined  him  in  the  determination  of 
prices  to  be  governed  by  the  advice  of  a  committee  "consti- 
tuted for  the  purpose,"  which  should  include,  besides  himself, 
"members  of  the  Board  immediately  charged  with  the  study 
of  raw  materials  and  of  manufactured  products,  of  the  Labor 
member  of  the  Board,  of  the  chairman  of  the  Federal  Trade 
Commission,  the  chairman  of  the  TariflF  Commission,  and  the 
Fuel  Administrator." 


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INTENTIONAL  SECOND  EXPOSURE 


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1. 


168    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

fixing  was  mixed  that  it  was  not  practicable  to  surrender 
price-fixing  to  the  committee.  Particulars  of  the  price-fixing 
of  different  commodities  including  steel  and  iron  will  be 
dealt  with  in  later  chapters. 

The  establishment  of  prices  was  such  a  delicate  matter 
and  so  charged  with  explosive  possibilities  that  it  was  always 
a  matter  for  presidential  analysis  and  approval.  As  time 
went  on,  and  it  became  necessary  to  take  control  over  more 
and  more  commodities  in  which  shortages  developed,  and  as 
the  control  of  prices  of  finished  products  began  to  loom,  the 
price-fixing  function  became  such  a  burden,  in  addition  to 
its  delicacy  and  complexity,  that  the  necessity  arose  for  the 
creation  of  a  new  agency  for  its  administration.  Price-fixing 
was  a  judicial  function,  which  seemed  to  require  a  certain 
detachment  from  the  administrative  functions  of  the  Board. 

It  is  true  that  priority,  which  in  the  last  analysis  was  the 
principle  which  controlled  all  the  other  functional  divisions 
of  the  War  Industries  Board,  affected  prices  and  that  prices 
reacted  on  the  administration  of  priority;  but  between  price- 
fixing  and  the  other  functions  of  the  Board  there  was  such  a 
sharp  distinction  as  was  to  be  found  nowhere  else  in  an 
organization  which  was  remarkable  for  its  lack  of  hard-and- 
fast  boundaries  between  departments.  This  difference, 
indeed,  was  almost  generic  and  led  in  the  final  reorganization 
of  the  War  Industries  Board  to  a  curious  division  of  the 
Price-Fixing  Committee  from  the  Board  proper,  even  in 
authority. 

On  the  recommendation  of  Mr.  Baruch,  prior  to  his 
appointment  to  the  chairmanship  of  the  Board,  the  Price- 
Fixing  Committee  was  named  by  the  President  and  not  by 
the  chairman  of  the  Board.  It  was  the  only  part  of  the  Board 
in  which  the  chairman  was  not  independent  of  committee 
action.  The  President  enjoined  him  in  the  determination  of 
prices  to  be  governed  by  the  advice  of  a  committee  "consti- 
tuted for  the  purpose,"  which  should  include,  besides  himself, 
"members  of  the  Board  immediately  charged  with  the  study 
of  raw  materials  and  of  manufactured  products,  of  the  Labor 
member  of  the  Board,  of  the  chairman  of  the  Federal  Trade 
Commission,  the  chairman  of  the  Tariff  Commission,  and  the 
Fuel  Administrator." 


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THE  CONTROL  OF  PRICES 


169 


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While  the  committee  was  to  determine  prices  for  the  chair- 
man of  the  Board,  it  really  reported  them  directly  to  the 
President,  who  always  passed  on  them  before  they  were 
promulgated.  Nevertheless,  the  Board  defined  the  functions^ 
of  the  committee,  which  always  acted,  not  of  its  own  initia- 
tive, but  at  the  instance  of  the  Board  or  some  department 
of  it. 

It  was  distinctly  a  committee  of  the  Board,  and  yet  only 
three  of  its  members  were  members  of  the  Board  itself;  at 
the  same  time  the  committee,  in  its  function  of  determining 
prices,  was  absolutely  independent  of  the  Board  and  was 
responsible  directly  to  the  President.  The  initiative  in  price- 
control  lay  with  the  Board,  but  in  determining  prices  or 
policies  the  committee  acted  as  an  isolated  judicial  body, 
divorced  by  its  composition  from  a  suspicion  of  bias,  abso- 
lutely independent  of  administrative  control  and  the  partiali- 
ties or  antagonisms  that  might  arise  therefrom. 

Prior  to  the  final  separation  of  the  War  Industries  Board 
from  the  Council  of  National  Defense,  the  latter  body  issued 
a  statement  regarding  the  purpose  of  the  Price-Fixing  Com- 
mittee, in  which  it  described  the  committee  as  being  quasi- 
judicial  and  separate  and  "made  up  of  men  separated  so 
completely  from  industrial  interests  that  their  motives  and 
actions  in  the  determination  of  prices  can  be  subject  to  no 
suspicion  of  mercenary  interest." 

Chairman  Robert  S.  Brookings,  who  had  previously  been 
at  the  head  of  the  Finished  Products  Division  of  the  Board, 
Chairman  Baruch  of  the  Board,  and  Henry  C.  Stuart  (former 
governor  of  Virginia),  who  was  on  the  committee  as  the 
representative  of  the  public  interest  as  contrasted  with  the 
specialized  war  interest  of  other  members,  were  the  only 
members  who  could  be  classed  as  business  men  who  might 
have  a  remote  personal  interest  in  prices  (although  all  three 
were  strictly  disassociated  with  active  business) . 

^Wlien  the  committee  was  called  together  by  the  War  Industries  Board,  its 
functions  were  outlined  as  follows:  **(!)  to  advise  upon  prices  of  basic 
materials;  (2)  from  time  to  time  to  advise  as  to  general  price  policies,  acting 
in  this  way  as  a  coordinating  price  body;  (3)  the  committee  will  advise  when 
requested  by  any  department  upon  a  specific  contract,  assuming,  however,  that 
no  department  will  submit  for  advice  those  problems  which  it  is  organized 
and  qualified  to  handle  itself;  and  (4)  when  materials  are  commandeered 
prices  of  the  same  will  be  fixed  by  this  committee." 


ni 


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i'l 


t  • 


170    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

But,  even  if  their  views  on  prices  had  been  tinged  by 
remote  particular  interests,  they  would  have  been  outvoted 
in  a  committee  of  nine  members,  the  other  six  of  whom  were 
Hugh  Frayne,  representative  of  Labor  and  at  the  head  of 
the  Labor  Division  of  the  Board;  F.  W.  Taussig,  chairman  of 
the  United  States  TariflF  Commission;  W^  B.  Colver,  chairman 
of  the  Federal  Trade  Commission;  Dr.  Harry  A.  Garfield, 
United  States  Fuel  Administrator;  Commander  John  M. 
Hancock,  representing  the  navy;  and  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Robert  H.  Montgomery,  representing  the  War  Department. 

The  Price-Fixing  Committee  bore  about  the  same  relation 
to  the  War  Industries  Board  as  the  Federal  judiciary  does 
to  the  Federal  Government  as  a  whole:  certainly  the  Supreme 
Court,  for  example,  is  a  part  of  that  Government,  and  yet 
it  is  in  a  position  to  oppose  both  the  executive  and  the  legis- 
lative arms.  The  Supreme  Court  supposedly  promotes  the 
policies  of  the  Government  by  keeping  it  true  to  the  Consti- 
tution, the  organic  governmental  programme.  The  Price- 
Fixing  Committee  was  designed  to  determine,  without  influ- 
ence of  persons  or  interests,  prices  that  would  conform  to 
the  success  of  the  function  of  the  War  Industries  Board  — 
which  was  to  obtain  and  maintain  adequate  production  in 
support  of  the  army  and  navy.  The  specialization  of  price- 
fixing  in  a  department  of  its  own  made  the  function  a  con- 
tinuous one;  the  committee  was  continuously  at  work  and 
ready  to  pass  on  any  question  that  might  be  referred  to  it; 
so  that  price-fixing  became  a  process  rather  than  a  series  of 
incidents. 

It  is  conceivable  that  a  body  which  was  a  part  and  instru- 
ment of  the  War  Industries  Board,  both  in  its  membership 
and  in  its  administration,  and  yet  largely  autonomous, 
might  have  been  a  source  of  friction.  For  instance, 
the  Board  might  have  considered  a  certain  price  policy 
necessary  to  the  success  of  its  work,  whereas  the  committee 
might  have  favored  another.  In  fact,  there  was  no  friction 
for  the  same  reason  that  the  Board  worked  without  friction 
between  any  of  its  departments,  which  was  the  cooperative 
attitude  of  the  whole  personnel.  Consecrated  to  a  common 
purpose,  the  members  rose  above  personal  ambitions  and 
pride. 


THE  CONTROL  OF  PRICES 


171 


In  prices  as  in  much  else  of  its  work  the  War  Industries 
Board  avoided  the  creation  of  rigid  policies.  Mr.  Baruch 
always  had  the  conception  of  industrial  control  as  analogous 
to  military  strategy,  and  he  consistently  opposed  the  estab- 
lishment of  policies  that  might  hamper  action  in  the  face  of 
an  emergency.  The  Board  never  considered  its  acts  in  any 
case  as  precedents  for  others;  it  kept  itself  in  a  fluid  state. 

There  was  necessarily,  however,  a  general  method  of  deal- 
ing with  prices.  Prices  might  have  been  dealt  with  in  three 
ways,  namely,  leaving  them  to  the  open  market — supply  and 
demand;  the  establishment  of  a  fixed  rate  of  profit;  and  the 
setting  of  a  fixed  price.  The  first  was  obviously  impossible 
if  there  was  to  be  any  eff'ective  control  of  industry  when  the 
demand,  being  largely  the  imperative  war  demand  of  the 
Government  and  of  the  Allies,  was  not  subject  to  reduction 
by  a  rise  in  prices,  as  is  the  case  with  demand  in  ordinary 
times.  The  adoption  of  that  policy  would  simply  have 
meant,  in  the  circumstances,  that  the  source  of  the  demand 
that  was  sending  prices  upward,  and  would  continue  to  do 
so,  would  have  left  price-fixing  entirely  to  the  sellers.  It 
would  have  been  to  give  governmental  sanction  to  unmiti- 
gated profiteering. 

Even  before  there  was  any  definite  thought  of  price-fixing 
as  a  policy,  the  open-market  plan  was  adopted  when  the 
peace-time  policy  of  letting  contracts  by  bids  was  suspended 
at  the  very  beginning  of  the  war.  Thereafter  Government 
purchases  were  chiefly  through  negotiated  prices,  which 
involved  from  the  start  an  element  of  Government  price- 
fixing,  which  became  more  and  more  important  as  the  offices 
of  the  Council  of  National  Defense,  General  Munitions 
Board,  and  War  Industries  Board  were  invoked.  These 
bodies  always  exerted  an  influence  on  prices  that  tended  to 
suspend  the  free  operation  of  the  law  of  supply  and  demand 
and  that  limited  profits.  They  were  not  concerned,  it  is 
true,  with  getting  the  lowest  possible  prices;  but  with  the 
establishment  of  prices  that  would  stimulate  production  with- 
out being  intolerable  in  amount. 

In  some  instances,  as  in  shipbuilding,  cantonments,  air- 
craft, etc.,  the  Government  did  adopt  the  policy  of  fixing 
prices  by  fixing  profits,  which  was,  under  another  name,  the 


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III 


■■i 


172    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

cost-plus  policy.  With  certain  products  it  seemed  to  be  the 
only  feasible  one;  actual  Government  possession  and  oper- 
ation of  manufacturing  plants  would  have  been  only  a  form 
of  cost-plus,  because  the  owners  of  the  plants  would  have 
been  entitled  to  a  compensation  which  would  have  to  be  deter- 
mined sooner  or  later. 

It  was  a  policy  with  manifest  defects.  It  involved  the 
maintenance  of  enormous  and  costly  accountancy  systems  by 
the  Government  in  order  to  determine  just  what  the  cost  of 
production  was;  endless  disputes  concerning  the  calculation 
of  costs;  a  premium  on  inefiSciency,  because  the  more  efficient 
a  producer  was,  the  lower  his  costs  and  the  less  his  abso- 
lute profits  (although  ingenious  devices  were  adopted  to 
counterbalance  this  tendency).  To  have  applied  it  to  all 
Government  purchases  would  have  called  for  an  army  of 
accountants  almost  as  large  as  the  army  in  France. 

The  third  policy,  and  the  one  followed  by  the  War  Indus- 
tries Board,  was  peculiarly  susceptible  of  application  to 
raw  materials,  which  were  the  chief  concern  of  that  Board, 
because  with  them  it  was  a  comparatively  easy  matter  to 
determine  production  costs  in  advance.  Having  obtained 
these  for  both  high-cost  and  low-cost  producers,  the  Board 
in  conference  with  the  producers  fixed  a  price  that  would 
give  a  reasonably  stimulative  profit  to  the  low-cost  men.  It 
was  the  business  of  the  Board  to  stimulate  production  in  all 
lines  in  which  there  was  a  shortage  —  not  to  haggle  for  the 
lowest  possible  price  for  a  given  order.  A  reasonable  price 
was  important,  but  volume  production  was  the  imperative 
consideration. 

It  should  not  be  inferred  from  this  that  the  Board  was 
reckless  as  to  prices.  There  was  a  view  that  the  Board  did 
not  need  to  be  too  careful  of  prices  because  the  war  and 
excess  profits  taxes  would  automatically  return  to  the 
Treasury  the  major  part  of  large  profits.  The  Board  did 
not  share  it,  however,  because  it  looked  to  the  economic 
effects  of  extravagant  prices  and  profits  —  mounting  wages, 
high  retail  prices,  labor  unrest,  credit  inflation,  etc.  The 
Board  did  consider,  though,  that  while  prices  that  would 
insure  a  profit  to  four  fifths  or  nine  tenths  of  an  industry  — 
which  seems  to  have  been  the  bulk-line  fractions  it  had  in 


THE  CONTROL  OF  PRICES 


173 


mind  —  would  mean  very  large  profits  to  the  low-cost  pro- 
ducers, a  large  portion  of  their  profits  would  come  back  to 
the  Government  in  taxes. 

It  cannot  be  denied  that  the  horizontal-price  plan  applied 
on  the  plane  of  high-cost  production  was  a  tremendous 
invigorator  of  big  business  and  hard  on  small  business. 
The  large  and  efficient  producers  made  larger  profits  than 
normally  and  many  of  the  smaller  concerns  fell  below  their 
customary  returns.  On  the  other  hand,  if  prices  had  been 
fixed  on  the  plane  of  low-cost  production,  many,  if  not  all, 
of  the  smaller  concerns  would  have  been  driven  out  of 
Government  business,  which  meant  for  a  time  at  least  from 
all  business,  with  a  resultant  loss  of  their  potential  pro- 
duction and  the  withdrawal  of  the  premium  on  maximum 
production  from  the  large  producers. 

In  view  of  the  general  dissatisfaction  that  was  expressed 
with  the  cost-plus  system,  few  would  have  the  hardihood  to 
say  now  that  it  should  have  been  adopted  generally.  The 
level-price  plan  accorded  admirably  with  the  general  policy 
of  the  Board  —  of  getting  results  instead  of  concerning  itself 
with  the  details  of  methods.  Industry  was  left  to  its  own 
management  and  devices  in  extending  itself  to  the  maximum 
and  was  not  hampered  with  a  swarm  of  critical  supervisors 
and  accountants.  In  this  way  the  genius  of  American  busi- 
ness was  not  cramped,  but  utilized  to  the  fullest  extent  for 
the  purposes  of  war.  The  discussion  concerning  the  basis  of 
fixed  prices  was  long  and  of  absorbing  interest.  Professor 
Taussig,  a  member  of  the  Price-Fixing  Committee,  presented 
the  argument  for  a  uniform  price  as  follows: 

1.  If  diflferences  in  cost  of  production  between  different  pro- 
ducers were  — 

(a)  Clearly  ascertainable; 

(b)  Due  solely  to  differences  in  the  natural  resources  utilized 
by  them; 

it  would  not  be  impracticable  to  purchase  from  them  at  pricesi 
based  on  their  differing  costs. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  neither  of  these  conditions  is  ever  present. 
In  the  first  place,  costs  are  not  clearly  ascertainable.  They  vary 
from  month  to  month,  from  year  to  year.  We  get  figures  from 
cost  accountants  which  are  worked  out  to  the  last  cent,  but  which, 


;{.: 


174    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


THE  CONTROL  OF  PRICES 


175 


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as  a  matter  of  fact,  contain  arbitrary  and  debatable  elements.  Any 
endeavor  to  pay  to  each  producer  according  to  his  costs  would  lead 
to  perpetual  wrangling,  perpetual  requests  for  changes  and  modi- 
fications. In  the  second  place,  differences  in  cost  are  by  no  means 
due  solely  to  differences  in  natural  resources.  They  arise  very 
largely  from  differences  in  skill,  energy,  efl&ciency.  To  pay  a  low 
price  to  a  producer  who  has  brought  down  his  costs  through  skill 
and  ability  is  to  penalize  the  most  effective  form  of  human  effort. 

2.  Sale  at  varying  prices  is  in  any  case  not  practicable.  If  the 
Government  fixes  a  price,  it  must  be  a  price  uniform  for  all 
producers.  Were  this  not  the  case,  there  would  be  constant 
squabbling  and  intriguing  for  favored  position. 

3.  The  main  problem  is  that  of  purchase,  and  I  am  unable  to 
see  the  practicability,  as  conditions  of  production  stand  to-day,  of 
carrying  out  a  policy  of  purchase  at  varying  prices.  The  only 
possible  way  of  carrying  it  out  would  be  for  the  Government  to  take 
over  all  the  establishments  and  try  to  run  them.  Quite  apart  from 
the  constitutional  questions  involved  (as  regards  the  fair  price 
which  the  Government  must  pay  for  each  plant)  the  actual  admin- 
istration and  running  of  an  enormous  variety  of  plants  would  be 
a  hopeless  task. 

4.  The  only  feasible  plan  in  price-fixing  is  that  of  establishing 
a  uniform  price,  which  should  ordinarily  be  paid  for  the  whole  of 
the  output. 

The  uniform  price  which  the  Government  thus  must  fix  is  not 
necessarily  the  cost-of-production  price.  It  need  not  be  either  an 
average  cost-of-production  price  or  a  marginal  or  "bulk-line"  cost. 
The  Government  might  be  expected  under  ordinary  conditions  to  pay 
the  market  price  that  would  obtain  in  the  absence  of  regulation, 
irrespective  of  cost.  Under  conditions  of  war  stress  and  war 
exigency,  however,  the  Government  must  pay  for  an  essential 
commodity  that  price  which  will  maintain  and,  if  possible,  stimu- 
late the  volume  of  production.  Such  a  stimulating  price  is  not  far 
from  the  marginal  or  "bulk-line"  cost. 

There  will  always  be  sporadic  producers  having  very  high  costs, 
higher  than  the  "bulk-line,"  who  may  be  disregarded.  It  is  con- 
ceivable that  in  extreme  need  for  a  particular  commodity  the 
Government  will  make  some  special  bargain  with  the  small  number 
of  high-cost  producers.  But  such  transactions  are.  extremely 
dubious  and  are  to  be  avoided  except  in  the  extremest  urgency.  As 
regards  them,  it  must  be  made  out  that  the  very  high  cost  of  the 
producers  is  not  due  to  slackness  or  inefficiency  on  their  part,  but 
to  poor  natural  resources,  and  that  the  payment  is  indispensable  for 
the  maintenance  of  a  supply  absolutely  needed. 


At  the  same  time  the  fixed  price  stimulated  efficiency  and 
consequently  production,  because  the  larger  the  volume  of 
production  in  proportion  to  cost,  the  larger  the  profit,  even 
after  making  allowance  for  taxes. 

It  does  not  appear  that  there  was  any  customary  per- 
centage of  profit  estimated.  The  whole  price-fixing  theory 
was  based  upon  the  fact  that  the  price  must  be  put  at  the 
lowest  possible  figure  at  which  we  could  obtain  all  the  things 
that  were  needed  for  the  prosecution  of  the  war. 

The  earlier  policy  of  the  Board  as  a  price-fixing  medium 
was  also  the  policy  of  the  Price-Fixing  Committee.  Time 
and  again  Chairman  Brookings  made  it  plain  that  his  com- 
mittee had  no  rigid  policy  beyond  that  of  making  the  costs 
of  the  less  eflficient  section  of  an  industry  the  basis  of  the 
price  for  all.  Here  it  must  be  remembered  that  the  Board 
primarily  dealt  only  with  materials  in  which  there  was  a 
shortage  and  in  which,  therefore,  production  must  be 
increased.  Unlike  the  Food  and  Fuel  Administrations,  the 
War  Industries  Board  was  not  fundamentally  concerned  with 
retail  prices.  The  course  of  events  was  turning  it  in  that 
direction  as  the  war  approached  its  end,  but  its  chief  purpose 
was  to  secure  the  materials  the  Government  or  the  war 
industries  needed  at  a  price  that  would  stimulate  production 
without  being  excessive. 

However,  the  Board  did  always  provide  that  the  raw 
materials  prices  obtained  for  the  Government  should  also 
be  enjoyed  by  the  public  and  the  Allies.  Thus,  the  original 
producers  could  not  practice  extortion  on  the  public,  but  the 
secondary  producers  —  the  makers  of  finished  goods  — 
were  not  so  restrained.  When  retail  prices  began  to  get  so 
high  as  to  react  on  production,  through  disturbance  of  the 
public  mind,  the  unsettling  of  wage  scales  and  concomitant 
industrial  disturbances,  they  did  become  the  concern  of  the 
Board,  and  only  the  early  termination  of  hostilities  pre- 
vented a  regime  of  price-fixing  for  the  protection  of  the 
ultimate  consumer,  comparable  to  that  of  the  Food  and 
Fuel  Administrations,  but  probably  on  a  fixed-maximum- 
price  basis  instead  of  on  the  basis  of  regulation  of  profits. 

The  War  Industries  Board's  conception  of  price-control 
leaned  toward  stabilization  as  the  chief  consideration.     This 


at 


176    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

it  obtained  in  the  completely  controlled  industries  through 
price-fixing  and  in  the  partly  controlled  through  the  applica- 
tion of  the  principle  of 'priority.  "War  prices  were  high 
prices,"  writes  Mr.  Baruch  in  his  preliminary  report  on  the 
work  of  the  Board,  "but  they  were  stabilized  prices.  The 
most  effective  organ  of  stabilization  was  the  operation  of  the 
priorities  system."  Priority  took  away  from  the  market 
the  element  of  price-determination  that  arises  from 
knowledge  of  insufficient  supply  of  raw  materials;  price- 
making  deprived  the  market  of  the  element  that  proceeds 
from  the  desire  for  inordinate  profits. 

Quite  aside  from  the  matter  of  profiteering,  unnecessary 
burden    on    the    taxpayers,    and    social    justice,    the    War 
Industries  Board  sought  stabilization  as  a  sine  qua  non  of 
maximum  production.     Production  to  it  was  as  ammunition 
to  the  soldier.     At  the  risk  of  unnecessary  repetition,  it  is 
essential  to  state  that  the  War  Industries  Board  was  the 
civilian  complement  of  the  armed  forces  of  the  Nation.     Its 
business  was  the  basic  procurement  of  the  goods  needed  for 
war  consumption;  not  to  safeguard  the  civilian  against  want 
and  extortion  as  were  the  Food  and  Fuel  Administrations  in 
large  degree.     When  it  acted  to  protect  production  for  the 
public,  as  it  did  at  times  —  and  was  coming  more  and  more 
to  do  —  it  was  still  with  its  eye  on  the  objective  of  pro- 
duction.    It  took  care  not  to  kill  the  goose  of  the  golden 
eggs  whilst  stimulating  the  output  of  eggs;  but  the  goose  was 
conserved,  not  for  her  own  sake,  but  for  that  of  the  eggs. 
As  the  Shipping  Board's  incessant  clamor  was  for  ships  and 
more  ships,  the  War  Industries  Board's  insistent  urge  was 
for  production,  production,   production.     This  may   seem 
somewhat  cold-blooded,  but  it  was  not;  it  was  simply  fidelity 
to  function.     A  general  will  save  all  the  lives  he  can;  but 
however  humane  he  may  be,  and  as  such  gratified  by  a  small 
casualty  list,  he  is  sparing  of  his  men  in  his  capacity  as  a 
general  only  that  he  may  have  more  to  spend  at  another 
time. 

In  this  making  of  the  Government  price  the  common 
price  the  Board  was  moved  by  both  sentiment  and  sense. 
It  was  obviously  not  the  fair  thing  to  leave  producers  free 
to  squeeze  the  public  to  make  up  for  any  slendemess  of 


THE  CONTROL  OF  PRICES 


177 


profits  under  Government  contracts,  and  it  was  not  in 
accordance  with  the  ethics  of  partnership  to  allow  the  Allies 
to  be  assailed  by  excessive  prices  behind  the  lines  while  we 
were  fighting  for  and  with  them  at  the  front.  The  Allies 
were  spending  in  this  country  money  loaned  to  them  by  the 
National  Treasury;  the  higher  the  prices  exacted  of  them, 
the  greater  the  loans,  and  the  greater  the  ultimate  burden  of 
the  American  people. 

Price-fixing  by  the  War  Industries  Board  was  not  an 
arbitrarily  proclaimed  or  abruptly  determined  process.  It 
always  took  the  form  of  negotiation,  and  the  results  were, 
strictly  speaking,  agreed  rather  than  decreed  prices.  It  is 
true  that  in  some  instances  the  Board  had  to  show  its  teeth 
and  force  fair  prices  by  threats  of  commandeering,^  but  the 
method  of  approach  was  always  one  of  mutual  consideration. 

On  the  historic  occasion  when  the  sixty-five  delegates  of 
the  steel  industry  met  the  Board  in  full  session  to  determine 
steel  prices.  Judge  Elbert  H.  Gary,  speaking  for  his  asso- 
ciates, solemnly  inquired  of  Judge  Lovett,  of  the  Board,  as 
a  lawyer: 

"May  I  ask  by  what  authority  the  War  Industries  Board 
has  undertaken  to  fix  these  prices?" 

"A  gentleman  of  your  eminent  qualifications  in  law,"  was 
Judge  Lovett's  answer,  after  a  moment  of  profound  silence, 
"requires  no  information  from  me  on  that  point." 

And  with  a  grim  smile  all  around,  the  Board  and  the 
delegation  proceeded  to  fight  it  out.  It  was  no  parlor 
debate,  either.  The  Board  was  armed  with  facts  and  figures 
about  steel  and  iron  production  and  costs,  not  only  from  the 
exhaustive  investigations  of  the  Federal  Trade  Commission, 
but  from  the  inside  information  of  Replogle  and  other  steel 
men  who  were  now  playing  the  Government's  game. 

In  lumber  and  other  commodities  as  well  there  were  some 
very  tense  sessions  in  connection  with  price-fixing,  but  the 
war  service  committees  and  other  representatives  of  industry 
had  the  satisfaction  that  every  good  fighter  has  in  meeting  a 
f oeman  worthy  of  his  steel.  On  the  foundation  of  its  com- 
modity sections  and  divisions,  the  War  Industries  Board 

^Commandeering  was  actually  resorted  to  by  the  army  and  navy  in  many 
cases.  The  army  alone  issued  510  requisitions  for  goods  and  996  compulsory 
orders  for  production  of  goods. 


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178    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

built  up  a  skillfully  used  knowledge  of  everything  it  under- 
took to  do.  Business  men  used  to  complain  of  "professors" 
in  other  Government  agencies,  but  in  the  War  Industries 
Board  they  dealt  with  their  own  kind.  The  fidelity  of  the 
transplanted  business  man  to  the  Government  was  remark- 
able and  stirring.  He  played  the  game  just  as  strenuously 
and  remorselessly  for  the  Government  as  he  would  have 
played  it  on  the  other  side.  It  is  a  singular  fact,  too, 
that  the  very  men  on  that  other  side  were  sometimes  furious 
at  their  brethren  in  the  Government's  service  for  doing  pre- 
cisely what  they  would  have  done  had  they  been  on  that  side. 

When  a  price  for  any  commodity  had  been  determined 
by  the  War  Industries  Board,  it  did  not  follow  that  Govern- 
ment purchasing  agencies  were  not  free  to  obtain  better 
prices  if  they  chose  to;  the  Board  price  was  always  a 
maximum  price.  In  general,  though,  it  was  accepted  as  the 
established  price,  and  that  part  of  contract-making  did  not 
bother  the  buyers  any  more.  Occasionally  a  price  was  fixed 
only  for  a  limited  purpose  or  for  one  department,  and  some- 
times for  the  benefit  of  the  Government  or  for  the  Allies 
only;  but  in  general  a  price  once  made  was  a  price  for  all. 
Note  that  prices  were  fixed  every  three  months,  to  insure 
fair  play  to  producers  and  justice  for  the  general  public 
At  all  times  the  Price-Fixing  Committee  was  open  to  com 
plaints  or  suggestions  from  Federal  departments,  the  public 
and  Congress.  This  seems  to  have  been  forgotten,  particu 
larly  by  a  few  Congressmen  who  complained  after  the  event 

The  creative  and  research  work  of  the  Price-Fixing  Com 
mittee  was  vastly  simplified,  not  only  by  its  intimate 
relations  with  other  parts  of  the  War  Industries  Board  — 
particularly  the  commodity  sections  —  but  by  the  assistance 
of  the  Federal  Trade  Commission.  This  imposed  a  heavy 
burden  on  the  Commission  and  made  it  in  large  measure  an 
adjunct  of  the  War  Industries  Board.  Some  five  or  six  hun- 
dred persons  were  employed  by  the  Commission  in  its  work 
of  investigating  costs  as  related  to  the  war  effort. 

The  administration  of  fixed  prices  was  left  to  the  com- 
modity sections  of  the  Board,  which  also,  it  should  be  noted, 
were  constantly  tied  in  to  the  process  of  price-making.  The 
details  of  aligning  the  prices   of   particular   products   in 


THE  CONTROL  OF  PRICES 


179 


accordance  with  basic  prices  were  usually  left  to  the 
industrial  associations  or  war  service  committees  as  a  matter 
of  trade  routine  based  on  accepted  differentials. 

In  the  beginning  important  legal  aspects  presented  them- 
selves. Excellent  authorities  held  that,  in  contemplating  fair 
prices  to  producers,  the  prices  prevailing  before  we  entered 
the  war  would  have  to  be  considered.  In  some  cases  these 
were  one  hundred  per  cent  higher  than  those  finally  paid. 
The  prices  finally  agreed  upon  were  voluntarily  arrived  at 
and  the  mounting  legal  aspect  thus  eliminated.  The  Govern- 
ment consequently  avoided  the  higher  prices  that  legal  action 
might  well  have  caused. 

The  general  results  of  the  price-fixing  work  of  the  War 
Industries  Board  were  satisfactory.  Together  with  the 
price-controlling  of  the  Food  and  Fuel  Administrations  they 
did  effectually  check  the  runaway  market  of  the  summer  and 
fall  of  1917,  and  kept  prices  under  restraint  until  control 
was  released.  It  has  been  pointed  out  that  because 
the  War  Industries  Board  (with  the  notable  exception  of 
cotton)  confined  its  price-controls  to  raw  materials,  there 
was  a  wide  opportunity  for  profiteering  in  prices  to  the  final 
consumer.  This  opportunity  was  undoubtedly  used,  too, 
but  price  records  show  a  gratifying  response  on  the  whole 
of  prices  of  finished  products  to  those  of  raw  materials. 
It  was  in  the  final  step  from  the  retailer  to  the  private  con- 
sumer that  there  was  the  greatest  departure  from  proportion. 
The  Government  and  the  Allies,  as  buyers,  got  the  benefit 
all  along  the  line  from  the  stabilization  of  original  pro- 
ducers' prices.  Had  it  not  been  for  the  primary  control, 
however,  with  its  rationalizing  and  steadying  influence, 
retail  prices  would  certainly  have  been  much  more  erratic 
and  probably  on  a  far  higher  average  plane  than  they  were. 

The  departure  from  the  rule  in  the  case  of  cotton,  a  most 
important  raw  material  and  the  only  one  of  the  great  raw 
materials  that  was  not  priced  at  the  source,  has  been  the 
occasion  of  much  controversy.  To  fix  the  price  of  cotton 
meant  dealing  with  millions  of  producers  —  the  cotton 
farmers  —  which  was  an  undertaking  foreign  to  the  Board's 
habit  of  establishing  prices  quietly  through  conferences  with 
a  few  men  who  were  able  to  speak  for  industrial  groups. 


1 1 


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ij 


180    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


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It  would  not  have  been  a  matter  of  the  council  room,  but  of 
debate  in  the  national  forum. 

Congress  had  fixed  prices  for  all  wheat  produced,  but  had 
not  touched  com  and  had  refused  to  deal  with  cotton  prices. 
It  was  a  question  whether  the  Board  had  justification  for 
entering  a  field  that  had  thus  been  preempted  by  Congress, 
though  President  Wilson  stood  ready  to  support  it.  Finally, 
though  there  was  at  times  a  shortage  of  the  better  grades  of 
cotton,  there  was  never  a  general  shortage,  which  fact  left 
raw  cotton  outside  the  Board's  defined  field.  It  is  true  that 
exhaustive  consideration  was  given  to  the  question  of  stabil- 
izing the  price  for  raw  cotton  and  that  price-fixing  at  the 
source  was  considered.  A  special  committee  appointed  to 
consider  the  raw-cotton  problem  advised  against  price-fixing, 
as  being  unnecessary  and  capable  of  application  only  by 
Government  purchase  of  the  entire  crop. 

As  an  administrative  machine  the  War  Industries  Board's 
practice  of  dealing  with  prices  at  the  source  had  the  great 
advantage  of  simplicity.     There  was  no  necessity  for  an 
enormous  policing  and  administrative  force  to  watch  and 
supervise  hundreds  of  thousands  of  establishments.     The 
few  thousands  of  industries  located  at  the  source  of  the 
controlled  materials  were  so  grouped  together  by  association 
or  committees  that  they  effectually  policed  themselves,  and 
their   operations   were    so    conspicuous    that    any    glaring 
evasion  or  violation  of  regulations  for  any  length  of  time 
was  impossible.     The  whole  personnel  of  the  War  Industries 
Board  at  its  height  did  not  exceed  fifteen  hundred  persons. 
Yet,  with  this  small  force,  order,  reason,  and  restraint  were 
introduced  into  purchases  for  the  Government  and  the  Allies 
that  aggregated  thirty  billions  of  dollars  in  value  and  that 
ramified  throughout  the  teeming  industrial  life  of  America, 
touched  the  business  life  of  the  whole  neutral  world,  and 
even  of  the  Allies  themselves,  and  imbued  the  huge  economic 
mechanism  of  America  with  potent  eflSciency. 


1 1 


i 


CHAPTER  X 
BALANCING  SUPPLY  AND  DEMAND 

The  twilight  zone  between  essential  and  non-essential  industries  —  Looking 
beyond  the  war  —  Jewelry  and  automobiles  —  An  industrial  operating  clinic 
—  What  happened  to  the  building  trade  —  Baruch  writes  Mayor  Hylan  — 
Politics  adjourned  —  Rifles,  artillery,  gun  mounts  —  Ferreting  out  hoarded 
goods  —  Housing  fifty  army  divisions  —  The  Board  and  the  railways  —  Break- 
ing a  great  transportation  jam  —  The  searchlight  of  statistics  —  The  War  Trade 
Board  ties  in  —  The  legal  factor. 

A  SIMPLE  analysis  of  the  elementary  functions  of  the  War 
Industries  Board  would  be  to  say  that  they  consisted  of  the 
stimulation  of  production  and  the  conservation  of  products. 
We  have  seen  in  previous  chapters  how  the  task  was  outlined 
through  the  study  of  requirements  and  resources,  and  how 
it  was  attacked  through  the  two  implements  of  priority  and 
price-fixing,  both  of  which  were  primarily  used  for  obtain- 
ing increased  production  of  the  things  that  were  essential 
to  the  successful  conduct  of  the  war  and  the  maintenance  of 
the  sanity  and  vigor  of  the  people. 

In  the  judgment  of  the  writer  the  principle  of  priority  in 
the  broadest  sense  was  the  underlying  principle  of  all  the 
work  of  the  Board  except  that  of  price-fixing.  We  are  not 
speaking  now  merely  of  the  Board's  Priorities  Division,  but 
of  the  principle  of  priority  —  the  ordering  of  the  fulfillment 
of  requirements  to  correspond  with  the  volume  of  supply 
or  resources. 

To  meet  the  demands  of  priority,  it  was  necessary  to  take 
direct  administrative  measures  to  increase  production  and 
restrict  use.  The  organic  functional  units  through  which 
these  ends  were  attained  were  the  Conservation  Division  and 
certain  other  restrictive  instrumentalities,  on  the  one  hand, 
and  certain  agencies  for  the  expansion  of  supply,  on  the 
other  hand.  These  last,  as  already  noted  in  Chapter  VIII, 
included  the  Resources  and  Conversion  Section,  the  Facili- 
ties Division,  the  Advisory  Committee  on  Plants  and 
Munitions,  and  the  Division  of  Planning  and  Statistics.  The 
two  first-named  agencies  were  placed  administratively  in  the 


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182    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Division  of  Finished  Products  under  the  Commissioner  of 
Finished  Products,  the  third  was  placed  under  Mr. 
Alexander  Legge,  and  the  fourth  was  independent,  reporting 
directly  to  the  chairman,  but  being  intimately  associated 
with  the  Conservation  Division. 

Actually,  there  were  other  functional  agencies  that  were 
specifically  created  to  increase  production,  conserve  pro- 
ducts, or  curtail  consumption.  One  of  these  was  the  Non- 
War  Construction  Section  which  was  placed  directly  under 
the  Priorities  Commission,  as  was  another,  the  Industrial 
Adjustments  Committee.  Another  was  the  Fire  Prevention 
Section  in  Mr.  Peek's  administrative  division;  still  another 
was  the  Stored  Materials  Section  imder  Mr.  Legge ;  and  also 
the  Inland  TraflSc  and  Emergency  Construction  Sections  of 
Mr.  Legge's  administrative  sector  of  the  Board.  Some  of 
the  so-called  commodity  sections  had  such  specialized 
functions  in  relation  to  the  stimulation  of  production  in 
general  as  to  be  more  properly  classed  with  the  agencies 
just  mentioned  than  as  media  of  contact  with  particular 
industries.  Of  course,  it  is  not  to  be  forgotten  that  the  com- 
modity sections  were  almost  always  the  point  of  direct  appli- 
cation of  the  functional  activities  under  whatever  adminis- 
trative divisions  or  whatever  guise.  Quite  outside  of  the 
administrative  authority  of  the  Board  was  the  augmentation 
of  supply  through  the  expansion  of  imports  and  the 
restriction  of  exports  through  the  cooperation  of  the  War 
Trade  Board. 

It  is  the  purpose  of  this  chapter  to  deal  with  these  special 
instrumentalities  of  balancing  supply  and  demand  except 
the  Conservation  and  Resources  and  Plants  Divisions,  each 
of  which  will  require  a  separate  chapter. 

The  application  of  the  principle  of  priority  with  all  its 
corollaries  quickly  raised  the  sore  question  of  non-essential 
industries.  It  was  apparent  that,  under  the  preferential 
system  of  access  to  materials  and  facilities,  some  of  the 
industries  not  engaged  in  actual  production  of  commodities 
for  war  utilization  would  be  restricted  to  the  vanishing  point. 
But  beyond  the  inevitable  evolution  in  that  direction  there 
was  an  insistent  demand  for  the  arbitrary  excision  of  "non- 
essential" industries  at  a  single  operation. 


BALANCING  SUPPLY  AND  DEMAND         183 

Viewing,  on  the  one  hand,  the  need  of  men  for  the  armies, 
and  of  equipment  for  them  in  its  myriad  forms  which  made 
demands  upon  the  productive  capacity  of  the  country  that 
in  some  lines  were  more  than  equal  to  the  annual  output, 
and,  on  the  other  hand,  a  host  of  luxurious  or  decorative 
industries  which  were  holding  men  and  consuming  materials, 
there  was  an  impulsive  demand  of  great  intensity  and 
determination  for  the  virtual  scrapping  of  many  industries. 
With  this  extreme  view  the  War  Industries  Board  did  not 
agree.  It  was  prepared  to  strip  the  fighting  Nation  to  the 
waist,  and  was  willing  to  decree  the  suspension  or  even  the 
ruin  of  any  industry  if  that  were  the  price  of  victory,  but 
it  saw  that  there  was  no  dividing  line  between  essential  and 
non-essential  industries  —  only  a  twilight  zone  that  reached 
at  points  to  the  other  sides  of  the  main  zones.  The  Board  was 
not  prepared  to  single  out  the  sheep  from  the  goats  by  an 
omnibus  proscription.  It  preferred  to  leave  the  elimination 
to  a  process  of  natural  selection  through  the  progressive 
operation  of  priority.  It  perceived  that  the  morale  of  the 
people  was  deeply  involved,  and  it  saw  that  psychological 
reactions  cannot  be  easily  foretold.  It  saw  also  that  to  extin- 
guish an  industry,  even  if  its  product  were  a  patent  super- 
fluity, was  to  cripple  the  industrial  body,  which  had  to  be 
kept  sound  and  strong,  even  if  lean  and  stringy,  unless  the 
facilities  and  persons  involved  could  be  immediately  applied 
to  other  tasks  that  would  keep  them  in  the  industrial  fabric. 

Then,  too,  beyond  the  moment  was  the  question  of  the 
future.  All  wars  come  to  an  end,  and  it  is  desirable  to  have 
something  left  of  what  was  worth  fighting  for.  The  victors 
in  some  wars  have  been  the  victims  of  the  following  peace. 
The  doughboys  would  not  have  gone  very  cheerfully  to  the 
front  if  they  had  thought  that  they  were  to  return  to  an 
impoverished  and  disorganized  homeland.  Certainly  there 
was  no  occasion  for  a  dramatic  sacrificial  gesture  that  would 
mean  the  sweeping  away  of  scores  of  industries,  the  disem- 
ployment  of  hundreds  of  thousands,  widespread  bitterness, 
and  impairment  of  the  will  to  war,  as  was  urged  by  the 
extreme  "forgodsakers,"  to  whom  every  soda  foimtain,  ice- 
cream parlor,  jewelry  shop,  candy  store,  automobile  pleasure 
car  agency,  theater,  movie-house,  pie  bakery,  etc.,  was  an 
ofi*ense. 


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184    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Nevertheless,  there  came  a  time  when  some  industries, 
even  highly  useful  and  fundamental  ones,  if  they  happened 
to  deal  with  its  deferrable  needs,  had  to  face  virtual  sus- 
pension.    They  were   left,   it   is   true,    with    skeletons    on 
which  the  flesh  of  activity  might  be  regrown,  but  they  were 
very  ghastly  skeletons  in  the  eyes  of  the  proprietors.    In  the 
great  majority  of  cases  the  application  of  the  policy  of  con- 
version found  places  for  plants  and  personnel  in  work  that 
could  not  be  deferred.    In  scarcely  a  case  was  any  industry 
except  that  of  alcoholic  beverages^  branded  as  non-essential, 
and  that  was  the  work  of  Congress,  though  the  Board  had 
caused  the  largest  whiskey  distilleries  to  be  converted  to  the 
manufacture  of  alcohol  for  utilization  in  making  smokeless 
powder.     The  War  Industries  Board  rather  inclined  to  the 
view  that  in  the  true  perspective  there  were  no  non-essential 
industries,  only  many  grades  of  relative  immediate  utility. 
The  crusade  against  non-essential  industries  became  so 
insistent,  and  so  many  people  felt  that  the  tapering-off  policy 
of  the  War  Industries  Board  was  so  unheroic  and  even  timid 
in  view  of  the  universal  tragedy  of  the  war,  that  President 
Wilson  designated  the  chairmen  of  the  War  Trade  Board 
and  of  the  War  Industries  Board  and  the  Food  and  Fuel 
Administrators  to  consider  and  decide  what,  if  any,  indus- 
tries were  non-essential  and  should  be  sacrificed  in  order  to 
stimulate  indispensable  production  by  the  diversion  to  it  of 
labor  and  materials.     This  committee  appointed  a  working 
committee,  composed  of  Clarence  M.  WooUey,  of  the  War 
Trade  Board,  as  chairman;  Edwin  B.  Parker,  Priorities  Com- 
missioner; T.  F.  Marsh,  of  the  Food  Administration;  Edwin 
F.  Gay,  of  the  Shipping  Board;  P.  B.  Noyes,  of  the  Fuel 
Administration;  Felix  Frankfurter,  chairman  of  the  War 
Labor  Policies  Board;  and  George  May,  of  the  Treasury 
Department.    This  second  committee  finally  reported  to  the 
President  that  in  its  opinion  no  industry  should  be  prohibited 
or  destroyed,  and  that,  instead,  there  should  be  a  general 
curtailment  plan  that  would  do  away  with  the  conflict  between 

*The  suspension  of  the  manufacture  of  intoxicants  was  by  an  act  of  Congress, 
but  before  the  national  legislature  had  decreed  full  war-time  prohibition  the 
committee  of  investigation  had  recommended  that  the  brewing  industry,  which 
was  still  legal,  should  be  curtailed  to  fifty  per  cent  of  its  normal  barrelage, 
the  committee  holding  that  summary  prohibition  by  administrative  action 
would  have  an  untoward  effect. 


BALANCING  SUPPLY  AND  DEMAND 


185 


war  and  non-war  industries  in  the  matters  of  materials,  labor, 
fuel,  and  transportation. 

Out  of  the  long  list  of  American  industries,  the  committee 
reported  that  "a  searching  analysis  revealed  only  twenty-five 
classes  as  purely  non-war  industries  and  therefore  worthy  of 
consideration  for  complete  prohibition."  The  capital  invested 
in  these  industries  was  $733,000,000,  the  number  of  em- 
ployees 283,518,  and  the  annual  fuel  consumption  1,701,000 
tons.  In  part  the  committee's  inescapable  conclusion  was  as 
follows: 

Contrasting  the  degree  of  relief  afforded  with  the  hardships 
necessarily  imposed  upon  a  part  of  the  community,  your  commit- 
tee has  reached  the  conclusion  that  it  would  be  inadvisable  to  adopt 
direct  industrial  prohibition  to  accomplish  the  desired  end.  It 
would  not  only  result  in  inequalities  and  thus  engender  intense  dis- 
satisfaction on  the  part  of  those  affected,  but  it  would  also  create 
grave  apprehension  throughout  the  entire  industrial  community. 
This  might  weaken  the  morale  of  the  Nation  and,  in  the  final 
analysis,  cause  actual  harm  rather  than  positive  benefit. 

We  also  invite  your  attention  to  the  fact  that  a  sudden  disloca- 
tion through  complete  prohibition  of  any  industry  involves  the 
disintegration  of  entire  organizations,  including  the  workers,  fore- 
men, superintendents,  and  managers.  Such  organizations  in  most 
cases  are  the  cumulative  result  of  many  years  of  constructive  effort, 
and  it  is  obvious  that  with  the  ending  of  the  war  the  prohibited 
industries  would  be  obliged  to  go  through  the  pioneer  process  of 
re-creation.  This  would,  in  the  opinion  of  your  committee,  augment 
the  embarrassment  of  post-war  industrial  readjustments. 

The  sub-committee  which  made  the  report  on  non-essential 
industries,  and  found,  in  effect,  that  there  were  none,  was 
constituted  a  permanent  body  as  the  Industrial  Adjustment 
Committee  of  the  Priorities  Board,  with  Rhodes  S.  Baker, 
Assistant  Priorities  Commissioner,  as  its  executive  officer. 
This  committee  gave  constant  consideration  to  forecasting 
the  efi'ects  of  the  extension  of  the  rule  of  priority.  As  each 
additional  industry  was  found  to  be  a  proper  subject  of 
curtailment,  ample  advance  notice  of  the  Priority  Division's 
plan  was  given  to  its  members,  and  they  were  accorded  the 
fullest  opportunity  to  oppose  the  curtailment  programme  or 
to  cooperate  in  its  determination.     The  basic  policy  of  the 


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186    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

committee  was  to  outlaw  no  industry  as  non-essential  and  to 
seek  to  leave  enough  of  each  so  that  its  resumption  of  activity 
at  the  end  of  the  war  would  be  expansion  instead  of  recon- 
struction. At  the  same  time  the  curtailment  process  released 
men  and  materials  for  the  currently  indispensable  industries 
so  gradually  that  there  was  no  shock  to  the  economic  body. 
The  committee's  report  threw  light  on  some  of  the  un- 
toward results  that  would  have  followed  the  adoption  of  the 
view  of  the  absolute  non-essentiality  of  certain  industries. 
Offhand,  one  of  the  most  palpably  non-essential  industries 
in  war-time  is  the  manufacture  of  jewelry.  But  certain  cities 
actually  live  on  that  industry.  Would  it  be  promoting  the 
winning  of  the  war  to  wipe  the  city  of  Attleboro  off  the 
industrial  map  and  make  its  inhabitants  a  public  charge? 
Moreover,  jewelry  as  an  article  of  export  had  an  important 
bearing  in  balancing  exports  and  imports  and  in  maintaining 
exchange  at  a  parity,  at  a  time  when  exports  were  of  great 
importance  as  a  means  of  obtaining  necessary  imports.  A 
nation  must  live  if  it  is  to  fight,  and  in  the  economic,  as  in 
the  human,  body  there  are  obscure  and  seemingly  superfluous 
organs,  the  removal  of  which  upsets  the  whole  of  the  bodily 
processes. 

The  committee  might  have  added  that  the  prevalence  of 
some  luxuries  is  the  surest  incentive  to  labor.  Many  an  alien 
laborer  did  good  service  in  the  war  —  not  from  patriotism, 
but  because  of  the  lure  of  diamonds,  silk  shirts,  and  phono- 
graphs. Ice-cream  and  candy  look  like  dispensable  luxuries 
when  men  are  dying  for  lack  of  shell  steel,  but  the  driven 
worker  in  the  roaring  bays  of  factories  is  but  human,  and 
even  in  war-time  he  cannot  be  a  Jack-of-all-work-and-no-play. 

The  Industrial  Adjustment  Committee  had  a  stormy  career. 
It  was  essentially  a  trouble  committee.  Around  it  raged  the 
storms  of  torn  and  shorn  business,  shot  through  with  lightning 
flashes  of  selfish  anger  and  dark  with  apprehension  and  mis- 
givings. To  it  came  American  business  as  a  fearful  patient 
to  the  operating-room.  One  of  the  most  difficult  of  its  patients 
was  the  passenger  automobile  business,  which  was  finally 
cut  down  to  a  twenty-five  per  cent  basis,  but  that  is  chiefly  a 
story  of  steel  and  iron  curtailment  and  will  be  told  in  the 
chapter  on  those  commodities. 


BALANCING  SUPPLY  AND  DEMAND 


187 


The  most  heroic  operation  was  performed  on  the  building 
industry.  Priorities  Circular  No.  21  was  all  but  a  death- 
blow for  it.  It,  as  supplemented,  decreed  that  except  by 
special  permit  no  new  non-war  building  construction  should 
be  undertaken  involving  an  expenditure  of  more  than  five 
hundred  dollars  and  no  extensions  costing  over  twenty-five 
hundred  dollars.  The  administration  of  this  Draconian  ordi- 
nance was  entrusted  to  a  Non-War  Construction  Section, 
under  the  Priorities  Commissioner,  headed  by  Mr.  D.  R. 
McLennan. 

Circular  No.  21  was  a  painful  and  staggering  blow,  not 
only  to  the  building  trades,  but  to  all  the  industries  from 
which  they  drew  their  materials.  It  fell  upon  the  plumbers, 
the  carpenters,  the  steam-fitters,  the  lumber  manufacturers, 
the  cement  men,  the  furniture  makers,  and  numberless  other 
industries.  And  it  made  trouble  for  every  citizen  who  wished 
to  build  or  enlarge  a  home  or  a  business  structure.  It  was  a 
hard  blow,  and  the  reaction  was  instantaneous  and  indignant. 
It  came  from  all  parts  of  the  country  and  from  every  rank 
of  life.  It  rolled  up  to  Washington  in  a  cyclonic  storm  of 
protest  to  the  War  Industries  Board  and  to  Congress.  It  was 
a  fierce  storm,  but  it  was  resisted  with  patience  and  ingenuity. 

In  an  inspired  moment  it  had  been  suggested  that  the  Non- 
War  Construction  Section  operate  through  the  State  Councils 
of  Defense  and  their  local  bodies.  The  writer  so  warmly 
approved  of  this  course  that  as  director  of  the  Council  of 
National  Defense  and  as  the  active  head  of  the  Council's 
great  Field  Division  that  guided  and  coordinated  the  work  of 
the  184,000  units  of  the  State  and  local  councils  of  defense, 
he  agreed  to  the  Board's  establishing  direct  contact  with  the 
State  bodies.  To  avoid  overlapping  war  eff'ort  in  the  States, 
this  had  not  been  done  before. 

Here,  however,  the  short  cut  was  imperative.  To  get  a 
building  permit  from  the  Section  the  would-be  builder  had 
to  have  his  project  approved  by  his  fellow  townsmen  before 
his  application  could  be  considered  at  Washington.  Those 
fellow  townsmen  had  sons  and  brothers  in  the  trenches  or  on 
their  way  to  them.  It  had  to  be  a  very  necessitous  enterprise 
that  would  persuade  them  to  divert  labor  and  materials  that 
might  be  used  directly  to  help  the  fighting  line.     They  did 


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III! 


188    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

their  duty  without  fear  or  favor,  these  local  Councils  of 
Defense,  and  the  would-be  builders  had  to  make  their  fight 
at  Washington. 

The  Priorities  Commissioner  and  the  War  Industries  Board 
were  in  a  state  of  siege,  but  they  stood  firm  and  defended 
themselves  before  the  high  court  of  Congress  when  a  Senate 
resolution,  introduced  by  Senator  Calder,  of  New  York, 
called  upon  the  Board  to  explain  why  a  four-billion  dollar 
industry,  "than  which  it  seems  to  me  there  can  be  few  more 
essential,"  should  be  condemned  to  quiescence.  Chairman 
Baruch's  answer  pointed  out  that,  as  against  a  semi-annual 
war  demand  of  twenty-one  million  tons  of  iron  and  steel,  the 
product  was  but  seventeen  million  tons;  that  in  the  face  of  a 
shortage  of  fuel  for  carrying  out  the  war  programme  the 
production  of  building  materials  was  consuming  thirty  mil- 
lion tons  of  coal,  and  that  twenty-five  per  cent  of  the  railway 
transportation  capacity  of  the  country  was  being  utilized  by 
building  materials,  and  that,  with  not  enough  war  labor, 
large  numbers  of  men  were  employed  in  private  building 
operations. 

"It  is  not  only  the  policy,"  the  answer  concluded,  "but 
the  clear  and  simple  duty  of  the  War  Industries  Board  to 
see  that  the  war  programme  of  the  country  is  met,  and  this 
programme  must  be  met  now,  when  the  needs  are  upon  us. 
This  duty  must  be  fulfilled,  even  if  its  fulfillment  entails 
industrial  loss  in  this  country  as  it  does  human  loss  abroad." 

With  this  answer  the  general  storm  passed,  but  there  were 
numerous  local  cyclones  to  deal  with.  The  churches  and  the 
schools  and  the  like  were  used  as  the  first  line  of  attack. 
Chicago  clamored  for  a  huge  temporary  memorial  building 
to  the  soldiers;  "Billy"  Sunday,  the  evangelist,  wanted  per- 
mits for  great  temporary  tabernacles;  New  York  City  insisted 
on  an  $8,000,000  school  building  project;  and  so  on.  Chi- 
cago finally  withdrew  its  application,  Sunday,  after  he  was 
told  of  the  need,  telegraphed  that  he  would  "gladly  comply," 
and  Mayor  Hylan,  of  New  York,  had  to  endure  an  unyielding 
"no"  to  his  appeal  to  Mr.  Baruch.  In  the  last-named  instance 
strong  political  pressure  was  brought  to  bear  on  the  chairman, 
the  line  of  this  appeal  being  that  he  was  a  Democrat,  and 
should  help  the  party  in  New  York  City  by  making  it  possible 


X     • 


BALANCING  SUPPLY  AND  DEMAND 


189 


for  Mayor  Hylan  to  keep  his  preelection  pledge  of  more  and 
better  schools  in  that  city. 

Apropos,  the  writer  —  merely  to  confirm  what  he  already 
knew  —  has  made  it  a  point  to  inquire  of  most  of  the  princi- 
pal executives  of  the  War  Industries  Board  as  to  what,  if 
any,  influence  partisan  politics  had  on  the  administration  of 
the  Board.  The  replies  have  invariably  taken  the  form  of 
a  categorical  and  emphatic  negative  and  have  usually  pointed 
to  the  fact  that  the  personnel  of  the  Board  was  overwhelm- 
ingly Republican.  It  has  not  been  possible  to  find  the  faintest 
trace  of  a  single  appointment  being  based  on  anything  else 
than  presumed  fitness  for  the  task.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
most  of  the  Board  men  were  so  little  concerned  with  politics 
that  they  did  not  ask  each  other's  partisan  affiliations.  Just 
after  the  war,  however,  at  a  dinner  attended  by  these  execu- 
tives, a  poll  was  taken,  and  it  was  found  that  of  those  present 
there  was  only  one  Democrat  —  Mr.  Baruch.  The  political 
government  of  America  remained  of  one  party  throughout 
the  war,  but  the  industrial  government  —  for  that  is  what  the 
War  Industries  Board  really  was — was  entirely  non-political. 
No  formal  decree  by  Congress  of  an  industrial  coalition  gov- 
ernment could  have  realized  anything  like  the  non-political- 
ism  of  the  industrial  control  of  the  Nation  that  characterized 
the  War  Industries  Board. 

It  might  be  inferred,  from  what  has  been  said  about  the 
storm  aroused  by  the  restriction  of  the  building  industry, 
that  it  was  a  peculiarly  selfish  business  group.  Such  is  far 
from  being  the  case.  The  reaction  to  restriction  was  simply  in 
proportion  to  the  blow  —  the  most  sweeping  that  was  dealt 
to  any  great  industry  during  the  war  —  a  blow  of  thousands 
of  reflexes  which  struck  sturdy  American  individualism  in 
every  section  of  the  country.  The  farmer  who  wished  to  build 
a  new  bam  and  the  industrialist  who  was  planning  a  new 
plant  were  alike  hit  and  hit  hard.  Naturally  they  were  angry 
at  first.  However,  as  Mr.  Baruch  showed  in  his  letter  to  the 
Senate,  the  trade  had  been  consulted  in  advance  through 
many  of  its  most  representative  men,  and  had  acquiesced  in 
the  decree  —  so  that  it  had  the  advantage  of  cooperative 
support. 

The  protests  were  largely  from  those  who  would  build 


^ 


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190    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

rather  than  from  the  builders  themselves.  Despite  the  fact 
that  for  a  time  more  than  half  the  War  Industries  Board's 
mail  related  to  the  work  of  the  Non-War  Construction  Section 
and  that  countless  delegations  and  individuals  made  pil- 
grimages of  protest  to  Washington,  it  is  authoritatively  stated 
that  only  one  personal  protestant  refused  to  approve  the 
course  of  the  War  Industries  Board  after  the  subject  had  been 
canvassed  with  him.  A  superb  illustration  of  what  a  ration- 
ally plastic  human  material  the  leaders  of  America  have  to 
work  with!  If  American  democracy  had  borne  no  other  fruit 
than  this  plasticity  which  arises  from  the  deep-lying  devotion 
to  the  common  good  of  a  people  who  share  in  the  common 
control,  it  would  have  been  vindicated  by  this  fine  fruit  alone. 

"I  tell  you,"  said  Samuel  M.  Vauclain,  the  great  loco- 
motive manufacturer,  to  the  writer  in  talking  of  his  experi- 
ence in  the  War  Industries  Board,  "you  will  go  a  hell  of  a 
long  way  before  you  will  find  men  like  our  Americans  and 
the  way  they  worked  together  in  Washington.  There  was  no 
other  government  that  had  such  a  crowd.  You  can  talk  about 
Baker,  about  Daniels,  about  President  Wilson ;  but  the  people 
who  won  this  war  and  the  people  who  managed  this  war  and 
who  were  responsible  for  the  results  are  the  common  people 
you  see  walking  around  here  and  everywhere." 

Out  of  many  thousands  of  instances  of  reasonableness  in 
the  face  of  great  personal  disappointment,  take  the  case  of 
an  influential  Democratic  member  of  Congress  from  New 
York.  He  had  purchased  a  new  home,  which  he  was  enlarg- 
ing to  meet  the  requirements  of  a  numerous  family,  and  it 
had  already  been  partly  dismantled.  Ordinarily  in  such  a 
case  a  permit  would  have  been  granted,  but  in  this  instance 
the  application  was  denied  because  the  applicant  was  a 
Congressman! 

It  was  explained  to  him  that  many  houses,  schools,  and 
hospitals  in  his  vicinity  had  been  held  up,  and  that  it  would 
make  a  bad  impression  if  a  Congressman  were  able  to  build 
when  others  could  not.  The  legislator  admitted  the  force  of 
the  argument  without  a  moment's  hesitation  and  withdrew  his 
application. 

The  Non-War  Construction  Section,  though  firm  in  fidelity 
to  its  functions  of  restricting  some  forms  of  production,  that 


BALANCING  SUPPLY  AND  DEMAND 


191 


others  more  immediately  necessary  might  be  stimulated,  was 
never  arbitrary  in  manner  or  method.  It  kept  the  general 
result  rather  than  the  particular  in  mind  and  permitted  the 
continuation  of  such  building  operations  as  were  in  line  with 
the  broad  policy  of  not  upsetting  the  industrial  fabric  just  for 
the  dramatics  of  the  thing  or  for  merely  disciplinary  reasons. 
It  was  one  of  the  greatest  factors  in  balancing  war  demand 
with  war  supply  by  means  of  curtailment  on  the  one  hand 
in  order  to  efi'ect  expansion  on  the  other. 

The  Advisory  Committee  on  Plants  and  Munitions  was  a 
survival  of  the  old  Council  of  Defense  Munitions  Standards 
Board,  which  had  a  committee  on  production  that  persisted 
through  the  different  phases  of  the  War  Industries  Board, 
and  in  the  reorganization  in  the  spring  of  1918  was  named 
as  above.  The  evolution  of  the  Board  restricted  the  commit- 
tee's functions  somewhat,  but  it  remained  throughout  a  power- 
ful stimulator  of  production,  especially  in  locomotives  and 
ordnance.  At  its  head  was  Samuel  Vauclain,  president  of 
the  Baldwin  Locomotive  Works  of  Philadelphia,  the  other 
members  being  Captain  J.  C.  Rockwell,  J.  M.  Hanson,  Henry 
R.  Rea,  Frank  W.  Morse,  Admiral  A.  R.  Couden,  and  G.  M. 
Shaw. 

It  will  be  something  of  a  surprise  to  those  who  recall  the 
wholesale  denunciation  of  General  Crozier  and  others  for 
the  decision  to  alter  the  British  Enfield  rifle  to  take  American 
Springfield  cartridges  and  standardize  its  parts,  as  an  unpar- 
donable delay  when  some  of  the  new  divisions  were  drilling 
with  broomsticks,  to  learn  that  this  decision  had  the  whole- 
hearted approval  of  such  practical  men  as  Mr.  Vauclain  and 
his  associates.  The  decision,  he  testifies,  resulted  in  a  great 
increase  of  production. 

Mr.  Vauclain,  although  he  had  been  manufacturing  the 
British  rifle  for  the  British  Government,  declares  that  it 
would  have  been  "a  crime  to  have  made  it  and  given  it  to 
our  boys  to  use."  The  remodeled  Enfield,  standardized  and 
using  the  same  ammunition  as  the  Springfield,  could  be  put 
together  in  one  minute  and  forty  seconds;  and  eight  thousand 
were  turned  out  in  a  single  day.  The  plants  making  the 
British  rifle  changed  their  tools  so  rapidly,  as  the  alterations 
in  design  were  made,  that  quantity  production  began  the  day 


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192    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

after  the  last  alteration.  So  great  were  the  production 
advantages  of  standardization  that  the  United  States  within 
ten  months  was  turning  out  service  rifles  twice  as  fast  as 
Great  Britain.  In  a  single  week  fifty-one  thousand  rifles 
were  made  of  both  the  Springfield  and  Enfield  types.  In  no 
other  part  of  their  equipment  were  the  American  soldiers 
so  liberally  and  excellently  supplied  as  in  service  rifles. 
What  was  denounced  at  the  time  as  a  colossal  blunder  of 
judgment  on  the  part  of  Secretary  Baker  and  the  War  Depart- 
ment was  in  fact  one  of  the  soundest  things  done  in  the  whole 
war.  Public  criticism  is  the  best  safeguard  of  government, 
but  it  sometimes  makes  costly  errors. 

The  Vauclain  committee  also  sustained  the  army  in  its 
adoption  of  French  artillery  designs,  instead  of  taking  over 
the  production  of  plants  which  were  making  guns  for  the 
British.     "If  they  had  not  adopted  the  French  guns,  they 
would  have  had  nothing,"  says  Mr.  Vauclain,  who  is  of  the 
firm  opinion  that  both  French  guns  and  projectiles  were 
better  than  the  British.     And  yet  it  must  be  recorded  that, 
owing  to  the  tardiness  of  production  of  the  French  type  of 
guns,  the  War  Department  was  compelled  to  contract,  in 
October,  1918,  for  a  considerable  quantity  of  English  artil- 
lery to  be  made  in  England  that  it  could  have  had  in  1917 
from  American  plants  that  had  been  producing  the  British 
guns  and  that  could  have  swung  immediately  to  the  produc- 
tion of  them  for  the  American  army.    In  the  long  view,  the 
adoption  of  French  types  was  sound,  but,  considering  that 
British  types  were  in  production  in  America  when  we  entered 
the  war,  they  should  have  been  used  to  the  utmost  at  first. 
This  book  is  not  a  history  of  munitions  manufacture,  and 
much  of  the  work  of  the  Advisory  Committee  on  Munitions 
and  Plants  was  of  a  highly  technical  nature.    It  had  certain 
routine  duties  to  attend  to,  such  as  the  compilation  of  muni- 
tions production  reports  and  the  like,  but  its  most  brilliant 
and  appealing  work  was  in  its  use  of  the  personal  equation. 
It  rallied  men  and  plants  through  the  personal  appeal  for 
feverish  jobs  in  the  making  of  locomotives,  rifles,  artillery, 
f orgings,  shafting  for  destroyers,  gun  carriages,  shells,  and 
ammunition  in  general.  American  manufacturers  were  reluc- 
tant and  slow  to  drop  other  business  and  take  up  the  making 


BALANCING  SUPPLY  AND  DEMAND         193 


of  munitions  of  which  they  knew  nothing  from  experience, 
and  there  was  a  general  aversion  to  "Government  business" 
as  being  unprofitable  and  vexatious.  Mr.  Vauclain  and  his 
assistants  were  among  the  cheer  leaders  who  rushed  them  to 
the  job. 

"Look  here,"  said  Vauclain  to  Baldwin,  of  the  Otis  Ele- 
vator Company,  "the  time  has  arrived  for  every  red-blooded 
American  manufacturer  to  take  off  his  business  coat  and  get 
to  work  manufacturing  military  goods.  We  can  do  without 
elevators.  You  cannot  get  any  wire  rope  for  them,  anyway. 
Put  your  brains  and  the  brains  of  your  staff'  on  this  gun- 
carriage  business!" 

"Vauclain,  the  business  coat  is  off,"  was  Baldwin's  prompt 
answer  as  he  threw  his  coat  on  the  back  of  a  chair;  "now, 
what  do  you  want  me  to  do?" 

"Make  244  mm.  recuperators." 

Baldwin  did  not  know  a  recuperator  from  a  cartridge,  but 
he  made  them. 

The  navy  wanted  railway  mounts  for  the  fourteen-inch 
guns  that  were  intended  to  snuff  out  the  "Big  Bertha"  that 
was  shelling  Paris  at  a  ninety-mile  range.  It  furnished  the 
designs  and  called  for  bids.  Nobody  could  make  them  under 
nine  months. 

Vauclain  said  he  could  have  them  built  in  four  months; 
he  had  them  on  the  way  in  three.  One  factor  in  this  success 
was  the  perfection  of  the  drawings  furnished  by  the  navy. 

Vauclain's  method  was  entirely  the  personal  method,  and 
he  sometimes  collided  with  policies  of  his  own  organization 
—  the  War  Industries  Board.  An  amusing  incident  arose 
therefrom  in  connection  with  the  making  of  the  naval  four- 
teen-inch gun  mounts.  They  were  building  before  the  priority 
order  came  through  and  Vauclain  applied  for  priority  for 
sixteen  similar  jobs  for  the  army.  He  encountered  the  army 
and  navy  priority  representatives  in  a  heated  wrangle.  The 
army  man  was  opposing,  as  he  supposed,  priority  for  the 
naval  gun  carriages. 

"What  in  hell  is  the  use  of  talking  about  what's  done?" 
exclaimed  Vauclain.  "I  want  priority  now  for  those  army 
guns."  This  was  quite  a  horse  of  another  color  to  the  army 
man  and  Vauclain  got  his  priority. 


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194    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Before  the  creation  of  the  Railroad  Administration,  the 
Advisory  Committee  was  specially  charged  with  locomotive 
and  car  production,  and  had  much  to  do  with  the  facilitation 
of  production  through  the  standardization  of  different  types 
of  locomotives.  In  this,  as  in  hundreds  of  other  matters 
relating  to  the  practical  side  of  production,  the  Advisory 
Committee  on  Plants  and  Munitions  was  the  constant  coun- 
sellor and  adviser  of  the  War  and  Navy  Departments.  Under 
its  direction  and  through  its  knowledge  of  men  and  plants 
there  went  on  a  vast  conversion  of  industries  from  imple- 
ments of  peace  to  weapons  of  war. 

Another  special  task  was  the  procuring  and  forwarding  of 
supplies  for  the  Czecho-Slovak  army  which  was  just  then 
completing  its  eclipse  of  the  march  of  Xenophon's  Ten  Thou- 
sand by  fighting  its  way  across  Russia  and  Siberia  to  Vladi- 
vostok. Just  as  the  war  ended,  the  chairman  of  the  commit- 
tee was  starting  for  France  at  the  request  of  General  C.  C. 
Williams,  Chief  of  Ordnance,  to  take  charge  of  the  big  tank 
assembling  plant  at  Chateauroux. 

The  Fire  Prevention  Section,  of  which  W.  H.  Merrill  was 
chief,  was  established  in  April,  1918,  in  order  to  conserve 
products  and  production  through  precautions  to  guard  against 
destructive  fires,  many  of  which  had  already  occasioned 
serious  losses.  This  section  inspected  and  made  fire-preven- 
tion recommendations  for  all  plants  having  more  than  a 
hundred  thousand  dollars  worth  of  Government  orders.  Mr. 
Merrill  was  assisted  by  Frank  E.  Pierce,  W.  E.  Mallalieu] 
George  W.  Booth,  and  Charles  H.  Smith. 

As  the  war  went  on,  it  became  increasingly  apparent  that 
a  very  important  volume  of  necessary  materials  and  goods 
was  being  hoarded  or  stored  by  speculators,  held  on  foreign 
account,  concealed  by  pro-Germans,  or  in  other  ways  kept 
from  consumption.  Accordingly  a  Stored  Materials  Section 
was  formed  in  December,  1917,  with  John  F.  Wilkins  as 
chief,  with  the  function  of  locating,  unearthing,  and  inven- 
torying all  such  stores.  In  prosecuting  its  work  this  section 
was  of  great  incidental  help  to  the  War  Trade  Board,  by 
informing  it  of  goods  intended  for  foreign  consignees  on  the 
enemy-trading  list;  to  the  Alien  Property  Custodian,  by 
giving  information  about  enemy-owned  goods;  and  to  the 


BALANCING  SUPPLY  AND  DEMAND         195 

transportation  agencies  by  its  information  in  regard  to  con- 
gestion of  goods  in  warehouses,  on  docks,  and  in  railway 
terminals.  Later  this  section  took  up  the  operation  of  a  plan 
devised  by  the  Conservation  Division  for  an  interdepartmental 
clearing-house  to  bring  into  use  the  surpluses  or  inactive 
materials  that  the  various  departments  had  accumulated, 
through  change  of  programme,  overcalculation,  etc.  The 
navy,  for  instance,  might  be  in  need  of  materials  or  goods 
of  which  the  army  had  a  burdensome  excess,  and  vice  versa. 
The  chief  sources  of  information  of  the  section  were  the 
various  governmental  intelligence  services,  the  insurance 
companies,  the  banks  (through  their  collateral  loans  on 
stored  materials),  voluntary  individual  information,  and 
systematic  inventories  of  stores  in  certain  warehouses.  The 
insurance  companies  were  loath  to  open  up  their  private 
records  at  first,  holding  that  they  were  sacredly  confidential, 
but  eventually  means  were  found  to  persuade  them  to  cooper- 
ate cordially,  and  voluminous  information  thus  came  to  light. 
A  single  insurance  company  report,  for  instance,  disclosed 
one  hundred  thousand  pounds  of  copper  just  at  a  juncture 
when  it  was  a  Godsend  for  the  navy.  The  section  turned  its 
data  over  to  Alexander  Legge  as  chief  of  the  Requirements 
Division,  who  disposed  of  it  according  to  war  needs;  and 
the  various  purchasing  agencies  of  the  Government  were  also 
notified,  as  well  as  the  chiefs  of  commodity  sections  of  the 

Board. 

At  a  rough  estimate  the  section  uncovered  a  billion  dollars 
worth  of  goods  concealed  purposely  or  by  accident.  Its 
revelations  were  in  the  nature  of  a  surprise  package.  When 
every  other  source  was  exhausted,  an  agency  with  unsatisfied 
requirements  would  reach  into  the  Wilkins  grab-bag.  On 
one  occasion  it  yielded  the  army  one  hundred  thousand  kegs 
of  wire  nails  when  nails  were  scarcer  than  practical  men  in 
Soviet  Russia.  Speaking  of  Russia,  the  Stores  Section  located 
an  immense  amount  of  supplies  destined  for  the  Kerensky 
Government,  but  held  up  on  its  downfall.  They  consisted 
of  woodworking  machinery,  agricultural,  railroad  and  wagon- 
road  equipment,  projectiles,  guns,  and  metal-working  machin- 
ery. The  work  of  the  section  put  an  end  to  a  period  of 
opera-bouffe  looting.    It  is  stated  that  at  one  time  two  hun- 


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196    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

dred  motor  trucks  from  these  Russian  stores  were  being  used 
by  the  grafters  in  private  trucking  businesses  on  Long  Island. 
The  sidmgs  for  twenty  or  a  hundred  miles  back  of  Seattle 
and  Vancouver  (B.C.)   were  blocked  with  Russian  goods 
mixed  up  with  goods  intended  for  Japan.    The  latter  were 
of  course,  legitimate,  but  the  work  of  the  Stores  Section  con- 
tributed to  getting  them  moved  out  and  sent  on  their  way. 
The  Emergency  Construction  Committee,  under  W.  A.  Star- 
rett,  of  New  York,  is  properly  considered  here  because,  while 
Its  work  was  pretty  well  headed  into  the  War  Department,  it 
played  a  large  part  in  equalizing  supply  and  demand  through 
Its  introduction  of  form  and  plan  into  the  huge  building 
programme  of  the  army,  which  involved  in  its  earlier  stages 
some  336  projects  costing  $619,000,000.   The  most  impres- 
sive phase  of  the  committee's  work  was  during  the  rush  to 
build  the  cantonments  for  the  National  Army  in  the  spring 
and  summer  of  1917.    It  was  responsible  for  the  creation, 
organization,  and,  largely,  the  personnel  of  the  Army  Con- 
struction Division,  and  until  the  end  of  the  war  it  maintained 
the  most  intimate  relations  of  an  advisory  and  informative 
nature  to  that  division.     It  acted  as  a  clearing-house  for 
commodity  sections  that  were  concerned  with  building  and 
building  materials,  and  was  very  helpful  to  the  United  States 
Housing  Corporation  in  its  early  stages.    As  the  army  had 
virtually  no  building  organization  at  the  beginning  of  the 
war,  the  practical  men  of  the  committee  carried  the  load  of 
the  brilliant  achievement  of  erecting,  in  about  ninety  days, 
the  edifices  of  temporary  cities  of  thirty  thousand  population 
each  lor  fifty  army  divisions,  as  well  as  other  army  build- 
ings.    Without  Its  practical  knowledge  and  inspiration  one 
ot  the  most  impressive  construction  feats  in  the  history  of  the 
world  would,  under  the  circumstances,  inevitably  have  been 
a  long-drawn-out  chaos.    As  this  committee  was  the  pioneer 
governmental  agency  in  dealing  with  cost-plus  contracts,  it 
was  a  storm  center  of  criticism  arising  from  the  inevitable 
abuses  of  that  form  of  business  relationship,  but  no  one  has 
yet  brought  forward  any  substitute  for  its  method  of  meeting 
the  building  emergency  that  confronted  it. 

This  emergency  was  marked  by  the  foUowing  features: 
tHe  projects  arose  quickly  and  unexpectedly;  there  was  little 


BALANCING  SUPPLY  AND  DEMAND 


197 


or  no  time  between  conception  and  inauguration  of  the  work; 
preliminary  estimates  of  cost  were  impossible;  planning  and 
building  had  to  go  on  together  as  the  work  developed.  Under 
these  and  many  surrounding  circumstances,  together  with  the 
fact  that  immense  lump  sums  had  been  appropriated  which 
might  be  far  in  excess  of  costs,  and  were,  therefore,  tempting  to 
reckless  and  profiteering  contractors,  it  was  felt  that  the  Gov- 
ernment must  rely  on  the  "strong  and  experienced  building 
organizations  of  the  country."  That  these  organizations  did 
not  abuse  the  confidence  that  was  reposed  in  them  is  shown 
by  the  fact  that  the  average  contractor's  remuneration  on  the 
1917  work  was  only  4  1/2  per  cent,  and  on  the  total  only 
3  2/3  per  cent.  Undoubtedly  the  costs  to  which  these  percent- 
ages^ were  applicable  were  excessive  as  compared  with  cor- 
responding costs  in  ordinary  times,  but  they  were  less  than 
they  would  have  been  if  contracts  had  been  let  on  bids  to 
careful  and  responsible  builders,  who  would  have  been  com- 
pelled to  allow  ample  protective  margins  against  the  runaway 
prices  of  the  times.  G.  W.  Lundoff ,  of  Cleveland,  was  for  a 
short  time  chairman  of  the  committee,  but  throughout  its 
period  of  attachment  to  the  War  Industries  Board  Mr.  Starrett 
was  its  chairman.  Ftederick  Law  Olmsted,  of  Boston,  was  a 
member  of  the  committee  from  its  beginning.  In  the  final 
period  the  other  members  were  John  Donlin,  president  of 
the  Building  Trades  Section  of  the  American  Federation  of 
Labor;  Major  Clair  Foster,  Engineers  Corps;  and  Lieutenant 
J.  B.  Talmadge,  secretary.  At  an  earlier  period  Major  M.  C. 
Kelly  represented  the  Engineers,  and  M.  C.  Tuttle,  of  Boston, 
was  another  member. 

The  Inland  Traffic  Section  was  virtually  the  channel  of 
communication  between  the  War  Industries  Board  and  the 
Government  Railroad  Administration,  whereby  the  railways 
were  made  responsive  to  the  policies  of  the  War  Industries 
Board.  This  was  a  tremendously  important  function,  but  is 
so  bound  up  with  the  Railroad  Administration  proper  that 
to  attempt  even  to  sketch  the  section's  work  would  be  to 
write  a  short  history  of  the  Railroad  Administration.  T.  C. 
Powell,  an  experienced  railway  man,  an  important  officer  of 

^Thanks  to  the  good  judgment  of  Julius  Rosenwald,  the  amount  of  profit 
on  any  single  contract  was  limited  to  $250,000,  which  was  productive  of  effi- 
ciency and  celerity  and  brought  down  the  profit  percentage. 


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198    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


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the  Railroad  Administration  and  a  member  of  the  Priorities 
Committee,  headed  this  section.  As  such  he  became  the  great 
war-time  conservator  and  husbander  of  railway  transportation. 
The  railways,  like  many  other  agencies,  "won  the  war,"  but 
no  small  part  of  their  share  in  the  victory  was  due  to  the 
manner  in  which  the  most  was  made  of  the  total  sum  of 
transportation,  which  was  primarily  a  War  Industries  Board 
job.  So  close  and  loyal  was  the  union  between  the  War 
Industries  Board  and  the  railways  that  for  war  purposes  the 
latter  were  as  much  at  the  disposal  of  the  Board  as  any  of  its 
own  divisions  or  sections. 

As  an  outcome  of  the  development  of  the  plan  for  balanc- 
ing requirements  and  resources,  the  Facilities  Division  was 
established  as  the  war  was  nearing  its  end.  It  was  to  handle 
the  problem  of  providing  facilities  of  manufacture  to  meet 
future  requirements  after  they  had  been  approved  by  the 
Requirements  Division  and  the  appropriate  commodity  sec- 
tions; and,  in  regard  to  immediate  orders,  was  to  clear  them 
with  advice  or  instruction  as  to  what  facilities  were  to  be 
used.  In  a  word,  it  was  to  be  the  supreme  conserver  of  man- 
ufacturing instrumentalities  to  the  end  that  they  might  to 
the  greatest  possible  degree  carry  the  burdens  that  were 
assigned  to  them.  In  a  way  the  Facilities  Division  was  but 
a  further  step  beyond  the  field  of  the  Resources  and  Conver- 
sion Section,  but  it  was  intended  to  be  more  of  a  future- 
regarding  and  planning  body,  with  an  almost  unlimited  scope. 
Its  creation  affords  an  admirable  illustration  of  the  grasp, 
foresight,  and  vision  with  which  the  War  Industries  Board 
was  dealing  with  its  colossal  problems  in  the  latter  part  of 
1918.' 

Samuel  P.  Bush,  of  Columbus,  Ohio,  was  made  chief  of 

^The  duties  of  the  Facilities  Division  were  laid  down  by  the  War  Industries 
Board  as  follows:  (1)  "The  division  will  make  a  comprehensive  study  of  all 
aspects  of  new  construction  projects,  advising  in  respect  to  proposed  locations 
on  the  availability  of  power,  fuel,  labor,  building  materials,  raw  materials,  etc.; 
(2)  it  will  advise  in  the  selection  and  specification  of  materials  of  construction, 
so  as  to  avoid  long  hauls,  especially  through  the  congested  district,  and  so  as 
to  avoid  confli9t8  with  orders  already  placed;  (3)  it  will  look  to  the  adoption 
of  forms  of  contract  such  as  will  insure  uniiformity  and  consistency  in  all 
Government  building  activities;  (4)  it  will  compile  and  from  time  to  time 
revise  lists  of  responsible  contractors  and  architects  throughout  the  United 
States  equipped  to  undertake  construction  work  of  various  kinds,  furnish  such 
lists  to  Government  agencies  upon  request,  and  it  will  keep  a  record  of  existing 
Government  contracts  with  a  view  to  preventing  interference  between  new  and 


BALANCING  SUPPLY  AND  DEMAND 


199 


this  division.  He  was  a  successful  manufacturer  and  had 
been  chief  of  the  Board's  Section  of  Forgings,  Ordnance, 
Small  Arms,  and  Ammunition.  His  assistants  were  Captain 
C.  Bamberger,  C.  W.  Carroll,  M.  F.  Chase,  F.  L.  Dame, 
Captain  W.  B.  Dickinson,  J.  I.  Downey,  L.  H.  Kittredge, 
G.  E.  Miller,  L.  B.  Reed,  and  H.  Williams.  The  big  task 
ahead  of  this  division  was  that  of  reducing  the  congestion 
in  the  northeastern  section  of  the  country  through  the  devel- 
opment of  facilities  elsewhere,  and  the  prevention  of  any 
like  jams  in  the  future.  The  so-called  breakdown  of  the  rail- 
ways under  private  management  was  chiefly  the  result  of  the 
overloading  of  this  industrial  section  with  Government  busi- 
ness. It  got  to  be  almost  impossible  to  get  goods  into  or  out 
of  this  region  because  the  railways  were  called  upon  to  do 
two  years'  work  in  one.  The  Government  Railroad  Adminis- 
tration found  the  problem  as  hopeless  as  the  private  man- 
agers, and  Mr.  McAdoo  called  upon  the  President  to  take 
steps  to  extricate  the  railways  from  a  condition  in  which 
they  were  slowly  strangling.  The  President  turned  to  the 
War  Industries  Board,  which  was,  however,  already  working 
on  the  problem  through  a  number  of  channels,  with  the  pur- 
pose of  diverting  a  part  of  the  Government  demand  to  other 
sections  of  the  country. 

No  lesson  of  the  industrial  side  of  the  war  will  be  longer 
remembered  than  that  taught  by  the  penalties  of  the  over- 
working of  the  northeastern  section  of  the  country.  Even 
without  a  Grand  General  Staff  or  some  equivalent  organiza- 
tion, no  efficient  industrial  mobilizer  of  this  generation  will 
permit  the  repetition  of  the  error  of  1917,  whereby  the  manu- 
facturing potentiality  of  the  country  and  the  efficiency  of  a 
large  part  of  its  railroad  system  and  marine  transport 
were  almost  negatived  by  a  congestion  of  production  and 
transportation.  The  harm  was  done  before  the  War  Industries 
Board  had  grown  up  to  its  full  stature  and  responsibilities. 
It  was  easily  and  naturally  done  because  the  northeastern 

old  orders;  (5)  it  will  prevent  the  creation  of  new  facilities  in  localities  where 
the  condition  of  existing  facilities  is  such  that  new  ones  would  be  inadvisable; 
(6)  it  will  endeavor  to  coordinate  the  activities  of  all  departments  and  agencies 
of  the  Government  in  construction  work  of  every  kind  except  shipbuilding; 
and  (7)  it  will  study  prospective  departmental  needs  and  make  plans  for  the 
new  facilities  necessary  to  meet  them."  (Final  Report  of  War  Industries 
Board.) 


200    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


BALANCING  SUPPLY  AND  DEMAND 


201 


I. 


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region  is  the  center  of  the  metal-making  and  using  industries, 
and  also  the  region  of  the  greatest  general  manufacturing 
development.  To  go  elsewhere  meant  investigation,  planning, 
and  conversion.  So  the  Government  purchasing  agencies  fol- 
lowed the  path  of  least  resistance,  and  kept  on  following  it 
until  long  after  it  was  the  one  of  the  most  resistance.  The 
result  was  that  the  most  extensive  industrial  region  in  Amer- 
ica came  near  to  nullification  as  a  contributor  to  the  early- 
success  of  the  war  by  being  smothered  under  the  immovable 
mass  of  its  own  product. 

One  of  the  most  interesting  growths  in  a  war  organization 
that  was  a  congeries  of  growths  —  which  like  all  living  things 
are  full  of  interest  —  was  the  Division  of  Planning  and 
Statistics.  This  was  really  the  War  Industries  facet  of  a 
threefold  statistical  organization,  which  grew  up  from  neces- 
sity rather  than  from  a  triune  plan.  The  army  was  demand- 
ing more  and  more  ships  from  the  Shipping  Board.  To  grant 
these  demands  the  Board  had  to  withdraw  ships  from  com- 
mercial uses  that  were  fundamentally  military,  and  also  to 
disturb  the  balance  of  trade  upon  which  depended  the  possi- 
bility of  securing  the  foreign  materials  that  were  necessary 
to  the  industrial  life  of  the  country.  A  nice  priority  prob- 
lem was  involved.  It  could  not  be  solved  unless  the  War 
Industries  Board,  the  Shipping  Board,  and  the  War  Trade 
Board  were  all  tied  in. 

Judge  Parker  first  sought  to  meet  the  problem  by  estab- 
lishing Dean  Edwin  F.  Gay,  of  Harvard,  then  a  member  of 
the  Commercial  Economy  Board  of  the  Council  of  National 
Defense,  later  the  Conservation  Division  of  the  War  Indus- 
tries Board,  as  an  expert  adviser  to  him  in  priority  matters 
relating  to  shipping.  This  did  not  appeal  to  Dean  Gay  as 
meeting  the  triangular  situation,  but  when  Chairman  Edward 
N.  Hurley,  of  the  Shipping  Board,  asked  him  to  establish  for 
that  body  a  Division  of  Planning  and  Statistics  whose  first 
important  job  would  be  to  study  imports  with  a  view  to 
applying  the  principle  of  priority  to  their  reduction  in  order 
to  release  shipping  for  the  army,  he  accepted;  the  more 
readily  as  he  was  simultaneously  made  a  member  of  the 
War  Trade  Board. 

In  the  latter  capacity  Dean  Gay  was  able  personally  and 


authoritatively  to  urge  the  reduction  of  imports  through  that 
body's  control  in  accordance  with  the  result  of  his  investiga- 
tion. This  investigation  was  designed  to  establish  a  list  of 
materials  which  could  be  entirely  excluded  from  importa- 
tion, another  of  those  that  would  be  excluded  in  part,  and  a 
third  of  those  that  would  have  to  be  imported  in  full  or 
larger  than  current  amounts.  Thus  a  Shipping  Board  Divi- 
sion had  completely  invaded  the  peculiar  field  of  the  War 
Industries  Board  in  the  task  of  balancing  supply  and  demand, 
or  resources  and  requirements.  At  the  same  time  the  War 
Industries  Board  had  its  member  of  the  War  Trade  Board 
and  was  continually  resorting  to  foreign  trade  control  in  its 
manipulation  of  industrial  strategy. 

About  this  time  the  War  Industries  Board  lost  to  the  army 
the  Statistical  Division  of  the  Council  of  National  Defense, 
which  was  taken  over  almost  in  a  body  by  the  General  Staff. 
This  division,  initiated  by  the  writer's  predecessor,  and 
headed  by  Dr.  (Colonel)  Leonard  P.  Ayres,  a  purely 
civilian  enterprise,  had  turned  out  to  be  of  inestimable 
value  to  the  army,  which,  surprisingly  enough,  came  into 
the  war  without  any  adequate  statistical  organization  erf 
its  own.  Thus  deprived  of  a  general  informational  instru- 
mentality, the  War  Industries  Board  naturally  turned  to 
Dean  Gay,  who  by  this  time  had  established  a  Bureau  of 
Research  and  Tabulation  of  Statistics  in  the  War  Trade 
Board.  With  the  setting-up  of  the  Division  of  Planning  and 
Statistics  of  the  War  Industries  Board  there  was  established 
a  machine  of  coordination  between  shipping,  foreign,  and 
domestic  trade. 

But  the  purpose  of  the  new  division  was  even  more  ambi- 
tious. It  was  intended  to  be  the  seer  and  prophet  of  the  War 
Industries  Board,  the  general  agency  of  deliberative  and 
reflective  contact  with  the  Board's  impending  problems  and 
the  supplier  of  data  for  the  solving  of  its  current  problems. 
Virtually  all  of  the  commodity  sections  and  divisions  of  the 
Board  were  conducting  their  own  statistical  researches,  but, 
entirely  apart  from  the  needs  of  central  survey  and  general 
thought,  there  was  need  of  a  composition  of  the  data  obtained 
by  them. 

Dean  Gay  was  chairman  and  Henry  S.  Dennison  assistant 


II 


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202    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

chairman  of  the  new  division.  Dr.  Henry  R.  Hatfield  was  in 
immediate  charge,  and  six  sections  were  established.  The 
Section  on  Price-Fixing,  under  Professor  W.  C.  Mitchell, 
worked  in  close  cooperation  with  the  Price-Fixing  Committee. 
It  made  a  thorough  study  of  war-time  price  movements,  the 
results  of  which  were  published  in  a  series  of  fifty-seven  War 
Industries  Board  bulletins.  The  War  Contracts  Section, 
under  Mills  E.  Case,  sought  to  obtain  a  complete  record  of 
war  contracts  and  deliveries,  but  was  never  fully  successful 
in  this  because  of  the  impossibility  of  getting  the  purchasing 
agencies  to  make  full  reports.  Efforts  to  obtain  information 
directly  from  manufacturers  did  not  fare  much  better,  and 
this  phase  of  the  requirements  programme  shared  in  the 
general  defectiveness  of  the  determination  of  requirements, 
which  went  primarily  to  the  War  Department's  failure  in  this 
respect  —  a  failure  that  was  partly  destined  in  the  circum- 
stances and  partly  the  result  of  the  failure  of  the  human 
factor. 

The  Editorial  Section  informed  war  agencies  of  the  status 
of  the  supply  programme;  the  Section  on  War  Industries 
Abroad  gleaned  helpful  information  from  the  industrial 
experience  of  allies  and  enemies,  and  the  Commodity  Statis- 
tics Section  drew  to  central  points  the  statistical  data  of  the 
commodity  sections,  helped  them  to  organize  their  own  statis- 
tical agencies  and  collect  information,  and  assisted  in  the 
formation  of  joint  statistical  instrumentalities  between  the 
sections  and  other  war  agencies. 

The  Questionnaire  Section  centralized  the  function  of 
obtaining  information  by  circulars.  So  many  Government 
agencies  had  recourse  to  the  mimeograph,  the  printing-press, 
and  the  mail  in  the  quest  of  information  that  the  burden  of 
responding  adequately  became  an  intolerable  absorber  of 
time,  labor,  and  expense  to  Government  contractors.  In 
many  instances  it  was  necessary  to  maintain  large  staffs  for 
the  purpose  of  answering  the  cloud  of  questionnaires.  It  was 
ordered  that  all  War  Industries  Board  queries  should  be 
issued  through  the  Questionnaire  Section,  and  eventually  it 
became  the  questionnaire  medium  for  pretty  much  all 
departments. 

When  President  Wilson  began  to  meet  the  heads  of  certain 


BALANCING  SUPPLY  AND  DEMAND         203 

war  agencies  weekly  in  the  so-called  War  Cabinet,  he  felt 
the  need  of  a  clear  and  concise  presentation  of  the  progress 
of  the  war  enterprise.  The  establishment  of  such  a  periodical 
survey  had  been  recommended  to  him  by  the  writer  when 
secretary  of  the  Council  of  National  Defense,  as  well  as  by 
Representative  Swagar  Sherley,  chairman  of  the  House 
Appropriations  Committee.  The  President  asked  the  writer 
to  elaborate  his  views  and  then  immediately  called  on  Mr. 
Baruch  for  this  "conspectus,"  but,  owing  to  a  desire  to  avoid 
any  suggestion  of  the  superimposition  of  the  Board  over 
other  agencies,  they  made  their  returns  of  the  required  data 
to  the  President,  who  then  sent  them  to  the  War  Industries 
Board  for  digestion  by  the  Division  of  Planning  and  Statis- 
tics. Because  of  the  secret  and  confidential  nature  of  the 
data,  a  carefully  chosen  staff,  with  separate  quarters,  was 
assigned  to  them. 

The  first  thing  to  do  was  to  compile  a  review  of  the  various 
war  agencies  and  their  functions;  the  next  to  arrange  for  a 
flow  of  statistical  data  from  each  of  them  for  summaries  that 
were  at  first  monthly  and  then  weekly.  The  review  had  the 
advantage  of  showing  overlappings  and  duplications  of  func- 
tions. For  the  purpose  of  getting  the  precise  information 
required,  "contact"  men  were  established  in  the  different 
war  agencies.  The  first  report  this  section  secured  from  the 
Navy  Department  is  believed  to  be  the  first  consolidated 
report  that  even  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  had  ever  had.  So 
airtight  were  some  of  the  bureaus  in  the  war  agencies  that 
the  compilers  of  the  conspectus  found  themselves  in  posses- 
sion of  information  that  was  not  available  to  other  bureaus 
within  an  agency!  The  conspectus  was  compiled  weekly  for 
some  time  after  the  armistice  and  was  sent  regularly  to  the 
President  while  he  was  in  Paris,  thus  providing  him  while 
away  from  the  Capital  with  an  excellent  governmental 
panorama. 

In  general,  the  section  had  the  most  cordial  cooperation 
of  all  departments,  though  there  was  some  opposition  to  the 
compression  of  data  that  the  section  was  bound  to  make  in 
preparing  a  bird's-eye  view  of  the  general  situation,  as  the 
departments  naturally  wanted  the  President  to  see  a  full  and 
detailed  statement  of  their  achievements.    In  the  case  of  the 


i  'I 


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204    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

War  Department  there  was  also  the  difficulty  that  both  the 
General  Staff  and  the  supply  agencies  had  separate  statis- 
tical organizations.  For  some  reason  the  Labor  Department 
was  a  hard  one  from  which  to  extract  data  at  first.  The  State 
Department  was  so  independent  that  no  effort  was  made  to 
include  its  activities  in  the  conspectus,  and  it  is  doubtful  if 
the  President  ever  had  more  than  a  loose  and  general  verbal 
account  of  the  information  gathered  from  its  various  foreign 
representatives.  The  Department  of  Justice  was  also  a  hard 
nut  to  crack,  and  the  writer  has  it  on  excellent  authority  that 
the  President  probably  never  knew  very  much  about  that 
department's  activities. 

The  compilation  of  the  conspectus  involved  searching  and 
critical  inquiries,  and  brought  out  among  other  facts  the 
important  one  that  the  army  was  prone  to  overestimate 
requirements  when  it  did  estimate,  without  regard  to  the 
facilities  for  manufacture  and  conveyance  and  the  rate  of 
consumption  of  the  goods.  Important  revisions  of  estimates 
followed.  This  work  showed,  too,  that  the  War  Industries 
Board  should  not  have  drawn  the  line  between  civilian  and 
military  duties  so  sharply  that  it  would  rarely  question  the 
validity  of  a  military  statement  of  requirements.  The  reve- 
lations of  the  conspectus  research  would  doubtless  have 
brought  about  a  certain  intervention  of  the  Board  in  require- 
ments at  their  source,  but  it  was  ticklish  ground. 

The  three-in-one  statistical  organization  of  the  Shipping 
Board,  the  War  Trade  Board,  and  the  War  Industries  Board 
was  powerful  in  working  harmonious  cooperation  in  the 
balancing  of  marine  transport,  facility,  and  requirement.  It 
was  largely  instrumental  in  releasing  shipping  for  military 
service  by  reducing  imports.  In  fact  it  was  on  the  prospect 
of  its  success  that  President  Wilson  pledged  General  Pershing 
a  large  accession  to  the  troop  and  military  cargo  fleet, 
when  such  an  assurance  was  indispensable  to  the  General's 
plans.^ 

^As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  Ship  Control  Committee,  set  up  by  the  Shipping 
Board,  appears  to  have  allocated  ships  in  defiance  of  the  War  Industries  Board. 
It  was  the  Allied  Maritime  Council  that  really  saw  to  it  that  ships  were  pro- 
vided for  Pershing.  The  United  States  was  represented  on  the  Council  by 
Commissioner  Stevens,  of  the  Shipping  Board,  assisted  by  Dwight  Morrow,  of 
J.  P.  Morgan  &  Co.,  and  George  Rublee.  The  British  members,  at  the  height 
of  the  shipping  crisis  in  May,  1918,  convinced  the  Americans  that  the  United 


BALANCING  SUPPLY  AND  DEMAND 


205 


The  Statistical  Division  was  frequently  called  upon  for 
special  investigations  and  reports,  such,  for  example,  as  one 
on  watches  for  the  A.E.F.  and  another  on  the  "thrift"  cam- 
paign for  the  Treasury  Department.  Immediately  after  the 
war  it  put  out  an  invaluable  volume  on  the  history  of  prices 
during  the  war.  The  statistical  bodies  of  the  Shipping  Board, 
the  War  Industries  Board,  the  Food  Administration,  the  Fuel 
Administration,  and  the  War  Trade  Board  joined  in  making 
a  survey  of  the  economic  situation  of  the  world,  with  par- 
ticular reference  to  the  United  States,  for  the  uses  of  the 
Peace  Conference.  Dr.  Hatfield  was  chairman,  of  the  Fusion 
Committee;  Dr.  Ernest  L.  Bogart  represented  the  War  Trade 
Board;  Dr.  Frank  M.  Surface,  the  Food  Administration;  Mr. 
Finch,  the  Shipping  Board;  and  Dr.  Leo  Wolman,  the  War 
Industries  Board.  The  division  also  made  a  study  of  post- 
war labor  conditions,  in  connection  with  the  Department  of 
Labor,  and  issued  weekly  reports  on  labor  conditions  which 
were  of  value  in  industrial  readjustment  following  demobili- 
zation and  the  suspension  of  war  industries.  This  work  was 
transferred,  after  the  dissolution  of  the  War  Industries  Board, 
to  the  War  Trade  Board  and  was  continued  well  into  1919. 

It  is  noteworthy  that  the  Statistical  Division  was  only 
coming  into  its  own  when  the  war  ended.  Logically  it  should 
have  been  the  first  agency  of  the  War  Industries  Board  to 
be  developed  to  its  full  capacity;  really  it  was  the  last. 
First  to  last,  in  all  Government  departments,  the  lack  of 
ordered  facts  was  a  cause  of  inaction  or  of  mistaken  action. 
They  were  in  a  sense  blinded  because  they  had  not  developed 
eyes.  Their  work  gave  them  eyes,  whereas  their  eyes  should 
have  selected  their  work.  Nobody  is  to  be  blamed  for  this 
except  the  Nation  itself,  which  elected  to  be  unprepared  in 
the  face  of  war  just  as  it  is  now  so  electing  even  after  the 
searing  lessons  of  war.  When  the  house  is  burning  up,  the 
first  thing  to  do  is  throw  on  some  extinguisher  —  not  to 

States  was  not  doing  its  full  share  in  the  shipping  pool  because  it  had  left  too 
many  ships  in  private  trade.  Mr.  Stevens  was  so  impressed  that  he  sent  Rublee 
and  Moriow  back  to  Washington  to  explain  the  situation  to  President  Wilson. 
The  former  talked  with  the  President  personally,  and  both  of  them  conferred 
with  Baruch  repeatedly.  The  fact  that  the  American  members  were  so  ill- 
informed  in  regard  to  materials  requiring  shipping  was  one  of  the  reasons  for 
the  creation  of  the  Foreign  Economic  Mission  of  the  Board,  which  by  producing 
the  facts  was  able  to  give  great  assistance  to  the  Council. 


i' 


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206    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

compile  a  statistical  study  of  the  fire  department's  resources 
for  fighting  fire. 

The  War  Trade  Board,  as  a  rule,  worked  so  harmoniously 
with  the  War  Industries  Board  that  it  could  hardly  have 
done  the  latter  Board's  programme  better  service  if  it  had 
been  an  integral  part  of  it.  The  two  agencies  were  so  closely 
related  that  it  would  have  been  better,  theoretically,  if  the 
War  Trade  Board  had  been  made  subject  to  the  War  Indus- 
tries Board.  It  was  correctly  in  line  with  the  duties  of  the 
latter  board,  as  the  balancer  of  requirements  and  resources 
to  have  complete  control  of  imports.  As  we  have  seen,  how- 
ever, through  the  three-cornered  statistical  and  planning 
organization  there  was  a  large  degree  of  coordination  between 
shipping,  foreign  trade,  and  internal  trade.  But  beyond  this 
the  War  Trade  Board,  in  a  spirit  of  complete  cooperation, 
surrendered  to  the  War  Industries  Board  absolute  control 
over  foreign  goods  once  they  were  imported.  So,  while  the 
latter  board  was  not  in  a  position  to  dictate  the  nature  and 
volume  of  imports,  it  was  master  of  them  once  they  were 
admitted  —  at  least,  after  the  reorganization  following  Mr. 
Baruch's  appointment  as  chairman. 

To  make  this  union  of  the  two  bodies  a  vital  one,  Mr.  C. 
M.  WooUey  was  designated  as  the  War  Trade  Board  member 
specially  charged  with  War  Industries  Board  relations.  He 
was  also  the  War  Trade  Board's  representative  on  the  Prior- 
ity Board  of  the  War  Industries  Board  and  was  in  almost 
daily  personal  touch  with  Mr.  Baruch.  The  latter  and 
Vance  McCormick,  chairman  of  the  War  Trade  Board,  were 
also  in  continuous  touch  with  each  other.  Dr.  Alonzo 
Taylor,  a  member  of  the  Food  Administration  and  its  rep- 
resentative on  the  War  Trade  Board  —  one  of  the  clearest 
minds  in  Washington  —  was  a  potent  agent  for  cooperation 
between  the  War  Industries  Board  and  the  War  Trade 
Board,  and  also  the  Food  Administration.  Mr.  McCormick 
has  perhaps  never  been  given  full  credit  for  effective  and 
self-sacrificing  work.  Like  Baruch,  he  was  indifferent  to 
self-glorification  and  toiled  whole-heartedly  for  the  common 
goal,  never  thinking  of  or  seeking  personal  or  departmental 
distinction.  The  War  Industries  Board,  through  its  Foreign 
Mission  and  its  requirements  of  foreign  products,  and  its 


BALANCING  SUPPLY  AND  DEMAND         207 

need  of  regulating  the  outflow  of  American  goods,  was  con- 
tinually invading  the  field  of  the  sister  board,  but  always 
with  its  cordial  approval  and  assistance.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  War  Trade  Board  in  negotiating  treaties  with  the 
neutral  countries,  for  the  double  purpose  of  economically 
isolating  Germany  and  securing  needed  supplies  for  the 
Allies,  often  had  to  pledge  in  return  certain  American 
materials,  which  brought  it  into  the  sphere  of  the  War 
Industries  Board.  It  was  for  the  latter  to  determine 
what  could  be  spared.  Thus  it  had  its  hand  on  both  imports 
and  exports  in  the  interminable  efi'ort  to  balance  goods  and 
needs. 

As  the  War  Industries  Board  was  always  skating  on  very 
thin  ice  in  the  matter  of  legal  authority  for  its  policies  and 
acts,  it  had  great  need  of  a  mobile,  resourceful,  and  tactful 
legal  department.     One  of  the  thinnest  and  most  treacherous 
spots  was  the  reconcilement  of  the  virtual  pooling  of  pro- 
duction and  orders  absolutely  essential  to  the  coordination 
of  industrial  potentialities  with  the  inhibition  of  combina- 
tions by  the  anti-trust  laws.     Another  rubber-ice  spot  was 
the  question  of  responsibility  for  damages  resulting  from 
the  application  of  priority  regulations.     This  was  not  so 
much  from  the  producers,  who  had  to  shape  their  deliveries 
according  to  priority  instructions,  as  it  was  from  those  whose 
orders  with  producers  were  delayed  or  cancelled  because 
of  Government  necessity.     On  these  and  many  other  matters 
the  whole  War  Industries  Board  was  often  in  need  of  the 
sagest  counsel.     The  Legal  Department  was  placed  in  the 
Priorities  Division.     Thomas  N.  Perkins,   of  Boston,  was 
chief  counsel,  and  Robert  J.  Bulkley,  of  Cleveland,  was 
chairman  of  the  legal  committee.^     The  general  counsel  of 
the  Board  itself  was  Albert  C.  Ritchie,  now  Governor  of 
Maryland.     International     questions     were     handled     by 
Chandler  P.  Anderson,  former  counselor  of  the  Department 
of  State.     All  served  without  compensation  and  even  paid 
their  own  expenses.     The  small  amount  of  litigation  that  has 

xrrnl^^  ^*^®o  ™e°»^ers  of  the  committee  were  Henry  M.  Channing,  Boston; 
Wiltord  C.  Saeger,  Cleveland;  Walter  H.  Pollak,  New  York;  Charles  W. 
McKelvey,  New  York;  E.  M.  Dodd,  Jr.,  Cambridge,  Mass.;  Herbert  A. 
Friedlich,  Washington,  D.  C;  Louis  S.  Weiss,  New  York;  D.  H.  Van  Doren. 
East  Orange,  N.  J.;  A.  Ettinger,  Cleveland. 


'       ; 


208    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

resulted  from  the  War  Industries  Board's  operations  is  the 
measure  of  the  success  of  the  Legal  Department. 

Another  functional  body,  associated  with  the  Priorities 
Division,  was  the  Labor  Priorities  Section,  which  will  be 
considered,  however,  in  the  chapter  on  the  Labor  Division 
of  the  Board,  which  in  a  large  sense  was  the  balancer  of 
labor  supply  and  demand.  The  Employment  Management 
Courses  Section,  though  organically  in  Mr.  Legge's  admin- 
istrative division  of  the  Board,  naturally  falls  into  that 
chapter  also.  There  are  still  other  sections  that  might  be 
classed  as  exercising  special  functions  in  the  balancing  of 
resources  and  requirements,  but  as  virtually  all  the  sections, 
though  classified  by  the  commodities  they  dealt  with,  were 
at  all  times  primarily  functioning  in  that  capacity,  it  would 
be  profitless  to  follow  further  the  segregational  basis  of 
this  chapter.  The  story  of  their  work  will  be  told  under 
subjective  chapter  groupings. 

In  truth,  the  whole  War  Industries  Board  was  but  a  vast 
industrial  stabilizing  and  equalizing  mechanism.  It  all 
seems  complex,  intricate,  and  illogical  in  many  respects.  It 
was  not  a  standardized  product;  it  was  built  on  the  ground 
and  patched  and  added  to  to  do  the  work  that  must  be  done. 
It  was  made  by  its  environment  and  was  adapted  to  it. 


I 


1 '  I 


h 


CHAPTER  XI 
CONSERVATION:  REDUCING  AMERICA'S  SURPLUS  TISSUE 

Thrift  at  the  source  — Shaw  projects  his  plan  — First,  economy;  second, 
economy;  third,  economy  —  Bread  for  two  hundred  thousand  persons  saved  — 
I  he  chemistry  of  voluntary  cooperation  -  The  technique  of  procedure  -  Cur- 
tailing the  capricious  customer  —  Paper  wrappers  for  wooden  cases  —  Excising 
the  dead  matter  of  industry  -  Nine  lines  of  approach  -  Ambassador  Jusserand 
and  the  modistes -Shaw  attacks  corset  steel,  tin,  spool  thread,  typewriter 
ribbons,  farm  wagons,  buggy  axles,  trace  chains,  motor-cycles,  alarm  clocks, 
tinfoil -Salvaging  wool  for  nine  hundred  thousand  uniforms  -  Peace-time 
benefits -Shaw  meets  Baruch  -  Conservation  without  destruction  succeeds - 
Lessons  for  to-day  and  to-morrow. 

Let  us  liken  the  American  industrial  Colossus,  adapting  and 
fitting  Itself  to  war,  to  a  strong  but  over-fat  athlete  getting 
into  condition.  It  may  be  said  with  a  sufficient  degree  of 
accuracy  that,  while  other  parts  of  the  War  Industries  Board 
supplied  the  conditioning  exercise,  the  Conservation  Division 
directed  the  internal  removal  of  superfluous  tissue.  While 
the  other  divisions  and  sections  toughened  and  strengthened 
the  muscles,  the  Conservation  Division  reduced  the  fat. 

The  simile  is  applicable  in  another  view,  too.  The  War 
Industries  Board  strove  to  get  its  fighting  Nation  into  trim 
without  jpermanent  injury  to  the  muscles  that  were  not 
needed  for  the  task.  This  policy  was  peculiarly  the 
function  of  the  Conservation  Division.  Instead  of  leaving 
the  unneeded  muscles  to  atrophy,  it  gave  them  enough 
attention  to  keep  them  alive  whilst  eliminating  all  useless 
tissue.  Instead  of  abandoning  industries  that  could  be 
dispensed  with  in  war,  the  general  policy  was  to  eliminate 
from  all  industries  —  even  the  most  essential  —  all  the  non- 
essential  parts,  processes,  functions,  and  products.  The 
outcome  was  a  fighting  Nation,  hard  as  nails. 

The  more  essential  industries  were  necessarily  developed 
beyond  the  requirements  of  peace-time  symmetry,  but  the 
less  essential  were  still  vital  and  ready  to  "come  back" 
rapidly  and  easily  —  and  they  did.  War-time  conservation, 
as  practiced  in  America,  was  a  policy  of  saving  and 
husbanding  rather  than  of  ruthless  elimination. 


-»ii  rgi->tv 


i 


i 


rt' 


i 


210    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

The  Conservation  Division  was  the  one  agency  through 
which  the  quietly  performing  War  Industries  Board,  work- 
ing for  the  most  part  with  the  controlling  men  of  the  great 
industries  through  unheralded  and  often  unknown  confer- 
ences and  agreements,  and  through  regulations  that  directly 
affected  economic  integrations  rather  than  the  individual 
citizen,  was  in  contact  with  the  citizen.     Ask  the  average 
merchant  or  manufacturer  what  the  War  Industries  Board 
did,  and  nine  times  out  of  ten  he  will  refer  to  functions  of 
the  Conservation  Division.     Ask  the  men  or  women  in  the 
street,  and  they  will  tell  you  that  it  lowered  women's  boots 
and  curtailed  women's  skirts  or  gave  the  man  his  smoking 
tobacco  in  paper  instead  of  tin  and  made  him  take  the 
place  of  a  delivery  wagon  with  respect  to  the  household 
commissariat.     In     the     public     mind     the     Conservation 
Division  ranked  with  the  Food  and  Fuel  Administrations  as 
an  intrusive  and,  therefore,  highly  interesting  factor  in  daily 
life.     The  Food   Administration   shaped   the  citizen's  bill 
of  fare;  the  Fuel  Administration  figured  in  his  fuel  quan- 
tities, qualities,  and  costs,  and  in  his  lighting  of  office  and 
home;  the  Conservation  Division  shortened  his  coat,  altered 
its  material,  defined  its  color  and  pattern,  and  touched  the 
customs  and  habits  of  his  life  at  many  other  points. 

The  function  of  the  Conservation  Division  was  the 
exercise  of  thrift  at  the  source,  as  distinguished  from  money 
savings,  which  might  or  might  not  result  in  the  actual  saving 
of  labor,  service,  and  materials.  It  was  a  tangible  saving 
and  its  fruits  were  immediately  and  automatically  available 
for  war  purposes.  A  man  released  by  this  sort  of  economy 
was  one  man  more  for  the  army  or  another  worker  for  the 
war  industries;  a  pound  of  steel  saved  by  it  was  another 
pound  for  ships  or  guns  or  some  other  of  the  many  war 
requirements  for  a  commodity  in  which  there  was  a  deficit. 
To  save  and  salvage  is  so  obvious  a  complement  of 
intensified  production  to  meet  a  surpassing  demand,  and  so 
much  easier  of  immediate  approach,  that  it  is  not  surprising 
to  find  that  the  Council  of  National  Defense  had  an  efiicient 
organization  for  this  purpose  while  much  of  its  other  work 
was  still  in  process  of  incubation.  Also,  it  was  a  function 
that  could  be  undertaken  to  a  large  extent  without  the 


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INTENTIONAL  SECOND  EXPOSURE 


210    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

The  Conservation  Division  was  the  one  agency  through 
which  the  quietly  performing  War  Industries  Board,  work- 
ing for  the  most  part  with  the  controlling  men  of  the  great 
industries  through  unheralded  and  often  unknown  confer- 
ences and  agreements,  and  through  regulations  that  directly 
affected  economic   integrations  rather  than  the   individual 
citizen,  was  in  contact  with  the  citizen.     Ask  the  average 
merchant  or  manufacturer  what  the  War  Industries  Board 
did,  and  nine  times  out  of  ten  he  will  refer  to  functions  of 
the  Conservation  Division.     Ask  the  men  or  women  in  the 
street,  and  they  will  tell  you  that  it  lowered  women's  boots 
and  curtailed  women's  skirts  or  gave  the  man  his  smoking 
tobacco  in  paper  instead  of  tin  and   made  him  take  the 
place  of  a  delivery  wagon  with  respect  to  the  household 
commissariat.     In     the     public     mind     the     Conservation 
Division  ranked  with  the  Food  and  Fuel  Administrations  as 
an  intrusive  and,  therefore,  highly  interesting  factor  in  daily 
life.     The   Food   Administration   shaped   the   citizen's  bill 
of  fare;  the  Fuel  Administration  figured  in  his  fuel  quan- 
tities, qualities,  and  costs,  and  in  his  lighting  of  office  and 
home;  the  Conservation  Division  shortened  his  coat,  altered 
its  material,  defined  its  color  and  pattern,  and  touched  the 
customs  and  habits  of  his  life  at  many  other  points. 

The  function  of  the  Conservation  Division  was  the 
exercise  of  thrift  at  the  source,  as  distinguished  from  money 
savings,  which  might  or  might  not  result  in  the  actual  saving 
of  labor,  service,  and  materials.  It  was  a  tangible  saving 
and  its  fruits  were  immediately  and  automatically  available 
for  war  purposes.  A  man  released  by  this  sort  of  economy 
was  one  man  more  for  the  army  or  another  worker  for  the 
war  industries;  a  pound  of  steel  saved  by  it  was  another 
pound  for  ships  or  guns  or  some  other  of  the  many  war 
requirements  for  a  commodity  in  which  there  was  a  deficit. 
To  save  and  salvage  is  so  obvious  a  complement  of 
intensified  production  to  meet  a  surpassing  demand,  and  so 
much  easier  of  immediate  approach,  that  it  is  not  surprising 
to  find  that  the  Council  of  National  Defense  had  an  efficient 
organization  for  this  purpose  while  much  of  its  other  work 
was  still  in  process  of  incubation.  Also,  it  was  a  function 
that  could   be   undertaken  to   a   large   extent  without   the 


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REDUCING  AMERICA'S  SURPLUS  TISSUE    211 

cooperation  of  the  war-making  agencies,  and,  consequently, 
was  a  simpler  and  more  direct  task.  There  was  no  need  to 
wait  on  war  programmes  and  requirements,  as  in  the  case 
of  production.  The  subject-matter  was  ready  in  the  per- 
fectly patent  excess  baggage  of  services  and  goods  with 
which  a  settled  life  encumbers  itself.  Yet  the  initiative  in 
this  important  enterprise  was  supplied  by  a  man  who  was 
not  at  the  time  connected  with  the  Council  or  its  Advisory 
Commission. 

A  Chicago  business  man,  A.  W.  Shaw,  a  publisher  of 
business  books  and  magazines,  notably  "System,"  was, 
appropriately  enough,  the  initiator.  His  business  interests 
in  England  had  resulted  in  bringing  very  forcibly  to  his 
attention  how  little  system  there  was  in  both  England  and 
France  in  the  studied  adaptation  of  industry,  commerce,  and 
civil  life  in  general  to  the  requirements  of  war.  He  found 
that  the  principle  of  orderly  priority  was  virtually  unknown 
in  those  countries  outside  of  the  rationing  of  the  people. 
Civil  and  military  needs  were  largely  left  to  free  com- 
petition with  each  other  for  capital,  labor,  facilities,  and 
materials;  while  in  Germany  they  were  following  a  very 
definite  plan  of  "stretching  industry." 

Like  many  other  patriotic  citizens,  Mr.  Shaw  went  to 
Washington,  in  the  days  of  suspenseful,  belated  preparation 
just  preceding  the  declaration  of  war,  to  ascertain  through 
the  Council  of  National  Defense  what  was  being  done  or 
needed  to  be  done  to  meet  the  approaching  test.  He  had 
clear  and  well-defined  ideas  of  commercial  economy  applied 
as  a  means  of  meeting  the  unprecedented  demands  which 
he  knew,  from  personal  observation  in  England  and  study  of 
the  economic  reactions  of  war  in  Germany  and  France, 
would  tax  the  energy  and  resources  of  the  Nation  to  the 
utmost. 

Finally,  in  a  luncheon  interview  with  Secretary  of 
Agriculture  Houston  on  March  23,  1917,  he  presented  his 
plan  so  persuasively  and  convincingly  that  Mr.  Houston  was 
an  immediate  convert.  Secretary  of  the  Interior  Lane  — 
also  a  member  of  the  Council  —  was  immediately  called 
into  the  conference  by  Mr.  Houston,  and  he  asked  Mr.  Shaw 
to  put  his  proposals  into  writing  at  once,  so  that  they  might 


'    ! 


f 


V  *  H 

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I 


II 


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4 


212    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

be  submitted  to  the  Council  at  a  meeting  to  be  held  the  next 
morning.  This  was  done,  the  Council  approved,  and  the 
Commercial  Economy  Board  was  immediately  instituted 
with  Mr.  Shaw  as  chairman. 

It  is  worth  mentioning  that  the  Commercial  Economy 
Board  was  a  creature  of  the  Council  proper,  not  of  the 
Advisory  Commission  which  mothered  most  of  the  other 
activities  that  were  grouped  around  the  Council.  Thus, 
until  the  Commercial  Economy  Board  became  a  part  of  the 
War  Industries  Board  a  year  later,  as  the  Conservation 
Division  of  the  latter,  it  occupied  a  position  independent 
of  the  Advisory  Commission  and  all  its  activities.  This 
was  a  fortunate  detachment.  The  Council  was  reluctant 
formally  to  endorse  much  of  what  the  Board  was  doing, 
though  the  feeling  of  the  individual  members  was  that  it 
ought  to  be  done,  so  the  Council  for  the  most  part  looked  the 
other  way  and  let  Mr.  Shaw  and  his  colleagues  proceed 
according  to  their  own  judgment.  In  this  way  they  were 
probably  freer  than  they  would  have  been  if  attached  to  the 
Advisory  Commission,  which,  being  responsible  to  the 
Council,  might  not  have  felt  itself  at  liberty  to  give  the 
Commercial  Economy  Board  a  wide  range  of  independence 
without  positive  approval  by  the  Council.  On  the  other 
hand  was  a  distinct  advantage  to  the  conservation  function 
to  be  merged  later  with  the  War  Industries  Board  when  the 
latter  had  become  an  organism  of  power. 

Mr.  Shaw  named  as  his  associates  W.  D.  Simmons,  pres- 
ident of  the  Simmons  Hardware  Company,  of  St.  Louis; 
E.  F.  Gay,  dean  of  the  Graduate  School  of  Business  Admin- 
istration of  Harvard  University;  George  Rublee,  a  lawyer 
and  member  of  the  Eight-Hour  Commission;  and  Henry  S. 
Dennison,  president  of  the  Dennison  Manufacturing  Com- 
pany, of  Framingham,  Massachusetts.  Dr.  HoUis  Godfrey, 
of  the  Advisory  Commission,  was  a  member,  ex-officio,  of 
the  Board;  Alfred  Pittman  was  assistant  to  the  chairman, 
and  Melvin  T.  Copeland  was  secretary.  Mr.  Shaw  was 
determined  in  his  choice  of  associates  by  the  considerations 
of  having  business  theory  and  practical  merchandising  and 
manufacturing  experience  and  legal  knowledge  at  his 
command.     His  judgment  was  confirmed  both  by  the  work 


REDUCING  AMERICA'S  SURPLUS  TISSUE    213 

of  the  Board  and  by  the  fact  that  all  four  of  the  men  he 
chose  were  ultimately  called  upon  to  render  other  services 
to  the  Government.     Dean  Gay  became  a  member  of  the 
War  Trade  Board  and  chairman  of  the  Division  of  Planning 
and  Statistics  of  the  War  Industries  Board,  as  well  as  of  the 
statistical  departments  of  the  War  Trade  Board  and  of  the 
Shipping  Board;  Mr.  Simmons  became  a  member  of  the 
Treasury  Advisory  Board ;  Mr.  Rublee  became  the  alternate 
American  member  of  the  Economic  Council  of  the  Allies 
and  the  United  States;  and  Mr.  Dennison  became  assistant 
chairman  of  the  Division  of  Planning  and  Statistics,  and 
also  of  the  Shipping  Board's  statistical  and  planning  work. 
The   Commercial  Economy  Board  early  established   its 
purposes  as  follows:  (1)  to  determine  how  economies  can  be 
effected  in  the  distribution  of  commodities;  (2)  to  determine 
what  commercial  services  can  be  curtailed  or  dispensed  with 
during  the  war;   (3)  to  determine  what  economies  can  be 
made  in  the  management  of  commercial  businesses;  (4)  to 
study  efficiency  of  administration  with  a  view  to  conveying 
the  results  to  less  efficient  business  organizations;   (5)   to 
study  operating  expenses  for  the  purposes  of  arriving  at 
standards  for  general  guidance;  (6)  to  determine  means  of 
effecting  economies  in  the   commercial  use   of  materials, 
such  as  wool  and  leather,  that  would  be  needed  by  the 
Government  in  large  quantities. 

The  Council  had  not  yet  called  on  Herbert  Hoover  to  take 
up  the  advisory  work  which  was  to  lead  to  his  becoming 
Food  Administrator,  so,  as  economy  in  the  use  of  the 
primary  foodstuff  of  the  white  races,  wheat,  seemed  to  be 
of  prime  importance,  Mr.  Shaw  first  set  about  a  study  of  the 
uses  and  distribution  of  wheat.  Bread  seemed  the  nearest 
and  most  approachable  angle  of  this  subject.  The  handling 
of  this  first  attempt  to  shape  private  economy  for  the  public 
good  became  the  model  for  the  whole  vast  work  that 
followed.  The  bakers  were  asked  for  suggestions,  and  their 
responses  emphasized  the  matters  of  waste  in  delivery  and 
in  the  returning  of  unsold  bread  by  the  retailers.  It 
appeared  that  about  five  per  cent  of  all  bread  made  by 
bakeries  was  returned  because  it  became  stale  before  it 
could  be  disposed  of.     Having  the  privilege  of  returning 


214    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


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the  loaves  they  could  not  dispose  of,  retailers  were  naturally 
in  the  habit  of  insuring  sufficient  supplies  by  ordering  a 
little  more  than  they  probably  would  sell.  Some  of  the 
returned  bread  eventually  entered  into  human  consumption, 
but  most  of  it  was  food  waste.  Yet  the  total  of  the  returns 
was  enough  to  supply  bread  to  two  hundred  thousand  people, 
and  there  was  an  attendant  waste  of  men  and  equipment 
involved  in  the  handling  of  the  surplus.  The  situation 
having  been  definitely  determined  by  conferences  and 
correspondence,  and  all  but  three  of  the  wholesale  bakers 
consulted  having  agreed  that  the  elimination  of  the  bread- 
return  privilege  was  wise  and  feasible,  a  circular  was  issued 
to  the  trade  on  June  6,  1917,  setting  forth  the  consensus 
of  opinion  as  to  the  desirability  and  practicability  of  the 
proposed  economy  and  stating  that  it  was  the  desire  of  the 
Government  that  it  be  efifected.  The  response  was 
unanimous. 

As  time  went  on,  the  Commercial  Economy  Board  gained 
moral  authority  from  custom  and  habit,  and  when  it  became 
the  Conservation  Division  of  the  War  Industries  Board  it 
had  all  of  the  powers  that  the  Board  had;  but  from  first  to 
last  it  conducted  all  of  its  operations  on  the  principle  of  the 
bread  regulation  —  of  voluntary  cooperation.  It  neither 
sought  nor  used  power,  for  the  controlling  reason  that  it 
was  profoundly  convinced  that  imposed  control  could  never 
be  as  effective  as  voluntary  cooperation  for  a  rational, 
common  objective.  This  was  not  a  mere  theory  bom  of 
optimistic  confidence  in  men,  but  a  definite  conclusion  to 
which  Mr.  Shaw  had  come  from  close  observation  of  the  way 
legal  control  worked  in  France,  England,  and  Germany. 
As  with  the  prohibition  law  in  this  country,  it  was  there 
accepted  as  a  challenge  to  a  battle  of  furtive  evasion  and 
ingenious  violation.  It  required  elaborate  and  exaspera- 
ting policing  that  resulted  in  large  expense  and  a  great 
waste  of  energy.  And  its  effect  on  the  popular  morale  was 
most  demoralizing,  for  it  concentrated  public  attention  on 
the  personal  hardships  of  war  and  diverted  it  from  the 
national  purpose.  In  fact,  it  tended  to  divide  the  nation 
into  hostile  camps  of  occupational  law  enforcers,  on  the  one 
hand,  and  the  great  mass  of  the  people  endeavoring  to 
nullify  it,  on  the  other  haad. 


REDUCING  AMERICA'S  SURPLUS  TISSUE    215 


The  establishment  of  the  Food  Administration  made  it 
oiitside  the  scope  of  the  Commercial  Economy  Board  to 
proceed  further  with  food  economies,  but  the  principle  of 
cooperation  rather  than  of  command  was  adopted  by  that 
administration  as  the  very  foundation  of  its  work.  Before 
Mr.  Hoover  was  designated  as  Food  Administrator,  under 
the  Lever  Act,  he  was  asked  his  opinion  of  the  intention  to 
do  away  with  the  bread-return  privilege  wholly  by  voluntary 
cooperation.  Fresh  from  his  experience  of  the  arbitrary 
methods  prevailing  in  Europe,  he  was  greatly  impressed, 
and  answered :  "If  this  can  be  accomplished  on  a  voluntary 
basis,  it  would  be  infinitely  better  than  if  we  should  set  up 
an  elaborate  engine  for  enforcement."  It  was  most  success- 
fully accomplished  —  and  it  may  be  that  the  first  achieve- 
ment of  the  Commercial  Economy  Board  gave  the  Food 
Administration  its  policy  bent. 

Following  up  its  initial  success,  the  Commercial  Economy 
Board  gave  most  of  its  attention  in  the  early  weeks  of  the 
war  to  savings  that  might  be  made  in  distribution  of  com- 
modities,  leaving  economies  of  production  till  a  later  time. 
The  technique  of  procedure  was  always  the  same  — the 
ascertainment  of  facts  by  inquiry  and  investigation,  the 
elicitation  of  suggestions  for  economy  from  the  trade 
interests  involved,  the  formulation  of  cooperative  regula- 
tions in  conference,  and  finally  the  issuance  of  the 
"recommendation." 

Usually  a  few  objectors  and  obstructors  were  encountered 
in  each  trade,  but  they  always  fell  into  line  under  the  com- 
pulsion of  trade  opinion  which  automatically  policed  the 
observance  of  the  recommendations.  Whatever  he  may  be 
at  heart,  no  man  covets  the  reputation  of  being  a  slacker  or 
a  sulker.  He  may  flout  and  violate  a  law  that  he  dislikes, 
but  a  practice  adopted  by  the  overwhelming  consent  and 
even  insistence  of  his  fellows,  especially  when  it  bears  the 
label  of  patriotic  service  in  a  time  of  emergency,  is  not 
lightly  to  be  disregarded.  Men  will  seek  to  beat  an 
arbitrary  order,  but  they  will  loyally  support  an  elected 
cooperative  programme. 

Whether  the  voluntary  method  was  the  outcome  of  the 
reluctance    of    Congress    to    pass    laws    interfering    with 


>1 


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If  ' 


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216    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

ordinary  commercial  customs,  thus  leaving  the  adminis- 
trators of  the  commercial  and  industrial  regulatory  agencies 
without  well-defined  authority;  or  whether  it  was  even  more 
the  outcome  of  a  lesson  from  Europe's  experience  and 
knowledge  of  the  American  character  is  immaterial.  The 
important  fact  is  that  from  the  start  in  the  Council  of 
National  Defense  the  whole  direction  of  industrial  adapta- 
tion to  the  requirements  and  incidence  of  war  was  basically 
of  the  people  rather  than  of  the  Government.  Nowhere  did 
this  method  meet  with  greater  success  than  in  the  Conserva- 
tion Division,  which,  excepting  the  Food  Administration, 
came  intimately  in  contact  with  more  individuals  in  their 
daily  life  than  any  other  regulatory  agency. 

After  the  elimination  of  the  bread-return  privilege,  the 
Commercial  Economy  Board  recommended  the  general 
adoption  of  the  rule  of  no  exchanges  by  retail  stores  of  all 
sorts.  It  was  found  that  as  much  as  twenty-five  per  cent 
of  the  daily  sales  were  brought  back  to  the  stores  by 
capricious  customers.  Most  of  these  exchange  items  were 
of  small  value,  but  they  involved  a  tremendous  waste  of  men 
and  equipment.  Then  the  Board  inaugurated  the  plan  of 
encouragement  of  the  "buy-and-carry"  habit,  which  was  a 
complement  of  the  recommendation  for  cooperative 
deliveries  of  merchandise  and  the  adoption  of  only  one 
delivery  a  day.  The  reductions  in  the  number  of  men, 
animals,  and  motors  thereby  effected  were  startling.  In 
more  than  three  hundred  of  the  larger  cities  merchants  cut 
out  special  deliveries  and  reduced  general  deliveries  to  one 
a  day;  and  cooperative  delivery  systems,  which  were  still 
more  economical,  were  established  in  about  two  hundred 
cities.  In  one  city  the  number  of  delivery  employees  was 
reduced  from  848  to  545,  seventeen  horse-drawn  vehicles 
were  discarded,  and  the  number  of  automobiles  used  was 
lowered  from  325  to  195.  On  the  whole,  the  department 
stores  found  that  simplification  of  deliveries  reduced  by 
twenty-five  per  cent  the  man  power  needed;  the  grocery 
stores  had  a  corresponding  reduction  of  fifty  per  cent,  and 
the  cooperative  delivery  systems  sometimes  operated  with 
twenty-five  per  cent  of  the  employees  formerly  needed. 
Another  line  of  distributive  economies  was  found  in  pack- 


I 


REDUCING  AMERICA'S  SURPLUS  TISSUE    217 

ing  and  transportation,  which  dovetailed  into  each  other. 
By  simplifying  and   altering  the  form  and   materials  of 
packages  intended  for  transportation  by  rail  or  boat,  a  very 
substantial  saving  was  effected  in  car  space.    The  substitu- 
tion of  paper  wrappers  for  pasteboard  cartons  and  wooden 
packmg-cases  in  the  hosiery  and  underwear  trade  alone  was 
estimated  to  be  the  equivalent  of  17,312  freight  cars'  space 
and  to  replace  141,800,000  cartons  and  more  than  500,000 
wooden  cases.     These  changes,  of  course,  not  only  saved 
transportation,  but  diverted  to  other  and  indispensable  uses 
the  pasteboard  and  box  lumber  that  the  knit  goods  manu- 
facturers could  easily  get  along  without.     Like  distributive 
economies  were  sought  by  increasing  the  number  of  units 
of  goods  placed  in  each  container  for  shipment. 

Still  another  transportation  and  materials  economy  was 
effected  by  reducing  the  number  of  sample  trunks  carried 
by  the  traveling  salesmen  of  dry-goods  wholesalers.  Some 
salesmen  were  accustomed  to  take  with  them  nine  or  ten 
heavy  trunks.  The  average  number  was  reduced  to  two. 
In  this  way  many  baggage  cars  were  released  for  troop 
trains  and  the  railways  were  relieved  of  a  heavy  burden. 

Conservation  by  measures  relating  to  delivery  and  methods 
ot  packing,  however,  was  but  a  scratch  on  the  surface 
compared  with  the  deep  cuts  into  the  mountain  of  waste  of 
energy  and  material  effected  by  the  reorganization  of 
industrial  processes  and  practices.  It  was  found  that 
almost  all  industries  were  encumbered  with  an  unbelievable 
amount  of  unexamined  tradition,  that  resulted  in  duplica- 
tion of  ^effort,  waste  of  material,  and  unnecessary  expendi- 
tures of  energy.  Industry  as  it  was,  compared  to  industry 
as  it  should  be  for  war  purposes,  was  as  a  barracks  to  a 
modem  hotel.  Everywhere  was  found  the  superfluity  of 
luxury  and  taste  and  the  impedimenta  of  custom. 

Much  of  the  rubbish  that  loads  and  clogs  the  economic 
machine  was  found  in  totally  parasitic  jobs,  and  almost 
every  sort  of  production  and  service  was  found  to  be 
barnacled  with  uselessness.  So  deep  is  this  economic 
mould  and  parasitism  that  the  men  of  the  Conservation 
Division  ultimately  became  convinced  that  modern  civiliza- 
tion is  become  anemic  from  obesity.     It  is  so  encumbered 


M 


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218    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

with  what  it  is  uselessly  doing  that  vitality  is  denied  to  useful 
and  essential  organs.  The  simple  life,  thoroughly  inculca- 
ted, it  would  seem  from  the  work  of  the  Conservation 
Division,  would  without  increased  productive  effort  take 
the  sting  out  of  the  inequalities  of  life.  Simplification  of 
living,  of  production,  and  of  distribution  would  insure  an 
abundance  of  necessaries  and  comforts  for  all.  Of  course, 
the  simple  life  is  not  to  be  thoroughly  inculcated,  any  more 
than  the  race  is  suddenly  to  be  raised  to  that  degree  of 
individual  excellence  which  conditions  the  perfect  social- 
istic state.  Superfluity  of  services  and  an  abundance  of 
useless  trinkets,  gewgaws,  and  baubles  are  a  part  of  the 
price  that  civilization  pays  for  the  money  instrumentality. 
Barter  is  too  laborious  and  tedious  to  be  the  means  of 
accumulating  rubbish. 

The  Conservation  Division  found  endless  satisfaction  and 
an  almost  inexhaustible  source  of  supplies  and  power  in 
these  huge  folds  of  fat  of  a  luxurious  civilization.  Sloth- 
fully  accumulated  in  the  soft  times  of  peace  and  surfeit, 
they  were  now  converted  from  useless  luxury  to  useful 
necessary.  The  fat  was  turned  into  muscle,  and  thus 
answered  in  a  surprisingly  large  degree  the  question  of  how 
it  would  be  possible  for  a  busy  nation  to  produce  more  in 
war  than  in  peace,  with  thirteen  million  out  of  fifty-five 
million  workers  in  the  ranks  or  engaged  in  war  service  or 
production. 

The  elimination  of  the  emergently  useless  was  accom- 
panied by  a  surprising  release  of  energy,  which  fact  throws 
a  great  light  on  the  inefficiency  of  peace-time  production. 
As  Professor  David  Friday  hints,  it  almost  makes  war 
appear  a  blessing  instead  of  a  curse.  It  took  war  to  give 
comfort  and  sufficiency  to  millions  who  had  not  known  them. 
Most  of  the  soldiers  were  better  clothed,  better  fed,  and 
better  housed  than  when  at  home,  and  their  health  was 
much  better.  Millions  of  toiling  workers,  more  energetic 
and  efficient  than  ever  before,  were  healthier,  wealthier, 
and  happier  than  at  any  other  time.  It  would  appear  to  an 
amateur  economist  that,  if  some  way  could  be  found  to 
keep  the  working  people  of  the  world  busy  with  the  vim  of 
war-time,  there  would  be  such  content  and  prosperity  that 


REDUCING  AMERICA'S  SURPLUS  TISSUE    219 

the  cancerous  growths  of  social  destruction  would  have  noth- 
ing upon  which  to  feed. 

The  delicate  task  of  removing  the  fat  from  the  economic 
body  without  weakening  the  muscles  or  impairing  its 
general  health  could  not  be  accomplished  in  desultory 
fashion.  It  was  necessary  to  have  a  programme  applicable 
to  all  industries.  Aside  from  the  economies  relating  to 
distribution  which  have  been  glimpsed,  there  were  nine  lines 
of  approach  to  the  solution  of  the  problem.  These  were 
defined  by  Mr.  Shaw  as  follows: 

1.  To  secure  a  maximum  reduction  in  the  number  of  styles  and 
varieties,  sizes,  colors,  or  finishes  of  the  product  of  industry.  In 
this  way  economy  in  manufacturing  was  secured.  The  number  of 
operations  was  reduced  and  by  making  larger  runs  less  labor 
was  required.  Manufacturers  were  enabled  to  simplify  and  reduce 
their  stocks  of  raw  material,  and  the  quantity  of  materials  and 
the  amount  of  capital  tied  up  in  the  stocks  of  finished  products  in 
the  hands  of  manufacturers,  wholesalers,  and  retailers  were 
lessened. 

2.  To  eliminate  the  styles  and  varieties  that  took  more  than  the 
strictly  necessary  amount  of  material;  as,  for  example,  by  restricting 
the  length  and  sweep  of  overcoats. 

3.  To  eliminate  features  or  accessories  which  used  materials  for 
adornment  or  convenience,  but  which  were  not  actually  essential 
to  the  serviceability  or  utility  of  the  product. 

4.  To  eliminate  patterns  and  types  of  product  that  were  less 
essential  to  the  civilian  population. 

5.  To  substitute  materials  which  were  plentiful  for  those  that 
were  scarce  and  urgently  needed  for  the  war  programme.  For 
example,  in  numerous  instances  zinc  was  substituted  for  steel  and 
other  metals. 

6.  To  discontinue  the  use  of  certain  materials  for  unnecessary 
purposes,  such  as  caustic  soda  in  the  manufacture  of  automobile 
tires. 

7.  To  standardize  sizes,  lengths,  widths,  thicknesses,  weights, 
gages,  etc.,  of  materials,  parts,  and  sections  by  means  of  which 
proper  strength  and  durability  could  be  obtained  with  the  employ- 
ment of  a  minimum  of  material  and  labor  in  manufacturing  and  a 
reduction  of  the  quantity  of  material  carried  in  stocks  of  parts 
and  finished  product. 

8.  To  reduce  the  excessive  waste  of  materials  in  manufacturing 
processes,  such  as  chrome  chemicals  in  certain  branches  of  the 
leather  tanning  industry. 

9.  To  secure  economy  in  samples  used  in  selling  the  product. 


I 


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:  i 


220    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

This  being  an  interpretive  and  appraising  history  as  much 
as  a  chronicle,  it  will  be  quite  impossible  to  follow  the  appli- 
cation of  these  means  of  conservation  through  the  two 
hundred  and  fifty  industries  affected  by  "schedules"  that 
were  issued  or  prepared  by  the  Conservation  Division.  A 
schedule  was  the  Division's  name  for  a  conservation  pre- 
scription. Behind  each  schedule  were  congeries  of  con- 
ferences, discussions,  investigations,  and  conclusions. 
Altogether  they  represent  the  most  searching  examination  of 
American  industry  from  the  standpoint  of  stark  necessity 
and  efficiency  that  has  ever  been  made.  Their  effectuation 
called  for  the  highest  degree  of  diplomatic  management, 
and  their  promulgation  involved  the  sagacious  and  general 
use  of  all  manner  of  publicity  —  from  circulars  to  the 
news  and  editorial  columns  of  the  general  press,  the  pages 
of  the  magazines  and  of  the  trade  periodicals,  and  to  films 
of  the  moving-picture  theaters.  To  make  conservation  go 
on  an  enthusiastic,  cooperative  basis  it  was  necessary  to 
"sell"  it  to  the  consumer  as  well  as  to  the  producer,  to  the 
dandy  and  the  clubman  as  well  as  to  the  navvy  and  the 
proprietor,  to  the  primping  school  girl,  the  fine  lady,  and 
the  washwoman.  Thus  conservation  became  the  intimate 
and  popular  side  of  the  War  Industries  Board,  which  was 
otherwise  little  known  and  slightly  appreciated  by  the 
public. 

Its  ramifications  even  reached  into  the  stately  courses  of 
international  diplomacy  and  brought  it  to  bear  on  the 
vanities  of  woman's  dress.  The  dressmakers  of  Paris,  in 
the  midst  of  a  somber  desert  of  black  and  repression  of  the 
lighter  side  of  life,  planned  for  1918  fashions  that  would 
call  for  an  abundance  of  materials,  which  they  hoped  would 
loosen  the  purse-strings  of  prosperous  and  as  yet  unmourn- 
ing  America.  M.  Jusserand,  Ambassador  of  France,  was 
appealed  to.  He  promptly  took  the  matter  up  with  his 
Government,  which  in  turn  found  a  way  to  convince  the 
modistes  that  the  fashions  for  1918  should  be  of  the  slim 
silhouette  type.  So  for  the  practical  purpose  of  saving 
twenty-five  per  cent  of  the  material  used  in  women's  frocks 
and  gowns,  that  there  might  be  more  material  for  uniforms 
and  airplane  wings  and  tents  and  the  like,  the  Conservation 


REDUCING  AMERICA'S  SURPLUS  TISSUE    221 

Division  brought  it  about  that  woman  in  1918  should 
emulate  Diana  rather  than  Juno.  The  fashions  thus  set 
have  smce  evolved  alarmingly  in  the  three  dimensions,  and 
now  have  passed  from  the  realm  of  economics  to  that  of 
manners. 

Mars  demanded  many  other  sacrifices  of  women.     First- 
quality  steel  was  denied  them  for  corsets  to  eive  it  to 
implements  of  war.     Taking  the  weight  and  rustle  out  of 
their  siUcs,  as  supplied  by  tin,  gave  three  hundred  tons  of 
a  much-needed  metal  to  war  industries.     War-time  scrimp- 
ing, as  an  offset,  gave  them  more  thread  to  the  spool.     As 
materials  went  up,  manufacturers  had  cut  down  the  length 
ot  thread  to  a  spool  in  order  to  maintain  the  traditional 
unit  price.     Less  thread  meant  more  spools,  and  more  spools 
meant  more  wood,  and  more  wood  meant  more  space  in 
packing  and   transportation.     By  putting  the   amount   of 
thread  on  a  spool  back  to  two  hundred  from  one  hundred 
and  fifty  yards,  Mr.  Shaw  saved  die  transportation  space 
represented  by  six  hundred  cars.     A  small  thing,  you  say. 
But  a  car  meant  more  in  the  war  dian  a  horse  to  King 
Richard  at  Bosworth  Field.    And  the  affair  of  the  thread 
spool  was  but  one  of  1241  such  savings. 

Typewriter  ribbons  are  little  things,  but,  by  reducing  the 
numbers  of  colors  from  one  hundred  and  fifty  to  five,  and 
doing  away  with  the  use  of  tinfoil  and  tin  boxes  for  con- 
tamers  of  the  ribbons,  three  hundred  and  ninety-five  tons 
of  steel  were  saved  and  seven  tons  of  pig  tin,  to  say  nothing 

colJrS  ''^  "^*^"*^  ''''^^^^  ^y  ^^  limitation  of  the 

Even  so  rugged  and  commonplace  a  thing  as  a  farm  wagon 
IS  frescoed  with  the  di^erentiations  of  taste,  custom,  section, 
and  makers'  pride.  The  fanner  has  wasted  as  much  on  a 
manure  cart  as  a  rich  man  on  a  limousine.  If  you  have 
thought  that  fashions  in  vehicles  arrived  with  auiomotion! 
consider  the  niceties  of  the  farm  wagon.  Going  no  furthe 
than  die  front  and  rear  gears,  it  was  found  that  there  were 
almost  as  many  models  as  there  were  coal-tar  dyes.  One 
manufacturer  reported  1736  varieties  of  gears.  Think  of 
the  frozen  capital  the  inert  material,  the  dead  storage  space, 
the  superfluity  of  cataloguing,  the  cumbersome  complexity 


4 


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222    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

of  production,  and  the  deep  crust  of  useless  cost  all  this 
involved.  A  critical  examination  and  review  showed  that 
sixteen  patterns  was  the  outside  limit  of  necessity. 

A  like  scrutiny  showed  that  the  fastidious  farmers  pain- 
fully chose  their  plows  from  three  hundred  and  twenty-six 
sizes  and  styles;  seventy-six  were  found  to  be  an  abundance. 
They  had  hesitated  over  the  niceties  of  seven  hundred  and 
eighty-four  drills  and  other  planting  machines,  whereas  it 
was  found  that  twenty-nine  would  plant  all  the  crops  without 
the  loss  of  an  acre  or  a  bushel.  In  buggies  there  were  two 
hundred  and  thirty-two  varieties  of  wheels;  four  were 
enough.  There  were  even  one  hundred  kinds  of  buggy 
axles,  and  one  would  do.  And  this  is  only  half  the  wagon 
and  buggy  story.  The  horse-drawn  vehicles  were  as  good 
and  as  plentiful  as  ever  after  these  prunings,  but  there  were 
thousands  of  tons  of  steel  more  for  war  and  a  tremendous 
saving  of  time,  space,  transportation,  and  man  power. 

In  a  country  of  the  size  and  consuming  capacity  of  the 
United  States,  many  a  mickle  piles  up  a  mountainous 
muckle  in  short  order.  Take  so  simple  a  thing  as  trace 
chains.  When  the  Conservation  Division  began  to  operate 
on  them,  it  was  found  that  there  were  five  hundred  and  four 
varieties;  seventy-two  were  enough.  The  twist  links  and 
copper  finish  were  eliminated.  Insignificant,  you  would 
say  —  these  changes.  Are  eighty  five-thousand-ton  cargo 
ships,  for  which  the  steel  could  thus  be  provided,  insig- 
nificant? Cutting  out  the  fads  in  pocket-knives  reduced 
the  catalogues  of  manufacturers  from  six  thousand  items  to 
one  hundred.  Just  the  saving  in  the  bulky  catalogues  that 
fill  parcels-post  sacks  and  express  cars  was  enormous, 
not  only  for  the  makers  of  pocket-knives,  but  for  all 
industries.  Similar  paring  throughout  the  hardware  trade 
made  it  possible  for  one  great  wholesaler  to  reduce  by  more 
than  half  the  ninety  thousand  items  in  his  encyclopaedic 
catalogue. 

Reducing  bicycle  designs  and  stripping  them  of  furbelows 
saved  2265  tons  of  precious  steel.  A  like  process  in  motor- 
cycles indicated  the  saving  of  six  hundred  tons  of  steel,  nine 
tons  of  alumimmi,  thirteen  and  a  half  tons  of  brass,  twelve 
and  a  half  tons  of  copper,  and  twelve  tons  of  rubber.    By 


I 


REDUCING  AMERICA'S  SURPLUS  TISSUE    223 

taking  the  tin  out  of  children's  toy  carts  and  the  like,  seventy- 
five  thousand  pounds  of  pig  tin  were  saved,  and  by  changes 
in  packing,  the  freight  space  of  2325  cars  was  in  the  way  of 
being  saved.  The  clock  industry  was  restricted  to  four  alarm 
clocks,  one  style  of  mantel  or  hanging  clock,  and  two  sizes  of 
clock  watches.  Brass  writing  pens  were  abolished,  and  the 
styles  of  steel  pens  reduced  from  one  hundred  and  thirty-two 
to  thirty.  Eliminating  the  dozen-package  saved  1,800,000 
boxes.  By  reducing  the  proportion  of  tin  used  in  Babbit 
metal  for  bearings  and  by  using  cadmium  instead  of  tin 
for  solder,  three  thousand  tons  of  tin  were  to  be  saved  in  a 
year.  Reforming  the  tinfoil  industry  saved  one  thousand  tons 
of  tin;  that  of  collapsible  tubes,  about  five  hundred  tons;  of 
silverware,  a  like  amount.  The  completion  of  the  plans  for 
substituting  other  material  for  tinplate  in  the  making  of  tin 
cans  and  other  containers  would  have  saved  4680  tons  of 
pig  tin  and  450,000  tons  of  tinplate. 

The  Conservation  Division  overlooked  no  economy  between 
the  cradle  and  the  grave.  Baby  carriages  were  standardized, 
and  the  vanity  was  stripped  from  coffins.  Brass,  bronze,  and 
copper  caskets  were  tabooed,  and  the  styles  and  sizes  of  steel 
caskets  much  curtailed.  Even  the  varieties  of  wooden  coffins 
were  reduced  eighty-five  per  cent.  The  labor-saving  was 
thirty-five  per  cent,  and  in  a  full  year  the  materials  savings 
would  have  been  6000  tons  of  steel,  285  tons  of  tinplate, 
275,000  pounds  of  copper,  90,000  pounds  of  brass,  74,000 
pounds  of  bronze,  70,000  pounds  of  pig  tin,  17,000  pounds 
of  nickel,  2200  tons  of  coal,  and  212,000  yards  of  wool 
fabrics. 

Attention  was  early  concentrated  on  the  necessity  of  saving 
wool.  The  purchases  of  wool  for  the  army  alone  exceeded 
in  1918  the  ordinary  annual  consumption  of  wool  by  the 
entire  population,  and  sixty-five  per  cent  of  the  raw  wool  had 
to  be  imported.  In  a  lesser  degree  it  was  necessary  to  con- 
serve all  clothing  fabrics.  In  men's  clothing  twelve  to  fifteen 
per  cent  of  yardage  was  saved  by  eliminating  flap  and  out- 
side pockets,  shortening  the  lengths  of  coats,  narrowing  the 
width  of  facings,  etc.  Also,  each  manufacturer  was  restricted 
to  ten  models  of  sack  suits.  Boys'  suits  models  were  reduced 
to  three. 


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224    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Reference  has  been  made  to  the  economies  effected  in 
women's  garments.  Wool  was  ruled  out  of  shawls  and  robes, 
and  colors  of  sweaters  were  limited.  These  and  other  modi- 
fications reduced  by  one  third  the  quantity  of  wool  consumed 
by  makers  of  knitted  textiles.  Felt  hats  were  limited  to  ten 
colors  for  men  and  twelve  for  women  and  children.  Of 
stiff  straw  hats  only  six  combinations  and  dimensions  were 
permitted.  This  programme  reduced  one  manufacturer's 
samples  from  four  thousand  to  one  hundred  and  forty-four. 

The  husbanding  of  textiles  was  carried  back  even  to  the 
designs  and  qualities  of  the  goods.  The  excessive  number  of 
designs,  for  most  of  which  there  was  small  demand,  caused 
the  accumulation  of  enormous  amounts  of  goods  in  the  hands 
of  manufacturers,  wholesalers,  and  the  cutting-up  trades. 
Frequent  changes  of  the  patterns  restricted  the  total  output 
of  the  textile  machines.  Large  patterns  were  wasteful  in  the 
cutting.  Great  savings  were  effected  by  limiting  the  number 
of  designs  and  sorts  of  goods.  It  was  found  that,  by  reducing 
the  weight  of  cloth  and  mixing  reworked  wool  and  long 
staple  cotton  with  the  virgin  wool,  the  latter  could  be  made 
to  go  much  farther.  The  reduction  in  the  number  and  sizes 
of  samples  —  a  seemingly  insignificant  item  —  provided 
cloth  for  900,000  uniforms.  Leaving  the  shine  off  certain 
rubber  shoes  saved  30,800  gallons  of  varnish.  Taking  the 
"frost"  off  automobile  tires  released  considerable  quantities 
of  caustic  soda  to  necessary  uses. 

War  is  a  great  consumer  of  leather.  Of  shoes  alone  the 
army  purchased  during  the  war  more  than  twenty-nine  mil- 
lion pairs.  At  the  same  time  the  shortage  of  shipping  resulted 
in  a  reduction  of  the  imports  of  hides  by  nearly  forty  per 
cent.  An  untimely  fashion  decreed  high  boots  for  women 
and  of  many  colors.  The  uppers  were  shortened,  colors  were 
limited  to  white,  black,  and  tan,  and  new  lasts  forbidden.  In 
consequence  there  was  a  great  saving  of  all  of  the  elements 
of  boot  and  shoe  production.  In  general,  "lines"  carried  by 
manufacturers  were  reduced  about  two  thirds.  Incidentally, 
it  may  be  said  that  these  economies  had  nothing  to  do  with 
the  standardization  of  shoe  prices,  which  was  about  to  be 
applied  by  the  War  Industries  Board  when  hostilities  ceased. 

Substitution  was  never  carried  so  far  in  this  country  as 


iM< 


REDUCING  AMERICA'S  SURPLUS  TISSUE    225 


in  Germany,  but  wood  and  paper  replaced  metal  to  a  very 
large  extent,  and  plentiful  zinc  was  often  made  to  do  in  place 
of  scarce  steel  and  copper.  Many  of  the  substitutions  are 
still  with  us,  and  always  will  be,  for  in  breaking  up  trade 
traditions  and  customs  it  was  found  that  there  were  many 
methods  and  many  kinds  and  uses  of  materials  that  were 
based  entirely  on  habit  and  custom.  It  was  also  discovered 
that  many  of  the  accepted  "can'ts"  of  industry  were  only 
"had-not-been-dones." 

The  effects  of  conservation  met  the  citizen  at  every  turn. 
Besides  the  articles  and  commodities  mentioned,  the  bed  he 
slept  in,  the  chinaware  of  his  table,  the  chairs  of  his  home, 
the  paint  on  the  house,  the  desks  of  his  office,  the  hose  of  his 
lawn,  his  electrical  instruments  and  implements,  the  utensils 
of  his  kitchen,  the  roof  of  his  home,  the  stove  in  his  kitchen, 
the  furnace  in  his  basement,  his  talking  machine,  the  books 
in  his  library,  and  many  other  of  the  impedimenta  of  daily 
life  were  affected  by  the  conservation  programme. 

To  pursue  the  trail  of  simplification  and  substitution 
further  would  be  wearisome  for  the  ordinary  reader,  but  he 
perhaps  will  understand  from  what  has  been  said  that  it  soon 
became  an  absorbing  game  with  the  war  service  committees 
of  the  different  industries.  They  suggested  and  defined  the 
schedules  of  changes  in  their  respective  businesses.  For  the 
first  time  manufacturers  had  a  chance  to  strip  off  the  parasitic 
infestations  of  production.  They  were  amazed  and  fasci- 
nated by  the  results.  It  is  said  that  the  economies  in  the 
horse-drawn  vehicle  business  thus  inaugurated  have  put  profit 
and  new  vigor  into  it.  All  manufacturers  learned  a  lesson 
under  the  tutelage  of  the  Conservation  Division  that  is  now 
standing  them  and  the  country  in  good  stead.  They  are 
armed  with  the  knowledge  and  experience  to  meet  the 
demands  for  lower  prices  in  a  time  when  competition  in 
prices  is  more  important  than  competition  in  varieties  of 
styles  and  novelty  of  appearance. 

Conservation  was  applied  chiefly  to  goods  intended  for 
civil  use,  but  in  many  instances  standardization  was  so 
applied  that  the  goods  were  suitable  for  either  civil  or  mili- 
tary use.  It  was  apparent,  however,  that  there  was  a  wide 
field  for  conservation  in  the  manufacture  of  military  goods. 


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I    • 


226    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

To  a  certain  extent  such  conservation  did  result  from  the 
insistent  pressure  by  manufacturers  and  various  agencies 
of  the  War  Industries  Board  for  the  elimination  of  refine- 
ments and  excessive  margins  of  safety  and  strength  for  which 
the  military  had  a  great  fondness  even  at  the  cost  of  delays 
in  development,  slow  production,  and  an  unnecessary  waste 
of  material.  Plans  were  being  matured,  just  as  the  armis- 
tice came,  for  a  general  standardization  of  army  and  navy 
goods  that  looked  to  uniformity  of  design  and  reduction  in 
the  number  of  models  wherever  possible. 

These  plans  also  contemplated  a  degree  of  uniformity 
between  civil  and  military  goods.  It  was  one  of  the  inevitable 
failures  of  the  supply  of  the  army  in  France  that  there  was 
such  a  variety  of  models  and  sizes  of  almost  every  sort  of 
army  equipment.     One  outcome  was  that  there  was  a  great 
waste  of  transport  and  storage  space.  There  was  also  a  waste 
of  precious  time  in  designing  and  producing  so  many  differ- 
ent sorts  of  equipment,  and  a  considerable  confusion  in  dis- 
tribution.   The  army  tended  to  elaborate  just  when  the  civil 
population  was  simplifying,  being  obsessed  with  the  idea  that 
perfection  and  completeness  of  equipment  were  of  more 
importance  than  time.     This  was  partly  the  result  of  the 
observation  of  the  advantage  of  superior  equipment  which 
the  Germans  had  in  the  earlier  stages  of  the  war,  partly  of 
the  conviction  that  the  climax  of  the  war  would  come  in  1919, 
and  partly  of  the  abundance  of  funds  suddenly  placed  in  the 
hands  of  oflScers  who  long  had  been  stinted  and  cramped  in 
the  acquirement  of  equipment. 

While  the  general  policy  of  the  Conservation  Division  was 
one  of  pruning  rather  than  of  cutting  industries  back  to  the 
roots,  several  lines  of  conservation  sometimes  converged  on 
one  industry,  and  in  such  industries,  as  well  as  in  some 
others,  the  use  of  whose  products  could  be  deferred,  there 
was  a  positive  limitation  of  output.  The  automobile  indus- 
try was  an  enormous  user  of  steel,  and  there  was  but  small 
opportunity  to  economize  it  by  substitution  or  standardiza- 
tion. Moreover,  much  of  the  steel  was  of  the  high-grade 
alloys,  which  were  scarce  and  imperatively  necessary  in 
ordnance.  The  associated  tire  industry  normally  consumed 
seventy  per  cent  of  all  the  rubber  used  in  the  United  States, 


REDUCING  AMERICA'S  SURPLUS  TISSUE    227 

and  it  was  important  to  reduce  the  imports  of  this  commodity 
because  of  the  large  amount  of  shipping  needed  to  bring  it 
from  the  distant  sources  of  supply. 

Another  factor  was  the  need  of  conservation  of  gasoline. 
Still  another  was  the  large  amount  of  skilled  or  expert  labor 
absorbed  by  this  industry.  Finally,  as  the  industry  was  one 
on  which  the  equipment  of  the  army  and  navy  with  aircraft 
and  with  vehicular  transport  largely  depended,  it  was  felt 
that  there  was  little  danger  of  disorganizing  it  by  limiting  the 
output  for  civil  use.  The  automobile  problem  was  one  of  the 
conservation  fields  which  became  a  problem  for  the  War 
Industries  Board  as  a  whole,  and  even  involved  other  major 
war  agencies,  as  did  all  of  the  conservation  problems  which 
involved  curtailment. 

Even  in  the  narrower  sense  of  the  husbanding  of  materials 
and  facilities,  the  conservation  work  overlapped  and  inter- 
locked with  other  functions  of  the  Board.  In  truth,  the 
whole  Board  organization  was  marked  by  overlapping  of 
functions.  When  Mr.  Baruch  became  chairman,  he  saw  at 
once  that  this  might  be  either  a  strength  or  a  weakness, 
depending  on  the  attitude  of  the  personnel.  Each  executive 
was  expected  to  pursue  his  duties  with  this  fact  in  mind,  so 
that  there  would  be  no  friction  over  authority  disputes.  So 
broad  and  tolerant  were  the  various  executives,  and  so  little 
concerned  in  winning  individual  honors,  that  an  unparalleled 
degree  of  harmony  and  helpful  cooperation  was  realized, 
with  the  result  that  each  department  was  greater  and  stronger 
than  it  would  have  been  in  hard-and-fast  functional  isolation. 
The  Conservation  Division  was  full  grown  and  highly  efficient 
before  it  was  incorporated  into  the  War  Industries  Board, 
but  after  the  merger  it  had  virtually  the  whole  of  the  War 
Industries  Board's  machine  at  its  command,  and  was  enabled 
to  view  and  practice  conservation  as  the  complement  of  the 
other  activities  of  an  agency  whose  field  was  becoming  the 
whole  of  industry. 

The  amazing  thing  about  the  harmony  that  pervaded  the 
organization  was  that  the  executives  were  all  strong,  forceful, 
and  outspoken  men.  Mr.  Shaw,  for  example,  was  disap- 
pointed by  the  selection  of  Mr.  Baruch  for  chairman  of  the 
Board,  and  bluntly  told  him  so.    Although  they  had  been  in 


>  I 


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228    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

the  Government  service  for  a  year,  under  the  central  authority 
of   the   Council    of   National    Defense,    they   were   barely 
acquaintances  and  each  knew  little  of  the  other  or  his  work. 
Shaw  spoke  as  an  impartial  critic  and  not  as  a  partisan. 
Baruch  in  no  way  resented  Shaw's  position.  On  the  contrary, 
he  asked  Shaw  to  remain  at  the  head  of  the  Conservation 
Division  and  assured  him  that  he  would  have  in  his  work  all 
the  authority  that  he  (Baruch)  and  the  Board  had.    Then  the 
two  men  sat  down  and  amicably  discussed  the  points  of 
Shaw's  objections  to  Baruch  as  chairman.     The  outcome 
was  that  Baruch  "sold"  himself  to  Shaw  "in  principle,"  as 
the  diplomats  say,  and  subsequent  experience  applied  the 
principle. 

The  success  of  the  Conservation  Division  illustrates  one 
of  the  advantages  among  some  disadvantages  that  a  democ- 
racy has  over  an  autocracy  in  an  emergency.    Shaw,  a  per- 
son unknown  to  the  Government,  had  an  important  idea  and 
a  studied  knowledge  of  how  to  apply  it.     He  and  his  idea 
were  appropriated  by  the  Government  within  twenty-four 
hours  after  he  had  come  into  contact  with  members  of  the 
Council  of  National  Defense.     This  idea  of  conservation 
without   exhaustion   or  destruction,  through  the   voluntary 
cooperation  of  the  men  and  industries  affected,  was  so  well 
applied  that  there  is  no  question  that  conservation  was  more 
judicious  and  efficacious  in  the  United  States  than  in  other 
countries  engaged  in  the  war.     As  applied  here,  civilian 
economy  of  men,  materials,  finance,  and  facilities  was  a 
means  of  strengthening  the  morale  as  well  as  the  physique  of 
the  Nation. 

The  Economic  Intelligence  Section  of  the  Division  kept 
it  informed  of  conservation  practices  in  Germany,  France, 
England,  and  other  countries  engaged  in  the  war.  The 
reports  from  Germany  were  as  significant  in  the  latter  months 
of  the  war  of  that  country's  impending  economic  collapse  as 
Foch's  bulletins  were  of  her  military  debacle.  Monthly 
analyses  of  German  uniforms  foretold  the  army  in  rags; 
the  increasing  number  of  "duds,"  or  dead  shells,  told  of 
the  growing  inefficiency  of  the  German  projectile  factories. 
Other  reports  unerringly  showed  that  the  German  steel  indus- 
try  was  reaching  the  end  of  its  rope.    A  chart  was  kept  up 


1 


REDUCING  AMERICA'S  SURPLUS  TISSUE    229 

to  date  which  reflected  all  obtainable  information  as  to  the 
supply  of  raw  materials  in  Germany.  Month  by  month  the 
quantities  sank,  and  the  inevitable  end  was  seen  coming 
nearer  and  nearer.  A  prediction  based  on  this  chart  and 
favored  by  luck  foretold  the  precise  day  of  the  signing  of 

the  armistice. 

What  civilians  did  resentfully  under  compulsion  elsewhere, 
they  here  did  cheerfully  as  a  high  privilege.  Lord  Reading 
was  so  much  impressed  by  the  American  plan  while  he  was 
in  this  country  that  it  is  believed  that  had  the  war  lasted 
longer  Britain  would  have  adopted  it,  and  some  of  the  great 
industries  of  England  applied  it  to  themselves,  of  their  own 
initiative.  Although  in  Canada  the  Government  had  direct 
powers  of  compulsion  in  effecting  conservation,  it  elected  to 
adopt  the  Shaw  idea  of  "aid  and  consent." 

The  conservation  work  was  conducted  with  remarkable 
coolness  of  judgment  at  a  time  when  passion  ran  high  and 
public  opinion  was  cyclonic.  There  was  a  clamorous  demand 
for  heroic  measures.  Many  earnest  patriots  could  not  toler- 
ate the  continuation  of  any  business  that  savored  in  any 
degree  of  luxury  or  dispensability.  They  had  no  thought 
for  timeliness  or  the  complexities  of  industry  and  the  weak- 
nesses of  human  nature.  They  did  not  consider  that  to  crush 
an  industry  before  the  time  had  arrived  in  which  its  per- 
sonnel could  be  transferred  to  other  activities,  or  its  materials 
economically  applied  elsewhere,  was  to  injure  the  economic 
body  and  result  in  waste  instead  of  economy.  They  did  not 
realize  that  the  humble  worker  could  not  always  be  expected 
to  take  the  broad  and  impersonal  view  that  they  had.  They 
could  not  understand  that  to  take  away  from  such  a  man  the 
opportunity  to  spend  his  earnings  in  amusement  and  on 
baubles  was  to  deprive  him  of  the  incentive  to  labor. 

These  were  the  people  who  were  always  appealing  to  the 
Government  to  do,  "for  God's  sake,"  this  or  that  drastic 
thing.  They  had  a  sort  of  tragic  conviction  that  the  Nation 
must  gash  and  torture  itself  to  prove  its  gravity  and  attest 
the  solemnity  of  the  hour.  Parkman  tells  us  how  the  rela- 
tives of  deceased  Indian  warriors  ostentatiously  mutilated 
and  racked  their  bodies  to  attest  their  sorrow.  Some  such 
thought  of  proof  of  national  sense  of  affliction  was  vaguely 


! 


I 


230    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


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in  the  minds  of  the  emotional  "forgodsakers."  The  Conser- 
vation Division  was  unmoved  by  such  appeals.  At  the  fitting 
time  it  acted  with  the  balanced  judgment  and  cool  precision 
of  a  surgeon  in  the  operating-room.  It  used  the  knife,  not 
to  punish  or  to  avenge,  but  to  conserve. 

The  World  War  was  a  wonderful  school,  but  it  gave  too 
many  lessons  at  once.  It  showed  us  how  so  many  things  may 
be  bettered  that  we  are  at  a  loss  where  to  begin  with  perma- 
nent utilization  of  what  we  know.  The  Conservation  Division 
alone  showed  that  merely  to  strip  from  trade  and  industry 
the  lumber  of  futile  custom  and  the  encrustation  of  useless 
variety  would  return  a  good  dividend  on  the  world's  capital. 
It  was  an  amazing  proof  of  what  can  flow  from  a  detached 
scrutiny  of  industry  applying  the  criterion  of  utility  and 
efliciency.  It  is,  perhaps,  too  much  to  hope  that  there  will 
be  any  general  gain  in  time  of  peace  from  the  triumphant 
experiment  of  the  Conservation  Division.  Yet  now  the  world 
needs  to  economize  as  much  as  in  war. 

In  this  country  it  is  the  savings  of  the  producers  rather 
than  those  of  the  consumers  that  accumulate  new  capital. 
Our  savings  deposits  make  a  sorry  showing  by  the  side  of 
those  of  some  other  nations,  but  in  no  other  country  do  the 
producing  agencies  store  up  capital  as  they  do  here.  It  has 
been  calculated  that  only  one  third  of  the  war  profits  of  the 
great  American  industries  reached  the  pockets  of  individuals. 
Outside  of  taxes,  the  rest  went  into  surplus  and  undivided 
profits;  that  is  to  say,  capital.  The  individual  spent  his  large 
earnings  and  profits  freely  during  the  war  and  sold  his  Gov- 
ernment bonds  afterwards,  so  that  there  was  little  gain  from 
individual  thrift.  The  Conservation  Division  opened  up  a 
vast  field  for  the  exercise  of  producers'  thrift,  but  to  preempt 
this  abundant  source  of  new  capital  implies  such  a  close 
and  sympathetic  affiliation  of  competitive  industries  as  is 
hardly  possible  under  the  decentralization  of  business  that 
is  compelled  by  our  anti-trust  statutes. 

It  would  seem  possible,  however,  and  it  is  emphatically 
advisable,  that  the  Government  should  have  some  close  and 
intelligent  liaison  with  business  that  would  keep  it  fully 
informed  as  to  how  in  another  emergency  the  experience  of 
the  Conservation  Division  could  be  applied  quickly  and  intel- 


REDUCING  AMERICA'S  SURPLUS  TISSUE    231 


ligently  and  thus  contribute  greatly  to  the  expedition  and 
effectiveness  of  industrial  mobilization.  We  know  now  that 
another  great  war  may  be  won  or  lost  by  celerity  of  indus- 
trial mobilization.  To  know  beforehand  just  how  the  com- 
munity should  strip  and  adjust  itself  for  the  test  of  combat 
would  be  a  factor  of  the  first  importance.  It  may  be  that 
we  are  coming  into  a  period  of  international  disarmament. 
Should  that  be  the  case,  facility  of  industrial  mobilization 
will  be  greatly  enhanced.  A  show-down  between  disarmed 
nations  will  be  one  of  potency  to  arm  after  the  break  comes 
—  and  nobody  has  yet  had  the  temerity  to  say  that  disarma- 
ment is  insurance  of  peace. 


i\ 


CHAPTER  XII 


'»  I 


CONVERSION:  THE  METAMORPHOSIS  OF  INDUSTRY 

What  France  learned  — Our  own  peculiar  problem  —  Making  haste  slowly 

Converting  regions  as  well  as  plants  —  Should  our  industries  have  been  pooled 

with  the  Allies'?  —  The  early  days  of  conversion  —  Peek  arrives Otis  goes 

into  action  — He  converts  Baruch- The  regional  system  is  bom  —  Conversion 
by  long-distance  telephone  —  Applying  the  continental  vision  of  industry  — 
Those  who  also  served  —  Graphic  forms  of  conversion. 

In  the  World  War  cavalry  became  footsoldiers  and  trudged 
in  the  mud  of  foot  transport.  Marines  fought  far  from  their 
ships.  Paris  taxicabs  shifted  Gallieni's  army  to  the  undoing 
of  von  Kluck.  London  buses  figured  in  the  supply  of  the 
British  army.  Engineers  dropped  picks  to  take  up  weapons. 
Naval  guns  moved  on  railway  trucks  and  behind  gasoline 
tractors  instead  of  on  warships.  Soldiers  spent  more  time 
with  pick  and  shovel  than  they  did  with  arms,  and  riflemen 
discarded  their  favorite  weapon  to  become  grenade-throwers. 
Throughout  the  military  forces  there  was  adaptation  and 
conversion. 

Likewise  the  industrial  army  had  to  be  nimble  on  its  feet 
and  mobile  in  function.     No  nation  could  keep  in  reserve 
the  infinitely  specialized  facilities  and  sufficient  stores  of  the 
supply  side  of  such  a  war.    In  truth,  its  demands  were  fore- 
seen only  dimly.     The  French  were,  as  always,  artillery 
specialists.    Yet  they  calculated  that  thirteen  hundred  rounds 
a  day  each  would  be  the  limit  of  consumption  of  ammunition 
by  the  75's.  There  were  days  when  single  guns  of  this  caliber 
fired  four  thousand  projectiles  each.    At  the  beginning  of  the 
war  the  French  were  making  only  fifteen  thousand   such 
projectiles  daily,  but  the  output  had  to  be  pushed  up  until 
It  was  at  the  rate  of  8,400,000  a  month.    The  entire  French 
supply  of  artillery  shells  of  all  calibers  was  5,000,000  at  the 
begmnmg  of  the  war,  but  before  the  end  the  monthly  pro- 
duction was  9,000,000.    In  the  final  ofi"ensive  of  1918  the 
French  and  American  armies  together  shot  away  33,000.000 
French  shells  —  an  average  of  272,500  a  day.    Every  litUe 


THE  METAMORPHOSIS  OF  INDUSTRY       233 

shop  and  even  the  cottages  of  France  turned  to  the  making 
of  shells.  It  was  by  a  marvelous  conversion  and  improvisa- 
tion that  France  was  able  to  meet  the  unforeseen  demands 
and  stunning  loss  of  a  large  proportion  of  its  manufacturing 
industry  at  the  outset  of  the  war. 

Knowing  of  this  shifting  of  industrial  capacity  by  France 
and  also  by  England,  conversion  early  became  one  of  the 
popular  cries  in  America.     And  because  every  piano  and 
talking-machine  factory  in  the  country  was  not  forthwith 
converted  to  the  making  of  war  machines  or  commodities, 
there  was  a  general  fear  that  our  leaders  had  not  grasped  the 
industrial  implications  of  modern  warfare.    There  were  two 
excellent  reasons  why  conversion  proceeded  somewhat  slowly 
in  this  country.    One  was  that  it  took  time  to  ascertain  what 
conversions  were  possible  and  desirable,  and  the  other  was 
that  American  quantitative  manufacture  depends  more  on 
machines  than  on  workmen.     Our  workmen  are  machine- 
tenders  rather  than  mechanics.     To  a  degree,  conversion  in 
England,  and  more  particularly  in  France,  was  one  of  setting 
adaptable  mechanics  to  doing  something  other  than  they  had 
been  doing.     But  you  cannot  tell  a  machine  to  make  some- 
thing else.    You  must  remodel  it  or  replace  it  with  another. 
A  group  of  French  workmen  who  had  been  making  auto- 
mobiles could  almost  on  a  day's  notice  begin  making  air- 
planes, and  might  have  one  done  within  a  few  days.     The 
process  of  making  standardized  parts  for  final  assembly  into 
a  whole  is  incomparably  diff"erent.     The  factory  may  be 
running  weeks  or  months  full  blast  before  a  single  finished 
article  comes  from  the  assembly  room.    This  was  one  of  the 
things  that  mystified  our  people.     They  would  read  that 
factories  were  "in  production,"  working  day  and  night,  and 
yet  there  would  be  no  reports  of  finished  goods;  and  it  is  not 
surprising  that  the  public  often  thought  that  it  had  been  the 
victim  of  deliberate  deception. 

To  the  layman  production  means  goods  ready  for  use.  To 
the  quantitative  manufacturer  production  has  a  technical 
meaning  as  distinguished  from  development.  An  automobile 
company,  for  example,  may  spend  months  developing  a  new 
model  and  may  even  turn  out  quite  a  number  of  sample  cars. 
That  is  not  production,  but,  when  the  plant  at  last  begins 


1,1 


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234    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

making  the  standardized  parts  of  the  new  model  in  volume, 
it  is  considered  that  the  factory  is  in  production,  though  it 
may  be  a  long  time  before  a  single  car  is  in  the  hands  of  the 
dealers.  If  there  are  fifteen  hundred  parts  of  a  given 
machine,  there  must  first  be  made  a  reserve  of  each  one  of 
those  parts,  and  there  will  be  no  completed  production  if 
there  should  be  any  delay  or  mishap  in  connection  with  any 
of  the  fifteen  hundred  items.  Thus,  a  certain  contract  may 
from  the  standpoint  of  the  manufacturer  be  considered  ninety 
per  cent  done  before  a  single  completed  unit  has  been 
shipped.  The  group  of  mechanics,  perhaps,  may  have  built 
a  hundred  machines  before  the  great  factory  has  completed 
one;  but,  when  the  assembly  room  at  last  begins  to  function, 
the  factory  may  send  out  in  a  day  more  units  than  the  group 
of  workers  has  completed  in  a  month. 

Wholesale  conversion  of  manufacturing  plants  in  the  early 
stages  of  the  war  would  have  been  as  disastrous  as  too  hasty 
conservation.  There  would  have  been  a  long  period  of  pro- 
duction of  nothing,  and  doubtless  many  maladroit  conver- 
sions, necessitating,  possibly,  reconversions.  Preliminary 
to  conversion,  it  was  necessary  to  make  a  survey  of  the 
resources  of  the  country  with  regard  both  to  materials  and 
facilities. 

The  Resources  and  Conversion  Section  took  over  the  data 
and  work  of  the  old  Industrial  Inventory  Section  (one  of  the 
first  creations  of  the  Council  of  National  Defense)  as  one 
means  of  obtaining  its  basic  facts,  and  through  its  regional 
organization  was  able  to  shape  the  industrial  inventory  more 
practically  than  formerly  had  been  the  case,  though  the 
armistice  came  before  its  revision  of  old  and  collection  of 
new  data  had  been  completed. 

Allied  to  conversion  of  plants  was  conversion  to  war  objec- 
tives of  manufacturing  centers  and  regions  which,  in  the  haste 
of  placing  early  Government  orders,  had  been  neglected. 
About  sixty  per  cent  of  the  first  orders  placed  for  war  goods 
were  given  to  manufacturing  plants  in  the  four  States  of 
New  York,  Pennsylvania,  Ohio,  and  Massachusetts.  In  value 
and  in  tonnage  they  bulked  much  larger.  The  northeastern 
section  of  the  United  States  is  predominantly  the  manufac- 
turing region,  and  it  enjoyed  the  advantage  of  being  near 


THE  METAMORPHOSIS  OF  INDUSTRY       235 

to  Washington.  It  was  but  natural  that  each  of  the  score  of 
Government  purchasing  agencies  should  instinctively  turn 
to  this  region,  and  there  being  virtually  no  thought  of  the 
relation  between  the  total  volume  of  the  twenty  sources  of 
orders  and  the  productive  capacity  of  the  favored  section  — 
flowing  from  a  lack  of  centralized  control  of  buying  —  an 
overtaxing  of  every  facility  of  production  in  this  section 
resulted.  Power,  transportation,  facilities,  fuel,  materials, 
labor,  and  finance  were  strained  to  the  point  of  collapse. 

Long  before  there  was  anything  approaching  an  authori- 
tative and  general  control  of  the  creation  and  utilization  of 
facilities  the  condition  had  become  inextricably  snarled. 
There  was  not  only  that  general  congestion  of  the  northeastern 
section,  but  there  were  innumerable  local  entanglements  in 
and  out  of  that  section.  The  diflferent  supply  agencies  of  the 
army,  the  navy,  the  Shipping  Board,  had  placed  orders  with- 
out reference  to  or  thought  of  each  other.  The  result  was 
that  there  was  not  power,  fuel,  transportation,  or  labor  enough 
to  go  around.  Thus  orders  were  many  times  placed  where 
they  never  could  be  filled.  Each  agency  counted  on  all  the 
local  factors  of  production  as  available  for  itself,  not  know- 
ing that  other  agencies  were  doing  the  same.  Even  when 
they  were  aware  of  their  conflicting  plans,  the  responsibility 
of  each  officer  for  the  success  of  his  own  job  drove  him  to 
plan  and  strive  for  his  own.  In  this  way  many  brilliant 
individual  achievements  in  procuring  production  were  at  the 
cost  of  bitter  failures. 

The  topic  of  conversion  touches  on  the  interesting  question 
of  whether  the  whole  matter  of  America's  industrial  partici- 
pation in  the  common  war  against  Germany  should  not  have 
been  treated  entirely  as  one  of  coordination,  in  the  sense  of 
complementation  and  supplementation,  of  American  industry 
with  that  of  the  Allies.  This  is  a  subject  that  popular  dis- 
cussion of  the  war  has  hardly  ever  touched,  and  students  of 
the  economics  of  the  war  have  not  given  it  more  than  a 
passing  thought.  It  will,  therefore,  come  as  a  surprise  that 
some  army  men  are  of  the  deliberately  formed  opinion  that 
the  greatest  mistake  of  American  military-industrial  policy 
—  a  mistake  that  is  characterized  as  a  blunder  that  cost 
billions  and  hobbled  the  Allied  power  —  was  the  failure  to 


11" 


ii 


I 


f 


236    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

deal  with  American  industry  as  a  complementary  part  of 
Allied  industry  instead  of  as  an  integral  industrial  unit. 

What  is  meant  is  this:  The  Allies,  especially  France  and 
England,  had  built  up  the  specialized  war  industries  of  their 
countries,  during  three  years  of  intense  effort,  to  such  a  point 
that  their  capacity  was  beyond  the  demand.  They  reached 
the  peak  of  production  after  their  armies  had  reached  the 
peak  of  numbers,  and  of  consumption.  These  industries  had 
already  made  up  the  ordnance  and  munitions  deficits  of  the 
first  years  of  the  war,  and  when  we  entered  the  struggle  they 
had  only  to  replace  wastage  and  current  consumption  by 
armies  which  were  declining  in  numbers. 

The  French  army,  for  example,  reached  its  maximum 
strength  in  July,  1915,  when  it  was  almost  5,000,000  men. 
By  the  spring  of  1917  it  had  declined  to  4,400,000,  and  at 
the  signing  of  the  armistice  was  down  to  4,143,000.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  munitions  capacity  was  growing  steadily. 
When  the  war  began,  France  had  3696  75's;  at  its  end, 
despite  loss  and  wastage,  she  had  6555.  In  1914,  the  French 
army  had  only  288  pieces  of  heavy  artillery;  in  1918,  5477.^ 
But  that  is  not  all.  The  French  capacity  for  artillery  produc- 
tion became  so  great  that  it  not  only  made  up  the  enormous 
deficits  indicated  and  met  the  current  depreciation,  but  was 
able  to  supply  ten  thousand  guns  to  the  armies  of  the  other 
allies.  The  French  airplane  capacity  was  62  a  month  in 
1914,  and  2068  a  mondi  in  1918.  England  was  in  much 
the  same  situation.  France,  alone,  was  perfectly  competent, 
with  benefit  instead  of  injury  to  herself,  to  have  supplied  all 
of  the  artillery  and,  probably,  all  of  the  munitions,  for  an 
American  army  of  any  size  that  could  have  been  sent  to 
France.  From  the  viewpoint  of  the  industrial  capacity  and 
efficiency  of  the  Allies  what  the  addition  of  millions  of 
American  soldiers  to  the  Allied  armies  required  was  not 
more  facilities  for  the  manufacture  of  war  goods,  but  of 
more  materials  for  existing  facilities  to  utilize.  Because  we 
could  not  sooner  get  our  ordnance  and  munition  plants  into 
production,  the  American  army  in  France  did,  in  fact,  fight 
wholly  with  French  guns  and  projectiles  and  largely  so  with 

^These  and  preceding  figures  regarding   French   ordnance  and   munition 
production  are  from  M.  Andre  Tardieu's  book.  The  Truth  About  the  Treaty, 


THE  METAMORPHOSIS  OF  INDUSTRY       237 

I 

French  airplanes.  If  we  had  undertaken  to  provide  the 
materials,  the  French  could  have  so  supplied  our  armies 
indefinitely  with  guns,  projectiles,  tanks,  and  airplanes. 

Instead  of  following  this  policy  of  supply  integration  with 
the  Allies,  we  set  out  to  create  an  absolutely  independent 
supply  scheme.  Not  only  that,  but  we  developed  a  strong 
tendency  to  take  away  from  the  Allies  the  ordnance  and 
munitions  plants  that  they  had  built  up  in  this  country.  For 
months  plants  that  had  been  producing  for  the  Allies  pro- 
duced for  nobody.  Those  who  hold  that  the  failure  to  fuse 
our  industrial  efforts  and  capacities  with  those  of  the  Allies 
was  a  great  economic  blunder  point  out  that  had  we  done  so 
there  would  have  been  no  necessity  for  the  tremendous  dis- 
turbance of  the  normal  industry  of  this  country  that  resulted 
from  conversions  and  the  creation  of  new  facilities  for  the 
manufacture  of  ordnance  and  munitions. 

It  is  further  pointed  out  that  we  should  have  been  saved 
the  vast  expenditures  in  such  plants,  which  the  unexpectedly 
early  termination  of  the  war  rendered  practically  futile. 
Certain  specialized  war  goods  —  for  example,  explosives  — 
would  have  been  made  in  this  country  on  a  tremendous  scale, 
under  a  programme  of  inter-Allied  economic  coordination, 
but  for  the  most  part  the  contribution  of  American  industry 
to  the  war  effort  would  have  been  an  increased  production 
of  what  it  was  accustomed  to  produce,  with  a  saving  of  much 
of  the  loss  of  time,  energy,  and  money  spent  in  conversion 
and  on  new  plants. 

Again,  the  army  would  have  been  relieved  of  the  tre- 
mendous burden  of  the  complex  ordnance  problem,  involved 
in  the  virtual  creation  in  this  country  of  a  mammoth  new 
industry,  and  thousands  of  officers,  enlisted  men,  and  civilian 
personnel  would  have  been  released  for  active  service.  We 
spent  about  $7,000,000,000  for  ordnance,  a  large  part  of 
which  represented  amortization  of  plants,  and  still,  because 
of  the  brevity  of  the  war,  fought  it  with  French  ordnance, 
outside  of  small  arms  and  machine  guns;  the  latter  being, 
by  the  way,  one  of  the  things  that  we  should  have  made  in 
this  country  under  the  coordination  plan. 

To  admit  that  the  omission  to  integrate  our  industrial 
effort  with  that  of  the  Allies  was  a  blunder  would  not  be  to 


M   i 


238    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


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say  that  it  was  avoidable.  National  pride  might  have  moved 
public  opinion  successfully  to  oppose  such  an  undertaking, 
and  there  undoubtedly  would  have  been  clamorous  opposi- 
tion to  the  expenditure  of  vast  sums  abroad  that  might  have 
been  spent  at  home. 

Even  the  wise  arrangement  by  which  the  gap  in  domestic 
production  was  filled  by  having  the  Allies,  particularly  the 
French,  provide  guns,  projectiles,  and  airplanes  for  the  first 
two  million  men  has  been  persistently  represented  as  the 
imposition  of  an  intolerable  burden  on  an  already  overtaxed 
France.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  it  was  a  positive  benefit  to  that 
country. 

One  of  the  principal  objections  to  the  production  of  Ameri- 
can munitions  in  Europe  was  the  necessity  of  transporting 
the  bulky  raw  materials  overseas.  It  would  have  meant 
vastly  increased  shipping. 

In  the  case  of  powder,  from  ten  to  twelve  pounds  of  raw 
material  would  have  to  be  transported  to  produce  a  single 
pound  of  finished  powder.  For  artillery  and  shells  the  ship- 
ping demands  would  have  been  still  more  serious. 

It  is  also  to  be  said,  in  direct  opposition  to  the  contention 
that  the  neglect  of  Allied  industrial  integration  was  a  pro- 
found error,  that  there  was  always  a  menacing  possibility 
that  France  might  have  been  inundated  by  the  Germans,  and 
her  industrial  potency  annihilated,  leaving  America,  had 
Allied  economic  unity  been  eflfected,  without  facilities  at 
home  or  abroad  with  which  to  continue  the  contest. 

The  present  writer's  judgment  is  that,  while  the  early 
termination  of  the  war  undeniably  resulted  in  a  tremendous 
loss  because  of  the  lack  of  coordination  between  American 
and  Allied  industry,  it  would  have  been  most  unwise  to  have 
assumed  that  the  war  would  end  as  soon  as  it  did. 

However,  this  was  a  matter  of  national  and  military  policy 
that  was  entirely  outside  the  domain  of  the  War  Industries 
Board.  It  had  to  operate  under  an  adopted  plan  of  inde- 
pendent equipment  and  supply  of  the  American  armies; 
but  it  did  concern  itself  with  Allied  economic  cooperation 
adapted  to  the  chosen  policy,  and  it  was  always  ready  to 
hold  back  American  preparation  when  to  do  so  strengthened 
the  hand  of  the  active  armies  of  the  Allies.    When  the  War 


!i 


THE  METAMORPHOSIS  OF  INDUSTRY       239 

Industries  Board  came  into  its  own,  it  had  a  herculean  task 
in  the  internal  coordination  of  American  industry. 

It  goes  without  saying  that  conversion  of  industries  began 
as  soon  as  the  war  began,  but  for  a  long  time  it  was  not  a 
considered  policy.  It  was  a  hit-and-miss  affair  of  individual 
initiative  by  civilians,  army  and  navy  officers,  and  various 
sections  of  the  War  Industries  Board.  There  were  no  guiding 
channels.  Manufacturers  who  wished  to  engage  in  the  pro- 
duction of  war  goods  came  to  Washington  and  were  caught 
up  in  an  endless  game  of  tag  that  led  them  from  bureau  to 
bureau  and  finally  dropped  them  spent  and  angry.  Some- 
times a  manufacturer  would  have  the  luck  to  stumble  into 
an  office  that  was  crying  for  the  help  he  could  give,  but  in 
most  cases  the  offer  and  the  need  did  not  join.  Moreover, 
the  whole  field  of  industrial  adaptation  was  dependent  on  the 
slow  formulation  of  a  programme  of  projected  requirements. 

It  was  not  until  late  in  November,  1917,  that  the  War 
Industries  Board  got  to  a  definitive  decision  with  regard  to 
the  orderly  study  and  direction  of  conversion.  It  then  re- 
solved to  create  the  office  of  Industrial  Representative,  and 
Mr.  George  N.  Peek,  then  vice-president  of  Deere  &  Com- 
pany, Moline,  Illinois,  was  appointed  such  representative  by 
Chairman  Willard,  on  the  advice  of  Mr.  Legge.  The  duties 
of  the  industrial  representative  were  defined  as  advising  with 
Government  agencies  regarding  the  location  of  new  facilities 
and  the  diversion  of  existing  ones  from  their  accustomed 
activities;  to  cooperate  with  industries  to  procure  necessaries 
for  war  and  for  public  welfare,  and  to  study  "future  war 
requirements  and  from  time  to  time  make  such  recommenda- 
tions to  the  chairman  as  the  exigencies  of  the  situation 
require."  Mr.  Peek's  function  included  conversion,  but  was 
more  extensive.  He  was  to  be  a  sort  of  generalissimo  of 
industry  under  the  War  Industries  Board,  to  direct  the  con- 
version, the  conservation,  and  the  sagacious  concentration  of 
industrial  facilities,  old  and  new,  keeping  in  mind  the  dual 
purpose  of  efficiency  for  war  and  public  welfare  and  preser- 
vation for  peace. 

Mr.  Peek  reduced  his  problem  to  its  simplest  terms,  and 
decided  that  its  solution  required  the  convergence  of  require- 
ments by  the  Government  in  a  central  agency  in  touch  with 


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240    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


^ 


authorized  committees  of  industry.  The  complement  of  the 
committees  of  industry  would  be  specialized  agencies  of  con- 
tact on  the  part  of  the  central  agency,  which  was,  of  course, 
the  War  Industries  Board.  The  specialized  agencies  were 
the  commodity  sections,  which  had  their  beginnings  in  the 
subdivisions  of  the  work  of  the  Committee  on  Raw  Materials 
early  in  1917.  This  committee,  it  should  be  remembered, 
never  identified  its  own  fimctions  with  those  of  the  coopera- 
tive industrial  committees  with  which  it  worked.  It  worked 
with  and  through  the  committees  of  industry,  but  they  were 
not  its  committees. 

As  has  been  pointed  out  before,  this  early  idea  of  special- 
ized Government  representatives,  dealing  with  particular 
commodities  in  contact  with  authorized  representatives  of  the 
corresponding  industrial  groups,  was  the  alpha  and  omega 
of  the  final  form  of  the  War  Industries  Board.  It  was  sim- 
plicity itself,  but  it  took  a  year  for  it  to  come  into  domination 
of  the  War  Industries  Board,  and  then  only  when  the  chair- 
man of  the  old  Raw  Materials  Committee  became  chairman 
of  the  Board.  Mr.  Peek  contributed  powerfully  to  the 
advancement  of  the  idea  of  specialized  contact  between  Gov- 
ernment and  grouped  industry,  but,  owing  to  the  drifting 
status  of  the  Board  for  several  months,  following  his  appoint- 
ment as  industrial  representative,  it  was  not  possible  posi- 
tively to  accomplish  much  in  the  direction  of  ordered 
conversion. 

In  the  reorganization  of  the  Board  by  Mr.  Baruch,  Mr. 
Peek  was  made  Commissioner  of  Finished  Products,  succeed- 
ing Mr.  Brookings,  who  became  chairman  of  the  Price-Fixing 
Committee.  In  this  capacity  Mr.  Peek  had  an  opportunity  to 
apply  directly  his  ideas  of  the  joining-up  of  Government 
purchasing  and  supply  agencies  with  corresponding  commit- 
tees of  industry  —  through  commodity  sections  and  war 
service  committees.  At  the  same  time  the  reorganization 
gave  opportunity  for  the  development  of  the  functions  that 
had  been  entrusted  to  Mr.  Peek  as  industrial  representative. 
They  remained  under  his  general  supervision,  but  were 
particularized. 

It  should  be  remarked  that  the  title  of  Commissioner  of 
Finished  Products  was   somewhat   of  a   misnomer.     This 


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240    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

authorized  committees  of  industry.  The  complement  of  the 
committees  of  industry  would  be  specialized  agencies  of  con- 
tact on  the  part  of  the  central  agency,  which  was,  of  course, 
the  War  Industries  Board.  The  specialized  agencies  were 
the  commodity  sections,  which  had  their  beginnings  in  the 
subdivisions  of  the  work  of  the  Committee  on  Raw  Materials 
early  in  1917.  This  committee,  it  should  be  remembered, 
never  identified  its  own  functions  with  those  of  the  coopera- 
tive industrial  committees  with  which  it  worked.  It  worked 
with  and  through  the  committees  of  industry,  but  they  were 
not  its  committees. 

As  has  been  pointed  out  before,  this  early  idea  of  special- 
ized Government  representatives,  dealing  with  particular 
commodities  in  contact  with  authorized  representatives  of  the 
corresponding  industrial  groups,  was  the  alpha  and  omega 
of  the  final  form  of  the  War  Industries  Board.  It  was  sim- 
plicity itself,  but  it  took  a  year  for  it  to  come  into  domination 
of  the  War  Industries  Board,  and  then  only  when  the  chair- 
man of  the  old  Raw  Materials  Committee  became  chairman 
of  the  Board.  Mr.  Peek  contributed  powerfully  to  the 
advancement  of  the  idea  of  specialized  contact  between  Gov- 
ernment and  grouped  industry,  but,  owing  to  the  drifting 
status  of  the  Board  for  several  months,  following  his  appoint- 
ment as  industrial  representative,  it  was  not  possible  posi- 
tively to  accomplish  much  in  the  direction  of  ordered 
conversion. 

In  the  reorganization  of  the  Board  by  Mr.  Baruch,  Mr. 
Peek  was  made  Commissioner  of  Finished  Products,  succeed- 
ing Mr.  Brookings,  who  became  chairman  of  the  Price-Fixing 
Committee.  In  this  capacity  Mr.  Peek  had  an  opportunity  to 
apply  directly  his  ideas  of  the  joining-up  of  Government 
purchasing  and  supply  agencies  with  corresponding  commit- 
tees of  industry  —  through  commodity  sections  and  war 
service  committees.  At  the  same  time  the  reorganization 
gave  opportunity  for  the  development  of  the  functions  that 
had  been  entrusted  to  Mr.  Peek  as  industrial  representative. 
They  remained  under  his  general  supervision,  but  were 
particularized. 

It  should  be  remarked  that  the  title  of  Commissioner  of 
Finished   Products   was    somewhat    of   a    misnomer.     This 


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THE  METAMORPHOSIS  OF  INDUSTRY       241 

department  did  not  include  all  finished  products;  neither  did 
it  actually  include  all  of  the  conversion  and  adaptation  task. 
C.  A.  Otis,  president  of  the  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  Cleve- 
land, and  a  banker  of  that  city,  was  placed  at  the  head  of  the 
Section  of  Resources  and  Conversion.  His  selection  was 
another  instance  of  how  men  with  ideas  made  their  niches 
in  the  War  Industries  Board.  Mr.  Otis  had  taken  the  lead 
in  Cleveland,  even  before  the  United  States  entered  the  war, 
in  a  successful  endeavor  to  concentrate  in  the  Cleveland 
district  the  making  of  all  the  parts  and  accessories  of  the 
characteristic  manufacturing  products  of  that  part  of  the 
country.  This  work  had  been  prompted  by  the  confusion 
encountered  in  responding  to  the  demands  of  the  Allies. 
The  object  was  to  cut  out  wasteful  and  time-consuming  cross- 
hauling,  and  generally  to  integrate  industrial  processes  not 
domiciled  in  a  single  plant. 

Such  an  experience  met  the  requirements  of  the  War 
Industries  Board,  for  in  connection  with  unit  conversion 
Mr.  Baruch  was  planning  to  meet  the  problem  of  regional 
congestion  of  production  with  territorial  decentralization. 
In  a  way  Mr.  Otis  and  his  associates  had  been  building  up  a 
little  war  industries  board  of  their  own  in  Cleveland.  Like 
nuclei  all  over  the  country  were  what  the  Board  needed  — 
not  only  to  promote  the  diffusion  of  war  industry,  but  to 
break  up  the  jam  of  administrative  burdens  that  was  over- 
whelming the  central  offices.  Under  the  new  organization 
authority,  being  definitely  placed  in  the  hands  of  the  chair- 
man in  the  first  instance,  was  by  him  conveyed  to  division 
and  section  heads.  A  step  further  would  be  to  project 
authority,  not  only  functionally,  but  territorially.  Thus  arose 
the  regional  system  under  Mr.  Otis's  direction. 

"I'm  sold,"  said  Baruch  at  the  conclusion  of  his  first 
interview  with  Otis. 

The  latter  then  suggested  that  some  great  organizer,  such 
as  President  Farrell  of  the  United  States  Steel  Corporation, 
be  put  in  charge  of  the  new  enterprise. 

"No,  you  have  the  idea,  and  I  think  you  are  the  fellow  to 
carry  it  out,"  was  Baruch's  answer.  "You  get  your  winter 
clothes  and  come  to  Washington." 

Otis  and  Peek  worked  out  the  plan  of  nineteen  (later 


I'fi 


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242    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

twenty-one)  industrial  regions  with  an  "adviser/'  represent- 
ing the  War  Industries  Board,  in  each.  These  advisers  were 
usually  men  associated  with  local  chambers  of  commerce 
and  fully  conversant  with  industrial  facilities  and  personnel 
in  their  district.  They  knew  men  and  facilities.  They  knew 
what  was  feasible  and  what  was  possible.  They  had  a  com- 
mendable local  interest,  but  it  was  remarkable  how  com- 
pletely they  subordinated  the  local  to  the  general.  If  the 
full  story  were  ever  told  of  how  these  local  men  sometimes 
prevented  their  home-town  plants  or  business  men  from  get- 
ting Government  patronage  that  they  were  not  competent  to 
handle,  a  number  of  gentlemen  would  find  it  desirable  to 
seek  new  habitats.  On  the  other  hand,  they  developed  and 
encouraged  worthy  local  enterprises  of  conversion  or  new 
organization  that  might  never  have  got  a  hearing  in 
Washington. 

Should  regional  patriotism,  however,  advocate  a  steel 
plant  in  Salt  Lake  City  or  in  Maine  because  there  happened 
to  be  some  convertible  buildings  on  hand  or  some  idle  labor 
available,  it  collided  with  the  watchful  Otis  in  Washington. 
Regional  integration  of  industry  was  one  of  his  great  pur- 
poses—  the  territorial  concentration  of  the  final  form  of 
manufacture,  with  the  production  of  materials,  massed  labor, 
ample  power,  and  adequate  transportation  with  a  minimum 
of  long  hauls  and  the  elimination  of  cross-hauls. 

With  the  coming  of  the  regional  organizations  the  day 
was  gone  forever  when  smooth  persons  armed  with  a  roll 
of  blue-prints  could  talk  themselves  into  contracts  they  were 
not  competent  to  perform.  If  they  came  to  Washington,  a 
few  minutes'  telephone  talk  between  Otis  and  Trigg  in  Phila- 
delphia or  McAllister  in  Cleveland  indicated  the  way  out 
for  them.  But  if  the  men  and  the  project  were  genuine,  the 
same  quick  intelligence  started  them  immediately  on  their 
way  to  business.  It  was  the  purest  sort  of  application  of 
private  business  methods  to  the  Government's  business.  It 
was  a  case  of  an  old  friend  in  the  person  of  Otis  asking  a 
friend  or  acquaintance  in  Oshkosh  or  San  Francisco  or 
Chicago,  "What  kind  of  a  fellow  is  Sam  Perkins?  Can  he 
change  his  washing-machine  plant  into  a  balloon  factory, 
and  if  he  can  is  he  the  sort  that  can  make  a  success?"    It 


THE  METAMORPHOSIS  OF  INDUSTRY       243 

was  the  informal  personal  intelligence  method  of  the  cama- 
raderie  of  business  which  is  worth  more  than  volumes  of 
reports  and  stacks  of  card  indices. 

The  section,* like  so  many  of  the  War  Industries  Board 
departments,  was  composed  centrally  of  representatives  of 
the  war  agencies  in  addition  to  Mr.  Otis  and  his  staff,  the 
latter  being  John  A.  Kling,  Charles  H.  Anthony,  Edward  F. 
Buhlman,  W.  T.  Rossiter,  and  Irving  H.  Taylor.  Each 
regional  adviser  had  a  committee  made  up  of  one  repre- 
sentative of  each  of  the  principal  war  industries  in  his 
territory,  with  special  members  to  look  locally  after  priori- 
ties, production  stimulation,  and  statistical  information.  As 
has  been  shown,  they  cooperated  with  regional  agencies  of 
the  war-making  bodies  and  thus  created  local  war  industries 
boards.  Originally  conceived  of  as  specially  charged  with 
the  function  of  conversion,  they  were  rapidly  decentralizing 
the  work  of  every  division  and  section  of  the  Central  Board. 

The  army  took  up  the  zone  or  regional  system  of  decen- 
tralization. The  Shipping  Board,  the  navy,  the  Fuel  Admin- 
istration, the  Food  Administration,  etc.,  had  their  local  or 
sectional  representatives  in  many  if  not  all  parts  of  the 
country.  These  local  chiefs  and  the  War  Industries  Board's 
regional  adviser  and  his  helpers  began  to  meet  and  counsel 
together.  The  former  soon  found  that  they  had  a  local  war 
industries  board  to  help  them  in  their  local  work,  just  as 
the  Government  as  a  whole  had  the  Central  Board  in  Wash- 
ington. Thus,  the  whole  contact  of  Government  with  business 
was  oiled  and  flexed  and  articulated.  Personal  ties  were 
established,  aloofness  was  banished,  rigidity  and  formality 
were  blown  away. 

As  in  the  regions,  so  in  Washington.  Otis  did  not  spend 
his  time  writing  long  letters  and  makirfg  tedious  reports  to 
the  Ordnance  or  Quartermaster  Departments.  Unhampered 
by  uniform  or  rank,  he  established  reciprocal  relations  of 
confidence  and  understanding  with  men  like  General  Hugh 
Johnson  and  General  Williams,  and  so  through  the  medium 
of  business  men,  talking  and  acting  like  business  men,  indus- 
try and  the  Government  were  brought  together  in  understand- 
ing, sympathy,  and  effective  effort. 

The  Otis  organization  aimed  at  getting  the  efficient  pro- 


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244    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

ducers  into  Government  work,  keeping  the  ineflEcient  out  and 
distributing  the  load  of  production  for  war  over  the  whole 
industrial  body.  It  did  not,  any  more  than  any  other  part 
of  the  War  Industries  Board,  make  purchases  or  let  contracts. 
What  it  did  was  to  put  itself  into  an  unassailable  position 
of  being  able  to  send  to  the  proper  contracting  or  purchasing 
agency  men  who  were  competent  for  the  work  they  sought  to 
do;  or,  conversely,  direct  the  latter  to  the  men  and  plants 
they  needed.  It  thought  out  for  the  men  in  uniform  the 
problems  of  location  in  respect  of  personality,  finance,  power, 
transportation,  adaptability  to  conversion,  and  so  on.  It 
thought,  too,  not  from  the  myopic  point  of  view  of  Washing- 
ton on  the  eastern  seaboard,  but  with  the  continental  vision 
of  all  industry.  It  thought  for  industry  as  well  as  for  the 
Government. 

The  old  Washington  maze,  in  which  good  men  were  lost 
for  weeks,  was  destroyed.  The  manufacturer  whose  business 
was  being  curtailed  and  conserved  into  a  mere  skeleton  could 
now  come  to  Washington  and  go  to  Otis,  or,  locally,  for 
example,  to  Boston  to  Stuart  W.  Webb,  and  get  a  quick  and 
intelligent  answer  to  his  question,  "For  what  kind  of  war 
work  is  my  plant  suitable,  and  do  you  want  it?" 

On  the  other  hand,  if  the  initiative  came  from  the  Gov- 
ernment, Otis  and  his  organization  could  summon  the  right 
man  and  say  to  him:  "Jones,  the  time  has  come  for  you  to 
forget  Jones.  You  must  lay  off  making  wash-boilers  and 
take  to  making  helmets  for  the  boys  in  France." 

To  some  men  it  was  necessary  to  say:  "It's  too  bad,  old 
man,  but  your  plant  cannot  be  used.  There's  nothing  for 
you  to  do  but  lock  the  doors  and  wait  till  the  storm  blows 
over." 

Almost  invariably  the  manufacturers  took  their  sentences 
like  Spartans.  Their  formula  of  acceptance  was  something 
like  this: 

"All  right,  Otis;  that's  war.  I  haven't  a  complaint.  You 
have  given  us  every  chance.  We'll  shut  the  old  shop  up  and 
at  least  release  some  good  men  for  essential  work." 

One  such  man  closed  up  his  woodworking  plant  and 
devoted  himself  wholly  to  selling  Liberty  bonds  during  the 
rest  of  the  war. 


:  \ 


THE  METAMORPHOSIS  OF  INDUSTRY       245 

A  by-product  of  the  regional  decentralization  of  the  War 
Industries  Board  —  for  the  regional  organizations  came  to 
represent  all  phases  of  the  Board's  activities  —  was  that  all 
over  the  country  there  were  little  knots  of  business  men  who 
got  an  intimate  view  of  the  Government's  colossal  problems. 
They  became  less  destructively  critical,  and  began  to  think 
that,  considering  the  size  and  strangeness  of  its  task  and 
inherent  limitations  of  ofiicialism,  the  war  Government  was 
surprisingly  efficient. 

Reference  was  made  in  Chapter  X  to  the  Facilities  Divi- 
sion, and  the  reader  will  experience  some  confusion  of  under- 
standing of  the  line  of  demarcation  between  this  division 
and  the  Resources  and  Conversion  Section.  Both  were  in  the 
same  administrative  department  of  the  Board,  but  they  were 
separate,  and  yet  the  definitions  of  their  functions  reveal  a 
wide  overlapping.  In  the  language  of  a  memorandum  pre- 
pared by  Mr.  Peek,  their  common  chief,  they  were  "insep- 
arably connected."  In  any  other  than  such  a  loose  and 
adaptive  organization  as  the  War  Industries  Board,  they 
would  have  fouled  each  other.  The  records  show  that  they 
worked  together  hand-in-glove. 

The  Facilities  Division  was  more  general  and  the  Resources 
and  Conversion  Section  more  particular,  but  both  functioned 
particularly  and  generally,  and  both  had  to  do  with  the 
problem  of  conversion  or  adaptation.  The  division  special- 
ized more  on  the  Government's  future  requirements  of  facil- 
ities and  on  studies  of  how  to  meet  them.  It  dealt  with 
the  source  of  demand,  and  endeavored  to  modify  and  formu- 
late it  in  the  light  of  what  was  practicable  and  possible.  It 
sought  to  mould  new  enterprises  into  conformity  with  con- 
ditions. The  army,  for  instance,  would  say,  "We  must  have 
additional  facilities  for  making  gun  forgings."  Mr.  Bush 
and  his  associates  would  study  the  proposal  first  with  a  view 
to  ascertaining  whether  any  existing  facilities  could  be 
utilized;  and,  second,  if  new  construction  was  necessary, 
with  a  view  to  seeing  that  it  should  not  interfere  in  any  way 
with  existing  plants. 

Care  was  taken  that  the  labor  supply  should  not  be  drawn 
from  going  factories,  that  housing  should  be  adequate,  that 
power  could  be  provided,  that  local  and  external  transporta- 


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246    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


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tion  was  suitable,  that  the  proposed  location  should  be  out- 
side of  the  congested  region,  that  fuel  and  raw  materials 
were  available.  In  fine,  the  division  sought  to  avoid  errors 
at  the  start;  its  representative  in  the  War  Department  was 
cognizant  of  new  projects  from  the  moment  of  their 
inception.  It  was  a  sort  of  practical  counsellor  to  the  war- 
waging  agencies.  The  latter  stated  their  requirements  in 
terms  of  facilities  and  the  former  told  them  how  to  realize 
them.  This  sometimes  necessitated  a  veto  of  army  or  navy 
construction  plans.  The  division  did  not  act  positively  so 
much  as  negatively.  It  would  not,  for  example,  undertake 
to  tell  the  army  where  it  should  place  a  contemplated  plant, 
but  it  would  tell  it  where  it  must  not  place  one. 

The  fact  that  the  Resources  and  Conversion  Section  had 
a  regional  organization  indicated  a  rough  line  of  division 
of  function.  To  a  very  considerable  extent  the  section 
obtained  the  data  on  which  the  division  based  its  advice, 
recommendations,  and  inhibitions,  and  assisted  in  their 
application.  The  division  was  more  concerned  with  facility 
requirements  at  their  source  and  the  section  more  with 
converting  facilities  to  the  meeting  of  requirements  that  were 
already  in  the  stage  of  orders.  The  section  had  but  little  to 
do  with  new  facilities  and  much  with  adaptation  of  old. 
The  one  dealt  largely  with  facility  proposals  emanating 
from  the  Government;  the  other  largely  with  such  proposals 
emanating  from  private  sources.  Through  the  division  the 
need  sought  its  fulfillment;  through  the  section  a  potential 
facility  was  drawn  toward  a  known  need. 

One  result  of  the  work  of  the  Facilities  Division  was  that 
the  army,  after  having  drafted  thousands  of  skilled  men,  was 
compelled  to  look  to  the  ranks  for  labor  for  new  plants,  in 
order  to  avoid  the  practice,  all  too  common  in  the  early  days 
of  the  war,  of  robbing  one  plant  of  its  labor  to  fill  up  the 
rolls  of  another. 

The  division  was  also  instrumental  in  developing  new 
sources  of  labor,  such  as  female  labor.  It  contributed  to 
the  checking  of  the  merry-go-round  of  labor  which  caused 
hundreds  of  thousands  of  restless  men  to  put  in  a  large  part 
of  their  time  traveling  from  an  old  job  to  a  new  one  in  a 
very  dementia  of  mass  migration,  which  congested  passenger 


1 


THE  METAMORPHOSIS  OF  INDUSTRY       247 

traffic  and  turned  manufacturing  establishments  into  mere 
junction  points  where  the  victims  of  the  wanderlust  changed 
trains.  The  writer  does  not  know  that  any  one  has  ever 
tried  to  estimate  the  labor  loss  that  followed  the  colossal 
turnover  of  personnel  in  the  war  industries,  but  much  was 
wasted  at  this  capacious  bunghole  that  was  saved  at  many 
a  tight  spigot. 

Mr.  Bush,  with  his  wide  experience  as  a  railway  executive 
and  as  a  manufacturer,  had  a  comprehensive  understanding 
of  the  interlocking  factors  and  remote  reactions  of  new 
facilities  in  the  midst  of  a  great  tension.  As  a  volunteer  he 
had  originally  approached  the  Government's  war-time  prob- 
lem from  the  railway  angle,  and  had  early  advocated 
supreme  Government  control  and  administration  of  traffic, 
instead  of  Government  operation  of  the  railways.  He  was 
drafted  into  Mr.  Vauclain's  sub-committee  of  the  Council 
of  National  Defense  on  army  and  navy  artillery,  was  sub- 
sequently at  the  head  of  the  War  Industries  Board's  section 
of  forgings,  guns,  small  arms,  and  ammunition  for  the  last; 
and  in  the  last  months  of  the  war  became  chief  of  the  Facil- 
ities Division.  His  public  and  private  experience  peculiarly 
qualified  him  for  the  management  of  facilities  development, 
which  was  most  intimately  related  to  transportation. 

The  concentration  of  facilities  control  in  one  head,  which 
should  have  been  one  of  the  first  things  undertaken  at  the 
beginning  of  the  war,  came  at  a  time  when  the  situation  was 
desperately  involved,  and  the  termination  of  the  war  soon 
afterwards  found  him  in  the  midst  of  his  task. 

Conversion  of  manufacturing  plants  from  one  sort  of 
goods  to  another  is  not  a  simple  thing.  If  nothing  but 
varying  materials  and  varying  machines  were  involved,  it 
would  be  different.  But  to  alter  to  a  degree  that  afi'ects 
fundamental  processes  and  invalidates  the  experience  and 
skill  of  workmen,  the  specialized  knowledge  of  technicians 
and  the  commercial  deftness  of  the  manager,  is  a  delicate 
if  not  impossible  business.  Any  successful  business  man 
will  tell  you  that  his  "organization"  is  more  important  than 
his  plant.  An  organization  turned  to  an  unfamiliar  thing 
is  little  better  than  no  organization.  So  conversion,  to 
accomplish  one  of  its  ends,  of  obviating  the  construction  of 


248    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


fl 


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i  i 


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:  I 


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new  plants,  had  to  determine  whether  or  not  proposed  con- 
versions were  sound  in  principle. 

The  carpet  manufacturer  could  not  make  shells,  but  he 
could  make  blankets  and  duck.  The  dredging  contractor 
who  was  ambitious  to  make  airplanes,  but  could  not,  could 
excavate  berths  in  shipyards.  The  makers  of  refrigerators 
could  turn  to  hospital  tables.  Horseshoe  makers  could  not 
make  automobile  tires,  but  overnight  they  could  take  to 
making  trench  picks.  The  toy  manufacturer  .thought  he 
could  make  surgical  instruments,  but  came  into  his  own  in 
packing-cases.  When  curtailment  hit  the  stove  business, 
it  was  found  that  the  idle  plants  could  be  turned  to  making 
grenades  and  trench  mortar  bombs,  which  are  largely  casting 
jobs.  The  corset-maker  foimd  that  he  could  easily  master 
belts  for  the  Medical  Corps  and  fencing-masks.  The  piano 
factories  and  furniture  men  got  their  chance  in  the  fuselages 
and  wings  of  airplanes.  The  makers  of  automobile  motors 
took  to  the  Liberty  engine  like  a  duck  to  water.  Even  the 
talking-machine  people  landed  right  side  up  with  facilities 
adaptable  for  the  making  of  seaplanes.  Shirtless  shirt 
factories  came  in  handy  for  sewing  mosquito  netting  into 
required  forms;  and  pipe-organ  factories,  strangely  enough, 
were  very  good  at  making  mosquito  netting.  Yacht-makers 
were  excellent  on  flying  boats,  and  manufacturers  of  air- 
brakes found  they  could  master  Le  Rhone  motors.  These 
are  but  samples  out  of  thousands  of  industrial  adaptations 
to  the  requirements  of  war. 

The  Resources  and  Conversion  Section  reversed  the 
old  and  awkward  method  of  making  the  American 
mountain  come  to  the  Washington  Mahomet.  It  was  taking 
Mahomet  to  the  mountain.  Washington,  too,  was  no  longer 
the  monumental  puzzle  whither  men  went  to  help  and 
remained  to  dodder.  The  puzzle  resolved  itself,  and  gave 
to  each  man  the  key  to  his  part.  On  the  one  hand,  the  new 
section  gave  light  and  leading  to  the  engrossed  army  and 
navy  ofiicers,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  it  guided  the  resources 
and  facilities  of  the  Nation  to  orderly  concentration  on  war 
industry.  Like  a  sorting-table  in  a  fruit-packing  plant  it 
received  miscellaneous  industry  in  mass  and  distributed  it, 
according  to  its  nature,  to  the  great  tasks  in  hand.     Some 


THE  METAMORPHOSIS  OF  INDUSTRY       249 


industries  were  preserved  for  the  civilian  population,  some 
were  virtually  suppressed  for  the  period  of  the  war,  some 
were  spurred  on  to  renewed  and  increased  activity  in  what 
they  were  doing>,  and  others  were  shifted  from  strong  to  weak 
spots  in  the  industrial  structure  or  from  dispensable  to  indis- 
pensable production.  The  War  Industries  Board,  as  a 
whole,  directed  industrial  strategy;  the  Conversion  Section 
concerned  itself  with  industrial  tactical  evolutions. 


. 


ii 


I 


CHAPTER  XIII 


13 


>1  l,i|ll 


J      I* 

4      I        i        ' 


:| 


i  L 


iv 


DISBURSING    FIFTEEN   BILLION    DOLLARS:    THE    INTER- 
ALLIED PURCHASING  COMMISSION 

The  New  World  succors  the  Old  —  A  golden  key  for  the  Allies  —  Establishing 
a  central  control  —  Legge's  way  —  The  traditional  obstacles  —  Mastering  the 
common  problems  of  supply  —  A  great  coalition  at  work  —  Fifty-two  million 
dollars  for  one  item  —  NorthcMe,  Brand,  Tardieu,  and  Tozzi. 

Canning  said  long  ago  that  he  had  raised  up  a  New  World 
to  restore  the  balance  of  the  Old.  When  America  threw  the 
weight  of  her  finance  and  her  industry  on  the  side  of  the 
Allies,  she  upset  the  economic  balance  between  the  two 
worlds.  Europe  felt  for  months  the  tread  of  her  armies, 
but  the  world  still  reacts  from  the  shock  of  America's 
economic  ofifensive.  The  troops  who  poured  into  France  in 
brown  human  rivers,  filled  the  gaps  in  man  power,  and  grad- 
ually turned  the  balance  of  preponderance,  were  but  two 
millions  added  to  ten  millions.  In  terms  of  soldiers  we 
contributed  to  the  Allied  cause  about  twenty  per  cent,  but 
economically  we  contributed  the  potency  of  the  wealth  of 
half  the  world.  The  result  was  that  all  the  old  channels 
of  commerce  and  finance  were  diverted  or  reversed  with  an 
ensuing  confusion  that  still  bedevils  mankind  in  its  trade 
relations. 

America  rushed  to  the  support  of  the  Allies  her  unsapped 
strength  of  man  power  and  at  the  same  time  she  applied 
her  economic  power  through  the  arms  of  the  Allies.  She 
not  only  added  her  own  new  armies,  but  kept  the  old  armies 
going.  There  was  even  a  period  of  hesitation  in  which  it 
seemed  that  the  one  way  in  which  we  could  render  effective 
assistance  was  by  putting  every  ounce  of  our  strength  into  the 
reinforcement  of  Allied  supply.  It  was  thought  that  to 
raise  huge  armies  in  this  country  would  be  but  to  divert  from 
the  Allies  the  vast  sources  of  supply  they  were  already  enjoy- 
ing; thus  crippling  them  during  the  long  period  before  our 
new  armies  could  be  eflfective. 

The  Allies  themselves  originally  inclined  to  this  view,  but 


DISBURSING  FIFTEEN  BILLION  DOLLARS    251 

its  fallacy  was  exposed  when  the  British  army  in  the 
greatest  disaster  in  its  history  groped  its  way  in  shattered 
fragments  back  to  Amiens,  gasping  for  the  reserves  that  were 
non-existent.  President  Wilson,  as  early  as  May,  1917, 
had  decided  that  the  American  eflfort  must  be  bi-lateral,  and 
m  an  address  to  the  people  in  that  month  he  prophetically 
declared  that  creating  and  equipping  a  great  army  would 
be  "the  simplest  parts  of  the  great  task  to  which  we  have 
addressed  ourselves."  In  the  same  address  he  said  that  we 
must  not  only  equip  our  own  forces  on  land  and  sea,  but  that 
we  must  supply  ships  by  the  hundreds  and  materials  "to 
help  clothe  and  equip  the  armies  with  which  we  are 
cooperating  in  Europe,  and  to  keep  the  looms  and  manu- 
factories there  in  raw  materials;  coal  to  keep  the  fires  going 
in  ships  at  sea  and  in  the  furnaces  of  hundreds  of  factories 
across  the  sea;  steel  of  which  to  make  arms  and  ammunition 
both  here  and  there.  ..." 

We  placed  the  resources  of  America  at  the  disposal  of  the 
Allies  on  a  parity  with  ourselves,  and  gave  them  a  golden 
key  to  the  warehouses  of  the  land  in  the  form  of  ahnost 
unlimited  access  to  the  credit  of  America  through  the 
medium  of  colossal  loans  of  such  magnitude  that  they  may 
not  be  repaid  in  a  hundred  years.  In  doing  so  we  multi- 
plied their  already  large  drain  on  our  resources  and  facilities 
at  the  very  moment  that  we  ourselves  were  subjecting  them 
to  an  unprecedented  strain. 

It  was  very  much  as  if  we  had  authorized  the  Allies  to 
recruit  their  armies  from  our  men  of  military  age  at  the 
same  time  that  we  were  raising  great  new  armies. 

It  was  evident  that  there  must  be  some  sort  of  central 
control;  first,  to  prevent  further  disastrous  competitive  con- 
flicts between  the  Allies,  such  as  were  common  before  we 
became  a  party  to  the  great  combat;  and,  second,  between 
them  and  us.  The  latter  developed  first,  by  reason  of  the 
fact  that  the  Allies  had  already  built  up  large  sources  of 
supply  in  this  country. 

As  has  been  noted  elsewhere,  our  military  men,  con- 
centratmg  their  attention  on  their  own  problem  of  creating 
and  supplying  great  armies,  took  the  position  that  they  must 
be  served  first.     They  not  only  applied  this  principle  with 


»Vi 


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J- ' 


,1 


252    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

respect  to  the  current  requirements  of  the  Allies,  but  ruth- 
lessly took  over  their  plants  that  were  erected  for  and  were 
in  production  for  the  Allies  (some  of  which  they  virtually 
had  paid  for  through  orders  at  prices  that  allowed  for 
amortization  of  plant  costs)  on  contracts  placed  before  the 
United  States  entered  the  war.  They  further  complicated 
the  situation  by  preempting  the  supplies  of  raw  materials, 
even  though  those  could  not  be  utilized  for  many  months  or 
even  longer. 

The  taking-over  of  plants  that  had  been  making  projectiles 
and  guns  for  the  Allies,  although  in  some  cases  a  sheer  waste 
of  the  most  profligate  kind,  was  not  so  serious  a  matter,  on 
the  whole,  as  it  might  have  been,  because  the  Allies  had 
continuously  increased  their  domestic  facilities  until  they 
were  in  excess  of  their  requirements.  Nevertheless,  the 
stopping  of  production  for  them,  long  before  plants  could 
be  utilized  for  the  equipping  of  the  American  forces,  was  a 
blunder  that  has  never  been  adequately  explained.  It 
resulted  in  the  dissipation  of  manufacturing  organizations 
that  had  been  laboriously  built  up  and  in  months  of  non- 
productiveness.  The  most  flagrant  case,  perhaps,  is  that  of 
the  Minneapolis  Steel  and  Machinery  Company,  which  was 
successfully  engaged,  in  cooperation  with  a  forging  plant, 
in  producing  British  six-inch  shells.  The  works  were  closed 
for  six  months  and  the  organization  virtually  wrecked. 
There  was  no  reason  why  they  should  not  have  been  allowed 
to  continue  on  the  British  contract  while  "tooling  up"  for  the 
American  contracts.  In  fact,  they  were  shut  down  before 
the  ordnance  people  had  even  begim  to  design  the  shell  they 
were  to  make  for  the  American  artillery. 

Originally  it  had  been  the  intention  of  the  Allies  to  form 
a  sort  of  committee,  sitting  in  London  or  Paris,  that  would 
primarily  determine  among  themselves  the  form  and  pre- 
cedence of  their  participation  in  American  supplies.  This 
intention  was  fully  realized  by  the  foreign  missions  rep- 
resented on  the  Inter-Allied  Munitions  Council  in  the  last 
few  months  of  the  war. 

The  Inter-Allied  Purchasing  Conunission,  as  it  was  called, 
was  established  in  August,  1917,  about  the  time  the  War 
Industries  Board  was  created,  and  was  composed  of  three 


DISBURSING  FIFTEEN  BILLION  DOLLARS    253 

members  of  that  Board,  whose  aggregate  duties  composed 
the  whole  field  of  supply,  namely,  Messrs.  Baruch  (Raw 
Materials),  Lovett  (Priorities),  and  Brookings  (Finished 
Products).  Although  it  was  primarily  designed  as  an 
instrumentality  of  the  Treasury,  which  did  not  wish  to  dis- 
burse money  to  the  Allies  faster  or  in  larger  amounts  than 
their  necessities  required  as  determined  by  ability  to  procure 
goods  in  this  country,  its  chief  function  soon  became  one  of 
industrial  management,  which  inextricably  involved  it  with 
all  the  functions  of  the  War  Industries  Board.  It  was 
fundamentally  related  to  the  general  problem  of  require- 
ments, and  eventually,  in  the  final  form  of  the  War 
Industries  Board,  it  was  affiliated  with  the  Requirements 
Division. 

Mr.   Baruch,  who   was   then   at   the   head   of  the   Raw 
Materials  Division  of  the  War  Industries  Board,  called  on 
Mr.  Alexander  Legge,  vice-president  and  general  manager 
of  the   International  Harvester   Company,   of   Chicago,   to 
assist  him  generally  and  particularly  in  his  duties  as  mem- 
ber of  the  new  Commission.     Mr.  Legge  had  had  a  large 
experience  in  foreign  trade   and  was  very  familiar  with 
American  industry.     A  little  later,  Mr.   Brookings  asked 
Mr.  Legge  to  act  in  a  similar  capacity  for  him  with  respect 
to  finished  products,  as  the  line  of  separation  between  raw 
materials  and  finished  products  was  a  very  hazy  one.     He 
was  then  designated  as  general  manager  of  the  Commission. 
His  office  equipment  at  first  consisted  of  one  edge  of  Mr. 
Baruch's  desk.     In  view  of  the  fact  that  his  duties  involved 
the  adaptation  of    both    American  and  Allied  requirements 
to  the  available  resources  and  facilities,  a  member  of  the 
British  High  Commission  calculated  that  his   staff"  would 
uhimately  comprise  many  more  than  the  fourteen  thousand 
people  of  the  British  Ministry  of  Munitions. 

"I  might  take  the  fourteen  part  of  that  number,"  said 
Legge. 

He  was  not  quite  right,  but  his  staff"  never  exceeded  one 
hundred  and  fifty.  Its  smallness  was  due  partly  to  the  fact 
that  the  War  Industries  Board's  duties  were  such  that  all 
contracting,  ordering,  and  the  supervision  of  production, 
mspection  and  delivery,  etc.,  remained  in  the  hands  of  the 


;i 


li 


'  I 


« 


f' 


Li 


254    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

War  and  Navy  Departments  and  other  bodies.  For  the  rest, 
it  was  due  to  the  loyal  cooperation  of  American  industry 
which  performed,  through  its  war  service  committees  and 
other  associations,  and  through  individual  industries,  many 
of  the  tasks  that  would  otherwise  have  fallen  to  the  Board. 

Owing  to  the  difficulties  inherent  in  the  situation  of  a  great 
industrial  nation  transforming  its  productive  organization 
to  meet  the  requirements  of  war,  so  radically  different  from 
those  of  peace,  the  task  of  the  Inter-Allied  Purchasing  Com- 
mission would  have  been  hard  enough  at  best.  But  being 
without  any  more  real  authority  in  the  beginning  than  any 
other  part  of  the  War  Industries  Board  at  that  time,  it  was 
placed  in  a  very  awkward  position.  There  was  nowhere 
else  for  the  commercial  and  industrial  representatives  of  the 
Allies  to  go  in  their  quest  of  action.  They  had  voluntarily 
given  up  their  own  previous  system  of  buying  in  this  country 
and  they  represented  Governments  which  were  accustomed 
at  home  to  having  their  orders  obeyed  as  much  industri- 
ally as  militarily.  Yet  the  Allied  Purchasing  Commission 
and  the  War  Industries  Board  had  no  authority.  All  the 
Commission  could  do  was  to  argue,  beg,  and  implore  the 
army,  navy,  and  Shipping  Board  people  to  let  the  French 
have  this,  the  British  that,  the  Italians  something  else,  and  so 
on.    It  was  a  maddening  position. 

At  first,  so  far  were  our  military  authorities  from  the 
cooperative  spirit  that,  instead  of  releasing  to  the  Allies  any 
of  the  facilities  that  diey  had  taken  away  from  them,  they 
were  disposed  to  (and  often  did)  take  possession  of  any  that 
Mr.  Legge  might  uncover.  In  effect,  we  said  to  our  Allies, 
*'Help  yourselves,"  indicating  with  a  sweeping  gesture  the 
illimitable  resources  of  a  continent;  but  at  the  same  time 
negativing  the  invitation  by  helping  ourselves  first  to  every- 
thing in  sight. 

The  Inter-Allied  Purchasing  Commission  saw  clearly  that 
to  sacrifice  the  efficiency  of  the  armies  already  contending 

^t  is  pertinent  to  note  here  that  the  total  expenditures  of  the  Council  of 
National  Defense  and  the  War  Industries  Board  for  the  war  period  amounted 
to  but  $771^.  This  included  $200,000  for  the  erection  of  the  Council  of 
National  Defense  Building,  in  which  the  War  Industries  Board  was  housed. 
It  is  doubtful  if  any  governmental  war  agencies  of  similar  importance,  in  any 
country,  operated  under  such  amazingly  small  overhead.  £.  K.  Ellsworth  dis* 
bursed  the  funds  for  both  bodies. 


t   ! 


DISBURSING  FIFTEEN  BILLION  DOLLARS    255 

with  the  common  foe  in  France  and  elsewhere  for  the  super- 
equipment  of  an  army  not  yet  in  being  was  a  strategic  error 
for  the  like  of  which  a  field  marshal  would  have  been  court- 
martialed.  In  their  humiliating  task  of  begging  for  conces- 
sions which  they  should  have  been  in  a  position  to  command, 
members  of  the  Commission  had  to  iterate  and  reiterate  the 
cogent  argument  that,  if  the  Allies  should  collapse  while 
America  armed,  our  armies  might  have  to  fight  for  a  landing- 
place  in  Europe  and  continue  the  war  alone.  By  the  cumu- 
lative results  of  persistence  and  repetition,  the  Commission 
gradually  brought  the  military  authorities  around  to  the  view 
that  the  war  was  to  be  fought  not  by  an  American  army 
alone,  but  by  that  army  as  part  of  a  great  coalition. 

Perhaps  it  was  not  that  our  officers  were  so  blind  as  not  to 
recognize  the  implications  of  alliance,  but  more  the  bad 
practice  resulting  from  the  lack  of  internal  coordination. 
Each  procuring  officer  was  so  placed  and  bound  that  officially 
he  could  do  nothing  but  grab  for  himself  and  his.  If  in  the 
rush  he  bowled  over  associates  and  allies,  it  was  not  his  to 
pause  or  reason  why,  but  to  go  madly  on  with  the  grabbing. 
In  this  sort  of  procedure,  the  more  efficient  the  agent,  the 
greater  the  damage. 

We  here  come  back  to  that  hydra-headed  traditional  refusal 
of  the  American  people  to  prepare  for  the  future.  A  small 
complement  of  officers  who  had  been  precluded  from  getting 
ready  even  in  a  small  way  for  war  was  diluted  twenty  to 
one  with  civilians  temporarily  in  uniform  whose  special, 
technical,  and  commercial  qualifications  only  served  to  make 
them  more  efficient  than  the  regulars  in  the  grand  game  of 
grab,  .each  for  his  own.  Under  these  circumstances  it  was  a 
harder  task  to  obtain  recognition  of  the  principle  of  equal, 
if  not  preferred,  treatment  of  the  Allies'  economic  needs  than 
it  was  afterwards  to  fill  them. 

The  explanation  of  the  ruthless  competition  of  departments 
of  our  Government  with  each  other  and  with  the  Allies  was 
well  set  forth  by  an  energetic  and  achieving  young  army 
officer,  who  had  upset  the  carefully  laid  plans  of  months  of 
another  department  by  requisitioning  certain  facilities.  When 
Mr.  Legge  had  pointed  out  to  him  the  consequences  of  his 
action,  he  answered: 


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256    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

*'Well,  I  guess  that  is  true,  but  I  am  put  on  this  job  of 
mine  with  imperative  instructions  to  get  these  goods  by  a 
fixed  date,  and  there  will  be*  no  excuse  for  me  if  I  go  back 
to  my  chief  and  say  that  it  was  out  of  consideration  for  the 
other  fellow  that  I  failed  to  deliver.  My  instructions  are 
to  go  and  get,  and  I  go  and  get  regardless  of  how  it  hurts  or 
whom  it  hurts.  I  must  do  it.  I  have  no  authority  to  consider 
the  other  fellow's  problems." 

Despite  the  enormous  diflSculties  the  Inter-Allied  Purchas- 
ing Commission  steadily  gained  mastery  of  the  epic  prob- 
lem of  keeping  open  and  enlarging  the  American  sources  of 
supply  for  the  Allies,  simultaneously  with  the  satisfaction  of 
the  vast  new  demands  of  arming  America.  The  problem 
was  blended  with  the  general  problem  of  the  War  Industries 
Board.  That  Board  never  for  a  moment  subordinated  Allied 
needs  to  those  of  the  American  forces.  On  the  contrary,  every 
effort  was  made  to  secure  precedence  for  the  requirements 
of  the  Allies  in  all  the  days  while  the  American  armies  were 
training;  and  later  the  needs  of  all  the  armies  of  the  great 
coalition  were  met  according  to  the  demands  of  the  common 
eflfort. 

A  decision  by  the  Inter-Allied  Purchasing  Commission  was 
a  decision  by  the  War  Industries  Board.  It  was  necessarily 
a  part  of  the  Board's  requirements  machinery,  and  when  the 
Requirements  Division  was  set  up,  Mr.  Legge  became  its  head. 
He  was  succeeded  by  James  A.  Carr  as  general  manager  of 
the  Commission,  but  the  work  remained  under  Mr.  Legge's 
general  supervision,  and,  of  course,  under  the  authority  of 
the  Commission.  The  manner  in  which  what  was  originally 
conceived  of  as  a  sort  of  Treasury  advisory  board  regarding 
loans  to  the  Allies  became  part  of  the  warp  and  woof  of  the 
War  Industries  Board  is  an  illustration  of  the  absorptive  and 
adaptive  nature  of  that  body,  which  was  always  ready  to 
fit  into  all  the  niches  and  crannies  of  things  to  be  done,  with- 
out waiting  for  hint  or  command.  An  undone  job  unclaimed 
by  others  was  always  a  signal  for  initiative  on  the  part  of 
the  Board.  Could  the  mood  and  temper  of  war-time  prevail 
among  people  and  leaders  in  peace-time,  a  general  form  of 
government  as  mobile  and  as  initiative  as  the  War  Industries 
Board  would  approach  the  ideal. 


DISBURSING  FIFTEEN  BILLION  DOLLARS    257 


The  members  of  the  Commission  met  regularly  with  the 
authorized  representatives  of  the  Allies  in  Washington,  thus 
forming  an  Inter-Allied  Council  on  American  economic  con- 
tribution to  the  reinforcement  of  the  Allies.  So  far  as  the 
Americans  were  concerned,  there  were  no  intrigues  and  no 
finesse  in  the  proceedings  of  these  meetings.  And,  it  is  but 
fair  to  say,  if  the  representatives  of  the  Allies  had  at  first 
purposes  of  promoting  individual  interests  at  the  expense  of 
their  associates,  they  were  soon  abandoned. 

These  meetings,  daily  at  first  and  semi-weekly  later,  soon 
became  judicial  conferences.  Each  national  representative 
stated  his  requirements  and  narrated  his  troubles  with  respect 
to  pending  orders.  Among  the  literally  thousands  of  articles 
and  commodities  the  Allies  were  getting  in  this  country,  an 
immense  number  were  for  things  of  which  there  was  no 
shortage.  In  such  cases  a  statement  of  requirement  was 
merely  pro  forma,  but  in  the  basic  commodities  and  in  many 
sorts  of  finished  goods,  where  there  was  a  shortage,  it  became 
a  question  of  allocating  the  supply  or  the  facilities  pro  rata 
or  according  to  superior  need.  Each  national  representative 
stated  the  position  of  his  country  with  regard  tp  an  article 
or  commodity  and  then  the  conference  discussed  the  relative 
importance  of  needs  with  the  common  cause  as  the  sole 
criterion  of  judgment.  It  was  no  unusual  thing  for  the 
representative  of  one  nation,  after  hearing  the  presentation 
of  the  position  of  another  nation,  to  waive  or  postpone  his 
own  applications. 

Many  of  the  decisions  this  council  was  called  upon  to 
make  could  better  have  been  made,  perhaps,  with  fuller 
knowledge  and  understanding  by  such  a  body  meeting  near 
the  theater  of  war  and  the  governments  of  the  Allies;  but  it 
had  the  advantage  of  being  in  the  American  scene,  and  of 
understanding  the  problems  of  production  and  delivery  that 
arose  on  this  side  of  the  water.  In  Europe  the  belief  per- 
sisted that  the  United  States  was  both  a  huge  storehouse 
of  inexhaustible  accumulated  products  and  a  manufacturing 
miracle,  with  transport  facilities  equal  to  instantaneous  com- 
pliance with  every  possible  demand.  The  members  of  the 
purchasing  commissions  of  the  diflferent  countries,  who  were 
resident  here,  understood  how  diflferent  were  the  facts.    They 


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258    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

knew,  too,  how  their  goods,  delivered  at  the  seaboard,  were 
forever  accumulating  in  terminal  yards  and  on  wharves,  for 
lack  of  shipping  to  move  them;  and  why,  therefore,  it  was 
often  useless  to  press  for  immediate  satisfaction  of  the  direst 
needs.  But  the  Commission  and  the  War  Industries  Board, 
with  all  the  machinery  of  its  functional,  administrative,  and 
commodity  divisions,  was  always  eager  and  ready  to  meet  as 
best  the  conditions  permitted  every  requirement  approved  at 
the  conferences. 

Aside  from  its  function  of  financial  controller  of  Allied 
purchases  for  the  purposes  of  the  Treasury  Department,  the 
Allied  Purchasing  Commission  was  in  practice  the  whole 
War  Industries  Board  functioning  for  the  Allies.  To  under- 
take to  follow  the  detail  of  the  management  of  the  economic 
recruiting  of  the  Allies  in  America  would  be  merely  to 
follow  through  a  particular  phase  of  the  War  Industries 
Board's  work,  with  this  difference  that  the  Commission 
proper  had  also  to  deal,  as  the  guardian  of  the  Allies'  inter- 
ests, with  the  Shipping  Board  for  marine  transport,  with  the 
Food  Administration  for  foods  and  feeds,  and  with  the  Fuel 
Administration  for  fuels.  So  far  as  the  materials  and  facili- 
ties needed  by  the  Allies  fell  within  the  domain  of  the  War 
Industries  Board,  and  even  when  without,  that  body  through- 
out all  its  parts  was  the  authorized  instrumentality  of  their 
realization. 

The  relations  of  the  Commission  to  the  purchasing  agents 
of  the  Allies  were  analogous  to  those  existing  between  the 
War  Industries  Board  and  the  corresponding  agencies  of  the 
American  war-making  media.  The  agents  of  the  Allies 
attended  to  their  own  purchases  just  as  the  army  oflScers  did. 
The  Commission  sometimes  told  them  what  they  must  do  and 
what  they  could  not  do,  in  a  general  way.  It  also  reviewed 
their  contracts  to  assure  itself  that  they  were  not  being 
victimized.  They  were  assisted,  guided,  and  protected,  but 
the  Commission  did  not  undertake  to  pass  on  the  validity  of 
their  requirements  any  more  than  the  War  Industries  Board 
sought  to  tell  our  army  what  sort  of  equipment  it  should 
have.  They  were  assumed  to  know  their  own  business.  The 
Conunission's  business  was  to  see  that,  since  they  were  spend- 
ing borrowed  American  money,  they  were  not  mulcted,  that 


DISBURSING  FIFTEEN  BILLION  DOLLARS    259 


they  received  the  degree  of  preference  they  were  entitled  to, 
having  in  mind  the  end  in  common,  and  that  their  course  was 
made  as  smooth  for  them  as  possible.  Beyond  those  friendly 
limitations  they  were  free  agents  and  made  or  marred  their 
own  records.  Yet  the  fact  that  the  Inter-Allied  Purchasing 
Commission  regulated  the  flow  of  credits  from  the  Treasury 
gave  the  War  Industries  Board  a  general  power  of  direction 
and  manipulation  that  it  did  not  have  over  the  purchasing 
agencies  of  our  Government.  It  had  more  authority  at  the 
source,  at  least  in  the  way  of  advice  that  would  command 
respect.  In  a  very  true  sense  it  was  the  disburser  of  the  ten 
billions  of  dollars  that  the  Allies  received  from  the  United 
States. 

The  men  who  measured  the  flow  of  this  golden  flood  had 
had  large  experience  in  big  business,  but  Mr.  Legge,  for 
example,  was  amazed  at  the  colossal  buying  powers  for  war. 
One  of  the  first  orders  he  had  to  deal  with  was  one  for  the 
British  Government  for  $52,000,000  worth  of  six-inch  gun 
shells.  Fifty-two  million  dollars  in  one  order  for  one  item! 
When  we  consider  that  this  approximated  one  third  of  the 
normal  annual  net  earnings  of  the  world's  greatest  corpora- 
tion and  more  than  the  entire  cost  of  the  Revolutionary  War, 
we  begin  to  understand  what  fifteen  billions  (including 
private  credits),  so  placed  that  it  reversed  the  old  inter- 
national position  of  credits  and  debits,  meant.  The  largest 
national  debt  in  the  world  before  the  World  War  was  that  of 
France,  which  was  about  $6,000,000,000,  virtually  all  held 
at  home.  A  single  national  bond  issue  of  a  billion  dollars 
was  never  known  before  the  recent  war,  and  such  an  inter- 
national credit  between  governments  as  ten  billions  would 
have  been  considered  preposterous  in  sensational  fiction. 
Is  it  any  wonder  that  the  outpouring  of  American  wealth 
into  the  scale  pans  of  the  Allies  disturbed  the  balance  of  the 
world  more  than  the  armed  weight  of  two  million  soldiers? 

Yet  the  War  Industries  Board,  in  supervising  for  the  Allies 
the  expenditure  of  the  cost  of  twenty-five  Panama  Canals, 
was  attending  to  only  about  one  third  of  the  total  of  its  work 
as  measured  in  dollars.  All  the  costs  of  the  Federal  Govern- 
ment since  the  Revolutionary  War  were  not  equal  to  the 
amount  spent  and  loaned  by  the  Government  of  the  United 


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260    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

States  in  the  World  War.  In  a  few  months  the  War  Indus- 
tries Board  had  to  adapt  national  resources  and  facilities 
to  a  flood  of  expenditures  so  vast  that  it  can  be  glimpsed  only 
by  such  comparisons. 

The  foreign  representatives  on  the  Inter-Allied  Purchasing 
Commission  were  without  exception  men  of  integrity  and 
high  ability.  Each  Government  maintained  a  representative 
in  America  with  the  official  title  of  High  Commissioner.  In 
the  earlier  days  of  the  Inter-Allied  Purchasing  Commission, 
Lord  Northclifi*e  was  the  High  Commissioner  of  Great 
Britain.  He  was  succeeded  by  Sir  Charles  Gordon,  whose 
representative  was  the  Honorable  R.  H.  Brand.  The  French 
Government  was  represented  by  a  High  Commissioner  in  the 
person  of  M.  Andre  Tardieu,  who  maintained  a  residence  in 
Washington  and  had  an  extensive  and  highly  trained  staff. 
The  Italian  Government  was  represented  in  the  person  of 
General  Tozzi. 

James  A.  Carr  succeeded  Mr.  Legge  as  business  manager 
of  the  Commission,  and  W.  M.  Reay,  A.  L.  Bostwick,  James 
C.  Leddy,  and  F.  E.  Penick  acted  as  assistants. 

The  Inter-Allied  Purchasing  Commission  performed  its 
great  work  without  the  slightest  hint  of  corruption,  and  the 
efficiency  of  its  performance  was  undoubtedly  on  a  par  with 
American  military  cooperation  with  the  Allies. 


>  i 


I 


CHAPTER  XIV 

AMERICA  AND  WORLD  WAR  ECONOMICS:    THE  FOREIGN 
MISSION  AND  INTERNATIONAL  EXECUTIVES 


Buttressing  the  world's  economic  structure  —  Baruch  demands  reciprocity  from 
the  British  —  The  Foreign  Mission  lays  its  plans  —  The  British  Government 
meets  Sunmiers  —  Austen  Chamberlain  and  Winston  Churchill  cooperate  — 
Seventy-five  million  dollars  saved  —  Summers  takes  charge  of  a  meetings 
Conserving  steel  for  war  —  The  story  of  two  million  shoes. 

So  commanding  was  the  economic  strategic  position  of  the 
United  States  in  the  Allied  coalition  that  it  was  inevitable 
that  the  American  economic  control  should  tend  to  become 
that  of  the  whole  alliance.  Considered  as  an  agricultural, 
mining,  lumber,  and  manufacturing  unit,  the  United  States 
approached  more  nearly  to  self -containment  than  any  other 
nation.  In  no  other  country,  available  as  a  base  of  supplies 
for  the  Allies,  was  it  possible  for  them  to  satisfy  so  large 
a  proportion  of  their  needs. 

In  some  commodities,  such  as  steel  and  copper,  the  Ameri- 
can sources  were  virtually  the  only  ones  available  to  the 
Allies  outside  their  inadequate  domestic  productions.  In 
other  commodities,  such  as  foodstuffs,  that  were  available 
in  large  surplusages  in  distant  British  dominions  and  in 
South  America,  the  extreme  shortage  of  shipping  made  it 
necessary  to  put  a  tremendous  strain  on  North  American 
supplies,  for  owing  to  the  shorter  route  the  limited  transport 
facilities  could  render  greater  service.  Under  these  arti- 
ficial conditions  the  United  States,  which  had  almost  ceased 
to  be  an  exporter  of  meats  and  wheat  and  its  products, 
became  for  a  time  again  an  exporter  of  them  in  unprece- 
dented volume. 

The  United  States  was  also  the  one  member  of  the  anti- 
Teutonic  coalition  that  was  in  a  position  to  impel  the  eco- 
nomic assistance  of  the  politically  neutral  nations.  In  the 
case  of  the  Scandinavian  countries,  for  example,  the  United 
States  was  in  a  position,  as  the  price  of  that  modicum  of 
supply  that  was  necessary  to  their  existence,  to  assist  in  the 
diversion  of  such  exportable  goods  as  they  had,  to  the  Allies, 


M 


262    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


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and  to  tighten  the  embargoes  against  trade  with  Germany. 
In  the  case  of  Chile,  the  shifting  of  its  source  of  supply  of 
manufactured  goods  and  financing  from  Europe  to  the  United 
States  made  it  possible  .for  the  United  States  to  secure  control 
of  the  Chilean  nitrates  witliout  which  the  war  could  not  have 
continued. 

Thus  the  United  States  in  reality  played  a  triple  economic 
part  in  the  war.  It  had  to  meet  its  own  civil  and  military 
needs,  an  indispensable  proportion  of  those  of  the  Allies, 
and  such  part  of  the  requirements  of  the  neutrals  as  would 
make  them  economically  contributory  to  the  Allies.  In  a 
very  large  way  the  United  States  was  the  cohesive  force 
which  kept  the  whole  economic  structure  of  the  world  from 
falling  into  ruin.  In  the  final  analysis  the  major  part  of 
this  tremendous  task  fell  to  the  War  Industries  Board.  When 
at  last  the  chairman  of  the  Board  became  the  arbiter  of 
priority —  that  is  to  say,  the  allocator  of  the  products  of 
American  industry  —  he  automatically  tended  to  become  the 
central,  though  undesignated,  distributing  authority  of  the 
internationally  derived  commodities  of  the  entire  world  out- 
side of  the  Teutonic  alliance. 

The  growth  of  this  international  power  and  its  efficient 
application  necessitated  that  the  War  Industries  Board  should 
be  ably  and  authoritatively  represented  in  Europe  in  close 
touch  with  the  Inter- Allied  Munitions  Council  and  with  those 
British  agencies  which  thitherto  had  dominated  the  control 
of  certain  materials  that  were  obtainable  chiefly  within  the 
British  Empire  or  were  British-owned.  Another  considera- 
tion that  demanded  the  projection  of  the  War  Industries 
Board  into  Europe  was  the  need  of  far  more  economical  use 
of  shipping  in  the  interest  of  the  common  cause.  A  third 
was  the  need  of  seeing  to  it  that  American  materials,  often 
supplied  to  the  Allies  at  the  cost  of  much  deprivation  and 
hardship  to  American  industry  of  a  non-war  nature,  were 
husbanded  and  faithfully  used  by  the  Allies  for  war  and 
not  for  private  trade  purposes.  A  fourth  need  of  representa- 
tion abroad  was  the  conviction  that  the  American  Expedi- 
tionary Forces  were  calling  for  or  were  receiving  certain 
kinds  of  supplies  far  in  excess  of  current  or  reasonably 
anticipated  requirements.    Finally,  the  A.E.F.  had  need  of 


AMERICA  AND  WORLD  WAR  ECONOMICS    263 


business  advice  and  judgment  in  its  extensive  purchases  in 
Europe,  which  could  hardly  be  expected  to  be  available  to 
it  without  outside  assistance. 

It  is  difficult  for  Americans  to  understand  that  in  the 
fourth  year  of  the  World  War,  and  even  after  the  United 
States  had  been  a  party  to  it  for  upwards  of  a  year,  the 
British  control  of  production,  distribution,  and  prices  was 
far  weaker  and  much  less  extensive  than  like  control  in  the 
United  States.  It  is  something  of  a  shock,  too,  to  find  that 
throughout  our  first  year  in  the  war  our  Government  in  its 
foreign  requirements  was  treated  by  the  British  Government 
precisely  as  if  it  were  a  British  civilian  in  the  matter  of 
prices.  In  such  commodities  as  the  British  Government  had 
put  under  price-control  there  was  one  price  for  the  Govern- 
ment and  another  for  civilians  and  private  industry.  The 
United  States  Government  had  paid  the  civilian's  price, 
though  from  the  first  the  United  States  had  made  it  an 
invariable  rule  that  all  prices  established  for  governmental 
buying  should  also  prevail  for  civilians  and  for  the  Allies. 

The  prime  purpose  of  the  Foreign  Mission  was  to  put 
an  end  to  this  inequality.  This  purpose  was  frankly 
disclosed  to  Lord  Reading,  the  British  Ambassador  at  Wash- 
ington. He  opined  that  the  Mission  was  a  very  disturbing 
factor  in  international  relations.  Mr.  Baruch  informed  him, 
with  the  directness  of  a  business  man,  that  the  United  States 
could  no  longer  tolerate  the  continuation  of  such  an  inequity 
as  that  we  should  lend  the  Allies  immense  sums  with  which 
to  purchase  goods  at  a  restricted  and  controlled  price, 
whereas  we  were  denied  equal  price  treatment  by  them.  This 
meant  that  unless  reciprocity  were  eff*ected  American  finan- 
cial support  would  be  withdrawn  from  the  Allies. 

A  further  step  was  the  insistence  that  the  British  should 
take  under  price-control  certain  important  commodities  that 
they  were  still  permitting  to  run  wild.  These  proposals 
were  unpleasant  to  the  British  Government,  for  the  coalition 
war  machinery  of  England  was  highly  responsive  to  the 
power  and  demands  of  its  commercial  interests;  and  the 
economic  side  of  the  war  was  considered  from  a  material- 
istic angle  undreamed  of  in  America.  It  was  this  fact  that 
accounted  for  the  anomaly  of  no  price-regulation  at  all 


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264    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

of  some  scarce  commodities  and  of  two  prices  for  others. 

The  American  War  Industries  Board  was  thus  directly 
involved  in  British  trade  and  industrial  control  when  it  sent 
out  the  Foreign  Mission.  It  was  a  bold  and  hazardous  enter- 
prise, and  Lord  Reading  was  well  advised  to  say  that  it  was 
a  disturbing  factor  in  international  relations.  It  went,  how- 
ever, in  no  Quixotic  quest,  but  firm  of  purpose,  clear  of 
comprehension  as  to  its  objectives,  and  fully  supported  at 
home.  Both  President  Wilson  and  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
McAdoo  were  whole-heartedly  behind  the  undertaking.  There 
was  no  chance  that  the  Mission  would  find  itself  out  on  a 
precarious  limb.  It  was  anticipating  trouble,  but  it  was 
well  armed. 

Any  one  who  attempts  to  interfere  with  any  of  the  vested 
interests  of  John  Bull,  especially  in  his  own  home,  will  not 
find  interest  in  life  lacking.  The  Foreign  Mission  was  advised 
by  old  heads  in  European  diplomacy  that,  however  much 
value  the  indirect  and  soft-pedaling  methods  of  the  tradi- 
tionally disingenuous  manner  of  dealing  with  international 
matters  might  have  in  ordinary  times,  shirt-sleeves  diplomacy 
was  precisely  the  sort  for  the  hour. 

The  Mission,  being  mostly  composed  of  American  business 
men  accustomed  to  direct  dealing  and  impatient  of  delays, 
received  this  admonition  with  satisfaction.  At  its  head  was 
L.  L.  Summers,  member  of  the  War  Industries  Board  and 
technical  adviser  to  the  Board,  who  combined  a  vast  and 
mobile  knowledge  of  the  chemistry,  physics,  and  economics 
of  war,  in  practical  application,  with  a  quick  and  lucidly 
analytical  mind  and  abundant  energy.^  Chandler  P.  Ander- 
son, a  lawyer  of  extensive  diplomatic  and  international 
experience  who  enjoyed  a  personal  acquaintance  with  officials 
of  the  French  and  British  Foreign  Offices,  was  counsellor  and 
adviser  to  the  Mission.  George  N.  Armsby,  vice-president 
of  the  California  Packing  Corporation,  of  San  Francisco,  and 
chief  of  the  Tin  Section  and  also  a  member  of  the  Priorities 
Committee  of  the  War  Industries  Board,  was  specially 
charged  with  the  subject  of  tin.  Paul  Mackall,  assistant  sales 
manager  of  the  Bethlehem  Steel  Corporation,  was  the  steel 

^Mr.  Summers's  role  in  the  War  Industries  Board  will  be  discussed  in 
Chapter  XXI. 


AMERICA  AND  WORLD  WAR  ECONOMICS    265 


man.  A.  M.  Patterson,  president  of  the  Textile  Alliance,  and 
chief  of  the  Foreign  Wool  Section,  was  the  wool  authority. 
Henry  W.  Boyd,  president  of  the  Armour  Leather  Company, 
was  the  leather  expert.  Arthur  D.  Whiteside,  president  of 
the  National  Credit  Office,  New  York,  a  member  of  the  Wool 
Section,  had  general  charge  of  the  Mission's  statistical  mat- 
ters. Edward  Allen  Pierce,  of  the  brokerage  firm  of  A.  A. 
Housman  &  Co.,  New  York,  was  business  manager.  Lucius 
P.  Ordway,  president  of  the  Crane-Ordway  Company,  of 
Minneapolis,  and  a  member  of  the  Priorities  Committee,  was 
the  Mission's  representative  on  the  Inter-Allied  Munitions 
Council.  John  Hughes,  president  of  the  American  Sheet  and 
Tinplate  Company,  and  member  of  the  American  Iron  and 
Steel  Institute,  was  associated  with  Mr.  Armsby  on  tin. 
Frederick  K.  Nixon,  president  of  Nixon,  Walker  &  Tracy, 
New  York,  assisted  Mr.  Patterson  in  textile  matters.  Dr. 
Lincoln  Hutchinson,  professor  of  Commerce  of  the  University 
of  California,  was  the  non-ferrous  metals  expert. 

Through  the  President  and  the  State  Department,  it  was 
arranged  that  the  Mission  should  have  such  a  diplomatic 
status  that,  while  having  the  cordial  support  of  the  American 
diplomatic  and  war  trade  services,  it  would  have  full  author- 
ity to  act  directly,  thus  effecting  a  saving  of  time  and  gain- 
ing the  advantage  of  forceful  contact  with  the  responsible 
war  executives  of  France  and  England. 

The  War  Trade  Board  had  its  representatives,  with  pleni- 
potentiary credentials,  associated  with  American  embassies 
and  ministers  throughout  the  world,  and  was  in  a  position  to 
be  and  was  of  the  greatest  assistance  to  the  Foreign  Mission. 
This  was  especially  true  in  regard  to  matters  with  which  it 
had  been  incidentally  dealing  before  the  Foreign  Mission 
took  them  over.  Its  representatives  knew  the  ropes  and  the 
key  men  in  the  Governments  of  the  Allies  and  the  neutrals. 
Thus  there  was  extended  into  international  relations  the 
War  Industries  Board's  methods  of  expediting  business  by 
direct  and  frank  dealings  between  Government  representa- 
tives who  were  experts  in  their  particular  commodities  and 
the  delegated  committees  of  industries.  It  was,  moreover, 
essential  that,  since  the  chairman  of  the  Board  delegated 
absolute  control  of  the  foreign  relations  of  the  Board  to  the 


^^.l 


i 


i 


t' 


If 


w 


\ 


M 


266    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Foreign  Mission,  it  should  be  in  a  position  to  acquaint  itself 
directly  with  all  the  facts  and  factors  that  would  determine 
its  policies  and  practices.  Long-winded  diplomatic  corre- 
spondence, circumlocution,  and  procrastination  were  thus 

avoided. 

About  the  time  the  Mission  sailed,  it  was  found  that  in  a 
strict  legalistic  sense  the  then  available  funds  of  the  War 
Industries  Board  could  not  be  used  to  defray  its  expenses. 
This  fact  was  later  discovered  by  a  lynx-eyed  member  of 
Congress  during  one  of  the  gossipy  committee  hearings  that 
enlivened  Executive  performance  during  the  war.  Judge 
Albert  C.  Ritchie,  general  counsel  of  the  War  Indus- 
tries Board,  and  at  this  writing  governor  pf  Maryland,  was 
testifying  as  representative  of  Mr.  Baruch  who  was  then  in 
Europe.     A  colloquy  something  like  the  following  ensued: 

The  Member:   "How  much  did  the  Foreign  Mission  cost?" 

Judge  Ritchie:  "It  cost  $63,752.25." 

The  Member:  "Are  you  aware  that  there  was  no  authority 
for  such  an  expenditure?" 

Judge  Ritchie:   "Yes,  sir." 

The  Member:   "Have  you  any  explanation  to  offer?" 

Judge  Ritchie:  "There  was  no  expenditure  of  Government 
moneys.  Under  the  circumstances  there  was  nothing  for  Mr. 
Baruch  to  do  but  pay  the  bills  himself.    The  Mission  had  to 

go-" 

The  Foreign  Mission  aimed  at  the  creation  of  international 

executives  (as  the  most  satisfactory  method  of  control  of  a 

number  of  commodities  of  which  the  supply  was  insufficient 

and  whose  sources  were  largely  or  chiefly  outside  of  the 

United  States)   similar  to  the  nitrate  executive,  which  had 

been  established  previously,  as  will  be  related  later.     The 

commodities  whose  control  was  definitely  contemplated  in 

this  manner  when  the  Mission  went  abroad  were  tin,  jute, 

rubber,  manganese,  tungsten,  leather,  platinum,  flax,  wool. 

Other  commodities  were  tentatively  under  consideration. 

Prior  to  or  aside  from  the  creation  of  such  executives,  the 

Mission  sought  its  ends  through  contacts  with  the  Inter-Allied 

Munitions  Council,  the  British  economic  control  committees, 

the  French  and  British  Ministries  of  Munitions,  shipping 

control  agencies,  and  the  A.E.F.    The  three  objects  in  view 


:  I 


ALBERT  C.  RITCHIE  HUGH  FRAYNE 

General  Counsel  of  the  War  Industries  Board;  Member  of  the  War  Industries  Boani 

now  Governor  of  Maryland  representing  Labor 

ROBERT  S.  BROOKINGS 
Member  of  the  War  Industries  Board  and  Chairman 
;  of  its  Price-fixing  Committee 


f 


' 


INTENTIONAL  SECOND  EXPOSURE 


^ 


I 


I 


266    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Foreign  Mission,  it  should  be  in  a  position  to  acquaint  itself 
directly  with  all  the  facts  and  factors  that  would  determine 
its  policies  and  practices.  Long-winded  diplomatic  corre- 
spondence, circumlocution,   and  procrastination  were  thus 

avoided. 

About  the  time  the  Mission  sailed,  it  was  found  that  in  a 
strict  legalistic  sense  the  then  available  funds  of  the  War 
Industries  Board  could  not  be  used  to  defray  its  expenses. 
This  fact  was  later  discovered  by  a  lynx-eyed  member  of 
Congress  during  one  of  the  gossipy  committee  hearings  that 
enlivened  Executive  performance  during  the  war.  Judge 
Albert  C.  Ritchie,  general  counsel  of  the  War  Indus- 
tries Board,  and  at  this  writing  governor  of  Maryland,  was 
testifying  as  representative  of  Mr.  Baruch  who  was  then  in 
Europe.     A  colloquy  something  like  the  following  ensued: 

The  Member:   "How  much  did  the  Foreign  Mission  cost?" 

Judge  Ritchie:  "It  cost  $63,752.25." 

The  Member:  "Are  you  aware  that  there  was  no  authority 
for  such  an  expenditure?" 

Judge  Ritchie:   "Yes,  sir." 

The  Member:   "Have  you  any  explanation  to  offer?" 

Judge  Ritchie:  "There  was  no  expenditure  of  Government 
moneys.  Under  the  circumstances  there  was  nothing  for  Mr. 
Baruch  to  do  but  pay  the  bills  himself.    The  Mission  had  to 

go-" 

The  Foreign  Mission  aimed  at  the  creation  of  international 

executives  (as  the  most  satisfactory  method  of  control  of  a 

number  of  commodities  of  which  the  supply  was  insufficient 

and  whose  sources  were  largely  or  chiefly  outside  of  the 

United  States)   similar  to  the  nitrate  executive,  which  had 

been  established  previously,  as  will  be  related  later.     The 

commodities  whose  control  was  definitely  contemplated  in 

this  manner  when  the  Mission  went  abroad  were  tin,  jute, 

rubber,  manganese,  tungsten,  leather,  platinum,  flax,  wool. 

Other  commodities  were  tentatively  under  consideration. 

Prior  to  or  aside  from  the  creation  of  such  executives,  the 

Mission  sought  its  ends  through  contacts  with  the  Inter-Allied 

Munitions  Council,  the  British  economic  control  committees, 

the  French  and  British  Ministries  of  Munitions,  shipping 

control  agencies,  and  the  A.E.F.    The  three  objects  in  view 


r   > 


ALBERT  C.  RITCHIE  HUGH  FRAYNE 

General  Counsel  of  the  War  Industries  Board;  Member  of  the  War  Industries  Board 

now  Governor  of  Maryland  representing  Labor 

ROBERT  S.  BROOKINGS 

Member  of  the  War  Industries  Board  and  Chairman 

of  its  Price-fixing  Committee 


iWt  III 


Il 


v\4 


>l*|. 


1 1 


i 

.•If. 


(  ) 


AMERICA  AND  WORLD  WAR  ECONOMICS    267 

with  respect  to  each  commodity  were  (1)  to  assist  the  Inter- 
Allied  Munitions  Council  in  determining  the  actual  needs  of 
the  respective  nations;  (2)  to  obtain  such  a  control  of  the 
sources  of  supply  as  would  insure  a  maximum  of  production ; 
and  (3)  to  control  prices  through  the  elimination  of  compe- 
tition among  the  Allies. 

Connected  with  the  last  was  the  particular  American  pur- 
pose of  securing  price-reciprocity  from  the  British,  whether 
an  international  executive  was  set  with  respect  to  a  com- 
modity or  not.     In  all  these  matters  the  chief  difficulty,  as 
indicated  above,  was  that  the  British  control  committees  were 
chiefly  private  committees  of  industry  acting  in  a  govern- 
mental capacity  and  with  one  eye  frankly  on  their  private 
interests.     The  committees  that  controlled  these  commodities 
were  under  the  Allied  Munitions  Council.     The  Americans 
took  the  position  that  the  chairman  of  the  Steel  Committee 
should  be  an  American,  and  that,  in  the  case  of  the  proposed- 
intemational    executives,    the    headquarters    should    be    in 
Washington  of  such  as  might  be  set  up  in  commodities  of 
which  the  principal  supply  came  from  the  United  States. 
Everything  the  Americans  contended  for  was  in  the  nature 
of  insurance  that  the  Allies  should  act  squarely  with  and 
reciprocally  to  the  attitude  of  the  War  Industries  Board, 
which  at  all  times  treated  America's  economic  resources  as 
Allied  resources.    Probably  the  only  international  executive 
that  would  have  had  its  seat  in  Washington  would  have  been 
that  of  leather  and  hides.    It  does  not  appear  to  have  been  the 
intention  to  establish  international  control  in  such  things  as 
copper  and  steel,  which  were  overwhelmingly  of  American 
origin   and,   therefore,   dominated   by  the  War   Industries 
Board  for  the  general  good. 

Immediately  after  arriving  in  London  in  midsummer, 
1918,  the  Mission  asked  the  various  committees  of  the  Muni- 
tions Council  to  undertake  price-control  of  various  com- 
modities. This  request  was  promptly  rejected  by  the  British 
chairmen  of  those  committees. 

The  next  step  was  a  direct  appeal  to  the  British  Govern- 
ment and  a  declination  by  the  Americans  to  join  the  com- 
mittees until  they  were  thoroughly  govemmentalized,  their 
position  being  that,  as  official  representatives  of  the  American 


f 


II 


iv  W 


4 


J  *1 

*1 


J'H 


\\ 


268    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Government,  they  could  deal  only  with  agencies  of  like 
authority.  Austen  Chamberlain,  Minister  without  portfolio, 
was  put  in  charge  of  these  matters.  He  was  sympathetic  and 
actively  cooperative  and  the  status  of  the  committees  was 
promptly  altered,  conformably  to  the  American  plan. 

The  Americans  then  joined  the  respective  committees  and 
renewed  their  request  for  a  new  method  of  commodity  con- 
trol. Again  they  were  denied,  and  again  they  appealed  to 
the  Cabinet,  with  plain  intimations  this  time  to  representa- 
tives of  the  Government  that  this  appeal  was  an  ultimatum. 

Jute,  which  is  an  Indian  product,  both  as  to  the  raw 
material  and  the  textile,  was  in  great  demand  in  the  United 
States  for  such  purposes  as  bags  for  nitrate  and  for  wrapping 
many  kinds  of  war  materials  and  implements,  in  addition  to 
ordinary  uses.  The  British  made  the  argument  that  they 
could  not  interfere  with  the  free  play  of  the  Calcutta  market 
in  jute,  because  the  Government  of  India  was  separate  from 
the  British  Government.  The  American  reply  pointed  the 
general  ultimatum. 

"We  regret  to  learn  that  that  is  the  position,"  said  Sum- 
mers for  the  Americans,  in  effect,  "because,  being  under  the 
impression  that  the  Indian  Government  was  subject  to  the 
Imperial  Government,  we  have  been  executing  orders  from 
the  British  Treasury  for  the  shipment  of  silver  to  the  Indian 
mints.  Now  that  we  learn  that  the  two  Governments  are 
independent,  we  shall  feel  free  to  withhold  further  shipments 
of  silver,  assail  Indian  currency  in  the  markets,  and  purchase 
our  requirements  of  jute  in  the  depreciated  currency  that 
will  result." 

Mr.  Chamberlain  saw  the  point  without  explication, 
expressed  apprehension  that  the  alternative  American  plan 
would  create  a  panic  and  close  the  Calcutta  Exchange,  and 
asked  for  forty-eight  hours'  delay  in  the  inauguration  of  the 
alternative  policy  of  getting  jute  at  reasonable  prices.  The 
Cabinet  at  once  reconsidered  the  jute  question,  determined 
on  Government  control  of  that  material,  and  invited  the 
Americans  to  be  represented  on  a  special  board  which  was 
established  to  decide  what  prices  should  be. 

As  the  Foreign  Mission  saw  the  situation.  Chamberlain  and 
Winston  Churchill,  Minister  of  Munitions,  whole-heartedly 


AMERICA  AND  WORLD  WAR  ECONOMICS    269 

supported  the  American  contention,  but  were  powerless  to 
take  the  initiative  because  of  the  commanding  influence  of 
the  Manchester  and  Aberdeen  spinners,  who  owned  the  Indian 
jute  mills  and  were  more  interested  in  their  profits  than  in 
eflScient  international  control  of  jute. 

The  ice  having  been  broken,  the  Americans  next  succeeded 
in  having  tin  —  which  had  been  controlled,  in  conjunction 
with  rubber,  by  a  committee  of  the  British  Board  of  Trade, 
which  was  virtually  a  committee  of  the  tin  and  rubber  indus- 
tries—  separated  from  rubber  and  placed  under  an  inter- 
national executive  committee.  Tin  comes  principally  from 
the  British  Straits  Settlements  and  the  Dutch  East  Indies. 
The  tin  executive  established  a  price  for  tin  which  was 
enforceable  in  the  Straits  and  stopped  all  buying  in  Batavia. 
The  Dutch  refused  to  meet  the  executive  price,  but,  being 
thereafter  without  a  market,  their  price  soon  broke  to  the 
established  level.  It  was  calculated  that  the  new  price  meant 
a  saving  of  $75,000,000  a  year  to  the  United  States  alone, 
to  say  nothing  of  the  Allies.^ 

As  an  actual  purchasing  agency  the  Foreign  Mission  had 
no  authority,  for  it  was  simply  a  subsidiary  body  of  the  War 
Industries  Board,  which,  though  it  might  conduct  prelim- 
inary negotiations  as  a  corollary  of  its  advisory  powers,  and 
virtually,  if  not  actually,  shape  contracts,  was  without  power 
to  execute  them.  The  effectuation  of  the  international  execu- 
tives necessitated  firm  purchasing  agreements  on  the  part  of 
the  respective  nations.  In  this  emergency  the  United  States 
Steel  Products  Company  acted  most  patriotically,  and  when 
the  tin  executive  was  created  bound  itself  to  take  and  pay 
for  the  tin  allocated  to  the  United  States.  Subsequently  it 
delivered  this  material  according  to  the  requirements  of  the 
different  purchasing  agencies  of  the  Government  as  directed 
by  the  War  Industries  Board,  being  then  reimbursed;  but 
without  profit,  commission,  or  pay  for  its  services. 

The  coolness  of  the  British  members  of  the  then  forming 
committees  of  the  Munitions  Council  continued.  The  Ameri- 
cans found  that,  although  the  completion  of  their  organiza- 
tion had  been  delayed  pending  the  arrival  of  the  Mission, 

^The  results  of  the  Foreign  Mission's  labors  will  receive  further  considera- 
tion in  the  chapters  relating  to  commodity  sections. 


iff 


t  >  . 


¥i 


270    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

there  was  no  disposition  to  confer  with  them  regarding  the 
chairmen.  They  were  particularly  sensitive  regarding  the 
omission  to  consult  with  them  regarding  the  chairmanship  of 
the  Steel  Committee  which,  they  thought,  should  be  assigned 
to  them  without  question.  However,  the  day  of  the  organi- 
zation meeting  of  this  committee  arrived  without  any  sug- 
gestion that  there  should  be  an  American  chairman.  Mr. 
Summers  was  greatly  concerned  and  acted  in  a  manner  that 
was  decidedly  disconcerting  and  entirely  in  the  "it-isn't-done" 
category. 

He  boldly  took  the  chair  himself,  declared  the  purpose 
of  the  meeting,  and  announced  that,  inasmuch  as  America 
was  furnishing  its  allies  with  more  steel  than  their  own  entire 
production,  the  permanent  chairman  of  the  committee,  in 
all  propriety,  should  be  an  American.  Accordingly,  as 
chairman  of  the  American  Mission,  Mr.  Summers  nominated 
Paul  Mackall  for  permanent  chairman. 

"There  being  no  objection,"  proceeded  the  amazing 
Summers,  "I  will  declare  Mr.  Mackall  chairman."  There 
were  doubtless  mental  objections  aplenty,  but  none  was 
audible. 

"Will  you  kindly  take  the  chair,  Mr.  Mackall?"  proceeded 
Mr.  Summers  —  and  that  settled  it.  Whereupon  he  left  the 
meeting  to  Mr.  Mackall  and  proceeded  about  his  other 
business. 

That  evening  the  secretary  of  Winston  Churchill,  Minister 
of  Munitions,  called  on  Mr.  Summers  to  say  that  the  Minister 
would  be  very  glad  to  confer  regarding  the  chairmen  of  all 
the  committees. 

It  was  about  this  time  that  Bonar  Law  while  at  a  dinner- 
party said  to  the  remarkable  head  of  the  Mission:  "So  you 
are  Mr.  Summers?  Well,  you  have  been  the  most  talked- 
about  man  in  the  British  Cabinet  for  the  past  two  weeks." 

The  British  Government,  it  seems,  naturally  hesitated  to 
disturb  the  aflfairs  of  the  great  industrial  interests  that  were 
supporting  the  Coalition  Government,  but  when  the  Govern- 
ment's hand  was  forced  by  the  dominating  American  partner 
it  was  relieved  of  responsibility  to  these  interests.  Mr. 
Summers  was  so  confident  of  the  essential  soundness  and 
righteousness  of  the  American  position  that  he  even  told 


< 


AMERICA  AND  WORLD  WAR  ECONOMICS    271 

Lord  Reading  that,  if  necessary,  he  would  go  before  the 
British  and  American  publics  with  a  candid  statement  of 
the  situation. 

The  chairmanship  of  the  Steel  Committee  enabled  the 
Foreign  Mission  to  find  out  just  how  the  Allies  were  utiliz- 
ing the  immense  amounts  of  steel  they  were  receiving  from 
America  at  the  cost  of  very  serious  dislocation  of  American 
industry.  Mr.  Summers  and  Mr.  Mackall,  now  having  an 
official  international  standing,  were  in  a  position  to  secure 
reports  and  personally  to  inspect  steel  plants,  which  they 
did  in  both  England  and  France.  They  were  in  a  position 
to  enforce  the  use  of  American  steel  for  necessary  war 
purposes  and  to  see  that  French  and  British  steel  was  used 
in  the  same  way,  and  not  diverted  to  ordinary  commercial 
purposes.  There  was  a  great  temptation  for  the  British  to 
use  American  steel  for  war  purposes  and  devote  their  own 
production  to  manufacture  for  post-war  trade.  Similar 
intimate  knowledge  was  obtained  concerning  the  disposition 
of  copper  and  other  materials  that  were  being  supplied  by 
America  at  a  sacrifice. 

The  British  were  persuaded  to  grant  their  Government 
prices  in  their  price-controlled  commodities  to  the  American 
Government.  In  the  item  of  wool,  chiefly  originating  in 
Australia  and  South  Africa,  this  amounted  to  a  saving  of 
$45,000,000  on  a  single  order. 

The  war  came  to  an  end  before  any  international  execu- 
tives, besides  those  of  nitrates  and  tin,  were  established,  but 
the  cordial  spirit  of  cooperation  that  the  British  controlling 
agencies  developed,  afteV  a  period  of  stiffness  and  frigidity, 
resulted  in  much  the  same  thing,  though  a  number  of  other 
executive  committees  certainly  would  have  been  established. 
It  is  only  fair  to  say  that,  although  the  Foreign  Mission 
encountered  very  determined  opposition  at  the  start  from  the 
business  interests  that  were  in  the  saddle  in  England,  they 
enjoyed  the  frank  support  of  numbers  of  influential  persons 
who  freely  conceded  that  the  American  programme  was 
purely  an  Allied  programme,  wholly  unselfish  and  entitled 
to  the  support  of  impartial  judgment. 

Complete   consummation   of    international   control,    thus 
creating  a  monopoly  of  buying,  would  have  saved  hundreds 


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J 


272    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

of  millions,  if  not  billions,  to  the  Allies,  had  the  war  con- 
tinued for  another  year.  This  saving  was  important,  not 
only  as  an  item  of  expense,  but  in  relation  to  the  international 
monetary  situation,  as  it  would  have  enabled  the  Allies  to 
keep  at  home  large  amounts  of  gold  which  otherwise  would 
have  been  exported  in  payment  of  the  excess  prices. 

Aside  from  the  concentration  of  the  buying  and  control- 
ling power  of  the  Allies,  which  the  Foreign  Mission  was  so 
contributory  in  bringing  about,  it  was  of  the  greatest  value 
as  a  general  European  relations  department  of  the  War 
Industries  Board.  It  gave  our  Government  what  might  be 
called  a  selling  agency  in  Europe  in  contradistinction  to 
the  buying  agencies  that  the  Allies  and  some  of  the  neutrals 
maintained  in  the  United  States.  It  gave  the  Board  its  own 
sources  of  information  with  which  to  check  the  requirements 
statements  of  the  various  high  commissions,  and  thus  intro- 
duced a  new  factor  in  the  determination  of  requirements. 

An    illustration    of    the    benefits   that    flowed    from    the 
manifold  activities  of  the  Foreign  Mission  is  the  story  of  a 
contract  for  two  million  shoes  placed  in  England  by  the 
A.E.F.     The  British   authorities  asked  for  special  alloca- 
tions of  leather  and  other  privileged  treatment,  saying  that 
this  contract  was  a  great  hardship  to  their  boot  and  shoe 
industry.     It  was  awarded  to  the  British  factories  because 
it  was  represented  that  they  could  give  quicker  delivery 
than  American  factories,   and  the  price  was  higher  than 
it  would  have  been  for  the  latter.     Mr.   Boyd  found   on 
investigation    that    deliveries    would    not    be    made    even 
approximately  on  time  and  that  American  shoes  of  a  better 
quality  could  be  delivered  much  more  promptly.     Armed 
with    this    information,    Mr.    Boyd    went    to    France    and 
acquainted  the  Supply  Department  of  the  A.E.F.  with  the 
facts  and  received  authority  to  cancel  the  contract.     When 
the  shoe  contract  was  again  used  in  London  as  a  stalking 
horse  for  preferred  consideration  for  British  industries,  Mr. 
Boyd  created  consternation  by  stating  that  the  Americans, 
realizing  what  a  burden  the  shoe  contract  was,  had  secured 
authority  to  cancel  it.     And  he  thereupon  handed  a  can- 
cellation of  the  contract  to  the  chairman  of  his  committee. 

In  October,  Mr.  Legge,  accompanied  by  Pope  Yeatman, 


AMERICA  AND  WORLD  WAR  ECONOMICS    273 

head  of  the  non-ferrous  section,  and  Irwin  H.  Cornell,  chief 
of  the  lead  and  zinc  section,  were  dispatched  to  Europe  to 
reinforce  the  Foreign  Mission  for  a  time.  The  alarmingly 
growing  shortages  in  some  commodities  and  other  changes 
in  the  industrial  situation  in  America  made  it  advisable  to 
give  the  Mission  the  benefit  of  authoritative  personal 
accounts  thereof.  Mr.  Legge  and  his  associates  took  with 
them  a  mass  of  statistics  regarding  shortages,  and  other 
data,  but  the  armistice  was  signed  a  few  days  after  their 
arrival  in  Paris.  The  statistics  immediately  became 
obsolete,  for  overnight  deficits  turned  to  surpluses,  and  in 
the  general  rush  to  liquidate  commitments  the  Americans 
learned  that  the  thrifty  Allies  had  often  salted  down  con- 
siderable surplus  stores  of  some  materials  whilst  clamoring 
for  more  at  any  sacrifice.  Some  interesting  confrontations 
followed,  amusing  to  the  Americans  and  embarrassing  to 
the  Allies. 

Just  as  the  Mission  was  preparing  to  return  to  America, 

Colonel   House   asked   its   cooperation    in    preparing   data 

regarding  the   industrial   status   and   requirements  of  that 

section  of  France  that  had  been  held  more  or  less  damaged 

by  the  Germans.     As  the  Mission  then  comprised  about  a 

dozen  industrial  experts,  it  was  well  equipped  for  a  rapid 

survey  and  hasty  recapitulation  of  the  situation,  which  was 

promptly  made.     It  remained  in  Paris  until  after  President 

Wilson's  arrival,  but,  when  it  was  found  that   economic 

questions   were   not-  at  the  top    of   the   Peace    Conference 

agenda,  Mr.  Legge  and  others  returned  to  the  United  States. 

He  was  hard  at  work  in  his  private  afi'airs  in  Chicago 

when  he  received  a  summons  by  cable  from  Mr.  Baruch,  who 

had  become  the  President's  economic  adviser  in  the  Peace 

Conference,  to  get  together  a  party  of  specialists  and  hasten 

to  his  assistance  in  drafting  the  economic  section  of  the 

Treaty.     Including  Mr.   Summers,  who   had   remained   in 

Europe,  this  staff"  of  economic  experts  was  made  up  of  Mr. 

Legge;  Dr.  Frank  W.  Taussig,  then  chairman  of  the  United 

States  Tariff  Commission;  Charles  H.  McDowell,  formerly 

Director  of  the  Chemical  Division  of  the  War  Industries 

Board;  Frederick  K.   Nielsen,   later  the   Solicitor  for  the 

State  Department;  Bradley  W.  Palmer,  of  Boston,  a  lawyer 


«:■;«-,  -^.'.; 


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274    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

who  had  been  sent  to  Paris  by  the  Alien  Property  Custodian; 
John  C.  Pennie,  of  New  York,  a  noted  expert  in  inter- 
national and  American  patent  law;  and  J.  Bailey  Brown,  of 
Pittsburgh,  an  expert  in  patents,  trademarks,  and  copyrights. 
Mr.  Baruch  and  Thomas  F.  Lamont  were  the  American 
members  of  the  Economic  Drafting  Section.  Professor 
Allyn  Young,  who  was  independently  attached  to  the 
Peace  Commission,  acted  as  Mr.  Lamont's  alternate. 
The  work  of  this  section  is  no  part  of  the  history  of  the  War 
Industries  Board,  though  the  American  part  of  it  was  largely 
the  heir  of  that  body's  experience;^  but  this  reference  to  it 
is  required  in  rounding  out  the  account  of  the  Foreign 
Mission. 

The  Foreign  Mission,  being  in  direct  and  constant  com- 
munication with  and  in  the  full  confidence  of  the  parent 
body,  the  latter  was  enabled  to  act  in  instant  response  to  the 
varying  demands  of  the  war  from  day  to  day.  It  has 
already  been  told  how  American  ammonia  was  traded  for 
Spanish  mules,  and  how,  on  word  from  Mr.  Summers  regard- 
ing the  gravity  of  the  approaching  exhaustion  of  the  French 
projectile  reserve  in  the  fall  of  1918,  the  Lackawanna  and 
Carnegie  steel  mills  were  instantaneously  thrown  into  the 
breach  with  such  gratifying  results  that  one  more  name  was 
added  to  the  list  of  those  who  won  the  war.  The  work  of 
the  Foreign  Mission  was  a  giant's  stride  toward  the  realiza- 
tion of  the  mobile  determination  and  execution  of  the 
industrial  strategy  of  war. 

Sir  Philip  Gibbs^  relates  with  what  joy  the  British 
regiments,  "with  their  backs  to  the  wall"  at  the  northern  end 
of  the  Allied  line  in  March,  1918,  welcomed  the  French 
cavalry,  galloping  their  panting  horses  through  clouds  of 
dust,  "followed  by  divisions  of  blue  men  in  hundreds  of 
blue  lorries,  tearing  up  the  roads,  and  forming  a  strong 
blue  line  behind  our  thin  brown  line."  A  little  later  these 
men  in  blue  were  withdrawn,  as  quickly  as  they  came,  to 
assist  in  the  first  of  those  hammer-blows  on  the  Marne  that 

*Those  readers  who  may  be  interested  in  an  intimate  account  of  the  origin 
of  the  economic  portion  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  would  do  well  to  read 
The  Making  of  the  Reparation  and  Economic  Sections  of  the  Treaty,  by 
Bernard  M.  Baruch.    Harper  &  Bros.,  New  York. 

'Now  It  Can  Be  Told.    Harper  &  Bros.,  New  York. 


AMERICA  AND  WORLD  WAR  ECONOMICS    275 

shattered  the  Weltpolitik  dream  of  Germany.  So  the  men 
of  the  War  Industries  Board  visualized  a  centralized  contrcl 
of  the  industrial  resources  of.  the  Allied  world,  as  a  swift 
shifting  of  industrial  divisions  to  meet  the  successive  crises 
of  the  war.  To  them  there  was  drama  comparable  to  that 
of  the  battle  scene  in  the  swift  shifting  of  twenty  thousand 
sweating  toilers  in  Homestead  and  Buffalo,  their  rows  of 
glowing  blast  and  open-hearth  furnaces  and  their  rumbling, 
monstrous  rollers,  to  the  making  of  steel  for  the  75's  of 
France  galloping  to  victory  if  only  the  shells  would  hold  out. 


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CHAPTER  XV 
THE  CONTROL  OF  LABOR 

The  human  understanding  of  labor  —  Obtaining  workers  for  war  industries  — 
Salvaging  waste  man  power  and  materials  —  Gompers  in  the  war  —  His  call 
to  labor  —  Scrutinizing  the  I.W.W. —  Some  early  history  —  The  Taft- Walsh 
Board  —  The  War  Labor  Policies  Board  —  Employment  management  —  Labor 
after  the  war  —  Priorities  in  labor. 

In  the  preceding  chapters  we  have  seen  how  the  War 
Industries  Board  practicalized  the  relations  of  government 
and  industry  by  invoking  the  assistance  of  capital  and 
management.  We  come  now  to  an  account  of  how  it  con- 
cerned itself  with  the  third  factor  in  production  —  labor. 

Following  the  sagacious  example  set  by  the  &)uncil  of 
National  Defense  in  making  Samuel  Gompers  a  member  of 
its  Advisory  Commission,  the  War  Industries  Board  from 
its  beginning  had  a  member  charged  with  the  consideration 
of  labor  problems,  Mr.  Hugh  Frayne.  Very  properly,  he 
was  of  labor,  but  just  as  capitalists  and  managers  were  used 
as  instrumentalities  of  the  Government  in  controlling  capital 
and  management,  so  Mr.  Frayne's  experience  and  ability 
were  applied  to  the  consideration  and  control  of  labor  in  the 
triple  team  of  production. 

Strictly  speaking,  Frayne  was  not  on  the  Board  to  repre- 
sent labor,  but  to  manage  it.  There  is  a  labor  element  in 
every  commodity,  a  labor  factor  in  every  price.  Labor  is 
sometimes,  indeed,  considered  as  a  commodity  —  as  an 
ingredient  of  production.  But  it  is  unlike  other  com- 
modities in  that  it  is  vital  and  human.  To  get  the  most  out 
of  it,  it  must  be  sympathetically  and  understandingly 
managed,  just  the  same  as  with  the  capitalist  and  the 
business  man.  Labor  in  the  United  States  is  quite  as 
patriotic  as  the  employer,  and  the  patriotic  appeal  was 
equally  powerful  with  it,  but  labor  must  have  its  hire,  and 
that  was  subject  to  extreme  fluctuations  during  the  war. 
It  was  limited  in  quantity;  hence  it  was  subject  to  priority 
regulations   and   essentially  involved   in  price-fixing.     No 


THE  CONTROL  OF  LABOR 


277 


I  •' 


requirements  programme  could  be  drafted  intelligently  with- 
out due  allowance  for  the  labor  factor.  Conservation  could 
not  get  far  without  the  cooperation  of  labor,  and  the 
problems  of  conversion  directly  concerned  the  susceptibil- 
ities of  the  workers.  A  War  Industries  Board  without  a 
labor  member  would  have  been  a  very  lame  and  ill-balanced 
agency.  It  would  have  fallen  into  a  capital  error,  com- 
parable to  that  of  the  Food  Administration,  which  dealt  with 
feeds  and  foodstufi's  without  taking  the  farmer  into  its 
decisive  counsels. 

The  creation  of  the  War  Labor  Administration,  with  the 
Secretary  of  Labor  as  administrator,  prior  to  the  reorganiza- 
tion of  the  War  Industries  Board,  in  the  spring  of  1918, 
made  unnecessary  the  setting-up  of  any  administrative 
machinery  for  labor  matters  within  the  Board.  Mr.  Frayne 
was,  therefore,  relieved  of  a  burden  of  administrative  detail 
that  would  otherwise  have  fallen  to  his  office.  He  was  free 
to  meet  the  labor  problem  at  the  source,  and  prevent  friction 
by  foresight.  And  he  had  the  leisure  to  emphasize  the  labor 
factor  in  all  the  industrial  contacts  of  the  Board.  He  was 
an  active  and  important  member  of  the  Price-Fixing  Com- 
mittee, a  member  of  the  War  Labor  Policies  Board  in  behalf 
of  the  War  Industries  Board,  and  his  office  aff'orded  a  direct 
and  ever  open  channel  of  efi"ective  communication  between  the 
Board  and  the  War  Labor  Administration.  Like  so  much  of 
the  other  work  of  the  Board,  a  large  part  of  the  performance 
of  the  Labor  Division  resulted  from  informal  conferences. 
The  war  labor  news  was  mostly  of  general  policies,  and 
adjudications  of  open  controversies  by  the  Labor  Admin- 
istration. Little  was  known  of  the  continuous  adaptation 
of  industrial  policies  and  the  tedious  appraisal  of  the  labor 
factor  to  prevent  or  nip  in  the  bud  labor  troubles. 

Most  of  the  policies  and  problems  that  came  before  the 
Board  were  recognized  as  having  a  labor  element,  as  well 
as  elements  of  price,  priority,  facilities,  requirements,  etc. 
By  this  forethought  much  industrial  controversy  was  avoided. 
As  time  went  on,  and  the  general  authority  of  the  Board 
grew,  and  it  became  supreme  in  priority  and  the  final 
repository  of  the  power  of  commandeering,  there  was  a 
corresponding  expansion  of  the  power  and  influence  of  the 


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278    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Labor  Division  both  in  Government  departments  and  in  the 
industrial  world.  Mr.  Frayne  held  no  less  than  two 
hundred  and  fifty-five  conferences  with  representatives  of 
labor  and  five  hundred  and  fifty-five  with  employers  and 
chiefs  of  Government  departments  and  bureaus.  Besides 
the  adjustment  of  disputes,  determination  of  matters  of 
wages,  labor  management,  and  the  like,  all  of  the  industries 
that  were  in  contact  with  the  War  Industries  Board  grew 
into  the  habit  of  appealing  to  Mr.  Frayne  for  help  in  their 
supply  of  labor.  He  became  their  special  friend  at  court 
with  the  United  States  Employment  Service.  It  is  reason- 
ably safe  to  say  that  through  Mr.  Frayne's  initiative  one 
hundred  and  twenty-five  thousand  workers  were  obtained  for 
war  industries,  mostly  in  the  way  of  meeting  special 
emergencies. 

While  Mr.  Frayne  was  specially  charged  with  seeing  that 
labor  was  equitably  treated,  his  associates  on  the  Board 
and  the  employers  with  whom  he  came  in  contact  unani- 
mously testify  that  he  acted  first  of  all  as  a  good  citizen, 
giving  the  first  consideration  to  the  demands  of  country  as 
against  those  of  a  special  interest. 

Aside  from  its  general  duties  as  the  Board's  Department 
of  Labor,  the  Labor  Division  conducted  a  work  which  was 
in  the  nature  of  conservation,  under  the  sections  of  War 
Prison  Labor  and  National  Waste  Reclamation.  At  the 
head  of  this  division  was  a  committee  made  up  of  Dr.  E. 
Stagg  Whitin,  chairman  of  the  executive  committee  of  the 
National  Committee  on  Prisons  and  Prison  Labor;  W.  J. 
Spillman,  chief  of  the  Office  of  Farm  Management,  Depart- 
ment of  Agriculture;  Anthony  Caminetti,  United  States 
Commissioner  of  Immigration;  John  J.  Manning,  secretary 
of  the  Union  Label  Trades  Department;  Dr.  Charles  H. 
Winslow,  Assistant  Director  of  Research,  Federal  Board  for 
Vocational  Education;  Edwin  F.  Sweet,  Assistant  Secretary 
of  Commerce;  and  naval  and  army  officers. 

The  first  task  of  this  section  was  an  investigation  of  the 
Base  Sorting  Plant,  Inc.,  which  had  a  contract  with  the  War 
Department  relating  to  waste  materials.  This  investigation 
resulted  in  the  cancellation  of  the  contract,  with,  it  was  said, 
a  saving  of  many  millions  of  dollars  to  the  Government.     It 


THE  CONTROL  OF  LABOR 


279 


then  undertook  the  creation  of  a  system  of  methodical 
saving  and  reclamation  of  waste  throughout  the  army  and 
navy,  the  Government  departments,  and  civil  life. 

Waste  man  power  was  found  in  large  numbers  of  men  of 
German  birth,  who  had  volunteered  for  or  were  inducted 
into  the  army.  It  was  not  thought  advisable  to  send  them 
into  active  service,  and  they  were  given  the  privilege  of  an 
honorable  discharge.  Many  refused  to  avail  themselves  of 
this  privilege,  and  arrangements  were  made  to  employ  them 
in  manual  labor  for  the  army,  thus  releasing  eligible  men 
for  active  service.  Similar  action  was  taken  with  respect 
to  conscientious  objectors,  soldiers  physically  unfit  for  active 
service,  and  military  prisoners.  In  this  connection  war 
camp  gardens  were  encouraged.  The  army  was  persuaded 
to  accept  discharged  convicts  whose  offenses  were  not 
treason,  felony,  or  infamous  crime.  Special  efforts  were 
made  for  the  employment,  chiefly  in  agriculture,  of  such 
discharged  prisoners  as  did  not  enter  the  army.  Interned 
enemy  aliens  were  put  to  work  on  the  roads.  With  the 
assistance  of  local  authorities  and,  in  some  states,  of  special 
laws  regarding  vagrancy  and  idleness,  thousands  of  tramps, 
bums,  and  loafers  were  put  to  work. 

The  waste  labor  in  corrective  institutions  all  over  the 
country,  if  not  otherwise  employed,  was  turned  to  the 
reclamation  of  waste  material.  The  studies  of  the  section 
led  to  the  estimate  that  the  waste  material  of  the  Nation,  if 
thoroughly  reclaimed,  through  the  use  of  waste  labor,  would 
represent  a  saving  of  a  billion  dollars  annually.  Local 
committees  were  forming  in  every  county  in  the  country  to 
interest  the  public  authorities  in  this  sort  of  saving  and 
otherwise  promote  it.  As  the  end  of  the  war  approached. 
Congressional  action  was  sought  for  the  authorization  of  the 
use  of  prison  labor  in  producing  supplies  for  the  army  and 
navy. 

Through  the  section's  initiative  the  army  gave  special 
attention  to  the  utilization  of  food  and  clothing  wastes. 
Between  January  1  and  October  31,  1918,  nearly  eighteen 
million  articles  of  wearing  apparel  were  renovated  and 
returned  to  service  in  the  army.  In  the  single  month  of 
June,  1918,  there  was  a  saving  of  twenty  million  dollars  in 


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280    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

the  equipment  of  eighteen  thousand  soldiers  who  went  to 
France  entirely  outfitted  with  reclaimed  equipment,  which 
had  formerly  gone  to  junk  dealers  for  a  song.  Of  other 
materials  the  salvage  for  further  use  by  the  army  amounted 
to  a  value  of  six  hundred  and  thirty-three  thousand  dollars 
and  the  proceeds  from  the  sale  of  such  materials  were  six 
hundred  and  six  thousand  dollars.  In  addition  the  utiliza- 
tion of  army  garbage  in  the  same  period  brought  in  three 
hundred  and  thirty-nine  thousand  dollars. 

The  relations  between  the  Labor  Division  of  the  War 
Industries  Board  and  the  War  Labor  Administration  were  so 
intimate  and  so  interwoven  that  it  is  necessary  to  a  sym- 
metrical presentation  of  Government  relation  with  industry 
during  the  war  to  give  some  account  of  the  latter.  At  every 
turn  the  War  Industries  Board  found  itself  dependent  on 
the  cooperation  of  labor. 

The  Council  of  National  Defense  realized  the  importance 
of  the  labor  factor  in  war  industry  from  its  very  inception, 
and  there  resulted  a  general  governmental  policy  of  scrupu- 
lous regard  for  labor's  interest.  Whatever  the  capitalist 
and  the  manager  from  their  point  of  view  may  have  to  say 
in  condemnation  of  the  generous  consideration  given  to  labor 
by  the  Government  throughout  the  war,  and  however  much 
they  may  be  correct  in  holding  that  many  of  the  present 
complications  of  relations  between  organized  labor  and 
employers  are  the  direct  result  of  the  somewhat  paternalistic 
policy  assumed  by  the  Government  toward  labor,  it  was  a 
wise  war  policy.  With  Samuel  Gompers,  president  of  the 
American  Federation  of  Labor,  assigned  to  the  chairman- 
ship of  the  Labor  Committee  of  the  Council's  Advisory  Com- 
mission, the  great  initial  planner  of  the  industrial  side  of 
the  war,  labor  could  but  feel  that  it  was  an  equal  partner 
in  the  war  with  all  other  factors.  Other  labor  leaders, 
following  Mr.  Gompers's  lead,  with  but  few  exceptions 
viewed  the  war  as  a  common  enterprise  of  all  Americans, 
cooperative  rather  than  autocratic.  Practically  all  the  basic 
policies  regarding  labor  relations  during  the  war  were  laid 
down  by  the  Labor  Committee,  and  it  was  the  outcome  of  its 
advice  that  the  War  Labor  Administration  was  set  up.  As 
control  of  all  industrial  matters  more  and  more  passed  from 


THE  CONTROL  OF  LABOR 


281 


the  Council  to  its  child,  the  War  Industries  Board,  the  central 
advisory  function  likewise  passed  from  the  Labor  Com- 
mittee to  the  Labor  Division  of  the  Board. 

Mr.  Gompers  called  a  conference  of  labor  leaders  as  early 
as  February  28,  1917,  at  which  it  was  decided  that  it  would 
be  wise  to  have  organized  labor  take  a  definite  public  stand  in 
regard  to  the  approaching  war.  Accordingly,  Mr.  Gompers 
called  a  meeting  of  the  executive  council  of  the  American 
Federation  of  Labor  on  March  9th,  which  was  followed  three 
days  later  by  a  meeting  of  the  members  of  the  council  with 
one  hundred  and  forty-eight  representatives  of  national  and 
international  labor  organizations  affiliated  with  the  Feder- 
ation of  Labor,  five  departments  of  the  Federation,  and  five 
labor  organizations  not  affiliated  with  it.  Among  the  decla- 
rations of  labor's  attitude  adopted  by  the  meeting,  the 
following  is  most  reflective  of  the  war  spirit  of  organized 
labor: 

We,  the  officers  of  national  and  international  trade-unions  of 
America,  in  national  conference  assembled  in  the  capital  of  our 
Nation,  hereby  pledge  ourselves  in  peace  or  war,  in  stress  or  storm, 
to  stand  unreservedly  by  the  standards  of  liberty  and  the  safety  and 
preservation  of  the  institutions  and  ideals  of  our  Republic.  .  .  . 
We,  with  these  ideals  of  liberty  and  justice,  herein  declared  as  the 
indispensable  basis  for  national  policies,  offer  our  services  to  our 
country  in  every  field  of  activity  to  defend,  safeguard,  and  preserve 
the  Republic  of  the  United  States  of  America  against  its  enemies, 
whomsoever  they  may  be,  and  we  call  upon  our  workers  and  fellow 
citizens,  in  the  holy  name  of  justice,  freedom,  and  humanity,  to 
devotedly  and  patriotically  give  like  service. 

The  writer  well  remembers  the  dramatic  and  obviously 
sincere  manner  in  which,  in  a  room  in  the  Munsey  Building 
in  Washington,  Mr.  Gompers  read  to  the  Advisory  Com- 
mission his  summons  to  labor.  With  great  emotion  he  told 
of  coming  to  this  country  as  a  child,  of  his  experience  in  the 
sweatshops  —  for  which,  as  he  said,  "I  have  never  quite 
forgiven  society"  —  and  of  his  overpowering  desire  that 
American  labor  should  instantly  come  to  the  side  of  the 
Government  in  the  event  of  war.  He  said  particularly  that 
he  did  not  want  the  United  States  to  have  the  same  difficulty 
with  labor  that  England  had  in  her  first  year  and  a  half. 


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282    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Gompers  sat  at  one  end  of  the  Commission's  long  table,  Chair- 
man Willard  at  the  other,  with  Baruch,  Rosenwald,  Coffin, 
Martin,  Godfrey,  Gifford,  and  the  writer  along  the  sides,  all 
listening  intently.  The  writer  took  many  of  Mr.  Gompers's 
remarks  verbatim.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  in  this  con- 
tingency the  veteran  labor  leader  was  first  an  American  and 
a  special  pleader  for  the  working-men  afterward. 

Pursuant  to  Mr.  Gompers's  call,  more  than  one  hundred 
and  fifty  persons  representative  of  labor  organizations  and 
of  finance,  commerce,  and  industry,  as  well  as  public  and 
civic  interests,  met  in  Washington  on  April  2,  1917,  as 
members  of  his  general  committee.  Other  members  were 
added  to  the  general  committee  thus  created,  until  it  eventu- 
ally numbered  several  hundred  persons.  An  executive  com- 
mittee was  appointed  with  the  following  membership: 

Samuel  Gompers  (Chairman),  American  Federation  of  Labor, 
Washington,  D.  C. 

William  B.  Wilson,  Secretary  of  the  Department  of  Labor,  Wash- 
ington, D.  C. 

V.  Everit  Macy,  President,  National  Civic  Federation,  New 
York. 

James  Lord,  President,  Mining  Department,  American  Federation 
of  Labor,  Washington,  D.  C. 

Elisha  Lee,  General  Manager,  Pennsylvania  Railroad  Company, 
Philadelphia,  Pa. 

Warren  S.  Stone,  Grand  Chief,  Brotherhood  of  Locomotive 
Engineers,  Cleveland,  Ohio. 

C.  E.  Michael,  National  Association  of  Manufacturers  (President, 
Virginia  Bridge  &  Iron  Company),  Roanoke,  Va. 

Frank  Morrison,  Secretary,  American  Federation  of  Labor, 
Washington,  D.  C. 

Lee  K.  Frankel,  Third  Vice-President,  Metropolitan  Life  In- 
surance Company,  New  York. 

James  O'Connell,  President,  Metal  Trades  Department,  American 
Federation  of  Labor,  Washington,  D.  C. 

Louis  B.  Schram,  Chairman,  Labor  Committee,  United  States 
Brewers'  Association,  Brooklyn,  N.  Y. 

Ralph  M.  Easley,  assistant  to  Samuel  Gompers,  New  York. 

James  W.  Sullivan,  assistant  to  Samuel  Gompers  as  member  of 
Advisory  Commission,  Brooklyn,  N.  Y. 

Gertrude  Beeks,  Secretary,  Executive  Committee,  New  York. 

Other  committees  and  their  chairmen  were: 


THE  CONTROL  OF  LABOR 


283 


,i 


Wages  and  Hours,  Frank  Morrison,  Chairman,  Washington,  D.  C. 
Mediation   and  Conciliation,  V.   Everit  Macy,   Chairman,  New 
York. 

Welfare  Work,  Louis  A.  Coolidge,  Chairman,  Boston,  Mass. 
Women  in  Industry,  Mrs.  Borden  Harriman,  Chairman,  Wash- 
ington, D.  C. 

Information  and  Statistics,  Dr.  Frederick  L.  Hoffman,  Newark, 
N.  J. 

Press,  Grant  Hamilton,  Washington,  D.  C. 
Cost  of  Living,  Domestic  Economy,  S.  Thruston  Ballard,  Louis- 
ville, Ky. 

The  executive  committee  adopted  a  resolution  regarding 
the  attitude  of  Governments,  State  and  National,  toward 
labor  during  the  period  of  the  war,  which  was  approved  on 
April  7th  by  the  Council  of  National  Defense  and  the 
Advisory  Commission.    The  most  significant  paragraph  read: 

That  the  Council  of  National  Defense  should  issue  a  statement 
to  employers  and  employees  in  our  industrial  plants  and  trans- 
portation systems  advising  that  neither  employers  nor  employees 
shall  endeavor  to  take  advantage  of  the  country's  necessities  to 
change  existing  standards.  When  economic  or  other  emergencies 
arise,  requiring  changes  of  standards,  the  same  should  be  made 
only  after  such  proposed  changes  have  been  investigated  and 
approved  by  the  Council  of  National  Defense. 

This  statement  subjected  the  Council  to  some  criticism, 
as  advocating  a  policy  which  was  opposed  to  the  maximum 
of  effort  on  the  part  of  labor  that  die  strain  of  war  would 
involve.  The  Council  issued  an  interpretative  statement, 
the  gist  of  which  was  that  the  Council  felt  that  it  was  incum- 
bent upon  it  to  warn  both  employers  and  employees  that  the 
public  necessity  of  a  state  of  war  should  not  be  used  by 
either  group  as  a  means  of  attaining  ends  that  had  not  been 
realized  in  peace.  In  effect,  the  Council's  position  was  that 
during  the  war  there  should  be  a  truce  between  conflicting 
industrial  interests,  for  the  period  of  which  each  side  should 
hold  the  ground  it  held  at  the  beginning  of  hostilities,  subject 
only  to  such  alterations  as  should  be  made  for  promoting 
industrial  efficiency  and  that  the  determinations  of  such  alter- 
ations should  not  be  left  to  arbitrary  action  by  either  side. 

No  eflfort  will  be  made  here  to  follow  further  the  work 


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284    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

of  the  Committee  on  Labor  and  its  various  sub-committees 
and  sections,  which  contributed  greatly  to  the  organization 
and  policies  of  the  War  Labor  Administration  of  the  Depart- 
ment of  Labor.  At  the  beginning  of  the  war  about  the  only 
machinery  that  department  had  that  was  suitable  for  dealing 
with  the  emergency  in  any  way  were  the  United  States  Board 
of  Mediation  and  Conciliation,  created  to  deal  with  disputes 
in  the  railway  service;  the  Division  of  Conciliation,  which 
aimed  to  compose  labor  disputes,  by  acting  in  an  advisory 
capacity;  and  the  United  States  Employment  Service.  These 
three  agencies  were  not,  however,  organized,  authorized,  and 
equipped  in  such  a  way  as  effectively  to  meet  the  many  and 
pressing  labor  problems  that  war  evoked. 

As  in  dealing  with  most  of  the  novel  situations  created  by 
the  war,  comprehensive  handling  of  the  labor  factor  evolved 
but  slowly.  The  first  acute  emergency  was  created  by  the 
menacing  revolutionary  activities  of  the  Industrial  Workers 
of  the  World  in  the  mining  and  lumbering  industries  of  the 
mountain  States  and  the  Pacific  coast.  The  President 
appointed  a  commission,  which  was  known  as  the  President's 
Mediation  Commission,  with  William  B.  Wilson,  Secretary 
of  Labor,  as  chairman,  for  the  purpose  of  dealing  with  the 
concrete  questions  raised  by  these  activities  and  of  studying 
the  conditions  which  bred  them.  This  commission  dealt 
successfully  with  a  number  of  disputes,  discussed  the  causes 
of  labor  unrest,  and  recommended,  among  other  things,  that 
the  Nation  should  recognize  the  principle  of  collective 
bargaining,  the  creation  of  "continuous  administrative 
machinery  for  the  orderly  disposition  of  industrial  issues," 
and  of  "a  unified  labor  administration  for  the  period  of  the 
war."  This  report  was  not  made  until  January  9,  1918. 

In  the  meantime  the  army,  the  navy,  the  Shipping  Board, 
the  Fuel  Administration,  and  the  Railroad  Administration 
were  each  dealing  with  the  labor  question  in  piecemeal 
fashion.  They  were  adjusting  their  own  labor  questions  more 
or  less  independently  and  were  competing  with  each  other 
in  the  labor  market.  The  labor  turnover  had  become 
enormous  as  men  lured  by  higher  wages  flitted  from  job  to 
job.  The  demand  was  increased  by  the  war  boom,  and  at 
the  same  time  the  supply  was  curtailed  through  the  dimin- 


THE  CONTROL  OF  LABOR 


285 


ishing  of  immigration  and  the  calling  of  millions  of  men  to 
the  colors.  The  unscrupulous  activities  of  private  employ- 
ment agencies  became  a  national  scandal.  Strikes  were 
fomented  to  create  opportunities  for  their  profitable  employ- 
ment. They  raided  well-manned  industries  to  get  men  for 
others,  and  employers  often  maintained  employment  bureaus 
which  brazenly  "stole"  labor  right  and  left.  Wages  were  so 
unsettled,  so  ascendant,  so  various;  employment  conditions 
were  so  diverse,  competition  between  employers  so  keen,  that 
labor  began  to  lose  its  balance.  Strikes  over  the  most  trivial 
matters  became  frequent  and  the  consequent  loss  of  produc- 
tive effort  was  enormous.  The  word  "chaos"  is  the  only  one 
that  fits  the  general  labor  situation  that  prevailed  in  the 
first  year  of  the  war. 

The  Council  of  National  Defense,  quick  to  safeguard  labor 
as  it  was,  wrestled  with  the  question  of  labor  administration 
for  months,  but  while  its  Advisory  Commission's  Labor  Com- 
mittee had  done  much  within  its  province  the  Council  itself 
held  back,  and  all  of  many  attempts  to  get  it  to  take  the 
initiative  in  establishing  some  sort  of  central  control  of  labor 
failed,  until  January  3,  1918,  when  Secretary  Lane  intro- 
duced a  resolution  asking  the  President  to  approve  of  the 
appointment  by  the  Council  of  a  War  Labor  Board.  Even 
then  the  Council  declined  to  take  positive  action,  but  ordered 
that  the  Lane  resolution  and  an  account  of  the  discussion 
on  it  be  transmitted  to  the  President.  This  resolution  pro- 
vided that  a  Board  composed  of  the  Secretary  of  Labor,  a 
representative  of  employers  and  a  representative  of  labor 

shall  be  authorized  to  negotiate  an  agreement  between  the  manu- 
facturing industries  of  the  United  States  and  labor  employed 
therein,  to  endure  as  modified  from  time  to  time  by  the  said  Board, 
for  the  period  of  the  war;  this  agreement  to  include  the  creation 
of  machinery  by  which  the  stoppage  of  production  by  strikes  or 
lockouts  will  be  prevented,  and  the  establishment  of  adjustment 
boards  for  the  settlement  of  industrial  disputes. 

The  Lane  resolution  further  provided  that  the  Department 
of  Labor  should  set  up  a  comprehensive  war  labor  adminis- 
tration for  the  execution  of  the  following  functions: 

1.    A  means  of  furnishing  an  adequate  and  stable  supply  of  labor 
to  war  industries.    This  will  include: 


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286    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

(a)     A  satisfactory  system  of  labor  exchanges. 
(6)     A   satisfactory  method   and   administration   of  training 
of  workers. 

(c)  An  agency  for  determining  priorities  of  labor  demand. 

(d)  Agencies  for  dilution  of  skilled  labor  as  and  when  needed. 

2.  Machinery  which  will  provide  for  the  immediate  and  equitable 
adjustment  of  disputes  in  accordance  with  principles  to  be 
agreed  upon  between  labor  and  capital  and  without  stoppage 
of  work.  Such  machinery  would  deal  with  demands  concerning 
wages,  hours,  shop  conditions,  etc. 

3.  Machinery  for  safeguarding  conditions  of  labor  in  the  pro- 
duction of  war  essentials.  This  to  include  industrial  hygiene, 
safety,  women  and  child  labor,  etc. 

4  Machinery  for  safeguarding  conditions  of  living,  including 
housing,  transportation,  etc. 

5.  Fact-gathering  body  to  assemble  and  present  data  collected 
through  various  existing  governmental  agencies  or  by  independ- 
ent research,  to  furnish  the  information  necessary  for  effective 
executive  action. 

6.  Information  and  education  division,  which  has  the  functions 
of  developing  sound  public  sentiment,  securing  an  exchange  of 
information  between  departments  of  labor  administration,  and 
promotion  in  industrial  plants  of  local  machinery  helpful  in 
carrying  out  the  national  labor  programme. 

The  outcome  of  the  Lane  resolution  and  the  report  of  the 
President's  Mediation  Commission  was  the  designation  by 
the  President  of  Secretary  Wilson  as  War  Labor  Adminis- 
trator. The  latter  appointed  Dr.  Felix  Frankfurter,  who  had 
been  assistant  to  the  Secretary  of  War  and  was  secretary  and 
counsel  to  the  President's  Mediation  Commission,  as  his 
assistant  in  charge  of  war  labor  matters.  At  the  same  time 
Secretary  Wilson  appointed  an  advisory  council,  headed  by 
former  Governor  John  Lind,  of  Minnesota,  to  consider  and 
recommend  such  changes  in  the  Department  of  Labor  as  were 
necessary  to  fit  it  for  its  emergency  duties  as  a  war  labor 
administration.  On  what  might  be  called  the  judicial  as 
distinguished  from  the  strictly  administrative  side  of  the 
labor  problem,  the  Secretary  appointed  an  advisory  body, 
the  War  Labor  Conference  Board,  which  laid  down  certain 
principles  of  relations  between  employers  and  employees  in 
the  war  industries  and  recommended  the  establishment  of  a 


THE  CONTROL  OF  LABOR 


287 


f 


National  War  Labor  Board  to  apply  these  principles  in  the 
adjudication  of  disputes  arising  out  of  such  relations. 

This  body  consisted  of  five  representatives  of  employers 
chosen  by  the  National  Industrial  Conference  Board,  and 
five  representatives  of  labor  designated  by  the  American 
Federation  of  Labor.  Each  of  these  groups  then  selected  a 
representative  of  the  general  public;  the  labor  men  naming 
Frank  P.  Walsh,  and  the  employers  former  President 
William  H.  Taft. 

Among  the  principles  established  for  the  guidance  of  the 
War  Labor  Board  were  the  right  of  both  employers  and 
employees  to  organize  in  associations  of  groups  and  to 
bargain  collectively;  that  workers  should  not  be  discharged 
for  membership  or  legitimate  activity  in  trades  unions;  that 
non-union  workers  should  not  be  interfered  with;  and  that 
all  workers  were  entitled  to  a  minimum  wage  "which  will 
insure  the  subsistence  of  the  worker  and  his  family  in  health 
and  reasonable  comfort." 

The  War  Labor  Board,  composed  equally  of  representa- 
tives of  labor  and  employers,  had  as  its  joint  chairmen 
former  President  William  H.  Taft  and  Frank  P.  Walsh, 
former  chairman  of  the  Industrial  Relations  Commission. 
It  was  appointed  by  the  President  in  April,  1918,  and  came 
to  be  known  as  the  Taft-Walsh  Board.  It  endeavored  to 
settle  industrial  controversies  in  the  first  instance  through 
informal  action  by  sections  and  local  committees.  These 
failing,  the  Board  itself  sought  definitely  to  compose  disputes 
by  acting  as  an  arbitration  commission  whose  decisions  were 
unanimous.  Lacking  such  a  decision,  a  dispute  was  finally 
dealt  with  by  an  umpire  selected  from  a  panel  of  ten, 
appointed  by  the  President.  In  this  way  some  hundreds  of 
serious  disputes  were  amicably  settled. 

It  is  noteworthy  that  the  War  Labor  Board  had  no  statutory 
authority  and  that  its  decisions  were  not  legally  binding. 
But,  as  they  represented  the  will  of  the  President  and  of  the 
vast  executive  and  administrative  establishment  that  was 
carrying  on  the  war,  and  were  supported  by  a  public  opinion 
that  would  permit  no  foolishness,  they  were  always  observed. 
Attention  is  called  to  the  analogy  of  the  judicial  side  of  the 
War  Labor  Administration  to  the  Executive  control  of  indus- 


ftl 


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288    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

try  under  the  War  Industries  Board.  Both  functioned  by 
consent  of  the  governed  rather  than  by  intrinsic  powers. 

While  the  War  Labor  Board  was  of  the  greatest  assistance 
to  the  War  Industries  Board  in  composing  and  adjudicating 
the  disputes  which  interfered  so  much  with  production,  the 
latter  was  in  a  way  more  interested  in  the  War  Labor  Policies 
Board,  for  the  latter,  which  was  created  in  May,  1918,  about 
the  time  the  reorganized  War  Industries  Board  began  to  get 
into  its  stride,  proposed  to  standardize  the  practices  of  the 
Government  as  an  employer  of  labor,  whether  directly  or 
indirectly;  and  to  establish  a  central  control  for  all  indus- 
tries of  questions  relating  to  the  distribution  of  labor,  wages, 
hours,  and  working  conditions. 

The  Policies  Board  applied  the  execution  of  its  policies 
directly  to  all  industries  having  contractual  relations  with 
the  Government.  Others  were  reached  through  the  War 
Industries  Board  by  means  of  its  control  of  materials,  trans- 
portation, and  power.  No  transfer  of  labor  from  one  indus- 
try to  another  was  to  be  sanctioned  unless  directed  by  the 
War  Industries  Board,  and  it  was  hoped  to  remove  the 
incentive  for  individual  change  of  employment  by  stand- 
ardizing working  conditions  and  wages.  The  War  Industries 
Board  was  represented  on  the  War  Labor  Policies  Board 
by  Mr.  Frayne.  The  other  members  were  Felix  Frankfurter, 
chairman;  Stanley  King,  representing  the  Secretary  of  War; 
Franklin  D.  Roosevelt,  the  Navy  Department;  G.  I.  Christie, 
the  Department  of  Agriculture;  John  P.  White,  the  Fuel 
Administration;  R.  P.  Bass,  the  Shipping  Board;  Howard 
Coonley  or  Charles  A.  Piez,  the  Shipping  Board  and  the 
Emergency  Fleet  Corporation;  and  representatives  of  the 
Food  and  Railroad  Administrations. 

Although  the  War  Labor  Board  had  its  general  policies 
and  principles  determined  for  it  by  the  President  and  by  the 
National  Industrial  Conference  Board,  no  conflict  with  it  was 
involved  in  the  creation  of  the  Policies  Board.  The  latter 
adopted  the  general  principles  of  the  former  and  then  sought 
to  apply  them  at  the  source  of  labor  troubles  by  securing  the 
general  adoption  of  concrete  practices  that  were  in  harmony 
with  them.  In  other  words,  it  sought  so  to  harmonize  employ- 
ers and  employees  in  their  relations  that  disputes  would  be 


THE  CONTROL  OF  LABOR 


289 


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r 


avoided,  and  so  to  standardize  wages  that  they  would  be 
taken  out  of  the  realm  of  disputation  (analogous  to  price- 
fixing  of  commodities). 

Working  conditions  were  also  to  be  standardized,  not  only 
as  between  different  employment  agencies  of  the  Government, 
as  in  the  shipyards,  the  navy  yards,  and  the  arsenals;  but 
between  them  and  private  industries  working  on  Government 
orders.  It  was  possible  for  the  Government  as  employer  or 
paymaster  to  force  its  will  in  those  fields.  There  remained 
the  problem  of  competition  of  non-war  industries,  which 
were  brought  into  line  by  the  power  of  the  War  Industries 
Board  over  all  the  other  factors  of  production. 

The  war  came  to  its  end  before  the  Policies  Board's  pro- 
gramme had  been  applied,  or  even  worked  out,  in  full,  but 
it  seems  probable  that  the  basis  of  satisfactory  control  of 
labor  on  the  human  side  had  been  reached  through  the  two 
boards  and  the  Division  of  Labor  of  the  War  Industries 
Board.  While  these  agencies  were  making  progress  in  their 
fields  of  policy,  mediation  and  adjudication,  the  executive 
administration  of  labor  as  a  commodity  to  be  collected, 
trained,  allocated,  distributed,  cared  for,  and  conserved  was 
being  dealt  with  by  new,  reorganized,  or  enlarged  admin- 
istrative agencies  within  the  Department  of  Labor. 

The  most  important  of  these  agencies  was  the  reorganized 
United  States  Employment  Service,  which  acted  as  a  national 
labor  employment  medium,  and  aimed  at  controlling  the 
whole  supply  of  labor;  one  purpose  being  to  give  the  War 
Industries  Board  the  means  of  applying  the  principle  of 
priority  to  labor,  just  as  it  was  applied  to  materials,  etc. 
The  first  step  in  this  direction  was  an  appeal  to  all  employers 
to  refrain  after  August  1,  1918,  from  recruiting  unskilled 
labor  in  any  other  way  than  through  the  Employment  Service. 

Surveys  were  made  of  the  common  labor  requirements  of 
the  war  industries  and  of  the  reserves  of  such  labor  in  each 
State.  Employers  were  forbidden  to  make  any  effort  to 
recruit  labor  (but  might  continue  to  hire  such  as  applied  at 
the  gates  of  plants)  without  a  special  permit  from  the  Federal 
Director  of  Labor  for  the  particular  State,  or  a  permit  from 
the  Director-General  of  the  Employment  Service  for  the 
recruiting  of  labor  outside  the  State.  It  was  further  provided 


I 


If! 


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I. 

f•^ 


I     ' 


;} 


h 


iH 


;   r 


290    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

that  no  unskilled  labor  should  be  transported  from  one  State 
to  another  without  special  permission.     In  distributing  such 
surplus  labor  as  was  found  to  be  available,  the  system  of  the 
Priorities  Division  of  the  War  Industries  Board  was  utilized. 
While  the  Employment  Management  Section  was  not  in 
the  Labor  Division,  it  was  directly  related  to  labor  problems. 
Inefficiency  of  production  during  the  war  was  partly  due  to 
defective  management  of  employment.    Hire-and-fire  was  the 
cut-and-dried  way  in  which  most  labor  forces  were  built  up, 
which  naturally  resulted  in  a  vast  amount  of  misfit  employ- 
ment and  a  very  large  labor  turnover.    The  idea  of  training 
employment  managers  for  the  war  industries  probably  origi- 
nated with  Morris  L.  Cooke,  chairman  of  the  old  Storage 
Committee  of  the  Council  of  National  Defense  —  a  commit" 
tee  which  had  no  heir  in  the  Board  sections.    It  was  cordially 
received  by  the  industrial  service  sections  of  the  Ordnance 
Department,  the  Quartermaster  Corps,  and  the  Emergency 
Fleet  Corporation.     Captain  Boyd  Fisher,  of  the  Ordnance, 
took  the  active  management  of  the  work  of  providing  training 
courses  for  employment  managers,  assisted  by  a  joint  com- 
mittee from  the  above  agencies  and  the  navy.  When  the  War 
Industries  Board  succeeded  the  Council  organization  in  all 
industrial  matters,  an  employment  management  section  was 
set  up  with  James  A.  Inglis  as  chief.    Training  courses  were 
established   with   excellent   results   at   the    Universities    of 
Rochester,  Harvard,  Columbia,  Pittsburgh,  Washington,  and 
California. 

In  the  iconoclastic  days  of  war,  when  conventions  were 
ignored  and  traditions  forgotten,  when  the  test  of  men  and 
machines  was  their  qualification  for  promoting  victory,  the 
belief  was  common  that,  with  the  shackles  of  the  past  thrown 
off,  permanent  revolutionary  changes  in  industry  and  society 
would  follow.  The  recommendations  of  the  President's 
Mediation  Commission  and  the  principles  laid  down  for  the 
guidance  of  the  War  Labor  Board  were  hailed  as  new  and 
epoch-making  charters  of  the  rights  of  labor.  Supported, 
as  they  were,  by  hundreds  of  quasi-judicial  decisions  by  the 
Board  and  their  resulting  application  in  practice,  it  was 
thought  that  they  would  inevitably  continue  to  be  observed 
and  become  the  conventions  and  traditions  of  a  new  era  in 


< 


THE  CONTROL  OF  LABOR 


291 


the  relations  of  employers  and  employees.  In  particular  it 
was  thought  that  the  principles  of  the  minimum  wage,  recog- 
nitions of  trade  organizations,  and  collective  bargaining 
would  be  so  firmly  anchored  during  the  war  that  the  back- 
wash of  peace  could  not  dislodge  them. 

Four  years  after  the  armistice  it  is  plain  that  these  hopes 
are  not  to  be  realized  in  full.  Labor,  it  must  be  admitted, 
did  not  rise  to  the  level  of  its  opportunities.  Feeling  too 
fully  its  power,  it  slowed  up  after  the  war  to  such  an  extent 
that  for  a  long  time  it  was  not  more  than  sixty  per  cent 
efficient.  Employers  felt  that  labor  had  taken  advantage  of 
the  necessities  of  war  to  exact  from  them  concessions  that 
were  unendurable,  and  they  determined  to  even  up  the  score 
when  circumstances  should  be  favorable. 

Such  circumstances  arose  when  the  inevitable  industrial 
depression  set  in.  But  even  before  that  the  programme  of 
the  radical  laborites,  who  were  not  content  with  the  advances 
made  during  the  war,  but  boldly  sought  to  syndicalize  indus- 
try, was  crushingly  defeated  in  the  great  steel  strike  of  the 
fall  of  1919,  which  was  also  a  blow  to  conservative  labor 
programmes.  The  failure  of  this  strike  was  the  death-blow 
of  bolshevism  in  America,  and  stimulated  chauvinism  among 
employers. 

Since  then  there  has  been  a  powerful  campaign  for  the 
open  shop,  and  virtually  for  the  destruction  of  the  power  of 
labor  organizations.  The  aggressiveness  of  employers,  com- 
bined with  the  pressure  of  unemployment  in  1920-21, 
resulted  for  the  time  in  an  apparent  loss  of  most  of  the 
advantages  gained  by  labor  during  the  war.  These  losses, 
however,  were  rather  the  losses  of  labor  in  respect  of  the 
power  and  influence  of  its  organizations.  There  has  been  a 
real  gain  in  the  national  understanding  of  the  labor  problem 
and  in  a  changed  attitude  of  employers  who,  regardless  of 
their  attitude  toward  labor  organizations,  are  everywhere 
intent  upon  improving  the  status  of  labor  for  reasons  of  self- 
interest  if  for  no  higher  motives. 

As  labor  as  a  commodity  began  to  reach  the  stage  of  a 
known  and  controllable  factor,  the  War  Industries  Board 
established  in  the  fall  of  1918  a  Labor  Priorities  Section  with 
A.  W.  Clapp  as  chief.    The  first  labor  priorities  order  was 


I' 

T 


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I 


»    *\: 


i:i 


•1 


ij 


292    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

issued  September  17,  1918.  It  explained  to  members  of  the 
United  States  Employment  Service  that  the  preference  list 
of  industries  did  not  include  all  essential  industries,  its 
chief  purpose  being  to  procure  an  automatic  flow  of  fuel  and 
transportation  service  to  such  industries,  and  that  in  some 
instances  labor  would  require  separate  treatment.  Lumber, 
for  example,  was  not  on  the  preference  list  because  it  was 
intended  to  discourage  long  hauls  of  that  commodity  for  the 
use  of  civilians  and  to  promote  the  use  of  wood  as  fuel. 
But  as  certain  kinds  of  lumber  were  in  great  demand  for 
ffSLT  purposes,  it  was  important  that  the  labor  supply  should 
be  husbanded. 

The  establishment  of  priority  control  of  labor  led  to  a 
great  expansion  of  the  power  of  the  War  Industries  Board. 
As  it  was  necessary  that  the  additional  men  called  to  the 
colors  under  the  selective  draft  should  be  chosen  with  scrupu- 
lous regard  for  the  interests  of  the  most  essential  industries, 
it  became  necessary  for  the  Provost  Marshal  to  widen  the 
scope  of  his  "work  or  fight"  regulations.  He  appealed  to 
the  Board  to  help  him  to  apply  them  to  larger  numbers  of 
men  and  in  more  industries  than  at  first.  It  now  became  the 
duty  of  the  Priorities  Division  to  specify  what  industries 
were  freely  open  to  the  draft  and  what  must  be  safeguarded. 
After  conference  with  General  Crowder's  office  and  the 
American  Federation  of  Labor,  a  bulletin  was  prepared  which 
abolished  the  labor  exemption  privileges  of  whole  classes, 
such  as  private  chauff'eurs,  traveling  salesmen,  etc. 

Thus  the  War  Industries  Board,  already  supreme  in  mate- 
rials, facilities,  finance,  and  transportation,  wheresoever 
involved  in  the  industrial  prosecution  of  the  war,  now  became 
the  allocator  of  men,  not  only  between  industries,  but  between 
civil  and  military  life.  It  was  become  the  virtual  general 
staff"  of  the  civil  life  of  the  country  as  applied  to  war  ends. 
All  America  in  all  its  material  and  human  resources  was 
subject  to  its  command.  It  was  an  industrial  dictatorship 
without  parallel  —  a  dictatorship  by  force  of  necessity  and 
common  consent  which  step  by  step  at  last  encompassed  the 
Nation  and  united  it  into  a  coordinated  and  mobile  whole, 
supporting  the  army  and  navy  with  all  the  incomparable 
strength  of  the  greatest  industrial  potentiality  in  the  world. 


ii 


CHAPTER  XVI 

IN  THE  SEAT  OF  POWER 

Pacifism  and  the  dollar  expended  —  Industry  in  a  blind  alley  — The  transfor- 
mation—A one-man  authority  arises  —  Should  it  have  been  expanded  further? 
—  The  Board's  hard  road  to  power. 

The  preceding  chapters  of  this  book  and  the  first  fifteen 
months  of  America's  participation  in  the  war  represent  in 
large  measure  the  doing  of  what  should  have  been  done  long 
before  the  war;  namely,  the  ascertaining  of  what  was  to  be 
done  and  how  to  do  it.  In  the  school  of  experience  and  at  a 
tremendous  cost  the  objectives  were  at  last  clarified,  the 
methods  established,  and  the  mechanism  outlined  and  largely 
filled  in.  Once  again  we  had  paid  a  staggering  price  for  that 
ineradicable  folly  of  the  blind  pacifism  of  America,  which  is 
forever  sure  that  each  war  will  be  the  last. 

Some  one  has  calculated  that  nintey-three  cents  out  of 
every  dollar  of  current  Federal  expenditures  represents  the 
costs  of  war  and  armaments  past  and  present.  That  calcu- 
lation is  based  on  a  perversion  of  facts.  It  would  be  very 
much  nearer  the  truth  to  say  that  seventy-five  cents  of  every 
dollar  of  current  expenditures  is  the  cost  of  blind  pacifism. 
It  is  not  improbable  that  a  billion  dollars  of  extraordinary 
expenditure  on  preparedness  between  1914  and  1917  would 
have  saved  ten  billion  of  the  twenty-four  billion  dollars  the 
war  cost  us,  exclusive  of  loans  to  the  Allies.  It  is  even 
possible  that  such  an  outlay  would  have  made  our  actual 
participation  in  the  war  unnecessary.  Germany  dared  our 
intervention  because  she  believed  the  Allies  would  be  finished 
off"  before  it  could  become  effective.  The  event  showed  that 
her  calculation  was  not  far  wrong. 

As  early  as  May,  1917,  it  was  perceived  in  the  councils 
of  those  who  were  striving  to  introduce  order  into  the  direc- 
tion of  industry  for  war  purposes  that  there  must  be  some 
central  head  of  industrial  direction  and  that  the  determina- 
tion of  priority  of  every  need  or  requirement  must  be  the 


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il 


294    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

keystone  of  its  functions.  A  year  was  to  pass  before  the  full 
power  of  determination  of  priority,  supported  by  central 
control  of  the  power  of  commandeering,  was  finally  central- 
ized in  the  War  Industries  Board.  Progress  was  being  made 
during  that  period,  but,  as  a  general  statement,  it  is  safe  to 
say  that  during  that  time  American  industry  was  working 
furiously,  but  blindly,  for  the  furtherance  of  war  ends. 

Clearance  of  current  orders  was  the  first  step  toward  the 
introduction  of  priority.  Then  followed  the  study  of  require- 
ments and  resources  with  the  resulting  application  of  the 
principle  of  priority  to  the  future.  Finally,  we  have  the 
Priorities  Division  of  the  War  Industries  Board,  with  a 
Priorities  Board  that  takes  all  the  information  in  hand,  bal- 
ances requirements  against  resources,  determines  the  superior 
need,  and  directs  the  indicated  action.  Price-fixing  evolves 
at  the  same  time,  and  finally  there  is  a  powerful  Price-Fixing 
Committee.  Conservation  of  men  and  materials,  allied  to 
prosperity,  explores  its  way,  and  at  last  becomes  a  powerful 
and  effective  machine.  The  control  of  facilities  and  the 
conversion  of  industries  to  war  uses  become  comprehensive 
and  systematic.  In  the  exercise  of  priority  and  its  con- 
comitants and  of  price-fixing,  the  War  Industries  Board 
gradually  interlocks  with  all  of  the  war-making  agencies  of 
the  Government  —  with  the  Shipping  Board,  with  the  Treas- 
ury Department,  with  the  army,  with  the  navy,  with  the 
purchasing  commissions  of  the  Allies,  and  with  the  economic 
controls  of  the  Allies,  with  the  war  administration  of  labor, 
with  the  Railroad  Administration,  with  the  Food  and  Fuel 
Administrations,  and  others. 

There  results  from  the  peculiarity  of  this  interlocking  that 
a  Board  which  was  originally  only  one  among  equals 
becomes  at  length  paramount.  The  interlocking  boards  and 
committees  are  made  up  of  representatives  of  many  or  all 
of  the  war  agencies,  but  they  are  committees  of  die  War 
Industries  Board,  and  the  chairman  of  each  is  either  a  mem- 
ber of  the  Board  or  of  its  organization.  Behind  all  the 
functional  boards  and  committees,  except  the  Price-Fixing 
Committee,  stands  the  chairman  of  the  War  Industries 
Board,  in  whom  the  final  power  of  decision  rests.  Thus, 
once  one  of  these  apparently  inter-departmental  committees 


IN  THE  SEAT  OF  POWER 


295 


takes  up  a  subject,  it  opens  the  way  for  the  channel  of  power 
over  it  to  the  chairman  of  the  Board. 

Even  the  Price-Fixing  Committee  is  within  his  influence. 
It  is  true  that  he  does  not  make  prices,  but  he  is  a  member 
of  the  committee  and  the  committee  knows  that  its  business 
is  to  establish  prices  conformable  to  the  general  policies  of 
the  Board. 

Thus,  the  War  Industries  Board,  in  its  general  function 
of  coordinating  industry  to  meet  the  demands  of  war,  grad- 
ually arrives  at  the  position  wherein  it  exercises  control  over 
all  the  other  agencies  in  matters  that  fall  within  the  scope  of 
its  function.  At  last,  behind  that  gradually  evolved  com- 
manding position  the  President  lodges  the  enormous  power 
of  the  veto  of  the  commandeering  privilege,  which  implies 
its  exercise,  and  supplements  it  with  full  control  of  a  number 
of  the  principal  commodities  and  their  industries. 

Toward  the  other  war-making  bodies  the  War  Industries 
Board  now  comes  to  hold  a  relation  analogous  to  that  of  the 
Federal  Government  to  the  States  and  their  people.  The 
Board  does  not  attempt  to  control  or  dominate  the  other 
bodies  in  their  peculiar  fields,  but  it  afi'ects  their  activities 
by  the  application  of  its  general  policies  to  the  factors  of 
production.  The  Government  at  Washington  does  not 
attempt  to  tell  the  Government  at  Sacramento  what  it  shall 
do  in  California,  but  in  many  ways  it  acts  directly  and 
authoritatively  on  the  people  of  California.  So  the  War 
Industries  Board  did  not  undertake  to  tell  the  army  what  to 
do  in  the  military  field,  but  it  was  able  to  tell  war  industries 
what  to  do  with  respect  to  army  orders. 

To  a  foreigner  our  duplex  system  of  government,  whereby 
the  individual  is  at  once  subject  to  the  National  and  State 
Governments  and  has  a  dual  allegiance,  seems  complex  and 
clumsy,  but  it  works  admirably.  To  a  detached  observer 
the  finally  evolved  system  of  Government  relations  with 
industry  during  the  war  would  likewise  seem  complex  and 
clumsy.  Every  producer  was  subject  to  some  agency  of  the 
Government  which  had  the  buying  power;  on  the  other  hand, 
he  was  subject  to  the  War  Industries  Board,  which  had  no 
buying  powers.  Again,  just  as  the  sovereign  States,  as  well 
as  the  people,  are  represented  in  the  Government  at  Wash- 


ft 


I 


296    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

ington,  so  the  various  war-making  agencies,  charged  with 
particular  divisions  of  the  task,  were  represented  in  the 
War  Industries  Board,  and  in  a  way  composed  it. 

All  of  this  interlocking  and  federating  would  have  been 
merely  an  aggregation  of  debating  societies  had  it  not  been 
for  the  fact  that  the  moment  they  began  to  counsel  they 
created  responsible  power,  automatically  lodged  in  the 
last  analysis  in  the  chairman  of  the  War  Industries  Board. 
The  Shipping  Board,  for  instance,  might  have  been  very 
loath  to  see  the  War  Industries  Board  applying  its  function 
of  priority  in  a  certain  field.  But  to  oppose  a  policy  of  the 
War  Industries  Board  it  had  to  speak  through  its  representa- 
tives on  the  Priorities  Board.  Then  and  there  the  chairman 
of  the  former  became  the  final  arbiter  of  the  question  at 
issue.  It  is  an  admitted  fact  that  this  loose  and  seemingly 
frail  machine  of  interlocking  committees,  emanating  from 
a  body  that  held  no  purse-strings  and  was  empowered  only 
in  indirect  ways,  exercised  a  firmer  and  more  general  control 
over  industry  than  did  the  munition  ministries  of  France  and 
England. 

Whether  it  would  have  been  better  if  the  body  that  finally 
firmly  gripped  the  sequences  and  processes  of  industry  for 
the  emergency  of  the  war  by  federating  and  blending  them 
with  itself  had  also  held  the  purse-strings  is  not  to  be  decided 
easily.  In  that  case  it  might  have  lost  itself  in  a  multitude 
of  matters  with  which  it  was  not  conversant  and  have  sac- 
rificed intelligent  general  control  and  sound  counsels  to 
absorption  in  detail.  As  it  was,  it  escaped  the  infinite 
burdens  of  negotiating  and  drawing  thousands  of  contracts 
and  the  multitudinous  details  of  purchase,  procurement, 
inspection,  transportation,  and  finance.  It  remained  a 
small  and  compact  body,  creative,  advisory,  and  generally 
directive,  rather  than  executive;  free  to  take  the  broad  view 
and  make  the  unbiased  decision.  It  is  probable  that,  with- 
out sacrifice  of  its  efl&ciency  and  with  great  benefits  to  the 
Government  and  the  country,  it  could  have  extended  its 
control  of  the  business  side  of  war  further  into  the  sources. 

It  had  to  deal  with  many  problems  which  would  never 
have  arisen  if  it  had  exercised  authority  at  the  source.  For 
example,  it  might  have  been  well  for  the  War  Industries 


IN  THE  SEAT  OF  POWER 


297 


Board  to  have  had  the  power  to  decide  such  a  question  as 
whether  we  should  attempt  to  manufacture  75's  in  this 
country  or  get  them  all  in  France.  Such  questions  as  this, 
the  Board  always  considered  military  and,  therefore,  outside 
its  province.  It  conceived  its  duty  to  be  the  fulfilling,  not 
the  determination,  of  the  requirements  of  the  army  and 
navy.  It  would  not  tell  the  army  how  many  or  what  sort 
of  guns  it  should  have  manufactured;  but,  when  the  army 
had  decided,  the  general  problem  of  getting  production  fell 
to  the  Board. 

No  doubt,  the  proper  functions  of  the  Board  were  thus 
gummed  up  at  the  beginning.  However  it  might  have  been 
had  the  Board  started  full-fledged  at  the  beginning  of  the 
war  and  with  a  clean  slate,  it  had  to  adapt  itself  to  the  facts 
of  the  time  of  its  rise  to  power.  It  sought  to  discharge  its 
functions  through  existing  machinery  and  agencies,  creating 
only  such  additional  machinery  of  its  own  as  was  necessary 
to  unite  and  coordinate  what  was  already  set  up  and  deeply 
involved  in  war  work. 

So  far  we  have  treated  of  the  origin  and  growth  of  the 
functions  of  the  Board  and  the  general  administrative  organ- 
ization they  entailed.  These  were  lodged  in  the  Board 
proper  and  in  certain  subsidiary  organizations  which  have 
been  described,  with  one  exception.  These  functional 
divisions  of  the  Board  were  those  of  Priority,  Price-Fixing, 
Labor,  Technical  and  Consulting,  Requirements,  Purchasing 
Commissions  for  the  Allies,  Conservation  Division,  Facilities 
Division,  Resources  and  Conversion  Section,  Conservation 
Division,  and  the  Division  of  Planning  and  Statistics.  All 
of  these  and  their  subsidiaries  dealt  with  the  general  policies 
involved  in  their  functions  and  were  more  or  less  executive 
and  advisory.  The  Technical  and  Consulting  Section  was 
a  functional  part  of  the  Board  on  which  it  was  represented 
through  Mr.  L.  L.  Summers,  who  was  styled  Technical 
Adviser,  but  it  seems  better  to  describe  it  in  conjunction  with 
the  subjective  chemical  and  explosives  divisions,  which  were 
under  Mr.  Summers's  direction. 

It  was  a  long  and  hard  period  of  slow  growth  before  the 
War  Industries  Board  was  at  last  full  grown  and  in  full 
command  of  its  developed  functions  of  interknitting  and 


I  ,ii 


»{ 


'■A 


l|8! 


298    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

synclironizing  the  manifold  activities  of  the  huge  war 
machine  that  America  had  built  with  haste  and  waste.  But 
it  was  a  sturdy  if  delayed  growth.  While  it  had  been 
sending  down  its  roots,  shooting  out  branches  and  raising 
its  head  above  the  tangle  of  war  agencies,  it  had  been 
developing  and  toughening  internally.  The  commodity 
sections  —  the  trunk  of  the  tree  —  had  become  specialized, 
defined,  ordered,  and  manned  by  the  best  types  of  American 
industrial  talent,  genius,  and  experience. 

It  would  be  an  exaggeration  to  give  the  impression  that 
the  War  Industries  Board  approximated  perfection  of 
function  as  soon  as  it  came  into  fullness  and  power.  The 
tangled  growth  of  luxuriant  disorder  was  not  to  be  cleared 
in  a  day,  and  it  was  a  matter  of  time  to  reveal  and  prove  to 
all  concerned  that  there  was  at  last  a  single  expert  and 
powerful  hand  at  the  helm.  Dependent  for  a  full  measure 
of  success  on  the  whole-hearted  cooperation  of  many  govern- 
mental agencies,  thousands  of  executives,  and  the  masterful 
and  often  headstrong  captains  of  industry  who  must  be 
gently  gathered  in  and  restrained;  opposed  to  the  last  in 
some  quarters,  the  Board  had  to  make  haste  slowly.  Nor 
would  it  be  accurate  to  say  that  the  Board  made  no  errors. 
To  say  that  would  be  to  say  that  it  did  not  act  —  and 
action,  quick  and  vigorous,  was  one  of  its  outstanding 
characteristics. 


;i 


CHAPTER  XVII 

THE  BACKBONE  OF  THE  BOARD:  THE  COMMODITY 

SECTIONS 

Baruch  taps  three  hundred  and  fifty  industries  —  Administrative  organization 
at  its  height  —  The  mechanism  visualized  —  The  Board's  genesis  —  The  dis- 
carded committee  plan  —  Dissecting  the  commodity  sections  —  The  appetite 
for  facts  —  A  head  center  for  producer  and  consumer  —  Guesswork  annihilated 
—  Industry  mobilized,  drilled,  and  militant  —  Coordinated  industry  at  the 
service  of  coordinated  consumption  —  The  philosophy  of  business  in  Govern- 
ment—  Dreams  of  an  ordered  economic  world. 

The  commodity  sections  were  the  source  and  the  life  of  the 
War  Industries  Board.  The  Board  grew  out  of  and  with 
them.  All  the  other  administrative  divisions  were  based  on 
them.  They  were  the  substance  of  the  stuff  of  which 
requirements,  price-fixing,  priority,  and  all  the  subsidiaries 
of  those  three  were  made.  They  were  American  industry 
in  microcosmic  reduction. 

Mr.  Baruch  used  to  visualize  them  as  sixty-odd  neatly 
labeled  taps,  from  which  he  and  the  various  boards,  com- 
mittees, and  divisions  that  functioned  between  the  sections  on 
the  one  hand  and  the  governmental  departments,  the  Allies, 
the  public  and  the  industries  on  the  other  hand,  could  draw 
all  the  facts,  figures,  ideas,  and  contrivances  for  any  situa- 
tion. They  tapped  some  three  hundred  and  fifty  industrial 
reservoirs,  represented  ultimately  by  the  war  service  com- 
mittees of  the  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  the  United  States.^ 

These  taps  were  duplex  and  reversible.  Turned  one  way, 
they  poured  into  the  Board  the  controlling  information  in 
regard  to  all  American  industry  that  was  not  controlled  by 
those  two  independent  commodity  bodies,  the  Fuel  Adminis- 
tration and  the  Food  Administration.  Turned  the  other 
way,  they  promptly  transmitted  to  all  industry  the  behests 
and  requests  of  the  Board. 

Altogether  the  commodity  sections  represented  the  highest 
type  of  administrative  organization  the  United  States  has 
ever  seen.  It  was  a  vast  order  without  a  single  taint  of 
bureaucracy.     It  was  abundant  knowledge  with  no  trace  of 

*See  Appendix  for  personnel  of  committees. 


I  «! 


r 


i 


i> 


i       1 


I 

4. 


300    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

pedantry.  It  was  keen  and  expert  business  in  government 
with  absolute  disinterest.  It  was  the  sort  of  government  that 
would  be  ideal  in  peace  if  it  were  possible  to  maintain  in 
ordinary  times  the  output  of  energy,  the  singleness  of 
devoted  purpose,  and  the  high  ideals  that  dominate  men  in 
numbers  only  in  times  of  imminent  national  peril.  Modem 
government  is  more  economic  than  political,  but  the  manage- 
ment of  government  remains  not  only  political,  but  also 
partisan. 

The  commodity  sections  were  business  operating  Govern- 
ment business  for  the  common  good.  They  reduced  the 
deadliness  of  routine  to  the  lowest  possible  minimum.  They 
operated,  not  by  the  ponderous  momentum  of  custom,  but 
by  the  alert  elaji  of  an  initiative  which  faced  each  succeed- 
ing problem  with  zest  and  curiosity.  They  had  to  the 
highest  degree  that  mobility,  ductility,  and  resilience  that 
are  so  constrained  by  the  rigid  lines  of  bureaucracy  and 
even  of  most  business  organizations.  The  nominal  parti- 
tion that  separated  the  field  of  one  section  from  the  others 
was  highly  osmotic.  Overlapping  and  interfusion  were 
characteristic  of  the  organization  of  the  War  Industries 
Board  all  the  way  through.  It  was  not  the  sort  of  overlap- 
ping that,  for  example,  chokes  Alaska  by  the  formalism  of 
thirty  bureaus,  but  the  overlapping,  the  interpenetration  of 
unjealous,  cordial  team-work,  uncurbed  by  the  hard-and-fast 
lines  of  statutes  and  regulations  aimed  at  prevention  of  abuse 
of  power  instead  of  its  efficient  application. 

Imagine  a  business  enterprise  composed  of  sixty  partners, 
each  of  whom  is  experienced  in  a  particular  field,  but  not  lack- 
ing in  knowledge  of  some  of  the  other  fields  and  of  general 
industrial  and  commercial  processes.  Assume,  further,  that 
they  are  mostly  men  under  fifty,  and  that  none  of  them  is 
stale  or  cynical  and  that  they  are  engaged  in  a  novel,  stimu- 
lating, and  absorbing  enterprise,  which  so  dominates  their 
lives  that  with  respect  to  its  realization  they  suppress  all 
jealousy,  eliminate  internal  politics,  and  are  free  from  self- 
seeking.  Now,  put  them  under  a  loose  central  control  whose 
purpose  is  not  to  dominate,  but  to  coordinate  them,  and  which 
gives  to  every  partner  the  full  control  of  his  assignment 
accompanied  by  the  fullest  confidence,  with  virtually  no 


THE  BACKBONE  OF  THE  BOARD 


301 


limitation,  and  you  have  the  commodity  sections  of  the  War 
Industries  Board;  and,  practically,  the  Board  itself. 

If  you  surround  this  central  group  of  experts,  who  are 
largely  of  the  type  that  unites  the  vision  of  the  engineer 
to  the  practicality  of  the  production  manager,  with  a 
responsive  environment  of  men  of  similar  type  made  up  of 
several  hundred  committees  representing  in  a  very  authori- 
tative though  voluntary  way  virtually  the  whole  of  American 
industry,  you  will  have  an  almost  ideal  control  of  the 
industry  of  this  continent.  You  have  not  only  control,  but 
you  have  a  vital  organism,  moved  from  the  center  to  the 
remotest  boundaries  by  a  high  resolve. 

This  loose  organization,  close-knit  only  by  the  threads  of 
an  inspiring  common  purpose,  achieved  results  with  a 
surprising  celerity.  If  the  tap  was  turned  in  Washington, 
there  was  the  same  instantaneous  response  at  the  remotest 
contacts  of  the  system  that  the  automatic  water-heater  gives 
to  the  bathroom  faucet.  The  war  committees  of  industry 
knew,  understood,  and  believed  in  the  commodity  chiefs. 
They  were  of  the  same  piece.  They  responded  not  to  orders, 
but  to  rationalized  inevitability,  in  the  determination  of 
which  they  were  potent  factors.  Guided  and  informed  by 
what  they  learned  from  the  commodity  sections,  they 
imposed  on  their  industries  by  democratic  consent  the 
burdens  and  restrictions  of  industrial  mobilization  and 
largely  composed  and  administered  their  own  regulations 
and  discipline. 

The  first  stage  of  the  commodity  sections  was  in  the  com- 
mittees on  war  goods  and  materials  formed  by  the  members 
of  the  Advisory  Commission  of  the  Council  of  National 
Defense,  but  more  particularly  in  the  sub-committees  on 
raw  materials.  The  Committee  on  Raw  Materials,  under 
Baruch,  Summers,  and  Meyer,  eventually  became  the  War 
Industries  Board,  for  two  reasons:  first,  because  after  a 
few  months  it  was  plain  that  the  basic  economic  problem  of 
the  war  was  lodged  in  the  administration  of  the  production, 
procurement,  and  allocation  of  raw  materials;  and,  second, 
because  it  had  grasped  the  true  idea  of  control  of  industry, 
Baruch's  faucet  idea  —  the  compacting  of  knowledge  and 
direction  of  all  things  pertaining  to  a  given  commodity  into 


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302    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

the  hands  of  practical  specialists,  who  were  to  operate 
through  the  existing  business  mechanism  instead  of  through 
an  artificial,  superimposed,  brand-new  administrative  ma- 
chine. 

From  the  very  beginning  the  raw  materials  sub-com- 
mittees and  their  manipulation  were  differentiated  from  the 
other  Advisory  Commission  committees  that  had  to  do  with 
supplies.  Mr.  Baruch  conceived  of  his  committees  as 
implements  of  the  government  of  industry,  but  not  as  the 
Government.  They  were  to  control  their  respective 
industries  for  the  Government,  but  they  were  not  to  control 
the  Government.  He  was  too  worldly  wise  to  think  of  giving 
over  to  any  group  of  men  the  virtual  determination  of  their 
own  business  relations  with  Government.  For  a  long  time 
he  and  two  or  three  assistants  discharged  the  function  of 
contact  from  the  side  of  Government  with  these  committees. 
The  committees  were  freely  used,  but  they  were  watched. 

When  in  the  summer  of  1917,  in  response  to  public 
criticism  and  Congressional  action,  it  became  necessary  to 
draw  a  sharp  line  between  the  cooperative  committees  of 
industry  and  the  direction  of  governmental  contact  with 
industry,  the  Raw  Materials  Division  of  the  War  Industries 
Board  was  not  much  affected;  none  at  all  in  principle, 
though  some  in  form.  Mr.  Baruch  and  a  few  associates 
could  no  longer  cover  the  whole  field  of  commodities  with 
an  eye  single  to  the  protection  of  the  Government's  interests. 
The  old  committees  were  disbanded.  Men  from  them  went 
over  to  the  Government  side  of  the  line  and  divorced  them- 
selves from  their  industries  or  were  replaced  on  the  Govern- 
ment side  with  commodity  specialists.  Thereafter  the  War 
Industries  Board  approached  each  industry  through  a  com- 
modity section  that  was  entirely  of  and  for  the  Board  and 
the  Government,  and  it  was  met  on  the  part  of  the  appro- 
priate industry  by  a  committee  that  was  frankly  of  and  for 
the  industry,  though  assumedly  and  generally  in  fact 
dominated  by  the  spirit  of  public  service. 

Under  the  auspices  of  the  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  the 
United  States,  these  committees  were  thereafter  wholly 
appointed  by  their  respective  industrial  groups,  and  were 
known    as    the    "War    Service    Committees    of    Industry." 


THE  BACKBONE  OF  THE  BOARD 


303 


There  was  no  longer  a  twilight  zone  of  divided  fealty  in  any 
man  or  committee.^ 

Business  men  wholly  consecrated  to  Government  service, 
but  full  of  understanding  of  the  problems  of  industry,  now 
faced  business  men  wholly  representative  of  industry  as 
distinct  from  Government,  but  sympathetic  with  the  purpose 
of  Government.  Cooperative  but  sharply  separated  points 
of  contact  were  thus  created.  The  Raw  Materials  Division 
had  always  maintained  the  separation^  but  in  the  early  days 
the  contact  on  its  side  was  single  or  only  slightly  disturbed. 
Later  in  the  War  Industries  Board  there  were  sixty  separate 
wires  reaching  out  from  the  chairman  to  contact  with  more 
than  three  hundred  and  fifty  industries. 

This  sounds  dismaying,  but  it  was  really  simplicity  itself. 
Each  of  the  sixty  wires  was  executively  controlled  by  a 
section  chief.  The  chairman  of  the  Board  could,  in  human 
limitations,  know  but  little  of  what  each  chief  was  doing. 
The  latter's  job  was  defined  for  him  and  he  mastered  it  or  it 

*The  passing  of  the  old  trade  committees  was  definitely  marked  when,  on 
October  31,  1917,  the  War  Industries  Board  directed  Judge  Lovett  to  write 
the  Director  of  the  Council  of  National  Defense  as  follows: 

"I  am  directed  by  the  War  Industries  Board  to  say,  in  reply  to  your  letter 
of  the  17th  inst.,  that  the  War  Industries  Board  are  of  the  opinion  that  com- 
mittees composed  wholly  or  largely  of  manufacturers  or  producers  of  com- 
modities or  articles,  the  price  and  production  of  which  are  not  ordinarily  fixed 
by  law,  such  as  coal,  steel,  copper,  etc.,  should  not  be  created  and  supported 
as  committees  of  the  Council  of  National  Defense  or  of  the  War  Industries 
Board,  and  thus  be  given  an  apparent  legal  status  with  respect  to  functions 
which  as  exemplified  by  the  committees  heretofore  appointed  are  at  least 
vague.  Such  committees,  according  to  our  information,  have  rendered  most 
valuable  service  to  the  Government  in  the  present  emergency,  but  we  do  not 
deem  them  absolutely  necessary.  We  believe  that  committees  or  other  rep- 
resentatives created  by  and  representative  of  the  several  trades  themselves  will 
be  substantially  as  effective  in  cooperating  with  the  Government  as  these  com- 
mittees, where  there  is  a  bona  fide  desire  to  cooperate.  In  any  event,  such 
advantages,  if  any,  as  may  arise  from  the  creation  and  activities  of  such  com- 
mittees as  agencies  of  the  Council  of  National  Defense  are  in  our  judgment 
offset  by  the  public  prejudice  against  having  a  group  of  individuals,  represent- 
ing an  industry,  act  for  the  Government  in  buying  the  product  of  such  in- 
dustry, and  by  the  doubt  as  to  whether  the  creation  of  such  agencies  harmo- 
nizes with  public  policy  as  established  by  statutes  enacted  by  practically  all 
the  States  as  well  as  by  Congress,  designed  to  discourage  organizations  of 
groups  of  competitors  in  trade.'* 

Judge  Lovett*s  letter  further  made  it  plain  that  the  War  Industries  Board 
would  not  sponsor  any  particular  source  of  appointment  of  these  committees 
of  industry,  whether  by  the  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  the  United  States  or  by 
the  industries  directly.  The  Chamber  of  Commerce  rendered  an  important 
service  in  this  connection  by  seeing  to  it  that,  wherever  an  industry  had  not 
appointed  an  authorized  committee,  it  did  so;  and  in  impressing  upon  all  such 
committees  the  high  importance  of  their  cooperative  function. 


4 


304    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


THE  BACKBONE  OF  THE  BOARD 


305 


I! 


4.i 


'^  i 


%*    A 


^ 


mastered  him.  There  was  no  scolding,  no  rebuking.  If 
the  chief  succeeded,  he  stayed;  if  he  failed,  he  went.  He 
had  at  his  command  all  the  powers  of  the  Board  —  priority, 
allocation,  curtailment,  price-fixing,  commandeering.  It  was 
assumed  that  he  knew  enough  of  the  industries  using  his 
commodity  to  perceive  how  to  wield  his  powers  discreetly 
and  effectually. 

The  establishment  of  the  war  service  committees  marked 
the  end  of  the  campaign  the  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  the 
United  States  had  been  carrying  on  for  the  creation  of  a 
Government  purchasing  commission  by  act  of  Congress  to 
supersede  the  War  Industries  Board.  It  had  been  largely 
impelled  to  that  campaign  by  the  dissatisfaction  of  many 
industries  with  the  old  committee  system  of  the  Council 
which  had  the  basic  defect  of  serving  two  more  or  less 
opposed  masters. 

Not  only  did  the  different  commodity  sections  work 
together  happily  and  harmoniously,  so  that  their  strength 
was  the  strength  of  all;  but  they  were  fused  with  the  general 
administrative  divisions  of  the  Board.  Some  heads  of 
commodity  sections  or  groups  of  sections  had  their  places 
on  the  Priorities  Committee,  the  Priorities  Board,  the  Clear- 
ance Committee,  the  Price-Fixing  Committee.  Even  if  they 
did  not  belong  to  committees  or  boards,  they  were  the  chief 
sources  of  information  and  action  of  all  of  them.  They  con- 
stantly appeared  as  active  agents  at  meetings  of  these  and 
other  bodies.  In  fact  there  was  the  union,  not  only  of 
formal  representation  and  informal  attendance  at  meetings, 
but  the  union  of  daily  routine  and  contact  whereby  virtually 
everything  the  Board  did  originated  with  or  was  referred  to 
the  commodity  sections.  Separately  they  were  the  perform- 
ing members  of  the  Board ;  collectively  they  were  the  Board, 
even  though  that  designation  was  limited  to  an  executive 
group  of  seven.  Three  members  of  the  Board  —  Replogle, 
Peek,  and  Summers  —  in  fact  represented  the  commodity 
sections.  Legge,  besides  his  duties  as  vice-chairman 
of  the  Board  and  director  of  Requirements,  represented 
commodity  sections,  including  the  small  group  that  was  still 
classed  as  the  Raw  Materials  Division  after  many  individual 
raw  material  sections  had  been  established. 


. 


Altogether  there  were  sixty-six  units  of  the  Board  that 
were  commonly  referred  to  as  commodity  sections.  Six  of 
these  were  really  functional  rather  than  commodity  bodies. 
For  purposes  of  centralization  and  coordination,  every  true 
commodity  section  came  under  the  department  of  some 
member  of  the  Board  or  reported  directly  to  the  chairman. 
In  some  instances  they  were  grouped  first  into  divisions,  as, 
for  example,  the  Textile,  Chemical,  and  Explosives 
Divisions,  which  would  be  in  the  department  of  some  Board 
member.  Two  of  the  functional  divisions  —  Conservation 
and  Planning  and  Statistics  —  reported  directly  to  the  chair- 
man. The  Steel  Division  and  that  of  Planning  and  Statistics 
had  sections,  but  were  usually  dealt  with  as  units,  though  in 
computing  the  number  of  true  commodity  sections  as  sixty, 
the  steel  sections  of  a  commodity  nature  have  been  counted. 
Adding  the  five  sections  of  the  Division  of  Planning  and 
Statistics  and  other  miscellaneous  sections  of  an  internal 
administrative  or  functional  nature  that  were  not  classed 
as  commodity  sections  even  loosely,  the  total  number  of 
primary  units  of  the  Board  was  somewhat  more  than  seventy 

The  commodity  sections  were  being  added  to  continu 
ously,  as  industry  after  industry  became  subject  to  control 
After  the  final  reorganization  of  the  Board  under  Mr 
Baruch,  he  called  and  ordinarily  presided  at  weekly  meet 
ings  of  the  chiefs  of  commodity  sections,  which  were  also 
attended  by  the  heads  of  divisions,  whether  members  of  the 
Board  proper  or  not.  These  meetings  afforded  an  oppor- 
tunity for  acquaintance,  exchange  of  views,  consideration 
of  topics  of  common  interest,  criticism,  and  suggestion. 
They  made  a  sort  of  popular  assembly  of  the  Board  organiza- 
tion, though  they  had  no  control  of  policies  and  took  action 
only  on  projects  intended  to  promote  team-work. 

The  actual  composition  of  this  assembly  was  thirteen 
division  heads  and  sixty-one  section  chiefs,  no  sections  or 
other  subdivisions  of  the  Labor,  Steel,  Conservation,  Plan- 
ning and  Statistics  Divisions  being  included,  but  being 
represented  by  their  respective  division  chiefs.  Of  the 
section  chiefs  fifty-five  headed  true  commodity  sections. 
Full  reports  of  these  meetings  were  distributed  to  members. 
In  order  to  keep  the  whole  organization  fully  informed  of 


t 


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i 


306    INDUSTRIAL  AMERI(L\  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

the  Board's  activities,  there  was  published  a  confidential 
weekly  review,  which  was  preceded  by  a  review  with  a  less 
comprehensive  field  published  by  the  Priorities  Division. 
The  latter  was  resumed  about  the  time  of  the  armistice  and 
appeared  only  once  or  twice/ 

^The  following  is  a  list  of  divisions  and  commodity  sections  represented  at 
these  meetings: 


DIVISIONS 


Price-Fixing  Committee. 

Purchasing  Commission  for  Allies. 

Explosives. 

Lahor. 

Planning  and  Statistics. 

Requirements. 

ChemicaL 


Facilities. 

Priorities. 

Finished  Products. 

Steel. 

Textile. 

Conservation. 


SECTIONS 


Tin. 

Crane. 

Acid  and  Heavy  Chemicals. 
•Legal. 

Forgings,  Guns,  etc. 

Alkali  and  Chlorine. 

Refractories. 

Optical  Glass  and  Instruments. 

Electric  Wire  and  Cable. 

Platinum. 

Wood  Chemicals. 

Knit  Goods. 

Creosote. 

Power. 

Pulp  and  Paper. 

Electrodes  and  Abrasives. 

Rubber. 

Lumber. 

Tobacco. 

Railroad  Equipment  and  Supply. 

Miscellaneous  Commodities. 

Tanning  Materials. 

Automotive  Products. 

Jute,  Hemp,  and  Cordage. 

Paint  and  Pigment. 

Building  Materials. 

Cotton  and  Cotton  Linters. 

Mica. 

Nitrates. 
•News. 
•Fire  Prevention. 

Machine  Tool. 

Price. 
•Technical  and  Consulting. 


Coal-Gas  Products. 

Brass  —  Non-ferrous  Tubing. 
•Resources  and   Conversion. 

Agricultural  Implements,  etc. 

Foreign  Wool  Section. 

Woolens. 

Domestic  Wool. 
•Inland  Traffic. 

Electrical  and  Power  Equipment. 

Fine  Chemicals. 

Ferro- Alloys. 

Hardware  and  Hand  Tool. 

Chain. 

Dye  —  Artificial  and  Vegetable. 

Medical. 

Silk. 

Flax  Products. 

Emergency  Construction. 

Hide,  Leather  and  Leather  Goods. 

Felt. 

Chemical   Glass  —  Stoneware. 

Cotton  Goods. 
•Special  xYdvisory  Committee  on 
Plants  and  Munitions. 

Stored  Materials. 

Ethyl  Alcohol. 

Sulphur  Pyrites. 

Non-ferrous  Metals. 

Steel  Products  Section. 

Projectile  Steel,    Rails,   Alloy   Steel, 
and  Cold-Drawn  Steel  Section. 

Pig  Iron  Section. 

Iron  and  Steel  Scrap  Section. 


•Indicates  technical  non-commodity  sections. 


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306    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

the  Board's  activities,  there  was  published  a  confidential 
weekly  review,  which  was  preceded  by  a  review  with  a  less 
comprehensive  field  published  by  the  Priorities  Division. 
The  latter  was  resumed  about  the  time  of  the  armistice  and 
appeared  only  once  or  twice/ 

^The  following  is  a  list  of  divisions  and  commodity  sections  represented  at 
these  meetings: 


DIVISIONS 


Price-Fixing  Committee. 

Purchasing  Commission  for  Allies. 

Explosives. 

Labor. 

Planning  and  Statistics. 

Requirements. 

ChemicaL 


Facilities. 

Priorities. 

Finished  Products. 

Steel. 

Textile. 

Conservation. 


SECTIONS 


Tin. 

Crane. 

Acid  and  Heavy  Chemicals. 
*Legal. 

Forgings,  Guns,  etc. 

Alkali  and  Chlorine. 

Refractories. 

Optical  Glass  and  Instruments. 

Electric  Wire  and  Cable. 

Platinum. 

Wood  Chemicals. 

Knit  Goods. 

Creosote. 

Power. 

Pulp  and  Paper. 

Electrodes  and  Abrasives. 

Rubber. 

Lumber. 

Tobacco. 

Railroad  Equipment  and  Supply. 

Miscellaneous  Commodities. 

Tanning  Materials. 

Automotive  Products. 

Jute,  Hemp,  and  Cordage. 

Paint  and  Pigment. 

Building  Materials. 

Cotton  and  Cotton  Linters. 

Mica. 

Nitrates. 
•News. 
*Fire   Prevention. 

Machine  Tool. 

Price. 
•Technical  and  Consulting. 


Coal-Gas  Products. 

Brass  —  Non-ferrous  Tubing. 
•Resources  and   Conversion. 

Agricultural  Implements,  etc. 

Foreign  Wool   Section. 

Woolens. 

Domestic  Wool. 
•Inland  Traffic. 

Electrical  and  Power  Equipment. 

Fine   Chemicals. 

Ferro- Alloys. 

Hardware  and  Hand  Tool. 

Chain. 

Dye  —  Artificial  and  Vegetable. 

Medical. 

Silk. 

Flax  Products. 

Emergency  Construction. 

Hide,  Leather  and  Leather  Goods. 

Felt.  ^ 

Chemical   Glass  —  Stoneware. 

Cotton   Goods. 
•Special  Advisory  Committee  on 
Plants   and   Munitions. 

Stored   Materials. 

Ethyl  Alcohol. 

Sulphur  Pyrites. 

Non-ferrous  Metals. 

Steel  Products  Section. 

Projectile   Steel,    Rails,   Alloy   Steel, 
and  Cold-Drawn  Steel  Section. 

Pig  Iron  Section. 

Iron  and  Steel  Scrap  Section. 


•Indicates  technical  non-commodity  sections. 


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THE  BACKBONE  OF  THE  BOARD 


307 


A  commodity  section  consisted  of  a  chief,  who  often  had 
several  assistants,  and  the  representatives  of  the  various 
purchasing  agencies  of  the  army,  navy,  Emergency  Fleet, 
etc.,  that  were  interested  in  the  particular  commodity.  At 
first  the  chief  had  the  same  relation  to  the  departmental 
members  of  his  section  that  Mr.  Baruch  had  to  other 
members  of  the  Board;  that  is,  the  power  of  decision  was 
with  him.  This  was  found  to  be  a  mistake,  as  the  depart- 
mental representatives,  standing  for  demand,  and  the 
sectional  chief,  standing  for  supply,  would  sometimes  dis- 
agree, with  the  result  that  the  decision  was  determined  from 
the  standpoint  of  supply.  Afterwards  the  procedure 
required  unanimity  of  the  section  for  a  decision;  failing 
that  an  appeal  lay  directly  to  the  chairman  of  the  Board. 

The  singular  result  of  this  alteration  was  that  unanimity 
was  almost  invariable.  The  change  brought  the  War 
Industries  Board  and  the  supply  agencies  of  the  Government 
much  closer  together.  Before  it  was  made  there  was  a 
strong  tendency  on  the  part  of  the  former  to  send  to  the  com- 
modity sections  men  of  inferior  rank  or  little  authority, 
and  to  act  independently  of  it.  When  they  found  that  they 
had  an  equal  voice  in  determining  the  course  of  such  a 
powerful  aid  as  a  commodity  section,  the  departments  sent 
men  of  rank  and  force  to  represent  them.  The  army  to  a 
large  extent  duplicated  the  commodity  system  sections  in  its 
new  Division  of  Purchase,  Storage,  and  Traffic,  so  that  it  had 
a  specialist  of  its  own  in  each  commodity  section  with  which 
it  was  concerned.  The  departmental  members  of  the 
sections,  having  absorbing  administrative  duties  of  their 
own,  were  not  concerned  with  the  section's  administration, 
but  only  with  its  decisions. 

The  first  requirement  of  every  commodity  section  to 
qualify  it  to  become  one  of  the  faucets  of  Mr.  Baruch's  visu- 
alization was  an  assemblage  of  all  the  facts  about  materials 
with  which  they  dealt.  These  facts  were  not  only  those  relat- 
ing to  sources  of  materials,  processes  of  preparation  and 
manufacture,  names,  locations,  and  capacities  of  plants, 
railway  and  other  shipping  facilities,  but  of  possible  substi- 
tutes, costs  of  manufacture,  fairness  of  prices,  and  the  per- 
sonal equation  of  producers.  Without  this  knowledge  neither 


308    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


THE  BACKBONE  OF  THE  BOARD 


309 


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the  section  nor  any  other  agency  of  Government  could  act 
rationally.  It  was  because  there  was  in  the  beginning  no 
such  grouped  practical  knowledge  of  industry  that  many 
serious  errors  were  made  in  letting  contracts. 

Usually  the  men  at  the  heads  of  sections  had  a  vast  amount 
of  unwritten  information  about  the  commodities  they  dealt 
with  and  they  knew  how  and  where  to  get  the  data  required. 
They  also  knew  the  men  of  the  industries  and  their  capacities 
and  characters.  Nevertheless,  the  compilation  of  the  basic 
facts  and  the  maintenance  of  their  currency  were  laborious 
tasks  and  consuming  of  time,  when  time  was  more  valuable 
than  money.  The  war  service  committees  were  invaluable 
in  this  work.  The  industries  gave  not  only  the  ordinary 
statistical  data,  but  revealed  trade  secrets,  special  processes, 
and  improved  methods,  which,  being  cleared  through  the 
sections  and  the  war  service  committees,  enabled  their  com- 
petitors to  improve  quality  or  speed  up  production.  Having 
made  a  survey  of  the  industries  with  which  it  was  concerned, 
the  section  was  qualified  to  respond  to  the  demands  of  the 
functional  divisions,  such  as  Requirements,  Priority,  and 
Price-Fixing.  It  was  also  qualified  to  act  as  the  intermediary 
of  the  purchasing  agencies.  Into  it  flowed  all  pertinent  infor- 
mation from  industry  and  the  Government.  Out  of  it 
flowed  instruction  to  Government  agencies  and  direction  to 
industries. 

Thus  at  one  definite  place  all  of  an  industry  —  the  pro- 
ducer—  and  all  of  Government  —  the  consumer  —  could, 
meet  and  dispose  of  every  situation  so  far  as  the  bringing 
together  of  requirements  and  supplies  could  do  it.  Many 
momentous  matters  were  virtually  settled  by  the  sections 
before  the  War  Industries  Board  proper  even  knew  what  was 
going  on. 

The  sections,  always  on  watch,  would  see  a  critical  situa- 
tion developing.  They  would  assemble  all  the  facts,  call  in 
all  the  manufacturers,  or  at  least  their  war  service  committee, 
study  the  problem  with  them,  work  out  the  solution  with  all 
its  involvements  of  allocation,  priority,  prices,  etc.,  and  then 
submit  it  to  the  proper  functional  division  or  divisions  for 
approval  and  application. 

Sometimes  Mr.  Baruch  or  other  members  of  the  Board 


from  their  conning-towers  would  be  the  first  to  perceive  the 
necessity  of  some  course  of  action.  In  that  case  all  they  had 
to  do  was  to  turn  on  the  faucet;  the  commodity  sections  saw 
that  there  was  a  flow  of  results.  So  far  as  it  was  humanly 
possible  under  the  conditions,  the  commodity  sections  had 
their  respective  industries  always  on  tap.  There  they  were 
—  sixty  of  them  —  packed  into  the  temporary  plaster  and 
lath  building  of  the  Council  of  National  Defense  —  focus- 
ing in  Washington  all  the  facts  and  all  the  factors  of  control 
of  American  industry. 

As  they  came  into  efiiciency,  all  the  guesswork,  uncertainty, 
and  vagueness  of  Government  relations  with  industry  dis- 
appeared. Replogle  could  say  to  army,  navy.  Shipping 
Board,  Allies,  Industries:  "Here's  the  steel  tank.  Let  me 
know  how  much  each  of  you  is  to  have.  There's  exactly 
thirty-three  million  tons  to  go  around."  So  with  all  the  other 
controlled  industries.  No  more  did  Government  agencies 
shoot  orders  in  the  general  direction  of  sources  of  goods, 
hoping  to  hit  something  sooner  or  later.  The  commodity  sec- 
tions stood  at  their  respective  tanks,  their  hands  on  the  spigots, 
prepared  to  measure  out  the  Nation's  resources,  not  on  the 
old  principle  of  first  come,  first  served,  to  the  limit  of  his 
demand,  but  in  neat  allocations  according  to  the  standard  of 
priority.  To  use  another  simile,  the  old  way  had  been  that 
of  general  admission  to  a  theater.  Everybody  who  wanted 
seats  rushed  into  an  auditorium  of  unknown  capacity  and 
took  them,  and  the  last  comers  were  out  of  luck.  The 
new  way  was  by  reserved  seats.  It  is  true  that  under  this 
system  some  got  no  seats,  but  they  could  get  along  without 
them.    Standing  room  or  the  sidewalk  sufficed  for  them. 

The  more  one  studies  the  operations  of  the  commodity 
sections,  the  more  he  is  impressed  by  their  simplicity  and 
efiiciency.  They  were  more  than  the  mobilization  of  indus- 
try. They  were  industry  mobilized  and  drilled,  responsive, 
keen,  and  fully  staff*ed.  They  were  industry  militant  and 
in  serried  ranks.  The  War  Industries  Board  stood  for  coor- 
dination among  the  war-making  agencies,  and  it  practiced  its 
own  preaching  at  home.  In  the  end  it  placed  superbly 
coordinated  industry  at  the  service  of  coordinated  consump- 
tion. Thanks,  of  course,  to  priority,  but  the  commodity  sec- 
tions were  the  alpha  and  omega  of  priority. 


310    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


THE  BACKBONE  OF  THE  BOARD 


311 


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The  commodity  sections  triumphed  because  they  possessed 
knowledge.  In  them,  if  anywhere,  supply  was  appraised  and 
demand  measured.  Through  their  representative  composi- 
tion they  penetrated  all  war  agencies  and  bound  them  indis- 
solubly  together  and  to  the  magnification  of  the  War  Indus- 
tries Board.  Around  plain  yellow  desks  in  little  hot  cubicles 
of  oflSces  a  handful  of  men  met  with  the  resources  and  dispo- 
sition of  mighty  industries  in  their  hands.  It  was 'only  a 
matter  of  cutting  the  cloth  to  fit  the  suits. 

At  one  of  the  weekly  meetings  of  the  commodity  sections 
an  enthusiastic  section  chief  complained  that,  whereas  the 
War  Industries  Board  continuously  and  diligently  invited 
and  urged  all  other  Government  bodies  concerned  in  the  war, 
directly  or  indirectly,  to  be  represented  on  its  sections,  com- 
mittees, boards,  and  divisions,  there  was  little  or  no  reci- 
procity. This  was  a  blessing  in  disguise.  All  channels  of 
influence  and  power  thus  converged  in  the  Board,  and  it  did 
not  dissipate  its  strength.  It  tapped  the  other  bodies  for  the 
elements  of  its  own  nutrition,  and  grew  great  by  serving 
them.  This  was  proper  and  logical  and  overcame  the  tend- 
ency for  each  part  of  the  Government  to  wage  its  share  of 
the  war  in  a  water-tight  compartment. 

A  marked  characteristic  of  the  work  of  the  commodity  sec- 
tions was  the  slight  administrative  machinery  they  required. 
The  burden  of  preparation  of  information  and  the  handling 
of  an  infinite  amount  of  the  detail  of  administration  fell 
largely  on  the  industries  and  their  committees;  the  latter 
often  maintaining  (at  an  expense  prorated  among  the  indus- 
tries concerned)  large  staffs  and  well-appointed  offices  to 
look  after  the  details  of  liaison  between  industry  and  the 
commodity  sections.  On  the  Government  side,  the  details  of 
plans,  specifications,  contracts,  inspection,  production,  and 
delivery  were  in  the  hands  of  the  different  supply  depart- 
ments. The  conunodity  sections  were  thus  relieved  of  a  vast 
mass  of  time-consuming  and  energy-exhausting  detail.  They 
were  free  to  devote  themselves  to  the  outstanding  problems 
of  determining  and  enlarging  resources,  indicating  maximum 
prices,  uncovering  and  creating  facilities,  compiling  and  com- 
pacting requirements,  speeding  up  industry,  and  informing 
Government  in  the  ways  of  business. 


The  reader  may,  perhaps,  be  confused  by  mention  of  the 
commodity  sections  as  dealing  with  the  functions  of  priority, 
prices,  requirements,  etc.  The  commodity  sections  were  not 
merely  collectors  and  keepers  of  stores.  Each  was  a  minia- 
ture War  Industries  Board  for  its  commodity.  In  a  very 
large  degree  the  functional  divisions  were  merely  offices  of 
record  and  formal  approval  for  the  dealings  of  the  sections 
with  their  functions.  All  of  the  Board's  functions  were 
rooted  in  the  sections.  The  divisions  were  little  more  in 
some  respects  than  orderly  entrances  and  exits  to  the  sections. 
The  principle  of  decentralization  of  authority  by  a  central 
head  in  which  it  was  definitely  lodged  was  carried  to  the 

highest  degree. 

This  was  the  grand  differentiation  between  the  mobile 
War  Industries  Board  and  the  rigid  bureaucracy  of  the  War 
Department  and  Government  in  general.  Bureaucracies  are 
machines  made  up  of  parts  that  are  bound  by  statutes  and 
regulations  to  automatic  motions.  The  less  play  the  parts 
have,  the  better  the  machine  runs. 

In  a  bureaucracy  the  perfection  of  the  machine  is  the  main 
consideration;  the  quality  of  the  product  a  minor  one.  Any 
departure  of  a  part  from  its  prescribed  routine  upsets  the 
whole  machine.  In  the  War  Industries  Board,  the  parts  did 
their  own  work  in  their  own  way.  Initiative  as  well  as  per- 
formance were  in  their  own  hands.  They  were  adjudged, 
not  by  the  smoothness  of  their  functioning,  but  by  the  quan- 
tity and  quality  of  their  product.  The  head  from  whom 
authority  flowed  reserved  only  enough  to  keep  the  parts 
working  toward  a  common  goal.  If  trouble  arose,  appeal 
to  the  head  was  direct  and  instantaneous  —  no  tedious  ascent, 
step  by  step,  to  the  source  of  authority.  If  failure  came  for 
any  reason  chargeable  to  human  weakness  or  ineptitude,  the 
man  was  changed,  but  the  principle  of  decentralization 
remained  inviolate.  The  War  Industries  Board  was  built 
on  men,  not  on  rules. 

We  may  have  budgets,  comptrollers,  departmental  reor- 
ganizations, etc.,  to  the  end  of  time,  but  we  diall  always  have 
bureaucracies  with  their  woodenness  of  motion  and  their 
wooden-headedness  of  policy  until  Congress  is  willing  to 
leave  the  Executive  free  to  decentralize  and  big  men  are 


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312    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

willing  to  serve  Government.    The  former  will  produce  the 
latter. 

The  forms  of  business  are  dead  things  without  the  brains 
and  initiative  of  business.  The  War  Industries  Board  liter- 
ally brought  business  into  the  business  of  Government.  If 
we  had  a  Government  business  manager  with  a  free  hand  to 
run  the  business  side  of  Government,  as  free  as  Baruch  had 
in  the  War  Industries  Board,  we  should  have  a  successful 
Government  of  business.  The  public  service  would  be  alert, 
initiative  and  energetic  throughout.  Some  day  it  may  occur 
to  some  President  to  apply  the  organization  scheme  of  the 
War  Industries  Board  to  Government. 

It  is  little  wonder  that  the  men  who  dealt  with  the  indus- 
tries of  a  nation,  binned  and  labeled,  replenished  and  drawn 
on  at  will  for  the  purposes  of  war,  and  its  train  of  conse- 
quences,  meditated  with  a  sort  of  intellectual  contempt  on 
the  huge  hit-and-miss  confusion  of  peace-time  industry,  with 
its  perpetual  cycle  of  surfeit  and  dearth  and  its  eternal 
attempt  at  adjustment  after  the  event.  From  their  medita- 
tions arose  dreams  of  an  ordered  economic  world.  In  the 
high  tide  of  altruism  bom  of  the  brotherhood  in  arms  of 
many  nations,  they  even  talked  of  a  possible  international 
application  of  the  commodity-section  idea  to  the  world's  raw 
materials. 

Brushing  that  aside  as  something  a  hundred  years  too  soon, 
and  returning  to  the  sound  footing  of  nationalism,  they  con- 
ceived of  America  as  "commodity-sectionized"  for  the  control 
of  world  trade.  They  beheld  the  whole  trade  of  the  world 
carefully  computed  and  registered  in  Washington,  require- 
ments noted,  American  resources  on  call,  the  faucets  opened  or 
closed  according  to  the  circumstances.  In  a  word,  a  national 
mind  and  will  confronting  international  trade  and  keeping 
its  own  house  in  business  order.  At  the  very  least,  they 
hoped  that  some  organization  would  be  maintained  at  Wash- 
ington that  in  another  emergency  could  instantaneously 
expand,  with  the  basic  information  ready,  to  deal  with  the 
problem  of  supply;  with  resources  in  commodity  strata  classi- 
fications articulating  on  the  same  level  with  corresponding 
strata  of  requirements. 
At  the  beginning  of  the  last  war  the  confusion  was  partly 


THE  BACKBONE  OF  THE  BOARD 


313 


due  to  many  independent  requirement  agencies  attempting  to 
tap  the  commodity  strata  perpendicularly  at  different  places 
so  that  the  pools  of  supply  were  exhausted  without  warning. 
A  year  of  evolution  was  required  to  realize  the  Baruch  idea 
of  a  single  controllable  outlet  for  each  commodity.  With  this 
conception  accepted  for  the  future  and  the  pools  always 
filled,  in  the  information  sense,  the  essential  commodities  kept 
under  current  measure  and  survey,  it  would  be  a  quick  and 
easy  matter  to  mobilize  industry  through  a  central  agency 
amply  endowed  with  reserve  powers,  but  cooperatively 
shaped. 

American  industry  was  profoundly  affected  by  the  contacts 
of  the  commodity  sections  with  war  committees  and  groups 
of  industries,  which  tended  to  substitute  cooperation  for  com- 
petition. During  the  war  there  was  virtually  no  competition 
for  orders  among  the  efficient  business  concerns,  for  the  prob- 
lem then  was  not  who  would  get  patronage,  but  who  must 
accept  it.  Every  large  plant  engaged  in  an  essential  industry 
was  compelled  to  enlarge,  work  overtime,  and  drive  in  order 
to  attain  the  production  that  was  allocated  to  it.  It  was 
necessary  for  firms  and  corporations  that  had  hitherto  been 
business  enemies  to  work  together,  to  exchange  information, 
to  pool  their  resources,  to  lend  labor  and  executives.  Com- 
petition in  price  was  practically  done  away  with  by  Govern- 
ment action.  Industry  was  for  the  time  in  what  was  for  it 
a  golden  age  of  harmony.  Government  prices  made  a  living 
possible  for  all  except  the  submerged  tenth  of  shoestring 
industry;  and  executives,  relieved  from  the  nightmare  of 
menacing  losses,  were  free  to  give  their  attention  to  quality 
and  quantity  of  product. 

Theoretically  much  of  this  was  in  violation  of  the  letter 
of  the  anti-trust  laws,  and  at  times  the  Department  of  Justice 
was  much  perturbed.  Even  the  industries  themselves  were 
fearful  that  they  might  be  punished  for  doing  the  Govern- 
ment behests.  On  one  occasion  Judge  Elbert  Gary,  chairman 
of  the  Steel  Corporation,  asked  the  opinion  of  the  Attorney- 
General  as  to  the  legality  of  some  of  the  inevitable  conse- 
quences of  imited  effort.  Having  experienced  the  advantages 
of  combination  for  a  laudable  public  purpose,  during  the 
war,  it  is  not  unlikely  that  some  industrial  groups  have 


I 


314    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

sought  since  to  continue  it  for  their  selfish  benefits  and  thus 
have  effected  such  an  intimate  flow  of  information  between 
themselves,  intended  for  study  from  the  point  of  view  of 
common  action  for  the  group  prosperity,  that  they  have  been 
able  to  act  as  units  in  matters  of  prices  and  regulation  of 
production  without  entering  technically  into  agreements  in 
restriction  of  trade.  A  complex  problem  of  industrial  regu- 
lation is  thus  presented.  No  doubt  vast  economies  and  great 
general  benefits  are  derivable  from  close  understandings  and 
agreements  between  industries.  But  how  may  the  public 
share  in,  instead  of  being  oppressed  by,  them? 


CHAPTER  XVIII 
STEEL:  AN  EPIC  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR 

I.  A  conflict  of  blood  and  iron  —  The  super-demand  for  steel  —  A  nation's 
industries  rock  —  The  Board  a  storm  center  —  Demand  breeds  demand  —  The 
attitude  of  the  steel  producers  —  Replogle's  faith  —  Baruch  and  Gary  negotiate 
steel  for  the  navy  —  Wilson  demands  reasonable  prices  —  Legge,  Replogle,  and 
Summers  lay  a  foundation  —  The  Board  threatens  to  seize  the  steel  plants  — 
An  historic  meeting  follows  —  Analysis  of  price  elements  —  Production  drops 

—  Replogle  repeatedly  summons  producers  —  Mastering  the  facts  of  steel  — 
Baruch  demands  a  show-down  —  The  crisis  is  met  —  Details  of  the  Steel 
Administration. 

n.    The  automobile  industry  fights  control  —  The  Board  and  the  industry  meet 

—  The  industry  denounces:  Baruch,  Replogle,  et  al.,  reply  —  A  stenographic 
report  —  Legge  states  a  desperate  case  —  The  Board  takes  a  peremptory  stand 

—  A  great  industry  pleads  for  its  life  —  The  final  agreement. 

III.  The  steel  industry's  contribution  to  the  war  —  The  Federal  administration 
of  steel  appraised. 

I 

The  World  War  was  moved  and  fought  on  steel.  In  its 
last  days  it  was  as  much  a  Vulcanic  struggle  between  the 
Mesabi  and  Lorraine,  between  the  Ruhr  and  Pittsburgh,  as 
it  was  a  final  grapple  of  men  in  Flanders,  Champagne,  and 
the  Argonne. 

It  was  literally  a  war  of  blood  and  iron.  The  long,  brown 
ore-carriers  that  passed  in  endless  procession  day  and  night 
through  the  locks  of  the  Sault  Ste.  Marie  were  the  transports 
of  victory  as  much  as  the  ocean  liners  that  conveyed  to  the 
battle-front  the  fresh  bodies  that  were  to  be  the  final  offering 
to  Mars.  The  thunders  of  war  were  heard  no  less  in  the 
booming  of  rollers  on  ingots  in  the  valley  of  the  Mononga- 
hela  than  in  the  reverberations  of  great  guns  in  the  valleys 
of  the  Meuse.  The  fires  of  war  burned  under  the  lines  of 
coke  ovens  at  McConnellsville  no  less  intensely  than  they 
did  in  the  wake  of  the  German  retreat.  The  men  who  dug 
the  coal  of  coke  and  the  ore  of  iron  were  as  much  combatants 
as  the  enlisted  men  in  trenches. 

The  steel  producers  of  America  were  as  much  pitted 
against  Krupp  and  other  German  steel  masters  as  Foch 


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316    INDUSTRIAL  AMfeRICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

against  Ludendorff .  Pig  iron  and  steel  flowing  from  America 
to  Le  Creusot  stiffened  France  as  much  as  Pershing's  fightmg 
men.  Countless  rolls  of  barbed  wire  from  America  held 
back  the  furor  Teutonicus  in  1916  and  1917,  and  steel  rails 
by  the  thousands  provided  the  roads  of  pursuit  when  the 
hordes  began  to  recede  toward  the  Rhine.  Steel  plates  issued 
from  the  mills  of  America  faster  than  German  submarines 
could  send  them  to  the  bottom  of  the  ocean.  Shell  steel  from 
the  rolling  mills  of  America  enabled  the  munition  plants  of 
the  Allies  to  provide  the  drum  fires  that  smothered  the  Ger- 
man batteries,  as  tanks  made  from  the  same  material  rolled 
over  flattened  defenses. 

Replogle,  of  the  War  Industries  Board,  as  generalissimo, 
Judge  Gary  and  his  staff,  allocating  and  shifting  orders, 
changing  rail  mills  to  shell  mills,  structural  mills  to  rails, 
and  so  on,  were  playing  the  war  game  as  fundamentally  as 
Foch  baiting  the  German  bear  to  exhaustion  and  piercing 
his  vitals  in  the  hour  of  collapse. 

The  industrial  drama  of  the  war  is  largely  expressed  in 
terms  of  steel.  Ours  is  an  age  of  steel  in  the  arts  of  peace 
quite  as  much  as  in  the  arts  of  war.  The  puzzle  of  steel 
from  first  to  last  was  how  to  meet  the  great  new  demands  of 
war  and  simuhaneously  take  care  of  the  ordinary  demands 
that  were  increased  by  the  repercussion  of  war  needs.  For 
example:  the  greater  the  war  trafiic,  largely  of  steel,  the 
greater  the  need  of  the  railways  for  steel  for  rails  and  roll- 
ing stock.  The  railroads  cried  aloud  that,  without  repaired 
ways,  more  cars,  and  more  locomotives,  they  would  succumb 
to  exhaustion.  France,  Italy,  Belgium,  and  the  A.E.F.  de- 
manded steel  as  the  inescapable  price  of  victory.  The 
Emergency  Fleet  Corporation  pressed  for  unheard-of  quanti- 
ties of  plates  of  mills  that  were  overwhelmed  with  orders  for 
shell  steel.  Numerous  colossal  new  war  industrial  plants 
needed  to  be  housed  in  steel. 

Every  direct  war  demand  bred  indirect  industrial  demands. 
The  fact  that  demand  bred  demand  for  steel  was  not  under- 
stood in  the  beginning.  Some  authorities  thought  the  war 
would  require  about  seventeen  per  cent  of  the  normal  steel 
output  of  the  country.  President  Farrell,  of  the  Steel  Cor- 
poration, after  a  few  months  got  his  estimate  up  to  forty 


STEEL:  AN  EPIC  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR     317 

per  cent.  Later  he  jumped  it  to  eighty  per  cent.  In  the 
end  the  demand  for  steel,  bred  by  the  war,  was  about  one 
hundred  and  twenty  per  cent  of  the  possible  output. 

"Business-as-usual"  met  its  first  great  rebuff  in  the  steel 
problem.  It  was  a  smash  in  the  solar  plexus.  It  rocked  the 
industries  of  the  Nation  to  their  base.  The  War  Industries 
Board  became  the  storm  center  of  dramatic  struggles  and 
controversies  over  steel.  Almost  every  meeting  of  the  Board, 
from  the  first  one  on  August  1,  1917,  until  the  last  one  after 
the  armistice,  records  friction  between  governmental  agencies 
for  steel  and  between  them  as  a  whole  and  the  non-war 
industries;  and  on  the  part  of  essential  industries  against 
reduction  of  their  supplies. 

Hours  and  days  the  Board,  the  Fuel  Administration,  the 
Railway  Administration,  and  the  captains  of  the  steel  indus- 
try spent  in  trying  to  solve  the  problem  of  meeting  an  unlim- 
ited demand  with  a  limited  supply.  Time  and  again  they 
wrangled  over  and  wrestled  with  the  puzzle  of  how  to  break 
the  vicious  circle  whereby  insufficient  coal  limited  coke,  and 
not  enough  coke  limited  iron  and  steel,  and  lack  of  steel 
limited  cars  and  locomotives  and  maintenance  of  way,  and 
thus  restricted  transportation  upon  which  coal  and  coke  pro- 
duction depended.    And  then  around  the  circle  again. 

Bound  up  with  the  circular  recoil  of  effort  upon  effort 
was  the  question  of  prices.  When  we  entered  the  war  the 
steel  industry  was  replete  from  long  feeding  on  the  unstinted 
patronage  of  the  Allies,  and  at  first  the  tendency  was  to 
exact  as  large  prices  from  the  Home  Government  as  from  the 
foreigners.  In  the  records  of  the  early  negotiations  between 
the  army,  navy,  the  Shipping  Board,  and  the  War  Industries 
Board  there  are  unmistakable  signs  of  lack  of  cooperation 
on  the  part  of  representatives  of  industry.  President  Farrell, 
of  the  Steel  Corporation,  displayed  a  somewhat  startling 
unfamiliarity  with  the  costs  of  production  of  steel  plates. 
Judge  Elbert  Gary,  chairman  of  the  board  of  the  corporation, 
at  first  advocated  excessive  prices  in  the  face  of  refuting 
figures  of  his  own  accountants.  This  attitude  was  partly 
accounted  for  by  apprehension  as  to  the  instabilities  of  the 
future,  by  resentment  at  Government  interference,  and  above 
all  by  a  profound  lack  of  understanding  of  the  radical  in- 


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318    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

volvements  of  war.    In  the  beginning  business  and  patriotism 
were  confined  to  separate  compartments. 

In  all  fairness,  it  should  be  said  that  the  steel  men  soon 
adapted  themselves  to  the  view  that  the  national  need  was 
above  the  question  of  profits.  As  soon  as  they  understood 
that  the  rules  of  the  games  had  been  revised,  they  observed 
them.  When  they  perceived  that  it  was  not  a  question  of 
how  much  they  could  get,  but  of  how  much  the  Government 
would  be  justified  in  paying,  and  even  of  how  much  they 
would  be  justified  in  asking,  their  attitude  changed  from  one 
of  wary  aloofness  to  whole-hearted  cooperation.  Contrast 
the  price  of  12.15  cents  a  pound  for  steel  plate,  with  the 
Japanese  bidding  as  high  as  50  cents  in  the  spring  of  1917, 
and  the  3.25  cents  later  obtained. 

Even  at  the  height  of  this  saturnalia  of  high  prices, 
J.  Leonard  Replogle,  who  had  been  called  to  Washington 
by  Mr.  Baruch  to  advise  the  War  Industries  Board  as  to 
steel,  expressed  the  confidence  that  when  the  situation  clari- 
fied just  prices  could  be  obtained  from  the  steel  industry 
without  resort  to  compulsion.  In  fact,  on  the  very  day  he 
voiced  this  opinion  he  was  able  to  put  it  to  the  test.  The 
Italian  Government  was  in  the  market  for  40,000  tons  of 
steel  billets,  which  were  then  bringing  around  $140  a  ton 
in  the  open  market.  Mr.  Price  McKinney,  of  the  McKinney 
Steel  Company,  of  Cleveland,  happened  to  be  in  Mr. 
Replogle's  oflSce.  They  discussed  the  general  steel  situation 
and  the  Italian  requirement.  Mr.  Replogle  said  that  it  was 
obvious  that  steel  could  not  bring  such  prices  much  longer, 
and  asked  Mr.  McKinney  to  determine  a  fair  price  for  the 
Italian  order. 

"Write  the  ticket  yourself,  Replogle,'*  was  McKinney's 
answer.  "Any  price  you  name,  profit  or  no  profit,  will  be 
satisfactory  to  me." 

Replogle  figured  and  said  he  guessed  $45  a  ton  would  be 
about  right. 

That  was  $3,000,000  swept  away,  but  McKinney  stood  pat. 

Once  they  got  their  shoulders  into  the  collar,  most  of  the 
steel  men  had  the  feeling  of  Mr.  McKinney.  They  resented 
brusque  orders,  but  they  rarely  resisted  an  appeal  made  to 
them  on  the  ground  of  patriotic  service  accompanied  by  an 


STEEL:  AN  EPIC  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR     319 

explanation.  Many  of  them  felt  that  they  owed  extraordi- 
nary service  because  they  were  making  so  much  money.  "We 
are  all  making  more  money  out  of  this  war  than  the  average 
human  being  ought  to,"  said  McKinney  on  another  occasion, 
in  explanation  of  his  cheerful  acceptance  of  a  hard  job. 
Once,  when  Judge  Gary  was  informing  the  Board  that  the 
steel  interests  would  not  ask  for  an  increase  of  prices  at  the 
expiration  of  the  ninety-day  period  for  which  prices  were 
established,  he  dwelt  on  the  fact  that  the  level  price  plan 
accrued  greatly  to  the  profit  of  the  Steel  Corporation,  "but," 
he  added,  "the  tax  collector  comes  along  and  takes  about 
fifty  per  cent  of  it  —  and  I  wish  it  was  more." 

The  first  conflicts  between  the  Government  and  the  steel 
industry  arose,  however,  from  navy  and  Shipping  Board 
contracts.  The  Steel  Corporation  stood  out  for  4.25  cents  a 
pound  for  steel  plates.  Government  officials  had  reason  to 
believe  that  there  was  a  fair  margin  of  profit  for  the  Cor- 
poration at  2.5  cents  a  pound.  Informal  negotiations  between 
Mr.  Baruch  and  Judge  Gary,*  the  former  then  speaking  for 
the  navy,  resulted  in  a  tentative  price  of  2.5  cents,  subject 
to  review.  The  same  tentative  price  was  later  obtained  by 
the  Shipping  Board.  In  one  of  the  early  conferences,  Judge 
Gary  off'ered  to  make  a  final  price  of  3  cents.  As  we  shall 
see  later,  the  eventual  price  was  3.25  cents  to  all  producers, 
as  compared  with  the  4.25  first  asked  by  Mr.  Farrell. 

The  tremendous  instability  of  steel  prices,  the  public 
resentment  at  profiteering,  radical  measures  proposed  in 
Congress,  the  actual  conference  of  the  power  of  commandeer- 
ing on  the  Shipping  Board,  along  with  like  powers  resident 
in  the  War  and  Navy  Departments,  tended  to  dissolve  the 
opposition  of  the  steel  industry  to  a  degree  of  Government 
control  of  the  industry.  Many  who  at  first  opposed  all 
Government  interference  came  to  welcome  it.  It  was  plain 
that  the  Government  could  not  go  along  with  prices  unknown 
and  variable  and  haggled  over  at  every  turn.  There  must 
be  ordered,  cooperative  control  on  a  reasonable  price  basis 
or  the  Government  was  certain  to  take  over  the  whole  indus- 
try. Many  efforts  were  made  to  agree  on  some  cooperative 
plan,  but  nothing  but  talk  came  out  of  them. 

In  a  report  to  the  Board  on  the  iron  and  steel  situation 


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320    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

on  September  14th,  Mr.  Replogle  dwelt  on  the  chaotic  con- 
dition of  the  iron  and  steel  industry  with  respect  to  meeting 
war  demands.  It  was  evident  that  both  prices  and  produc- 
tion must  be  coordinated  with  war  policies.  As  early  as 
July  12th  the  President  had  announced  that  the  Government 
was  determined  on  reasonable  prices,  and  on  the  same  day 
a  committee  from  the  American  Iron  and  Steel  Institute  had 
discussed  prices  and  requirements  with  the  Secretary  of  War, 
the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  the  chairman  of  the  Shipping 
Board,  and  Mr.  Baruch. 

It  was  decided  to  leave  the  settlement  of  prices  until  after 
the  Federal  Trade  Commission  had  completed  the  inquiry 
it  was  then  making.  When  the  report  was  made,  it  was 
evident  that,  after  all,  practical  men  would  have  to  iron  out 
the  prices.  For  instance,  the  report  gave  the  cost  of  rolling 
billets  and  blooms  as  varying  from  $2  to  $8  a  ton.  Any  one 
familiar  with  the  process  would  know  that  the  variation 
between  different  plants  could  be  scarcely  more  than  fifty 
cents.  The  difference  was  simply  a  difference  in  accounting, 
one  mill  allocating  a  percentage  of  the  overhead  and  another 
not  doing  so.  The  chief  value  of  the  inquiry  was  that  it 
proved  that  there  was  a  great  disparity  in  costs  of  production 
between  different  plants. 

The  bulky  report,  as  a  whole,  was  simply  dismaying  to 
the  War  Industries  Board.  To  Judge  Lovett,  who,  after  a 
number  of  futile  conferences  with  the  steel  men,  had  come  to 
hold  a  poor  opinion  of  their  reasonableness,  and  had  begun 
to  despair  of  anything  but  compulsion,  the  report  looked  like 
more  grease  on  the  rails.  It  was  then  that  Legge  remarked 
that  the  bulk  of  the  report  did  not  mean  anything  at  all  to 
men  who  were  familiar  with  the  steel  business.  (The  steel 
men,  for  their  part,  argued  that  the  report  reflected  1916  and 
not  1917  costs.)  It  was  then  suggested  that  there  had  been  too 
much  vague  talk,  and  that  Messrs.  Legge,  Replogle,  and 
Summers  make  up  a  definite  schedule  of  prices  that  should 
be  demanded  of  the  steel  producers.  Judge  Lovett  was  due 
to  leave  Washington  at  one  the  next  afternoon. 

"I'll  tell  you  what  we'll  do,"  said  Legge.  "If  you  will 
have  a  meeting  of  the  Board  at  ten  o'clock  to-morrow  morn- 
ing, we  will  have  the  figures  ready." 


STEEL:  AN  EPIC  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR     321 

The  three  worked  most  of  the  night,  and  the  next  morning 
presented  the  schedule  of  basic  coke,  iron,  and  steel  prices 
that  was  afterwards  adopted  for  the  rest  of  the  year 
substantially  as  it  stood.  In  fact,  it  remained  virtually 
unchanged  for  the  period  of  the  war. 

On  September  18th  the  War  Industries  Board  decided  to 
call  a  meeting  of  the  whole  industry  at  Washington  on 
September  21st  to  which  the  prices  determined  upon  by  the 
Board  would  be  submitted  and  cordial  cooperation  in  the 
war  programme  demanded.  The  temper  of  the  Board  was 
shown  by  its  resolution  "that,  if  the  steel  interests  should  not 
be  willing  to  give  their  full  cooperation  because  of  the  prices 
fixed,  the  War  Industries  Board  would  take  the  necessary 
steps  to  take  over  the  steel  plants." 

The  meeting  was  a  stormy  one.  Sixty-five  executives  of 
the  great  industry  faced  the  War  Industries  Board.  There 
were  heated  arguments  and  even  impassioned  oratory.  The 
Board's  programme  was  definitely  opposed  as  being  too  low. 
The  smaller  producers  were  in  the  difficult  position  that  a 
bare  cost  price  for  them  would  make  a  good  profit  for  the 
Steel  Corporation  and  other  highly  integrated  producers. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  representatives  of  the  Steel  Corpora- 
tion felt  that  they  must  stand  by  the  smaller  producers.  On 
their  side  the  members  of  the  War  Industries  Board,  knowing 
that  they  had  purposely  raised  their  minimum  price  on  plates 
and  shell  steel  in  order  to  stimulate  production,  were  not 
disposed  to  yield. 

The  meeting  began  at  10  a.m.;  by  noon  it  looked  as  if 
there  could  be  no  agreement.  At  this  stage  Hugh  Frayne 
made  a  patriotic  appeal  in  which  he  pointed  out  what  a 
disastrous  effect  it  would  have  on  public  opinion  and  morale 
if  the  leaders  of  the  great  steel  industry  could  not  amicably 
agree  with  the  Government  on  prices,  and  proposed  an 
adjournment  for  the  purpose  of  "cooling  off."  This  appeal 
for  harmony  from  a  labor  leader  made  a  deep  impression. 
During  the  recess  the  steel  men  met  and  appointed  commit- 
tees to  deal  with  the  prices  of  ore,  coke,  and  pig  iron,  which 
the  War  Industries  Board  had  agreed  must  be  priced  sep- 
arately as  steps  in  determining  steel  prices.  At  the  recon- 
vened joint  meeting  at  four  o'clock  the  respective  committees 


I 


I 


1 


322    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

named  $5.05  a  ton  at  lower  lake  ports  for  non-Bessemer 
Mesabi  Range  iron  ore,  $6.50  a  ton  for  coke  at  the  ovens 
(but  both  C.  M.  Schwab  and  Judge  Gary  thought  $6  enough), 
and  that  $35  a  ton  for  basic  iron  would  permit  ninety  per 
cent  of  the  blast  furnaces  to  operate  at  a  profit,  though  with 
coke  at  $6,  $30  a  ton  would  be  fair.  After  Mr.  Schwab, 
Mr.  Farrell,  and  Mr.  Clarke  had  made  representations  as 
to  what  steel  should  be  priced  at  on  the  basis  of  the  fore- 
going prices,  the  members  of  the  War  Industries  Board 
retired  from  the  meeting  to  permit  the  steel  men  to  prepare 
their  final  schedule  of  basic  prices. 

When  this  was  presented  to  the  Board  later  in  the  day,  it 
was  found  to  allow  $5.05  for  iron  ore,  $6  a  net  ton  for 
coke,  $33  a  gross  ton  for  pig  iron,  $2.90  a  hundred  for  steel 
bars,  $3  a  hundred  for  shapes,  and  $3.25  a  hundred  for 
plates.  These  were  not  far  from  the  prices  named  by  the 
Board  and  were  acceptable  to  it.  Upon  being  approved  by 
the  President  on  September  24th,  they  were  confirmed  in 
a  letter  from  Judge  Lovett,  acting  chairman  of  the  Board, 
to  Judge  Gary  on  September  25th,  which,  after  specifying 
the  prices  and  the  period  of  their  duration  as  until  January 
1,  1918,  included  as  part  of  the  agreement: 

Also,  first,  that  there  should  be  no  reduction  in  the  present  rate 
of  wages;  second,  that  the  prices  above  named  shall  be  made  to  the 
public  and  to  the  nations  associated  with  the  United  States  in  the 
present  war  with  Germany,  as  well  as  to  the  Government  of  the 
United  States;  and,  third,  that  the  steel  producers  represented  at 
the  meeting  pledge  themselves  to  exert  every  eflfort  necessary  to 
keep  up  the  production  to  the  maximum  of  the  past  so  long  as  the 
war  lasts. 

For  the  highly  integrated  producers  these  prices  were  high 
and  meant  enormous  profits  in  the  aggregate,  for  directly 
or  through  subsidiaries  they  made  a  profit  on  ore,  on  coke, 
on  iron,  and  on  steel.  Yet  the  Board  could  see  no  practicable 
way  to  avoid  allowing  a  profit  on  each  step. 

The  cost-plus  plan  of  prices  was  already  distasteful  to  the 
country,  inevitable  as  it  was  in  some  cases.  The  suggestion 
that  profits  be  pooled  and  divided  among  all  the  producers 
had  the  shortcoming  that  it  would  stimulate  neither  the  high- 
cost  nor  the  low-cost  producers;  also  it  would  have  been 


STEEL:  AN  EPIC  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR     323 

about  as  complicated  in  accounting  as  the  cost-plus  plan.  It 
must  be  remembered  that  maximum  production  was  then  of 
even  more  importance  than  equitable  prices.  The  War 
Industries  Board  sought  to  enlist  the  steel  industry  as  an 
enthusiastic  part  of  the  war  forces  amd  it  needed  every  pound 
of  steel  that  could  be  produced.  It  shrank  from  the  com- 
mandeering of  the  industry  as  a  whole.  Perhaps,  if  there 
should  be  another  great  war,  it  may  be  possible  to  draft 
industry  just  as  the  soldier  was  drafted  in  the  last  war. 
Industry  may  be  compelled  to  labor  without  profit,  as  the 
soldier  was  compelled  to  fight.  At  best  it  would  be  a  dubi- 
ous experiment.  Then,  too,  there  were  the  excess  profits  and 
war  taxes  to  fall  back  on.  The  Government  balanced  high 
profits  with  high  taxes. 

At  the  same  time  the  War  Industries  Board  did  not  fall 
into  the  error  of  being  indiiferent  to  prices  because  taxes 
would  bring  most  of  the  extraordinary  profits  into  the 
Treasury.  It  perceived  the  far-reaching  evil  economic  con- 
sequences of  varying  and  mounting  prices  in  raw  materials. 
A  remoter  point  of  importance  was  also  the  fact  that  if 
American  steel  prices  were  forced  too  far  below  the  existing 
British  prices,  there  would  be  a  temptation  to  purchase  exces- 
sive amounts  of  steel  in  America  at  the  expense  of  American 
•  manufacturers.  So  it  contented  itself  with  generous  fixed 
prices  —  but  which  were  far  below  those  that  had  been  pre- 
vailing. The  market  was  so  erratic  that  it  is  diflScult  to  say 
just  what  were  prevailing  prices,  but  certainly  coke  had  been 
$12.75  a  ton;  pig  iron  $60;  steel  bars  $5  a  hundred  pounds; 
shapes  $6;  and  plates  $12.  The  established  prices  were 
much  higher  than  those  of  the  pre-war  period,  but  they  were 
not  out  of  line  with  the  general  increase  in  prices  of  com- 
modities and  of  labor.  Following  the  fixation  of  prices  in 
the  basic  materials  all  steel  products  were  later  priced 
accordingly. 

The  steel  industry  accepted  the  new  prices  in  good  faith, 
the  American  Iron  and  Steel  Institute  appointed  a  cooperative 
committee,  and  from  that  time  on,  as  experience  showed  the 
way,  the  iron  and  steel  industry  virtually  became  a  depart- 
ment of  the  Government.  It  pooled  its  resources  and,  through 
the  Institute  committees,  put  them  at  the  service  of  the  Gov- 


I  ;  ■ 


I 


'1  I 


324    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

emment.  The  War  Industries  Board  set  up  a  steel  division 
under  Replogle,  himself  an  acknowledged  master  of  the 
business,  and  between  that  division,  in  touch  with  the  needs 
of  the  Government  and  of  war  industry  and  the  committee 
thoroughly  conversant  with  and  acting  for  the  steel  industry, 
American  steel  and  iron  making  was  treated  as  a  unit.  Syn- 
chronously with  the  fixing  of  steel  prices,  the  War  Industries 
Board  laid  down  the  general  basis  of  the  distribution  of  the 
product  through  its  Priorities  Circular  No.  1,  which  estab- 
lished the  sequence  in  which  orders  should  be  filled;  and 
Circular  No.  2,  explaining  the  use  of  priority  certificates. 
Thus  Government  price-fixing  and  Government  allocation  of 
products  made  their  debut  simultaneously. 

It  is  not  to  be  assumed  that  the  new  partnership  of  Govern- 
ment and  steel  was  always  harmonious.  The  steel  men  were 
loath  to  believe  that  the  war  demands  for  steel  were  as  great 
as  the  Board  maintained  they  were.  They  were  reluctant 
to  give  all  their  production  to  the  Government  and  the  Allies: 
they  hated  to  shut  off  their  old  customers  entirely.  Yet  the 
production  of  iron  and  steel  was  less  in  1918  than  in  1917, 
though  it  is  agreed  that  prices  had  nothing  to  do  with  this 
fact. 

Replogle,  in  despair  as  he  saw  production  falling  behind, 
especially  in  the  disastrous  winter  of  1917-18  —  the  worst 
in  a  hundred  years  —  called  the  steel  men  into  conference 
with  the  Board  on  several  occasions.  The  minutes  of  these 
meetings  show  how  the  friction  of  war  effort  wore  out 
nerves.  At  times  the  Board  members  were  convinced  that 
the  steel  industry  was  not  doing  its  best,  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  iron  and  steel  men,  conscious  of  maximum  effort, 
resented  the  slightest  criticism.  At  the  same  time  these 
meetings  were  really  councils  of  war  in  which  the  whole 
situation  was  exhaustively  discussed  and  reviewed,  and  the 
best  minds  of  the  industry  were  concentrated  on  ways  and 
means  of  breaking  up  the  vicious  circles  of  relations  which 
seemed  to  block  at  every  turn  every  efi'ort  toward  increased 
production. 

How  far  the  hard  industry  of  iron  and  steel  had  progressed 
from  the  acquisitive  days  of  1917  was  fully  expressed  by 
Judge  Gary  when  he  said  at  one  of  these  conferences  that  the 


STEEL:  AN  EPIC  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR     325 

steel  industry,  under  Government  control,  had  become  such 
a  unit  that  no  member  of  it  any  longer  had  any  right  to 
conduct  his  business  with  a  view  to  individual  profit;  that  it 
was  simply  an  integration  that  must  be  treated  as  having 
only  the  one  purpose  of  serving  the  war  purpose.  He  thus 
disposed  of  the  last  hope  of  some  of  the  steel  men  that  they 
might  now  and  then  fill  private  orders  —  when  for  the 
moment  Government  orders  were  off  their  books.  If  such  a 
situation  arose,  the  free  mills  had  to  come  to  the  relief  of 
the  congested  mills. 

It  is  not  surprising  that  in  such  a  robust  industry  as  that  of 
steel  and  iron,  in  which  the  tenacity  of  the  product  seems  to 
be  reflected  in  the  character  of  its  managers,  there  should 
have  been  some  recalcitrants  —  some  of  the  "I-will-do-with- 
my-business-as-I-damn-please"  type.  The  priority  clamps  — 
the  blockade  of  industrial  manipulation  —  and  the  threat  of 
taking  over  the  plant  finally  brought  all  into  line. 

Because  it  was  the  first  and,  all  things  considered,  the 
most  important  of  the  industries  dominated  by  the  War 
Industries  Board,  in  addition  to  being  the  greatest,  the  steel 
administration  provides  the  best  model  of  the  scheme  of 
industrial  control  through  a  compact,  expert  unit  on  the  side 
of  the  Government,  dealing  with  a  close  organization  on  the 
side  of  industry.  For  integrated  administrative  purposes 
this  industry  had  the  advantage  of  being  already  much  cen- 
tralized. In  the  first  place,  the  Steel  Corporation  represented 
about  fifty  per  cent  of  it,  and  in  the  last  analysis  about  fifteen 
men  could  swing  the  whole  of  it.  In  the  next  place,  the  long- 
established  American  Iron  and  Steel  Institute  had  given  the 
industry  an  advantageous  rallying-point.  After  the  agree- 
ment of  September  22d,  Judge  Gary,  as  president  of  that 
Institute,  appointed  a  general  committee  and  a  number  of 
sub-committees  to  direct  the  industry  in  cooperation  with  the 
War  Industries  Board.  Judge  Gary  was  chairman  of  the 
general  committee  and  the  other  members  were: 

'  J.  A.  Farrell  (vice-chairman),  president,  United  States  Steel 
Corporation,  New  York,  N.Y. 

E.  A.  S.  Clarke  (secretary),  president,  Lackawanna  Steel  Com- 
pany, New  York,  N.Y. 

L.  E.  Block,  vice-president,  Inland  Steel  Company,  Chicago,  111. 


326    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


STEEL:  AN  EPIC  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR     327 


1 


.1 


J.  A.  Burden,  president,  Burden  Iron  Company,  Troy,  N.Y. 

J.  A.  Campbell,  president,  Youngstown  Sheet  and  Tube  Company, 
Youngstown,  Ohio. 

H.  G.  Dalton,  Pickands,  Mather  and  Company,  Cleveland,  Ohio. 

A.  C.  Dinkey,  president,  Midvale  Steel  and  Ordnance  Company, 
Philadelphia,  Pa. 

E.  G.  Grace,  president,  Bethlehem  Steel  Corporation,  Bethlehem, 
Pa. 

A.  F.  Huston,  president,  Lukens  Steel  Company,  Coatesville,  Pa. 

W.  L.  King,  vice-president,  Jones  and  Laughlin  Steel  Corpora- 
tion, New  York,  N.Y. 

C.  M.  Schwab,  chairman,  Bethlehem  Steel  Corporation,  New 
York,  N.Y. 

J.  A.  Topping,  chairman.  Republic  Iron  and  Steel  Company, 
New  York,  N.Y. 

H.  H.  Cook  (assistant  secretary),  American  Iron  and  Steel 
Institute,  New  York,  N.Y. 

An  elaborate  organization  was  set  up  in  Washington  and  the 
head  offices  in  New  York  were  largely  given  over  to  war 
work. 

On  his  part  Mr.  Replogle  set  up  a  staff  with  Frank  Pumell 
as  assistant  director  and  E.  D.  Graff,  special  agent;  a  steel 
products  section  with  F.  E.  Thompson  as  chief;  a  projectile 
steel,  rails,  alloy  steel,  and  cold  drawn  section,  with  Captain 
D.  E.  Sawyer  as  chief;  a  pig  iron  section,  headed  by  Jay  C. 
McLauchlan;  a  permit  section,  headed  by  J.  S.  Barclay;  a 
bureau  of  warehouse  distribution,  with  Andrew  Wheeler  as 
chief;  an  iron  and  steel  scrap  section,  with  William  Vernon 
Phillips  as  chief;  and  a  statistics  section  under  Percy  K. 
Withey.  Paul  Mackall,  another  of  Mr.  Replogle's  assistants, 
later  became  the  Division's  representative  on  the  Board's 
Foreign  Mission. 

The  success  of  the  Steel  Division  was  founded  on  its 
mastery  of  the  facts  of  the  industry,  as  well  as  the  expert 
knowledge  of  its  members.  Every  bit  of  information  at  the 
disposal  of  the  Government  and  the  Allies  regarding  steel 
requirements  and  purchases  was  collected  and  put  in  order. 
Every  iron  and  steel  plant  in  the  country  was  required  to 
make  weekly  reports,  giving  all  the  essential  facts  of  the 
state  of  its  business.  Agents  of  the  Division  and  of  the 
Institute  visited  different  plants  from  time  to  time.    Lagging 


plants  were  speeded  up,  prompt  ones  were  encouraged,  vio- 
lations of  priority  were  reprimanded  and  even  penalized. 
A  steel  committee  composed  of  the  principal  members  of  the 
Steel  Division  and  representatives  of  the  Government  depart- 
ments and  agencies  using  steel  met  almost  daily  to  keep  the 
requirements  side  as  up-to-date  as  the  production  side,  and 
to  consider  measures  to  meet  the  ever-changing  situation. 
The  general  outcome  was  an  almost  incredible  direction  of 
the  iron  and  steel  industry  as  a  unit,  of  which  the  different 
plants  were  merely  subordinate  parts.  As  offense  and 
defense  alternated  in  France,  as  the  requirements  of  the  rail- 
roads, the  shipyards,  the  munitions  plants  varied  in  relative 
importance  from  day  to  day,  mills  and  whole  plants  were 
speeded  up  or  shifted  from  one  product  to  another.  There 
was  a  strategy  of  steel  in  America  that  was  as  much  directed 
by  events  as  the  strategy  of  armies  in  France. 

The  steel  forces  were  as  much  discouraged  by  the  awful 
sag  in  production  in  the  winter  of  1917-18  as  the  French 
and  British  by  the  destruction  of  Cough's  army  in  March, 
1918.  On  May  7th,  Mr.  Replogle,  speaking  at  a  meeting  of 
the  War  Industries  Board  with  the  representatives  of  the 
automobile  industry,  drew  a  vivid  picture  of  the  steel  situa- 
tion. He  showed  that  there  were  then  orders  on  the  books 
of  the  steel  mills  for  seven  months'  production,  and  more 
orders  coming  in  all  the  time. 

As  late  as  August  22d,  Mr.  Baruch,  speaking  to  the  steel 
men,  pictured  every  offensive  of  the  war  as  dependent  on 
steel: 

Every  place  where  there  is  an  Allied  army,  no  matter  whether  it 
be  Italian,  French,  English,  or  American,  there  is  a  demand  upon 
the  resources  of  this  country.  The  figures  we  have  represented  to  you 
we  can  add  to  because  we  have  additional  demands  for  the  Meso- 
potamia campaign.  The  whole  Siberia  project  rests  upon  whether 
we  can  support  the  men  there  with  material.  As  soon  as  that 
advance  starts,  it  means  steel.  The  whole  question  on  the  western 
front  is  a  question  of  metals.  It  is  not  to  get  steel  there  in  January 
or  February  —  not  even  day  after  to-morrow,  but  to-day.  We  must 
have  the  weight  of  metal.  If  we  cannot  carry  out  this  programme, 
I  want  to  know  it  from  this  meeting.  If  we  cannot  do  it,  it  is  time 
for  us  to  inform  the  military  chiefs  on  the  western  front.  We  must 
say:  "We  cannot  support  you.    You  have  got  to  sit  there  and  wait 


328    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


STEEL:  AN  EPIC  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR     329 


1 


\ 


■ 


*     (I 


or  go  back  because  we  cannot  support  you."  It  is  really  up  to 
that.  You  have  all  done  wonderfully  in  a  great  way,  and  person- 
ally I  appreciate  it,  but  if  we  cannot  meet  this  demand  —  if  you 
think  we  cannot  —  let  us  say  so  and  give  them  the  facts. 

Viewed  in  the  whole  the  outlook  did  seem  hopeless.  But 
the  steel  industry  met  every  decisive  crisis,  though  it  was  able 
to  do  so  only  by  virtually  ceasing  to  produce  steel  but  for 
war  purposes,  primary  or  secondary.  The  conservation  of 
steel  for  war  got  to  such  a  point  that  it  was  even  denied  to 
the  corset  manufacturers,  who  consumed  only  twenty-five 
thousand  tons  a  year,  until  it  was  shown  that  corsets  were  a 
necessary  of  war  —  that  women  workers  could  not  stand  up 
to  their  work  without  them  —  when  a  certain  amount  of  "off- 
grade"  heats  was  allowed  them.  Some  of  the  steel-consuming 
interests  "died  hard"  as  curtailment  went  on  and  priority 
choked  off  supplies.  Step  by  step,  however,  the  lines  were 
tightened  up,  and  Priorities  Circular  No.  5,  of  July  22,  1918, 
took  away  the  last  vestige  of  control  of  the  steel  manufac- 
turers over  their  own  product.  After  that  date  no  steel 
manufacturer  could  deliver  goods,  even  if  he  had  filled  all 
his  Government  orders,  without  approval  of  the  director  of 
steel.  Thenceforth  no  steel-using  industry  could  continue 
except  by  grace  of  the  War  Industries  Board.  All  this  was 
effected  with  an  executive  and  clerical  force  that  did  not 
exceed  a  hundred  persons,  thanks  to  the  fact  that  the  industry 
largely  directed  and  policed  itself.  The  more  arbitrary  and 
authoritative  system  of  administering  steel  priorities  in 
England  employed  three  thousand  persons. 

While  it  is  dangerous  to  attempt  such  a  generalization,  the 
impression  is  that  the  Steel  Division  came  nearer  to  being  an 
absolute  industrial  control  agency  of  the  Government  than 
did  any  of  the  other  subdivisions  of  the  War  Industries 
Board.  Of  course,  it  did  not  sign  contracts  and  make  pay- 
ments, but  it  allocated  virtually  all  the  steel  and  iron  require- 
ments of  the  United  States  Government  and  of  the  Allies.  It 
could  hardly  have  made  effective  use  of  the  pooled  resources 
and  facilities  of  the  steel  industry  if  it  had  not  done  so. 
Operating  under  basic  fixed  prices,  it  was  not  involved  in 
any  price  bargaining  or  influenced  by  relative  prices  as  bal- 
anced against  comparative  eflficiency.     So  far  as  the  work 


already  in  hand  permitted,  it  was  free  to  place  each  contract 
in  the  plant  that  was  best  adapted  to  filling  it.  In  this  part  of 
its  work  the  Steel  Division  worked  in  the  closest  union  with 
the  steel  distribution  sub-committee  of  the  American  Iron  and 
Steel  Institute,  of  which  J.  A.  Farrell,  president  of  the  United 
States  Steel  Corporation,  was  chairman.  In  this  connection 
it  should  be  mentioned  that  the  Institute,  in  addition  to  this 
committee,  had  other  sub-committees  on  sheet  steel,  ferro- 
alloys, pig  iron,  iron  ore,  and  lake  transportation;  tubular 
products,  tinplate,  pig  tin,  scrap  iron  and  steel,  wire  products, 
wire  rope,  cold  rolled  and  drawn  steel,  malleable  castings, 
cast-iron  pipe,  and  traffic  conditions.  Each  of  these  articu- 
lated with  the  appropriate  section  of  the  War  Industries 
Board. 

Allocation  was  not  confined  to  original  orders,  but  was 
even  applied  to  the  extent  of  shifting  work  in  hand,  in  order 
to  consolidate  projects  and  eliminate  cross-hauls  and  unnec- 
essary hauls.    For  example: 

A  BufiFalo  steel  manufacturer  was  making  an  enormous  tonnage 
of  projectile  steel  to  be  shipped  in  bar  form  to  a  Cincinnati  forge 
plant  to  be  forged  into  projectile  forgings,  which  were  in  turn  to 
be  shipped  back  to  Buffalo  for  machining  into  the  finished  pro- 
jectile. A  plant  within  fifty  miles  of  Cincinnati  was  making  pro- 
jectile bars  which  were  being  sent  to  Buffalo  for  forging  and 
machining.  The  differential  in  price  of  the  several  contracts  was 
very  great,  but,  after  a  number  of  conferences  which  the  director 
of  steel  supply  had  with  the  various  manufacturers  involved, 
arrangements  were  made  to  have  the  steel  bars  rolled  in  Buffalo, 
shipped  to  a  near-by  plant  and  machine  shop  for  finishing,  and  in 
turn  the  Cincinnati  forge  man  was  supplied  by  the  steel  mill  in 
his  district.^ 

The  Distribution  Committee  not  only  acquitted  itself  well 
in  placing  and  shifting  orders,  but  was  often  instnmiental  in 
providing  new  plants.  The  Liberty  Plate  Mill  of  the  Carnegie 
Steel  Company  at  Pittsburgh,  for  example,  was  rolling 
plates  for  the  Hog  Island  shipyards  ninety  days  after  groimd 
was  broken  for  its  foundations.  Incidentally,  one  of  the 
great  achievements  of  the  war  was  the  work  of  the  steel 

^Report  of  the  War  Industries  Board.  Government  Printing  Office,  Wash- 
ington. 


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330    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

rolling  and  steel  fabricating  mills  in  delivering  the  parts  for 
the  fabricated  or  assembly  shipyards,  such  as  Hog  Island, 
Bristol,  and  Newark.  Forty  or  fifty  mills,  scattered  all  over 
the  country,  cooperated  in  this  undertaking.  On  one  occa- 
sion Mr.  Baruch  casually  remarked  to  Judge  Gary  that  the 
country  was  deficient  in  forging  plants.  Without  more  ado 
orders  were  issued  the  next  morning  for  an  $8,000,000  exten- 
sion of  the  Steel  Corporation's  forging  capacity. 

The  fact  that  a  long  time  elapsed  before  the  War  Indus- 
tries Board  was  in  full  control  of  industrial  mobilization 
and  industries  were  integrated  for  war  purposes  resulted  in 
an  immense  amount  of  wide  diffusion  of  "jobs"  that  were 
really  imits,  causing  much  waste  of  transportation,  confu- 
sion, and  loss  of  time. 

The  volume  of  steel  production  was  definitely  limited  by 
the  production  of  iron,  which  —  though  greatly  enlarged  in 
the  three  preceding  years  —  it  was  not  possible  to  increase 
during  1918  (though  by  various  devices  and  contrivances  the 
capacity  was  enlarged).  Another  limitation  was  the  neces- 
sity of  concentrating  the  mills  on  a  few  lines  such  as  projec- 
tile steel,  ship  plates,  and  rails.  This  involved  extensive 
conversions  and  the  erection  of  new  plants.  The  Steel  Cor- 
poration alone  was  at  one  time  spending  about  $14,000,000 
a  month  on  new  plants. 

Very  little  projectile  steel  was  made  in  this  country  before 
the  war,  and  diere  had  not  been  a  large  demand  for  rails  in 
recent  years.  Nevertheless,  the  output  of  projectile  steel  in 
1918  was  4,119,099  tons  and  in  October  shipments  were 
averaging  115,000  tons  a  week.  At  that  time  France  was 
getting  110,000  tons  a  month,  England  85,000,  and  Italy 
20,000.  While  the  steel  was  produced  to  keep  the  Germans 
on  the  run  before  the  hot  guns  of  the  Allies,  transportation 
was  maintained  both  abroad  and  at  home.  The  total  pro- 
duction of  steel  rails  during  1918  was  2,372,691  tons.  In 
the  month  of  September  alone  60,000  tons  went  to  Pershing 
and  in  the  year  die  American  army  got  305,000  tons,  France 
212,450  tons,  Italy  64,484  tons,  and  the  American  railroads 

1,263,720  tons. 

In  the  beginning  of  the  war  it  was  not  thought  possible  to 
provide  suflScient  steel  for  the  proposed  emergency  fleet. 


STEEL:  AN  EPIC  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR     331 

hence  the  recourse  to  wooden  ships;  but  in  1918  the  Fleet 
Corporation  received  2,132,907  tons  of  plates;  the  American 
railways,  for  cars  and  locomotives  1,100,000  tons;  Canada, 
53,178  tons;  England,  101,365;  France,  92,918;  Italy, 
56,595;  and  Japan,  100,284.  At  times  the  shipments  of 
plates  exceeded  120,000  tons  a  week. 

Allowing  for  duplications  in  reports  —  as  when  one  plant 
made  some  steel  product  from  billets  received  from  another 
—  it  was  calculated  that  the  net  production  of  steel  during 
1918  was  33,000,000  tons,  although  the  nominal  production 
was  almost  39,000,000  tons.  The  steel  production  capacity 
extended  so  much  more  rapidly  than  iron  production,  which, 
despite  the  use  of  every  old  blast  furnace  in  the  country  and 
the  conversion  of  foundry  furnaces  to  basic  iron,  was  defi- 
nitely checked  by  the  fuel  factor,  that  it  is  doubtful  if  the 
record  for  1919  would  have  been  any  better  if  the  war  had 
continued,  except  as  a  mild  winter  would  have  helped  as 
against  the  curtailing  effects  of  the  terrific  winter  of  1917-18- 

n 

One  of  the  agonizing  industrial  tragedies  of  the  war  was  the 
gradual  extinction  to  which  the  passenger  automobile  indus- 
try was  eventually  sentenced.  It  was  the  greatest  of  the 
industries  that  were  singled  out,  not  only  for  curtailment, 
but  for  one  hundred  per  cent  conversion  or  repression.  The 
automobile  makers  had  always  been  sensitive  to  the  intima- 
tion that  their  business  was  a  luxury,  and  they  resented  its 
implied  classification  among  the  non-essential  industries 
during  the  war. 

Owing  to  its  size,  it  became  a  mark  for  curtailment  when 
many  wholly  wasteful  businesses  were  permitted  to  continue 
but  slightly  impeded.  It  was  an  enormous  consumer  of 
steel  —  two  million  tons  a  year  —  and  steel,  as  we  have 
seen,  was  the  crux  of  the  war.  It  employed  an  army  of  men 
who  could  be  used  in  other  industries  or  in  the  ranks.  The 
more  automobiles,  the  greater  the  drain  on  motor  fuel, 
already  scarce;  and  the  greater  the  demand  for  rubber  for 

tires. 

Finally,  when  all  is  said  and  done,  the  country  could  easily 
have  got  along  without  further  production  of  passenger  auto- 


332    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


STEEL:  AN  EPIC  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR     333 


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mobiles  for  a  year  or  two,  just  as  it  could  have  got  along  if 
there  had  been  no  new  clothing  manufactured  for  civilian 
use  for  a  like  period.  The  difficulty  was  not  in  dispensing 
with  new  passenger  automobiles  for  a  time,  but  in  conserving 
the  life  and  well-being  of  the  communities  that  are  so  largely 
dependent  on  the  business  and  in  making  conversions  widiout 
the  dispersion  of  forces  and  the  breaking-up  of  organizations. 
The  fact  that  in  a  sense  they  had  been  singled  out  for  sacrifice 
en  masse,  and  the  natural  tendency  to  believe  that  they  were 
the  victims  of  war-industry  enthusiasts,  put  the  automobile 
men  into  a  rebellious  state  of  mind.  Virtually  all  of  them 
were  for  a  long  time  passive  obstructors  of  curtailment,  and 
some  were  defiant. 

This  attitude,  in  turn,  caused  an  unfavorable  reaction 
among  the  war  administrators  who  realized  that  steel  was 
the  metal  of  victory,  that  the  maximum  output  of  it  had  been 
aUained  while  war  demands  for  it  were  increasing.  The  axe 
must  be  applied  some  place  and  preferably  where  there 
would  be  large  and  immediately  available  results.  The  auto- 
mobile passenger  industry  stood  out  in  this  view  like  a  tower 
on  a  fiat  plain. 

When  the  screws  of  priority  were  first  applied  (because 
of  the  scarcity  of  alloy  steels)  without  warning  in  November, 
1917,  there  was,  naturally,  a  violent  storm  of  protest.  In 
the  following  March  an  agreement  was  made  with  the  War 
Industries  Board  to  restrict  the  production  of  passenger  auto- 
mobiles to  thirty  per  cent  and  prepare  for  eventual  elimina- 
tion. Nevertheless,  according  to  the  Board's  information, 
many  concerns  proceeded  to  store  up  materials  and  supplies 
instead  of  balancing  their  inventories  and  tapering  off'.  A 
certain  great  manufacturer  even  challenged  the  War  Indus- 
tries Board  to  do  its  worst,  accompanying  his  challenge  with 
a  personal  insult  to  the  chairman.  He  had  materials  and 
fuel  in  abundance  and  thought  he  could  stand  a  state  of 
siege.  No  retort  was  made,  but  when  his  coal  pile  was 
ordered  to  be  commandeered  and  the  Railroad  Administration 

*0n  one  occasion,  so  tense  "was  the  feeling,  the  three  members  of  the 
committee  representing  the  automobile  industry  came  into  the  writer's  office 
greatly  exercised,  and  the  chairman  of  the  committee  said  to  the  writer:  If 
this  persecution  continues,  we  are  going  to  hire  the  best  publicity  man  in  the 
country  to  put  our  case  beiore  the  public** 


refused  him  cars  for  any  purpose,  even  for  his  Government 
business,  and  it  came  to  his  ears  that  he  would  soon  be 
taking  orders  from  a  smooth-faced  lieutenant,  if  permitted  to 
remain  in  his  own  plant  at  all,  he  saw  a  great  light.  He  saw 
not  only  his  folly,  but  also  his  selfishness.  His  submission 
was  characteristically  picturesque,  and  not  wholly  printable, 
but  it  was  submission. 

So,  when  the  War  Industries  Board  called  the  representa- 
tives of  the  automobile  industry  together  to  confer  regarding 
a  definite  limitation  of  the  output  of  passenger  cars,  prepara- 
tory to  ultimate  conversion  of  the  whole  industry  to  war 
service,  there  was  hard  feeling  on  both  sides.  The  auto- 
mobile men  considered  themselves  sacrificial  victims  of 
somebody's  foolish  ideas  of  how  the  war  should  be  conducted 
and  the  members  of  the  War  Industries  Board  considered 
that  they  had  to  do  with  a  heartless  industry  which  had 
already  made  them  a  laughing-stock. 

The  first  engagement  occurred  on  May  7,  1918,  when 
representatives  of  the  National  Automobile  Chamber  of 
Commerce  met  with  the  members  of  the  Board.  While,  as 
pointed  out,  other  considerations  pointed  to  the  suspension 
of  the  making  of  passenger  automobiles,  it  was  almost 
entirely  on  the  steel  factor  that  the  Board  took  its  stand.  Mr. 
Replogle  briefly  stated  the  steel  situation  after  a  winter  in 
which  transportation  was  incommoded  to  such  an  extent  as 
appallingly  to  reduce  the  production  of  steel  for  a  long 
time.  There  were  eighteen  months  production  orders  for 
standard  steel  rails,  on  the  getting  out  of  which  depended 
the  circulatory  system  of  the  Nation;  the  mills  had  twenty- 
four  weeks  of  work  on  sheets;  twenty-seven  on  seamless 
tubes;  thirty-three  on  structural  shapes;  twenty-eight  weeks 
on  bars  (in  which  the  automobile  manufacturers  were  chiefly 
interested) ;  twenty-three  weeks  on  tinplate;  tubular  products 
(also  much  used  by  the  automobile  industry),  twenty-eight 
weeks.  Altogether  the  entire  steel  industry  had  thirty 
weeks'  demand  on  its  production  at  the  then  rate  of  ship- 
ment. Also  the  demands  were  to  become  larger,  and  deliv- 
eries to  some  of  the  Allies  "were  in  frightful  shape  —  and 
we've  got  to  make  them  up."  The  steel  capacity  was  greater 
than  the  output,  he  admitted,  but  pig  iron  was  the  curb  — 


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334    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

"and  that  in  turn  goes  back  to  fuel  and  transportation." 
On  behalf  of  the  automobile  men  and  speaking  for  about 
ninety-eight  per  cent  of  the  automotive  industry,  exclusive  of 
the  Ford  Motor  Company,  which  is  not  a  member  of  the 
Automobile  Chamber  of  Commerce,  Mr.  John  Dodge  replied 
with  an  "ofiFensive  defensive."  In  plain  words  he  said  that 
the  whole  steel  and  iron  industry  from  ore  to  finished  prod- 
ucts was  down  and  lagging  and  boldly  laid  the  responsibility 
at  the  door  of  the  Government. 

If  a  steel  mill  is  down  even  ten  per  cent  [said  Mr.  Dodge],  the 
Government  should  go  and  find  out  why  it  is  down  and  remedy  the 
trouble.  I  believe  that  with  proper  Government  assistance  these 
steel  mills  could  be  brought  up  to  one  hundred  or  even  one  hun- 
dred and  twenty  per  cent  capacity.  The  steel  mills  don't  know 
whether  they  are  to  roll  Government  stuff  or  our  stuff.  If  the  orders 
were  placed  by  the  Government  as  a  private  concern  would  place 
them,  there  would  be  ample  supply  to  meet  all  demands.  It  should 
be  the  effort  of  the  Government  to  build  up  industries  and  not 
destroy  them.  It  takes  little  ability  to  get  a  crowd  of  men  down 
here  and  say,  "You  must  cease  manufacturing  automobiles,"  but  it 
takes  a  whole  lot  to  speed  up  all  the  other  industries.  ...  If 
this  policy  were  pursued  we  would  not  have  to  be  called  to  Wash- 
ington. No  one  ever  questions  in  the  least  that  our  Government 
comes  first;  every  one  knows  that.  But  there  is  no  reason  for  the 
Government's  building  stuff  and  storing  it,  as  I  was  told  yesterday, 
that  couldn't  be  shipped  in  five  years.  ...  If  you  give  us  this 
assistance,  if  you  give  these  mills  and  furnaces  the  proper  assist- 
ance, we  would  have  plenty  of  pig  iron  and  we  wouldn't  need  to  be 
curtailed;  and  if  you  would  just  take  the  material  that  you  actually 
need  and  leave  us  alone  everybody  would  be  satisfied. 

These  were  hard  words,  but  it  is  characteristic  of  the 
tolerant  methods  of  the  War  Industries  Board  that  Mr.  Baruch 
answered  calmly  that  the  Government  was  doing  everything 
in  its  power  and  that  he  would  be  greatly  pleased  to  know 
more  about  the  Government  "stuff"  that  could  not  be  shipped 
for  five  years.  Mr.  Dodge  cited  an  unnamed  high  Govern- 
ment official  as  his  authority,  thus  touching  one  of  the  plagues 
of  Washington  during  the  war  —  the  reckless  remarks  in 
private  conversation  by  Government  officials  who  did  not 
know  what  the  facts  were  any  more  than  the  man  in  the 
street. 


STEEL:  AN  EPIC  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR      335 

What  has  Mr.  Replogle  done  to  increase  the  pig  iron  and  scrap 
production?   [Mr.  Dodge  demanded.] 

Mr.  Replogle:  We  have  done  everything  of  which  we  are  capable. 

Mr.  Dodge:  In  new  furnaces? 

Mr.  Replogle:  I  have  discouraged  the  building  of  blast  furnaces. 
The  existing  furnaces  are  not  kept  operating  at  full  capacity  because 
of  lack  of  fuel.    This  is  not  a  question  of  pig  iron  capacity. 

Mr.  Dodge:  In  other  words,  you  mean  to  say  that  if  the  industry 
was  supplied  with  transportation  and  fuel  there  would  be  more 
steel. 

JVTr.  Replogle:  Certainly  there  would  be  enough.  It  would  at 
least  take  care  of  a  great  portion  of  the  commercial  interests.  We 
have  even  advocated  the  closing-down  of  certain  blast  furnaces 
where  the  coke  consumption  per  ton  of  metal  is  high,  and  putting 
the  coke  out  to  more  modem  blast  furnaces.  One  furnace  can  make 
a  ton  of  pig  iron  with  1700  pounds  of  coke,  and  another  furnace 
may  take  2500  or  2600  pounds.  That  is  very  drastic  when  a  man 
who  has  a  less  modern  furnace  would  have  to  shut  down,  but  I  think, 
sooner  or  later,  it  is  bound  to  come  to  that  point.  That  is  the 
limiting  fact,  Mr.  Dodge  —  the  fuel,  the  coke —  In  that  con- 
nection the  Government  is  spending  a  vast  amount  of  money  right 
now.  The  manufacturers  themselves  are  doing  a  great  deal  along 
that  line.  A  modern  coke  oven  costs  to-day  $50,000  to  $52,000, 
which  is  three  or  four  times  what  it  would  cost  in  normal  times. 
But  the  Government  is  encouraging  that  and  advancing  money  to 
people  who  are  prepared  to  build  such  ovens  —  in  some  cases 
advancing  one  hundred  per  cent  to  cover  the  cost  of  the  by-product 
oven,  which  Mr.  Baruch  has  encouraged  to  the  fullest  extent.  They 
will  not  be  available  for  a  long  time  to  come,  however.  ...  It 
is  problematical  just  what  benefit  will  be  derived  from  these  coke 
ovens.  There  are  many  cases  where  loaded  cars  of  coke  have  been 
standing  on  sidings  for  days,  because  of  the  inability  of  the 
transportation  people  to  move  them.  I  think  that  situation  has 
improved  materially,  but  it  is  still  far  from  being  solved. 

Mr.  Dodge:  It  appears  to  me  that  what  you  need  is  one  big 
boss  to  get  these  departments  together  and  shake  them  up  and  get 
results. 

Mr.  E.  W.  Durant,  of  the  General  Motors  Company,  then 
made  a  strong  appeal  for  the  maintenance  of  the  automobile 
organizations  for  the  good  of  the  country  and  for  the  good 
of  the  Government,  pointing  out  that  if  they  were  impaired 
then,  they  would  not  be  ready  for  future  Government 
demands  upon  them. 


.  I 


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336    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

At  this  point,  Mr.  Noyes,  speaking  for  the  Fuel  Adminis- 
tration, said: 

The  actual  facts  of  the  fuel  question  are  that  the  fuel  situation 
for  industrial  coal  is  going  to  be  immensely  worse  next  winter  than 
last  —  no  question  about  it.  It  can  be  figured  out  by  the  ton. 
It  is  a  business  that  cannot  be  placed  in  the  hands  of  some 
Napoleonic  man  —  in  that  respect  it  is  unlike  any  other  business. 
In  any  other  business,  I  agree  with  the  ideas  of  Mr.  Dodge  —  any 
other  business  would  say  that  it  has  got  to  be  done.  When  you 
get  to  the  coal  business  —  you  don't  realize  it  is  so  far  out  of 
range.  Remember  that  our  weekly  stunt  is  to  produce  twelve 
million  tons  of  bituminous  coal.  We  have  gone  through  the  whole 
line  —  there  is  not  a  single  item  from  barge  canals  to  little  canals, 
the  question  of  taking  boats  from  the  Lakes,  from  Montreal,  and 
running  them  down  to  New  England  —  when  you  get  through  all 
that,  you  are  not  going  to  be  able  to  meet  the  demands  for  coal 
this  winter.  When  the  big  war  came  on  every  railroad  man 
testified  that  it  was  just  taxing  the  railroads  to  do  what  the  normal 
business  of  the  country  required  to  be  done.  Frequent  embargoes 
were  necessitated  then.  Now  you  have  put  on  such  an  enormous 
increase  that  it  cannot  be  possible  to  meet  it  in  one  year,  and  the 
great  bulk  of  that  increase  is  coal.  Three  years  ago  you  were 
mining  440,000,000  tons  of  bituminous  coal;  this  year  it  is  figured 
at  the  least  estimate  you  must  have  600,000,000  tons  of  bituminous 
coal.  You  will  need  160,000,000  tons  more  than  you  needed  a 
year  ago.  This  is  a  problem  you  cannot  conceive  —  it  simply 
cannot  be  done.  Somebody  has  got  to  take  a  short  path  somewhere. 
The  increases  used  to  average  50,000,000  tons  of  coal  and  there 
would  be  a  struggle  over  that.  This  year  to  supply  the  actual 
necessities  that  can  be  figured,  you  need  at  least  70,000,000  tons 
and  possible  75,000,000  tons  more  than  you  had  last  year  of 
bituminous  coal.  Every  pound  must  be  carried  on  railroads  that 
must  be  taxed  in  the  same  percentage  on  other  supplies.  There 
is  going  to  be  a  world  shortage  of  coal  for  industrial  purposes 
this  year  over  last. 

Then  Mr.  Legge  reviewed  the  general  industrial  situation, 
saying: 

It  was  difficult  for  me  in  a  period  of  months  to  grasp  what  this 
situation  was  all  about.  I  confess  that  I  was  taught  to  understand 
what  Mr.  Dodge  says  was  one  of  the  first  difficulties  —  the  big 
supply  of  coal  that  formerly  came  into  New  England  from  Nova 
Scotia  fields  was  first  stopped.    The  next  item  was  the  large  supply 


ri 


STEEL:  AN  EPIC  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR      337 


of  Mexican  and  Texas  oil  carried  by  tankers.  These  tankers  were 
taken  off  because  we  had  to  supply  the  fleet  of  our  Government, 
and  other  fleets,  with  fuel  oil  abroad.  That  meant  that  these 
industries  up  in  the  Atlantic  woods  had  to  depend  on  coal  as  the 
oil  supply  was  cut  oflf.  The  Shipping  Board  had  one  hundred  and 
twenty  boats  under  construction  in  the  Lakes,  all  of  which  was 
promised  to  relieve  the  situation.  Ten  per  cent  of  them  were  to 
carry  coal  from  Hampton  Roads  —  from  New  York  to  New  Eng- 
land. Unfortunately,  things  have  occurred  on  the  other  side  and  the 
first  fifty  of  the  one  hundred  seven  have  already  been  requisitioned 
to  help  General  Pershing.  That  is  how  our  plans  got  shot  to 
pieces.  Coupled  with  that,  the  character  of  freight  must  be  moved 
from  the  northeast  comer.  The  railroads  are  handling  twenty-two 
per  cent  more  freight  in  that  northeastern  territory,  east  of 
Pittsburgh,  than  was  ever  handled  before  in  American  history, 
and  it  is  nowhere  near  enough.  They  tell  us  they  have  reached 
their  maximum  not  only  of  motor  power,  but  yards  and  terminals, 
and  it  cannot  go  much  further.  They  are  handling  through  each  of 
these  gateways  iii  that  country,  the  maximum  number  of  cars 
they  are  capable  of  handling.  The  B.  &  0.  Railroad  recently  tried 
to  get  the  coal  cars  to  raise  it  to  two  hundred  fifty  cars  a  day. 
They  absolutely  fell  down.  It  has  not  been  one  thing,  but  a  hun- 
dred and  one  things  to  bring  about  conditions.  The  Government's 
building  programme  of  this  year,  in  dollars  and  cents,  is  equal  to 
the  entire  building  programme  of  any  year  prior  to  the  war. 
Everybody  believes  we  are  not  doing  any  building.  Those  are  the 
facts,  when  you  get  down  and  analyze  what  has  happened.  Nobody 
likes  this  programme  here  —  Mr.  Durant  says  it  is  destruction. 
We  have  gone  behind  every  month  for  the  last  six  months.  There 
has  not  been  one  week  that  we  have  been  able  to  meet  our  obliga- 
tions from  a  military  standpoint.  We  have  been  going  back, 
back,  back.  On  top  of  that  comes  the  call  for  an  increase  in  the 
army  of  three  million.  Simultaneously  comes  a  call  from  England, 
France,  and  Italy  for  more  steel,  beyond  any  estimate  they  have 
ever  given  us.  They  have  got  to  come  back  to  us  for  more  metal  — 
that  is  dumped  right  on  top  of  the  programme.  By  the  time  you 
think  you  are  to  get  some  daylight,  it  gets  worse.  For  us  to  sit  in 
this  meeting  and  not  lay  all  the  cards  on  the  table,  I  think  would 
be  criminal.  No  one  wants  to  stop  you  for  a  minute,  and  you  ought 
to  know  something  of  what  the  problem  is,  and  then,  as  the 
chairman  says,  if  you  can  offer  any  suggestions  to  help  us  work  it 
out,  that  is  what  we  are  here  for.  In  this  building  programme 
down  here,  our  contractors  notify  us  that  we  are  up  against  it  on 
concrete.     The  cement  mills  in  the  East  will  close  down   for 


<  I 


a 


^11 


I 


I    ; 


338    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

lack  of  coal;  the  cement  mills  in  the  West  will  close  down  for 
lack  of  transportation.  We  ask  the  Railroad  Administration  about 
it,  and  they  answer,  "Do  you  want  to  haul  cement  or  haul  coal?  — 
tell  us  what  to  haul  out.  We  cannot  do  anything  unless  we  sac- 
rifice some  freight."  If  you  gentlemen  have  a  notion  that  this  is 
a  hobby,  please  get  that  out  of  your  minds  and  get  the  idea  of 
just  how  serious  it  is  and  tell  us  what  you  can  do  to  help.  It 
is  not  only  to  take  care  of  our  own  army  —  do  not  get  a  wrong 
impression  —  but  when  England  ran  short  of  material,  they  came 
here;  when  France  ran  short,  they  came  here;  when  Italy  ran  short 
of  material,  they  came  here.  Those  Allied  nations  are  spending 
every  month  in  this  United  States  $500,000,000  for  war  supplies 
of  one  kind  or  another  — half  a  billion  dollars  being  spent  on 
an  average  every  thirty  days,  all  of  which  has  to  come  out  and 
be  taken  care  of  somewhere,  somehow.  It  is  not  for  the  con- 
sumption of  the  small  army  that  this  country  has  abroad  — we 
have  got  to  take  care  of  the  other  fellow.  As  I  said  before,  we 
are  going  back.  Deferred  deliveries  have  grown  on  us  week  by 
week  for  the  last  six  months  — that  is  as  I  see  the  situation. 
Look  at  it  and  make  the  best  of  it. 

Frank  as  the  presentation  of  the  conditions  facing  the 
Board  was,  it  developed  that  its  members  did  not  feel  it  was 
proper  to  disclose  to  a  large  gathering  all  the  confidential 
facts  regarding  the  desperate  position  of  the  Allies  and  the 
general  movement  of  the  war  at  that  time.  It  was  agreed  to 
disclose  every  fact  to  a  committee  of  five,  and  the  rest  were 
to  accept  their  word  for  it. 

This  showing  appeared  to  be  conclusive  at  the  time,  but 
later  it  appeared  diat  it  was  not.  The  automobile  men  felt 
that,  although  the  Government  requirements  were  appalling 
as  presented  to  them,  after  all  far  more  was  being  currently 
required  of  industry  than  could  be  used.  Unquestionably 
there  was  a  deal  of  truth  in  this  position,  but  after  the  most 
solemn  warnings  the  requirement  agencies  were  unable  to 
report  to  the  War  Industries  Board  any  important  reductions. 
The  War  Industries  Board  had  no  choice  but  to  act  according 
to  military  demands.  The  situation  was  further  embroiled 
by  the  action  of  Oiairman  Edward  N.  Hurley,  of  the  Ship- 
ping Board,  who  in  addressing  a  meeting  of  the  motor  manu- 
facturers told  them  in  effect  that  the  situation  was  nowhere 
near  so  bad  as  it  had  been  represented. 


STEEL:  AN  EPIC  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR      339 

Also,  it  was  known  that  Judge  Gary  was  an  optimist  on  the 
outlook  for  steel  production  and  confident  that  the  Govern- 
ment was  over-buying.  Mr.  Stettinius,  then  an  Assistant 
Secretary  of  War,  also  gave  the  automobile  men  some  com- 
fort. As  both  the  War  Department  and  the  Shipping  Board 
were  at  that  very  moment  clamoring  for  steel  and  more  steel, 
and  complaining  that  their  work  was  being  held  back  by  lack 
of  steel,  and  the  steel  men  were  complaining  that  they  could 
not  get  coke  and  transportation  enough  to  run  to  capacity, 
the  War  Industries  Board  was  highly  exasperated  and 
adopted  some  rather  sarcastic  resolutions  which  pointed  out 
the  inconsistency  between  the  demands  of  the  War  Department 
and  the  Shipping  Board  and  the  public  utterances  of  Messrs. 
Stettinius  and  Hurley.  Judge  Gary  even  submitted  a  request 
to  be  permitted  to  supply  steel  to  the  city  of  Chicago  for 
some  municipal  construction.  With  a  reference  by  Mr.  Legge 
to  the  "German  Mayor  of  Chicago,"  this  petition  was  per- 
emptorily rejected. 

In  the  end  the  committee  of  the  Automobile  Chamber  of 
Commerce,  which  attended  the  May  7th  meeting,  declined 
to  take  the  responsibility  of  imposing  on  the  industry  the 
programme  of  drastic  curtailment  and  ultimate  abandonment 
of  the  passenger  automobile  business  favored  by  the  Board. 
But  as  it  was  obvious  that  the  Board  would  act  without  the 
cooperation  of  the  industry,  if  necessary,  Mr.  Hugh  Chalmers 
was  designated  to  make  the  final  stand,  independently  of  the 
permanent  national  organization,  although  he  was  accom- 
panied by  General  Manager  Reeves  of  that  body.  It  was  on 
July  16th  that  Judge  Parker,  speaking  for  the  Board  at  a 
meeting  of  the  Board  members  with  Mr.  Chalmers,  announced 
that  the  Board  had  concluded  that  the  passenger  automobile 
business  would  have  to  be  liquidated,  and  would  be  permitted 
to  acquire  only  such  materials  as  were  sufficient  to  round  out 
stocks  on  hand  and  limited  during  the  liquidation  process  to 
twenty-five  per  cent  of  1917  shipments  of  cars. 

There  followed  a  debate  that  was  as  frank  and  plain- 
spoken  as  the  one  at  the  preceding  meeting.  A  great  industry 
—  the  third  in  the  country  —  was  pleading  for  its  life.  It 
considered  that  it  was  to  be  made  the  unnecessary  victim  of 
Government  industrial  mismanagement.    On  the  other  hand, 


iir 


r  • 


t 


• 


:    i 
'    1 


I    { 


t      ! 


340    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

the  Board  memters,  though  not  without  sympathy,  were 
coldly  of  the  opinion  that  this  industry  was  willing  to  take 
a  chance  on  there  being  enough  steel  for  war  purposes  if  it 
could  get  enough  to  continue  making  vehicles  without  which 
the  country  could  get  along  for  a  period. 

Yet  it  was  plain  that,  while  the  industry  resolutely  opposed 
suppression,  it  was  not  so  much  that  fate  it  resented  as  it 
was  the  implication  of  non-essentiality.  It  vigorously 
objected  to  being  the  one  great  industry  singled  out  for  sac- 
rifice. Of  course,  the  Board  had  never  considered  it  a  non- 
essential industry,  but  had  come  to  the  conclusion  that  it  was 
the  one  enormous  consumer  of  steel  without  whose  product 
the  country  could  get  along  for  a  while.  If  it  had  to  die, 
the  industry  was  prepared  to  accept  its  fate,  but  it  wanted 
to  be  allowed  to  die  by  starvation  rather  than  by  proclama- 
tion. In  other  words,  it  wished  to  escape  the  notoriety  of 
decreed  curtailment,  and  pass  off  the  stage  through  the  opera- 
tion of  the  established  rules  of  priority.  It  could  not  get 
away  from  the  feeling  that  formal  curtailment  and  extin- 
guishment was  dissolution  with  a  brand  of  ignominy.  On 
the  other  hand,  members  of  the  Board  pointed  out  that, 
without  a  definite  starvation  ration,  the  application  of  priority 
would  instantly  shut  up  every  plant  that  did  not  have  a 
complete  store  of  materials  on  hand.  Even  then  Mr. 
Chalmers  stood  firmly  on  the  ground  that  the  industry  pre- 
ferred to  take  its  chances  rather  than  a  lean  ration.  Replymg 
to  Judge  Parker,  he  said: 

That  is  the  beginning  of  the  end.  You  may  not  pay  any 
attention  to  what  I  say,  but  this  is  the  most  serious  mistake  you 
have  made  down  here.  It  means  that  these  men  will  have  to  go 
to  the  War  Department  and  ask  for  postponement  of  dates  of 
delivery  or  cancellation  of  contracts.  Here  is  another  issue.  Ford 
has  been  able  to  get  his  steel.  This  won't  aflfect  Henry  Ford  at  all. 
Now,  how  is  he  doing  it?  He  is  getting  this  steel,  that  is  sure. 
Henry  Ford  has  been  favored  down  here,  because  he  has  got  his 
requirements,  he  has  got  his  steel.  Here  is  one  concern,  the 
Lexington-Howard  Company  — they  came  down  here  and  begged 
to  get  $190,000  in  steel  and  they  would  sign  an  agreement  to  go 
out  of  the  automobile  business,  but  they  didn't  get  it.  If  you 
put  that  act  through  you  will  precipitate  the  worst  panic  the 
country  has  ever  seen,  and  I  am  your  friend  in  telling  you  so.    It 


STEEL:  AN  EPIC  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR      341 

is  really  ridiculous  to  put  such  an  order  into  effect.  They  will 
have  to  go  out  of  business.  You  might  as  well  appoint  a  receiver 
for  the  State  of  Michigan,  for  it  means  a  panic  in  the  country  — 
absolutely  so.  There  are  over  300,000  men  in  Detroit  in  the  auto- 
mobile  industry,  and  for  you  to  do  that  now  will  certainly  mean 
a  panic.  If  you  were  to  say  twenty-five  per  cent  even  then 
twenty-five  per  cent  wouldn't  be  enough  to  keep  the  organizations 
alive,  but  you  say,  "We  want  you  to  liquidate,  but  at  the  sanae 
time  you  can't  ship  over  twenty-five  per  cent,"  and  when  it  is 
shown  that  the  great  purchaser  Henry  Ford  widi  his  $4^,000,000 
plant  can  be  favored,  to  get  his  steel  for  the  production  of  fifty 
or  sixty  thousand  automobiles  a  month,  I  think  there  will  be  some 
question.  We  know  Ford  is  getting  his  material,  but  of  course 
we  don't  admit  there  has  been  any  discrimination.^  He  has  enough 
steel  on  hand  to  go  ahead  with  his  production. 

I  say  it  would  be  much  better  than  to  put  a  ruling  of  that  kind 
into  eflfect  to  let  these  companies  go  on  as  they  are,  taking  their 
chances  of  getting  material  to  even  up  these  industries,  because 
without  discrimination  on  your  part,  we  feel  that  we  can  get 
some  steel,  that  is,  we  may  get  some.  Now  you  are  not  going 
to  discriminate  against  this  industry  in  favor  of  any  other  non-war 
industry.  It  would  be  better  for  us  to  go  on  as  we  are  than  to 
accept  that  kind  of  a  ruling. 

Mr.  Baruch:  I  don't  see  any  objection  to  accepting  that. 

Judge  Parker:  The  steel  mills  won't  fill  any  order  except  under 
priorities  or  permits.  Now  they  can't  get  steel  except  under 
priorities  or  permits,  and  we  cannot  get  them  priorities  or  permits 
for  any  amount  unless  we  know  what  they  are  entitled  to  in  order 
that  we  can  put  them  on  a  par  with  other  industries. 

Mr.  Chalmers:  Here  is  another  consideration:  there  are  all 
these  dealers  through  this  country  and  these  dealers  have  a  large 
investment;  they,  of  course,  are  absolutely  flat  out  of  business. 

Judge  Parker:   That  is   one  of  the   uncertainties   of  the   war. 

Mr.  Chalmers:  If  you  put  that  order  into  eff'ect  you  will  ruin 

the  automobile  industry.    I  think  it  is  for  you  to  save  their  interest 

in  their  business  and  then  talk  about  your  curtailment 

^Apropos  of  Mr.  Chalmers's  reference  to  Henry  Ford,  the  following  para- 
graph is  quoted  from  the  minutes  of  the  Board's  meeting  on  July  2,  1918: 

"Mr.  Replogle  stated  that  the  Ford  Motor  Company  desired  5196  tons  of 
steel  per  week  for  the  manufacture  of  1300  cars  per  day.  They  also  desire 
2100  tons  of  pig  iron  per  week.  They  claim  their  Government  work  alone  takes 
1910  tons  of  steel  and  1120  tons  of  pig  iron.  It  was  decided  to  give  them 
steel  enough  to  take  care  of  their  Government  work,  and  give  them  no  assur- 
ances of  any  more.  They  are  under  no  conditions  to  receive  more  than  twenty- 
five  per  cent  of  their  normal  requirements.  Mr.  Replogle  was  directed  to  take 
up  the  matter  of  their  requirements  with  Mr.  Hanch.'*  (Chief  of  the  Auto- 
motive Products  Section  of  the  War  Industries  Board.) 


'•f:  I 


ll 


If 


f 


I    .    ! 


342    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Mr.  Summers:  You  are  assuming  a  supply  of  steel  available 

when  there  isn't. 

Mr.  Chalmers:  We  are  willing  to  take  our  chances.  Get  your 
one  hundred  per  cent  war  programme.  We  will  take  our  chances 
of  the  situation  in  steel  breaking.  You  are  going  to  force  a 
situation  of  starved  industries  in  this  country;  you  are  accumulating 
a  lot  of  war  materials  that  cannot  be  shipped  and  when  that  is 
shown  and  the  industries  are  killed  you  will  find  yourselves  in 
a  storm  of  criticism. 

Judge  Parker:  I  am  willing  to  go  to  the  bat  with  you  right 
now  at  the  elections  if  you  please  as  to  whether  we  will  give  the 
boys  in  khaki  their  supplies  or  give  the  automobile   industries 

theirs.  ^         j   •;  t 

Mr.  Chalmers:  I  am  not  advocating  that  you  dont,  and  if  1 
had  to,  to  win  this  war,  I  would  put  the  automobile  industry  out 
of  business,  if  I  had  to  to  win  the  war;  but  in  the  absence  of 
definite  proof  that  you  are  going  to  use  all  this,  and  ship  all 
this,  that  is  a  dififerent  proposition. 

Mr.  Baruch:  And  you  would  rather  take  the  chance  on  keeping 

the  industry  going?  . 

Mr.  Chalmers:  I  am  telling  you  this,  and  I  think  it  is  my  busmess 
to  tell  you  because  we  are  not  going  to  sit  here  and  bow  our 
heads.  We  are  the  third  largest  industry  in  this  country,  and 
with  all  the  men  we  employ  and  all  the  obligations  we  have  to  our 
parts  people,  all  the  money  we  owe  our  banks,  we  cannot  surrender 
to  this.  I  am  only  here  representing  the  Association.  I  am  not 
trying  to  show  you  our  side  of  it.  Now  if  you  need  all  this  steel  -- 
Mr.  Baruch,  please  don't  misunderstand  me— -if  you  need  this 
steel  we  won't  get  a  pound  of  it  in  the  next  six  months,  but  we 
are  willing  to  take  our  chances  that  the  production  of  steel  will 
be  increased  or  that  there  will  be  a  slight  diminution  in  the  amount 
of  shipments.  If  you  know  what  is  going  through  to  be  shipped, 
then  go  and  talk  to  Mr.  Schwab  as  to  what  the  tonnage  is  going 
to  be.  Gentlemen,  you  have  a  second  thought  coming,  now  that 
is  all  there  is  to  it,  and  in  the  meantime  you  have  killed  industry. 
You  have  got  to  take  into  consideration  men  employed  on  war 
work  who  cannot  be  immediately  transferred  from  automobile 
work  to  war  contracts.    Would  you  let  them  go?^ 

So  great  was  the  demand  for  steel  for  war  purposes  in  the 

*The  War  Industries  Board  had  definite  information  on  all  contracts  that 
were  placed  with  the  automobile  works,  having  sought  to  divert  important 
artillery  contracts  to  them  in  addition  to  their  aircraft  contracts.  It  knew  that 
it  could  utilize  the  important  automobile  works  on  essential  war  work  and  thus 
avoid  any  permanent  injury  to  the  industry.  Subsequent  developments  showed 
its  position  to  be  correct. 


STEEL:  AN  EPIC  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR      343 

remaining  months  of  the  war  that  it  was  demonstrated  that 
the  Board's  plan  was  essentially  far  more  considerate  of 
the  industry  than  the  take-the-chances  plan  advocated  by 
Mr.  Chalmers.  The  final  agreement  was  that  the  makers  of 
passenger  cars  were  to  be  permitted  to  produce  in  the  last 
six  months  of  1918  one  fourth  as  many  cars  as  they  had 
delivered  during  1917,  and  to  that  end  were  to  be  permitted 
to  purchase  materials  and  parts  sufiicient  to  match  up  the 
stocks  on  hand.  The  understanding  was  that  the  industry 
was  to  shift  to  war  construction  entirely  in  the  first  part  of 
1919.  Inasmuch  as  about  half  the  capacity  of  the  industry 
was  already  engaged  on  artillery  cars,  trucks,  tanks,  aero- 
nautical motors,  airplanes,  etc.,  for  war  uses  and  there  were 
many  other  indispensable  products  to  which  it  could  be  con- 
verted, the  outcome  was  far  from  being  the  terrible  fate  that 
had  been  predicted.  Although  the  passenger  automobile 
men  put  up  the  greatest  fight  of  the  war  against  control,  they 
accepted  the  final  agreement  in  good  faith  and  lived  up  to* 
it  without  exception.  There  may  be  little  in  a  name,  but  the 
early  unauthorized  and  unwise  designation  of  the  industry 
as  a  non-essential,  was  undoubtedly  the  chief  cause  of  the 
stubborn  resistance  it  oflFered  to  curtailment  and  conversion. 
To  this  extent,  at  least,  the  Government  was  responsible  for 
the  situation  that  resulted. 

ni 

Appraising  mankind  as  it  is  and  conditions  as  they  were,  the 
writer  unhesitatingly  gives  it  as  his  judgment  that  the  steel 
industry  of  America,  once  it  realized  the  meaning  of  the 
war,  served  the  Nation  as  faithfully  as  the  soldiers  in  the 
ranks.  It  is  true  that  in  many  instances  great  profits  —  too 
great  profits  for  such  a  time  of  national  agony  —  were 
made,  but  rarely  were  they  profiteering  profits,  no  matter 
how  large.  Under  any  scheme  in  which  the  industry 
remained  in  private  hands,  the  Nation  was  bound  to  pay  too 
much  for  a  portion  of  the  product. 

And  there  is  no  reason  to  believe  that  it  would  have  paid 
less  imder  direct  public  management.  There  is  nothing  in 
the  history  of  governmental  administration  of  the  railways 
during  the  war  to  suggest  that  its  steel  would  have  cost  the 


f 

« 


m 


n 


344    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Government  any  less  if  the  industry  had  been  taken  over,  but 
it  was  annexed  as  an  autonomous  state  mstead  ol  by 
arbitrary  incorporation.  It  was  a  fully  controlled  mstru- 
mentality  of  Government  for  results,  but  it  preserved  its  own 
internal  methods.  The  relation  of  the  Government  to  the 
steel  industry,  when  fully  realized,  was  perhaps  the  best 
example  the  war  afforded  of  the  masterly  conception  ot 
industrial  mobilization  and  functioning  by  the  simple  proc- 
ess of  establishing  effectual  contact  between  a  pooled  and 
compactly  united  industry  manned  by  its  own  captains  and 
a  governmental  organism,  expert,  initiative,  resourcelul, 
and  energetic.  It  was  a  model  of  that  highest  and  best  form 
of  efficiency  which  President  Wilson  declared  to  be  the 
spontaneous  cooperation  of  a  free  people. 


CHAPTER  XIX 

THE  STORY  OF  COPPER,  BRASS,  AND  OTHER  NON- 
FERROUS  MUNITIONS  METALS 

The  myriad  needs  for  copper  —  The  copper  producers  fall  into  line  —  Forty-five 
million  pounds  for  the  army  and  navy  —  Further  price  agreements  —  The 
copper  mines  deliver — Brass  for  the  merchant  ships  and  navy  —  Zinc  —  Alu- 
minum at  the  Government's  price  —  Antimony  for  shrapnel  bullets  —  Lead  — 
Nickel  —  Quicksilver. 

Throughout  the  war  of  the  nations  copper  and  its  deriva- 
tives and  products  were  second  only  to  steel  as  a  military 
material.  Brass  cannon  have  long  since  joined  the  bronze 
dagger  in  museums,  but  in  the  rifle  cartridges  and  the  fuses 
and  the  cases  for  artillery  shells  of  projectiles,  copper,  or 
its  alloys,  the  first  metal  recovered  by  mankind,  is  still  a 
lethal  weapon  of  prime  importance. 

But  it  is  the  industrial  implications  of  modern  wars  that 
make  copper  so  important.  As  a  medium  of  communication 
alone,  for  every  ton  of  deadweight,  three  poimds  of  copper 
and  brass  go  into  every  commercial  ship  in  the  shape  of 
tubing,  wire,  and  condensers;  to  say  nothing  of  all  the 
copper  and  brass  for  fittings.  Naval  vessels  likewise 
require  large  quantities  of  the  red  metal.  Almost  every 
engine  of  war  from  the  hand  grenade  to  the  airplane 
requires  copper.  The  military  telephone  and  telegraph 
systems  of  a  communication  behind  the  lines  and  the  field 
telephone  and  telegraph  services  of  the  Signal  Corps  demand 
unbelievable  quantities  of  copper.  It  is  consumed  in  large 
quantities  by  the  machinery  of  production  in  almost  every 
industry  that  is  stimulated  by  the  demands  of  war.  At  the 
pinching  ofi*  of  the  St.  Mihiel  salient,  approximately  five 
thousand  telephones  were  used,  and  more  than  fifty 
thousand  miles  of  field  wire  were  laid  especially  for  that 
engagement. 

In  copper  as  in  steel,  the  war  in  all  its  stages  was  based 
on  American  resources,  and  also  as  with  steel  it  was  the 


i  I 


Mh 


346    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

strength  of  American  copper  that  was  one  of  the  decisive 
factors  in  the  final  act.  In  this  final  phase  the  struggle  was 
one  between  the  mines  of  America  and  the  scrap  of 
Germany.  Almost  without  domestic  copper  resources, 
Germany  had  to  fight  from  stores  laid  in  before  the  war 
and  from  the  metal  garnered  from  house  roofs  and  gutters, 
from  church  bells  and  kitchen  utensils.  As  these  supplies 
failed  and  substitutes  failed  in  efficiency,  the  industrial 
barometer  forecast  the  defeat  of  the  Teutonic  arms  even 
before  it  was  recorded  in  lost  battles. 

Perhaps  with  design,  copper  had  been  lavishly  used  in 
Germany  in  permanent  construction  and  in  durable  utensils 
and  implements  for  many  years,  but  the  roofs  and  kitchens 
even  of  an  empire  are  no  match  for  the  stores  of  nature  in 
Anaconda,  Utah,  Bisbee,  Miami,  and  the  Copper  Range. 
The  German  Hausfrau  might  be  more  docile  and  more 
amenable  to  discipline  than  the  rough  and  independent 
copper  miners,  streaked  with  alienism,  bolshevism,  syndi- 
calism, and  prone  to  strike,  but  the  advantage  was  with  them. 
Producing  two  thirds  of  the  world's  copper,  and  backed  by 
the  refineries  of  the  Atlantic  coast  and  the  copper  workers 
of  Naugatuck  and  other  centers  of  preparation  and  manu- 
facture, the  copper  mines  of  the  North,  the  West,  and  the 
Southwest,  beset  by  labor  troubles,  hobbled  by  the  draft, 
cramped  by  transportation  deficiencies,  and  sometimes 
starved  for  lack  of  fuel,  fed  the  workshops  of  the  Republic 
and  of  the  Allies  with  unfailing  streams  of  the  second  metal 
of  victory. 

The  copper  men  have  the  distinction  of  being  the 
industry  that  sounded  the  industrial  keynote  of  the  war  — 
the  note  of  service  and  of  repudiation  of  profiteering.  With 
the  industrial  compulsion  of  later  war  times  yet  unrealized, 
with  all  their  output  in  eager  demand  by  Allies  and  neutrals, 
and  with  prices  soaring  beyond  the  dreams  of  avarice  to 
three  or  four  times  pre-war  levels,  they  cordially  met  the 
Government's  initial  requirements  at  something  less  than 
half  the  prevailing  prices. 

One  of  the  small  measures  of  preparedness  tolerated  by 
a  great  people  involved  the  purchase  by  the  army  and  navy 
of  45,000,000  pounds  of  copper  somewhat  before  war  was 


THE  STORY  OF  COPPER,  BRASS,  ETC.   347 

declared.  The  negotiations  were  entrusted  to  Mr.  Baruch, 
who  was  then  chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Raw  Materials 
of  the  Advisory  Commission  of  the  Council  of  National 
Defense.  He  in  turn  advised  with  Eugene  Meyer,  Jr.,  who 
was  a  prime  mover  in  the  matter,  and  other  business  men. 
Meyer  suggested  that  a  straight-out  appeal  be  made  to  the 
leading  copper  producers  to  disregard  the  market  and  pro- 
vide the  specified  amount  of  copper  at  an  arbitrarily  low 
price. 

Baruch  and  Meyer  called  on  Daniel  Guggenheim,  of 
Guggenheim  Brothers,  informed  him  of  the  Government's 
need  of  copper  and  appealed  to  him  to  make  a  price  that 
would  dispel  the  thought  that  the  impending  war  was  being 
pushed  on  by  the  greed  of  anticipated  profits  —  a  price  also 
that  would  set  an  example  for  all  future  dealings  between 
the  Government  and  producers  and  tend  to  divest  the  war 
of  that  ignominy  of  blood-sucking  profiteering  from  the 
public  necessity  that  has  produced  its  swarms  of  heartless 
contractors  and  battle-field  ghouls  in  every  war  of  ancient 
or  modern  times.  Mr.  Guggenheim  offered  no  objections  to 
this  appeal  and  merely  asked  for  time  to  consult  with  the 
other  large  producers.  There  were  some  other  conversa- 
tions on  the  subject  and  the  representatives  of  the  Council  of 
National  Defense  made  the  suggestion  that  the  exemplary 
price  be  the  average  price  for  the  ten  years  1907  to  1916. 

On  March  19th,  the  chief  copper  producers,  under  the 
leadership  of  John  D.  Ryan,  united  in  addressing  a  letter 
to  the  Council  of  National  Defense  in  which  they  stated  that 
they  would  deliver  20,000,000  pounds  to  the  navy  and 
25,510,000  pounds  to  the  army  in  approximately  equal 
quantities  each  quarter  from  April,  1917,  to  April,  1918,  at 
the  price  of  16.6739  cents  a  pound  —  that  being  the  actual 
average  selling  price  obtained  by  the  United  Metals  Selling 
Company  during  the  period  named.  "We  ofi'er  the  copper 
at  this  price,"  said  the  latter,  "notwithstanding  our  costs 
for  labor,  materials,  supplies,  etc.,  vary  from  thirty  to 
seventy-five  per  cent  above  the  average  during  the  ten-year 
period,  because  we  believe  it  to  be  our  duty  to  furnish  the 
requirements  of  the  Government  in  preparing  the  Nation 
for  war  with  no  profit  more  than  we  receive  from  our 


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348    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

regular  production  in  normal  times.  It  is  understood  that 
the  price  quoted  above  is  for  the  quantity  and  period  of 
delivery  above  mentioned." 

As  orders  for  copper  went  during  the  war,  this  was  not  a 
large  order  and  the  saving  to  the  Government  —  some 
$3,700,000  —  as  compared  with  the  market  price  was  a 
mere  drop  in  the  flood  of  war  expenditures  that  was  to 
follow,  but  it  was  important  as  furnishing  a  precedent  to 
illustrate  the  principle  that  it  was  hoped  would  govern  all 
business  men  in  their  dealings  with  the  Government.  That 
the  copper  men  themselves  lived  up  to  the  principle  through- 
out the  war  there  can  be  no  question.  It  is  true  that  later 
purchases  were  at  23^  cents  and  even  26  cents  a  pound, 
and  that  at  both  of  the  later  prices  the  low-cost  producers 
made  handsome  profits,  but  here,  as  in  steel  and  in  other 
things,  it  was  considered  that  a  cost-plus  price,  which  meant 
a  diff'erent  price  for  each  producer,  was  not  practicable 
nor  stimulative  of  maximum  production. 

As  it  was  estimated  that  war  uses  would  require  about 
ninety  per  cent  of  the  total  production,  it  was  evident  that 
the  stimulation  of  production  was  even  more  important  than 
regulation  of  prices.  Of  course,  the  war  and  excess  profits 
taxes  came  in  as  a  sort  of  rebate  to  the  Government,  and 
there  was  the  recurrent  argument  that  prices  did  not  make 
much  diff'erence,  anyway,  as  the  higher  the  price  scale  the 
more  the  Government's  revenues.  As  has  been  noted  else- 
where, the  Raw  Materials  Committee  and  the  War  Industries 
Board  never  surrendered  to  this  fallacy,  but  always  strove 
for  the  minimum  price  that  would  stimulate  an  industry  as  a 
whole,  falling  back  on  the  excess  profits  tax  merely  as  a  rough 
corrective  of  an  unavoidable  evil.  Stability  of  commerce  and 
industry  was  one  of  the  essentials  of  maximum  production, 
for  more  reasons  than  one.  With  erratic  and  ever  mounting 
prices  there  would  follow  a  train  of  labor  disputes,  runaway 
costs  of  living,  protective  as  well  as  profiteering  profits,  a 
huge  expansion  of  war  costs  and  debts,  increased  difficulties 
of  public  financing,  and  then  —  after  the  war  —  the  deluge. 

The  price  of  16.6739  cents,  voluntarily  named  by  the 
large  copper  producers  for  the  45,000,000  pounds,  was  in 
no  sense  a  fixed  price.     It  was  more  in  the  nature  of  a 


THE  STORY  OF  COPPER,  BRASS,  ETC.      349 

dramatic  gesture  and  an  expression  of  attitude.     When  the 
army  came  into  the  market  again  in  June  for  60,000,000 
pounds  of  copper,  the  market  price  was  32.57.     There  was 
no  intention  of  paying  that  price,  but  at  the  same  time  there 
was  no  expectation  that  the  producers  would  match  their 
March    19th    concession.     The    45,000,000    pounds    were 
turned  over  to  the  Government  without  incidental  reflection 
in  the  wage  scale  of  the  miners,  which  was  based  on  15-cent 
copper  with  a  bonus  of  25  cents  a  day  for  each  2-cent 
advance  in  the  price  of  copper.     It  was  evident  that  with  the 
Government  taking  virtually  all  the  copper  for  itself  and 
Allies,  the  Government  price  would  be  the  market  price. 
In  June,  1917,  the  miners  were  receiving  bonuses  on  a 
price  of  27  cents,  and  to  have  accepted  as  a  permanent  price 
the    gift-price    of    March    would    have    meant    roughly    a 
reduction  of  a  dollar  a  day  in  the  wages  of  the  men  in  the 
Arizona    mines.     Notwithstanding    the    scale,    the    miners 
threatened  to  strike  if  the  price  were  reduced  and  in  some 
instances  did  strike.     In  the  absence  of  an  agreed  price,  the 
producers  continued  to  deliver  copper  to  the  Government 
without  payment,  it  being  understood  that  after  the  Federal 
Trade  Commission  had   investigated  copper  mining   costs 
there  would  be  an  adjustment. 

Soon  after  the  60,000,000-pound  army  order,  the  Sec- 
retary of  the  Navy  announced  that  on  further  orders  for  the 
navy  he  would  pay  down  75  per  cent  of  25  cents,  leaving  the 
other  25  per  cent  as  a  margin  for  adjustment.  This 
announcement  had  a  disturbing  efi'ect  on  the  Arizona  miners, 
and  there  was  much  fear  that  production  would  be  curtailed, 
as  it  was  felt  in  some  quarters  that  18.75  cents  was  the  price 
the  Government  had  decided  to  maintain. 

The  War  Industries  Board  was  convinced  that  such  a 
price  meant  curtailment  of  production,  and,  through  its 
efi"orts,  it  was  finally  agreed  that  the  cash  payment  on 
Government  orders  would  be  22.5,  leaving  2.5  cents  leeway 
for  adjustment.  Then  France  and  England,  which  had 
purchased  660,000,000  pounds  of  copper  in  the  United 
States  during  1916  at  as  high  as  27  cents  a  pound,  came 
into  the  market  for  77,000,000  pounds,  but  instead  of  acting 
independently  and  competitively  they  called  on  the  War 
Industries  Board  to  deal  for  them. 


'^■'H 


350    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

The  Board  met  the  producers  in  conference  on  August 
7th  and  offered  them  20  cents  a  pound  for  the  first 
60,000,000  pounds  of  the  copper  required  by  the  Allies,  it 
being  understood  that  this  price  should  not  be  a  precedent, 
but  Siat  the  final  price  might  be  higher  or  lower,  as  should 
be  determined  later.  The  Board  decided  at  the  same  time 
to  commandeer  the  copper  in  question  if  the  producers 
should  not  acquiesce.  Nevertheless,  when  the  Board  and  the 
producers  met  again,  the  latter  were  so  determined  in  their 
opposition  to  the  price  of  20  cents,  and  supported  their 
position  so  well,  that  the  conviction  of  the  Board  as  to  the 
reasonableness  of  the  price  was  weakened.  The  Board  then 
suggested  a  tentative  price  of  22.5  cents  subject  to  later 
revision.  This  was  not  satisfactory,  either,  to  the  producers, 
as  they  were  opposed  to  the  whole  principle  of  tentative 

prices. 

Finally  on  August  16th  the  copper  producers  agreed  to 
deliver  the  77,000,000  pounds  without  price  or  payment 
on  account  until  a  final  price  had  been  established.  A 
little  while  thereafter  the  Federal  Trade  Commission  made 
its  report,  and  after  studying  it  the  Board  decided  to  fix  a 
price  of  22  cents  a  pound.  Once  more  the  copper  producers 
were  called  in,  for  the  Board  was  loath  to  incur  their  dis- 
pleasure and  eager  to  secure  their  cordial  cooperation. 
There  was  no  optimism  about  obtaining  maximum  pro- 
duction by  commandeering  production,  or  the  mines, 
smelters,  and  refiners. 

At  this  meeting  the  Board  stood  for  a  price  of  22  cents 
for  refined  electrolytic  copper  for  the  Government,  the 
Allies,  and  the  public  —  for  a  limited  period  —  with  the 
proviso  that  wages  were  to  stay  on  the  27-cent  level,  not- 
withstanding the  sliding-scale  agreement.  The  producers 
objected  vehemently,  both  orally  and  by  written  memorandum 
submitted  later.  They  implored  the  Board  to  make  the 
price  25  cents,  and  John  D.  Ryan,  president  of  the  Anaconda 
Copper  Company,  speaking  for  the  producers,  said  that  at 
that  price  the  producers  would  engage  to  pool  and  deliver 
not  only  the  entire  production  of  die  United  States,  but 
virtually  all  the  copper  of  the  world.  The  producers  said 
that  at  22  cents  there  was  no  hope  of  controlling  by  voluntary 


THE  STORY  OF  COPPER,  BRASS,  ETC.      351 

cooperation  the  output  of  the  smaller,  high-cost  producers; 
that  labor  troubles  would  result  if  the  sliding  scale  was 
tampered  with.  The  larger  producers  were  frank  enough 
to  say  that  the  difficulty  as  to  price  was  not  with  them,  but 
that,  since  cooperation  of  the  whole  industry  was  essential, 
it  was  incumbent  upon  them  to  stand  for  a  flat  price  that 
would  make  such  cooperation  feasible.  They  dwelt  on  the 
almost  insurmountable  difficulties  of  eff'ectively  com- 
mandeering the  numerous  small,  high-cost  mines,  and  made 
the  following  suggestion: 

While  some  of  the  low-cost  producers  will  show  a  large  profit 
at  twenty  five  cents,  some  of  the  largest  and  practically  all  of 
the  small  producers  cannot  show  more  than  the  usual  peace-time 
profit  at  that  price,  and  if  depletion  of  mines  is  considered,  their 
profit  would  probably  Be  less  than  in  normal  times  at  average 
prices.  We  believe  that  it  would  be  in  the  interest  of  the  Govern- 
ment to  pay  twenty-five  cents  per  pound  and  take  all  of  the 
production  of  all  the  mines  of  the  country  at  that  price,  retaining 
all  of  the  copper  which  is  needed  for  this  Government  and  for 
its  Allies,  and  selling  the  balance  at  the  same  price,  or  approxi- 
mately the  same  price,  to  the  public. 

Finally,  on  September  14th,  the  larger  copper  producers 
met  in  New  York  and  with  only  one  dissenting  vote  agreed 
to  make  the  Board  a  compromise  price  of  231/2  cents.  At 
that  price,  John  D.  Ryan,  chairman  of  the  Copper  Coopera- 
tive Committee,  wrote  the  Board,  "We  would  still  be  able  to 
get  the  practical  result  that  we  are  aiming  for,  that  is,  pretty 
nearly  maximum  production;  therefore,  I  would  say  that  if 
your  committee  would  agree  to  231/^  cents,  we  can  pledge 
the  copper  industry  almost  as  a  whole  to  use  every  possible 
means  to  secure  a  maximum  production  and  to  maintain  the 
present  scale  of  wages,  and  I  am  satisfied  we  can  succeed.'* 

This  proposition  was  accepted  by  the  Board  and  approved 
by  the  President,  it  being  specified  that  the  agreed  price 
should  prevail  for  only  four  months.  During  that  period 
consumers  and  producers  were  invited  to  present  objections 
to  the  new  price.  Many  of  the  latter  did  so,  but  no  con- 
sumer objected.  Besides  maintaining  wages  as  they  were, 
it  was  agreed  that  the  negotiated  price  should  prevail  for 
the  Government,  for  the  Allies,  and  for  the  public,  and  that 


352    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


THE  STORY  OF  COPPER,  BRASS,  ETC.      353 


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the  producers  should  loyally  exert  themselves  to  maximum 
production  and  keep  the  metal  out  of  the  hands  of  specu- 
lators. So  many  complaints  of  the  agreed  price  were 
received  from  the  small  producers  and  the  need  of  copper 
was  so  great  that  in  the  summer  of  1918  the  price  was 
advanced  to  26  cents. 

Under  the  cooperative  agreement  the  committee  of  the 
producers  became  the  sole  medium  of  commercial  relation- 
ship between  the  Government  and  the  producers.  No  cop- 
per was  sold  except  on  the  approval  of  the  committee,  and 
private  consumers  were  restricted  to  the  smallest  possible 
current  demand,  no  stores  being  permitted.  The  two  lead- 
ing copper  selling  organizations  took  over  the  details  under 
the  direction  of  the  committee,  which  followed  the  wishes 
of  the  War  Industries  Board.  United  States  Government 
orders  were  attended  to  by  the  United  Metals  Selling  Com- 
pany, while  the  American  Smelting  and  Refining  Company 
looked  after  the  requirements  of  the  Allies. 

On  the  part  of  the  War  Industries  Board  the  administra- 
tive contact  with  the  copper  industry  was  through  the  Non- 
Ferrous  Metals  Section,  which  was  organized  in  October, 
1917,  with  Eugene  Meyer,  Jr.,  as  chief,  assisted  by  0.  F. 
Weber,  H.  B.  Moulton,  and  E.  N.  Feidman,  and,  later,  by 
Pope  Yeatman.  When  in  March,  1918,  Mr.  Meyer  became 
a  director  of  the  War  Finance  Corporation,  Mr.  Yeatman 
became  section  chief.  Some  months  later  the  section  was 
designated  as  a  division  with  Mr.  Yeatman  at  its  head,  his 
staff  including  E.  Coppe  Thurston,  Erwin  H.  Cornell  in 
charge  of  lead,  George  T.  Stone  in  charge  of  zinc,  assisted 
by  Andrew  Waltz,  and  Lieutenant  H.  R.  Aldrich,  statistician. 

Although  Government  requirements  were  put  as  high  as 
ninety-three  per  cent  of  the  supply,  there  was  never  any  real 
shortage  of  copper  during  the  war,  despite  the  fact  that  the 
refinery  output  was  less  in  1918  than  in  1917.  The  mines 
and  the  smelters,  on  the  whole,  increased  production  in  1918, 
as  compared  with  1917,  although  they  labored  imder  many 
difficulties,  such  as  the  military  draft  and  the  labor  com- 
petition of  the  mushroom  war  industries. 

Transportation  and  fuel  were  rarely  problems  for  the 
mines  and  smelters,  which  are  mostly  in  the  West  and, 


therefore,  outside  the  congested  region;  but  it  was  otherwise 
with  the  refineries  located,  largely,  on  the  Atlantic  coast  in 
the  midst  of  the  congested  region  and  fed  with  "blister" 
from  the  smelters  by  a  long  haul.  In  addition  to  new  copper 
there  was  an  increase  of  one  hundred  per  cent  in  1918  in  the 
recovery  of  secondary  copper  from  furnace  ashes  and 
cinders,  waste  and  scrap.  Even  in  1917,  when  there  were 
disastrous  strikes  in  Montana  and  Arizona,  the  mines  and 
smelters  put  out  more  copper  than  in  1916,  the  production 
in  that  year  being  2,428,000,000  pounds,  or  fifty-one  per 
cent  more  than  in  1913.  Truly,  the  copper  armies  did 
their  part  in  a  war  that  was  so  largely  decided  in  the 
industrial  home  sector. 

But  copper  is  only  a  raw  material,  and  after  the  mines, 
smelters,  and  refineries  had  done  their  work,  there  remained 
the  problems  of  direction  and  control  of  manufactured  prod- 
ucts in  the  form  of  pure  copper  and  the  alloys;  brass, 
cupro-nickel,  German  silver,  and  white  metal.  To  deal 
with  this  stage  of  the  industry,  the  War  Industries  Board 
established  a  brass  section  in  April,  1918,  Everett  Morss 
being  chief.  This  section  concerned  itself  with  brass  and 
copper  products  in  the  form  of  rods,  rolled  sheet,  and  strips; 
tubes  (brazed,  welded,  and  seamed),  wire,  and  all  other  non- 
ferrous  alloys. 

The  greatest  task  before  the  section  was  that  of  meeting 
the  demands  of  the  Emergency  Fleet  Corporation  and  the 
navy  for  tubing.  The  known  navy  requirements  for  special 
tubing  were  1,355,000  pounds  and  500,000  pounds  of 
incidental  tubing.  Moreover,  it  was  estimated  that  2,000,- 
000  pounds  more  would  be  required  for  condenser  tubes. 
These  were  considered  the  minimum,  but  in  addition  there 
were  large  numbers  of  naval  ships  building  in  private  yards, 
the  requirements  for  which  were  not  known,  though  it  was 
ascertained  that  every  destroyer  would  need  59,694  pounds 
of  brass  and  copper  tube.  The  average  merchant  ship  built 
by  the  Fleet  Corporation  required  24,000  pounds.  This 
meant  that  in  1919  the  emergency  fleet  would  have  consumed 
45,000,000  pounds  of  tubing,  or  one  third  of  the  total  pro- 
duction. A  cooperative  committee  of  tube  manufacturers 
with  Mr.  John  P.  Elton,  vice-president  of  the  American 


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354    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Brass  Company,  as  chairman,  was  formed  and  the  whole 
field  of  stimulating  production,  increasing  facilities, 
standardization,  conversion,  and  conservation  was  thoroughly 
covered. 

Toward  the  end  of  the  war  a  very  serious  situation 
developed  in  brass  products.  At  the  end  of  August,  the 
army,  the  navy,  and  the  Allies  were  calling  for  1,140,000 
pounds  of  rod,  3,220,000  pounds  of  disks  and  sheets,  and 
325,000  pounds  of  cupro,  and  the  production  was  alarm- 
ingly less,  although  the  nominal  capacity  was  about  the 
same. 

In  August  the  mills  were  short  9600  men,  and  the 
influenza  epidemic  reduced  the  number  of  men  in  the  Con- 
necticut region  to  fifty  per  cent  of  normal.  At  the  same 
time  the  requirements  for  brass  rods  and  disks,  used  in 
cartridge-case  manufacture,  from  the  French  and  Italian 
armies  as  well  as  from  our  own  Ordnance  Department,  sud- 
denly exceeded  all  estimates.  It  was  then  necessary  to  put 
the  industry  under  strict  control,  and  at  that  no  source  of 
supply  could  be  found  for  sixty  per  cent  of  the  demand. 
The  continuance  of  such  a  condition  meant  that  in  a  pro- 
longed war  the  infantry  would  be  without  cartridges  and 
the  artillery  without  cases.  The  army  was  called  upon  to 
furlough  men  drafted  from  the  copper-working  industries, 
new  plants  were  projected  far  removed  from  the  center  of 
the  industry,  in  the  Naugatuck  Valley  of  Connecticut,  and 
every  possible  shift  was  made.  Fortunately  the  end  of  the 
war  came  before  the  effects  of  lagging  production  became 
acute.  In  wire,  too,  the  situation  was  becoming  critical, 
following  the  call  of  the  Signal  Corps  in  September  for 
1,500,000  pounds  of  wire  for  field  telephones. 

It  has  since  developed  that  in  this  as  in  many  other  fields 
of  war  supplies  the  calculated  requirements  were  greater 
than  the  actual  needs;  and  while  this  belated  knowledge  is 
comforting  in  speculating  on  what  might  have  happened  had 
the  war  continued,  it  does  not  in  any  way  modify  the  gravity 
of  the  tasks  that  were  assigned  to  the  brass  section  and  to  the 
copper  and  brass  working  industries. 

Zinc  figures  as  a  war  material,  chiefly  through  its  use 
in  union  with  copper  in  the  making  of  brass  and  allied 


\ 

THE  STORY  OF  COPPER,  BRASS,  ETC.      355 

alloys  and  for  galvanizing  steel.  In  its  crude  form  — 
spelter  —  there  was  never  any  shortage  of  it  during  the  war 
for  military  purposes,  though  there  was  a  considerable 
diversion  of  this  metal  from  certain  peace-time  uses  and  it 
was  important  as  a  substitute  for  steel  in  some  uses.  The 
United  States  produces  thirty-one  per  cent  of  the  zinc  of  the 
world,  and  there  was  no  problem  of  importations  to  deal 
with.  Neither  was  price  a  vexatious  matter,  as  it  was  with 
many  other  metals. 

The  main  problem  of  zinc  regulation  was  to  secure  a 
sufficient  quantity  of  the  higher  grades,  demanded  by  the 
army  and  the  navy  in  the  manufacture  of  small-arm 
ammunition  shells.  This  was  solved  by  putting  a  stimu- 
lative maximum  price  of  twelve  cents  a  pound  on  Grade  A 
spelter.  It  was  not  felt  that  there  was  any  need  of  a  mini- 
mum price  in  order  to  stimulate  production.  The  zinc 
industry  was  not  highly  organized.  Although  there  was  at 
one  time  a  zinc  committee  in  the  Raw  Materials  Division  of 
the  Advisory  Commission  of  the  Council  of  National 
Defense,  it  was  dissolved  when  the  market  price  of  zinc 
fell  below  the  level  of  prices  it  was  intended  to  secure  by 
agreement. 

Throughout  the  war  Government  purchases  were  made 
directly  by  negotiation  or  by  competitive  bids.  After  the 
maximum  base  price  for  sheet  and  lead  had  been 
established,  the  mines  of  the  Joplin  field,  which  could  not 
continue  at  the  prices  they  had  been  receiving,  proposed  to 
the  zinc  rolling  mills  that  the  latter  should  increase  their 
price  from  about  $50  to  about  $75  a  ton  based  on  sixty  per 
cent  zinc  concentrates  and  a  certain  maximum  of  lead  con- 
tent, and  distribute  their  requirements  proportionately 
among  all  the  mines.  This  proposal  was  favorably  received 
and  the  mine  owners  formed  an  association,  a  committee  of 
which  was  authorized  by  the  Non-Ferrous  Metals  Section  to 
receive  the  pooled  requirements  of  the  rolling  mills  and 
allocate  them  among  the  mines.  The  American  Zinc  Insti- 
tute was  formed  in  July,  1918,  for  the  purpose  of  promoting 
the  interests  of  the  whole  industry,  but  it  was  not  a  war 
service  organization. 

The  sole  producer  of  aluminum  metal  in  the  United  State« 


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356    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

and  Canada  is  the  Aluminum  Company  of  America;  con- 
sequently Arthur  Davis,  the  president  of  that  company, 
could  speak  and  act  for  the  whole  industry  in  dealing  with 
the  War  Industries  Board.  He  virtually  placed  the  industry 
at  the  disposition  of  the  Government  and  acted  at  all  times 
on  the  highest  plane  of  service  and  patriotism.  On  April 
25,  1917,  he  offered  to  the  Government,  through  Mr.  Baruch, 
all  the  aluminum  it  might  require  at  that  time  at  its  own 
price,  despite  the  fact  that  the  outside  price  was  60  cents. 
Two  million  pounds  were  immediately  accepted  at  271/2 
cents,  and  later  six  million  pounds  were  added,  delivery  to 
be  made  before  August.  In  September,  Mr.  Davis  agreed 
with  the  War  Industries  Board  through  Mr.  Meyer  to  fill  all 
war  industry  requirements,  direct  or  indirect,  at  the  current 
38-cent  base  price  and  to  refund  the  diflference  should  the 
Government  later  name  a  lower  price.  Owing  to  the  short- 
age that  began  to  develop  at  a  later  period,  the  Federal 
Trade  Commission  was  asked  to  investigate  the  costs  of 
aluminum  manufacture.  With  the  Commission's  report 
before  it,  the  Price-Fixing  Committee  in  agreement  with  the 
Aluminum  Company  fixed  the  base  price  at  32  cents  for 
aluminum  ingots  in  fifty-ton  lots,  f .o.b.  the  producing  plants. 
This  price  prevailed  until  June  1,  1918,  when  it  was  raised 
one  cent,  and  the  price  remained  at  33  cents  until  it  expired 
by  agreement  March  1,  1919. 

There  is  a  considerable  quantity  of  aluminum  brought  to 
the  market  each  year  through  the  resmelting  of  scrap 
aluminum,  but  no  particular  difficulty  was  encountered  in 
dealing  with  this  secondary  product. 

With  the  United  States  in  the  war,  the  demand  for 
aluminum  for  military  purposes  rose  to  ninety  per  cent  of 
the  production,  and  control  of  distribution  was  necessary. 
This  was  eflfected  by  the  application  of  priority  principles, 
the  Aluminum  Company  being  allowed  considerable  latitude 
of  judgment  in  determining  the  relative  priority  of  the 
orders,  which  consumers  were  authorized  to  place  with  it 
directly.  When  the  Company  was  doubtful  of  the  validity 
of  its  own  judgment  in  this  matter,  it  referred  the  ques- 
tion to  the  Non-Ferrous  Metals  Section.  Secondary 
or  resmelted  aluminum  was  also  purchased  by  consumers 


THE  STORY  OF  COPPER,  BRASS,  ETC.      357 

directly  from  the  smelters,  but  only  on  the  approval  of  prior- 
ity applications  by  the  section. 

In  the  first  part  of  the  war  the  European  demand  for 
aluminum  was  chiefly  for  use  in  the  form  of  dust  to  make 
an  explosive  in  combination  with  ammonium  nitrate.  Other 
military  uses  of  aluminum  were  found  in  the  manufacture 
of  mess,  personal,  and  horse  equipment,  drop  bombs,  fuses, 
flares,  fillers,  hand  grenades,  heavy  ammunition,  rifle  cart- 
ridges, and  for  airplanes,  aeronautical  engines,  castings, 
and  all  kinds  of  engines.  In  normal  times  the  chief 
industries  using  aluminum  are  the  automotive  industry, 
which  consumes  15,500  tons;  the  steel  industry,  which  uses 
5000  tons  as  a  deoxidizing  agent;  and  the  manufacture  of 
utensils,  which  takes  12,000  tons. 

During  1918  the  production  of  primary  aluminum  in  the 
United  States  fell  from  the  100,000  tons  of  1917  to  67,000 
tons,  because  of  a  shortage  of  water  power  during  the 
winter,  and  the  situation  became  somewhat  delicate.  The 
Aluminum  Company  undertook  to  enlarge  its  capacity, 
but  this  was  not  accomplished  before  the  end  of  the  war. 

The  control  of  aluminum  was  the  perfect  model  of  the 
War  Industries  Board's  principle  of  concentration,  because, 
outside  of  the  secondary  metal  producers,  the  industry  was 
in  the  hands  of  a  single  well-intentioned  man,  and  did  not 
necessitate  even  the  friction  that  arises  in  a  small  committee. 
Even  when  it  developed  that  the  French  importers  were 
making  a  profit  on  aluminum  obtained  through  the  War 
Industries  Board  at  the  Government  price,  Mr.  Davis, 
though  protesting  and  asking  for  a  rectification  of  this 
injustice,  was  never  obstructive. 

Antimony  is  a  metal  that  is  produced  within  the  United 
States  only  in  negligible  quantities.  The  bulk  of  American 
requirements  are  supplied  by  China.  There  are  large 
deposits  of  antimonial  ores  in  France  —  so  the  United  States 
had  only  its  own  ordinary  and  military  requirements  to  deal 
with.  Nevertheless,  the  long  trans-Pacific  voyage  gave  rise 
to  some  concern  regarding  supplies,  and  at  times  there  was 
a  little  touch  of  panic  and  a  tendency  to  take  what  was 
ofi'ered  at  any  price.  In  the  peaceful  industries,  antimony 
is  used  in  such  alloys  as  Britannia  metal,  pewter,  Babbitt 


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358    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

and  other  bearing  metals,  type  metal  and  antimonial  lead. 
Its  oxide  and  sulphide  are  used  in  pigments,  glassware, 
metal  ware  enamel,  vulcanized  rubber,  and  some  other 
products.  The  chief  military  use  of  antimony  during  the 
recent  war  was  for  hardening  the  lead  of  shrapnel  bulletSi^ 
About  seventy  per  cent  of  the  available  supply  was  needed 
for  this  purpose. 

In  the  spring  of  1917  there  were  only  200  tons  of 
antimony  in  the  bonded  warehouses,  and  when  it  got  abroad 
that  the  ordnance  people  wanted  3000  tons  for  immediate 
delivery,  the  price  jumped  from  around  14  cents  to  191/0 
and  20  cents  a  pound.  Mr.  Meyer  then  took  up  the  matter 
and  found  that  3000  tons  could  not  be  used  for  a  long  time. 
He  accordingly  arranged  for  buying  in  one-hundred-ton  lots, 
with  the  result  that  the  price  gradually  settled  back  to  where 
it  had  been. 

By  the  end  of  1917  the  stocks  in  bonded  warehouses  were 
5201  tons.  In  these  circumstances,  little  or  no  control  was 
required  —  only  prudence  in  buying.  In  fact,  there  was 
no  control,  except  that  the  War  Trade  Board  put  an  embargo 
on  exports.  Needed  supplies  of  the  metal  were  bought 
from  time  to  time  on  bids  requested  by  the  Non-Ferrous 
Metals  Section  at  the  instance  of  the  Ordnance  Department. 
The  total  requirements  of  the  army,  navy  and  Emergency 
Fleet  Corporation  averaged  about  750  tons  a  month,  and 
during  1918  the  prices  varied  from  11.09  to  14  cents  a 
pound. 

The  only  manipulation  of  importance  in  insuring  an 
adequate  supply  of  antimony  was  an  arrangement  made 
through  the  Treasury  Department  with  the  Wah  Chang 
Company,  importers  from  China,  to  let  it  have  a  certain 
amount  of  silver.  There  was  an  embargo  on  the  export 
of  silver  from  this  country  to  China,  which  made  antimony 
trading  and  exporting  difficult.  In  this  way  the  Government 
obtained  a  sort  of  grasp  on  exports  of  antimony  from  China, 
which  made  extortion  impossible.  As  a  precautionary 
measure  some  effort  was  made  to  stimulate  the  domestic 
production  of  antimony,  and  it  was  included  in  the  War 
Minerals  Act  of  Congress.^ 

*See  Chapter  XX. 


THE  STORY  OF  COPPER,  BRASS,  ETC.      359 

Lead  was  another  of  the  sinews  of  war  in  which  no  real 
shortage  ever  developed,  though  Government  dealings  with 
the  lead  producers  are  a  good  example  of  the  manner  in 
which  the  War  Industries  Board  prevented  the  artificial 
manipulation  of  prices  when  the  relations  of  supply  and 
demand  were  not  normally  productive  of  high  prices.  The 
Board  never  used  a  sledgehammer  to  kill  a  gnat;  its  weapons 
of  priority,  formal  price-fixing,  and  commandeering  never 
being  used  or  even  exhibited  except  where  shortages  due  to 
emergency  demands  put  the  Government  in  the  position  of 
being  the  booster  of  the  prices  of  its  requirements.  In 
general,  the  lead  industry  was  simply  informed  that  no 
manipulation  would  be  tolerated. 

In  line  with  his  policy  of  securing  initial  raw  material 
prices  that  would  set  an  example  and  determine  the  later 
state  of  mind  of  the  trade,  Mr.  Baruch,  when  dealing  in  the 
first  days  of  the  war  with  all  raw  materials  personally,  with 
only  the  aid  of  two  or  three  executive  assistants,  obtained, 
through  his  Advisory  Commission  lead  producers'  com- 
mittee, a  price  of  8  cents  a  pound  for  Government  orders 
aggregating  83,000  tons.  At  that  time  the  New  York  price 
was  about  11  cents  a  pound,  as  against  6.8  cents  in  the  pre- 
ceding September.  In  this  manner  a  tendency  toward  a 
runaway  price  was  definitely  checked.  When  the  appointed 
lead  producers'  committee  resigned  in  November,  1917, 
after  the  War  Industries  Board  had  decided  on  a  sharp  line 
of  demarcation  between  trade  committees  and  authorized 
representatives  of  the  Council  of  National  Defense,  there 
was  one  directly  negotiated  purchase  of  lead,  amounting  to 
5000  tons,  at  5.425  cents  a  pound,  St.  Louis.  However, 
it  should  be  added  that  when  the  market  price  fell  below 
8  cents  in  October,  the  producers  made  good  their  early 
cooperative  intention  by  voluntarily  supplying  the  remainder 
of  the  83,000-ton  commitment  at  the  market  price. 

With  the  exception  of  the  5000  tons  noted,  all  purchases 
after  the  original  undertaking  were  made  at  the  St.  Louis 
market  price,  as  recorded  by  the  "Engineering  and  Mining 
Journal."  Whenever  a  tendency  developed  unduly  to 
control  the  market,  the  producers  were  mildly  reminded  that, 
while  the  Government  had  no  desire  to  control  this  industry. 


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360    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

it  was  incumbent  upon  them  to  maintain  a  price  that  would 
be  fair  to  the  Government  and  just  high  enough  to  bring  out 
the  needed  volume  of  production.  As  a  result  the  Price-Fixing 
Committee  never  had  to  interfere,  and  the  price  did  not  rise 
above  7.75  cents. 

There  were  signs  of  a  shortage  in  August,  1918,  due  to 
labor  troubles,  hot  weather,  and  the  Government  programme 
of  building  up  a  reserve  to  guard  against  transportation 
deficiencies.  On  investigation  it  was  found  that  there  was 
nothing  alarming  in  the  situation  and  that  some  of  the  pro- 
ducers had  excessively  large  stocks.  Still,  it  was  considered 
the  part  of  discretion  to  limit  stocks  to  thirty-days  require- 
ments and  arrange  with  the  Lead  Producers'  War  Service 
Committee  (organized  in  June,  1918,  with  Clinton  H.  Crane 
as  chairman)  to  distribute  supplies  under  the  supervision  of 
the  Non-Ferrous  Section. 

Owing  to  the  particular  shortage  of  sheet  lead,  J.  R. 
Wettstein  was  appointed  to  pass  on  the  relative  importance 
of  manufacturers'  orders.  An  embargo  was  placed  on  the 
exportation  of  domestic  lead,  and  the  allocation  of  importa- 
tions was  also  turned  over  to  the  committee.  No  applica- 
tions for  priority  were  required,  though  there  was  some 
conservation  with  the  assistance  of  the  Conservation  Division. 
Lead  for  birdshot  was  curtailed,  and  tobacco  manufacturers 
were  restricted  to  25,000  tons  per  annum  for  leadf oil  which 
they  had  begun  to  use  as  a  substitute  for  tinfoil.  The  use 
of  lead  in  building  was  reduced  somewhat,  and  zinc  was 
substituted  for  lead  in  coffin  linings  and  in  the  making  of 
pigments.  During  the  interval  between  the  resignation  of 
the  original  Council  committee  and  the  appointment  of  a 
war  service  committee  by  the  industry,  Irwin  H.  Cornell, 
acting  for  the  producers,  allocated  requirements  under  the 
supervision  of  the  section. 

The  handling  of  lead  prices  and  production  throughout 
the  war  is  an  admirable  illustration  of  how  an  industry,  in 
the  hands  of  a  comparatively  few  proprietors  and  managers, 
can  be  administered  without  profiteering  and  without  direct 
control  when  animated  by  a  spirit  of  fair-dealing,  and 
dealt  with  on  the  part  of  Government  by  business  men  devoid 
of  the  persecuting  motive  on  the  one  hand  or  of  the 
promptings  of  selfishness  on  the  other. 


THE  STORY  OF  COPPER,  BRASS,  ETC.      361 

Nickel,  like  aluminum,  is  a  monopolized  metal,  so  far  as 
American  production  is  concerned.  The  International 
Nickel  Company,  a  United  States  corporation,  produces  all 
of  the  nickel  made  in  the  United  States,  but  the  ore  or  the 
matte  comes  almost  entirely  from  Canada,  that  country  and 
New  Caledonia,  a  French  island  in  the  South  Pacific,  having 
about  the  only  important  nickel  deposits  in  the  world.  A 
little  nickel  originates  in  the  United  States  as  a  by-product 
of  the  electrolytic  refining  of  copper.  As  nickel  is  a 
monopoly  and  the  holder  of  the  monopoly  was  disposed  to 
fair  dealing,  no  formal  control  was  required,  and  only  such 
regulation  of  distribution  as  would  insure  the  war  needs  of 
the  Government  and  of  the  Allies. 

The  qualities  of  nickel  which  make  it  important  in  industry 
are  its  resistance  to  corrosion  and  its  contribution  of  tensile 
strength  to  steel  with  which  it  is  alloyed.  Nickel  steel  is 
used  in  rails,  armor  plate,  bridge  steel,  castings,  ordnance 
of  all  sorts,  engine  forgings  and  shafting  (especially  in 
automobiles  and  railroad  cars).  Monel  metal  is  a  nickel- 
copper-iron-cobalt  alloy  made  directly  from  nickel  ore 
which  is  largely  used  in  warships.  The  total  supply  of 
nickel  was  not  much  more  than  war  requirements.  After 
our  entry  into  the  war,  stocks  were  always  at  a  low  ebb, 
falling  to  only  267  tons  in  July,  1918.  However,  the  only 
serious  shortage  was  that  of  electrolytic  nickel,  used  for 
rotating  and  driving-bands  for  shells  and  for  bullet  jackets, 
in  the  spring  of  1918.  This  situation  was  met  by  using  a 
percentage  of  shot  nickel  with  the  electrolytic. 

Conservation  was  effected  by  restricting  the  unnecessary 
uses  of  nickel  and  even  by  refusing  its  exportation  to  foreign 
governments  for  coinage  purposes.  Prices  were  never  con- 
trolled, the  Price-Fixing  Committee  merely  entering  into  an 
agreement  with  the  Nickel  Company  which  confirmed  the 
price  the  Company  had  been  making.  Since  1910,  the  ingot 
price  fixed  by  the  Company  had  ranged  from  30  to  40  cents, 
the  latter  being  the  1917  price.  The  Company  offered  to 
supply  American  and  Allied  requirements  at  35  cents  a 
pound  for  ingot  nickel,  38  cents  for  shot  nickel,  and  40  cents 
for  electrolytic,  and  this  offer  was  accepted.  Corresponding 
prices  were  made  for  monel  metal  for  the  navy.     No  price 


II 


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362    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

for  the  public  was  made,  as  Government  requirements,  direct 
or  indirect,  about  filled  the  market.  The  consumers  on 
Government  account  made  their  purchases  directly  from  the 
Company  without  priority  applications,  except  in  a  few 
instances;  the  Company  controlling  distribution  according 
to  the  wishes  of  the  section,  and  determining  priority  of 
delivery  according  to  its  own  judgment. 

Quicksilver  is  a  metal  of  limited  production  and  cor- 
responding demand  in  ordinary  times.  The  extraordinary 
demands  of  war  increased  American  consumption  about  fifty 
per  cent,  the  increase  being  met  almost  wholly  by  increased 
domestic  production,  the  imports  remaining  about  the  same 
as  before  the  war.  The  problem  of  obtaining  an  adequate 
domestic  supply  was  almost  wholly  one  of  price,  as  many 
mines  are  shut  down  at  low  prices;  the  number  in  operation 
varying  from  twenty-four  to  sixty-six.  Spain  has  the  richest 
and  most  cheaply  worked  mines,  and,  aside  from  a  little 
recovered  mercury  that  comes  from  Mexico,  contributes  a 
varying  percentage  of  the  American  consumption. 

As  it  was  desirable  to  encourage  domestic  production, 
there  was  not  much  haggling  about  the  price,  especially  as 
the  total  amount  involved  was  small.  The  total  of  military 
contracts  during  1917  was  11,327  flasks,  but  the  forecast  for 
1919  was  33,000  flasks  —  about  equal  to  the  entire  domestic 
production.  The  chief  military  use  of  mercury  is  in  the 
manufacture  of  mercury  fulminates  for  ammunition.  The 
navy  and  the  Emergency  Fleet  needed  it  for  anti-corrosive 
paints,  and  other  uses  were  for  medicinal  purposes,  for  the 
"dope"  of  airplane  surfaces,  electrical  apparatus,  felt  manu- 
facture, gold  and  silver  milling,  and  certain  industrial  and 
scientific  instruments.  Practically  no  substitutes  for 
mercury  were  developed,  and  the  only  conservation  was 
through  economy  and  an  embargo  on  all  exports  except  a 
small  amount  for  the  Canadian  Government. 

Because  of  the  narrow  margin  between  possible  supply 
and  demand,  and  the  tendency  of  prices  to  advance  unduly, 
quicksilver  was  taken  imder  control  early  in  1918,  but  the 
Price-Fixing  Committee  did  not  act.  Prices  had  been  as 
high  as  $123.20  a  flask,  but  at  a  conference  between  Mr. 
Yeatman  and  the  producers  on  April  4,  1918,  they  agreed  to 


i 


THE  STORY  OF  COPPER,  BRASS,  ETC.   363 

deliver  to  the  Government  at  $105  a  hundred-pound  flask  at 
Mare  Island  Navy  Yard,  California,  and  $105.75,  Brooklyn 
Navy  Yard.  On  account  of  the  precarious  nature  of  the 
business,  it  was  not  considered  wise  to  demand  the  same 
price  for  the  public,  but  the  producers  were  informally 
urged  not  to  let  the  price  to  the  public  get  above  $125  to 
$130.  As  for  the  importers,  they  agreed  to  give  the  Govern- 
ment forty  per  cent  of  their  importations  at  approximately 
the  same  prices  as  the  domestic  producers.  All  Government 
demands  except  the  Medical  Corps  of  the  army  and  the 
Emergency  Fleet  Corporation  were  by  agreement  handled 
through  the  navy  and  the  Non-Ferrous  Section;  the  two 
exceptions  buying  in  the  market.  No  control  was  attempted 
over  the  material  not  required  by  the  Government,  except  the 
informal  price  limitation. 

However,  the  size  of  the  Government  requirements  for 
1919  indicated  the  necessity  of  extraordinary  measures. 
Steps  were  taken  to  increase  importations  and  the  Price- 
Fixing  Committee  had  called  a  conference  on  the  subject  of 
quicksilver,  but  the  ending  of  the  war  intervened. 

The  whole  handling  of  the  metals  that  came  within  the 
province  of  the  Non-Ferrous  Metals  Section  was  a  high  type 
of  the  characteristic  War  Industries  Board  policy  of 
sagacious  expediency.  Each  metal  was  dealt  with  accord- 
ing to  its  peculiar  relation  to  the  general  situation  caused 
by  the  war.  There  was  no  standard  form  of  regulation,  and 
none  whatever  merely  for  the  sake  of  regulation. 


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CHAPTER  XX 
PLATINUM  AND  TIN 

I.  Smuggling  platinum  from  Bolshevik  Russia  —  Bartering  with  the  British 
for  tin. 

n.  Where  the  world's  tin  is  —  Tin  and  the  "ring  merchants"  of  London  — 
Driving  down  the  price  and  saving  millions  —  Tin  cans  and  the  economics  of 
war  —  Tin  for  bombs,  fuses,  and  flares  —  A  moral  to  be  drawn. 

III.  Platinum  the  indispensable  —  Twenty  thousand  ounces  under  ambassa- 
dorial  seal  —  Requisitioning  platinum,  iridium,  and  palladium. 


The  metallic  elements  of  the  materiel  of  war  hitherto  con- 
sidered are  produced  in  the  United  States  in  sufficient 
quantities,  with  the  exception  of  antimony,  to  make  the 
Nation  self-contained  in  the  emergency  of  exclusion  from 
foreign  sources.  And  in  a  pinch,  and  at  a  high  cost,  we 
probably  could  produce  from  known  domestic  ores  enough 
antimony  to  tide  us  over.  It  is  true  that  only  a  negligible 
amount  of  nickel  is  found  in  the  United  States,  but  in  the 
recent  war  it  could  be  considered  as  a  domestic  product, 
not  only  because  Canada,  the  chief  source  of  nickel,  was  a 
neighbor  and  an  ally,  but  because  an  American  company  is 
the  chief  miner  of  the  Canadian  ores,  and  because  part  of 
the  smelting  and  virtually  all  of  the  refining  is,  or  was, 
carried  on  on  the  American  side. 

Two  important  metallic  factors  in  industrial  support  of 
military  effort  are  virtually  entirely  lacking  in  the  realms  of 
the  Republic,  namely,  platinum  and  tin.  Russia  normally 
supplies  from  eighty  to  ninety  per  cent  of  the  world's 
platinum,  and  most  of  the  rest  comes  from  Colombia.  Tin 
production  is  largely  within  the  boundaries  of  the  British 
Empire.  Thus,  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  the  sources  of 
these  indispensable  metals  were  in  the  hands  of  our  friends. 
The  Russian  revolution  eventually  resulted  in  the  with- 
drawal of  that  country  from  the  war,  and  the  Peace  of 
Brest-Litovsk  placed  Russia  in  the  Teutonic  colunm  in  an 


i 


PLATINUM  AND  TIN 


365 


industrial  sense  to  the  extent  that  the  Bolshevik  regime  did 
not  dissolve  Russia  as  an  industrial  factor. 

After  that  untoward  event  the  getting  of  platinum  from 
Russia  was  a  matter  of  intrigue  and  stratagem,  conspiracy 
and  adventure;  and  the  meeting  of  war  demands  became 
one  of  manipulation,  adaptation,  and  conservation  at  home, 
smuggling  in  Russia,  and  finance,  exploration,  and 
diplomacy  in  Colombia.  In  the  case  of  the  latter  country 
there  was  even  some  effort  to  pivot  the  settlement  of  the 
Panama  grievance  and  the  confirmation  of  the  Colombia 
Treaty,  with  its  $25,000,000  for  Colombia,  on  the  Colombia 
protection  of  platinum. 

With  tin  the  problem  was  one  between  friends,  involving 
careful  handling  to  enforce  the  American  policy  of  reci- 
procity of  materials  among  the  Allies,  which  held  that,  as 
between  Government  requirements,  at  least,  there  must  be 
an  equality  of  prices  and  equitable  allocation.  It  was  an 
international  contact  of  many  phases. 


\i 


n 

Although  producing  no  tin  ore,  except  less  than  one  per 
cent  of  its  tin  requirements,  the  United  States^  is  the  greatest 
consumer  and  the  greatest  manufacturer  of  tin  products, 
using  more  than  half  the  entire  tin  output  of  the  world.  The 
British  Empire  controls  about  sixty  per  cent  of  the  pig  tin 
of  the  world,  and  the  mining  sources  of  the  pig  tin  are  in  the 
Dutch  East  Indies,  the  Federated  Malay  States,  China,  Corn- 
wall in  England  itself,  Wales,  Portugal,  Nigeria,  Bolivia, 
South  Africa,  and  Australia.  The  Malay  States  alone 
produce  about  half  of  the  world's  tin  ore,  and  the  chief 
portion  of  the  world's  smelting  of  the  ore  into  tin  is  at 
Penang  and  Singapore  in  the  Straits  Settlements. 

The  American  imports  of  tin  are  in  the  form  of  pig  from 
all  of  the  above-named  countries  except  Bolivia,  which  ships 
concentrates  to  the  American  Smelting  and  Refining  Com- 
pany, at  Perth  Amboy,  New  Jersey.  Although  this  domestic 
smelting  did  not  begin  until  1916,  it  produced  more  than 
eight  thousand  tons  in  1918,^  while  the  imports  were  about 

^Alaska  yields  about  one  hundred  tons  of  tin  annually. 

The  Williams  Harvey  Corporation  built  a  smelter  at  Jamaica  Bay  in  1918. 


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366    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

ten  times  as  great.  The  foreign  tin  supply  was  largely  in 
the  hands  of  the  so-called  "ring  merchants"  in  London.  In 
further  complication  of  the  situation  the  British  Government 
insisted  that  all  importations  of  British  tin  into  the  United 
States  must  be  viseed  and  the  bills  of  lading  checked  by  the 
British  consul  at  the  port  of  entry.  After  this  restriction 
was  withdrawn  and  importations  were  put  into  the  hands  of 
the  Pig  Tin  Committee  of  the  American  Iron  and  Steel 
Institute,  further  entanglements  resulted  from  the  refusal  of 
the  British  authorities  to  give  export  licenses  for  shipment 
to  American  consumers  who  had  not  been  importers  thereto- 
fore. The  next  difficulty  was  in  the  scarcity  of  "Straits 
tin,"  which  resulted  in  orders  for  Dutch  East  Indies  tin. 
With  four  thousand  tons  of  this  tin  undelivered,  the  Dutch 
tied  up  their  ships,  and  there  arose  a  shortage  scare. 

As  a  result  of  these  impediments  and  the  manipulations 
of  the  London  "ring,"  Straits  tin  sold  as  high  as  $1.38  a 
pound  in  New  York  in  May,  1918,  as  compared  with  31 
cents  in  August,  1914.  In  consequence  of  the  effectuation 
of  the  International  Tin  Executive  in  London  in  August, 
following  negotiations  begun  in  Washington  with  the  British 
Embassy  and  Chandler  P.  Anderson,  George  Armsby,  and 
Professor  Lincoln  Hutchinson  in  May,  the  price  of  pig  tin 
at  its  various  sources  was  reduced  from  a  maximum  of  £443 
a  ton  to  £250,  and  would  have  been  put  down  to  £200.  In 
consequence  the  price  of  spot  tin  in  the  United  States  went 
down  to  71.5  cents  a  pound.  On  a  year's  importations  this 
bit  of  inter-Allied  diplomacy  resulted  in  a  saving  of 
$62,000,000  to  $75,000,000. 

Another  result  of  the  Tin  Executive  was  to  take  the 
handling  of  the  imports  out  of  the  hands  of  foreigners.  The 
United  States  Steel  Products  Company,  acting  for  the  Pig  Tin 
Committee  of  the  American  Iron  and  Steel  Institute,  bought 
all  the  tin  allocated  to  the  United  States,  which,  by  virtue 
of  the  cooperation  of  the  War  Trade  Board,  was  the  only 
licensed  importer,  and  the  Tin  Committee  attended  to  alloca- 
tion and  distribution.  Private  importations  of  tin  ore, 
concentrates,  and  tin  chemicals  were  permitted  subject  to 
the  approval  of  the  Tin  Committee,  and  even  imported  tin 
alloys,  containing  more  than  twenty  per  cent  of  tin,  were  put 


PLATINUM  AND  TIN 


367 


under  control.  The  Tin  Executive  allocated  80,000  tons  of 
tin  to  the  United  States  as  against  52,500  tons  to  the  Allies. 

The  tin  control,  it  will  be  seen,  did  not  involve  activity  by 
the  Price-Fixing  Committee,  nor  the  application  of  priority 
in  the  ordinary  sense.  There  was,  of  course,  no  committee 
of  tin  producers,  but  there  were  several  trade  committees 
of  tin-users,  through  which  the  Tin  Section  maintained  its 
contacts  with  consumption.  This  section  was  not  created 
until  March,  1918.  Grafton  D.  Dorsey,  of  New  York,  was 
the  first  chief,  but  was  compelled  to  retire  on  account  of 
ill-health,  and  was  succeeded  by  George  Armsby,  of  San 
Francisco. 

Aside  from  the  primary  work  of  bringing  about  inter- 
national control  of  pig  tin,  the  work  of  the  section  was 
largely  concentrated  on  economy,  conservation,  and  sub- 
stitution. Considerable  attention  was  given  to  the  recovery 
of  tin  from  scrap.  As  tin  is  used  in  some  form  or  degree 
by  almost  every  manufacturing  establishment  in  the  country, 
conservation  covered  a  very  wide  field.  The  chief  use  of 
tin  is  in  the  manufacture  of  tinplate  as  a  protective  cover 
for  the  iron  or  steel  sheet.  It  was  in  the  form  of  tinplate 
that  tin  chiefly  entered  into  the  economics  of  war,  the 
former  being  indispensable  in  providing  containers  of  foods, 
of  which  enormous  numbers  were  required  in  alimenting 
our  armies,  civil  population,  and  the  Allies,  as  well  as  the 
neutrals  to  some  extent. 

Conservation  was  mostly  aimed  at  withdrawing  as  much 
tin  as  possible  from  other  uses  in  order  to  provide  sufficient 
for  the  tinplate  industry.  Even  at  that,  the  amount  of  steel 
allowed  to  each  plate  mill  was  reduced  thirty  per  cent. 
Altogether  the  production  of  tinplate  was  maintained  at  a 
satisfactory  rate;  of  the  twenty-two  tinplate  plants  the  output 
in  September,  1918,  being  2,892,000  base  boxes  (a  base  box 
weighs  100  pounds).  By  November  it  was  possible  to 
authorize  the  production  of  1,200,000  boxes  for  the  oil 
industry  and  125,000  for  the  bottle-stopper  trade.  Besides 
meeting  all  necessary  American  requirements,  55,887  gross 
tons  of  tinplate  were  spared  to  the  Allies  during  1918. 

Tin  is  used  in  large  quantities  in  solder,  in  Babbitt  and 
other  bearing  metals,  in  the  manufacture  of  brass  and 


II 


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368    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

bronze,  in  the  manufacture  of  glass  and  rubber,  in  whitening 
enamel,  and  (in  the  tetrachloride  form)  as  a  mordant  in  the 
dyeing  of  silk  and  to  give  weight  to  the  fabric.  Besides 
its  ordinary  industrial  uses,  tin  was  especially  required  dur- 
ing the  war  for  bombs,  fuses,  flares,  and  pyrotechnic  explo- 
sives of  all  sorts,  both  as  a  producer  of  glaring  effects,  and 
of  concealing-smoke.  The  conservation  programme  involved 
the  curtailment  of  the  use  of  tin  in  tinfoil  and  collapsible 
tubes,  in  reductions  of  the  proportion  of  tin  in  Babbitts,  alloy 
castings,  and  solder.  The  actual  decline  in  tin  consumption 
in  1918  was  9300  long  tons,  and  the  full  application  of 
conservation  for  a  twelvemonth  would  have  resulted  in  a 
saving  of  13,000  long  tons,  or  fifteen  per  cent  of  the 
estimated  requirements  of  tin  for  1918. 

The  administration  of  tin  involved  the  closest  cooperation 
between  the  War  Industries  Board,  the  War  Trade  Board, 
and  the  Food  Administration,  to  say  nothing  of  the  basic 
international  cooperation  and  the  team-work  with  and 
between  the  tin-using  industries.  In  review,  it  now  appears 
that  there  was  never  any  real  danger  of  an  absolute  shortage 
for  restricted  uses,  notwithstanding  the  reduced  production 
of  tin  in  1918,  but  it  is  equally  true  that,  without  inter- 
national control  and  centralized  control  within  the  United 
States,  the  price  would  have  been  appallingly  high  and  the 
distribution  of  supplies  so  unequal  that  industry  would  have 
suffered  severely. 

The  handling  of  tin  aflFords,  perhaps,  the  best  example  of 
the  international  application  of  the  War  Industries  Board's 
conception  of  the  integration  of  industries  and  the  pooling  of 
their  products  under  joint  industrial  and  Government  con- 
trol. America  not  being  a  tin-producing  country,  the  Board 
reached  out  and  pooled  the  tin  of  all  the  world,  got  an 
equitable  share  for  the  United  States,  and  then  measured 
it  out  prudently  and  carefully  for  the  best  interests  of  the 
military  programme  and  the  public.  All  of  this  was 
accomplished  without  the  use  of  a  cent  of  Government 
capital,  the  funds  being  provided  in  the  first  instance  by  the 
United  States  Steel  Products  Company.  The  war  abounded 
in  similar  deeds  of  service  by  our  business  men  and 
corporations  that  are  little  known.     News,  luifortunately. 


I 


PLATINUM  AND  TIN 


369 


is  compounded  of  the  sensational  in  crime  rather  than  of 
excellence  in  well-doing.  To  swindle  the  Government  is 
to  get  on  the  first  page;  to  save  it  hundreds  of  millions  is 
more  likely  to  achieve  oblivion.  The  fault  lies  in  human 
nature  rather  than  in  the  press.  The  world  loves  to  hear  of 
the  evils  it  abhors,  but  cares  less  for  knowledge  of  honor  it 
demands. 

Ill 

Platinum  is  a  metal  that  gratifies  human  vanity,  and  at 
the  same  time  is  one  of  the  most  indispensable  of  the 
metallic  industrial  agents.  As  its  cost  soared  with  scarcity 
in  war-time,  it  arose  simultaneously  in  demand  for  the 
manufacture  of  jewelry  and  for  the  enginery  of  war.  The 
white  fingers  of  women  vied  with  the  stinking  vats  of  acid 
manufacture  for  its  possession.  The  more  the  war  demand 
drove  up  the  price  and  gold  sank  relatively  to  plebeian  levels 
of  price,  the  more  the  favor  for  platinum  jewelry. 

To  the  lay  mind  platinum  is  a  metal  of  mystery  and  almost 
of  necromancy  in  that  its  presence,  but  not  its  consumption, 
is  required  in  the  contact  process  of  making  concentrated 
sulphuric  acid.  The  immense  volume  of  this  acid  required 
in  the  manufacture  of  munitions  as  well  as  for  ordinary 
industrial  purposes  gives  platinum  a  unique  economic 
importance.  The  next  most  important  requirement  for  it 
during  the  war  was  in  the  erection  and  equipment  of  the 
nitrogen-fixation  plants,  which  were  designed  to  render  us 
independent  of  Chilean  nitrates  both  for  munitions  and 
industrial  uses. 

The  qualities  of  high  fusibility,  malleability,  electrical 
conductivity,  and  chemical  inactivity  in  platinum  are 
unequaled,  and  as  yet  no  adequate  substitutes  have  been 
found  for  its  most  important  uses.  Alloyed  with  iridium, 
it  is  used  in  the  contact  points  of  ignition  apparatus  of  all 
forms  of  internal  combustion  engines,  and  hence  it  is 
essential  to  the  manufacture  of  airplanes  and  all  sorts  of 
automotive  vehicles.  It  cannot  be  dispensed  with  in  the 
making  of  heavy  guns  because  its  wire  is  the  only  known 
wire  that  can  withstand  the  intense  heat  in  the  thermometer 
which  is  used  in  maintaining  for  definite  periods  the  uniform 


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370    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

high  degree  of  heat,  the  least  departure  from  which  will 
make  the  gun  useless.  It  is  used  in  ignition  fuses,  and  in 
the  chemical  and  physical  laboratories  it  was  of  the  greatest 
importance  in  the  research  work  the  war  demanded, 
especially  in  connection  with  the  use  of  gases  and  their 
neutralization.  It  is  indispensable  in  the  manufacture  of 
ship  compasses,  chronometers,  and  many  other  instruments 
of  precision.  Surgery  also  makes  its  demands  on  platinum 
for  surgical  instruments  and  such  apparatus  as  X-ray  tubes, 
cautery  tips,  and  hypodermic  needles,  and  dentistry  demands 
a  considerable  quantity. 

When  the  United  States  entered  the  war,  it  was  confronted 
by  a  very  limited  supply  brought  about  by  the  increased 
requirements  of  war  since  1914  and  the  steady  decline  of 
platinum  production  in  Russia  as  that  country  went  steadily 
from  worse  to  worst  economically.  In  1913,  Russia  pro- 
duced 250,000  ounces  and  all  the  rest  of  the  world  only 
17,233.  By  1917,  the  Russian  output  was  down  to  50,000 
ounces,  and,  though  the  Colombia  output  had  been  brought 
up  from  15,000  to  32,000  ounces,  all  the  rest  of  the  world 
produced  only  685  ounces  in  the  latter  year,  of  which  the 
United  States'  contribution  was  only  605  ounces.  There  is, 
however,  a  considerable  amount  of  platinum  refining  in  the 
United  States,  the  crude  platinum  coming  chiefly  from 
Colombia.  In  addition,  the  recovery  of  secondary  platinum 
from  sweepings  and  the  reduction  of  articles  that  have  gone 
into  the  scrap-heap  makes  a  considerable  addition  to  the 
domestic  supply,  which  under  the  pressure  of  war  necessity 
went  up  from  40,698  Troy  ounces  in  1914  to  between  60,000 
and  70,000  ounces  in  1918.  As  demand  increased  and 
supply  decreased,  prices  ascended  from  around  $39  an 
ounce  in  1915  to  $108  in  1917.  It  is  to  be  noted  that  Mr. 
Baruch,  as  early  as  December,  1916,  asked  Secretary 
McAdoo  to  place  an  embargo  on  all  platinum  received  at 
United  States  Mints,  thus  clearly  foreseeing  the  impending 
scarcity  and  demand. 

The  apprehension  caused  by  the  extreme  shortage  was 
relieved  for  a  time  in  December  of  that  year  by  the  arrival 
from  Russia  of  F.  W.  Draper,  an  American  engineer,  carry- 
ing with  him  20,000  ounces  of  crude  platinum,  which  was 


PLATINUM  AND  TIN 


371 


turned  over  to  the  Government  for  technical  uses.  Mr 
Draper  had  got  this  platinum  together  in  Russia  with  the  aid 
of  other  American  engineers,  the  Russian-English  Bank  ot 
Petrograd,  the  United  States  Department  of  Commerce; 
and  was  assisted  in  his  hazardous  journey  across  Russia  by 
the  American  embassy  to  Russia,  the  metal  being  carried 
under  the  ambassadorial  seal. 

An  element  of  business  as  well  as  personal  adventure 
entered  into  this  enterprise.  Mr.  Draper  feh  that  he  and 
his  associates  were  well  entitled  to  the  American  price  ot 
$105,  considering  the  risks  they  had  run,  the  hardships 
endured,  and  the  relief  they  had  occasioned.  In  this  view 
he  had  the  sympathy  of  the  Bureau  of  Mines,  of  the  Depart- 
ment of  the  Interior,  which  was  cooperating  with  the  War 
Industries  Board  in  the  handling  of  the  platinum  problem. 
The  War  Industries  Board  was  of  a  different  view,  recalling 
that  it  was  due  to  the  foresight  of  Mr.  L.  L.  Summers,  then 
associated  with  Mr.  Baruch  as  technical  adviser  and  later 
to  become  a  member  of  the  Board,  that  the  Draper  enterprise 
was  undertaken,  and  that  it  could  never  have  succeeded  with- 
out governmental  assistance. 

There  was  a  line  of  cleavage  between  the  Bureau  of  Mines 
and  the  War  Industries  Board  all  the  way  through  on  the 
platinum  problem.  The  Board  was  not  so  "jumpy"  on  the 
subject  as  the  Bureau,  which  was  inclined  to  take  a  gloomy 
view  of  the  platinum  prospect  on  the  assumption  that  the 
war  might  continue  for  several  years,  and  did  not  proceed 
precipitately  in  conservation  and  requisition  measures. 
The  Board,  while  recognizing  the  situation  as  serious  and 
taking  measures  to  build  up  a  reserve,  felt  that  in  the  last 
resort  the  platinum  in  private  hands,  chiefly  in  the  form  of 
jewelry,  would  be  ample  to  meet  any  future  deficit.  The 
difference  between  the  two  bodies  is  the  difference  that 
frequently  arises  between  men  with  the  scientific  outlook 
and  those  with  practical  experience. 

The  scientific  men  were  deeply  impressed  with  one  phase 
of  the  platinum  problem,  that  the  practical  men  had  not  at 
first  thought  much  about.  Iridium  and  palladium  are  two 
precious  and  important  metals  that  are  found  in  association 
with  platinum.     Iridium  was  of  military  importance  because 


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372    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

of  its  use  in  connection  with  platinum  for  sparking  points 
and  magnetos;  and  palladium  was  useful  in  that  it  could 
replace  platinum  in  dentistry  to  a  considerable  extent. 

In  a  report  on  the  platinum  situation,  made  at  the  begin- 
ning of  1918  by  Dr.  James  M.  Hill,  of  the  Geological 
Survey,  it  was  held  that,  while  the  outlook  indicated  that  the 
platinum  stores  were  sufficient  to  carry  through  1918,  there 
would  be  a  deficit  of  about  1200  ounces  of  iridium  and 
11,000  of  palladium.  The  palladium  deficit  was  not  a 
serious  thing,  but  that  of  iridium  was,  and  the  Hill  report 
emphasized  the  fact  that  there  was  no  way  to  meet  it  except 
to  procure  25,000  ounces  of  crude  platinum  which  would 
carry  with  it  sufficient  iridium.  "I  cannot  state  too  strongly 
the  extremely  serious  situation  in  which  we  find  ourselves," 
said  Dr.  Hill,  "and  urge  that  all  possible  steps  be  taken  at 
once  to  do  what  can  be  done  to  rectify  the  mistake  made 
early  in  the  summer  in  not  buying  crude  platinum." 

Dr.  Hill  was  also  much  disturbed  by  the  fact  that  two  of 
the  four  platinum  refining  concerns  in  the  United  States  were 
controlled  by  a  man  of  German  birth  and  most  intimate 
German  business  associations  who  was  reputed  to  be  in 
control  of  the  largest  platiniun  refining  plant  in  Germany. 
'His  loyalty  to  the  United  States,"  the  Hill  report  continued, 
is  open  to  question,  and  it  hardly  seems  wise  to  trust 
platinum  refining  to  such  a  one,  when  it  is  realized  that 
slight  impurities  in  platinum  for  sulphuric  acid  plants 
render  the  catalyst  valueless,  or  that  more  than  0.5  per  cent 
of  impurities  in  iridium  for  electrical  alloys  render  the 
alloy  ineffective."  Here  were  the  makings  of  a  portentous 
industrial  ambuscade.  Dr.  Hill  recommended  that  to 
remedy  the  situation  the  Government  should  immediately 
dispatch  agents  to  Russia  and  Colombia  to  procure  all 
possible  platinum  and  that  all  refining  and  fabrication 
should  be  done  imder  Government  supervision.  He  also 
urged  the  immediate  requisitioning  of  all  platinum  metals 
in  the  hands  of  refiners  and  jewelers. 

In  accordance  with  these  recommendations,  the  Platinum 
Section,  which  was  organized  in  March  with  C.  H.  Connor 
in  charge,  began  immediately  to  take  steps  to  cope  with  the 
situation.     One  of  its  first  discoveries  was  that  requirements 


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PLATINUM  AND  TIN 


373 


i 


would  be  larger  than  Dr.  Hill  had  calculated,  making  the 
position  proportionately  more  precarious.  A  requisition 
order  addressed  to  fourteen  holders  of  platinum  had  been 
issued  in  February,  but  on  May  1st  a  new  order  was 
addressed  to  947  dealers  in  or  users  of  platinum,  iridium, 
and  palladium.  The  two  orders  brought  to  the  section 
control  of  59,690  ounces  of  platinum.  A  later  order 
applied  to  1555  persons  or  companies.  To  make  control 
more  imperative.  Congress  amended  the  act  creating  the 
Bureau  of  Mines  and  gave  the  Bureau  statutory  authority 
to  establish  a  licensing  system,  whereby  the  sale,  possession, 
and  use  of  the  platinum  group  of  metals  would  be 
authorized.  It  was  thought  the  new  law  would  involve  more 
than  150,000  licenses.  The  War  Industries  Board  was  to 
administer  the  law  in  conjunction  with  the  Bureau  in  order 
to  avoid  confusion.  The  signing  of  the  armistice  inter- 
rupted the  licensing  work  before  it  had  made  much  of  a 
start. 

Special  efforts  were  made  to  increase  the  production  of 
platinum  in  Colombia  and  importations  therefrom.  These 
included  steps  to  facilitate  the  financing  of  mining  and 
trading,  and  even  contemplated  efforts  to  secure  the  ratifica- 
tion of  the  long-pending  treaty  with  Colombia  concerning 
the  Panama  Canal  as  an  08*801  to  Colombian  coldness  and 
disposition  to  exercise  control  over  platinum  as  a  reprisal. 
It  developed  that  speculators  were  holding  back  a  part  of  the 
Colombia  production. 

Through  appeals  made  by  the  Red  Cross,  patriotic  citizens 
contributed  platinum  articles  containing  several  thousand 
ounces  of  platinum.  As  early  as  August,  1917,  the  exporta- 
tion of  platinum  was  virtually  prohibited;  but  modifications 
permitted  the  exportation  of  platinum-containing  articles  if 
the  exporters  undertook  to  import  a  corresponding  amount 
of  metal.  In  this  way  the  platinum  stocks  of  other  countries 
were  drawn  upon  for  replacement  purposes.  Eventually 
the  use  of  platinum  in  the  manufacture  of  jewelry  was 
wholly  forbidden,  but  because  of  the  expense  involved  no 
effort  was  made  to  requisition  existing  jewelry;  but  the  pro- 
hibition of  its  exportation  kept  it  in  the  country  if  desperate 
need  should  arise.     Platinum  for  industrial  uses  was  con- 


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374    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

trolled,  and  it  was  denied  for  pleasure  cars,  electric  bells, 
electric  advertising  signs,  clocks,  photographic  paper, 
electrical  specialties,  and  many  other  purposes. 

It  was  found  possible  to  exclude  platinum  from  X-ray 
apparatus  and  to  reduce  its  use  in  dentistry  by  seventy-five 
per  cent  (a  saving  of  22,550  ounces).  Extensive  conserva- 
tion was  efifected  by  minimum  use  and  substitution,  many 
phases  of  the  latter  being  brilliantly  successful.  AH  the 
great  industrial  consumers  of  platinum  studied  substitution 
among  them  being  the  Ohio  Salt  Company,  the  North  Ameri 
can  Chemical  Company,  the  National  Electrolytic  Company 
and  the  Western  Electric  Company.  The  systematic  col 
lection  of  scrap  had  hardly  started  before  the  war  ended 
but  it  had  promising  possibilities.  But  in  July,  August,  and  . 
September,  the  policy  of  encouraging  consumers  of  platinum 
to  turn  in  scrap  in  return  for  new  platinum  resulted  in  the 
reception  of  platinum  scrap  amounting  to  fifty  per  cent  of 
the  withdrawals  of  the  metal.  It  was  planned  to  stimulate 
domestic  production  wherever  possible,  and  many  mining 
prospects  were  investigated.  The  War  Minerals  Stimulation 
Law^  was  not  approved,  however,  until  October  5,  1918, 
and  in  the  interval  before  the  armistice  no  enterprise  was 
found  that  was  deemed  worthy  of  assistance. 

Few  of  the  war  materials  developed  such  surprising 
fluctuations  in  requirements  and  so  much  resourcefulness 
and  enterprise  in  meeting  them.     In  July,  1917,  not  a  single 

*This  act  placed  $50,000,000  at  the  disposal  of  the  President  for  use,  virtu- 
ally at  his  discretion,  in  stimulating  the  production  of  minerals  of  which  the 
war  had  revealed  a  shortage  or  an  alarming  scarcity.  There  was  some  rivalry 
between  the  War  Industries  Board  and  the  Department  of  the  Interior  for 
choice  as  the  executive  agent,  the  latter  feeling  that,  on  account  of  the  intimacy 
of  the  two  great  bureaus,  the  Bureau  of  Mines  and  the  Geological  Survey,  with 
the  subject-matter  of  the  act,  the  administration  properly  belonged  to  it.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  War  Industries  Board  was  f  undamenully  the  Government  agency 
dealing  with  the  practical  use  of  such  materials.  At  the  suggestion  of  Mr. 
Baruch,  the  administration  of  the  act  was  allotted  to  the  Bureau  of  Mines,  but 
the  War  Industries  £k)ard  was  authorized  to  determine  needs  and  call  upon  the 
Bureau  to  apply  the  act  to  meet  them.  The  termination  of  the  war  nullified 
the  act,  which  otherwise  might  have  been  of  great  permanent  as  well  as  of 
emergency  benefit.  The  minerals  named  in  the  act  were  antimony,  arsenic, 
asbestos,  bismuth,  bromine,  cerium,  chalk,  chromite,  chromium,  cobalt,  cor- 
undum, emery,  fluorspar,  ferro-silicon,  fuller's  earth,  graphite,  grinding  peb- 
bles, iridium,  kaolin,  magnesite,  manganese,  mercury,  mica,  molybdenum, 
osmium,  sodium  nitrate,  palladium,  paper  clay,  phosphorus,  platinum,  potas- 
sium, pyrites,  radium,  sulphur,  tin,  titanium,  tungsten,  uranium,  vanadium,  and 
zirconium. 


PLATINUM  AND  TIN 


375 


Government  department  reported  any ,  need  of  platinum, 
but  nine  months  later  their  requirements  were  put  at  37,000 
ounces  for  1918,  and,  four  months  later  still,  they  jumped  to 
70,000  ounces.  At  the  same  time  the  essential  industries 
were  consuming  3000  ounces  a  month.  Then  for  1919  it 
was  figured  that  conservation  and  substitution  would  hold 
Government  requirements  down  to  33,000  ounces  of 
platinum  and  1159  ounces  of  iridium. 

The  creation  of  the  International  Platinum  Executive, 
which  was  about  ready  for  announcement  at  the  end  of  the 
war,  would  doubtless  have  been  of  great  assistance  in  meet- 
ing any  unforeseen  crisis  that  might  have  arisen  had  the 
struggle  continued. 


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CHAPTER  XXI 
FERRO-ALLOYS  AND  WAR  MINERALS 

The  steel  industry  jeopardized  —  Manganese  and  the  lost  collier  Cyclops-— 
Sailing  vessels  bring  chrome  metal  from  Rhodesia  —  Basic  policies  of  ravr 
materials  procurement  —  Their  operation  vital  to  national  defense  —  Tungsten 
and  vanadium  —  Henry  Ford,  Baruch,  and  zirconium  —  Other  precious  minerals. 

On  May  17,  1918,  President  Farrell,  of  the  United  States 
Steel  Corporation,  speaking  in  his  capacity  as  a  member  of 
the  Iron  and  Steel  Institute's  war  service  committee,  warned 
the  War  Industries  Board  that  the  entire  steel  industry  of 
America  would  be  shut  down  by  the  following  December 
unless  manganese  ore  could  be  procured  from  Brazil.  The 
statement  laconically  revealed  the  military  dependence  of 
the  United  States,  with  all  its  mineral  wealth,  on  foreign 
sources  for  an  essential  of  the  production  of  the  fundamental 
metal  of  warfare. 

Manganese  was  only  one  of  the  war  minerals,  as  were 
designated  ores  and  minerals  which  the  United  States  drew 
impartially  from  foreign  sources.  The  War  Minerals  Act 
list,  printed  elsewhere,  names  forty,  but  the  chief  of  them, 
considered  in  the  light  of  pressing  war  demands,  were 
sodium  nitrate,  potash,  pyrite,  manganese,  tin,  graphite, 
asbestos,  mercury,  tungsten,  vanadium,  molybdenum,  zirco- 
nium, chromite,  magnesite,  mica,  platinum,  iridium,  and 
antimony. 

Nickel  is  a  war  mineral  in  which  the  United  States  is 
primarily  dependent  upon  Canada,  but,  as  already  pointed 
out,  the  political,  transport,  and  proprietary  factors  relating 
to  it  made  it  virtually  a  domestic  metal  of  adequate  volume 
during  the  recent  war.  Mercury,  platinum,  tin,  iridium, 
and  antimony  have  been  considered  in  preceding  chapters, 
and  nitrate  will  be  the  subject  of  the  following  chapter.^ 

Of  the  war  minerals  already  dealt  with,  all  but  tin,  which 
was  in  a  section  by  itself  in  Mr.  Legge's  administrative 

^The  more  important  war  minerals  not  discussed  in  this  chapter  are  more 
properly  dealt  with  in  Chapter  XXIIl,  relating  to  chemicals. 


FERRO-ALLOYS  AND  WAR  MINERALS       377 

division,  were  in  the  Non-Ferrous  Metals  Section  of  the 
same  division.  The  remainder  of  the  war  minerals  were 
assigned  to  the  Chemical  Division,  in  Mr.  Summers's  depart- 
ment of  the  Board,  and  were  under  the  general  direction  of 
Mr.  C.  H.  McDowell. 

Mr.  Farrell  did  not  overstate  the  position  in  his  above- 
reported  statement  regarding  manganese.  Some  form  of 
manganese  is  indispensable  in  the  manufacture  of  steel  of 
almost  every  sort.  It  is  commonly  used  in  the  form  of 
iron-manganese  alloys,  spiegeleisen,  and  ferromanganese  as 
a  purifying  agent. 

There  are  considerable  deposits  of  manganese  ore  in  the 
United  States,  notably  in  Minnesota,  Montana,  California, 
Arizona,  Nevada,  Virginia,  Georgia,  Tennessee,  and  Arkan- 
sas, but,  as  compared  with  the  foreign  ores,  they  are  lean, 
hard  to  work,  and  costly  of  mining  and  transportation. 
Before  the  war  the  production  of  manganese  ores  in  the 
United  States  was,  therefore,  negligible.  But  the  military 
importance  of  self -containment  and  the  scarcity  of  shipping 
made  it  important  to  produce  as  much  ore  at  home  as  pos- 
sible. It  was  chiefly  with  manganese  and  other  ferro-alloy 
minerals  in  mind  that  Congress,  at  the  instance  of  the  late 
Secretary  of  the  Interior  Lane,  appropriated  $150,000  in 
March,  1918,  to  continue  and  extend  the  investigation  of 
domestic  war  materials,  and  later  appropriated  $50,000,000 
to  promote  their  production. 

Most  of  the  imported  manganese  came  from  Brazil,  and 
the  long  haul  absorbed  a  great  deal  of  shipping  that  could 
be  used  more  economically  elsewhere.  Domestic  pro- 
duction was  automatically  stimulated  by  the  high  prices, 
which  were  left  to  themselves  for  that  very  purpose,  but, 
with  all  the  gratifying  expansion  of  such  production  that 
followed,  it  was  still  necessary  to  foster  Brazilian  and  other 
foreign  manganese  mining.  It  was  even  necessary  to  divert 
precious  shipping  to  the  carrying  of  coal  to  Brazil  for  the 
use  of  the  railways  there  hauling  the  ore  to  the  seaboard. 
The  reduction  in  the  required  standard  of  purity  of  steel 
extended  the  availability  of  American  ores,  and  every  effort 
was  made  to  stimulate  their  production.  But  all  of  this 
required  time,  and  at  the  height  of  the  crisis  the  naval 


I  M 


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378    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

collier  Cyclops,  with  a  cargo  of  manganese,  was  lost  at 
sea,  and  12,000  tons  had  to  be  imported  from  England. 

The  price  of  high-grade  ferromanganese,  which  was 
$37.50  a  ton  in  1914,  went  as  high  as  $400  in  the  summer 
of  1917,  but  was  unofficially  stabilized  through  the  efforts  of 
the  American  Iron  and  Steel  Institute  at  $250  a  ton.  Cour 
nected  with  the  increased  production  of  domestic  ores  was 
the  problem  of  their  reduction  to  the  alloy  form,  which 
necessitated  a  considerable  extension  of  furnaces  suitable 
to  that  purpose.  Both  problems  were  successfully  met. 
From  a  domestic  production  of  ore,  amounting  to  only 
27,000  tons  in  1916,  the  output  soared  to  about  1,500,000 
tons  in  1918,  though  much  of  it  was  so  low  in  manganese 
content  that  it  was  necessary  to  import  520,000  tons  in  the 
same  year. 

The  programme  for  1919  contemplated  the  restriction  of 
Brazilian  imports  to  250,000  tons,  for  it  was  then  plain 
that  in  a  last  resort  the  United  States  could  take  care  of  all 
its  manganese  requirements  with  domestic  ores.  There  was 
no  conservation  or  price-fixing  required  in  the  manganese 
administration,  the  task  simply  being  one  of  stimulating 
and  facilitating  production  by  lifting  railroad  transportation 
embargoes,  getting  priorities  for  mining  machinery,  the 
building  of  side-tracks,  the  obtaining  of  food  and  machinery 
supplies  for  the  Cuban  mines  and  of  coal  for  Brazil,  and  of 
attending  to  innumerable  details  incident  to  a  mining 
revival  that  covered  the  continent  and  involved  scores  of 
mines. 

Chromium  or  chrome  metal  is  virtually  indispensable  in 
the  making  of  armor  plate,  projectiles,  high-speed  tool- 
steels,  motor  vehicles,  and  airplanes.  It  is  derived  from 
chromite,  a  mineral  ore,  which  was  also  used  directly  for 
bricks  and  cement  for  metallurgical  furnace  linings. 
Chrome  salts  are  widely  used  in  leather  tanning  solutions 
and  pigments  and  as  a  mordant  in  the  textile  industries. 
As  the  ordinary  sources  are  chiefly  in  Rhodesia  and  New 
Caledonia,  importation  under  war-time  shipping  conditions 
was  a  grave  problem.  Steam  vessels  were  not  available, 
and  recourse  was  had  to  sailing  vessels.  At  the  same  time 
every  eflfort  was  made  to  stimulate  the  domestic  production 
of  chromium,  chiefly  in  Oregon  and  California. 


'        •  M 


FERRO-ALLOYS  AND  WAR  MINERALS       379 

The  rise  in  price  from  around  $12  to  $60  and  $80  a  ton 
lured  prospectors  and  miners  to  the  chromite  deposits  before 
we  entered  the  war.  The  American  production  was  only 
255  tons  in  1913;  in  1917,  it  was  43,000  tons;  and  in  1918, 
60,000  tons,  as  against  total  requirements  of  90,000  tons. 

The  imports  for  the  year  were  90,000  tons.  The  end  of 
the  war,  therefore,  found  an  excess  of  high-priced  material 
on  hand.  This  development  was  brought  about,  not  only 
by  the  attraction  of  the  high  price  which  sent  the  prospectors 
into  the  hills  and  mountains  and  gave  them  a  claim  on  the 
resources  of  speculators  and  capitalists,  but  by  the  motive 
of  the  adventurous  public  service  and  by  the  unstinted 
encouragement  and  assistance  given,  not  only  by  the  Ferro- 
AUoy  Section,  but  by  the  Bureau  of  Mines  and  the  Geo- 
logical Survey. 

The  development  of  an  industry  in  an  artificial  manner, 
when  the  industry  cannot  hope  to  survive,  is  in  a  measure  an 
accompaniment  of  war,  but  is  also  an  industrial  tragedy. 
The  chrome  and  manganese  situations  were  similar.  These 
experiences  suggest  that,  in  another  emergency,  producers 
of  materials  who  cannot  compete  with  importers  in  times  of 
peace  should  have  some  guarantee  against  eventual  loss, 
but  whether  the  Government  can  aff'ord  to  develop  an 
industry  or  inveigle  capital  into  speculative  enterprises, 
when  the  price  of  the  material  is  five  times  the  peace  price, 
and  in  addition  requires  the  Government  to  bear  the  capital 
expenditure,  is  a  grave  problem.  There  was  a  radical 
diff'erence  of  opinion  between  the  experts  of  the  War 
Industries  Board  and  certain  experts  called  in  by  the  Bureau 
of  Mines  and  the  Geological  Survey  with  regard  to  this 
policy.  The  fundamental  difi"erence  between  the  bureaus 
and  the  War  Industries  Board  was  that  the  bureaus  asked  all 
experts  who  joined  them  to  work  primarily  for  the  benefit 
of  the  bureaus,  the  appropriations  allotted  to  the  bureaus 
being  in  a  measure  dependent  upon  the  pressure  they  can 
put  on  Congress  and  the  showing  they  can  make. 

The  War  Industries  Board  was  after  results  only,  and 
results  that  would  not  paralyze  or  leave  on  industry  a 
blasting  and  withering  eff'ect.  It  felt  that  no  form  of 
Government  subsidy  or  protection  could  possibly  justify  in 


h 


{\ 


I 
II 


380    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

peace-times  the  production  of  materials  which  could  not  be 
sold  at  a  cost  that  would  permit  industry  using  them.  It 
further  felt  that  there  was  neutral  shipping  in  the  world  that 
was  not  controlled  by  the  Allies  and  which  moved  to  the 
transportation  of  products  where  the  prices  were  unduly 
inflated.  The  only  control  of  this  shipping  was  by  refusal 
to  permit  the  importation  or  exportation  of  certain  goods. 
In  allowing  a  high  price  of  chrome  and  manganese  and 
similar  products,  there  became  available  an  adequate  ton- 
nage, and  by  closely  watching  the  importation  the  War 
Industries  Board  felt  that  it  could  maintain  a  safe  reserve  of 
these  important  materials,  and  at  the  same  time  was  whole- 
heartedly in  favor  of  Government  assistance  being  given  to 
those  mines  or  prospects  which  might  develop  commercial 
results  or  which  could  operate  during  the  war,  but  whose 
capital  expenditures  would  not  be  a  total  loss  to  be  absorbed 
by  the  Government.  In  view  of  this  policy,  the  War 
Industries  Board  granted  at  various  times  import  licenses 
for  chrome  ore  where  schooners  had  arrived  at  New 
Caledonia  and  would  bring  high-grade  ore  at  the  agreed 

price. 

In  the  opinion  of  the  War  Industries  Board,  it  was  basic 
that  in  case  of  war  the  supply  of  raw  materials  must  be 
accomplished  through  the  expenditure  of  the  minimum 
economic  eflFort.  The  stimulation  of  the  domestic  pro- 
duction of  a  raw  material  should  proceed  only  to  the  point 
of  balancing  with  the  limitations  of  procurement  abroad. 
The  Bureau  of  Mines  held  an  opposite  view,  and  clung,  in 
the  case  of  the  ores  under  discussion,  tenaciously  to  the 
doctrine  of  unlimited  stimulation  and  absolute  restriction 
of  importation.  The  Government  bureaus  maintained  that 
no  chrome  ore  should  be  permitted  to  enter  the  country,  thus 
intending  to  force  prospecting  and  ultimately  the  adoption 
of  low-grade  ores  regardless  of  the  effects  on  the  industries. 

At  another  time  the  Government  bureaus  recommended 
that  all  importation  of  manganese  be  prohibited  and  that 
the  steel  industry  be  forced  to  find  a  way  to  utilize  very  low- 
grade  ores.  The  experts  on  the  War  Industries  Board  knew 
that  this  was  an  utter  impossibility,  and  supported  the  steel 
industry  in  the  position  that  it  might  mean  the  production 


FERRO-ALLOYS  AND  WAR  MINERALS       381 

of  defective  steel,  which  would  be  disastrous.  They  thus 
insisted  on  bringing  in  a  certain  amount  of  high-grade 
material  about  which  there  could  be  no  question,  and,  while 
they  were  perfectly  willing  to  do  everything  in  their  power 
to  assist  in  American  production  within  rational  limits,  they 
were  bitterly  opposed  to  unscrupulous  developments  of 
impossible  prospects  and  mines  at  Government  expense. 
Thus,  when  Congress  appropriated  $50,000,000  under  the 
Minerals  Stimulation  Act,  the  War  Industries  Board  was  a 
party  to  the  control  of  expenditures.  Congress  later  seg- 
regated $8,500,000,^  to  be  used  under  the  direction  of  the 
Secretary  of  the  Interior,  to  compensate  producers  of 
manganese,  chrome,  pyrites,  and  tungsten  for  actually  sus- 
tained net  losses.  The  law  was  restricted  to  four  minerals, 
and  so  limited  in  its  application  that  it  naturally  could  not 
be  applied  to  compensate  the  irrational  and  unjustifiable 
ventures  that  had  been  undertaken. 

The  wisdom  of  the  War  Industries  Board  policy  was  thus 
fully  demonstrated.  It  would  be  utterly  impossible  to  per- 
mit the  production  of  a  product  at  five  to  six  times  its  peace 
price  and  then  be  forced  to  pay  another  five  to  ten  times  the 
value  on  every  ton  produced  owing  to  the  necessity  of  com- 
pensating for  the  capital  expenditure.  In  other  words,  the 
policies  of  the  bureaus  counted  on  an  eventual  payment  of 
from  ten  to  twenty  times  the  peace  price  with  a  total  loss  of 
the  property,  whereas  under  the  War  Industries  Board 
policy,  the  price  would  be  from  five  to  eight  times  the  peace 
price  with  a  possibility  of  future  development,  and  so  long 
as  shipping  could  be  obtained  from  the  neutrals  that  would 
not  interfere  with  the  military  shipping,  the  price  would  not 
rise  above  the  market  prices  which  were  really  set  by  the 
War  Industries  Board  through  the  granting  of  import  licenses 
carrying  a  specific  price  for  the  product  imported. 

The  artificial  stimulus  given  to  impractical  mining  prop- 
ositions, through  a  perfectly  honest  but  overzealous  admin- 
istration of  the  Government  bureaus,  is  a  grave  question, 
and  should  receive  careful  scrutiny  in  time  of  war.  The 
Raw  Materials  Committee  of  the  Council  of  National 
Defense,  as  early  as  April,  1917,  made  representations  to 

^Act  approved  March  2,  1919. 


1^1 


/. 


382    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


r 


!i 


the  State  Department  with  regard  to  chrome  and  manganese, 
and  assisted  in  getting  supplies  to  Brazil  and  in  having 
adequate  guards  placed  at  railroad  bridges  and  tunnels  so 
that  the  Brazilian  manganese  supply  was  at  no  time 
imperiled,  and  its  importation  price  through  the  import 
license  system  was  at  all  times  under  control.  Large 
Brazilian  deposits  eventually  became  the  property  of  the 
United  States  Steel  Corporation,  and  whereas,  before  the 
war,  the  American  steel  industry  was  practically  dependent 
upon  supplies  from  Caucasus  and  India,  the  American 
industry  now  has  available  a  much  nearer  deposit  of  large 
magnitude.  Manifestly  there  was  little  need  for  price  con- 
trol. For  a  short  time  conservation  seemed  imperative,  but 
in  the  last  months  of  the  war  the  object  of  the  section's 
activities  was  to  restrict  importations  and  sustain  the 
domestic  market  for  the  protection  and  relief  of  the  men 
who  had  responded  so  quickly  and  eflfectively  to  the  call  for 
production. 

In  1916,  tungsten  ore,  which  had  sold  as  low  as  $7.50  a 
unit  of  twenty  pounds  of  tungstic  acid  content,  sky-rocketed 
to  $93.50.  The  domestic  production  was  less  than  a 
thousand  long  tons  in  1913,  but  under  the  stimulation  of 
high  prices  it  ascended  to  4111  tons  in  1917.  There  was 
feverish  activity  in  tungsten  mining  in  California,  Colorado, 
Nevada,  and  Utah;  but  it  was  impossible  to  keep  pace  with 
domestic  consumption,  which  went  up  to  about  14,000  tons. 
As  there  was  no  possibility  of  the  home  output  meeting  the 
demand,  and  as  tungsten  ore  in  the  quantity  needed  was 
not  much  of  a  tax  on  shipping  capacity,  there  were  no 
restrictions  on  importations.  It  was  considered  wise,  also, 
to  leave  the  market  to  itself,  as  it  was  freely  responsive  to 
supply  and  demand.  While  the  domestic  producers  were 
appealed  to  for  increased  output,  as  a  precautionary 
measure,  it  was  not  considered  good  policy  to  attempt  to  give 
them  artificial  advantages  in  the  home  market. 

Tungsten  is  essential  in  the  manufacture  of  the  alloy 
steels  that  were  in  great  demand  for  high-speed  machine 
tools  in  the  war  industries.  Sixteen  to  twenty  per  cent  of 
tungsten  in  steel  imparts  to  the  alloy  tungsten's  properties 
of  high  melting  point,  hardness,  and  toughness.     In  the 


FERRO-ALLOYS  AND  WAR  MINERALS       383 

rapid  operation  of  machines  intense  heat  is  developed  by 
the  friction  of  cutting  tools.  Ordinary  steel  soon  loses  its 
temper  in  such  a  condition.  Other  uses  of  tungsten  were 
in  magnet  steels,  in  steel  for  the  valves  of  airplane  engines, 
in  X-ray  apparatus,  in  electrical  contact  points,  and  for 
filaments  of  incandescent  lamps.  No  satisfactory  substitute 
has  been  found  for  tungsten  in  the  manufacture  of  high- 
speed tools,  though  other  alloys  are  also  required. 

While  tungsten  was  not  much  of  a  problem,  vanadium 
required  the  closest  attention.  Only  a  little  is  produced  in 
the  United  States,  and  the  only  considerable  source  is  in  the 
mines  of  the  American  Vanadium  Company  in  Peru. 
Vanadium  is  used  in  high-speed  tool  steels,  automobile 
steels,  and  steel  castings  which  are  subjected  to  heavy 
dynamic  strains.  The  shortage  was  very  great,  which 
necessitated  every  possible  economy  and  conservation.  It 
was  necessary  to  supply  British  manufacturers  with  Ameri- 
can ferro-vanadium,  although  they  could  be  spared  only 
fifty  per  cent  of  their  requirements.  Prices  advanced  from 
$2.21  to  $4.76  a  pound.  No  price  control  was  necessary, 
but  to  insure  control  of  distribution  all  importations  of 
vanadium  concentrates,  as  with  the  other  ferro-alloy 
minerals,  were  consigned  to  the  American  Iron  and  Steel 
Institute,  which  operated  through  a  committee  on  ferro- 
alloys. 

There  were  some  interesting  experiments  and  develop- 
ments during  the  war  in  respect  of  molybdenum  and 
zirconium.  Molybdenum  was  tried  as  an  alloy  in  high- 
speed tools,  and  both  it  and  zirconium  were  believed  to  be 
of  exceptional  value  in  the  making  of  light  armor  plate, 
such  as  that  of  tanks.  The  Ford  Motor  Company,  which  had 
a  large  contract  for  tanks,  was  very  enthusiastic  about 
ferro-zirconium,  to  which  it  devoted  a  great  deal  of  study, 
research,  and  experimentation.  Both  the  army  and  the 
navy  turned  a  deaf  ear  to  the  possibilities  of  the  new  alloy, 
and  Mr.  Ford  appealed  to  the  White  House,  where  the 
matter  was  turned  over  to  Mr.  Baruch.  This  led  to  the  pro- 
vision by  the  War  Industries  Board  of  an  adequate  supply 
of  zirconium  ore,  and,  in  cooperation  with  the  Electro- 
Metallurgical    Company,    a    method    of    producing    ferro- 


l*lrHv1 


384    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

zirconium  was  worked  out.  The  interesting  possibilities  of 
the  new  alloy  then  attracted  the  attention  of  both  the  army 
and  the  navy,  and  there  followed  the  formation  of  the  Light 
Armor  Plate  Board,  on  which  the  War  Industries  was 
represented. 

Another  steel  alloy  material  with  which  the  War 
Industries  Board  dealt  was  ferro-silicon,  but  here  the  only 
problem  was  that  of  securing  adequate  hydro-electric  power 
for  the  manufacturers  at  Niagara  Falls,  as  the  ore  is 
abundant.  It  is  also  used  in  the  manufacture  of  hydrogen 
gas  for  balloons. 

In  the  War  Industries  Board's  administration  the  ferro- 
alloys were  finally  placed  in  a  section  by  themselves  under 
H.  W.  Sanford,  within  the  Qiemicals  Division,  but  previ- 
ously both  Messrs.  Summers  and  Replogle  had  given  much 
consideration  to  the  problems  they  involved,  and  industrially 
they  were  more  intimately  associated  with  the  work  of  the 
Steel  Division  than  that  of  the  Qiemicals  Division. 

Asbestos  is  a  mineral  product  for  which  the  United  States 
is  dependent  on  Canada  to  a  very  large  extent.  Although 
during  the  war  three  mines  with  a  satisfactory  product  were 
opened  in  Arizona,  they  are  too  far  from  railways  to  com- 
pete with  the  Canadian  product.  However,  no  international 
complications  developed.  In  mixture  with  magnesium 
carbonate,  mined  in  eastern  Pennsylvania  and  California, 
asbestos  is  used  for  heat  insulation  of  pipes,  boilers,  and 
furnaces,  etc.  The  shipbuilding,  aircraft,  and  motor-truck 
activities  of  the  war  required  large  quantities  of  this  insula- 
tion. There  was  no  control  of  the  industry  beyond  placing 
it  on  the  preference  list  and  requiring  observance  of  prior- 
ity, though  without  certificates.  R.  M.  Torrence  was  in 
charge  of  this  section,  as  well  as  that  of  chemical  glass  and 
stoneware. 

Metallic  magnesium,  which  was  in  the  province  of  the 
Miscellaneous  Chemicals  Section,  was  an  entirely  new  war 
product  in  the  United  States,  but  by  October,  1918,  three 
plants  were  producing  30,000  pounds  a  month  and  one  in 
Canada  was  turning  out  15,000  pounds  monthly.  Pro- 
duction was  far  below  requirements,  and,  if  the  programme 
of  governmental  aid  had  been  carried  out,  it  was  hoped  to 


FERRO-ALLOYS  AND  WAR  MINERALS       385 

bring  production  up  to  115,000  pounds  a  month  by  the 
summer  of  1919.  England,  France,  and  Italy  were  draw- 
ing on  the  American  production,  England  alone  calling  for 
250,000  pounds  per  annum.  The  metal  was  in  demand  for 
tracer  bullets  for  the  air  services,  artillery  shells,  alloys 
for  castings,  as  a  substitute  for  aluminum,  and  in  gas  masks; 
also  as  a  flux  for  malleable  nickel  and  monel  metal,  as  a 
deoxidizer,  and  for  flashlights. 

Mica  was  more  of  a  problem,  as  only  the  lower  grades 
are  found  in  the  United  States  and  the  best  quality  is 
imported  from  India  via  England.  The  British  Government 
made  allocations  to  the  United  States,  subject  to  Govern- 
ment control,  which  was  eff'ected  through  a  naval  com- 
mandeering order  of  imports.  The  commandeering  order 
was  later  extended  to  imports  from  South  America.  Prices 
fluctuated  greatly,  but  were  stabilized  to  some  extent  through 
the  commandeering.  There  was  a  demand  from  domestic 
producers  for  governmental  assistance,  but,  after  a  thorough 
study  of  the  subject  by  the  section  and  the  Association  of 
Southern  Mica  Miners  and  Manufacturers,  it  was  decided 
that  neither  stimulatory  price-fixing  nor  any  price-fixing 
would  be  of  much  avail,  as  there  was  little  prospect  that  the 
Government  use  of  domestic  mica  could  be  increased. 
Assistance  in  labor  priority  and  the  advisory  encouragement 
of  new  industries  was  recommended.  Mica  was  of  war-time 
importance  because  of  its  use  in  spark-plugs,  radio  appa- 
ratus, telephones,  magnetos  of  airplanes  and  automobiles, 
electric  generators,  etc.  Other  uses  are  in  the  chimneys 
of  gas  lights,  stove  windows,  and  in  the  fabrication  of 
decorating  paints  and  building  materials.  H.  J.  Adams 
was  the  first  chief  of  the  section  and  was  followed  by  J.  W. 
Paxton.  It  was  later  recognized  and  placed  in  the 
Chemicals  Division  under  C.  K.  Leith.  Lieutenant  C.  P. 
Storrs,  a  mica  expert  in  the  navy,  was  the  chief  factor  in 
directing  the  control  of  imports. 

In  concluding  this  partial  sketch  of  the  so-called  war 
minerals,  ample  credit  should  be  given  to  the  Department 
of  the  Interior,  the  late  Secretary  Franklin  K.  Lane,  the 
department's  Bureau  of  Mines,  and  the  Geological  Survey. 
Secretary   Lane  might  be   styled   the   great   mobilizer   of 


(I 


386    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

the  subterranean  war  resources  of  America.  He  was  the 
spiritual  war  leader  of  the  miners  and  metallurgical 
scientists  and  workers,  who  did  their  part  in  the  war  with 
pick  and  shovel  and  drill,  with  laboratory,  smelter,  and 
refinery.  The  Geological  Survey  combed  the  United  States 
and  even  foreign  countries  for  the  minerals  that  were 
scarce,  and  the  Bureau  of  Mines  was  tireless  in  determining 
the  economic  value  of  discoveries  and  in  encouraging  their 
utilization.  The  cooperation  of  the  Department  of  the 
Interior  was  invaluable  to  the  War  Industries  Board  as  the 
great  purveyor  of  raw  materials,  and  while  distinct  differ- 
ences developed,  as  is  always  the  case  when  engineer  and 
producer,  scientist  and  artisan,  principle  and  practice  meet, 
there  was  on  the  whole  effective  team-work  between  the 
Department  and  the  Board. 


t»< 


t  ! 


CHAPTER  XXII 
THE  WAR  IN  THE  NITRATES  AND  POTASH  SECTOR 

The  vital  need  for  nitrates  —  Why  Von  Spee  sought  Craddock's  squadron  — 
America  ignores  lack  of  nitrates  — In  the  war,  and  no  nitrate  reserves  — 
Baruch  and  Summers  take  bold  steps  — The  navy  intercepts  a  message  to  Berlin 
—  Baruch  and  Summers  beat  down  the  price  —  Securing  control  of  Chilean 
sources  — Nitrate  shortage  a  constant  specter  of  defeat  —  Developing  potash 
from  brine  — Potash  for  powder,  optical  glass,  and  gas  masks  —  Ogden  Armour 
asks  MacDowell  a  question  — The  nitrate  lesson  — Have  we  learned  it? 

The  World  War  was,  of  course,  distinguished  from  all  pre- 
ceding wars  of  modem  times  by  the  fact  that  it  was  a 
stubborn  contest  between  the  whole  moral,  economic, 
scientific,  and  industrial  as  well  as  the  military  forces  of  the 
combatant  nations.  It  was  a  one  hundred  per  cent  war  of 
nations  as  opposed  to  the  old  restricted  wars  carried  on 
between  clearly  defined  units  of  the  belligerent  nations, 
designated  as  armies  and  navies.  Strictly  speaking,  there 
are  no  longer  any  non-combatants,  for,  even  if  the  narrowly 
non-military  forces  of  a  nation  are  not  producing  the 
equipment  and  supplies  of  the  combatant  forces,  they  are 
at  all  times  directly  in  the  field  against  the  enemy  in  the 
domain  of  morale,  thought,  propaganda,  scientific  research, 
and  industrial  and  commercial  pressure  and  achievement. 
In  the  United  States  the  War  Industries  Board  stood  for 
the  industrial  corps  of  the  nation-army  with  extensive  aux- 
iliary forces  in  commerce  and  science.  It  carried  on  its 
part  of  the  war  in  well-defined  sectors  corresponding  to  the 
classifications  of  industries  and  materials,  and  always 
visualized  itself  as  an  industrial  and  economic  army 
belligerently    opposed    to    corresponding    agencies    in    the 

enemy  nations. 

No  part  of  the  industrial-military  grapple  was  more  tense 
and  breathless  than  that  of  the  nitrate  sector.  For  on 
nitrates  are  based  the  dynamics  of  projectile  warfare.  As 
water  is  to  steam,  so  are  the  nitrates  to  the  power  that  resides 
in  explosives.  On  the  side  of  the  Allies  the  nitrate  sector 
was  entrenched  in  the  dead  plains  of  Tacna  and  Arica, 


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388    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

where,  ten  thousand  miles  from  the  battle  contacts  in  France, 
are  found  the  only  important  nitrate  deposits  in  all  the 
world.  On  the  side  of  the  Germans,  nitrate  power  was 
based  on  a  highly  developed  industrial  chemistry  which  was 
capable  of  producing  all  the  nitrates  her  war  engines  might 

consume. 

It  was  not  a  purposeless  adventure  that  brought  Admiral 
Von  Spec's  fleet  across  the  Pacific  to  destroy  the  squadron 
under  command  of  Admiral  Craddock  in  the  battle  of  Cor- 
onel  oflF  the  nitrate  coast.  To  strike  at  the  source  of  the 
Allies'  nitrate  supply  was  to  paralyze  the  armies  in  France. 
The  destruction  of  a  nitrate  carrier  was  a  greater  blow  to  the 
Allies  than  the  loss  of  a  battleship.  With  American  fire- 
arms added  to  those  of  the  Allies,  the  demand  for  nitrates 
exceeded  the  possible  production  and  enforced  the  greatest 
economy  and  nicety  of  distribution  to  hold  the  fort,  whilst 
frantic  efiforts  were  being  made  to  bring  art  to  the  support 
of  nature  in  the  shape  of  nitrate-making  plants.  All  the 
men  and  aU  the  cannon  America  might  bring  to  Armageddon 
would  be  powerless  if  the  rusty  tramp  steamers  could  not 
maintain  their  drab  procession  from  Chile  to  the  ports  of 
America  and  of  the  Allies.  Nor  was  that  all,  for  the 
fertility  of  the  gardens  and  fields,  whence  the  Allies  drew 
their  food  supplies,  depended  in  no  small  measure  on  the 
nitrates  of  Chile. 

Nitric  acid,  which  is  made  from  nitrate  of  soda,  is  used 
in  mixture  with  sulphuric  acid  to  manufacture  both  pro- 
pellants  and  high  explosives.  Bleached  cotton  linters,  on 
being  nitrated,  become  nitrocellulose,  the  chief  propellant. 
If  toluol  be  nitrated,  the  product  is  T.N.T.;  if  phenol,  picric 
acid;  and  so  on  in  the  production  of  other  high  explosives. 
Not  only  are  nitrates  used  in  the  form  of  nitric  acid  in 
mixture  with  sulphuric  acid,  but  they  are  used  to  make 
sulphuric  acid  by  the  chamber  process.  So,  as  far  as  the 
Allies  were  concerned,  the  mighty  forces  that  hurled  their 
bolts  in  France,  Mesopotamia,  the  Balkans,  the  Alps,  at 
Jutland  and  Falkland,  were  latent  in  the  Chilean  deserts 
and  nowhere  else.  Thus,  even  in  the  chemistry  of  warfare, 
the  New  World  was  called  in  to  restore  the  balance  of  the 
Old. 


THE  WAR  IN  THE  NITRATES  SECTOR       389 

The  precarious  situation  of  the  United  States  with  respect 
to  nitrates  was  well  understood,  but  virtually  nothmg  was 
done  to  build  up  stores  before  our  entry  into  the  war,  though 
General  William  Crozier,  then  Chief  of  Ordnance,  had 
become  deeply  concerned  over  the  situation  a  year  earlier. 
The  Secretary  of  the  Interior  offered  the  War  Department 
the  cooperation  of  his  organization.  General  Crozier  con- 
ferred with  Dr.  C.  L.  Parsons,  chief  chemist  and  chief  ot 
the  division  of  technology  of  the  Bureau  of  Mines,  regarding 
the  nitrate  supply,  and  the  Geological  Survey  instituted 
exhaustive  but  vain  explorations  in  the  hope  of  finding 
nitrate  deposits  within  the  United  States.  ,      tvt    •      i 

In  the  following  June  the  Congress,  in  the  National 
Defense  Act,  authorized  the  President  to  direct  an  investiga- 
tion  as  to  the  best  means  of  producing  nitrates  and  nitrog- 
enous materials  used  in  munitions  and  in  fertilizers  and 
other  products  and  to  have  constructed  such  plants  as  might 
be  deemed  necessary,  $20,000,000  being  appropriated.       ^ 

There  followed  about  a  year  of  investigation  and  experi- 
mentation, the  War  Department,  the  Bureau  of  Mines,  the 
Department  of  Agriculture,  and  the  National  Academy 
cooperating.  The  War  Department  paid  the  expenses  of 
Dr.  Parsons  and  Eysten  Berg,  an  engineer,  familiar  with 
the  nitrogen-fixation  process  in  practical  use  in  Norway,  for 
a  trip  to  Europe  to  study  methods  of  manufacturing  nitric 
acid  otherwise  than  from  sodium  nitrate.  Arrangements 
were  made  with  the  Semet-Solvay  Company  to  erect  a  plant 
to  determine  whether  ammonia  could  be  commercially 
oxidized  to  nitric  acid.  The  American  Cyanamid  Company 
had  been  experimenting  with  the  oxidization  of  ammonia 
in  the  cyanamid  form  and  permitted  scrutiny  of  its  plant, 
but  withheld  certain  details.  The  Bureau  of  Mines  under- 
took studies  of  the  oxidization  process  at  Pittsburgh  and 
with  the  chemists  of  the  Semet-Solvay  Company  at  Syracuse, 
and  a  small  experimental  plant,  similar  to  the  Cyanamid 
Company's  plant,  was  erected  near  Syracuse,  platinum  gauze 
being  used  as  the  catalyzer. 

Messrs.  Parsons  and  Berg  did  not  return  from  Europe 
until  the  last  days  of  the  year.  The  former  made  a  pre- 
liminary report  in  January  and  his  final  report  to  the  Sec- 


\    ! 


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390    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

retary  of  War  on  April  30,  1918.  Meanwhile  a  committee 
of  the  National  Academy  had  been  making  studies,  and 
turned  in  its  report  to  the  Ordnance  Department  on  May 
11th.  The  two  reports  were  examined  by  a  special  com- 
mittee of  experts  and  practically  all  of  Dr.  Parsons's 
recommendations  were  adopted.  Eventually  the  War 
Department  undertook  the  erection  of  four  plants,  one  at 
Muscle  Shoals,  and  one  at  Sheffield,  Alabama,  using  differ- 
ent forms  of  the  ammonia  process,  and  the  others  in  Ohio, 
for  the  fixation  of  nitrogen  from  the  air.  In  the  meantime 
the  United  States  was  well  into  the  war,  and  had  neither 
nitrate  reserves  nor  commercial  manufacturing  plants. 
Indeed,  the  war  came  to  its  end  before  the  new  works  were 
completed;  and  we  are  as  precariously  situated  to-day  for 
a  nitrate  supply  as  ever. 

Messrs.  Baruch  and  Summers  had  become  worried  over 
the  nitrate  question  for  some  weeks  before  the  United  States 
declared  war.  The  latter  had  been,  in  his  professional 
capacity,  in  close  touch  with  the  French  and  British  supply 
officers  in  the  United  States,  was  thoroughly  aware  of  the 
enormous  explosives  requirements  of  modem  armies,  had 
closely  watched  for  ten  years  the  development  of  artificial 
nitrate  production  and  the  coal-tar  industry  in  Germany,  and 
was  deeply  impressed  by  the  scarcity  of  sodium  nitrate  and 
toluol  (for  the  manufacture  of  T.N.T.). 

Nitrate  prices  jumped  thirty-three  per  cent  when  the 
United  States  declared  war  and  another  hundred  per  cent 
within  three  weeks.  Congress  had  made  no  appropriations 
for  purchases  by  the  Government,  and  the  manufacturers  of 
explosives  were  taking  options  right  and  left  on  all  sorts 
of  materials,  thus  creating  a  fictitious  demand  and  an 
artificial  shortage.  The  whole  world,  outside  the  Teutonic 
combatants,  was  frantically  buying,  and  Chile  had  all  the 
nitrates  there  were.     It  seemed  as  if  nothing  could  be  done. 

Then,  without  a  cent  to  buy  with,  and  not  knowing  of  any 
nitrates  that  could  be  bought  if  they  had  millions,  the  Raw 
Materials  Division  announced  that  it  would  not  be  necessary 
for  bidders  for  munitions  contracts  to  attempt  to  procure 
nitrates  either  by  inquiry  or  option.  Not  only  that,  but 
bidders  were  told  to  figure  their  contracts  on  the  assurance 


THE  WAR  IN  THE  NITRATES  SECTOR       391 

of  getting  nitrates  at  four  and  one  fourth  cents  a  pound, 
though  at  that  very  moment  the  market  price  was  around 
seven  and  one  half  cents.  At  the  same  time  there  was  much 
talk  concerning  the  fixation  processes.  Buyers  lost  their 
eagerness  and  the  Chileans  were  scared.  They  were  sure 
the  Raw  Materials  Division  had  a  card  up  its  sleeve. 
Even  the  large  importers  of  nitrates  were  mystified. 

Then  Baruch  and  Summers  carefully  watched  for  some- 
thing to  make  good  with  —  and  stumbled  finally  on  the 
solution.  The  Naval  Intelligence  Office  one  day  picked  up 
a  message  from  the  Chilean  Government  to  Berlin  regarding 
the  gold  reserves  the  former  had  on  deposit  in  Berlin.  It 
wanted  to  get  them  released.  The  German  Government 
absolutely  refused  to  comply.  Quickly  the  suggestion  was 
made  to  the  Chilean  Government  that  the  United  States 
would  supply  the  necessary  gold  if  the  former  would  con- 
fiscate the  stocks  of  the  German-owned  nitrate  plants  in 
Chile,  Germany  being  a  large  importer  of  sodium  nitrate  for 
use  as  a  fertilizer  as  well  as  for  military  stocks.  These 
had  been  compelled  to  close  through  economic  measures 
taken  by  the  British  Government,  which  shut  off  their  sup- 
plies of  fuel,  jute  bags,  and  other  necessaries,  but  they  had 
235,000  tons  of  nitrates  on  hand.  The  Treasury  supplied 
the  gold,  and  the  British  waived  their  Trading-with-the- 
Enemy  Act  to  permit  the  shipment  of  bags  from  Calcutta 
and  also  provided  the  loading  facilities  and  ships. 

As  the  Allies,  through  their  American  contracts  for 
explosives,  would  share  in  these  German  nitrates,  they  were 
agreeable  to  a  proposal  that  was  now  made  to  them  to  help 
the  Raw  Materials  Division  rig  the  market,  which  was  that 
they  should  withdraw  from  the  nitrate  market  for  the  last 
three  months  of  1917.  The  disappearance  of  buyers,  coupled 
with  the  announcement  that  all  the  German  nitrates  in  Chile 
had  been  seized  and  sold  to  the  United  States  Government, 
left  the  producers  "up  in  the  air"  with  a  record  production 
and  no  market.  Nitrate  prices  broke  so  rapidly  that  Chile 
threatened  to  be  overwhelmed  with  a  financial  panic.  The 
Raw  Materials  people  had  no  desire  to  precipitate  a  real 
panic  in  Chile,  bui  the  apprehension  of  a  panic  was  grist  for 
their  mill;  arrangements  were  made  to  sustain  the  market 


>l(t 


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I 


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^p: 


392    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

at  a  fair  price  and  the  international  speculators  were  put  to 
rout. 

The  promised  price  of  four  and  one  fourth  cents  was 
beaten  by  an  eighth.  There  could  be  no  better  illustration  of 
prophetic  vision. 

Out  of  this  brilliant  maneuver  grew  the  International 
Nitrate  Executive,  which  was  merely  a  monopolistic  pool  of 
the  buying  power  with  which  to  meet  the  Chilean  producing 
monopoly.  It  was  made  up  of  representatives  of  France, 
England,  Italy,  and  the  United  States.  Its  offices  were  in 
London.  On  the  part  of  the  United  States  legitimate  trade 
interests  were  protected  by  providing  that  the  importers 
should  purchase  through  the  International  Executive  certain 
fixed  proportions  of  the  total  amount  of  the  Chilean  pro- 
duction allocated  by  the  executive  to  this  country.  To 
coordinate  and  supervise  the  operations  of  the  importers,  a 
nitrate  committee  was  established  in  New  York  with  H.  Ray 
Paige,  representing  the  War  Industries  Board,  as  manager. 
The  members  of  the  committee  were  representatives  of  the 
importing  houses.^  The  latter  were  bound  to  deliver  their 
imports  as  directed  by  the  War  Industries  Board,  receiving 
for  direct  Government  purchases  only  actual  expenses  of 
transactions  in  addition  to  cost  of  material,  and  for  other 
purchases  a  gross  commission  of  two  and  one  half  per  cent. 

The  outcome  of  the  international  pool  was  that  complete 
control  was  secured  over  the  Chilean  nitrates.  Buying  was 
as  sparing  as  possible,  and  all  the  time  great  interest  was 
kept  up  over  the  wonderful  progress  being  made  on  the 
artificial  nitrate  schemes.  On  the  other  hand,  the  entire 
Chilean  nation  was  interested  in  realizing  the  largest  pos- 
sible production  of  nitrates  as  the  mainstay  of  national  pros- 
perity. In  the  early  summer  of  1918,  the  shortage  of 
coal,  fuel  oil,  bags,  and  rolling  stock  for  the  railway 
from  the  nitrate  fields  to  the  coast  became  so  severe 
that  the  earlier  situation  was  entirely  reversed,  and  the 
Chilean  Government  made  a  special  oflfer  of  680,000  tons 
to  the  Allies  on  condition  that  the  needed  supplies  be  forth- 

^Under  this  arrangement  36  2-3  per  cent  of  the  American  share  of  nitrates 
was  handled  by  W.  R.  Grace  &  Co. ;  Du  Pont  Nitrate  Company,  33  1-3  per 
cent;  Wessel,  Duval  &  Co.,  111-3  per  cent;  H.  J.  Baker  &  Bro.,  representing 
Anthony  Gibbs  &  Co.,  182-3  per  cent. 


THE  WAR  IN  THE  NITRATES  SECTOR       393 

coming.  Through  the  intimate  cooperation  of  Winston 
Churchill  and  Baruch  the  offer  was  accepted. 

France  was  so  nearly  out  of  nitrates  that  supplies  intended 
for  American  agriculture  and  some  others,  amounting  in  all 
to  61,000  tons,  had  to  be  diverted  to  that  country.  On  May 
1st,  the  American  stock  had  dropped  to  only  six  weeks'  con- 
sumption. This  transaction  was  carried  through  by  the 
International  Executive,  to  avoid  conflict,  and  the  680,000 
tons  were  allocated  by  that  body  to  the  respective  members 
of  the  pool. 

All  of  the  foregoing  train  of  events  had  its  origin  in  a 
chance  meeting  between  Senator  Smith,  of  South  Carolina, 
and  Mr.  Baruch.  Congress,  alarmed  by  the  untoward  pos- 
sibilities of  a  lack  of  nitrates  for  fertilizer,  had  placed  funds 
at  the  disposal  of  the  Department  of  Agriculture  for  the 
purchase  of  nitrates  to  be  distributed  to  the  farmers  at  cost. 
The  Department  had  not  obtained  any  nitrates  under  this 
authority,  and  Senator  Smith,  representing  an  agricultural 
constituency,  undertook  to  push  things  a  little.  He  went  to 
the  President,  who  referred  him  to  Baruch;  from  whom  he 
learned  that  nobody  had  any  authority  to  deal  with  the 
problem.  The  Senator  went  back  to  the  President,  who  told 
him  that  Baruch  would  have  his  support  in  handling  the 
matter. 

Starting  in  with  this  leverage  of  authority,  the  Raw 
Materials  Division  rapidly  grew  into  the  whole  job.  Mr. 
Summers,  qualified  with  a  profound  knowledge  of  the 
subject,  and  as  Mr.  Baruch's  assistant  in  charge  of  chemicals, 
explosives,  and  propellants,  engineered  the  job.  He  had 
the  cooperation  of  Charles  H.  MacDowell,  of  the  Armour 
Fertilizer  Company,  who  was  a  member  of  the  Advisory 
Commission  Committee  on  Chemicals.  In  November,  1917, 
Mr.  MacDowell  took  charge  of  nitrates  and  other  chemical 
materials  in  the  Chemicals  and  Explosives  Section.  When 
the  Chemicals  Division  was  created,  he  became  the  director 
of  it.^ 

The  farmers  never  got,  during  the  period  of  the  war,  all 
the  Chilean  nitrates  that  Senator  Smith  was  after,  but  they 

*No  attempt  will  be  made  to  deal  comprehensively  in  this  text  with  the 
personnel  of  the  numerous  sections  that  had  to  do  with  chemicals  and  explo- 
sives.    Full  information  in  that  regard  will  be  found  in  the  Appendix. 


I 


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394    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

did  not  grudge  the  diversion  that  kept  the  French  guns  busy 
in  the  spring  and  summer  of  1918.  Other  nitrogenous 
materials  were  substituted  to  some  extent,  and  with  special 
care  the  crops  of  1918  came  through  in  good  shape;  but  the 
outlook  for  1919,  with  cumulative  defertilization  to  be  faced, 
was  rather  gloomy.  The  military  demand  for  sodium 
nitrate  was  expanding,  shipping  was  scarce,  scheduled  sail- 
ings were  always  off;  locomotives,  coal,  oil,  and  jute  bags 
to  keep  the  oficinas  going,  were  always  a  source  of  perpetual 
worry. 

Every  once  in  a  while  a  German  submarine  would  sink 
a  poor  old  tramp  almost  at  the  end  of  its  long  voyage  —  and 
the  whole  nitrate  situation  was  just  one  thing  after  another. 
At  one  time  the  diversion  of  a  single  vessel  loaded  with 
nitrates  from  the  United  States  to  France  was  all  that  pre- 
vented the  stoppage  of  explosives  plants  in  the  latter  country. 
Even  England  had  to  be  helped.  The  minutes  of  the  War 
Industries  Board,  correspondence,  diaries,  and  recollections 
abound  with  apprehensive  references  to  the  nitrate  situation. 

The  International  Executive  controlled  the  price  beyond 
doubt,  but  the  practical  problem  of  keeping  up  production 
by  providing  the  implements  of  production  was  all  with  the 
War  Industries  Board,  which  was  forever  haunted  by  the 
specter  of  a  war  won  or  lost  by  some  mishap  in  the  far-away 
Chilean  deserts  or  in  the  waters  between.  The  United  States 
estimates  alone  for  1919  were  put  at  2,321,086  gross  tons, 
of  which  the  strictly  military  needs  were  1,894,562  tons, 
and  there  was  no  chance  of  increasing  the  supply  in  1919. 
The  only  answer  was  in  the  nitrogen  synthetizing  and  am- 
monia nitrate  plants  then  building — and,  indeed,  the  whole 
programme  of  the  War  Industries  Board  had  been  to  hold 
the  fort  until  they  should  come  into  production.  That  was 
at  best  a  problematical  arrival. 

Explosives  and  fertilizers  are  antithetic  children  of 
nitrogen  and  potash.  Differently  applied,  these  great 
elements  of  agricultural  production  become  the  chief  imple- 
ments of  destruction.  To  divert  them  from  the  soil  to  the 
guns  is  simultaneously  to  promote  destruction  and  restrict 
production.  Germany  struck  at  the  agricultural  pro- 
ductivity of  the  United  States,  and,  indeed,  of  all  the  Allies, 


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394    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

did  not  grudge  the  diversion  that  kept  the  French  guns  busy 
in  the  spring  and  summer  of  1918.  Other  nitrogenous 
materials  were  substituted  to  some  extent,  and  with  special 
care  the  crops  of  1918  came  through  in  good  shape;  but  the 
outlook  for  1919,  with  cumulative  defertilization  to  be  faced, 
was  rather  gloomy.  The  military  demand  for  sodium 
nitrate  was  expanding,  shipping  was  scarce,  scheduled  sail- 
ings were  always  off;  locomotives,  coal,  oil,  and  jute  bags 
to  keep  the  oficinas  going,  were  always  a  source  of  perpetual 
worry. 

Every  once  in  a  while  a  German  submarine  would  sink 
a  poor  old  tramp  almost  at  the  end  of  its  long  voyage  —  and 
the  whole  nitrate  situation  was  just  one  thing  after  another. 
At  one  time  the  diversion  of  a  single  vessel  loaded  with 
nitrates  from  the  United  States  to  France  was  all  that  pre- 
vented the  stoppage  of  explosives  plants  in  the  latter  country. 
Even  England  had  to  be  helped.  The  minutes  of  the  War 
Industries  Board,  correspondence,  diaries,  and  recollections 
abound  with  apprehensive  references  to  the  nitrate  situation. 

The  International  Executive  controlled  the  price  beyond 
doubt,  but  the  practical  problem  of  keeping  up  production 
by  providing  the  implements  of  production  was  all  with  the 
War  Industries  Board,  which  was  forever  haunted  by  the 
specter  of  a  war  won  or  lost  by  some  mishap  in  the  far-away 
Chilean  deserts  or  in  the  waters  between.  The  United  States 
estimates  alone  for  1919  were  put  at  2,321,086  gross  tons, 
of  which  the  strictly  military  needs  were  1,894,562  tons, 
and  there  was  no  chance  of  increasing  the  supply  in  1919. 
The  only  answer  was  in  the  nitrogen  synthetizing  and  am- 
monia nitrate  plants  then  building — and,  indeed,  the  whole 
programme  of  the  War  Industries  Board  had  been  to  hold 
the  fort  until  they  should  come  into  production.  That  was 
at  best  a  problematical  arrival. 

Explosives  and  fertilizers  are  antithetic  children  of 
nitrogen  and  potash.  Differently  applied,  these  great 
elements  of  agricultural  production  become  the  chief  imple- 
ments of  destruction.  To  divert  them  from  the  soil  to  the 
guns  is  simultaneously  to  promote  destruction  and  restrict 
production.  Germany  struck  at  the  agricultural  pro- 
ductivity of  the  United  States,  and,  indeed,  of  all  the  Allies, 


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THE  WAR  IN  THE  NITRATES  SECTOR        395 

by  forcing  the  farmers  to  forego  for  a  time  an  element  of 
fertility  through  the  diversion  of  sodium  nitrate  to  military 
needs.  This  was  probably  an  unforeseen  economic  blow. 
But  the  moment  she  declared  war  she  knowingly  struck  a 
blow  in  the  same  vital  spot  through  her  potash  monopoly. 
Indeed,  there  were  proud  boasts  that  Germany  had  only  to 
hold  out  for  a  certain  period  to  compel  the  Allies  to  sur- 
render to  starvation,  even  though  victorious  in  arms. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  war,  Germany  had  at  Stassfurt  in 
Saxony,  and  in  Alsace  the  only  commercially  available 
sources  of  potash  in  the  world,  yet  potash  is  absolutely 
necessary  for  the  maintenance  of  fertility  in  certain  soils, 
especially  for  the  growing  of  wheat,  potatoes,  and  cotton. 
Potash  is  also  used,  though  not  in  relatively  large  quantities 
nowadays,  in  the  manufacture  of  black  explosive  powders 
and  for  many  industrial  purposes. 

As  soon  as  the  blockade  of  Germany  cut  off  the  flow  of  pot- 
ash from  that  country,  there  began  an  energetic  and  wonder- 
fully successful  attempt  to  produce  potash  in  this  country,  in 
which  the  Geological  Survey  played  an  important  part.  The 
first  commercial  success  was  scored  in  the  evaporation  of  the 
brine  of  certain  alkaline  lakes  in  the  Nebraska  sand  hills, 
and  later  from  the  Searles  Lake  deposits  in  California, 
brines  and  alunite  in  Utah,  kelp  on  the  Pacific  Coast,  etc. 
By  1918,  it  was  plain  that  the  United  States  was,  and,  at  a 
price,  could  be  made  perpetually,  independent  of  foreign 
sources.  As  with  the  other  war  minerals  the  coming  of 
peace  about  wiped  out  the  potash  industry,  in  which  $25,- 
000,000  had  been  invested,  it  being  unable  to  compete  with 
the  Stassfurt  and  Alsatian  deposits,  the  latter,  of  course, 
falling  to  France  with  the  cession  of  Alsace. 

While  with  potash,  as  with  nitrate,  the  Department  of 
Agriculture  was  chiefly  concerned  in  dealing  with  the 
fertilizer  requirements,  the  Chemicals  Section  of  the  War 
Industries  Board  was  closely  related  with  it  on  account  of 
military  requirements.  Aside  from  the  potash  required  in 
the  manufacture  of  powder,  it  was,  in  the  carbonate  form, 
essential  to  the  war-created  optical  glass  industry,  and  as 
permanganate  in  the  manufacture  of  gas  masks.  The 
Armour  Company  was  making  six  or  eight  hundred  pounds 


11 


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396    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

a  week  of  the  latter,  and  the  entire  production  was  turned 
over  to  the  Government  for  a  time  at  cost.  The  Geophysical 
Laboratory,  in  its  study  of  optical  glass,  called  on  Mr. 
MacDowell  for  the  carbonate.  He  recalled  that  the  Armour 
plant  working  on  alunite  had  turned  in  a  few  pounds  of 
very  pure  carbonate;  but  the  Laboratory  required  two  or 
three  tons  a  day. 

Before  committing  himself,  Mr.  MacDowell  wired  to  his 
chief  in  private  life,  Mr.  Ogden  Armour,  advising  him  that 
it  would  require  an  investment  of  $30,000  by  the  Armour 
people,  with  no  possibility  of  getting  out  even,  to  meet  the 
optical  glass  requirements. 

"What  in  the  devil  are  you  down  there  for?"  was  Mr. 
Armour's  answer. 

The  local  managers  said  it  would  take  three  months  to 
install  the  plant.  Mr.  MacDowell  gave  them  three  weeks  — 
and  inside  of  that  time  the  plant  was  producing  a  little  over 
a  ton  a  day. 

The  nitrate  struggle  is,  perhaps,  the  most  vivid  illustra- 
tion of  how  indispensable  to  military  efficiency  is  an  intelli- 
gent and  energetic  civil  body,  such  as  the  War  Industries 
Board,  in  dealing  with  problems  that  must  be  solved  if 
the  military  are  to  succeed  and  yet  are  foreign  to  military 
knowledge  and  experience. 

In  spite  of  this  and  a  thousand  other  illustrations  that 
may  be  drawn  from  the  bitter  experience  of  the  World  War, 
the  National  Defense  Act  of  1920  makes  no  provision  for 
what  the  war  showed  to  be  our  greatest  weakness  —  the 
absence  of  an  organized  liaison  between  the  striking  and 
the  power-creating  forces  of  the  Nation. 


CHAPTER  XXIII 
EXPLOSIVES  AND  CHEMICAL  WARFARE 

Chemical  action  in  modem  war  —  The  Board  takes  control  of  sulphur  pro- 
duction—  Five  hundred  thousand  tons  of  sulphuric  acid  monthly  attained  — 
Nitric  acid,  caustic  soda,  chlorine  —  The  mighty  cotton  linter  —  The  role  of 
alcohol  —  Summers  warns  of  the  T.N.T.  need,  and  the  army  learns  a  lesson  — 
Our  powder  on  the  Western  Front  —  America's  explosive  problem  and  pro- 
gramme—  The  plant  at  Muscle  Shoals  —  Pershing  cables  imperatively  —  The 
Board  protests  the  Du  Pont  contract  —  Baruch  calls  in  Jackling  —  What 
civilian  experts  did  in  producing  smokeless  powder. 

The  arrows  of  the  British  bowmen,  which  won  the  field  of 
Cressy  for  the  Black  Prince,  and  the  artillery  that  Froissart 
tells  of  in  his  accounts  of  sieges  of  mediaeval  castles,  were 
actuated  by  mechanical  power.  So  it  has  been  since  the 
throwing-stones  of  the  Neanderthal  man.  But  since  Con- 
stantinople fell  to  the  Turks,  projectiles  have  been  driven 
by  chemical  force.  The  fighting  weapons  of  modern  nations 
depend  almost  entirely  on  the  force  released  by  chemical 
action.  Perhaps  the  final  phase  of  warfare  will  be  the  direct 
use  of  chemicals,  as  exemplified  in  the  toxic  gases  of  the 
recent  war.  At  any  rate,  war  has  become  chemical  warfare. 
In  the  last  analysis  warfare  in  the  twentieth  century  is  very 
largely  a  matter  of  nitric  and  sulphuric  acid. 

The  preceding  chaptei*  sketched  the  story  of  the  raw 
material  of  nitric  acid.  There  remains  to  be  told  something 
of  sulphuric  acid  as  an  implement  of  combat  and  something 
of  the  forms  the  products  of  these  two  fundamentals  of  war 
take  in  their  final  form  as  controllable  explosives. 

As  we  have  seen,  sulphuric  acid  is  used  in  combination 
with  nitric  acid  to  eff'ect  the  nitration  of  certain  materials 
for  the  purpose  of  making  explosives.  Before  1917,  the 
large  part  of  the  sulphuric  acid  manufactured  in  the  United 
States  was  made  from  pyrites  ore  imported  from  Spain.  The 
activities  of  German  submarines  and  the  tremendous  demands 
on  trans-Atlantic  shipping  made  it  necessary  to  turn  to  home 
resources,  which  were  found  in  the  pure  sulphur  of  Louisiana 


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398    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

and  Texas,  Canadian  and  domestic  pyrites,  and  in  the  waste 
gases  of  copper  and  zinc  smelters.  The  problem  was  to 
make  these  sources  not  only  yield  substitute  amounts  of 
pyrites,  but  to  meet  the  demand  for  larger  production.  A 
largely  increased  production  of  domestic  pyrites,  chiefly  in 
the  South,  was  effected;  but  the  long,  expensive,  and  time- 
consuming  haul  from  the  Colorado,  California,  and  other 
Western  sources  made  it  impossible  except,  as  a  last  resort, 
to  rely  on  pyrites. 

The  brunt  of  the  burden  fell  on  the  brimstone  mines, 
ninety-eight  per  cent  of  the  production  of  which  in  the 
entire  country  was  in  the  hands  of  the  Union  Sulphur 
Company  and  the  Freeport  Sulphur  Company.  The  sul- 
phuric acid  requirements  for  explosive  purposes  were  esti- 
mated to  be  9,000,000  tons  for  1918;  300,000  short  tons 
of  sulphur  were  needed  for  the  paper  pulp  and  other 
industries,  and  the  Allies  were  in  need  of  150,000  tons. 
The  outlook  was  that  the  brimstone  mines  ought  to  produce 
1,500,000  tons,  whereas  their  maximum  capacity,  as 
developed,  was  not  more  than  1,300,000  tons,  with  produc- 
tion actually  going  on  at  the  rate  of  only  1,200,000  tons  in 
the  spring  of  1918. 

In  these  circumstances  it  was  held  wise  for  the  War 
Industries  Board  to  take  entire  control  of  the  product  of 
the  mines.  This  was  done  by  the  Sulphur  and  Pyrites 
Section  in  cooperation  with  a  committee  of  the  Chemicals 
Alliance.  With  the  assistance  of  the  Shipping  Board  and 
the  Railroad  Administration,  arrangements  were  made  for 
expediting  cargoes  by  sea  and  through  trains  by  land.  The 
price  of  sulphur,  by  agreement  with  the  fertilizer  sub- 
committee in  the  spring  of  1918,  had  been  fixed  at  $22  a 
ton,  in  harmony  with  the  Raw  Materials  Division's  basic 
plan  of  stabilizing  the  prices  of  materials  in  advance  of  the 
bulging  demand.  This  price,  which  was  the  normal  pre-war 
price,  was  maintained  for  Government  requirements,  direct 
or  indirect,  although  market  quotations  stood  at  $35.  Thus 
sulphur  affords  another  brilliant  example  of  the  remarkable 
manner  in  which  the  War  Industries  Board  held  down  the 
prices  of  materials. 

The  production  of  sulphuric  and  nitric  acids  was  under 


EXPLOSIVES  AND  CHEMICAL  WARFARE    399 

the  Acids  and  Heavy  Chemicals  Section,  and  its  most 
important  work  was  in  the  encouragement  of  production  of 
the  former,  the  output  of  the  latter  always  being  limited 
by  the  scarcity  of  nitrate  of  soda.  The  total  sulphuric  plant 
capacity  of  the  country  increased  from  427,000  tons  a  month 
to  501,000  during  1918,  through  additions  to  the  works  of 
the  Du  Pont  Company,  the  Hercules  Company,  the  Atlas 
Company,  the  General  Chemical  Company,  and  of  smaller 
producers,  and  by  Government  construction  in  connection 
with  the  War  Department's  smokeless  powder  plants  at  Nitro, 
West  Virginia,  and  Nashville,  Tennessee.  At  the  signing 
of  the  armistice,  plants  were  under  way  with  a  capacity  of 
37,650  tons  a  month. 

These  increases  were  on  top  of  large  increases  following 
the  beginning  of  the  war  in  Europe.  Prices  for  Government 
consumption  were  established  by  agreement  late  in  1917 
at  $18,  $30,  and  $35,  respectively,  for  the  three  different 
qualities.  Following  an  investigation  of  production  costs 
by  the  Federal  Trade  Commission,  the  Price-Fixing  Com- 
mittee, in  June,  1918,  altered  these  prices  to  $18,  $28,  and 
$32.  In  September  they  were  again  reduced,  to  $16,  $25, 
and  $28. 

The  situation  with  respect  to  nitric  acid,  in  view  of  the 
limited  supply  of  sodium  nitrate,  was  one  of  conservation 
rather  than  production.  Had  the  war  continued,  it  would 
have  been  necessary  to  curtail  the  use  of  nitric  acid  in  the 
manufacture  of  celluloid,  aniline  oil,  and  other  products. 
Originally,  by  agreement  between  the  War  and  Navy 
Departments  and  the  producers,  the  Government  price  was 
71^  cents  a  pound;  later,  at  the  instance  of  the  section,  the 
Price-Fixing  Committee  made  the  price  8^2  cents  a  pound. 
This  section  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  basic  nitric  acid 
problem,  the  importation  of  nitrates  being  under  the  direct 
supervision  of  Mr.  MacDowell,  and  the  synthetization  plants 
being  a  War  Department  project  with  which  the  War 
Industries  Board  had  little  direct  contact,  although  deeply 
interested  in  promoting  their  success  and  continually  spur- 
ring on  these  and  other  governmental  munitions  projects 
with  all  the  resources  at  its  command. 

Caustic  soda  is  another  important  member  of  the  chemical 


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400    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


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military  forces.  Its  chief  direct  use  as  a  fighting  chemical 
was  in  the  manufacture  of  phenol  for  picric  acid,  which 
was  in  great  demand  for  explosives  by  the  French  and 
Italian  armies.  When  the  Alkali  and  Chlorine  Section  was 
formed  in  April,  1918,  it  was  discovered  that  both  the  War 
Industries  Board  and  the  War  Trade  Board  were  correct  in 
their  position  that  there  was  no  surplus  production  in  the 
United  States,  and  it  was  demonstrated  that  there  was  a 
grave  shortage  impending.  As  there  were  important  indus- 
trial uses  of  caustic  soda  for  textiles,  and  making  soap  and 
glycerine  and  drugs  and  dyes,  it  was  necessary  to  reduce 
exports  to  South  America  by  one  third. 

Thanks  to  the  cooperative  spirit  of  the  industry,  there 
were  no  difficulties  in  the  matters  of  price  and  allocation. 
Plants  were  extended  and  the  Government  erected  two  new 
ones.  Extensive  curtailments  were  effected  in  the  con- 
sumption of  caustic  soda  by  the  cotton  finishers,  soap  manu- 
facturers, and  lye-makers.  The  price  had  early  been  fixed 
by  agreement  at  $3.50  for  Government  account,  and 
remained  unchanged.  There  were  five  high-cost  producers 
who  could  not  survive  at  this  price,  and  they  were  relieved  of 
Government  allocations  and  permitted  to  sell  their  product 
in  the  open  market,  where  the  price  was  much  higher. 

Only  a  small  proportion  of  the  country's  production  of 
soda  ash  was  required  for  the  military  programme,  directly, 
but  the  war  brought  a  great  increase  of  indirect  demands, 
and  both  production  and  prices  rose  greatly  —  the  latter 
as  much  as  four  or  five  times  the  pre-war  level.  By  agree- 
ment with  the  producers,  the  Government's  needs  were  met 
at  $1.57  a  hundred  pounds,  as  against  an  outside  market 
price  of  about  a  dollar  more.  No  control  of  this  industry 
was  required. 

Potash,  used  in  the  making  of  black  powder,  was  handled 
by  this  section,  but  has  been  discussed  elsewhere. 

Chlorine  was  needed  for  war  purposes  in  the  manufacture 
of  toxic  gases,  materials  for  smoke  screens,  and  textile 
bleaching  powder.  Besides  domestic  needs,  France  had  to 
have  three  hundred  tons  a  month.  By  July,  1918,  it  was 
discovered  that  there  was  a  shortage  of  at  least  twenty  per 
cent  in  liquid  chlorine.     Stringent  curtailment  orders  were 


EXPLOSIVES  AND  CHEMICAL  WARFARE    401 

issued,  and  in  October  it  was  decided  to  commandeer  the 
industry,  but  the  end  of  the  war  intervened.  The  Govern- 
ment's requirements  of  bleaching  powder  represented  half 
the  production,  and  compulsory  orders  were  issued,  at  the 
same  time  that  pulp  and  textile  industries  were  cut  down  to 
one  half  their  ordinary  consumption. 

Whiskey  manufacturers  addressed  themselves  to  the 
manufacture  of  ethyl  alcohol,  after  prohibition  had  denied 
them  the  privilege  of  supplying  it  to  the  human  system. 
The  dismantling  of  their  plants  was  held  up  and  in  every 
other  feasible  way  the  production  of  alcohol  was  stimulated, 
as  it  was  needed  in  very  large  quantities  in  the  manufacture 
of  smokeless  powder,  in  the  refining  of  T.N.T.,  for  toxic 
gases,  airplane  dope,  etc. 

The  tiny  little  fibers  of  cotton  that  adhere  to  the  seed  as 
it  comes  from  the  gin  fight  in  chemical  union  with  nitric 
and  sulphuric  acid  in  the  form  of  smokeless  powder.  In 
them  the  cotton-fields  of  the  South  united  with  the  nitrate- 
beds  of  Chile,  the  coke-ovens  of  the  Appalachians,  the 
pyrites  of  Spain,  and  the  sulphur  of  Louisiana  and  Texas 
to  spread  death  and  destruction.  So  great  was  the  demand 
for  cotton  linters  that  their  use  was  denied  to  mattresses, 
pads,  horse  collars,  celluloid,  felts,  and  the  like,  and  sub- 
stitution, formerly  "the  crime  of  the  age,"  but  now  become 
a  cardinal  virtue,  supplied  their  place. 

The  cotton-seed  crushers  were  conscripted  and  directed  to 
produce  no  linters  except  for  the  Government,  and  a  pool, 
of  international  scope,  was  created  to  see  that  everybody 
concerned  got  a  fair  share  of  the  mighty  little  things. 
France,  England,  Canada,  Belgium,  Italy,  American  manu- 
facturers, and  the  Ordnance  Department,  acting  for  the 
United  States  Government,  made  up  the  pool.  The  last 
undertook  the  financing  and  the  handling  of  all  aspects  of 
the  business  except  matters  relating  to  allocation,  storage, 
specifications,  statistics,  and  the  like,  which  were  handled 
by  the  section.  The  Du  Pont  American  Industries  acted  as 
purchasing  agent  for  the  Ordnance  Department.  Five 
hundred  thousand  bales  of  linters  were  acquired,  but  even 
that  would  not  have  been  enough,  plus  future  production, 
if  the  war  had  continued,  and  the  substitution  alternative 


( 


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i 


:W!.i 


\ 


i\ 


'M 


I! 


402    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

was  closely  examined,  hull  fiber  and  wood  pulp  being  the 
substitute  materials. 

"We  are  not  interested,"  said  the  representatives  of  the 
army  and  navy  at  the  first  meeting  of  the  General  Munitions 
Board,  when  Mr.  Summers,  in  presenting  the  situation  of 
the  country  as  to  explosives,  spoke  of  the  importance  of 
T.N.T.,  and  especially  of  the  shortage  of  toluol  needed  in 
its  manufacture.  Within  a  few  months  the  army  and  navy 
were  abstracting  toluol  from  the  gas  of  the  kitchen  stove  and 
the  parlor  light  jets,  thus' adding  to  low  living  and  the  high 
cost  thereof,  in  order  to  scrape  together  enough  for  the 
T.N.T.  programme. 

Nothing  had  been  learned  from  the  disastrous  attempt 
of  Lord  Kitchener  to  oppose  old-fashioned  shrapnel  to 
modem  high  explosives.  But  Summers  knew  better,  and  he 
and  Baruch  passed  the  word  along  to  the  Du  Fonts  to  corral 
all  the  toluol  they  could.  This  was  the  beginning  of  an 
explosives  undertaking  under  the  Ordnance  Department  that 
involved  the  erection  of  fifty-three  plants  and  the  expendi- 
ture of  more  than  $350,000,000  in  the  next  eighteen  months. 
As  in  other  supply  matters,  the  parsimony  and  blindness  of 
pre-war  days  enforced  wasteful  haste. 

In  explosives  America  was  to  make  up  the  debt  she  owed 
the  Allies,  and  particularly  France,  in  guns.  Guns  for 
explosives  was  the  friendly  pact  made  to  fit  the  needs  and 
circumstances  of  the  hour.  America  was  to  supply  all  of 
her  own  explosives,  at  least  half  of  France's,  and  most  of 
Italy's.  The  United  States  contained  all  of  the  materials 
for  the  making  of  propellants  and  exploding  charges,  except 
sodium  nitrate,  and  she  was  nearer  to  the  source  of  that 
than  the  Allies.  As  the  materials  weighed  eight  to  twenty 
times  the  finished  product,  economy,  as  well  as  the  scarcity 
of  ocean  transport,  dictated  that  the  United  States  should 
furnish  the  powder,  just  as  previously  sketched  circum- 
stances indicated  that  France  should  supply  the  guns  —  in 
the  beginning. 

Moreover,  while  the  Allies  had  built  up  a  great  explosives 
industry  in  this  country  before  our  entry  into  the  war, 
nothing  comparable  had  been  accomplished  in  artillery- 
making  capacity.     In  the  powders  we  got  off  from  a  running 


EXPLOSIVES  AND  CHEMICAL  WARFARE    403 

start;  in  guns,  from  a  standing  start.  First  and  last,  it  was 
American-made  powder  that  drove  half  the  projectiles  that 
rained  on  the  Germans  from  Goritz  to  Ostend.  Let  this 
not  be  forgotten  by  those  dour  critics  who  tell  of  the  guns 
and  shells  and  airplanes  that  did  not  get  to  the  front.  Also 
be  it  remembered  that  reserves  have  won  many  a  battle  with- 
out firing  a  shot. 

As  the  expansion  of  the  production  of  explosives  was 
largely  one  of  direct  action  by  the  Government,  instead  of 
reliance  upon  private  industry,  the  direction  and  responsi- 
bility for  the  programme  were  more  fully  War  Department 
matters  than  was  the  case  with  most  commodities.  At  the 
same  time  the  industrial  effects  and  relations  involved  were 
so  complex  and  so  far-reaching  that  the  War  Industries 
Board  was  compelled  to  carry  a  heavy  burden  of  cooperation 
with  the  Ordnance  people;  so  great,  indeed,  that  it  finally 
had  to  create  an  Explosives  Division,  headed  by  Mr.  M.  F. 

Chase. 

The  explosives  problem  was  a  dual  one,  the  two  parts 
being  propellants  and  bursting  charges  for  shells  —  the 
latter  being  variously  designated  as  high  explosives.  Before 
the  World  War,  high  explosives  had  not  been  as  commonly 
used  as  fillers  for  large  projectiles.  The  navies  were  formerly 
more  interested  in  high  explosives  than  the  armies,  but  the 
Germans  sprang  a  dismaying  surprise  in  their  liberal  use 
of  high-explosive  shells  in  field  warfare  —  so  much  so  that 
the  Allies  were  lucky  to  hang  on  while  they  were  rebuilding 
their  munition  programmes  to  meet  like  with  like.  Such 
high-explosives  powder  as  was  in  use  by  the  American  army 
and  navy  was  ammonium  picrate  —  which,  of  course,  tended 
to  make  the  military  authorities  further  indifferent  to  T.N.T. 

The  three  leading  high  explosives  are  ammonium  nitrate, 
T.N.T.,  and  picric  acid.  As  has  just  been  said,  the  Ameri- 
cans  used  a  modification  of  the  first  and  last,  while  the 
British  and  Germans  favored  T.N.T.,  and  the  French  and 
Italians  picric  acid.  However,  the  Allies  had  discovered 
that  a  mixture  of  ammonium  nitrate  and  T.N.T.  made  a  shell- 
filler  that  was  both  cheaper  and  more  easily  procurable  than 
T.N.T.,  and  in  October,  1917,  this  mixture,  known  as  amatol, 
was  adopted  by  the  United  States  army.     The  result  was 


( 


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If 


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404    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


■■i 


I 


the  creation  of  a  tremendous  demand  for  both  ingredients. 
The  Allies  had  built  up  through  their  patronage  of  private 
United  States  plants  a  T.N.T.  capacity  of  five  million  pounds 
a  month,  but  they  needed  it  all  and  more;  and  it  would  have 
been  the  height  of  absurdity  to  have  interfered  with  their 
supply  in  order  to  promote  the  munitions  programme  of  the 
American  army. 

Toluol  was  the  neck  of  the  bottle  in  T.N.T.  production  so 
long  as  the  nitrate  supply  would  hold  out,  although  the 
ammonia  supply,  not  only  for  it,  but  also  for  ammonium 
nitrate,  was  also  a  subject  of  deep  concern.  The  production 
of  toluol  and  ammonia  was  bound  up  with  the  by-product 
coking  industry,  which  in  turn  was  normally  dependent  for 
justified  expansion  on  the  patronage  of  the  steel  industry. 
Thus  it  came  about  that,  because  we  had  neglected  our  coal- 
tar  by-products,  we  were  weak  in  the  material  from  which 
high  explosives  were  made  that  we  needed  to  export  into 
the  German  lines  with  projectiles  as  carriers.  On  the  other 
hand,  just  in  proportion  as  Germany  had  built  up  her  coal- 
tar  industry,  so  had  she  ultimately  fortified  herself  with  the 
materials  for  high  explosives.^ 

In  making  it  possible  for  the  world  to  be  cheaply  gorgeous, 
Germany  had  made  it  possible  for  herself  to  be  supreme  in 
high  explosives.  To  meet  German  readiness  it  was  neces- 
sary for  the  unready  America  to  rob  the  city  gas  plants  of 
their  toluol,  build  numerous  by-product  coke-ovens  solely 
for  war  purposes  with  haste  and  waste,  and  expand  in  every 
possible  way  the  production  of  T.N.T.  The  Du  Pont  plant 
at  Barksdale,  Wisconsin,  enlarged  its  capacity  by  2,000,000 
pounds  a  month,  and  the  Hercules  plant  at  Giant,  California, 
by  3,500,000  pounds.  Contracts  were  let  for  Government 
plants  at  Racine,  Wisconsin;  Giant,  California;  and  at  Perry- 
ville,  Maryland,  calling  for  a  monthly  capacity  of  12,000,000 
pounds.  Although  none  of  these  plants  was  in  production 
when  the  war  ended,  the  total  T.N.T.  capacity  of  the  country 
had  then  risen  to  22,000,000  pounds  monthly. 

As  the  magnitude  of  the  requirements  for  propellants  and 
explosives  continued  to  increase,  the  War  Industries  Board 
urged  on  the  War  Department  the  necessity  of  providing 

*See  Qiapter  XXV. 


EXPLOSIVES  AND  CHEMICAL  WARFARE    405 

some  substitute  for  the  Chile  nitrates.  It  became  evident  in 
the  middle  of  1917  that  the  programme  would  require  a 
consumption  of  nitrates  greater  than  the  entire  output  of 

Chile. 

The  only  recourse,  therefore,  was  to  evolve  some  system 
of  obtaining  the  fixed  nitrogen  from  the  atmosphere.  An 
experimental  plant  had  been  undertaken  by  the  Government 
in  1916,  located  at  Muscle  Shoals,  Alabama.  After  numer- 
ous conferences  with  the  War  Department  and  after  repeated 
urgings  from  the  War  Industries  Board,  it  was  decided  m 
December,  1917,  to  locate  a  second  plant  at  Muscle  Shoals 
known  as  plant  No.  2,  this  plant  to  have  a  capacity  of 
110,000  tons  of  ammonia  nitrate  per  annum. 

The  system  adopted  was  a  process  which  first  makes 
calcium  carbide  and  from  this  a  product  called  cyanamide. 
The  War  Industries  Board  was  in  favor  of  this  process,  as 
it  involved  no  experimental  feature  and  as  there  were  a 
number  of  plants  in  Europe  and  a  small  plant  in  operation 
at  Niagara  Falls.  Furthermore,  the  process  could  be  ex- 
tended and  furnish  products  of  fundamental  importance  in 
the  manufacture  of  the  varnish  or  dope  for  airplane  wings, 
and  also  could  be  used  in  one  of  the  most  deadly  gases  to 
be  used  in  toxic  gas  warfare. 

The  War  Department  entered  into  contracts  for  the  con- 
struction of  the  plant  and  had  exclusive  control  of  the  ex- 
penditures made.  Plant  No.  2  at  Muscle  Shoals  represented 
the  first  step  of  the  Government  to  make  itself  independent 
of  the  importation  of  nitrate  of  soda  from  Chile,  and  marks 
one  of  the  most  important  measures  for  the  national  defense 
that  has  ever  been  inaugurated.  Following  the  armistice, 
a  great  deal  of  criticism  was  leveled  at  this  plant,  but,  owing 
to  the  natural  advantage  of  a  large  water-power  capable  of 
economical  development,  and  the  possibilities  of  utilizing 
the  power  and  the  plant  for  essential  materials  of  war,  the 
eventual  outcome  should  be  beyond  any  question  of  doubt. 
Picric  acid  calls  for  the  nitration  of  phenol,  another  coal- 
tar  product.  The  United  States  used  but  little  of  it,  but  the 
French  demand  built  up  a  great  production  from  numerous 
plants,  which  had  attained  to  135,000,000  pounds  annual 
capacity  by  the  spring  of  1918.     Nevertheless,  the  War 


! 


il 


TJ-? 


406    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Industries  Board,  mindful  of  our  obligations  to  the  Allies, 
recommended,  early  in  January,  1918,  that  a  $30,000,000 
Government  picric  acid  plant  be  erected.  Incidentally,  it 
may  be  said  that  the  Board  at  the  same  time  recommended 
a  like  plant  for  the  manufacture  of  T.N.T.  Because  of  the 
shipping  congestion,  France  and  Italy  could  not  import 
enough  phenol,  nitric  acid,  and  sulphuric  acid  to  keep  their 
picric  acid  plants  running;  so  they  had  to  fall  back  on 
American  production  of  the  finished  article.  France  imder- 
took  to  take  seventy  per  cent  of  the  additional  production, 
Italy  twenty  per  cent  and  the  United  States  was  to  use  ten 
per  cent.  Instead  of  one  large  plant  the  Ordnance  Depart- 
ment began  three  plants:  one  at  Little  Rock,  Arkansas;  one 
at  Grand  Rapids,  Michigan;  and  a  third  at  Brunswick, 
Georgia,  At  the  same  time  steps  were  taken  for  additional 
production  of  phenol  and  the  acids  and  other  materials  re- 
quired in  making  picric  acid. 

The  reader  may  wonder  why  it  is  that  dynamite  does  not 
figure  in  the  list  of  military  high  explosives.  The  reason  is 
that  it  is  so  unstable  that  die  shock  of  the  discharge  of  the 
gim  would  burst  the  shell  containing  dynamite.  That  is  why, 
in  the  Spanish-American  War,  the  United  States  experi- 
mented with  a  pneumatic  gim  for  projecting  dynamite- 
filled  projectiles  into  the  Spanish  defenses  at  Santiago. 
Since  that  time  all  the  nations  have  developed  more  stable 
high  explosives,  stable  enough  to  resist  the  explosion  of  the 
propelling  discharge,  and  to  require  a  detonator  within  the 
projectile  to  make  it  explode  at  the  required  moment.  The 
old  black-powder  shells  exploded  by  means  of  a  burning  fuse, 
but  the  high-explosives  shells  "let  go"  only  in  response  to 
a  priming  explosion  within  themselves. 

While  high  explosives  were  thus  in  use  by  France  and 
England,  it  remained  for  Germany  to  introduce  them  in  im- 
mense quantities  and  in  heavy  projectiles  in  field  warfare 
against  troops  instead  of  confining  them  to  naval  warfare 
and  the  battering  of  fortifications.  While  the  United  States 
was  a  large  manufacturer  of  commercial  dynamite,  required 
for  blasting  in  mining  operations,  excavating,  tunneling, 
and  other  peaceful  uses,  it  was  a  tyro  in  the  production  of 
military  high  explosives  in  1914. 


EXPLOSIVES  AND  CHEMICAL  WARFARE    407 

High  explosives,  because  of  their  terrific  rapidity  of  de- 
tonation, cannot  be  used  as  propellants.  The  powder  whose 
discharge  drives  the  projectile  from  the  gun  must  be  slow- 
burning  in  order  that  its  force  shall  be  exerted  in  expelling 
the  projectile  instead  of  exploding  the  gun.  The  United 
States  had  led  the  way  in  the  development  of  the  modem 
smokeless  powder,  which  it  had  attained  in  the  form  of 
nitro-cellulose  whereby  a  slow-burning  substitute  was  found 
for  the  nitro-glycerine  which  is  the  base  of  dynamite,  but 
it  had  small  capacity  for  its  production. 

Our  great  manufacturers  of  explosives  knew  so  little 
about  it  that  it  was  with  difficulty  that  the  British  Govern- 
ment induced  the  Du  Fonts  to  take  a  contract  for  nitro- 
cellulose. The  process  of  manufacture  is  complicated,  in- 
volving almost  every  form  of  industrial  chemistry,  such  as 
the  manufacture  of  sulphuric  and  nitric  acids,  caustic 
liquor,  the  bleaching  and  purification  of  cotton  for  nitration, 
the  solution  and  mixing  of  guncotton,  all  of  the  problems  of 
the  paper  mill,  the  manufacture  of  alcohol  and  ether,  gen- 
eration and  transmission  of  steam  in  tremendous  units,  and 
many  mechanical  problems. 

By  the  time  the  United  States  got  into  the  war,  though 
the  then  developed  capacity  for  the  making  of  smokeless 
powder  was  large,  it  was  far  from  being  large  enough,  for 
it  Was  necessary  to  leave  intact  and  even  augment  the  sources 
of  supply  of  the  Allies  and  meet  incredibly  large  require- 
ments of  our  own  forces.  Both  the  Du  Pont  Company  and 
the  Hercules  Company  increased  their  capacities,  and  two 
enormous  Government-owned  plants  were  undertaken;  one, 
the  "Old  Hickory"  plant,  being  located  at  Nashville,  Ten- 
nessee, and  the  other  at  the  new  town  of  Nitro,  near 
Charleston,  West  Virginia.  Both  are  to  be  numbered  among 
the  most  colossal  building  achievements  in  the  history  of 
mankind.  Yet  to-day  they  are  nothing  but  scrap!  The 
only  delay  in  connection  with  them  was  the  delay  in 
determining  upon  them.  The  contemplated  cost  of 
$90,000,000  for  a  single  plant  and  the  possible  reluctance 
to  entrust  such  an  enterprise  to  such  an  ogre  of  the  trust 
world  as  the  Du  Fonts,  as  well  as  the  fear  of  profiteering, 
caused  the  Secretary  of  War  to  hesitate  long. 


1 


i 


.it 


t 

■ 


!1 


408    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

In  accordance  with  the  Franco-American  agreement. 
General  Pershing  had  cabled  the  War  Department  on  August 
23,  1917,  that  "under  pain  of  incurring  disaster"  and  "to 
avoid  calamity"  the  United  States  Government  must  "furnish 
all  powders  and  explosives  needed  for  present  contracts  with 
the  French  Government,"  and  "that  the  United  States  Gov- 
ernment furnish  by  December  three  hundred  tons  per  day 
of  explosives  and  two  hundred  tons  per  day  of  powder  for 
French  consumption."  This  was  on  top  of  a  domestic  short- 
age of  smokeless  powder  for  our  army  alone  of  about 
350,000,000  pounds  for  1918  and  of  450,000,000  for 
1919 — figuring  on  the  then  rate  of  production.  Accord- 
ingly, General  Crozier  (then  Chief  of  Ordnance)  at  once 
drafted  an  agreement  with  the  Du  Fonts  for  the  erection 
and  operation  of  a  Government-owned  plant  to  produce 
1,000,000  pounds  a  day.  It  was  still  held  up  as  late  as 
Deceinber  13,  1917,  while  the  War  Department  considered 
direct  Government  construction  and  operation. 

The  War  Industries  Board  had  from  the  beginning  re- 
peatedly called  the  attention  of  both  the  army  and  the  navy 
to  the  grave  shortage  in  smokeless  powder  capacity.  Mr. 
Summers  was  placed  on  a  committee  with  Admiral  Fletcher, 
of  the  navy,  and  General  Pierce,  of  the  army,  and  the 
navy  immediately  imdertook  the  extension  of  their  Indian 
Head  plant,  which  would  provide  for  their  requirements, 
but  the  army  continued  to  hesitate  and  delay. 

Finally,  the  important  contract  for  a  million  pounds  of 
powder  a  day  was  entered  into  between  the  War  Depart- 
ment and  the  Du  Pont  Company.  The  War  Industries  Board 
had  not  been  consulted  concerning  this  contract.  It  protested 
against  this,  and  insisted  that  the  contract  be  cancelled,  hold- 
ing that  it  would  be  utterly  impossible  to  grant  to  the 
Du  Pont  Company  a  contract  which  offered  the  possibilities 
of  a  profit  of  sixty  or  seventy  millions  of  dollars  at  Govern- 
ment expense.  It  held  that,  if  the  Du  Pont  Company  would 
not  render  its  assistance  in  the  construction  of  a  Govern- 
ment-owned plant  which  should  produce  powder  for  the 
Government  without  profit,  the  Government  should  construct 
the  plant  with  civilian  experts,  the  War  Industries  Board 
maintaining  that  there  were  civilian  experts  who  would  con- 
struct a  plant  independently  of  the  Du  Fonts. 


EXPLOSIVES  AND  CHEMICAL  WARFARE    409 


On  these  representations,  the  Secretary  of  War  cancelled 
the  Du  Pont  contract,  and  Mr.  D.  C.  Jackling,  a  famous 
mining  engineer,  was  called  to  Washington  by  Mr.  Baruch 
to  take  charge  of  the  situation.  He  immediately  assembled 
an  organization  of  civilian  talent  and  undertook  the  con- 
struction of  the  famous  Nitro  plant,  to  have  a  capacity  of 
625,000  pounds  of  powder  a  day. 

This  plant  produced  its  first  powder  in  September,  1918, 
and  was  ninety  per  cent  complete  at  the  time  of  the  armistice, 
having  produced  4,533,000  pounds  of  powder  and  having 
been  built  by  former  civilian  engineers  without  regular  army 
or  navy  officers  or  experts  of  the  Du  Pont  companies. 

In  other  words,  within  nine  months  civilian  technical 
talent  had  constructed  one  of  the  largest  powder  plants  of 
the  world,  and  smokeless  powder  was  successfully  produced. 
This  grade  of  powder  was  considered  one  of  the  most  com- 
plicated and  intricate  products  required  in  modem  war. 
Mr.  Jackling,  on  the  29th  day  of  January,  as  director  of  the 
United  States  Government  Explosive  Plants  Units,  was  able, 
by  reason  of  the  then  recognized  strength  of  his  organization, 
to  conclude  with  the  Du  Pont  Company  a  contract  for  the 
erection  and  operation  of  a  second  large  plant  ("Old 
Hickory,"  Nashville)  on  a  basis  of  compensation  that  re- 
moved the  undertaking  from  the  category  of  profit  con- 
tracts. 

This  feat  must  be  credited  primarily  to  the  War  Industries 
Board,  as  it  had  been  the  one  critic  of  the  policy  that  nobody 
but  the  Du  Pont  Company  could  construct  a  plant  that  would 
produce  acceptable  smokeless  powder.^  A  large  saving 
to  the  Government  was  effected  through  the  construction  of 
one  plant  by  civilian  talent  and  the  amendment  of  the 
Du  Pont  contract. 

Both  the  Nitro  and  Nashville  plants  included  the  com- 
plete housing  and  equipment  of  a  city.    Each  plant  provided 

^General  Crozier  fully  reviews  his  smokeless  powder  plans  and  negotiations 
in  his  book.  Ordnance  and  the  World  War  (Scribner's),  and  says  on  page  249: 
"The  Du  Pont  Company  had  such  incomparably  greater  experience  than  any 
other  agency  in  America  in  the  construction  and  operation  of  plants  for  the 
manufacture  of  smokeless  powder,  and  was  so  well  provided  with  plans  of 
construction  and  administrative  and  technical  staff,  in  a  going  organization, 
that  I  had  no  hesitation  in  recommending  that  the  company  be  empowered  to 
erect  and  operate  a  plant  for  the  Government  in  accordance  with  the  proposi- 
tion which  it  submitted.*' 


it 


410    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

for  all  steps  in  the  manufacture,  from  the  making  of  the 
acids  and  other  chemicals  to  the  complete  smokeless  powder. 
The  Nashville  plant  started  its  first  acid  unit  in  June;  the 
first  acid  unit  of  Nitro  was  started  a  few  days  later.  The 
temporary  operation  of  the  Nashville  plant  in  making 
powder  was  started  in  July.  The  Nitro  permanent  operation 
was  started  in  August.  When  the  armistice  came,  the  two 
plants  were  practically  on  an  equal  footing  with  regard  to 
percentage  completed,  the  Nashville  plant  having  produced 
25,620,000  pounds  of  powder,  and  the  Nitro  plant, 
4,533,000  pounds. 

Aside  from  the  non-Government  plants  of  the  Du  Pont 
Company  and  the  Hercules  Company,  the  iEtna  Company 
had  large  contracts.  It  had  been  getting  its  pyro-cotton  from 
the  Du  Pont  plant  at  Hopewell,  Virginia,  but  that  plant  s 
capacity  was  about  to  be  absorbed  by  the  finishing  plants  of 
the  Du  Pont  Company  at  other  places.  So  it  was  decided  to 
build  a  pyro  plant  to  supply  the  iEtna  Company,  but  the  end- 
ing of  the  war  made  this  unnecessary.  Meantime,  the  navy 
had  been  erecting  a  plant  at  the  Indian  Head  proving  grounds 
with  a  capacity  of  400,000  pounds  a  day. 

Altogether  it  was  figured  that  the  United  States  would  be 
producing  1,080,000,000  pounds  of  smokeless  powder  in 
1919.  As  it  was,  when  the  end  came  we  were  actually  pro- 
ducing daily  six  times  as  much  smokeless  powder  as  was 
produced  in  the  whole  of  1914,  and  in  a  few  days  more  the 
output  would  have  been  almost  nine  times  as  much.  To 
simplify  the  supply  programme,  it  was  planned  that  the 
Ordnance  Department  would  purchase  the  entire  private 
production  of  smokeless  powder  in  1919  and  distribute  it 
among  the  Allies  as  required.  At  the  beginning  of  the  war, 
smokeless  powder  cost  about  eighty  cents  a  pound  and  the 
Allies  had  paid  more  than  that;  at  the  end  it  was  down  to 
about  forty-three  cents. 

The  careful  reader  of  this  sketch  of  the  production  of 
explosives  will  gather  some  idea  of  the  multitude  and  com- 
plexity of  the  industrial  problems  it  thrust  upon  the  War 
Industries  Board.  All  the  war  efforts  reacted  upon  each 
other  in  a  baffling  way,  but  in  none  so  much  as  in  the  Indus- 


EXPLOSIVES  AND  CHEMICAL  WARFARE    411 

trial  chemistry  of  war.  Every  step  forward  involved 
numerous  consequences,  some  of  them  unforeseen,  and  all  of 
them  requiring  adjustment.  Taken  into  consideration  with 
the  transportation,  scientific,  and  construction  problems  they 
involved,  it  may  be  said  that  the  production  of  explosives 
affected  the  entire  industrial  transport  and  technical  organi- 
zation of  the  Nation,  augmented  by  auxiliary  forces  that  were 
called  into  service  from  China  on  the  west  to  France  on  the 
east,  and  from  Canada  on  the  north  to  Chile  in  the  south* 


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-II 


CHAPTER  XXIV 

ARTIFICIAL  DYES:   THEIR  CRITICAL  RELATION  TO  THE 
WAR  —  OTHER  CHEMICAL  AND  AUXILIARY  MINERALS 

The  wonders  of  synthetic  chemistry  —  We  develop  a  dye  industry  —  Driving  up 
toluol  and  phenol  production  —  Sulphide  of  soda  for  olive-drab  cloth  — Acetone 
for  aircraft  dope  and  high  explosives  —  Substitutions  and  adaptations  —  A 
mosaic  of  brilliant  chemical  and  commercial  effort. 

Because  Germany  was  the  master  color-maker,  she  was  also 
dominant  in  explosives.  The  chemicals  that  send  colored 
light  waves  to  the  eye  swarm  with  a  thousand  devils  of 
death.  Imprisoned  in  the  coal  strata  for  aeons  countless 
genii  of  good  and  evil  have  been  brought  forth  by  the 
wonders  of  synthetic  chemistry.  Released  by  the  dry  dis- 
tillation of  coal  and  harnessed  together  in  innumerable  com- 
binations—  two  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  have  already 
been  tried  —  they  serve  mankind  in  dyes  innumerable,  per- 
fumes, flavors,  gases,  synthetic  fabrics,  therapeutic  drugs, 
power  fuels,  and  the  most  terrible  of  explosives. 

While  the  rest  of  the  world  jogged  along  in  old  ruts, 
Germany's  scientists  were  patiently  and  industriously  explor- 
ing the  vast  jimgle  of  coal-tar  derivatives,  and  her  military 
and  industrial  lords  were  assiduously  promoting  the  develop- 
ment of  the  industries  that  at  once  gave  her  commercial 
monopolies  and  military  primacy.  By  one  of  the  ironies 
of  fate,  however,  it  has  come  to  pass  that  the  brutal  assertion 
of  the  latter  has  destroyed  the  former  as  well  as  itself. 
Germany  as  a  military  power  is  prostrate  and  the  gates  of 
the  wonderland  of  coal-tar  products  have  been  forced  by 
her  victorious  enemies.  Driven  by  desperation  to  oppose 
her  with  her  own  weapons,  they  have  reversed  the  process 
and  become  independent  in  industry. 

In  1914,  Germany  was  manufacturing  more  than  seventy- 
five  per  cent  of  the  world's  supply  of  dyes  and  nearly  all 
of  the  immediate  derivatives  of  by-product  coking,  from 
which  dyes  and  high  explosives  are  made.  The  United 
States  was  producing  only  ten  per  cent  of  its  dyes  —  and 


ARTIFICIAL  DYES 


413 


even  that  small  fraction  was  based  on  the  importation  from 
Germany  of  ninety  per  cent  of  the  materials.  Every  pre- 
tentious attempt  to  compete  with  the  Germans  was  blocked  by 
secrecy  or  competitively  overwhelmed.  Behind  the  protec- 
tion of  prices,  skyrocketing  from  the  isolation  of  Germany 
after  1914  to  as  much  as  fifteen  hundred  per  cent,  and  the 
concurrent  demand  without  price  of  the  Allies  for  high  ex- 
plosives and  other  ultimate  products,  the  American  dye 
industry  expanded  magically.  In  its  train  came  the  potent 
derivatives  (of  such  by-products  of  the  distillation  of  coal  as 
coke,  ammonia,  gases,  and  coal  tar)  benzol,  toluol,  creosote 
oil,  solvent  naphtha,  naphthaline,  xylol,  and  carbazole  among 
the  primaries  or  crudes;  and  aniline  oil,  phenol,  salicylic 
acid,  beta-naphthol  and  para-nitraniline  among  the  intermedi- 
ates. Carrying  the  synthesis  farther,  by  way  of  illustration, 
benzol  treated  with  nitric  acid  gives  nitro-benzol  from  which 
aniline  is  produced.  In  its  turn  aniline  yields,  when 
treated  with  methyl  alcohol,  dimethylaniline.  Not  less  than 
three  hundred  intermediates  are  used  in  making  the  thousand 
dyes  of  commerce.  As  has  already  been  noted,  among  the 
main  sources  of  the  explosives  that  are  rooted  in  the  dye 
industry  are  phenol  for  picric  acid,  toluol  for  T.N.T.,  and 
ammonia  for  ammonium  nitrate. 

By  1917,  the  dye  industry  had  developed  one  hundred 
and  thirty-four  intermediates  in  the  United  States,  and  one 
hundred  and  eighteen  different  firms  were  engaged  in  the 
industry  with  an  output  of  287,000,000  pounds,  valued  at 
$104,000,000.  The  industry  was  given  insurance  in  the 
form  of  a  protective  tariff,  in  1916,  and  was  assisted  by 
the  confiscation  of  the  German  patents.  Although  by  its 
very  nature  the  industry  was  hobbled  at  every  step  by  the 
demands  of  the  manufacturers  of  explosives  for  identic 
materials,  it  grew  to  greatness  and  permanence  before  the 
war  was  over.  Between  the  need  of  dyes  and  the  still 
greater  need  of  explosives  the  section^  of  the  Chemicals 
Division  of  the  War  Industries  Board  that  was  charged  with 
the  supervision  of  the  artificial  dyes  and  intermediates  had 
its  hands  full.  Toluol,  phenol,  acetic  acid,  wood  alcohol, 
chlorine,  caustic  soda,  nitrate  of  soda,  ammonia,  and  other 

^Artificial  Dyes  and  Intermediates  Section,  J.  F.  Schoelkopf,  Jr.,  chief. 


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414    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

materials  of  dye  manufacture  were  placed  under  control 
—  and  it  became  the  Sisyphian  task  of  the  section  to  keep 
the  industry  alive  and  growing  without  interfering  with  the 
manufacture  of  explosives.  It  had  its  full  share  of  the 
eternal  problem  that  was  before  all  the  sections  which  were 
confronted  with  shortages  —  of  how  to  attain  one  end  with- 
out defeating  another  of  equal  importance. 

In  1914,  the  by-product  coke-ovens  of  the  United  States 
were  producing  only  700,000  pounds  of  toluol  a  month;  by 
1917,  this  had  been  driven  up  to  6,000,000  pounds;  to 
12,000,000  pounds  at  the  end  of  1918,  and  through  con- 
tracts made  by  the  Ordnance  Department  would  have  been 
increased  by  600,000  pounds  a  month  in  1920.  Gas  strip- 
ping plants  in  thirteen  cities  extracted  the  toluol  from  muni- 
cipal gas  at  a  loss  of  heat  and  light  to  the  people.  Three 
contracts  were  let  for  the  erection  of  plants  for  the  making 
of  toluol  by  cracking  crude  petroleum  or  its  distillates.  The 
three  plants  of  one  of  these  contracts  were  due  alone  to  pro- 
duce 3,000,000  pounds  monthly.  The  entire  production 
was  commandeered  in  February,  1918,  at  $1.50  a  gallon. 
The  production  of  phenol  was  driven  up  from  670,000 
pounds  a  month  in  the  spring  of  1917  to  13,000,000  pounds 
in  October,  1918.  The  stimulation  of  the  production  of 
toluol  was  partly  in  the  hands  of  the  Section  of  Industrial 
Gases  and  Gas  Products,^  which  was  also  importantly  inter- 
ested in  saccharine,  acetylene,  and  oxygen. 

The  contrivances  for  curtailment  and  conservation  in  the 
dye  industry  were  numerous.  Because  of  the  demand  for 
olive-drab  cloth  for  uniforms,  the  consumption  of  sulphide 
of  soda  was  enormous;  and  so  this  kind  of  cloth  for  civilian 
uses  was  curtailed  seventy-five  per  cent  and  was  to  be  elimi- 
nated. Sulphide  of  soda  was  to  have  been  entirely  denied 
to  the  manufacture  of  black  hosiery.  Owing  to  these  and 
similar  restrictions  and  inexperience  of  the  dye-makers, 
America  had  some  sad  experiences  with  its  wearing  apparel 

during  the  war. 

The  tobacco-chewers  were  pinched  a  little  by  the  cur- 
tailment of  saccharine  used  in  sweetening  chewing  tobacco, 
so  that  more  toluol  might  be  made.     War's  demands  for 

*J.  M.  Morehead,  chief. 


ifJ^ 


ARTIFICIAL  DYES 


415 


acetylene  and  oxygen  were  heavy  and  both  the  stimulation 
of  dieir  production  and  its  distribution  were  trying  tasks. 

The  Creosote  Section^  was  confronted  with  the  problem 
of  there  not  being  enough  creosote  for  Government  uses,  to 
say  nothing  of  private  consumption.  There  was  a  minus 
quantity  before  priority  was  served.  The  army,  navy, 
and  the  Shipping  Board  were  given  the  preference  and  the 
Railroad  Administration  took  all  the  rest.  Prices  were  not 
fixed,  but  were  controlled  through  the  enormous  purchases  of 
the  Railroad  Administration,  rising  only  from  seven  cents 
a  gallon  in  1913  to  nine  cents  in  1918.  Production  was  very 
greatly,  increased  during  the  war.  By  using  substitutes  in 
the  treatment  of  ties  and  by  careful  allocation,  the  situation 
was  saved. 

Space  does  not  suffice  for  an  account  of  how  the  Tanning 
Materials  and  Natural  Dyes  Section^  dealt  with  the  problems 
of  producing,  importing,  and  distributing  the  raw  materials 
and  with  that  of  meeting  the  increased  demand  for  natural 
dyes  because  of  the  scarcity  of  synthetic  dyes. 

In  paints  and  pigments^  one  of  the  problems  went  back 
to  the  competition  of  wheat  with  flax  for  growing  space. 
The  farmers  rushed  to  the  big  job  of  providing  bread  for 
the  Allies  and  skimped  flax,  so  that  linseed  oil  for  paint- 
making  was  short. 

The  Wood  Chemicals  Section*  became  one  of  the  most 
adept  in  playing  the  game  of  substitution.  All  of  the  pri- 
mary derivatives  from  the  distillation  of  wood  —  acetate 
of  lime,  wood  alcohol,  and  charcoal  —  were  in  great  de- 
mand, as  were  also  such  secondary  products  as  acetic  acid, 
pure  methyl  alcohol,  acetone,  and  methyl-ethol-ketone.  The 
dope  used  by  the  aircraft  production  industry  demanded 
all  the  acetone  in  the  country,  and  the  British  needed  it  for 
their  high  explosive,  cordite.  All  wood  chemicals  were 
commandeered  by  the  War  Department  and  their  distribu- 
tion turned  over  to  the  section. 

Our  old  friend,  "neck  of  the  bottle,"  here  took  the  form 

^Ira  C.  Darling,  chief. 
■E.  J.  Haley,  chief. 

'Russell  S.  Hubbard,  first  head  of  this  section,  died  at  his  post,  a  sacrifice 
to  his  sense  of  duty.    He  was  succeeded  by  Levris  R.  Atwood. 
*C.  H.  Conner,  chief. 


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416    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

of  acetate  of  lime.  Increased  production  did  not  amount 
to  much;  skimping  and  substitution  had  to  wm  the  war  here. 
Seaweed  had  to  deliver  acetone;  also  sour  and  low-grade 
com  thereby  got  into  the  war.  Chloroform  had  to  get  along 
with  denatured  alcohol  instead  of  acetone.  Non-war  mdus- 
tries  had  to  do  with  a  fifty  per  cent  supply  of  acetate  ot 
lime  —  some  of  them  with  twenty-five  per  cent  and  others 
could  not  have  anv  acetic  acid  if  it  was  made  from  acetate  ot 
lime.  Vinegar  had  to  give  up  its  acetic  acid  to  hold  the 
fort,  but  acetate  anhydrin,  for  the  making  of  aspirin,  got 
priority  when  the  influenza  epidemic  struck  the  country  in 

the  fall  of  1918.  ^      .     i    .  r       a 

In  the  Miscellaneous  Chemicals  Section  it  was  iound 
that,  while  the  Food  Administration  had  taken  charge  ot 
white  arsenic,  because  insects  destroyed  food  and  arsenic 
destroyed  them,  the  Chemical  Warfare  Service  was  callmg 
for  it  for  the  manufacture  of  toxic  gases.  The  glass  indus- 
try was  invited  to  get  along  without  arsenic  and  the  amount 
allocated  to  insecticides  was  reduced.  For  the  rest,  the 
Anaconda  Copper  Company  was  putting  up  a  plant  with 
a  capacity  of  10,000  tons  per  annum.  ,    ,    .    r 

When  the  Germans  put  the  Turcos  to  flight  with  their  farst 
gas  attack,  the  price  of  bromine'  went  up  1670  per  cent . 
The  normal  production  of  the  United  States  was  600,000 
pounds  per  annum.  Stimulated  by  a  price  that  was  never 
less  than  two  and  one  half  times  the  normal,  it  went  up  to 
1,600,000  pounds,  with  another  750,000-pound  increase  m 
sight,  and  the  Government  was  putting  down  seventeen  deep 
wells  near  Midland,  Michigan,  to  get  the  brines  from  which 
bromine  is  extracted.  This  section  dealt  with  camphor  and 
metallic  magnesium  as  well  as  with  bromine.  Camphor  had 
a  war  importance  of  a  negative  nature.  Not  used  itself 
to  any  great  extent,  its  use  in  the  manufacture  of  celluloid 
took  nitric  and  sulphuric  acids  away  from  explosives. 
Metallic  magnesium  has  been  mentioned  elsewhere. 

Wool  grease  did  not  seem  to  possess  any  war  use  possi- 
bilities until  the  Germans  sprang  mustard  gas.  Then  came 
lanoline  as  a  dressing  for  gas  bums,  and  almost  overnight 

*A.  G.  Rosengarten,  chief.  „ 

^Bromine,  camphor,  and  metaUic  magnesium  were  under  the  Miscellaneous 

Chemicals  Section. 


ARTIFICIAL  DYES 


417 


wool  grease  was  commandeered  to  make  it,  and  taken  from 
shoe  dubbin  to  the  pharmacopoeia. 

Germany  had  a  grip  on  American  chemical  and  metallur- 
gical industries  in  ante-bellum  times  because  it  was  thought 
diat  only  the  Klingenberg  clay  of  that  country  was  satisfac- 
tory for  making  linings  of  furnaces,  crucibles,  and  other 
containers  that  had  to  withstand  intense  heats.  With  no 
German  clay  available,  the  Refractories  Section^  developed 
a  satisfactory  mixture  of  a  number  of  American  clays.  The 
great  smelting  and  refining  activity  resulting  from  the  war 
gave  the  same  section  much  to  do  concerning  refractory 
bricks.  One  outcome  of  its  activity  was  to  inject  science 
into  the  business  and  greatly  improve  the  product. 

The  Ceramics  administrator  had  to  contend  with  one  of 
the  paradoxes  of  the  war,  namely,  that  in  the  midst  of  the 
terrific  struggle  the  standard  of  living  of  the  masses 
ascended  in  die  United  States.  They  wanted  more  and  better 
china  and  porcelain.  The  story  is  told  of  a  woman  of  the 
stockyards  section  in  Chicago  who,  with  her  bag  stuffed 
with  the  swollen  war  earnings,  rejected  all  the  twenty-five 
and  thirty-dollar  table  sets  the  clerk  showed  her.  Being 
a  green  clerk  in  this  department,  he  showed  her  a  set  which 
an  erroneously  placed  decimal  point  priced  at  $287.50. 
She  chose  it  the  moment  the  price  was  named.  The  demand 
actually  trebled  at  a  time  when,  on  account  of  the  difficulties 
of  importing  materials,  domestic  production  was  able  to 
expand  only  seventy-five  per  cent.  It  was  the  duty  of  the 
Ceramics  administrator  to  scout  for  suitable  domestic  pottery 
clays,  but  the  manufacturers  were  inclined  to  hold  aloof 
from  the  American  clays. 

Electrodes  for  electric  furnaces  were  so  scarce,  as  were 
also  abrasives,  that  it  took  a  section  to  look  after  them.^ 
The  manufacture  of  large  quantities  of  electro-chemical 
products  created  a  large  new  demand  for  electrodes.  There 
were  three  hundred  users  of  electrodes  and  only  four  pro- 
ducers. After  the  section  got  into  the  saddle,  every  user  of 
electrodes  was  adequately  supplied. 

The  Greek  island  of  Naxos  achieved  the  war  industrial 

^Charles  Catlett,  chief;  H.  F.  Staley,  of  the  Technical  and  Consulting  Staff, 
cooperated  with  Mr.  Catlett. 

^Henry  C.  Du  Bois  was  chief  of  the  Electrodes  and  Abrasives  Section. 


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418    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

spotlight  as  the  sole  source  of  high-grade  emery  for  grinding 
and  polishing  purposes,  especially  for  optical  glass.  The 
French  Government  controlled  the  supply,  but  there  was 
not  enough  to  go  around.  The  upshot  was  the  discovery 
of  an  artificial  abrasive,  manufactured  by  the  Norton 
Company  at  Niagara  Falls,  which  would  take  the  place  of 
emery.  Other  abrasives  were  also  manufactured  there.  One 
of  the  complications  was  that,  in  the  competition  for  hydro- 
electric power  generated  at  Niagara,  the  abrasives  industry 
was  nearly  crowded  out. 

The  demand  for  containers  for  acids  was  so  great  that 
civilians  had  to  get  along  with  a  limited  number  of  five- 
gallon  water  botdes,  to  make  way  for  the  production  of 
twelve-gallon  carboys.  The  glass  industry  was  put  to  it 
to  meet  the  emergency.  The  same  was  true  of  the  chemical 
stoneware  industry.  Chemical  plants  arose  like  mushrooms 
throughout  the  country,  but  by  hook  and  crook  the  Chemical 
Glass  and  Stoneware  Section^  met  the  situation  and  also 
provided  suflScient  glassware  for  chemical  laboratories  and 
medical  and  metallurgical  works. 

In  concluding  the  chapters  relating  to  chemicals,  mention 
should  be  made  of  the  Technical  and  Consulting  Staff  which 
Mr.  Summers  early  established  to  deal  with  special  chemical 
problems  and  to  look  after  commodities  which  had  not  been 
assigned  to  separate  sections.  The  War  Industries  Board 
was  always  seeking  able  technical  men  and  this  is  where 
the  professors  got  their  chance.  Dr.  M.  T.  Bogert  was  the 
first  head,  resigning  to  become  a  Colonel  of  Gas  Warfare. 
Professor  H.  R.  Moody  succeeded  him,  and  many  professors 
of  chemistry,  including  Samuel  Tucker,  cooperated.  The 
Mellon  Institute  at  Pittsburgh  was  turned  over  to  the  Gov- 
ernment, without  cost,  for  research  work,  and  its  acting 
director,  E.  R.  Weidlein,  was  indefatigable  in  the  promo- 
tion of  the  work  of  the  Technical  and  Consulting  Staff.  The 
staff  devoted  much  attention  to  the  problems  of  chemical 
substitutes  and  kept  an  eye  out  for  all  obstacles  that  required 
chemical  engineering.  It  fathered  many  of  the  chemical 
sections,  and  was  freely  and  frequently  consulted  by  the 
section  chiefs. 

^R.  M.  Torrence,  chief;  he  was  also  at  the  head  of  the  section  on  asbestos 
and  magnesia. 


ARTIFICIAL  DYES 


419 


Pursuing  an  idea  suggested  by  Mr.  MacDowell,  the 
Mellon  Institute  worked  on  toward  the  close  of  the  war  a 
substitute  for  platinum  as  a  catalyzer  in  the  manufacture  of 
sulphuric  acid,  which  would  also  be  available  in  the  makmg 
of  chlorine  gas,  in  great  demand  for  the  Chemical  Warfare 
Service.  A  new  catalyzer  was  developed  for  the  manu- 
facture of  ammonia  into  nitric  acid.  The  Institute  made 
invaluable  contributions  to  the  development  and  manufac- 
ture of  toxic  gases,  dealt  with  the  graphite  problem, 
experimented  with  motor  fuels,  found  a  substitute  for 
glycerine  (needed  for  explosives)  in  chewing  tobacco,  con- 
tributed to  the  mastering  of  the  acetone  and  acetic  acid 

problems,  etc.  m    i.  •    i 

Incidentally,  it  may  be  said  that  not  only  the  Technical 
Staff,  but  many  of  the  commodity  sections,  received  invalu- 
able help  from  the  scientists  of  the  Bureau  of  Mines  and  Mr. 
Van  H.  Manning,  its  war-time  chief;  from  the  Geological 
Survey,  from  the  National  Research  Council,  from  the 
Bureau  of  Standards,  from  the  Geophysical  Laboratory, 
from  the  technical  colleges,  and  from  individual  scientists. 
On  the  side  of  industry,  when  the  old  chemicals  com- 
mittee and  sub-committees  of  the  Council  of  National 
Defense  were  dissolved  after  rendering  notable  and  pioneer 
service,  the  Chemical  Alliance  (Inc.)  was  created  to  deal 
with  the  Government  as  the  representatives  of  the  chemical 
industries.  It  was  an  efficient  and  willing  cooperator  ably 
supplemented  by  the  Manufacturing  Chemists'  Association, 
the  National  Fertilizer  Association,  and  other  trade  asso- 
ciations. 

In  such  men  as  Summers,  commander-in-chief,  Mac- 
Dowell and  Chase  and  their  able  lieutenants,  American 
industry  at  its  best  —  learned,  experienced,  broad  of  vision, 
imaginative,  creative,  initiative,  bold  in  conception,  pains- 
taking in  detail,  and,  above  all,  dedicated  to  patriotic  service 
—  was  at  the  helm  throughout  the  vast  and  thousand-sided 
strategy  and  administration  of  the  chemical  wing  of  the 
War  Industries  Board. 


\\ 


k 


!* 


» 


I  I 


» 


.] 


CHAPTER  XXV 

THE  FORESTS  DO  THEIR  BIT  — LIKEWISE  THE  PITS 

AND  QUARRIES 

Mobilizing  the  lumbermen  —  Edgar  meets  an  emergency  —  Lumber  for  the 
cantonments  —  Pershing  calls  for  timber;  the  forests  answer  —  Filling  demands 
unforeseen  and  gigantic:  warehouses,  docks,  construction  in  France,  wooden 
ships,  aircraft,  hospitals  —  Agreeing  on  prices  —  Curtailing  news  print  —  Build- 
ing materials. 

Lumber  and  adventure  go  together.  In  America  lumbering 
is  still  entirely  dependent  upon  wild  timber  growths.  To 
speak  of  lumber  is  to  conjure  up  the  wilderness  —  the  virgin 
forests  —  the  freshet  floods.  The  lumberman  is  the  hunts- 
man of  floral  life  —  bold,  strong,  resourceful.  To  the  pas- 
sive resistance  of  the  wild  life  he  destroys  he  opposes  the 
most  systematic  attacks  and  the  most  powerful  weapons  with 
which  man  masters  his  environment.  Something  of  the  whirl- 
ing energy  of  his  bright  saws  and  something  of  the  stubborn 
power  of  his  log  carriages  adheres  to  his  character.  Lumber- 
making  is  a  quick  and  direct  process.  Its  results  are  immedi- 
ate. The  rough  log  of  an  hour  ago  is  now  an  imposing  pile 
of  a  finished  commodity.  The  quickness  of  production  is 
matched  by  the  alertness  of  management. 

Appropriately  enough,  the  first  great  dramatic  resource- 
mobilization  of  the  war  fell  to  lumber.  The  lumbermen 
responded  to  the  call  to  the  colors  of  production  with  whoops 
that  blended  with  the  screeching  thunder  of  their  saws.  They 
were  commanded  to  produce  the  chief  material  of  the  thirty- 
two  camps  and  cantonments  that  were  to  be  conjured  up 
within  ninety  days.  Forthwith  the  fragrant  piles  of  lumber 
at  a  thousand  yards  and  mills  were  transferred  to  cars,  and, 
before  the  surveyors  had  completed  their  work  at  the  camp 
sites,  lumber  began  its  march  to  the  new  cities  of  war  at  the 
rate  of  fifty  cars  a  day  each;  eight  hundred  cars  a  day  they 
came,  fifty-five  thousand  strong. 

Promptness,  zeal,  and  order  marked  this  initial  mobiliza- 
tion, as  they  did  every  part  of  the  industrial  part  of  the  war 


( . 


THE  FORESTS  DO  THEIR  BIT 


421 


W 


<( 


ii 


(C 


that  was  allocated  to  lumber,  first  and  last.  Thanks  to  the 
emergency  construction  and  lumber  committees  of  the  war 
industrial  management,  the  emergency  bureaus  of  the  indus- 
try, the  Railroads  War  Board,  and  the  very  able  Construction 
Division  of  the  army,  the  lumber  sector  was  handled  syste- 
matically and  without  confusion  from  the  start.  The  indus- 
try was  inherently  adaptive  to  big  jobs  and  violent  efforts. 
The  bigger  and  the  more  imperative  the  better. 

An  instance:  Late  in  the  afternoon  of  September  14,  1917, 
Qiarles  Edgar,  then  of  the  old  lumber  committee  of  the 
Raw  Materials  Division,  was  called  to  the  telephone  at  his 
office  in  the  Munsey  Building  in  Washington. 

"Hello,  Edgar!  This  is  Hamilton  [major  in  the  Construc- 
tion Division] .    Have  you  any  pep  left?" 

Tes;  what 's  up?" 

'A  plenty.  It 's  closing  time  and  we  've  just  got  orders  to 
increase  the  size  of  every  cantonment  in  the  country  except 
one;  five  million  feet  of  lumber  for  each  camp." 

'Are  your  schedules  ready?" 

'Yes;  they  are  being  typed  now  and  will  be  finished 
within  half  an  hour.  We  want  to  get  the  orders  out  to- 
night." 

"All  right,"  said  Edgar. 

He  immediately  called  up  the  emergency  bureaus  of  the 
Southern  pine,  Georgia-Florida,  North  Carolina,  and  the 
Pacific  coast  lumber  manufacturers  and  asked  them  to  hold 
their  office  forces  and  have  their  respective  chiefs  meet  him 
at  Major  Hamilton's  office.  There  the  schedules  were 
obtained,  considered  and  allocated  to  the  different  groups, 
which  took  them  to  their  offices  and  reallocated  them  to 
their  various  mills.  At  two  o'clock  the  next  morning  the 
job  was  done,  and  complete  telegraphic  orders  were  lying  on 
the  desks  of  all  the  hundreds  of  lumber  executives  involved 
when  they  came  to  their  offices  later  in  the  morning.  Before 
night  of  that  day  hundreds  of  cars,  piled  high  with  the  speci- 
fied lumber,  were  rolling  to  the  cantonments. 

In  similar  emergencies  as  much  as  twenty-five  million  feet 
of  lumber  were  loaded  and  started  within  three  days. 

On  one  occasion  General  Pershing  called  for  four  million 
feet  of  special-size  timbers  for  docks  in  France.    The  vessels 


li 


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I 


mi 

I 


!l 


422    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

for  their  transport  to  France  were  to  be  at  three  specified 
ports  within  a  few  days,  and  must  not  be  delayed  under  any 
circumstances.  Although  the  timbers  had  to  be  cut  to  order, 
in  some  instances  from  trees  still  standing  in  the  forest, 
almost  all  of  the  material  was  delivered  at  destination  before 

the  ships  arrived. 

When  the  cantonment  job  was  done,  the  lumbermen 
thought  their  great  war  work  was  already  over.  As  the  anny 
had  not  been  permitted  to  plan  for  the  war,  it  was  groping  in 
the  dark  itself  all  those  first  few  months.  It  was  traveling 
along  an  uncharted  path.  It  never  knew  what  was  around 
the  next  turn.  As  it  came  to  pass,  the  cantonments  and  camps 
were  little  more  than  a  drop  in  the  bucket.  Mighty  construc- 
tion jobs  developed  at  every  turn.  Warehouses,  docks,  hos- 
pitals, special  service  cantonments,  ordnance  cities.  Govern- 
ment plants,  the  epic  construction  in  France;  the  gigantic 
shipbuilding  enterprise,  with  its  lumber-consuming  yards  and 
ways  and  its  wooden  ships,  the  cities  and  towns  of  the  Gov- 
ernment Housing  Bureau,  the  building  of  aircraft,  the 
wheeled  transport  of  millions,  called  for  endless  quantities 
of  lumber  and  timber  in  every  form  from  delicate  mill-work 
to  sixty-foot  piles  and  the  tremendous  sticks  for  keels  and 
keelsons.  There  were  five  hundred  and  thirty-five  army  con- 
struction projects  alone,  to  say  nothing  of  the  navy,  the  Fleet 
Corporation,  and  the  Housing  Corporation. 

Not  an  item  of  these  demands  was  foreseen.  Each  was  an 
episode.  It  was  one  thing  after  another;  unrelated,  insistent, 
imperative!  It  was  a  task  of  colossal  proportions;  alluring 
in  its  uncertainties,  charged  with  all  of  the  stimulus  of  the 
novel  and  the  unknown.  It  was  precisely  the  up-and-down 
sort  of  thing  —  a  succession  of  furious  outbursts  of  energy 
and  sudden  stoppages  —  that  was  calculated  to  charge  with 
romance  an  industry  that  was  reared  in  it.  The  pen  of 
genius  could  write  thrilling  volumes  of  literal  accounts  of 
the  war  as  it  was  fought  in  cypress  swamps,  in  Southern 
sands,  in  the  shadows  of  the  lofty  firs,  spruces,  and  sequoias 
of  the  Pacific  coast;  and,  beyond  our  frontiers,  in  the  hot 
hardwood  forests  of  the  tropics. 

First  and  last  the  Government  called  for  five  or  six  billion 
feet  of  lumber,  much  of  it  to  be  cut  to  original  specifications 


THE  FORESTS  DO  THEIR  BIT 


423 


and  demanding  exceptional  qualities  and  dimensions.  The 
pine  woods  of  the  South  were  scouted  for  large  trees,  and  the 
demand  for  airplane  spruce  for  ourselves  and  the  Allies  tore 
gaps  of  devastation  in  stands  of  other  growths  to  extricate 
the  prized  spruce  of  the  Pacific  Northwest.  Superb  things 
were  done.  General  Goethals  once  spoke  deprecatingly  of 
the  programme  of  building  wooden  ships  from  trees  in  which 
the  eagles  were  yet  nesting.  Yet  time  and  again  a  tree  was 
moulded  into  ships  within  thirty  days  from  its  felling. 

All  this  great  and  often  heroic  endeavor  was  not  untinged 
with  the  color  of  human  weakness  and  errancy.  Lumbermen 
are  cast  in  a  rough  mould;  they  are  an  independent,  dom- 
inating crowd.  Government  regulations,  inspection,  price- 
making,  irked  them.  At  first  blush  many  of  them  regarded 
the  war  as  a  golden  opportunity  for  filling  their  coffers. 
Unlike  the  metal  men,  they  entered  the  war  with  no  dramatic 
gestures  signifying  a  high  purpose;  instead,  they  sought  and 
almost  got  away  with  an  excessive  price  for  the  cantonment 
lumber.  They  took  advantage  of  the  ingenuousness  of  the 
early  trade  committee  plan  of  the  Coimcil  of  National 
Defense. 

The  vastness  of  the  industry  and  its  thousands  of  units  put 
it  beyond  the  possibility  of  general  commandeering.  At  the 
same  time  it  was  humiliated  and  offended  because  it  was  not 
on  the  War  Industries  Board's  preferred  list  and  thus 
deprived  of  any  general  priority  classification.  This  was 
because  private  building  was  necessarily  curtailed;  in  fact, 
almost  prohibited;  and  because  it  was  desired  to  encourage 
the  use  of  wood  as  fuel.  The  lumbermen  felt  that  a  great 
industry  was  insulted,  and  insisted  that  to  be  off  the  prefer- 
ence list  was  to  be  branded  as  non-essential.  Of  course, 
nothing  of  the  kind  was  true.  Lumber  was  one  of  the  great 
essentials  of  the  war,  and  for  all  war  purposes  it  had  every 
preference  and  priority,  but  its  civilian  uses  were  of  a  defer- 
able nature;  and  so  for  those  purposes  it  was  thrown  into  a 
category  where  it  took  what  was  left.  Naturally  enough, 
however,  it  felt  aggrieved  and  was  sure  that  it  had  been 
vindictively  singled  out  for  sacrifice. 

The  greatest  friction  between  the  lumbermen  and  the  Board 
was  with  three  members  of  the  Southern  Pine  Association. 


ir> 


s 


\  ! 


:i 


424    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Many  a  battle  was  fought  between  them  and  Mr.  Edgar.  The 
latter  was  a  veteran  in  the  industry  and  knew  it  from  the 
woods  to  the  dry-kik.  His  old  associates  affected  to  thmk 
that  he  was  a  sort  of  trade  traitor  because  he  was  adamant 
for  fair  prices.  They  made  extraordinary  efforts  to  get  rid 
of  him.  Even  Baruch  thought  at  first  that  Edgar  lacked 
diplomacy.  But  these  men  were  not  subjects  for  diplomacy. 
They  drove  to  their  ends  with  the  brutal  energy  of  a  donkey 
engine  jerking  a  lurching  log  through  the  forest.  Baruch 
found  that  out  later  when  they  sought  to  batter  him  down. 
Then,  like  Edgar,  he  tossed  diplomacy  out  of  the  window, 
and,  figuratively  speaking,  threw  the  three  obstructionists 
after  it.  He  refused  to  have  anything  to  do  with  any  bureau 
or  committee  which  included  them.  Whereupon  the  axemen 
were  retired  to  obscurity  for  the  rest  of  the  war. 

Thereafter  the  lumber  sailing  of  the  War  Industries  Board 

was  smooth. 

On  the  other  side  of  the  shield  is  to  be  inscribed  a  tribute 
to  the  efficiency  of  the  general  cooperation  of  the  industry 
with  the  Board,  typical  instances  of  which  have  been  given. 
The  great  lumber  sections  of  the  country  established  and 
conducted  at  their  own  expense  highly  organized  emergency 
bureaus,^  which  maintained  efficient  offices  in  Washington, 
and  to  all  intents  and  purposes,  so  far  as  Government  lumber 
requirements  were  concerned,  were  the  executive  heads  of 
hundreds  of  mobilized  mills.  Through  these  bureaus  the 
individual  producers  were  integrated  for  carrying  out  the 
Government's  orders.  Schedules  of  needed  lumber  were 
split  up  between  the  different  bureaus  according  to  their 
nature  and  the  situation  of  the  member  mills  with  respect  to 
business  on  hand.    Then  the  bureaus  impartially  distributed 

*The  emergency  bureaus  were:  Southern  Pine  Emergency  Bureaus ;  Georgia- 
Florida  Yellow  Pine  Emergency  Bureau;  New  England  Spruce  Emergency 
Bureau;  Douglas  Fir  Emergency  Bureau  (later  merged  in  the  Fir  Production 
Board)  Northern  Hardwood  Emergency  Bureaus;  Central  Pennsylvania  Hem- 
lock  Emergency  Bureau;  Cypress  Emergency  Bureau;  and,  for  a  time,  there 
was  a  general  hardwood  bureau.  There  were  also  committees  representing 
Northern  pme  and  the  Alabama-Mississippi  section.  In  administering  the 
rulings  of  the  Price-Fixing  Committee,  it  was  decided  to  estabhsh  regional 
lumber  administrators.  W.  J.  Sowers  was  appointed  for  the  territory  of  the 
Southern  Pine  Bureau,  and  T.  J.  Aycock  for  that  of  the  Georgia-Florida  region. 
The  Fir  Production  Board,  representing  different  Government  agencies,  lookea 
after  the  War  Industries  Board's  business  in  the  Pacific  Northwest.  There  was 
aiso  a  wholesalers'  war  service  committee. 


THE  FORESTS  DO  THEIR  BIT 


425 


their  schedules  among  the  mills,  according  to  capacity  and 
readiness.  All  of  this  was  so  methodized  and  energized  that 
it  was  no  unusual  thing  for  a  hundred  mills  to  be  busy  one 
day  with  an  order  that  was  merely  a  typewritten  list  in  Wash- 
ington the  day  before. 

The  first  skirmish  between  the  Government  side  and 
the  industry  was  on  June  13,  1917,  when  R.  H.  Downman, 
chairman  of  the  Lumber  Section  of  the  Raw  Materials 
Committee  of  the  Advisory  Commission,  met  with  repre- 
sentatives of  the  Southern  Pine  Association  to  consider  can- 
tonment lumber  requirements.  A  basic  price  of  $20  event- 
uated, though  a  higher  one  was  named  until  it  was  discovered 
that  it  was  actually  above  the  market  price.  The  emergency 
nature  of  the  order  was  advanced  as  the  explanation  of  the 
attempt  to  make  the  Government  pay  more  than  the  public  — 
but  this  explanation  was  brushed  aside.  The  $20-figure 
represented  an  average  price  for  the  different  kinds  and 
qualities  of  lumber  of  about  $24.85  a  thousand.  Slight 
reductions  were  effected  in  the  fall  on  three  different  occa- 
sions, bringing  the  average  price  down  to  $23.20.  Later,  as 
the  costs  of  production  advanced,  the  Federal  Trade  Com- 
mission made  an  investigation  and  a  special  committee  of 
the  Price-Fixing  Commission  discussed  the  subject  fully  with 
representatives  of  the  yellow  pine  manufacturers. 

About  the  middle  of  June,  the  Government  price  was  raised 
to  approximately  $28  a  thousand.  A  demand  for  a  further 
advance  was  under  consideration  when  the  armistice  was 
signed.  The  price  agreement  protected  wages,  gave  the  Gov- 
ernment a  standing  option  on  private  orders,  and  provided 
for  the  furnishing  of  information  and  reports  the  Board 
might  require.  Although  the  Board  agreed  to  the  price  of 
$105  for  airplane  spruce,  fixed  in  June,  1917,  in  conference, 
and  of  $35  established  for  wooden  ship  lumber  in  May  of 
the  same  year,  it  may  be  said  as  a  general  rule  that  in  special 
requirements,  such  as  airplane  spruce,  shipbuilding  timbers 
and  lumber,  hardwoods  for  ordnance  purposes,  etc.,  the 
respective  purchasing  agencies  handled  the  situations  diem- 
selves. 

In  December,  1917,  the  Board,  feeling  that  the  comman- 
deering power  was  an  empty  thing  as  applied  to  such  a 


J  VI 


I 


426    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

decentralized  industry  as  lumber  —  since  it  was  manifestly 
impossible  for  the  Government  to  take  possession  of  thou- 
sands of  mills,  forests,  logging  railways,  distributing  machi- 
nery,  etc. —  and  that,  therefore,  public  price  control  would 
be  difficult,  recommended  that  it  be  clothed  with  direct  statu- 
tory authority  to  fix  lumber  prices.  This  recommendation 
does  not  appear  to  have  been  followed  up,  and  eventually  the 
Board  undertook  to  fix  maximum  prices  for  softwoods.  &)n- 
trary  to  early  expectations,  little  difficulty  was  encountered 
in  this  task.  The  object  in  view  being  diametrically  opposite 
to  one  of  the  objects  in  most  price-fixings  —  that  is,  to  dis- 
courage instead  of  to  stimulate  production  —  these  prices 
were  closely  trimmed,  averaging  about  $2.75  above  the 
Government  price. 

Production  beyond  minimum  requirements  was  further 
checked  by  the  activities  of  the  Non-War  Construction  Section 
of  the  Priorities  Division.  Manufacturers  and  distributors 
of  lumber,  like  all  producers  of  building  materials,  were 
required  to  sign  a  pledge  to  deliver  lumber  only  for  essential 
purposes  or  on  express,  written  permits.  Conservation 
restricted  the  use  of  hardwoods,  which  were  scarce,  and  in 
some  lines  softwoods.  Generally  speaking,  though,  lumber 
conservation  was  incidental  to  the  conservation  of  other 
materials  and  of  transportation.  Its  use  was  restricted,  not 
because  it  was  scarce,  but  in  order  to  reduce  production,  with 
its  savings  of  men,  machinery,  materials,  and  transportation. 

While  lumber  manufacturers  were  not  on  Preference  List 
No.  1  of  the  Priorities  Division,  designed  primarily  as  a 
guide  in  the  allocation  of  fuel,  many  industries  consuming 
lumber  were  on  it,  and  on  list  No.  2,  the  wood-consuming 
industries  were  given  priority  groupings.  All  Government 
requirements,  however,  carried  with  them  the  necessary  pri- 
ority privileges.  Just  before  the  end  of  the  war,  the  Priori- 
ties Commissioner  issued  a  circular  closely  defining  the 
restrictions  under  which  the  lumber  industry  would  be 
expected  to  operate. 

R.  H.  Downman,  then  president  of  the  National  Lumber 
Manufacturers'  Association,  was  chairman  of  the  original 
council  committee.  Later,  with  the  coming  of  the  plan  of 
disassociating   all   cooperative   committees  from   the   War 


THE  FORESTS  DO  THEIR  BIT 


427 


Industries  Board,  Mr.  Downman  became  chief  of  the  Build- 
ing Materials  Division.  Owing  to  illness  he  was  compelled 
to  resign.  A  lumber  division  was  then  established  with  Mr. 
Charles  Edgar,  a  retired  lumberman,  with  extensive  experi- 
ence in  Wisconsin,  Minnesota,  Arkansas,  and  elsewhere,  as 
chief. 

Among  Mr.  Downman's  more  active  assistants,  aside  from 
Mr.  Edgar,  who  was  early  on  the  job,  were  E.  T.  Allen, 
Charles  H.  Worcester,  and  Frank  G.  Wisner.  To  Mr.  Allen 
belongs  much  of  the  credit  for  the  comprehensive  handling 
of  the  spruce  production  problem  which  finally  became  the 
exclusive  province  of  the  Aircraft  Production  Bureau  of  the 
Signal  Corps  and  Air  Division.  Major  A.  M.  Cooke,  of  Nor- 
folk, Virginia,  was  Mr.  Edgar's  first  assistant,  and  his  stafiF 
included  Captain  E.  A.  Self  ridge,  Jr.,  Willitts,  California; 
M.  E.  Philbrick,  Memphis,  Tennessee;  W.  E.  Chamberlain, 
East  Cambridge,  Massachusetts;  F.  H.  Ransome,  Portland, 
Oregon;  H.  W.  Aldrich,  Mill  City,  Oregon;  C.  Y.  Winton, 
Minneapolis,  Minnesota.  The  Fir  Production  Board  was 
composed  of  J.  H.  Bloedel,  General  Brice  P.  Disque,  and 
H.  B.  Van  Duzer. 

The  Lumber  Division  had  to  deal  with  one  of  those  gangs 
of  bloodsuckers  who  are  always  on  hand  in  war-time  to  dis- 
grace humanity  when  others  are  honoring  it.  A  number  of 
unscrupulous  jobbers  of  the  curbstone  variety  conceived  the 
idea  of  having  lumber  surreptitiously  consigned  to  construc- 
tion officers  in  care  of  themselves.  Such  shipments  gained 
transportation  priority  and  got  lumber  into  the  possession  of 
the  crooks  when  other  dealers  were  without  it.  They  would 
then  go  to  the  construction  officers,  who  were  always  short  of 
lumber  because  of  transportation  congestion,  and  extort  a 
price  of  eight  to  twelve  dollar's  a  thousand  above  the  fixed 
Government  price  to  producers.  The  scheme  came  to  light 
when  the  producers  began  to  inquire  why  it  was  that  there 
was  one  price  for  orders  coming  to  them  for  Government 
account  through  the  bureaus  and  a  higher  price  for  orders 
from  these  jobbers.  Every  car  that  got  through  on  this 
fraudulent  billing  —  and  there  were  hundreds  of  them  — 
took  the  place  of  a  regular  Government  car  and  made  the 
dealers  a  profit  of  from  $150  to  $250  a  car.     Mr.  Edgar 


1 


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J 


428    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

discovered  one  of  these  deals  in  time  to  stop  payment  after 
$75,000  had  been  paid  on  account.  The  manipulator  of  this 
particular  deal  had  the  nerve  to  invoke  "influence"  to  bring 
pressure  to  bear  on  Mr.  Baruch  to  intervene,  but  was  shown 
the  door.  Nevertheless,  the  Court  of  Claims  eventually 
allowed  the  jobber  the  whole  of  his  claim  at  Newark  market 
prices;  despite  the  fact  that  eight  of  the  same  kidney,  caught 
in  the  meshes  of  the  Department  of  Justice,  had  to  disgorge 
$35,000  apiece. 

TTie  problem  of  getting  lumber  for  Government  purposes 
was  one  of  transportation  instead  of  production.  At  one 
time  there  were  seventeen  thousand  loaded  lumber  cars 
jammed  up  south  of  Richmond,  Virginia. 

Closely  associated  with  the  lumber  administration,  though 
in  another  general  division  of  the  Board,  that  of  Finished 
Products,  was  the  Wood  Products  Section  which  was  estab- 
lished in  October,  1917,  chiefly  to  help  the  army  obtain 
hardwoods  for  its  various  vehicles  with  wooden  wheels. 
There  was  found  to  be  a  real  shortage  of  dry  hardwoods, 
and  arrangements  were  made  for  the  Government  to  assist 
in  providing  adequate  dry-kiln  facilities.  Later,  the  chief 
work  of  the  section  was  to  plan  the  allocation  of  Government 
requirements  among  the  twelve  thousand  woodworking  estab- 
lishments in  such  a  manner  that  they  might  continue  to  exist, 
as  the  capacity  greatly  exceeded  war  requirements.  No  real 
shortages  of  finished  goods  existed  at  any  time.  Black  wal- 
nut was  so  scarce  that  it  was  necessary  to  inaugurate  a  cam- 
paign of  education  to  increase  production,  which  had  an 
element  of  the  picturesque  with  its  squads  of  Boy  Scouts 
scouring  the  forests  and  woodlots  for  walnut  trees. 

One  of  the  knottiest  problems  that  came  before  the  War 
Industries  Board  was  that  of  pulp  and  paper,  particularly 
newsprint.  As  this  industry  drew  on  materials  that  were 
needed  in  mimitions,  and  was  a  heavy  consumer  of  coal, 
labor,  and  transportation,  it  was  early  marked  for  drastic 
curtailment;  while  the  mounting  prices  of  paper  called  for 
price-fixing.  The  situation  became  so  desperate  that  the 
Board  had  decided  to  control  and  allocate  all  newsprint  after 
November  15,  1918.  The  Pulp  and  Paper  Section  was  cre- 
ated June  6,  1918.    W.  B.  Colver  was  the  first  chief.    He 


.  < 


THE  FORESTS  DO  THEIR  BIT 


429 


was  succeeded  by  Thomas  E.  Donnelley,  and  on  October  1, 
1918,  the  section  was  made  into  a  division.^ 

The  first  work  of  the  division  was  to  take  up  with  commit- 
tees of  the  industries  the  subject  of  the  elimination  of  waste- 
ful practices  and  the  reduction  of  the  quantities  of  chemicals 
consumed.  On  pledges  of  such  economies  the  industry  as 
a  whole  was  put  on  the  preference  list.  Class  IV,  for  coal  and 
transportation. 

The  biggest  job  that  fell  to  the  division  was  the  working 
out  of  a  series  of  regulations  for  thirty-six  industries  con- 
suming large  quantities  of  paper.  The  publishers,  who  had 
enthusiastically  backed  the  conservation  programme  for 
others,  found  it  a  horse  of  another  color  when  it  came  to  be 
applied  to  the  size  and  number  of  their  publications.  Daily 
and  weekly  newspapers  were  cut  down  fifteen  per  cent; 
Sunday  newspapers,  twenty  per  cent;  periodicals  and  general 
job-printing,  twenty-five  per  cent.  Each  of  the  paper  con- 
suming industries  initiated  its  own  curtailment  programme, 
through  its  war  service  committee.  Its  suggestions  were 
reviewed  by  the  division,  and  then,  after  further  consultation, 
regulations  were  drafted  and  issued.  In  dealing  with  the 
publishers  many  complex  questions  arose,  which  were  of  a 
highly  technical  nature,  and  not  susceptible  of  interesting 
presentation  in  a  book  for  the  general  reader. 

While  the  division  did  not  attempt  price  control,  the  price 
of  newsprint  was  finally  fixed  through  congressional  initia- 
tive. The  price  of  this  commodity  had  become  so  high  before 
the  United  States  entered  the  war  and  publishers  were  suffer- 
ing so  severely  that  Congress  directed  the  Federal  Trade 
Commission  to  make  an  investigation  of  costs  and  prices.  On 
June  30,  1917,  the  Commission  reported  that  $3.10  a  hun- 
dredweight was  a  fair  price.  After  many  appeals  and  hear- 
ings, this  was  established  as  the  base  price,  April  1,  1918. 
In  the  fall  of  1918,  the  United  States  Circuit  Court  for  the 
Southern  District  of  New  York,  acting  as  arbiter,  fixed  the 
price  at  $3.50;  later  still,  the  Federal  Trade  Commission 
advanced  the  base  price  to  $3.7525. 

^The  division  was  divided  into  a  Manufacturing  Section,  S.  L.  Willson, 
chief;  Paper  Economies  Section,  Isaac  W.  Blanchard,  chief;  Newspaper  Sec- 
tion, G.  J.  Palmer,  chief;  Fiber  Board  and  Container  Section,  Harold  W. 
Nichols,  chief. 


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430    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

The  Building  Materials  Division,  with  Richard  L.  Hum- 
phrey as  director,  was  established  in  March,  1918,  though 
the  supervision  of  the  industry  had  begun  with  cement  as 
early  as  April,  1917,  Eugene  Meyer,  Jr.,  then  looking  after 
it,  as  well  as  the  non-ferrous  metals.  Lumber  and  steel  were 
controlled  otherwise,  as  we  have  seen.  Sand,  gravel,  and 
crushed  stone  soon  followed  cement  under  the  old  committee 
organization. 

The  division  devoted  itself  principally  to  Portland  cement, 
brick,  hollow  tile,  gypsum,  plaster  board,  and  wall  board. 
These  materials,  if  not  abundant,  were  generally  in  sufficient 
quantity;  though,  owing  to  transportation  congestion  and 
local  conditions,  there  were  often  sectional  shortages.  The 
single  general  exception  was  gypsum  and  plaster  board,  of 
which  Government  requirements  were  twice  as  great  as 
normal  production  capacity.  Consequently  the  Government 
had  to  take  over  the  industry,  allocate  orders  and  fix  prices. 

In  general,  the  chief  work  of  the  division  was  to  promote 
curtailment  of  production  in  order  to  make  way  for  the 
emergently  essential  industries  and  to  assist  the  various  pro- 
curement and  construction  agencies  of  the  Government  in 
meeting  their  requirements.  The  general  method  of  pro- 
cedure was  the  same  as  with  lumber.  Prices  were  fixed  on 
cement  and  brick  for  Government  use,  and  the  industries 
voluntarily  kept  the  public  prices  near  the  Government 
prices;  while,  under  the  Non-War  Construction  Division  of 
the  Priorities  Division,  non-governmental  uses  were  cut  to 
the  bone,  virtually  all  building  and  road-making,  except  for 
war-promotion  purposes  and  exceptional  instances,  being 
stopped  as  has  elsewhere  been  related. 

Local  conditions  in  the  congested  northeastern  district 
became  such  in  the  spring  of  1918  that  it  was  necessary  to 
fix  prices  and  allocate  orders  for  sand,  gravel,  and  crushed 
stone  in  the  New  York,  Baltimore,  Washington,  and  Norfolk 
districts.  There  were  then  in  course  of  erection,  between 
Washington  and  New  York,  alone,  not  less  than  fifty-four 
big  Government  projects. 

The  work  of  this  division  was  so  broad,  covering  in  detail 
as  it  did  forty-three  important  industries  with  thirty-eight 
war  service  committees,  that  a  mere  sketch  of  its  activities 


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430    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

The  Building  Materials  Division,  with  Richard  L.  Hum- 
phrey as  director,  was  established  in  March,  1918,  though 
the  supervision  of  the  industry  had  begun  with  cement  as 
early  as  April,  1917,  Eugene  Meyer,  Jr.,  then  looking  after 
it,  as  well  as  the  non-ferrous  metals.  Lumber  and  steel  were 
controlled  otherwise,  as  we  have  seen.  Sand,  gravel,  and 
crushed  stone  soon  followed  cement  under  the  old  committee 
organization. 

The  division  devoted  itself  principally  to  Portland  cement, 
brick,  hollow  tile,  gypsum,  plaster  board,  and  wall  board. 
These  materials,  if  not  abundant,  were  generally  in  sufficient 
quantity;  though,  owing  to  transportation  congestion  and 
local  conditions,  there  were  often  sectional  shortages.  The 
single  general  exception  was  gypsum  and  plaster  board,  of 
which  Government  requirements  were  twice  as  great  as 
normal  production  capacity.  Consequently  the  Government 
had  to  take  over  the  industry,  allocate  orders  and  fix  prices. 

In  general,  the  chief  work  of  the  division  was  to  promote 
curtailment  of  production  in  order  to  make  way  for  the 
emergently  essential  industries  and  to  assist  the  various  pro- 
curement and  construction  agencies  of  the  Government  in 
meeting  their  requirements.  The  general  method  of  pro- 
cedure was  the  same  as  with  lumber.  Prices  were  fixed  on 
cement  and  brick  for  Government  use,  and  the  industries 
voluntarily  kept  the  public  prices  near  the  Government 
prices;  while,  under  the  Non-War  Construction  Division  of 
the  Priorities  Division,  non-governmental  uses  were  cut  to 
tlie  bone,  virtually  all  building  and  road-making,  except  for 
war-promotion  purposes  and  exceptional  instances,  being 
stopped  as  has  elsewhere  been  related. 

Local  conditions  in  the  congested  northeastern  district 
became  such  in  the  spring  of  1918  that  it  was  necessary  to 
fix  prices  and  allocate  orders  for  sand,  gravel,  and  crushed 
stone  in  the  New  York,  Baltimore,  Washington,  and  Norfolk 
districts.  There  were  then  in  course  of  erection,  between 
Washington  and  New  York,  alone,  not  less  than  fifty-four 
big  Government  projects. 

The  work  of  this  division  was  so  broad,  covering  in  detail 
as  it  did  forty-three  important  industries  with  thirty-eight 
war  service  committees,  that  a  mere  sketch  of  its  activities 


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THE  FORESTS  DO  THEIR  BIT 


431 


would  fill  a  sizable  volume,  and  anything  less  would  be  but 
a  dull  generalization.  It  employed  a  staff  of  fifty-five 
persons  besides  making  use  of  the  clerical  staffs  of  the 
governmental  agencies  with  which  it  cooperated.  One  of  its 
outstanding  achievements,  outside  the  usual  run  of  price 
negotiations,  priority  administration,  allocation,  etc.,  was  the 
standardization  of  schedules  for  war  building  projects.  This 
was  accomplished  in  carpentry,  millwork,  composition  roof- 
ing, slate  roofing,  clay  tile  roofing,  gypsum  wall  and  plaster 
board,  fiber  wall  board,  finishing  hardware,  door-hangers 
and  track,  plumbing  and  gas  fitting,  heating,  electric  wiring 
and  light  fixtures,  painting,  hollow  building  tile,  magnesite 
stucco,  fire  prevention  and  protection  devices. 

The  history  of  the  building  materials  industries  —  aggre- 
gating the  second  or  third  largest  trade  interest  in  the  United 
States  —  in  the  war  period  is  one  of  startling  contrasts.  On 
one  side  there  was  the  misery  of  curtailment  and  restriction, 
an  enforced  decline  in  activity  and  prosperity  in  the  midst 
of  a  general  boom  and  great  prosperity.  On  the  other  side 
were  the  tremendous  outbursts  of  productive  energy  to  meet 
occasional  emergencies  and  urgent  demands  for  certain 
commodities. 


I 


\ 


CHAPTER  XXVI 
LEATHER  AND  RUBBER  GO  TO  WAR 

A  million  sets  of  harness  —  Fifty  million  pairs  of  shoes  —  Regulating  the  shoe 
trade  —  What  might  have  happened  —  Rubber  an  economic  freak. 

Man's  ancient  ally  in  war,  the  horse,  came  back  from  his 
eclipse  by  motor  vehicles  to  take  his  part  in  the  black  drama 
of  the  greatest  of  wars.  His  recrudescence  revived  a  decadent 
industry  —  that  of  harness  and  saddlery  —  and  by  demand- 
ing a  million  sets  of  harness  contributed  to  the  violent  strains 
to  which  American  industry  was  subjected  during  the  war. 
Despite  motor  transport,  the  fighting  men  wore  out  shoes  in 
prodigious  quantities,  and  there  were  other  great  demands 
for  leather.  So  huge  was  the  total  of  all  military  demands 
that  the  civilian  was  doomed  to  get  along  with  about  a 
quarter  of  the  normal  leather  product  of  the  country. 

Indeed,  there  is  evidence^  that  if  procurement  officers  had 
not  rebelled  at  the  mountainous  size  of  the  leather  require- 
ments passed  on  to  them,  the  satisfaction  of  army  orders 
would  have  taken  all  the  hides  in  the  United  States  and  three 
hundred  thousand  more.  Men  who  had  figured  requirements 
for  troops,  batteries,  and  companies  in  peace-time  were  afloat 
on  an  uncharted  sea  when  it  came  to  calculating  the  leather 
needs  of  an  army  of  five  million  to  seven  million  men  that 
had  to  be  projected  at  least  six  to  eighteen  months  ahead 
because  of  the  time  that  elapses  from  the  taking  of  a  hide 
until  it  can  become  the  finished  product.  It  takes  as  long  to 
build  a  shoe,  from  the  animal's  back  to  the  finished  product, 
as  it  does  to  build  a  ship  from  ore  to  commission. 

The  American  leather  and  leather-consuming  industry  is 
a  Colossus  in  the  age  of  industrial  colossi  and  was  well 
prepared  for  the  war  orders  that  came  to  it  in  bales,  often 
with  very  little  anticipation.  The  United  States  makes  more 
leather  than  all  Europe  and  consumes  in  proportion.     The 

^Testimony  of  Colonel  George  B.  Goetz  before  House  of  Representatives 
Select  Committee  on  Expenditures  in  the  War  Department,  page  1403,  vol.  Ii, 
of  the  Ordnance  Sub-committee  bearings. 


\    'i 


LEATHER  AND  RUBBER  GO  TO  WAR   433 


war-time  weakness  of  the  industry  is  that  it  has  outgrown 
the  domestic  sources  of  hides.  A  third  of  the  cowhides  and 
kips,  three  fourths  of  the  calfskins,  eighty-eight  per  cent  of 
the  horsehides,  and  sixty-seven  per  cent  of  the  sheepskins 
tanned  in  the  United  States  are  imported.  With  the  re- 
striction of  shipping  space,  importations  were  greatly  reduced 
and,  at  the  same  time,  such  extraordinary  demands  as 
50,000,000  pairs  of  shoes,  1,000,000  sets  of  harness,  about 
3,500,000  leather  jerkins,  and  more  than  7,000,000  pairs  of 
heavy  gloves  had  to  be  provided  for  our  army  alone. 

As  an  offset  to  the  limitations  of  imports  was  the  fortu- 
nate fact  —  though  at  the  time  it  seemed  most  unfortunate 
—-that,  owing  to  the  restrictions  imposed  by  the  United 
Kingdom  in  the  spring  of  1917  on  importations  of  leather, 
there  was  a  large  supply  on  hand,  accumulated  in  anticipa- 
tion of  continuing  exports.  Moreover,  there  had  been  an 
extraordinary  increase  in  the  domestic  production  of  hides, 
owing  to  the  demands  of  the  Allies  and  of  neutral  nations 
for  meats  and  the  consequent  stimulation  of  the  live-stock 
business.  Consequently  there  was  no  great  disturbance  in 
the  industry  occasioned  by  the  entrance  of  the  United  States 
into  the  war. 

In  the  first  months  after  that  event,  a  Leather  and  Shoe 
Committee  and  a  Leather  Equipment  Committee  of  Mr. 
Rosenwald's  division  of  the  work  of  the  Advisory  Commission 
of  the  Council  of  National  Defense  handled  the  army's 
leather  needs;  which  were  slow  in  developing,  outside  of 
shoes.  Of  the  latter  it  was  the  means  of  providing  some 
eighteen  or  twenty  millions  of  pairs.  But  when  the  War 
Trade  Board  took  charge  of  imports,  when  shipping  space 
was  drastically  restricted,  and  the  Government  began  to  come 
into  the  market  for  incalculable  but  vast  quantities  of  leather 
products,  the  situation  completely  changed,  and  it  was  seen 
that  comprehensive  control  of  the  industry  from  ultimate 
sources  of  materials  to  distribution  of  products  must  be 
imdertaken. 

This  comprehensive  control  had  not  been  fully  worked  out 
when  the  war  came  to  its  end,  but  it  had  evolved  a  unique 
relationship  between  the  army  and  the  War  Industries  Board, 
which  amounted  to  a  blending  of  the  two  in  regard  to  the 


!■ 


k 


t 


\ 


I 


ii 


434    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

handling  of  leather.  The  fusion  came  about  in  this  way: 
In  the  first  part  of  February  the  Quartermaster  Corps  decided 
to  coordinate  army  contracts  with  the  leather  industry  for 
the  purpose  of  insuring  adequate  supplies  and  proper  quali- 
ties for  its  own  uses  and  also  to  protect  the  civilian  population 
from  unrestrained  consequences  of  its  enormous  demands. 

Mr.  C.  F.  C.  Stout  (of  John  R.  Evans  &  Company,  Phila- 
delphia), who  had  submitted  a  report  on  the  leather  situation, 
was  then  made  chairman  of  what  was  called  the  Hide  and 
Leather  Control  Board  of  the  Supply  and  Equipment  Divi- 
sion of  the  Quartermaster  Corps.  Later  it  was  made  a 
branch  of  the  Hide,  Leather,  and  Leather  Goods  Division. 
When  the  War  Industries  Board  was  reorganized  in  March, 
1918,  Mr.  Baruch  made  Mr.  Stout  chief  of  the  Hide,  Leather, 
and  Tanning  Materials  Section  of  the  Board.  (The  tanning 
materials  part  of  the  work  was  transferred  later  to  the 
Chemicals  Division.)  Mr.  Stout  was  thus  in  and  of  the 
War  Department  and  the  War  Industries  Board,  but  his  stafif 
was  in  the  former. 

In  the  following  October,  the  staflF  was  transferred  to  the 
War  Industries  Board,  with  the  exception  of  the  field  nien. 
It  had  nine  sections  or  bureaus  as  follows:  Foreign  Hides 
and  Skins,  0.  C.  Howe,  chief;  Domestic  Hides  and  Skins, 
Lewis  B.  Jackson,  chief,  Arthur  L.  Webster  and  Arthur  T. 
Coding,  assistants;  Sole  and  Beking  Leather,  H.  W.  Boyd, 
chief,  succeeded  by  W.  B.  Eisendrath;  Harness,  Bag,  and 
Strap  Leather,  F.  A.  Vogel,  chief;  Sheepskin  and  Glove 
Leather,  E.  C.  Shotwell,  chief;  Boots  and  Shoes,  C.  D.  P. 
Hamilton,  chief;  Harness  and  Personal  Equipment,  C.  A. 
Rogers,  chief;  Behing,  G.  B.  Rowbotham,  chief;  and  Gloves 
and  Leather  Clothing,  H.  J.  Lewis,  chief. 

Sheepskins  for  leather  jerkins  were  first  of  the  leather 
commodities  to  be  put  under  control.  On  March  20,  1918, 
the  packers  and  wool-pullers  met  in  Washington  and  agreed 
to  give  the  tanners  of  jerkin  leather  an  option  on  all  picked 
sheepskins  at  a  maximum  price  of  fourteen  cents  a  square 
foot;  and  the  tanners  agreed  to  dress  the  skins  at  four  cents 
a  square  foot.  This  agreement  was  equivalent  to  the  taking 
over  by  the  army  of  all  such  pelts.    It  ran  until  June  7, 1918, 


I         r 


LEATHER  AND  RUBBER  GO  TO  WAR       435 

and  made  no  provision  for  prices  to  the  public.  When  the 
agreement  expired,  the  Price-Fixing  Committee  issued  a 
schedule  of  maximum  prices  for  sheepskins,  varying  from 
eight  to  eighteen  cents  according  to  quality.  With  slight 
changes  in  October,  these  prices  prevailed  until  after  the 
war.  In  April,  the  Price-Fixing  Committee  established  max- 
imum prices  for  cattle  hides  and  made  several  revisions 
thereof  in  the  interval  before  the  end  of  the  war.  The  neces- 
sity for  allocating  stocks  did  not  arise,  but,  in  conjunction 
with  the  War  Trade  Board,  importations  were  allocated. 

The  maximum-price  plan  for  hides  and  skins  was  far  from 
being  satisfactory,  and  if  the  division  had  the  job  to  do  over 
again  it  would  probably  insist  on  licensing  every  dealer  to 
do  business  within  the  maximum  prices  under  penalty  of 
losing  his  license  in  case  of  overstepping  the  limit.  It  was 
also  felt  that  prices  were  changed  too  frequently. 

It  would  be  wearisome  to  undertake  to  trace  the  operations 
of  all  the  sections.  An  interesting  feature  of  the  general 
work  was  the  development  of  the  heavy  "Pershing"  and  later 
the  "Victory"  shoe  for  the  soldiers  in  the  trenches,  it  having 
been  found  that  the  American  army  shoe  was  not  heavy 
enough  for  that  kind  of  use. 

The  first  step  toward  entire  control  of  the  industry  was 
taken  on  June  29,  1918,  when  the  Conservation  Division 
issued  a  set  of  regulations  for  the  reduction  in  the  number  of 
styles,  colors,  and  lasts  of  shoes  and  eliminating  certain 
wasteful  fashions  altogether.  Each  manufacturer  pledged 
himself  to  obey  these  regulations  and  thereby  got  himself 
placed  on  the  preference  list  for  fuel  and  transportation. 
This  pledge  system  was  substantially  the  same  as  was  applied 
by  the  Priorities  Division  throughout  industry. 

The  soaring  prices  of  shoes,  as  well  as  the  scarcity  of 
leather  for  military  purposes,  inevitably  indicated  that  the 
War  Industries  Board  must  get  down  to  a  detailed  price  and 
model  regulation  in  the  shoe  business  that  was  hardly  known 
in  any  other  part  of  its  field.  With  that  singular  perversity 
of  human  nature,  which  makes  it  delight  to  revel  wantonly 
in  the  scarce  and  expensive  when  necessity's  demands  are 
most  pressing,  women's  fashions  called  for  a  different  color 
of  glazed  kid  shoes  for  each  gown;  and  the  shortening  of 


..  • 


I 


436    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

skirts  was  followed  by  the  heightening  of  shoes  —  just  when 
the  price  of  glazed  kid  was  three  hundred  and  fifty  per  cent 
above  normal  and  there  was  a  menace  of  a  general  shortage 
of  leather. 

At  first  it  was  proposed  that  there  be  but  a  single  type  of 
black  leather  shoe,  and  that  the  wholesale  price  should  be 
stamped  on  the  sole  of  every  shoe  to  provide  a  check  on  the 
cupidity  of  retailers.  This  last  suggestion  was  stubbornly 
opposed  by  the  trade.  After  a  long  series  of  conferences, 
some  of  a  very  warm  nature,  the  boot  and  shoe  manufac- 
turers finally  yielded  to  a  programme,  applicable  June  1, 
1919,  which  confined  shoes  to  black,  white,  and  one  shade 
of  tan,  in  color.  Heights  were  fixed,  the  introduction  of  new 
lasts  was  forbidden,  and  certain  wasteful  styles  were  dis- 
carded. As  to  quality  there  were  to  be  four  grades.  Class  A 
was  to  retail  at  $9  to  $12  for  high  shoes  and  $9  to  $11  for 
low  shoes;  Class  B,  at  $6  to  $8.95;  Class  C,  $3  to  $5.95; 
Class  D,  below  $3.  To  get  around  the  objection  to  having 
the  wholesale  price  stamped  on  the  shoe,  it  was  directed  that 
each  shoe  was  to  be  stamped  with  a  key  number,  so  that  the 
purchaser  could  assure  himself  that  he  was  getting  a  shoe  in 
the  represented  price  grade.  Retailers  were  to  be  required 
to  display  placards,  explaining  the  price  scheme,  and  pledges 
of  compliance  with  the  regulations  were  required  all  along 
the  line.  The  conservation  programme  would  not  only  have 
saved  the  consuming  public  millions  of  dollars,  but  would 
have  relieved  the  trade  from  the  burden  of  $100,000,000 
worth  of  stocks  needed  to  meet  the  great  number  of  styles 
and  models  in  ordinary  demands. 

While  leather  shod  the  doughboys  on  the  road  to  victory, 
rubber  shod  their  transport.  There  was  no  lack  of  either  for 
the  Allies,  and  their  enemies  were  pinched  for  both.  Paper 
shoes  and  metal  tires  for  Teutonic  locomotion  were  signs  of 
the  downfall  of  the  empires  of  the  Hapsburgs  and  the 
HohenzoUems. 

Rubber  was  one  of  the  economic  freaks  of  the  war  in  that 
its  price  was  in  no  wise  affected  by  the  political  and  com- 
mercial reactions  which  upset  pretty  much  everything  else. 
It  was  unaffected  by  the  beginning  of  the  war  in  Europe  and 
it  never  revealed  a  tremor  after  the  United  States  entered 


LEATHER  AND  RUBBER  GO  TO  WAR        437 

the  international  lists.  It  was  even  so  conservative  that  it 
refused  to  ascend  to  the  maximum  prices  prescribed  by  the 
War  Trade  Board.  Yet  the  United  States  produces  no  crude 
rubber  and  is  entirely  dependent  on  imports,  most  of  which 
come  over  long  ocean  routes  —  from  Brazil  and  the  East 
Indies. 

While  we  were  having  convulsions  in  the  control  of  some 
commodities  of  which  we  were  the  chief  if  not  sole  pro- 
ducers, we  had  an  easy  job  with  the  one  bulky  commodity, 
outside  of  nitrates,  which  we  did  not  and  could  not  produce 
at  home.  Moreover,  though  the  United  States  is  not  a  pro- 
ducer, it  is  by  far  the  greatest  consumer  of  rubber  and  manu- 
facturer of  rubber  products.  The  basic  explanation  of  the 
anomalous  calmness  of  rubber  in  a  world  of  economic  stress 
and  storm  was  somewhat  paradoxical;  prices  were  not  shoved 
up  by  the  foreign  producers  because  we  took  so  much  of 
their  product  that  diey  dared  not  risk  a  move  that  might 
reduce  consumption.  To  put  it  in  another  way,  production 
from  rubber  plantations  had  increased  so  rapidly  that,  when 
the  war  forced  Germany  and  Russia  out  of  the  market,  the 
producers  were  so  much  concerned  for  outlets  that  they  were 
in  no  mood  to  apply  the  screws. 

The  only  necessity  for  any  regulation  of  rubber  arose 
from  the  lack  of  ships  for  its  importation  and  from  the 
desirableness  of  the  conservation  of  men  and  materials  in 
every  phase  of  the  war  effort.  The  lack  of  transport  caused 
the  War  Trade  Board  to  put  a  limit  on  the  amount  of  rubber 
that  might  be  imported  —  a  limit  which  necessitated 
economy;  but  at  the  same  time  it  fixed  prices,  compliance 
with  which  was  the  only  means  of  getting  licenses  to  import. 
But  stolid  rubber  did  not  rise  to  these  prices.  As  the  War 
Trade  Board  did  not  act  in  this  matter  until  May,  1918,  and 
ample  cargoes  of  rubber  had  been  crossing  the  Pacific  prior 
to  that  time,  there  had  been  no  occasion  for  the  War 
Industries  Board  to  act.  Thereafter,  control  became  neces- 
sary and  the  Rubber  Section  (placed  administratively  in  the 
Textile  Division)  was  established  in  August,  with  H.  T.  Dunn 
as  chief  .^ 

U.  W.  Rowland  and  J.  C.  Matlack  were  assistants,  and  George  E.  C.  Kelley, 
auditor. 


I 

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Ti 


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I 


438    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

All  importations  were  cut  down  about  one  third,  and,  as 
war  uses  demanded  thirty  thousand  of  the  admitted  one 
hundred  thousand  tons  for  1918,  considerable  adjustments 
were  necessary.  The  restriction  of  the  automobile  industry 
was  an  important  factor,  as  seventy  per  cent  of  the  rubber 
imported  into  the  United  States  goes  into  tires  and  tubes. 
The  number  of  types  of  tires  was  reduced.  Then,  on 
September  21,  1918,  the  Priorities  Commissioner  issued 
Circular  No.  24,  which  put  rubber  among  the  controlled 
industries  in  the  customary  way.  The  circular  recom- 
mended that  models,  sizes,  and  styles  be  cut  down  in  all  lines 
of  rubber  goods,  and  limited  the  production  of  tires  and 
tubes  for  the  last  three  months  of  1918  to  three  fifths  of 
fifty  per  cent  of  the  normal  output  for  eighteen  months. 

The  rubber  trade  was  so  much  impressed  by  the  helpless 
dependence  of  the  United  States  on  foreign  sources  for  its 
crude  rubber  —  though  no  unpleasant  consequences  arose 
during  the  war  —  that  its  war  service  committee  ventured 
to  make  a  suggestion  to  the  American  delegates  to  the  Peace 
Conference.  It  was  feared  that  Holland  and  the  British 
Empire  might  be  tempted  to  use  their  near  monopoly  of  the 
raw  material  to  build  up  a  monopoly  of  manufacturing. 
Consequently  the  committee  recommended  that  the  American 
delegates  should  insist  on  guaranties  from  the  British  and 
Dutch  Governments  that  American  manufacturers  should 
have  access  to  the  raw  material  "upon  as  favorable  terms  as 
the  manufacturers  of  any  country.'* 


CHAPTER  XXVn 
WAGING  WAR  WITH  TEXTILES 

Blotting  out  Civil  War  scandals  —  The  early  Rosenwald  Committee  —  Clothing 
the  fighting  millions  —  The  final  stupendous  requirements  —  The  reign  of  wool 
—  The  story  of  "shoddy"  —  Mobilizing  the  cotton  goods  — Eight  hundred 
million  yards  for  the  army  — The  industry  falls  into  step  —  Gingham-makers 
produce  uniforms  —  Cromwell  cracks  the  whip. 

The  Civil  War  put  a  brand  of  shame  on  the  American  textile 
industry.  Old  soldiers  still  tell  of  the  rotten  fabrics  of 
their  uniforms  —  and  the  army  clothing  contractor  of  the 
internecine  struggle  was  for  fifty  years  the  type  par 
excellence  of  the  home-staying  leech  who  fattened  on  the 
profits  of  fraud  while  the  soldiers  bore  the  brunt  of  the 
Nation's  travail.  The  brand  was  not  erased  by  the  lapse 
of  sixty  years  when  the  World  War  once  again  called  upon 
the  textile  trade  to  clothe  the  fighting  millions  of  America. 

Here  was  the  opportunity  to  cover  the  old  shame  with  a 
new  honor.  It  was  fully  availed  of,  and  availed  of  under 
inevitable  circumstances  that  made  the  industry  the  guardian 
or  the  defiler  of  its  own  escutcheon. 

It  was  humanly  impossible  for  the  Quartermaster  Corps, 
or  the  organization  of  the  army  that  subsequently  assumed 
the  quartermaster  function,  to  deal  with  the  stupendous  tasks 
of  providing  clothing  for  the  mounting  millions  of  the 
Republic's  armies  without  mustering  into  its  service  the 
captains  of  the  industry.  Equally  impossible  was  it  for, 
first,  the  Council  of  National  Defense,  or,  later,  the  War 
Industries  Board  to  discharge  their  cooperative  functions 
without  endowing  with  regulatory  powers  the  very  men  who 
were  to  be  regulated.  None  but  great  textile  manufacturers 
and  dealers  could  apply  business  acumen  to  the  expenditure 
of  something  like  two  billions  of  dollars  for  the  clothing, 
tentage,  and  miscellaneous  textile  equipment  of  the  armies. 
Only  they  could  marshal  the  columns  of  mills,  only  they 
could  determine  fair  prices.  Put  on  their  honor,  these  men 
in  various  capacities  rose  above  personal  considerations, 


\ 


440    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

above  trade  friendships  and  group  loyalties,  forgot  personal 
gain,  and  served  unswervingly  the  interests  of  the  Govern- 
ment and  Nation.  Taken  from  the  sellers  and  producers 
and  placed  on  the  side  of  the  buyer  and  consumer,  they  never 
doubted  for  a  moment  what  their  duty  was  or  hesitated  for 
an  instant  in  following  its  commands. 

That  is  really  the  big  thing  of  the  war  in  the  textiles  —  not 
the  millions  of  garments  produced  or  the  billions  of  yards 
of  cloth  woven.  It  was  the  big  thing  of  the  war  in  almost 
every  line  of  supply  —  the  incorruptibility  of  the  American 
business  man  commandeered  for  Government  service.  It  is 
a  record  of  moral  integrity  developed  by  the  war  that  may 
well  be  placed  in  the  balance  against  the  demoralization  of 
character  that  seems  to  have  been  one  of  the  foul  legacies  of 
the  war. 

Notwithstanding  all  the  slander  to  the  contrary,  the  great 
task  of  meeting  the  first  supply  emergency  in  the  chaotic 
days  of  the  spring  and  summer  of  1917  was  met  just  as 
honorably,  ably,  and  faithfully  by  the  volunteer  committees 
of  the  industry,  attached  to  the  Government  only  by  the  mere 
name  of  an  Advisory  Commission  Committee,  as  it  was  later 
by  some  of  the  men  of  these  same  committees  when  they  were 
divorced  by  formal  direction  from  their  old  trade  associ- 
ations and  were  commanded  henceforth  to  be  the  servitors 
of  the  Government.  Had  they  not  been  of  good  stuff  in  the 
first  instance,  they  would  not  have  been  in  the  last. 

The  major  part  of  the  War  Industries  Board,  whether  in 
functional  or  conmiodity  capacities,  had  its  roots  in  the  old 
Committee  of  Raw  Materials  of  the  Council  of  National 
Defense  organization;  but  the  textiles,  like  leather,  go  back 
to  the  Committee  on  Supplies,  of  which  Julius  Rosenwald, 
of  the  Advisory  Commission,  was  chairman.  In  a  general 
way  of  speaking  it  may  be  said  that  the  Finished  Products 
administrative  division  of  the  War  Industries  Board  was  the 
heir  of  the  Supplies  Committee,  though  it  dealt  also  with 
matters  that  were  never  within  the  province  of  the  committee. 

Mr.  Rosenwald's  chief  of  staflF  was  Charles  Eisenman,  a 
retired  textiles  manufacturer;  and  to  his  assistance  in  the 
work  of  advising  the  Government  regarding  its  textile  pur- 
chases he  summoned  a  sub-committee  of  manufacturers  of 


WAGING  WAR  WITH  TEXTILES 


441 


/ 


woolens,  another  of  cotton  goods,  and  a  third  of  knit  goods. 
These  committees,  acting  with  purely  trade  committees,  con- 
stituted for  nearly  a  year  the  fabric  of  governmental 
relations  with  the  respective  industries. 

The  storm  of  public  protest  against  the  so-called  buyers- 
and-sellers  committees  centered  chiefly  on  these  three  com- 
mittees, and  during  the  drifting  period  in  the  development 
of  the  War  Industries  Board  their  staffs  and  to  some  extent 
their  executive  personnel  were  taken  into  the  reorganized 
army  supply  department,  which  for  a  time  virtually  essayed 
to  fill  the  whole  field  of  contact  between  the  War  Department 
and  the  textiles  as  well  as  in  other  finished  goods,  leaving  to 
the  Finished  Products  Division  of  the  Board  little  but  the 
name.  Some  of  the  men  remained  there  till  the  end  of  the 
war,  while  others  returned  to  the  War  Industries  Board  when 
it  gained  vigor  and  authority  with  the  appointment  of  Mr. 
Baruch  as  chairman. 

Incidentally,  it  may  be  said,  that  to  such  an  extreme 
degree  for  a  time,  and  to  such  a  large  degree  all  the  time, 
did  the  Clothing  and  Equipage  Division  of  what  became  the 
Office  of  the  Director  of  Purchase  and  Storage  of  the 
Division  of  Purchase,  Storage,  and  Traffic,  headed  by  Major- 
General  Goethals,  function  in  what  was  properly  the  zone  of 
the  War  Industries  Board,  that  it  is  very  difficult  to  write 
with  precision  of  the  credit  and  responsibility  for  much  of 
what  was  accomplished  in  the  textiles  sector. 

In  any  event,  great  credit  goes  to  the  Supplies  Committee 
and  its  subsidiaries.  Mr.  Eisenman  passed  off  the  scene 
about  the  end  of  1917,  but,  in  an  uncharted  field,  harassed 
by  unjust  attacks,  and  not  always  properly  supported  from 
above,  he  had  laid  the  foundations  of  a  firm  structure  of 
cooperation  between  the  Government  and  the  textile  indus- 
tries. Through  his  committees  were  handled  45,000  con- 
tracts aggregating  $800,000,000  at  an  administrative  expense 
of  only  $20,000.  His  honesty,  courage,  and  fidelity  to  the 
Government  were  beyond  question. 

The  various  textile  sections  were  finally  grouped  into  a 
Textiles  Division  with  John  W.  Scott  as  director,  having  as 
his  assistant  Henry  B.  Ashton.  Spencer  Turner,  who  had 
been  acting  chairman  of  the  old  cooperative  Committee  on 


i 


V 


:^ 


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M 


442    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Cotton  Goods,  then  became  chairman  of  the  Cotton  Goods 
Section,  having  as  his  assistants  Grosvenor  Ely,  George  F. 
Smith,  Burton  Etherington,  and  Ralph  E.  Loper;  Lincoln 
Cromwell,  who  was  chairman  of  the  old  Committee  on  Knit 
Goods,  became  chairman  of  the  Section  on  Knit  Goods,  his 
associates  being  Rufus  W.  Scott,  F.  E.  Haight,  and  John 
McCauley;  and  Herbert  E.  Peabody,  who,  as  the  active 
member  of  a  committee  of  the  American  Association  of 
Woolen  and  Worsted  Manufacturers,  had  been  the  liaison 
man  between  that  committee  and  the  Rosenwald  Committee 
on  Woolen  Manufactures,  became  chief  of  the  Woolens 
Section,'  assisted  by  A.  L.  Gifford.  With  this  much  of  an 
organization  background,  the  story  of  achievement  may  now 
be  told,  in  its  high  lights,  without  regard  to  nice  distinctions 
of  personal  or  group  credit  or  responsibility. 

Aside  from  the  rush  of  equipping  the  first  troops  called 

to  the  colors,  the  woolen  goods  manufacturers  never  had  any 

difl&culty  in  meeting  the  Government's  demands  throughout 

the  war,  so  far  as  dieir  productive  capacity  was  concerned. 

The  real  woolen  problem  was  that  of  the  supply  of  the  raw 

material  —  wool.     The   first   troops   got   some   queer   and 

miscellaneous  supplies,  chiefly  in  blankets,  picked  up  here 

and  there  and  made  up  from  heterogeneous   goods   that 

happened  to  be  on  hand.     After  that  there  was  never  any 

real  difficulty  in  meeting  the  growing  demands  of  the  army; 

of  blankets,  19,400,000  pairs  were  produced;  of  woolen 

coats,    12,365,000;    of    woolen    trousers    and    breeches, 

17,342,000;   of  flannel  shirts,  28,869,000;   of  overcoats, 

7,748,000;  of  woolen  stockings,  90,000,000;  and  much  else 

besides.  , 

The  nominal  requirements  of  the  army  were  so  great  ttiat 
the  needs  of  civilians  were  virtually  ignored.  If  there 
happened  to  be  any  wool  left  at  any  time,  the  civilians  got 

*The  other  sections  were:  ...    r««,„«  tit 

Cotton  and  Cotton  Linters  Section.    George  R.  James,  chief;  George  W. 
Naumburg,  assistant;  Sherburne  Prescptt,  assistant. 
Felt  Section.    Sylvan  Stroock,  cWef. 
Flax  Products  Section.    George  F.  Smith,  chief. 
Rubber  and  Rubber  Goods  Section.    H.  T.  Dunn,  chief. 
Silk  Section.    William  Skinner,  chief.  M^ir^n-, 

Domestic  Wool  Section.     Lewis  Penwell.  chief;   William  D.  McKellar. 

assistant.  »    ,,    o  u-  * 

Foreign  Wool  Section.    A.  M.  Patterson,  chief. 


WAGING  WAR  WITH  TEXTILES 


443 


It.  Toward  the  end  of  the  war  the  army  turned  in  require- 
ments based  on  the  immediate  supply  of  7,000,000  men. 
There  was  not  one  third  enough  wool  to  meet  such  a  pro- 
gramme. Mr.  Peabody  was  aghast.  It  is  certain  that  if 
the  army  had  insisted  on  its  schedules  as  they  stood  for 
urgent  delivery  —  assuming  that  the  war  had  gone  on  — 
there  would  have  been  no  woolen  clothing  for  civilians  in 
1919  and  thereafter  that  had  not  been  already  manu- 
factured. 

Facing  such  a  possibility,  the  wool  section  men  were 
very  philosophical,  though  they  dreaded  the  storm  of  com- 
plaint that  would  come.  They  knew  that,  as  a  matter  of 
hard  fact,  the  civilian  population  could  get  along  with  old 
clothes  for  a  year  without  any  great  hardship.  In  the  spring 
of  1918  only  forty-five  per  cent  of  the  woolen  mills  were  on 
Government  work,  and  the  others  were  unable  to  get  new 
stocks  of  wool,  as  the  Government  had  it  all.  The  chief 
problem  before  the  wool  section  was  what  was  to  be  done 
in  the  future  with  these  mills  and  with  the  supplying  of 
civilians.  Plans  were  under  way  for  the  conversion  of 
some  of  the  mills  to  other  war  work,  and  an  exhaustive 
survey  was  made,  through  questionnaires  and  by  other 
inquiries,  to  ascertain  just  what  were  the  private  stocks  of 
wool  and  the  amounts  of  manufactured  fabrics  and  clothing. 
Some  of  the  conservation  steps  taken  through  the  Conserva- 
tion Division,  as  well  as  the  Industrial  Adjustment  Com- 
mittee, have  been  noted  in  the  chapter  on  the  Conservation 
Division.  But,  at  best,  the  prospect  was  that  the  people 
would  have  to  go  on  an  old-clothes  basis  with  a  golden  era 
for  the  second-hand  clothing  men  and  a  period  of  vacuity 
for  clothing  stores. 

With  its  control  and  monopoly  use  of  wool  stocks  and, 
therefore,  its  control  of  the  whole  woolen  textile  business, 
the  War  Department  virtually  annexed  the  business  of 
fabricating  the  wool,  for  its  only  use  was  for  military 
clothing  and  other  military  uses.  The  clothing-makers  were 
little  more  than  its  manufacturing  department,  for  they  were 
chiefly  making  what  the  War  Department  wanted  and  making 
it  according  to  army  designs  and  specifications.  If,  in  this 
latter  period,  the  army  paid  too  much  for  its  clothing  (and 


n 


{ 


I  > 


It 


444    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

there  is  no  evidence  that  it  did),  there  is  but  one  place  for 
the  allocation  of  blame. 

The  control  of  the  wool  situation  began  in  July,  1917, 
when  $25,000,000  was  set  aside  for  the  purchase  of  raw 
material.     Prices  had  risen  sixty-five  per  cent  in  the  first 
months  of  1917  from  an  already  high  level,  although  at 
that  time  there  was  no  real  shortage.     Speculation  and  the 
familiar  eff*ects  of  optioning  and  buying  in  anticipation  of 
demand  had  elevated  prices.     Six  million  pounds  of  wool 
were  bought  at  once  and  held  as  a  dumping  source  to  keep 
prices  down.     In  October  the   Government  —  through  the 
Quartermaster  Department  —  purchased   from  the   British 
Government  (which  had  bought  the  entire  Australian  clip) 
123,500,000  pounds  of  wool;  and,  in  November,  325,000 
bales  more,  though  only  110,000  were  delivered.     In  the 
same  month  the  War  Trade  Board  put  all  wool  importations 
under  license,  with  the  proviso  that  no  wool  should  be  sold 
except  to  manufacturers  without  permission  from  the  War 
Industries  Board,  and  further  that  the  Government  should 
have  an  absolute  ten-day  option  on  all  consignments  and  a 
continuing  option  on  unsold  residues.     Imports  from  South 
America  were  prohibited.  ' 

These  measures  put  the  Government  in  absolute  control 
of  imported  wool.  By  exercising  its  option  on  the  domestic 
clip,  after  April  6,  1918,  on  the  basis  of  the  market  price 
of  July  31,  1917,  plus  five  per  cent,  that  was  thoroughly 
controlled.  Exportations,  except  those  that  were  to  be 
returned  in  manufactured  form,  were  forbidden.  All  of 
these  measures  resulted  in  a  total  net  supply  of  656,800,000 
pounds  of  grease  wool  for  1917  and  503,800,000  pounds 
for  1918  —  as  compared  with  821,800,000  pounds  in  1916. 
The  American  production  was  in  the  neighborhood  of  300,- 
000  000  pounds.  In  these  circumstances  the  allocation  for 
civilian  use  was  only  25,000,000  pounds  in  1918,  and  was 
nominally  only  15,000,000  for  1919. 

To  handle  the  business  resulting  from  the  various  control 
and  purchase  measures,  the  Government  appointed  a  wool 
administrator  to  make  purchases,  a  wool  purchasing  quarter- 
master to  attend  to  finances,  and  a  wool  distributor  to  allocate 
it  to  manufacturers.     It  was  hoped  to  augment  supplies  from 


WAGING  WAR  WITH  TEXTILES 


445 


South  America  in  1919,  and  the  Board's  Foreign  Mission 
procured  335,000  bales  of  Australian  wool,  but  the  outlook 
was  so  unpromising  in  general  that  attention  was  turned  to 
possible  substitutes. 

During  the  war  raw  materials  increased  in  price  two  or 
three  times  and  fabrics  from  150  to  200  per  cent.  Govern- 
ment prices  for  goods  were  much  lower  than  the  manufactur- 
ers could  have  secured  had  trade  been  free,  but  at  that 
profits  were  considerably  above  pre-war  averages.  Con- 
tracts were  sometimes  awarded  without  bids,  but  after  the 
Government  got  a  firm  grip  on  wool  there  was  ordinarily 
nothing  to  be  gained  by  departing  from  the  old  competitive 
bidding  system  —  the  more  especially  as  there  was  a  surplus 
of  manufacturing  capacity.  It  must  be  remembered  that 
one  reason  for  dispensing  with  bids  in  so  much  of  the 
Government  procurement  of  supplies  during  the  war  was  to 
prevent  artificial  rises  in  prices;  but,  as  the  woolens  situa- 
tion was  shaped,  bidding  would  tend  to  lower  prices. 

The  handling  of  the  wool  and  woolens  business  was 
necessarily  in  the  hands  of  the  trade.  Those  men  who 
joined  the  Government  are  to  be  honored  for  their  loyalty 
to  their  transformed  allegiance,  and  their  fellows  with  whom 
they  dealt  are  entitled  to  great  credit  for  their  cordial 
cooperation.  John  P.  Wood,  of  Philadelphia,  who  was 
chairman  of  the  original  cooperative  Committee  on  Woolen 
Manufactures  and  later  a  member  of  the  trade's  war  service 
committee,  is  to  be  credited  in  large  measure  with  the  high 
tone  of  the  whole  business.  He  determined  at  the  beginning 
that  honor  was  more  important  to  the  trade  than  profits  from 
war  work,  and  used  all  his  vast  influence  to  repress  rapacity 
and  to  see  that  the  Government  was  never  in  the  dark, 
deceived,  or  misinformed  in  its  dealings.  If  there  were 
any  crooks  in  the  business,  they  could  not  succeed,  because 
the  Government  had  the  benefit  of  the  services  of  honorable 
men  of  superior  acumen,  who  were  insistent  that  the  woolen 
industry  should  have  a  spotless  war  record. 

Readers  who  recall  the  attempt  to  stir  up  a  shoddy  scandal 
may  question  the  justice  of  the  recognition  herein  given  to 
the  woolen  manufacturers.  In  truth,  there  was  not  the 
slightest  basis  of  scandal.     Aside  from  some  of  the  early 


i|i>l 


i|i 


II 


•      I 


•  I 


i  ti  I 


446    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

gap-filling  purchases,  all  Government  fabrics  were  made  to 
comply  with  rigid  specifications  —  and  those  specifications 
called  for  a  certain  proportion  of  shoddy.  "Shoddy"  is  a 
disreputable  adjective,  but  it  is  an  honorable  noun.  Shoddy 
is  re-worked  wool,  and  there  are  many  grades  and  qualities. 
Ninety-five  per  cent  of  the  best  qualities  of  civilian  over- 
coats contain  a  percentage  of  shoddy.  An  all-wool  overcoat 
is  an  expensive  luxury,  for  it  is  no  better  and  perhaps  not 
as  good  as  a  garment  containing  a  proportion  of  good 
shoddy.  Some  sorts  of  wool  actually  make  a  distinctly 
inferior  fabric  unless  mixed  with  shoddy.  Moreover,  most 
of  the  shoddy  used  in  Government  fabrics  was  simply  the 
clippings  from  virgin  wool  fabrics  before  they  left  the 
factory. 

In  the  beginning,  the  army  specifications  called  for  all- 
wool  overcoats.  After  the  attempt  to  stir  up  a  scandal 
because  shoddy  was  found  in  some  of  the  emergency 
clothing.  General  Goethals  appointed  a  commission  to  fix 
specifications.  This  commission  reported  that  the  use  of 
shoddy  in  certain  fabrics  was  not  only  necessary  and 
essential,  but  advantageous.  A  mixed  fabric  was  just  as 
durable,  just  as  warm,  and  just  as  good  looking.  Moreover, 
if  the  economy  of  shoddy  had  been  neglected  there  would 
not  have  been  cloth  enough  to  clothe  the  army,  especially  as 
the  old  specification  of  sixteen-ounce  goods  was  abandoned 
and  twenty-oimce  specified  as  being  more  satisfactory  for 
overseas  service.  The  American  soldier  was  the  best-clothed 
soldier  in  the  World  War.  There  was  nothing  inferior  by 
design  or  fraud  in  his  equipment.  "Army  contractor"  is  no 
longer  a  stigmatic  term. 

In  cotton  goods  there  was  no  problem  of  scarcity  of 
material,  as  the  United  States  produces  more  than  half  the 
entire  cotton  supply  of  the  world.  Here  the  task  was  one  of 
mobilization  and  manipulation  of  the  manufacturing 
industry  to  meet  the  immense,  and,  with  reference  to  the 
different  kinds  of  mills,  imbalanced.  Government  require- 
ments. During  the  war  the  army  alone  bought  800,000,000 
yards  of  cotton  goods.  They  were  required  for  khaki  imi- 
forms,  working  clothes,  duck  for  tents,  webbing,  gauze, 
Venetian,  sheets,  pillow  cases,  towels,  and  other  purposes. 


WAGING  WAR  WITH  TEXTILES 


447 


As  with  woolen  goods,  the  tendency  of  the  army  was  to 
exaggerate  its  requirements  —  partly  from  a  laudable  desire 
to  provide  against  the  developments  of  a  war  that  could  not 
be  measured  by  any  past  experience  and  partly  from  the 
lack  of  any  standards  of  calculating  requirements.  Tents, 
for  example,  were  bought  on  the  theory  that  there  should  be 
one  big  tent  for  every  eight  men,  whereas,  for  the  most  part, 
the  army  at  home  was  in  cantonments  and  billeted  in  houses 
or  barracks  abroad.  The  first  call  for  tents  was  three  times 
the  normal  tentage  productive  capacity  of  the  country. 

The  situation  demanded  the  cooperation  of  the  representa- 
tive men  of  the  industry,  and  they  took  hold  of  it  in  the 
same  spirit  of  patriotic  service  and  anti-profiteering  that  tlie 
woolen  men  did.  They  started  out  so  strong  that  they 
incurred  some  opposition,  but  eventually  the  whole  industry 
came  into  line.  There  was  not  very  much  enthusiasm  for 
Government  business  in  the  early  days  of  the  war,  as  there 
was  plenty  of  private  patronage.  So  the  rather  amusing 
condition  arose  that  the  war  service  committee,  without  any 
authority,  would  be  found  bullying  manufacturers  into 
accepting  allocations  of  Government  orders.  In  the  case 
of  the  tentage  order,  for  example,  mills  were  actually  forced 
to  take  orders  despite  their  claims  that  their  machinery  was 
not  adapted  to  the  manufacture  of  duck.  The  committee 
knew  better. 

Again,  in  the  summer  of  1917,  the  army  called  for 
50,000,000  yards  for  cotton  uniforms,  which  was  five  times 
the  normal  annual  production  of  the  goods  needed.  Forth- 
with the  committee  swung  over  the  biggest  makers  of 
ginghams  and  fancy  colored  goods  to  the  making  of  a  cloth 
3iey  had  never  touched  before.  Two  such  concerns  —  the 
Amoskeag  Manufacturing  Company,  and  Amory,  Browne 
&  Company  —  came  through  with  40,000,000  yards. 

On  top  of  this  army  order,  the  navy  turned  up  unexpect- 
edly with  a  demand  for  5,000,000  yards  of  the  same  goods 
bleached.  To  meet  it  mills  that  were  manufacturing  for  the 
foreign  markets  and  others  that  were  making  sheetings  for 
the  domestic  market  were  persuaded  to  sidetrack  everything 
else  and  make  the  navy  cloth. 

As  if  that  were  not  enough,  the  army's  Medical  Corps, 


'ii 


4 


« 


«i 


i 


448    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

which  was  disregarding  the  advisory  committees,  called 
for  an  enormous  quantity  of  material  for  pajamas  — 
but  the  mills  that  were  prepared  to  make  it  had  already 
been  diverted  to  army  orders;  and  so  the  service  committee 
had  to  do  some  more  vigorous  extemporizing.  Despite  these 
vagaries  of  requirements  there  was  never  any  shortage  of 
equipment  due  to  the  failure  of  the  cotton  mills  to  deliver 
on  time. 

Speaking  of  requirements,  the  Cotton  Section  was  flabber- 
gasted one  day  by  a  hot  demand  for  100,000,000  yards  of 
gauze  from  the  Medical  Corps.  Consternation  reigned  until 
an  officer  blandly  explained  that  by  a  trifling  error  three 
ciphers  had  been  added  to  the  figure  desired. 

The  big  demands  came  from  the  Quartermaster  Depart- 
ment. It  acted  through  the  supply  committee,  but  the  navy, 
the  Ordnance,  the  Medical  Corps,  and  other  purchasing 
agencies  insisted  on  going  it  alone.  The  manufacturers 
hated  to  do  business  with  the  army  because  it  was  so  slow  in 
paying  its  bills  —  but  the  committee  compelled  them  to 
come  through. 

For  a  time  in  the  fall  of  1917  there  was  very  little 
coordination  between  the  Government  and  the  manufacturers. 
The  informal  war  service  committee  that  had  been  acting 
with  Mr.  Turner  as  the  go-between  was  dissolved.  Mr. 
Turner  joined  the  Supply  Committee,  and  then  the  army 
took  over  the  whole  job.  When  the  War  Industries  Board 
got  into  the  saddle  again,  there  was  a  new  war  service  com- 
mittee and  various  sub-committees  with  which  it  was  articu- 
lated. 

Prices  early  developed  a  runaway  tendency  and  the 
necessity  of  firm  control  soon  became  evident,  but  there  was 
no  authorized  body  to  deal  with  the  problem  until  the  War 
Industries  Board  was  thoroughly  reconstituted.  The  Price- 
Fixing  Committee  established  maximum  prices  on  certain 
basic  fabrics  in  July,  1918,  and  additional  schedules  were 
issued  in  the  four  following  months.  These  were  for  the 
public  as  well  as  for  the  Government  and  the  Allied  Govern- 
ments. The  matter  of  fixing  prices  for  raw  cotton  was  often 
considered,  but,  as  explained  in  the  chapter  on  prices,  the 
final  decision  was  against  doing  so.     Manufacturers  state 


WAGING  WAR  WITH  TEXTILES 


449 


that  their  profits  during  the  war  were  moderate  considering 
the  circumstances,  running  from  twenty  to  thirty  per  cent  as 
against  a  normal  ten  per  cent. 

When  Lincoln  Cromw'ell,  of  William  Iselin  &  Co.,  of  New 
York,  was  called  to  the  chairmanship  of  the  Supply  Sub- 
Committee  on  Knit  Goods,  he  changed  his  partnership 
relations  in  such  a  manner  that  as  a  member  of  the  firm  he 
had  nothing  to  do  with  nor  could  he  receive  any  profits  from 
knitting-mill  activities.  With  his  skirts  thus  cleared  in 
advance,  he  used  his  business  connections  to  get  the  cost- 
sheets  of  every  mill  he  could.  The  members  of  his  com- 
mittee followed  his  example  and  produced  their  cost-sheets. 
Then  as  committeemen,  they  turned  around  and  did  business 
with  all  the  other  manufacturers  with  the  cards  on  the 
table.  Mr.  Cromwell  happened  to  be  in  such  a  position  that 
he  could  divest  himself  of  business  affiliations  that  might 
be  embarrassing,  but  it  was  not  possible  for  every  big  busi- 
ness man  in  the  country  to  give  up  his  business  in  order  to 
serve  the  Government.  Indeed,  the  Government  needed  them 
in  their  business.  Certainly,  the  knit  goods  men  set  an 
admirable  example  of  how  to  meet  a  double  allegiance. 
With  these  low-cost  figures  before  them,  the  committeemen 
bullied  manufacturers  into  accepting  contracts  they  did  not 
want  at  fixed  prices  for  all. 

"You  can  make  ten  per  cent  profit,"  the  committee  would 
say,  "if  you  know  your  business,  and  if  you  don't  you  will 
have  to  contribute  the  rest." 

There  were  some  hogs,  some  red-handed  profiteers,  and 
some  pro-Germans  to  deal  with  in  this  industry.  Then, 
too,  the  industry  as  a  whole  had  a  dislike  for  Government 
business,  because  of  a  widespread  belief  that  through  some 
crooked  arrangement  a  certain  firm  had  got  most  of  the 
peace-time  patronage  of  the  Government.  The  idea  of 
patriotic  service  did  not  take  hold  at  first.  It  took  time  to 
grasp  the  deeper  meanings  of  war.  A  group  of  good 
American  underwear  manufacturers  who  were  still  infected 
with  the  "business-as-usual"  doctrine  had  a  meeting  at  their 
club  and  resolved  not  to  accept  the  price  the  committee  had 
fixed.  One  of  the  men  present  thought  it  his  duty  to  inform 
the  committee  of  the  determination  of  the  meeting.     So, 


'I 


v\ 


y 


«i' 


'  ■ 


i 


4 


ll  *    f 


^M 


450    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

when  the  delegate  from  the  group  called  on  Mr.  Cromwell, 
the  latter  was  prepared. 

"We'll  take  that  business  at  this  price,"  said  the  delegate, 
naming  his  figure. 

"Sorry,  but  we  don't  need  you,"  said  Mr.  Cromwell. 
"When  we  do,  I'll  let  you  know." 

However,  the  delegate  hung  around  the  office  the  whole 
morning  entirely  ignored  by  Mr.   Cromwell. 

Before  he  went  home,  he  signed  up  for  a  million  garments, 
which  compelled  the  rest  of  the  rebels  to  take  the  committee 
price,  while  excoriating  him  for  a  Judas. 

The  Knit  Goods  Section  performed  the  usual  commodity 
section  functions  in  relation  to  priority  matters  and  the 
general  facilitation  of  the  industry.  There  were  problems 
of  conversion  of  mills  to  Government  business,  of  securing 
supplies  of  needles,  of  ascertaining  increasing  costs  with 
changing  conditions,  of  new  machines,  of  appallingly 
grotesque  requirements  and  exasperating  cancellations.  Of 
course,  with  the  army  alone  taking  80,000,000  suits  of 
underwear  and  90,000,000  socks  from  the  knitters,  to  say 
nothing  of  other  goods,  the  civilian  had  a  hard  time  of  it. 
He  paid  through  the  nose,  but  the  Government,  through  its 
control  of  wool  and  yams  and  its  inside  knowledge  of  costs, 
had  the  manufacturers  at  its  mercy  and  held  them  to  the 
ten  per  cent  profit  on  low-cost  figure.  The  civilian  had  to 
satisfy  himself  with  conservation  darning  and  damning. 

The  Textiles  Division  had  many  grave  concerns  and 
heavy  burdens  beyond  woolen  and  cotton  fabrics  and  knit 
goods.  Felt  was  a  field  in  which  conflicting  needs  were 
always  tying  vexatious  knots  in  a  situation  that  was  marked 
by  a  desperate  shortage.  Ask  the  man  in  the  street  what 
felt  is  needed  for,  and  he  might  not  get  further  than  bedroom 
slippers,  but  the  army  wanted  it  for  canteens,  gas-masks, 
helmet,  hats,  caps,  clothing,  splints,  shells,  fuse-boxes  pack- 
ing, airplanes,  percussion  caps,  motor  trucks;  the  shipbuild- 
ing industry  needed  it  in  large  quantities  and  all  sorts  of 
machinery  clamored  for  it.  There  was  silk,  which  was 
mostly  a  puzzle  of  how  to  provide  coarse  silk  for  bags  for 
the  propellant  power  of  big  guns;  flax,  which  was  needed  for 
linen  and  had  to  be  got  from  abroad,  with  the  British  needing 


WAGING  WAR  WITH  TEXTILES 


451 


it  all  for  themselves;  jute,  hemp,  and  cordage,  which  were 
involved  in  the  nitrate,  packing,  shipping,  and  ship- 
equipping  tangles  of  the  ever-entangling  war  game;  and 
there  was  kapoc  from  Japan,  for  life-preservers;  cork  from 
Spain  for  linoleum,  and  so  on.  Conservation  and  curtail- 
ment were  resorted  to  freely. 

The  story  of  textiles  is  one  of  the  great  industrial  dramas 
of  the  war,  and  in  it  the  big  men  of  the  industry  played  fine 
parts.  More  than  any  other  industry,  perhaps,  the 
experience  of  its  manipulation  for  Government  purposes 
reveals  the  soundness  of  the  original  Raw  Materials  Com- 
mittee idea  of  making  contacts  between  business  men  in 
industry.  With  all  the  control  its  monopoly  of  wool  and  its 
domination  of  demand  gave  the  army  —  and  even  with  the 
aid  of  supply  committeemen  taken  into  its  procurement 
branch  —  it  found  that  it  had  to  fall  back  on  the  War 
Industries  Board  and  its  commodities  sections  for  that 
efficiency  of  articulation  which  is  summed  up  in  good 
management. 


14 


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CHAPTER  XXVIII 
THE  IMPLEMENTS  OF  WAR  BEHIND  THE  LINES 

Quantity  production  in  a  machine-made  war —  No  grinding  machines,  no  air- 
planes—  Reducing  standardization  fever  —  One  of  the  industrial  heartbreaks 
—  Anchor  chains  for  merchant  ships. 

A  MAN  and  a  machine  are  equal  to  thirty  men.  Hence  the 
magnitude  of  modem  war.  The  ancient  wars  were  fed  by 
supplies  produced  by  slave-power  —  a  power  virtually  with- 
out means  of  multiplying  itself.  The  wars  of  the  feudal  age 
were  measured  by  the  productive  powers  of  serfs  with  rude 
tools  and  of  artisans  without  machinery.  The  wars  of  our 
time  are  sustained  by  machines  which  do  not  depend  on 
human  energy  and  muscular  strength,  but  on  the  genii  of 
steam,  electricity,  and  gas  which  science  has  summoned  from 
their  repose  of  ages. 

When  Caesar  went  to  war,  the  slaves  went  to  work;  when 
the  knights  of  the  crusades  set  out  for  battle,  the  humble 
craftsmen  hammered  and  sawed.  Neither  slaves  nor  com- 
monalty could  be  made  to  order.  When  the  modems  war, 
they  call  on  the  machines  and  provide  more  machines.  Meas- 
ured by  machine-making  capacity,  the  war-power  of  the 
United  States  at  the  end  of  1918  was  two  and  a  half  times 
that  of  Germany  and  ten  times  that  of  England  —  and  war 
was  taking  nine  tenths  of  the  American  product. 

The  demand  for  machines  with  which  to  make  war 
machines  and  products  —  that  is,  tool  machines  —  had  mul- 
tiplied the  American  producing  capacity  four  or  five  times 
in  eighteen  months.  It  takes  anywhere  from  a  month  to 
nine  months  to  make  a  machine  tool  —  which  explains  why 
America  seemed  to  be  slow  in  getting  into  production  of  the 
goods  and  implements  of  war.  All  the  orders  given  by  the 
war-making  agencies  bred  requirements  for  machine  tools, 
and  thus  in  the  end  came  back  on  the  machine  tool  industry. 
In  the  case  of  some  war  implements,  such  as  airplanes,  the 
manufacture  of  which  was  previously  non-existent  in  this 
country,  the  entire  machinery  equipment  of  all  the  plants  set 


THE  IMPLEMENTS  OF  WAR  BEHIND  THE  LINES    453 

to  the  task  had  to  be  built  from  the  ground  up  —  thousands 
of  elaborate  machines  for  each  plant,  and  hundreds  of  thou- 
sands of  tool  attachments.  In  this  quantity-production  coun- 
try everything  goes  back  to  machine  tools  and  their  making. 

The  Air  Service,  for  example,  required  125,000  different 
articles  for  its  equipment  —  and  probably  every  one  of  them 
had  its  origin  in  machine  tools  —  tools  that  had  to  be  made 
in  thousands  of  instances. 

The  task  of  providing  machine  tools  would  have  been  over- 
taxing at  best,  but  when  it  is  added  that  seventy-five  per  cent 
of  the  industry  was  in  that  maelstrom  of  the  congested  region 
of  the  northeastem  section  of  the  country,  where  the  shortage 
of  fuel,  transportation,  and  power  confronted  a  cloudburst 
of  orders,  the  job  became  so  stupendous  as  to  appall  the 

stoutest  heart. 

Fortunately,  the  number  of  makers  was  relatively  small 
-i-  about  four  hundred  —  and  the  majority  of  the  machines 
required  were  standardized.  This  made  it  possible  for  the 
Machine  Tool  Section  to  keep  track  of  orders,  production, 
and  delivery  in  a  remarkably  complete  way  by  means  of  a 
card  system.  The  section  was  thus  currently  informed  of 
every  order  every  manufacturer  had  received.  The  manu- 
facturers kept  duplicate  cards.  By  means  of  these  cards, 
which  normally  recorded  twenty  thousand  orders,  the  section 
could  determine  when  delivery  could  be  made  on  a  new 
order  of  a  certain  grade  of  priority  and  what  unfilled  orders 
would  be  interfered  with  by  the  priority  assigned  to  the 
new  order.  Thus,  a  remarkable  degree  of  coincidence  of 
delivery  with  time  estimates  was  attained. 

The  cards  gave  the  Priorities  Committee  the  basis  of  shift- 
ing priority  and  also  of  determining  the  need  of  priority  for 
fuel,  materials,  and  labor.  Notwithstanding  a  great  shortage 
of  labor  and  materials,  the  industry  was  in  a  position  at  the 
end  of  the  war  to  have  extended  even  more  assistance  to  the 
Allies  than  it  had  been  giving,  besides  taking  care  of  all  of 
our  Government's  requirements. 

Owing  to  the  fact  that  war  requirements  bore  more  heavily 
on  some  lines  of  machines  than  on  others,^  George  E.  Merry- 

*Mr.  Merryweather's  assistants  were:  Alvin  B.  Einig,  Arthur  J.  M.  Baker, 
Roland  Houck,  Ernest  D.  Crockett,  Floyd  C.  Lowell,  Walter  L.  Ditforth. 


i 


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454    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

weather,  the  chief  of  this  section,  had  to  resort  to  a  diversity 
of  conversions  and  adaptations.  Plants  that  had  not  been 
making  a  certain  tool  at  all  got  jigs  and  fixtures  and  patterns 
from  plants  that  had  been.  Manufacturers  of  water  wheels 
turned  to  lathes;  one  printing-press  manufacturer  made  slot- 
ters;  another  made  milling  machines  and  lathes.  Owing  to 
the  suspension  of  building  operations,  several  hundred  stone 
planers  were  idle,  and  they  were  turned  to  certain  rough 
operations  in  ordnance  work. 

On  one  occasion.  Colonel  E.  A.  Deeds,  who  was  then  chief 
of  the  Equipment  Section  of  the  Aircraft  Production  Division, 
informed  Howard  E.  Coffin,  chairman  of  the  Aircraft  Pro- 
duction Board,  that  the  whole  aviation  programme  was 
blocked  because  of  the  lack  of  cylinder-grinding  machines. 
The  only  manufacturer  was  threatened  with  a  strike,  his 
superintendents  had  quit,  and  his  plant  was  demoralized. 
There  was  one  other  concern  which  had  made  such  machines, 
but  it  was  gorged  with  other  A-1  priority  work.  Mr.  Merry- 
weather  instantly  called  up  a  manufacturer  in  another  line 
that  was  not  essential.  This  man  went  to  the  full-up  plant, 
got  their  patterns  and  drawings,  came  to  Washington  the 
next  day,  got  an  order  for  fifty  machines,  and  was  soon 
turning  them  out. 

The  machine  tool  emergency  was  met  to  a  material  degree 
in  the  first  part  of  the  war  by  commandeering  machine  tools 
made  for  export  which,  owing  to  shipping  difficulties  and 
other  reasons,  had  been  lying  on  the  docks  for  months  and 
years.  The  Ford  Motor  Company  was  thus  provided  with 
airplane  cylinder  grinding  machines  on  twenty-four  hours' 
notice. 

One  of  the  biggest  things  Mr.  Merryweather  did  was  to 
kill  a  general  standardization  suggestion  that  was  evolved 
in  the  War  Department  during  an  attack  of  unusually  severe 
standardization  fever.  To  have  reduced  all  machine  tools  to 
uniform  standards  would  have  stifled  production  for  many 
months. 

Owing  to  the  length  of  time  required  for  the  production 
of  machine  tools,  the  inability  of  the  army  to  forecast  require- 
ments caused  more  trouble  here,  perhaps,  than  the  lack  of 
comprehension  of  requirements  in  any  other  line.    The  navy. 


THE  IMPLEMENTS  OF  WAR  BEHIND  THE  LINES    455 

as  in  most  requirement  matters,  functioned  better  than  the 
army  owing  to  its  superior  pre-war  organization  and  to  the 
comparative  simplicity  and  smallness  of  its  needs. 

Despite  all  of  Mr.  Merryweather's  efforts  to  look  ahead, 
his  section  was  continually  confronted  with  insistent  calls 
for  machines  that  had  been  overlooked  or  were  demanded 
by  some  unforeseen  and,  possibly,  unforeseeable  develop- 
ment. His  task  was  lightened  by  the  cheerful  and  intelligent 
cooperation  of  the  industry,  which  not  only  made  the 
machines,  but  contributed  its  engineering  knowledge  and 
experience  freely  to  the  section  and  to  the  various  procure- 
ment agencies.  Sometimes  the  industry  had  to  design  or 
choose  machines  before  the  army  officers  could  get  to  the 
stage  of  knowing  what  to  order;  as,  for  instance,  in  the 
machine  production  in  this  country  of  the  carriage  of  the 
French  75  mm.  guns,  it  required  fifteen  or  twenty  experts 
of  the  industry  to  figure  out  what  kind  of  machines  and  how 
many  would  be  needed. 

All  of  the  things  that  have  been  mentioned  give  but  a 
slender  conception  of  the  magnitude,  difficulty,  and  complex- 
ity of  the  work  of  the  Machine  Tool  Section.  And  that  is 
true  of  almost  all  of  the  sections  of  the  War  Industries  Board. 
Multiply  the  problems  and  deeds  of  one  section  by  sixty, 
and  one  gets  his  imagination  primed  for  a  hazy  conception 
of  what  the  War  Industries  Board  had  to  do  and  did  do. 

One  of  the  industrial  heartbreaks  of  the  war  was  in  the 
manufacture  of  cranes.  Because  of  some  blunder  or  failure 
of  coordination,  a  great  battery  of  sixty  huge  gantry  cranes, 
planned  with  amazing  prevision  and  built  with  wonderful 
dispatch  —  intended  for  the  equipment  of  the  vast  wharves, 
piers,  and  docks  the  A.E.F.  had  to  erect  in  France  in  order 
to  make  it  possible  to  land  millions  of  men  and  their  enor- 
mous equipment  and  mountainous  supplies  —  lay  for  eight 
months  at  the  seacoast  on  this  side  of  the  Atlantic.  Yet  each 
of  these  cranes  meant  five  or  more  days  saved  in  the  unload- 
ing of  a  vessel  —  and  those  five  days  were  equivalent  to  an 
increase  of  fifteen  per  cent  of  tonnage. 

Engineers  of  the  crane-making  companies  went  to  France 
with  the  army  engineers  and  worked  in  such  close  touch  with 
them  in  planning  the  port  bases  that  the  plants  in  this  country 


^ 


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456    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

were  ready  to  start  on  production  full-speed  ahead  the 
moment  they  got  the  word.  The  cranes  were  turned  out  with 
a  speed  that  was  the  amazement  of  the  builders  themselves 
and,  in  cooperation  with  the  Engineer  Corps  of  the  army, 
which  lived  up  to  its  reputation  for  efficiency  and  celerity, 
crews  of  civilian  erectors  were  dispatched  to  France  to  set 
the  cranes  up  with  all  possible  speed. 

Then  came  the  tragic  climax.  Somebody  on  the  other  side 
had  disregarded  the  engineers  on  this  side  and  had  built 
docks  that  could  not  sustain  the  great  gantry  cranes,  having 
made  up  his  mind  that  cheaper  temporary  construction  and 
improvised  unloading  contrivances  would  fill  the  bill.  It 
was  one  of  the  most  costly  errors  of  the  war,  as  well  as  inex- 
pressibly agonizing  to  the  section,  the  engineers  and  manu- 
facturers. 

Somehow,  two  or  three  of  these  cranes  did  get  across, 
and  being  there  some  one  decided  to  strengthen  a  dock  and 
put  them  up.  When  they  got  into  action,  the  improvised 
cranes  and  derricks  looked  like  a  horse  express  wagon  along- 
side an  eight-ton  truck.  Immediately  a  shout  came  back  from 
France  for  the  rest  of  the  ordered  cranes  and  twelve  more. 
But  eight  months  of  critical  time  had  been  lost. 

The  way  the  Crane  Section  dealt  with  that  tragic  consign- 
ment  for  France  was  typical  of  its  performance  throughout 
the  war.  In  its  head,  Alexander  C.  Brown,  the  War  Indus- 
tries Board  had  a  man  who  had  the  confidence  of  the  in- 
dustry and  it  followed  his  lead  with  enthusiasm.  Primarily 
organized  to  handle  locomotive  cranes,  which  the  Emergency 
Fleet  Corporation  needed  in  great  numbers  for  the  ship- 
yards, the  section  came  to  look  after  other  shipbuilding 
cranes,  coal-handling  machinery  of  all  kinds,  and  overhead 

electric  traveling  cranes.  ,     „  .,       i   a  j    •  •  * 

Between  the  Fleet  Corporation,  the  Railroad  Administra- 
tion,  the  Engineers,  the  Ordnance,  the  Quartermaster  Depart- 
ment, Aircraft  Production,  and  the  Allies,  the  section  was 
soon  confronted  with  an  insistent  demand  for  hundreds  of 
cranes.  These  were  carefully  allocated  with  respect  to 
urgency  among  the  existing  plants  and  then  steam-shovel 
builders  and  other  allied  lines  of  industry  were  called  into 
the  conversion  breach.    The  number  of  locomotive  crane- 


THE  IMPLEMENTS  OF  WAR  BEHIND  THE  LINES    457 

builders  was  thus  increased  from  seven  to  eighteen,  and  by 
October,  1918,  the  output  of  the  great  lifters  and  conveyors, 
of  standard  and  special  designs,  had  been  pushed  up  from 
fifty  to  three  hundred  and  eighty  a  month,  thus  providing 
the  colossal  construction  and  manufacturing  plants  and  trans- 
port evoked  by  the  war,  with  giant  hands  and  arms  of  fitting 

might. 

Chains  —  even  the  big  anchor  chains  —  would  seem  to  be 
a  small  thing  in  a  big  war  programme.  But  they  were  not. 
Despite  all  that  was  done  by  the  Chain  Section^  and  the 
Emergency  Fleet  Corporation,  anchor  chains  could  not  be 
forged  fast  enough  to  keep  up  with  the  demands  of  the 
impressive  column  of  merchant  ships  that  left  the  ways  at 
the  rate  of  four  or  five  a  day  when  American  energy  got  its 
bearings  in  the  war-enforced  revival  of  the  shipbuilding 
industry.  In  the  midst  of  the  ship  famine,  completed  ships 
could  not  sail  for  lack  of  anchor  chains.  Despite  all  efforts 
the  chain-makers  never  did  catch  up  with  the  shipbuilders; 
the  handicap  was  too  great. 

Nobody  could  have  foreseen,  in  the  winter  of  1917,  that 
within  a  year  America  would  be  producing  more  ship  tonnage 
a  week  than  it  had  formerly  turned  out  in  a  year.  To  meet 
the  emergency,  cast  steel  chains  were  conceived,  but  the 
armistice  came  before  they  got  into  production.^ 

The  Hardware  and  Hand  Tools  Section  had  some  interest- 
ing experiences.  It  came  into  contact  with  a  curious  phase 
of  the  incidence  of  priority.  Many  concerns  within  the  prov- 
ince of  the  section,  which  were  among  the  industries  that  had 
been  curtailed,  fearing  that  their  low  priority  standing  would 
result  in  shut-down,  came  to  Washington  and  got  Government 
contracts  at  any  price  in  order  to  get  a  better  priority  rating. 
The  practice  threatened  to  upset  the  whole  priority  scheme, 
but,  whether  it  would  have  resulted  in  the  Board's  substituting 
suspension  for  curtailment  in  the  offending  industries,  or  a 
modification  of  priority  administration  to  meet  this  attack 
by  infiltration,  was  not  determined  before  the  armistice  threw 

Uohn  C.  Schmidt,  chief. 

*Many  of  the  problems  relating  to  machinery  were  the  concern  of  the 
Resources  and  Conversion  Section,  dealt  with  in  Chapter  XII;  and  the  section 
on  forgings,  ordnance,  small  arms,  and  ammunition  discussed  in  the  same 
chapter. 


1  1 


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458    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

the  problem  into  the  scrap-heap.  The  section  had  to  do  with 
fourteen  of  these  rationed  industrial  groups,  and  the  progress 
of  the  war  had,  for  them,  turned  a  feast  into  a  famine.  With 
the  despair  of  hunger  they  fought  for  means  of  sustenance. 

On  the  side  of  shortages,  the  manufacture  of  needles  gave 
the  section  the  most  concern,  as  the  United  States  had  left 
them  mostly  to  Germany  and  England.  A  shortage  in  sad- 
dlery hardware  started  prices  ballooning,  but  was  met  with- 
out price-fixing.  Ships'  hardware  was  another  shortage  prob- 
lem. Carrying  the  trade  cooperation  idea  of  the  Board  to 
the  reductio-ad-absurdum  limit,  the  manufacturers  of  horse- 
shoes, and  also  the  manufacturers  of  hydrants  and  valves, 
created  tight  monopolies  and  insisted  on  dealing  with  the 
Government  as  units,  refusing  to  make  bids  or  otherwise 
deal  individually,  though  there  was  no  shortage  of  their 
products.  The  error  of  their  ways  was  pointed  out  to  them, 
and  moral  suasion,  and,  perhaps,  the  shadow  of  the  anti- 
trust laws,  caused  them  to  break  up  their  unity.  After  the 
metal  bed  manufacturers  had  been  curtailed  fifty  per  cent, 
the  influenza  epidemic  set  in  —  and  there  were  not  enough 
beds.  The  manufacture  of  toxic  gas  crowded  the  manufac- 
ture of  fire  extinguishers  out  of  their  supply  of  tetrachloride 
—  and  so  fire  extinguishers  were  scarce  and  costly. 

And  so  with  this  section,  as  with  most  of  the  others,  it  was 
one  problem  after  another;  the  solution  of  one  often  breeding 
others. 


CHAPTER  XXIX 
POWER  AND  TRANSPORTATION  AS  FIGHTING  FACTORS 

The  power-fuel  problem  —  Conserving  electrical  power  in  congested  centers  — 
The  riddle  of  steam  turbines  —  Automotive  engineers  in  the  war  game-^ 
Creating  the  heavy-duty  truck  —  Nine  thousand  locomotives  demanded. 

In  the  cycles  of  war  all  things  depend  on  power  and  trans- 
portation. Amputate  a  piece  of  a  straight  line,  and  you  still 
have  a  straight  line  left.  Take  a  sector  out  of  a  circle,  and 
you  have  nothing.  In  the  World  War,  cause  and  effect  pur- 
sued each  other  around  circles  until  it  was  impossible  to 
determine  their  primary  identities.  Power  and  transporta- 
tion loomed  large  in  these  vicious  circles  and  were  entitled 
to  respectful  consideration  for  their  claims  that  they  were 
the  primary  factors.  With  equal  propriety  innumerable 
other  factors  could  put  forward  a  similar  contention.  They 
were  all  right;  a  circle  exists  only  as  a  whole. 

In  the  larger  sense  transportation  was  lodged  in  the  Rail- 
road Administration  and  in  the  Shipping  Board  and  its  tre- 
mendous Emergency  Fleet  Corporation.  In  like  manner 
power  was  primarily  in  the  hands  of  the  Fuel  Administration, 
for  fuel  oil,  gas,  and  coal  are  power.  The  complete  history 
of  power  and  transportation  in  the  war  would,  therefore, 
include  a  narrative  of  those  three  administrations.  In  a 
previous  chapter  rather  full  mention  was  made  of  the  close 
articulation  of  the  Railroad  Administration  and  the  War 
Industries  Board,  whereby  the  former  functioned  for  the 
purposes  of  the  latter  just  as  directly  and  immediately  as  if 
it  had  been  a  subsidiary. 

The  cooperation  of  the  Fuel  Administration  has  been  often 
noticed,  but  perhaps  it  has  not  been  given  the  emphasis  it  is 
entitled  to.  The  War  Industries  Board  encountered  the 
power-fuel  problem  at  every  turn,  and  its  full  mastery  was 
essential  to  the  application  of  the  all-powerful  lever  of  pri- 


I 


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460    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

ority  A  conflict  or  serious  friction  between  the  administra- 
tions of  industries  and  of  fuel  would  have  been  catastrophic. 
Fortunately,  there  was  the  fullest  and  most  unselfish  partner- 
ship between  the  two.  For  all  its  purposes  the  War  Industries 
Board  could  at  all  times  count  on  the  Fuel  Admmistration 
as  certainly  as  on  one  of  its  own  divisions  or  sections. 

McAdoo  and  Garfield  were  constant  and  potent  allies  ot 
Baruch.  Chairman  Hurley,  of  the  Shipping  Board,  was 
more  a  law  unto  himself.  The  Shipping  Board  was  never 
knitted  into  the  fabric  of  the  War  Industries  Board  as  were 
fuel   and   the    railways.     It   cooperated,    but    it    did    not 

amalgamate.  r  i     wr     t  j    *  • 

Power  came  directly  under  the  sway  of  the  War  Industries 
Board  in  the  electrical  form,  whether  derived  from  fuel  or 
water  power;  for  in  this  form  it  was  a  commodity  of  well- 
defined  sources  with  many  consumers,  whereas  steam  power 
was  essentially  an  integral  part  of  each  industrial  unit,  and, 
therefore,  essentially  a  matter  of  fuel,  except  on  the  side  ot 
generating  instrumentalities.  In  hydro-electric  power  the 
Power  Section,  of  which  Frederick  Darlington  was  chief,  had 
to  do  with  both  the  distribution  of  power  and  the  problems 
and  machinery  of  its  generation.  But  the  administration  was 
a  rather  complex  one,  being  really  three-  and  even  four- 

Charles  K.  Foster,  who  was  vice-chairman  of  the  Priorities 
Committee  and  represented  Judge  Parker  on  the  Priority 
Board  when  the  latter  was  absent,  was  specially  charged  with 
all  priority  and  requirement  matters  relating  to  power,  in  a 
manner  and  degree  that  made  him  an  active  manager  as  well 
as  an  arbitrator  of  priorities.  Then,  power  matters  involving 
new  construction  had  to  be  cleared  through  the  Facilities 
Division.  Finally,  the  Army  Engineer  Corps  was  responsible 
for  studies,  surv^eys  and  investigations,  and  recommendations, 
and  the  staff  of  regular  and  temporary  engineer  officers  dele- 
gated to  this  task  acted  also  in  a  large  degree  in  an  executive 
capacity  for  the  section. 

General  Charles  Keller,  United  States  Engineers,  was  in 
charge  of  the  engineering  aspect,  and  he  and  R.  J.  Bulkley, 
who  was  chairman  of  the  legal  committee  of  the  War  Indus- 
tries Board,  and  C.  B.  Davis  acted  as  associates  of  Mr. 


POWER  AND  TRANSPORTATION 


461 


/  Darlington's,  Captain  W.  W.  Stanley,  of  the  army,  being 
executive  assistant.  Percy  H.  Thomas,  a  New  York  engineer, 
acted  as  special  consultant.  All  of  this  sounds  rather  com- 
plicated, but  the  combination,  which  appears  to  have  com- 
bined the  values  of  military  prestige  and  authority  with  those 
of  civilian  tact  and  adaptability,  worked  very  harmoniously 
and  effectively.  The  Power  Section  proper  was  not  estab- 
lished until  December,  1917,  although  Mr.  Darlington  had 
been   previously   acting   as   consuUing   engineer   in   power 

matters. 

The  section,  among  other  things,  advised  the  Capital  Issues 
Committee  when  application  to  that  committee  for  authority 
to  issue  securities  concerned  power  projects,  and  also  the 
War  Finance  Corporation  in  regard  to  loans  of  a  like  nature. 
It  also  acted  in  close  touch  with  the  Electrical  and  Power 
Equipment  Section,  of  which  Walter  Robbins  was  chief. 

The  shortage  of  electrical  power  in  some  of  the  congested 
centers,  such  as  Pittsburgh,  Buffalo  and  Niagara  Falls, 
Philadelphia,  Akron,  Ohio,  New  Jersey,  and  a  number  of 
places  in  the  South  and  elsewhere,  became  alarming  in  the 
fall  of  1917  and  the  winter  of  1917-18,  and  it  became  neces- 
sary to  apply  the  priority  principle  very  strictly,  rationing 
and  even  withdrawing  all  power  from  some  non-war  indus- 
tries. 

Ice,  drought,  low  water,  coal  shortage,  and  congestion 
of  transportation  battered  at  the  citadels  of  power  and  made 
many  an  ominous  breach.  In  Pittsburgh,  conservation  of 
power  was  carried  so  far  that  electrical  heating  was  denied 
to  street  cars,  and  the  whole  eastern  half  of  the  country 
endured  the  famous  five  heatless  and  lightless  days  which 
caused  localized  outbursts  of  popular  rage. 

Had  the  war  not  interfered  with  the  normal  development 
of  power  plants,  perhaps  there  would  have  been  enough 
power  in  all  the  congested  centers;  but,  as  it  was,  it  became 
the  duty  of  the  section  and  the  interested  departments  — 
the  Shipping  Board,  the  War  and  Navy  Departments  —  to 
develop  additional  power.  As  private  development  under 
war  conditions  of  a  degree  of  power  that  might  not  be  needed 
for  some  time  under  normal  conditions  was  out  of  the  ques- 
tion, it  was  necessary  for  the  Government  to  undertake  the 


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462    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

work.  It  was,  therefore,  arranged  that  the  War  Department  \ 
would  finance  extensions  in  the  Pittsburgh  district,  the  navy 
in  New  Jersey,  and  the  Emergency  Fleet  Corporation  in 
Philadelphia.  None  of  the  extensions,  of  any  consequence, 
was  completed  during  the  war;  though  much  was  effected 
by  conservation  and  inter-connection  of  electric  power  sys- 
tems. The  studies  and  surveys  were  very  comprehensive  and 
exhaustive,  and  a  plan  of  massing  and  consolidating  electric 
power  facilities  in  different  sections  into  power  pools  was 
worked  out;  which  has  been  and  will  be  of  much  value  to 
industry.^ 

While  Government  intervention  did  not  result  in  much 
increase  of  public  utility  power,  it  was  of  the  greatest  value 
in  maintaining  the  existing  power  and  making  the  most  of  it. 
In  Pittsburgh,  for  example,  there  was  dire  danger  of  a 
total  breakdown  of  the  Duquesne  and  West  Penn  plants 
because  of  overuse  and  deterioration.  Effective  steps  to 
make  repairs  and  prevent  overstrain  were  taken  at  once. 
Despite  all  that  could  be  done,  the  power  shortage  in  the 
Pittsburgh  district  in  1918  was  not  less  than  130,000 
kilowatts. 

At  the  Niagara  power  center  there  were  international  as 
well  as  shortage  complications  to  deal  with,  but,  with  cordial 
Canadian  cooperation,  curtailments,  and  economies,  it  was 
possible  to  make  shift  to  provide  the  imperatively  needed 
power.  Besides  the  reinforcement  and  supplementation  of 
existing  power  service  plants,  there  were  large  problems  of 
furnishing  power  for  the  great  Government  explosives  plants 
at  Nitro,  Nashville,  and  elsewhere,  and  the  nitrate  plants  in 
Alabama.  In  the  latter  connection,  it  was  fortunate  that  the 
retarded  development  of  electrical  power  generation  had  left 
considerable  machinery  in  the  hands  of  the  manufacturers 

^General  Keller's  Report  on  the  Power  Situation  During  the  War  (Govern- 
ment Printing  Ofl&ce,  Washington,  D.C.)  is  a  volume  of  the  greatest  importance 
for  engineers,  manufacturers,  economists,  and  all  who  are  attracted  by  the 
great  problems  of  efficient  and  economical  production.  It  is  really  a  presenta- 
tion of  the  present  power  problems  of  the  Nation,  and  shows  how  greatly  the 
war  industrial  productive  capacity  of  the  country  was  handicapped  by  lack  of 
power.  Had  there  been  some  such  agency  as  an  industrial  strategy  board  at 
work  before  the  war,  the  fundamental  importance  of  power  would  have  been 
appreciated  in  time  to  have  effected  needed  expansions  even  during  the  short 
term  of  our  participation  in  the  war.  As  it  was,  the  capacity  of  plants 
dependent  on  electrical  power  was  increased  out  of  all  proportion  to  the  power. 


POWER  AND  TRANSPORTATION 


463 


—  especially  the  Westinghouse  and  General  Electric  Com- 
panies—which could  be  taken  over.  This  completed  or 
partly  completed  generating  machinery  had  a  capacity  of 
one  million  kilowatts  —  enough  power  to  move  the  world, 
as  one  manufacturer  put  it,  but  it  was  only  enough  for  the 
growth  of  demand  in  one  year  under  war  conditions. 

After  all,  the  greatest  saver  of  the  situation  was  the  diver- 
sion of  business  from  the  congested  districts.  The  surveys 
showed  exactly  what  districts  must  be  relieved  and  what  could 
take  on  more  power.  This,  in  connection  with  other  reasons 
lor  the  diversion  and  diffusion  of  war  industry,  would  have 
effected  great  redistributions  of  industrial  activity  had  the 
war  continued  another  year.  Although  the  subject  does  not 
lend  Itself  to  vivid  narrative  within  a  limited  space,  there 
was  no  other  department  of  the  industrial  war  forces  which 
received  such  comprehensive  and  fundamental  examination 
and  such  adequate  preparation  for  future  contingencies. 

In  an  incidental  and  illustrative  way  the  work  of  the  Wire 
Section,  headed  by  Le  Roy  Clark,  has  been  referred  to 
already. 

The  Electric  and  Power  Section,  of  which  Walter  Robbins 
became  chief  in  November,  1917,  had  little  trouble  with 
electrical  supplies,  but  great  shortages  developed  in  appa- 
ratus, as  is  evidenced  by  the  fact  that  before  automatic 
priority  ratings  were  introduced,  the  section  received  as  many 
as  300  priority  applications  a  day  and  to  a  total  of  29,000 
Besides  committees  in  other  lines,  the  section  enjoyed  the 
assistance  of  a  general  war  service  committee  of  the  electrical 
industry,  and  of  twenty-four  war  service  sub-committees  in 
electrical  supplies,  and  eleven  in  apparatus,  also  a  jobbers' 
committee;  the  unusual  number  of  which  is  an  index  of  the 
variety  and  complexity  of  its  duties  and  functions. 

One  of  the  greatest  problems  of  the  section  was  that  of 
steam  turbines,  which  were  in  demand  by  the  navy,  the 
Emergency  Fleet,  the  army,  and  private  companies.  The 
chief  obstacles  here  were  not  only  the  great,  new  production 
demanded  for  marine  uses  —  hundreds  of  the  new  ships 
being  turbme-driven  —  and  the  enormous  demand  for  tur- 

'See  Chapter  VI. 


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464    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

bines  and  other  steam  engines  for  the  generating  of  electrical 
power,  but  the  fact  that  it  required  seven  to  twenty-four 
months  to  make  the  land  types.  It  was  finally  necessary  to 
make  steam  turbine  production  a  controlled  industry. 

Although  in  the  summer  of  1918  there  was  an  indicated 
demand  for  steam  boilers  in  excess  of  7,000,000  horse 
power,  orders  for  which  had  been  placed  chiefly  with  six 
companies,  all  essential  demands  were  being  met  substantially 
on  time  when  the  war  ended.  Old  boilers  were  brought  into 
use,  and  even  the  boilers  of  antiquated  locomotives  were 
fitted  to  stationary  engines.  Space  does  not  suffice  for  an 
account  of  the  voluminous  and  intricate  relations  of  the 
section  with  conveying  apparatus,  fans  and  blowers,  auto- 
matic mechanical  stokers,  small  engines  and  turbines,  trans- 
missions, superheaters,  and  economizers,  feed-water  heaters 
and  hot-water  generators,  fabricated  piping,  condensers, 
steam  engines,  pumps,  compressors,  hydraulic  turbines,  saw- 
mill machinery,  mining  machinery,  public  utility  equipment, 
internal  combustion  engines,  and  miscellaneous  machinery. 
The  mere  list  of  apparatus,  however,  illuminates  the  great 
scope  of  the  section's  work. 

When  it  is  considered  that  priority,  conservation,  and 
allocation  were  involved  in  connection  with  all  of  them, 
the  magnitude  of  the  section's  duties  may  be  glimpsed. 
Back  to  it  came,  in  a  word,  all  the  problems  of  supplying 
power  machinery  for  the  thousands  of  new  war  plants  and 
extensions  for  all  the  vast  and  heterogeneous  war  industries; 
for  the  three  thousand  ships  of  the  new  merchant  fleet,  for 
the  new  naval  vessels,  for  the  great  power  plants  of  the 
A.E.F.;  and  the  mechanical  power  of  the  Allies,  to  a  note- 
worthy extent. 

The  general  relations  of  the  automotive  industry  with 
the  War  Industries  Board  have  been  presented  in  the  chapter 
devoted  to  the  Steel  Section  and  in  Chapter  X;  It  will  be 
recalled  that  the  industr}'^  was  restricted  to  the  production 
of  half  of  its  normal  output  for  the  latter  half  of  1918. 
In  accordance  with  this  arrangement,  the  Automotive  Prod- 
ucts Section,  of  which  Charles  C.  Ranch  was  then  chief, 
certified  to  the  Steel  Division  the  requirements  of  ninety- 


POWER  AND  TRANSPORTATION 


465 


five  manufacturers  for  material  needed  for  the  production 
of  295,468  passenger  cars.  The  industry  was  supervised 
through  monthly  reports  from  each  manufacturer,  but  all 
restrictions  were  removed  before  the  end  of  November.  The 
manufacturers  of  parts  were  also  rationed  under  a  permit 
system  which  aimed  at  allowing  each  plant  to  purchase 
enough  material  to  keep  it  going  for  from  sixty  to  ninety 
days  on  a  fifty-per-cent  production  basis.  The  manufacture 
of  motor-trucks  was  considered  as  a  preferred  industry,  and 
was  supervised  only  to  the  extent  of  assisting  it  to  meet  its 
Government  orders  and  to  exclude  the  production  of  trucks 
for  non-essential  uses.  The  latter  was  accomplished  through 
pledges,  on  the  observance  of  which  priority  of  fuel  and  steel 
and  other  materials  was  conditioned,  and  on  monthly 
reports. 

The  positive  work  of  the  section  was  extensive.  Within 
its  jurisdiction  was  not  only  the  automobile  industry  proper, 
but  other  forms  of  production  in  which  the  industry  was 
engaged,  such  as  airplane  engines  and  bodies,  tanks,  marine 
gas  engines,  armored  cars,  motor-cycles  and  bicycles. 

It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  the  automobile  industry 
supplied  the  lion's  share  of  the  engineering  talent,  skilled 
workmen,  and  executive  direction,  as  well  as  production, 
of  the  major  part  of  the  great  aircraft  programme.  Its 
record  in  this  strenuous  endeavor  was  most  creditable  and 
abounds  with  instances  of  remarkable  feats  of  engineering 
and  production.  Of  Liberty  engines  alone  it  was  produc- 
ing 150  a  day  at  the  end  of  the  war,  and  had  completed 
16,000. 

The  automobile  industry  shared  in  the  obloquy  which  fell 
to  the  Aircraft  Production  Bureau,  but  all  well-informed 
persons  now  imderstand  that  its  war  service  in  that  respect 
was  extraordinary  and  even  heroic,  and  that  the  Bureau  itself 
discharged  its  unprecedented  and  unknown  task  in  a  manner 
which  at  the  least  justifies  cool  and  impartial  scrutiny.^ 
To  be  sure,  the  Aircraft  Production  Board,  headed  by 
Howard  E.  Coflin,  and  the  later  Aircraft  Board,  and  the 

^Wings  of  War:  An  Account  of  the  Important  Contribution  of  the  United 
States  to  Aircraft  Invention,  Engineering,  Development,  and  Production  during 
the  World  War,  by  Theodore  M.  Knappen  (G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons,  New  York), 
gives  many  essential  facts. 


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466    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Aircraft  Production  Bureau  took  a  large  share  of  the  field 
that  would  otherwise  have  been  that  of  the  Automotive 
Products  Section;  but,  nevertheless,  the  section  performed 
a  vital  service  because  of  the  way  in  which  supply,  priority, 
and  coordinative  functions  came  gradually  to  make  the  War 
Industries  Board  the  energizing  center  of  all  things  per- 
taining to  industry.  The  automotive  industries  had  war 
contracts  outside  of  their  normal  lines  that  amounted  to 
about  a  billion  dollars,  and  which  were  of  such  volume  as 
to  react  deeply  on  the  whole  industrial  complex. 

Historically,  this  section  goes  back  to  Mr.  Cofl&n's  division 
of  the  affairs  of  the  Advisory  Commission  of  the  Council  of 
National  Defense.  Mr.  Coffin,  whose  vision  regarding  motor 
transport  in  war  was  as  far-seeing  as  his  perception  of  the 
need  of  industrial  preparation  for  war  and  of  the  importance 
of  aircraft,  early  caused  to  be  appointed  a  committee  on 
automotive  transport,  with  Karl  W.  Zimmerschied,  of  the 
General  Motors  Company,  as  vice-chairman.  With  the 
passing  of  the  Council  committees,  the  work  was  taken  up  by 
the  section.  H.  L.  Homing  was  its  chief,  and  he  was  assisted 
by  H.  J.  Adams  and  advised  by  Coker  F.  Clarkson,  secretary 
and  general  manager  of  the  Society  of  Automotive  En- 
gineers, who  was  also  in  the  work  from  the  beginning.  In 
the  final  form  the  section  was  headed  by  Mr.  Hanch,  the 
other  members  being  representatives  of  six  governmental 
agencies. 

The  chief  creative  work  of  the  committee  and  the  inter- 
mediate stage  of  the  section  was  the  development  of  a 
standardized  heavy-duty  truck,  which  grew  out  of  army 
specifications,  based  on  experience  in  the  Mexican  affairs 
crisis.  From  specifications  of  parts  the  undertaking  grew 
into  the  designing  of  a  standard  heavy-duty  truck.  Through 
the  aid  of  the  Society  of  Automotive  Engineers,  one  of  the 
most  prominent  and  energetic  engineering  bodies  of  the 
world,  a  group  of  fifty  engineers  was  selected  by  the 
Quartermaster  Corps  to  design  such  a  truck;  and  a  sub- 
committee of  the  section  was  created  to  advise  with  the 
Quartermaster  Corps  regarding  the  organization  and  policies 
to  be  followed  in  production. 

The  new  truck  was  created  with  extraordinary  celerity. 


POWER  AND  TRANSPORTATION 


467 


Though  the  drawings  were  not  begun  until  September  1, 
1917,  two  trucks  started  on  trial  trips  from  Lima,  Ohio, 
and  Rochester,  New  York  on  October  10,  1917,  and  arrived 
in  Washington  on  the  14th.  By  July  1,  1918,  5000  trucks 
of  this  type  had  been  completed  and  13,000  more  were 
under  order.  There  were  also  four  other  general  types  of 
army  design  of  trucks.  The  requirements  of  trucks  and 
passenger  cars  for  the  Government  up  to  July,  1919,  were 
308,080,  and  more  than  84,000  had  been  completed  on 
October  10,  1918.  Of  motor-cycles  and  bicycles,  the  re- 
quirements were  188,358  and  40,319  had  been  completed. 
While  the  heavy-duty  truck  was  admirable,  it  was  found 
impossible  to  push  its  production  to  the  maximum  without 
interfering  with  that  of  the  ordinary  trucks  and  with  a  net 
loss  in  total  truck  production  capacity,  which  despite  all 
efforts  seemed  certain  to  fall  short  of  the  needs  of  an  army 
of  eighty  divisions.  The  complications  involved  in  the 
supply  of  parts  and  materials  for  the  favored  army  designs 
were  enormous,  to  say  nothing  of  the  planning  and  scheming 
to  bring  up  production  of  other  trucks.  The  section  was  kept 
on  tiptoe  with  problems  of  allocation,  conservation,  priority, 
and  the  origination  of  new  sources  of  parts.  There  is 
little  doubt  that,  notwithstanding  the  timid  reluctance  of 
manufacturers  to  retire  from  the  manufacture  of  passenger 
cars  except  for  war  uses,  the  industry  would  have  been 
taxed  to  the  limit  had  the  war  continued  to  meet  the  truck, 
airplane,  tank,  balloon,  tractor,  lighting  plant,  recoil 
mechanisms,  naval  gun  mount,  artillery  wheels,  caissons. 
Eagle  boats,  depth-bombs,  gas  engines,  and  miscellaneous 
demands  that  were  made  upon  it.  That  the  industry  met 
successfully  so  many  other  war  demands  at  the  same  time 
that  its  production  of  aeronautical  engines  and  airplanes 
and  balloons  was  alone  sufficient  to  strain  its  resources  is  a 
sufficient  vindication  of  the  judgment  of  those  who  relied 
on  it. 

While  rail  transportation  was  solely  the  business  of  the 
Railroad  Administration,  it  had  to  operate  in  conjunction 
with  the  War  Industries  Board  for  all  manner  of  supplies 
and  equipment.     Pertinent  to  this  chapter  was  the  demand 


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46g    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

for  locomotives  and  cars  —  not  only  from  the  American 
railways  but  from  the  Allies,  certain  neutral  countries,  the 
A.E.F.,  Government  plants,  and  industry  m  general. 
Originally  rolling  stock  was  looked  after  by  the  Advisory 
Committee  on  Plants  and  Munitions,  but  in  midsummer, 
1918  it  was  necessary  to  set  up  a  Section  of  Railway 
Equipment  and  Supplies,  of  which  J.  Rogers  Hannery  was 

It  was  characteristic  of  the  supple  organization  of  the  Board 
that,  whereas  the  other  sections  considered  in  this  chapter, 
as  well  as  those  dealt  with  in  the  preceding  chapter,  were 
grouped  under  Mr.  Peek  in  the  general  Division  of  Finished 
Products,  Mr.  Flannery's  section  was  considered  better 
placed  under  Mr.  Legge^  —  probably  because  of  the  inter- 
national phase  of  the  subject-matter.  The  priority  side  ot 
the  subject  was  the  special  concern  of  T.  C.  Powell,  vice- 
president  of  the  Southern  Railway,  who  was  a  member  ot 
the  Priorities  Committee  and  the  Requirements  Division  and 
the  general  representative  of  the  Railroad  Administration 
with  the  War  Industries  Board;  though  Edward  Chambers, 
director  of  traffic  of  the  Railroad  Administration,  was  a 
member  of  the  Priorities  Board.  Mr.  Powell,Mt  should 
be  said,  rendered  remarkable  service  in  the  manifold  duties 
that  thus  devolved  upon  him.  ^ 

Mr.  Flannery  had  been  associated  with  Mr.  Davison  in 
the  Red  Cross  at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  and  before  coming 
to  the  War  Industries  Board  had  organized  the  extensive 
housing  activities  of  the  Emergency  Fleet  Corporation.    One 

^The  reader  is  reminded  that  no  attempt  has  been  made  to  foUow  closely 
the  administrative  groupings  of  the  sections  of  the  Board  in  the  sequence  of 
subjects  considered  in  this  work. 


the 

h'' F  Turk? w!  H^awfey?  and"G."FrBueir'The'Transportation  Division  event- 
ually  controlled  priority  in  transportation,  but  it  was  more  J^^n  that  being  in 
fact  the  active  administrator  of  railway  traffic  on  behalf  of  he  War  Indust  les 
Board.  As  Mr.  Powell  always  had  the  Railroad  Administration  solidly  behind 
him,  and  that  administration  had  separate  traffic  departments  for  the  War 
Department,  Navy  Department,  Fuel  Administration,  Food  AdmimsttaUon,  and 
the'^Eency  Beet  Corporation,  the  whole  direction  of  traffic  for  Government 
purposes  was  tied  into  his  office.  In  this  way  the  War  Industries  Board  had  a 
direct  and  wide  authority  in  shaping,  directing,  and  expeditmg  railway  traffic 
throughout  the  country. 


POWER  AND  TRANSPORTATION 


469 


of  the  first  things  he  did  was  to  call  a  meeting  of  locomotive- 
builders  and  representatives  of  interesed  Government 
departments  to  deal  with  the  demand  for  nine  thousand 
locomotives  in  the  following  eighteen  months.  There  are 
only  three  builders  of  regular  railway  engines  in  the  United 
States,  and  there  was  no  possibility  of  their  meeting  the 
demand  without  great  enlargements  of  plants,  which  would 
take  so  long  as  to  be  impracticable.  The  best  that  could  be 
done  was  to  emphasize  repairs  and  rejuvenescence  of  old 
locomotives  and  speed  up  production  by  concentration  of 
types  in  the  three  plants.  The  Baldwin  Locomotive  Works 
took  the  military  engines,  and  the  American  and  Lima  com- 
panies concentrated  on  Railroad  Administration  machines. 
The  Allies  got  whatever  engines  the  A.E.F.  could  spare  them, 
but  the  Italian  roads  were  too  frail  for  the  "Pershing"  type, 
and  they  had  to  be  taken  care  of  at  the  Montreal,  Canada, 
plant  of  the  American  company. 

The  difficulty  in  supplying  freight  cars  was  just  as  great, 
and  called  for  all  sorts  of  shifts,  substitutions,  and  special 
aids.  The  Railroad  Administration  needed  100,000,  the 
Military  Railways  demanded  30,000,  and  then  41,000  more 
standard-gauge  cars  and  4000  narrow  gauges.  The  heavy 
demand  for  small  locomotives  for  narrow-gauge  railways  at 
the  front  and  elsewhere  was  entirely  diverted  from  the  three 
big  companies  to  the  makers  of  mining  and  industrial  plant 
engines. 

A  sidelight  on  one  of  the  hundreds  of  facets  of  the  sec- 
tion's work  is  afforded  by  the  outcome  of  an  order  of  one  of 
the  Allies  for  railway  equipment.  Its  agents  had  practically 
closed  the  deal  when  they  came  to  Mr.  Flannery  for 
approval.  He  saw  that  they  were  being  gouged;  reopened 
the  transaction,  and  saved  them  $4,000,000.  This  incident 
is  indicative  of  the  enormous  savings  the  War  Industries 
Board  was  the  means  of  making  in  the  thousands  of  orders 
it  revised. 

In  the  seething  caldron  of  the  times,  power  and  transport 
instrumentalities  held  an  almost  desperate  post  —  but  they 
held  it  nobly. 


^ 


1^* 


I 


i 


'II 


i}    . 


I 


II 


•  » 


P 


CHAPTER   XXX 
THEY  ALSO  FOUGHT 

Begging,  borrowing,  commandeering  optical  glass  —  A  new-bom  industry  — 
Surgical  needles,  aspirin,  artificial  eyes,  and  soldiers*  beds  —  Tobacco  for  the 
doughboy  —  Saluting  the  commodity  sections. 

When,  in  August,  1914,  Germany  struck  for  world  hegem- 
ony, she  not  only  had  a  virtual  monopoly  of  the  dynamic 
weapons  of  modem  war  in  her  highly  developed  chemical 
industries;  but,  among  other  initial  advantages,  she  was 
supreme  in  the  vision  of  the  battle-field  —  in  optics  applied 
to  war.  This  was  not  the  outcome  of  military  prescience  on 
her  part,  but  of  her  supremacy  in  the  manufacture  of  optical 
instruments  and  her  monopoly  of  the  knowledge  and  the 
means  of  production  of  optical  glass.  The  Allies,  in  the 
creation  and  mobilization  of  armies  and  fleets  of  unprece- 
dented magnitude,  were  compelled  to  beg,  borrow,  and 
commandeer  every  sort  of  instrument  that  contained  a  mag- 
nifying glass. 

Although  the  isolation  of  Germany  had  resulted  in  the 
stimulation  of  the  manufacture  of  optical  instruments  in 
this  country  and  elsewhere,  and  even  in  the  production  of 
some  optical  glass,  the  United  States  found  itself,  in  1917, 
in  about  the  same  precarious  position  that  the  Allies  occu- 
pied in  1914.  Large  quantities  of  instruments  were  needed 
for  field  use  by  the  army,  for  military  photography,  artillery 
fire-control  devices;  naval  and  merchant  shipping,  and 
microscopic  uses;  moving-picture  cameras  and  projectors, 
ordinary  photographic  purposes,  etc. 

The  two  greatest  obstacles  to  rapid  expansion  of  the 
infant  American  industry  to  meet  the  crisis  were  the  lack  of 
optical  glass  and  of  men  who  had  been  trained  in  the 
delicate  art  of  grinding  precision  optics.  In  the  production 
of  optical  glass,  the  chief  difficulty  was  that  the  formulas 
were  German  secrets.  It  was  necessary  to  determine  formu- 
las by  tedious  and  laborious  research  and  experimentation; 
and  when  they  had  been  worked  out,  there  remained  tough 
practical  problems  of  successful  manufacture  in  quantities. 


THEY  ALSO  FOUGHT 


471 


The  versatile  Federal  Bureau  of  Standards  threw  itself  into 
the  breach,  and  its  brilliant  technicians,  working  with  the 
Bausch  &  Lomb  Optical  Company,  the  Pittsburgh  Plate  Glass 
Company,  and  the  Spencer  Lens  Company,  had  arrived  at 
the  production  of  a  small  quantity  of  glass  before  the  War 
Industries  Board  intervened;  and  a  new  company,  the 
Keuffel  &  Esser  Company,  of  Hoboken,  New  Jersey,  had 
entered  the  field. 

By  March,  1918,  the  shortage  of  optical  glass  was  so  severe 

that  it  became  necessary  to  organize  a  section  of  the  Board  to 

deal  primarily  with  the  problem  of  quantitative  production. 

George  E.  Chatillon,  of  John  Chatillon  &  Sons,  New  York, 

became  the  chief,  and  Major  Fred  E.  Wright  represented 

the  army,  and  Commander  W.  R.  Van  Auken,  the  navy. 

The  Geophysical  Laboratory  and  the  Bureau  of  Standards 

were  appealed  to,  and  the  former  sent  a  technical  staff  to 

the  assistance  of  Bausch  &  Lomb  Company,  with  the  result 

that  a  number  of  scientific  problems  were  solved  and  optical 

glass  was  produced   in  commercial  quantities.     Professor 

Bleininger,    of   the   Bureau   of   Standards,    conquered   the 

problem  of  making  suitable  melting-pots,  and  thereafter  the 

Pittsburgh  Plate  Glass  Company  became  the  largest  producer 

of  optical  glass. 

The  Spencer  Lens  Company  received  a  contract  for  lenses 
which  necessitated  the  erection  of  a  glass-making  plant.  Dr. 
Morey,  of  the  Geophysical  Laboratory,  went  to  their  assist- 
ance and  improved  processes  to  such  a  degree  that  the 
number  of  hours  needed  to  make  glass  was  reduced  from 
forty  to  twenty-four.  The  quality  was  excellent.  There- 
after the  optical  instrument  problem  was  one  of  precision 
grinding  and  of  suitable  labor.  The  whole  industry  was 
taken  under  control  by  the  section,  and  the  glass  was  allo- 
cated as  produced  and  labor  forbidden  to  shift  from  plant 
to  plant.  Before  the  end  of  1918  the  new-bom  industry 
was  prepared  to  meet  all  future  requirements  and  had  ac- 
cepted orders  from  the  army  amounting  to  $50,000,000  and 
from  the  navy  of  $15,000,000.  Not  only  that,  but  the  United 
States  was  made  independent  of  foreign  sources  for  all  time. 

It  was  one  of  the  great  victories  of  the  war  as  fought 
behind  the  lines. 


*«  I 


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M 


472    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

The  work  of  the  Section  of  Medical  Industry  h^^^^^^^ 
connects  the  War  Industries  Board  with  the  General  Med  ca 

Board  of  the  Council  of  National  ^t^ ^«f //^^  ^^  S 
Section  of  the  Advisory  Commission,  beaded  by  Drjra^^^^^ 

Martin.     It  was  carried  on  in  the  original  ^^^/^^^^^^^^^ 
31   1918.    The  section  was  then  established  with  Lieutenant 

Sionel  F.  F.  Simpson,  chief.^  The  -^^ion  -^  assis  ed^^^^^^ 
an  advisory  board  on  medicinal  agents  and  by  ^ar  serv^e 
committees  of  the  interested  industries,  which  replaced  the 
rSperative  committees.  One  of  its  most  pre-ng^P^^^^^^ 
lems  was  that  of  originating  the  mani^acture  of  sur|ica^ 
needles  in  this  country,  as  previously  ^eyjiad  c^^^^ 
England,  and  that  country  could  no  longer  f^PP^J  ^^^^^^^^^ 
a  fifteenth  part  of  American  requirements.  All  surgical 
a  micciiui  pa  shortage  m  some 

instruments  were  scarce,  and  there  was  a  snonag 

of  the  synthetic  drugs.  ^^^^n^^  were 

In  order  to  conserve  productive  capacity,  P/^^^^^^^^^^ 
standardized  and  reduced  and  the  catalogue  of  articles  was 
reduce^^^^^^^^^^  to  51  pages.    Substitutes  for  such  local 

anS^^^^^  as  cocaine  and  novocaine  were  P.-^u^^^^^ 
number  of  factories  making  the  articles  were  induced  to  ^ke 

up  the  manufacture  of  surgica    ^^f™f '  J^  ^^^^^^^ 
of  drug.producing  plants  was  stimulated  through  the  Depart 

"  TL^ugT^^^^  of  all   industry   incident  to   the 

supreme  w^r  eiforworked  some  curious  consequences  to 
r^edTcTne  ^nd  surger>^     When  the  comitry  was  divided  by 
TeS   Administration   into   beet-sugar   and   cane-sugar 
zones    It  was  discovered  that  beet  sugar  was  not  adaptable 
rSdicinal  purposes,  and  the  correspondmg  adjustments 
had  to  Cmadl    When  the  influenza  epidemic  came  on,  the 
Research  Comicil  took  up  the  production  of  aspirm.     The 
Stent  had  expired,  but  Ae  Bayer  Company  claimed  the 
Same     Also  production  had  been  curtai  ed  because  one  of 
^.^narp^ipnts  was  in  great  demand  for  airplane  dope. 

'%^X  Ino™  production  of  industrial  chemicals 
usedTmelines,  the  latter  were  often  on  the  verge  of  being 
excluded  from  their  relatively  small  requirements.     There 

m     A  T    K,>an  was  assigned  to  surgical  instruments  and  hospital  furniture 
J^e^u^pmen^ri    "r^^^^^^^         to  medical  chemicals. 


THEY  ALSO  FOUGHT 


473 


were  not  enough  artificial  eyes,  and  maimed  civilians  had  to 
wear  eye-laps  to  let  the  wounded  fighters  have  the  eyes.  The 
shortage  of  steel  made  it  advisable  to  substitute  wood  for 
iron  in  bed-frames  for  cantonments,  camps,  and  industrial 
housing,  and  the  Field  Medical  Supply  Corps  called  for 
two  hundred  thousand  wooden  bedside  tables.  The  Army 
Medical  Department  objected  on  sanitary  grounds  to  both 
beds  and  tables,  but  Judge  Parker  ruled  in  favor  of  the 
wooden  substitutes.  Nevertheless,  the  matter  was  still  in 
abeyance  when  the  armistice  came. 

These  were  only  a  few  of  the  section's  concerns,  which 
included  all  of  the  duties  customarily  performed  by  the 
various  sections  of  the  Board.  Price-fixing  was  not 
attempted,  although  there  were  some  tremendous  advances 
in  prices,  as  it  was  felt  that  high  prices  were  stimulative 
of  production.  Acetiphenetidin,  for  example,  which  sold  at 
84  cents  a  pound  in  1914,  jumped  to  $42  in  1916,  but  got 
down  to  $2.75  after  American  manufacturers  took  it  up. 
The  average  price  of  medicinals  at  the  end  of  the  war  was 
about  320  per  cent  of  normal. 

Tobacco  may  not  be  ranked  as  one  of  the  indispensables 
of  life,  but  in  these  times  a  smokeless  army  would  be  a 
fightless  one.  If  it  be  considered  one  of  the  essential 
materials  of  military  preparation,  the  United  States  could 
carry  on  forever  under  a  water-tight  blockade.  There  was 
really  no  shortage  of  tobacco  in  its  various  forms  at  any  time 
during  the  war,  though  a  larger  proportion  of  the  soldiers 
and  sailors  smoked  when  in  the  ranks  than  when  at  home 
and  their  average  individual  consumption  was  seventy-five 
per  cent  greater.  The  Quartermaster  Department  calculated 
that  each  soldier  would  consume  two  pounds  <rf  chewing 
and  smoking  tobacco  a  month  and  one  pound  of  cigars  and 
cigarettes.  Whether  this  was  an  overestimate,  or  whether 
it  was  multiplied  by  too  large  a  number  of  phantom  soldiers, 
the  situation  was  jammed  into  an  apparent  shortage,  which 
disappeared  when  requirements  were  revised,  although 
temporary  inconvenience  was  caused  by  overbuying  while 
the  erroneous  estimates  prevailed. 

The  general  situation  was  so  easy  in  the  first  part  of  the 


474    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


i 


it 

'I 


1^ 


i^ 


war  that  it  was  well  into  1918  before  it  appeared  to  be 
necessary  for  the  Board  to  establish  the  Tobacco  Section,  of 
which  Alfred  I.  Esberg  was  chief.  The  work  of  the  section 
was  largely  devoted  to  gathering  information  with  a  view  to 
preparing  for  a  possible  emergency.  The  subject  of  price 
control  was  being  examined  as  the  end  of  the  war 
approached. 

Aside  from  the  sections  concerned  exclusively  with  the 
internal  administration  of  the  War  Industries  Board,  the 
work  of  all  the  sections  has  now  been  reviewed,  though  but 
scantily  and  inadequately  in  many  instances.  With  rare 
exceptions,  the  sections  acquitted  themselves  in  their  numer- 
ous duties  with  a  degree  of  eflBciency  that  would  have  been 
considered  extraordinary  even  in  private  business.  They 
established  a  standard  of  excellence  in  government  that  will 
be  forever  the  despair  of  bureaucracies.  They  injected 
business  into  government  and  government  into  business  to 
the  benefit  of  both.  Perhaps,  in  the  course  of  the  slow 
evolution  of  politics  and  economics  and  their  inevitably 
progressive  blending,  we  may  come  some  day  to  a  general 
form  of  government  analogous  to  the  War  Industries  Board's 
brilliant  conception  and  practice  of  government  by  com- 
modities. Since  its  essence  is  simply  the  juxtaposition  of 
experts  and  specialists  representing  the  collective  interests 
of  the  people  on  the  one  hand  and  the  special  interests  on 
the  other,  it  requires  no  great  stretch  of  the  imagination 
to  see  it  become  fundamental  in  a  world  that  becomes  more 
and  more  industrial  and  less  and  less  political. 


» i 


L»  . 


CHAPTER  XXXI 

APPRAISAL  —  WITH  A  FEW  COMMENTS  ON  PUBLIC 

ADMINISTRATION 

The  unsung  men  in  mufti  —  Dropping  the  reins  of  power  —  Democracy  and 
decision  joined  —  Private  life  versus  public  life  —  A  panorama  of  the  task  and 
the  achievement  —  The  philosophy  of  priority  —  The  trend  toward  general  con- 
trol—  The  Board  reaches  its  zenith  r- Lessons  for  another  war  —  Industrial 
aftermath  —  Industrial  strategy,  in  war  and  peace  —  The  curtain  rings  down  — 
The  Board  becomes  history  —  Its  organism  in  perspective  —  Industrial  democ- 
racy vindicated. 

Despite  the  fact  that  all  great  captains  have  had  great 
quartermasters  and  commissaries,  little  is  recorded  of  them 
in  history.  The  marvel  of  Xerxes'  invasion  of  Greece  was, 
not  that  it  did  not  succeed,  but  that  the  host  of  a  million  men 
that  carried  it  so  far  from  its  base  was  supplied  with  arms 
and  provisions  for  so  long  a  time.  Yet  history  omits  to 
mention  the  business  manager  of  the  expedition  that  failed 
in  battle  at  Marathon.  Little  more  do  we  know  of  the  supply 
of  Alexander  from  the  Mediterranean  to  the  Indus,  of  the 
Roman  wars,  or  of  the  Saracenic  conquests.  By  research 
we  may  ascertain  how  Turenne,  Marlborough,  Alva,  Fred- 
erick the  Great,  Washington,  Napoleon,  and  Wellington  were 
supplied,  but  who  that  can  name  their  battles  and  their 
captains  can  name  the  men  who  furnished  and  outfitted  and 
fed  their  armies? 

During  the  World  War  and  since  we  have  heard  much 
(and  rightly)  of  marshals  and  generals  in  uniform,  and  what 
they  did  with  all  the  vast  and  complex  machinery  and 
enginery  of  war  with  which  they  were  so  abundantly 
supplied,  and  but  relatively  little  of  those  in  mufti  who  were 
the  sources  of  supply. 

The  general  public  is  ignorant  of  what  was  nothing  less 
than  an  epic  that  went  on  imder  its  eyes.  Save  for  a  few 
specialists,  the  members  of  our  own  military  establishment 
know  but  little  more.  Probably  even  Pershing  and  the  highly 
motive  Dawes  have  but  small  knowledge  of  the  processes 


U 


■> 


i 


f 


1 1 


I      I 


476    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

by  which  the  industries  of  America  supplied  them.  But, 
when  the  histories  of  these  times  are  finally  written,  the 
brilliant  records  for  posterity  will  be  found,  not  only  in  the 
battle-fields,  but  equally  in  the  offices  and  mills  that  planned 
and  produced,  in  the  ships  and  railways  that  carried,  in 
the  great  coordinations  that  wielded  for  the  first  time  all 
the  strength  of  nations  of  scores  of  millions  multiplied  by  the 
powers  of  steam  and  electricity.  The  pomp  and  circum- 
stance of  war  will  always  fascinate,  but,  as  time  goes  on,  men 
will  be  more  and  more  interested  in  the  accounts  of  how 
the  mastodonic  nations  of  modem  times  were  brought  to 
exercise  all  their  powers  and  put  them  into  effective  applica- 
tion behind  armies  that  demanded  and  consumed  so  much 
more  than  all  the  other  hosts  that  have  gone  to  battle  in  this 
world  of  wars. 

We  are  still  too  near  the  deeds  of  the  inarticulate  figures 
in  sack  suits  who  directed  the  outpouring  of  America's 
productive  powers  for  war's  demands  to  realize  that 
supremely  able  men  came  to  great  tasks.  When  the  war 
was  over,  they  did  not  march  up  Fifth  Avenue  to  the  cheers 
of  their  admiring  countrymen.  Tired  in  many  cases,  utterly 
drained  from  long  effort  and  depressed  reaction,  they  shut 
their  Government  desks  and  trickled  back  one  by  one  to 
the  old  desks  in  the  offices  of  everyday  business  and  industry. 
For  the  individuals  of  the  generalship  of  the  industrial  forces 
there  was  neither  present  distinction  nor  hope  of  future 
fame.  They  wrought  in  the  anonymity  of  association. 
While  they  labored,  they  were  worried  by  fault-finders,  and 
when  they  went  home,  they  were  followed  by  the  din  of 
investigators  who  sought  to  advertise  themselves  by  searching 
out  here  and  there  some  muffed  detail  of  execution  in  the 
work  of  men  who  toiled  fiercely  in  the  press  of  war  "at  a 
ten-league  canvas  with  brushes  of  comets'  hair."  But  a 
nation  of  industrialists  will  eventually  do  honor  to  the 
leaders  who  led  in  industry  in  war.  The  men  of  the  War 
Industries  Board,  and  those  who  preceded  them  in  too  loosely 
joined  committees  and  boards,  deserved  well  of  their 
country,  and,  though  their  deserts  are  not  symbolized  in 
triumph,  they  will  eventually  come  into  them. 

We  have  seen  the  narrative,  with  some  explication,  of 


APPRAISAL 


477 


their  work  unfold  in  the  preceding  chapters,  and  it  remains 
but  to  underscore  here  and  there  the  record  of  an  extraor- 
dinary achievement  in  an  exceptional  time. 

Perhaps  the  best  proof  of  the  quality  of  the  service  ren- 
dered by  the  War  Industries  Board  was  that  there  was  so 
little  shock  and  confusion  when  it  let  go  of  the  reins  of 
power.  "The  basis  of  political  economy,"  says  Emerson, 
"is  non-interference.  The  only  safe  rule  is  found  in  the  self- 
adjusting  meter  of  supply  and  demand.  Do  not  legislate. 
Meddle  and  you  snap  the  sinews  with  your  sumptuary  laws." 

That  was  the  belief  of  men  who  were  called  on  to  deal 
with  the  consequences  of  the  huge  meddling  of  war.  The 
meter  was  no  longer  self-adjusting,  but  they  sought  in  all 
their  controls  to  align  themselves  and  their  ordinances  with 
the  nature  of  men  and  the  flow  of  events.  Believers  in 
individualism,  they  had  avoided  nationalizing  industry 
while  directing  it  nationally.  Believers  in  the  initiative  of 
the  free  man,  opponents  of  paternalism,  devotees  of  the 
free  play  of  economic  forces,  they  yet  had  found  a  way  to 
harness  industry  and  commerce  and  to  drive  them  without 
harsh  curbing  or  paralyzing  domination. 

So  far  as  the  War  Industries  Board  was  concerned,  it 
let  go  of  its  control  of  industry  when  the  armies  ceased  to 
fight.  It  refused  to  believe  that  there  was  any  problem  of 
decontrol,  and  this  belief  was  based  on  its  knowledge  that  it 
had  not  deprived  industry  of  its  individual  vitality  or  robbed 
it  of  its  internal  energy.  It  had  massed  industry  for  a 
common  purpose,  but  it  had  done  so  according  to  the  genius 
of  individualism.  With  actual  or  conceded  powers  that  were 
almost  unlimited  in  extent,  it  was  as  far  as  possible  from 
being  comparable  to  an  autocratic  bureau.  It  was  demo- 
cratic in  purpose  and  method,  and  yet,  except  for  price- 
fixing  in  the  later  stages,  the  power  of  decision  was  singular. 
Its  methods  are  deserving  of  the  closest  study  of  statesmen, 
for  they  combined  the  efficiency  of  autocracy  with  the  spirit 
of  democracy.  After  May,  1918,  its  charter  consisted  of 
a  definition  of  purposes  and  virtually  imlimited  power  to 
realize  them. 

This  power  and  this  responsibility  were  lodged  in  one 
man.     It  was,  therefore,  the  very  antitype  of  the  ordinary 


\» 


»  i  ■  5 


!li 


i; 


478    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

governmental  bureaus,  whose  powers  and  duties  are  defined 
with  such  minute  detail  that  their  heads  are  little  better 
than  automatons;  with  the  result  that  equity  is  sacrificed 
to  legalism  and  efficiency  to  formalism.  We  cannot  expect 
great  administrators  under  such  conditions.  The  civil  ser- 
vice will  not  be  sought  as  a  career  by  men  of  talent  and 
genius  for  administration,  if  there  be  nothing  but  forms  for 
them  to  follow  and  no  outlet  for  originality  and  initiative. 
The  history  of  the  War  Industries  Board  shows  us  how  much 
better  government  might  be  if  we  could  draw  to  it  the  type 
of  men  who  so  faithfully  served  that  body.  In  a  broad  way 
of  speaking,  the  best  men  of  America  are  not  in  politics 
or  government  because  public  life  does  not  provide  the 
,  play  for  the  individual  genius  that  is  found  in  finance, 
commerce,  and  industry. 

Private  life  coheres  and  prospers  because  it  is  based  on 
confidence,  which  endows  its  leaders  with  power  and  respon- 
sibility. Public  life  disintegrates  and  fails  because  it  is 
based  on  suspicion  and  manacles  its  leaders  with  impotency 
and  irresponsibility.  Government  will  continue  to  be 
mediocre,  blundering,  and  inefficient  until  the  place  seeks 
the  man,  and  not  the  man  the  place.  And  that  will  not  be 
imtil  office  becomes  an  opportunity  instead  of  a  strait- jacket. 

The  function  of  the  War  Industries  Board  was  to  shape 
production  and  its  incidence  to  meet  the  huge  and  exceptional 
demands  of  war.  This  involved  a  knowledge  of  require- 
ments, a  reliable  cataloguing  of  resources,  a  system  of 
precedence  or  priority,  the  regulation  of  prices;  and  the 
direction,  restriction,  and  stimulation  of  industry.  Neither 
the  origin  nor  the  current  of  requirements  was  within  the 
control  of  the  Board.  Considering  them  as  they  came  to 
the  Board  —  and  not  as  they  might  have  been  presented  — 
they  were  dealt  with  brilliantly.  They  were  dissected, 
analyzed,  reduced  to  commodity  equivalents,  translated  into 
terms  of  labor,  power,  finance,  and  transportation,  and 
transmitted  to  industry  in  the  orderly  channel  of  priority. 
Order  and  regularity  thereby  succeeded  chaos,  but  the  sys- 
tem never  precluded  the  exceptional,  and  no  emergency 
was  denied  because  of  the  ease  of  routine. 


APPRAISAL 


479 


On  the  side  of  resources,  the  Board's  achievements  were 
remarkable.  These  were  in  reality  almost  as  unknown  and 
variable  as  requirements,  and  the  existing  data  were  gro- 
tesquely inadequate.  As  the  rising  tide  of  war  demands 
covered  one  commodity  after  another,  the  Board  ascertained 
actual  and  potential  resources  with  celerity  and  exceptional 
accuracy.  Its  use  of  the  data  when  obtained  was  prompt  and 
highly  adaptive.  Its  use  of  the  instrumentalities  of  conver- 
sion, curtailment,  and  conservation  as  applied  to  resources 
and  facilities  was  cool  and  deliberate  in  the  face  of  panicky 
demands. 

It  never  forgot  that,  while  it  was  called  upon  to  give 
excessive  temporary  enlargement  to  some  of  the  organs  of 
the  economic  body  and  to  shrink  others,  the  alterations  must 
be  such  as  not  to  weaken  the  body  as  a  whole.  Its  course  with 
regard  to  the  so-called  non-essential  or  non-war  industries 
was  commendably  cautious.  It  acted  in  this  respect  with 
the  consciousness  that,  in  such  a  complex  fabric  as  modem 
industrialism,  with  its  often  obscure  but  powerful  inter- 
relations and  reactions,  psychological  as  well  as  economical, 
it  was  a  dangerous  and  difficult  task  to  distinguish  between 
the  essential  and  non-essential.  It  saw,  in  many  an  appar- 
ently dispensable  trade  of  manufacture,  functions  analogous 
to  those  of  the  ductless  glands  of  the  human  body. 

The  method  of  controlling  prices  adopted  by  the  Board 
was  rational  and  fundamental.  It  dealt  almost  entirely  with 
materials  rather  than  articles.  It  thereby  checked  price 
inflation  at  the  source  and  tended  to  eliminate  the  evils  of 
pyramiding.  Practically  all  the  great  increases  in  prices 
in  commodities  were  checked  when  the  Board  began  to 
establish  prices,  which  is  to  say  that  prices  were  not  inflated 
by  the  entry  of  the  United  States  into  the  war.  Roughly, 
the  peak  of  prices  was  reached  about  the  time  or  just  after 
the  United  States  became  a  belligerent;  but  these  were 
fictitious  prices,  and  Government  purchases  of  the  basic 
commodities  were  made  at  lower  and  stabilized  prices, 
thanks  to  the  success  of  the  Board  or  what  became  the  Board 
in  negotiating  prices  by  agreement  before  it  had  the  power 
of  price-control. 

This  mastery  of  rising  prices  precisely  at  the  time  when 


{ 


i 


I 


480    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

the  enormous  war  demands  of  the  greatest  of  the  warring 
nations  were  added  to  an  already  extraordinary  demand, 
was  one  of  the  most  brilliant  economic  successes  of  the  war. 
In  this  field  the  War  Industries  Board  was  distinctly  fore- 
handed. The  credit  for  this  pivotal  success  is  due  to  the 
foresight  of  Mr.  Baruch  and  to  the  patriotism  of  the  masters 
of  production.  It  saved  the  country  billions  and  incalcula- 
bly checked  inflation. 

In  the  beginning  Mr.  Baruch  had  very  little  support  from 
the  great  financiers  and  bankers  of  the  country.  They  still 
clung  to  the  idea  that  supply  and  demand  should  be  left  to 
work  out  their  own  price  destinies  and  that  Government 
should  not  place  artificial  trammels  on  business,  appearing 
to  ignore  the  fact  that,  by  its  act  of  entering  the  war  and 
becoming  the  creator  of  a  demand  that  could  not  wait,  the 
Government  had  made  an  artificial  condition  of  demand 
which  would  be  hopeless  against  an  uncontrolled  supply. 
The  financiers  saw  in  mounting  prices  an  easy  way  of  financ- 
ing the  war  by  taxation  of  profits,  but  seemed  to  ignore  the 
dragon's-teeth  crop  of  by-products  of  the  resulting  insta- 
bility of  prices. 

It  is  not  to  be  inferred  that  because  the  Board  stabilized 
and  held  down  the  prices  of  certain  commodities  to  the 
Government,  the  Allies  and  the  private  consumers  thereof, 
the  public  benefited  accordingly.  The  middlemen  and 
retailers  absorbed  a  large  part  of  what  the  producers  gave 
up.  How  much  could  have  been  accomplished  in  this  field 
is  dubious.  The  experience  of  minute  price-control  in 
Europe  parallels  the  failure  to  date  of  the  enforcement  of 
prohibition  in  this  country.  We  know  now  that  law  is  not 
always  omnipotent.  Yet  it  became  apparent  that  the  main- 
tenance of  the  public  morale  required  a  measure  of  control 
of  retail  prices  of  some  of  the  necessaries.  As  the  end  of 
the  war  approached,  the  Board  was  girding  itself  for  this 
diflScult  and  delicate  task. 

The  conception  of  the  scheme  of  priority  and  its  applica- 
tion was  perhaps  the  greatest  achievement  of  the  War 
Industries  Board.  It  was  at  once  the  source  and  the  manifes- 
tation of  power.    Caught  in  the  clutch  of  priority,  there  was 


APPRAISAL 


481 


no  escape  for  the  obstinate.  Primarily  a  device  for  provid- 
ing, it  became  an  irresistible  weapon  of  compelling.  An 
insurance  of  maintenance  to  the  faithful,  it  became  a  terror 
to  the  false.  Conceived  as  the  "routining"  of  a  nation,  it 
became  also  its  discipline.  Ostensibly  a  contrivance  for 
dependable  delivery,  it  became  also  one  for  withholding. 
It  was  at  once  the  comfort  of  the  willing  and  the  scourge  of 
the  unwilling.  To  be  stricken  from  the  preference  list  was 
to  be  damned ;  to  be  on  it  was  industrial  salvation.  Unknown 
to  the  written  law,  it  became  the  greatest  law  of  the  land. 
The  manufacturer  who  sinned  against  priority  sinned  against 
his  business  life.  It  was  power  over  all  commercial 
environment. 

All  else  that  the  Board  did  in  the  regulation  of  trade, 
industry,  and  transportation  issued  from  priority.  Price- 
fixing  was  but  an  annex  to  priority,  for  in  priority  the  Board 
held  the  factors  of  compulsion  that  induced  reasonableness 
of  desire  and  gave  knowledge  and  control  over  the  factors 
of  prices.  Thus  priority  brought  not  only  order  and  system, 
but  power  and  its  whip.  And  yet  the  astonishing  thing  about 
priority  as  practiced  in  America  was  its  automaticity.  Men 
and  industries  sorted  themselves  and  their  tasks  as  they 
entered  the  ordered  maze  of  priority,  much  as  crowds 
entering  a  stadium  assign  themselves  to  entrances  according 
to  numbers  or  the  colors  of  their  tickets.  Each  contractor 
or  manufacturer  was  put  on  his  honor  to  determine  the  color 
of  his  card  of  admission,  according  to  certain  general  rules. 
That  there  was  an  occasional  abuse  of  individual  deter- 
mination cannot  be  doubted,  but  in  the  main  it  was  exercised 
with  fidelity  and  discretion.  The  exceptions  were  as  nothing 
compared  to  the  advantages  of  self-determination.  The 
arbitrariness  and  the  possible  favoritism  of  a  universal  use 
of  permits  would  have  challenged  evasion  and  involved 
external  policing.  The  self -application  of  priority  was  in 
harmony  with  the  genius  of  America.  It  was  the  most  signal 
demonstration  of  the  rare  talent  of  the  Board  for  direction 
in  accordance  with  human  nature  in  its  American  variation. 

It  was  to  this  subtle  sagacity  that  we  must  attribute  the 
Board's  rapid  progress  latterly  toward  general  control  of 
the  whole  industrial  field  and  centralized  direction  of  all 


hi 


,1 


4. 


482    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

the  economic  activities  of  Government,  with  so  little  friction 
and  so  little  general  realization  of  its  grasp  on  power.  Con- 
cerned always  with  centers  rather  than  peripheries,  its  con- 
trol was  often  obscure  when  most  dominant.  Much  of  its 
best  work  was  accomplished  through  independent  agencies, 
notably  the  Fuel  Administration,  the  War  Trade  Board, 
and  the  Railroad  Administration.  Its  own  organization  was 
but  slender. 

The  growing  brain  of  the  whole  body  of  war  enterprise, 
deriving  power  from  the  use  of  power,  it  came  to  be  the 
head  center  of  the  entire  economic  activity  of  the  Nation. 

Many-willed  America  had  never  known  or  even  dreamed 
of  anything  comparable  to  it.  Great  captains  of  industry 
accepted  its  decrees  as  inevitable,  and  its  will  touched  the 
remotest  hamlet  and  farmstead  and  shaped  the  commercial 
life  of  crowded  cities. 

All  industry  and  all  commerce  were  conformed  to  its 
policies.  Like  Camot,  the  great  war  minister  of  the  French 
First  Republic,  it  was  the  organizer  of  victory.  And  not 
alone  for  America,  but  to  a  very  important  extent  for  the 
Allies.  All-productive  America  was  the  commissary  of  its 
own  armies  and  of  those  of  the  Allies.  Thus  the  War 
Industries  Board  was  comparable  on  the  side  of  economic 
power  to  the  American  army  on  the  side  of  man-power. 

The  analogy  is  complete  in  theory,  but  was  not  so  in 
practice.  The  Nation  conscripted  its  men  by  direct  statute, 
but  not  so  with  its  resources.  In  another  war  the  principle 
of  the  selective  draft  should  be  applied  to  dollars  as  well 
as  to  men.  Industry  should  be  persuaded  to  cooperate  of 
its  own  initiative  as  in  the  World  War,  but  behind  all  indus- 
trial mobilization  should  be  the  formally  adopted  principle 
of  conscription,  which  is  the  direct  inference  of  the  con- 
ception of  modem  war  as  a  war  of  all  persons  and  things. 
Resources  and  facilities  should  be  used  with  as  little  thought 
of  profit  as  human  life  is  used.  In  considering  the  work  of 
the  War  Industries  Board  for  the  purpose  of  learning  how 
to  prepare  for  industrial  mobilization  for  another  great 
war,  our  military  authorities  and  Congress  should  not  over- 
look the  fact  that  the  selective  draft  of  industry  is  the  logical 
twin  of  the  selective  draft  of  men.     In  the  next  war  all 


APPRAISAL 


483 


industry  —  the  whole  economic  life  of  the  Nation  —  as  well 
as  human  life  should  be  conscripted.  As  has  been  said  in 
Chapter  IX,  "Nothing  undermines  the  will  to  war  so  rapidly 
as  the  popular  conviction  of  widespread  profiteering  and 
exploitation." 

It  is  yet  too  early  to  determine  how  much  the  War  Depart- 
ment and  the  army  have  learned  from  the  industrial  and 
commercial  experience  of  the  World  War.  With  an  amazing 
but  familiar  lack  of  foresight.  Congress  has  made  no 
pecuniary  provision  for  the  maintenance  of  a  sl^eleton 
liaison  between  the  army  and  industry,  though  the  Assist- 
ant Secretary  of  War  is  made  responsible  for  the  articu- 
lation of  military  and  industrial  forces,  and  there  is  slowly 
evolving  a  plan  of  familiarizing  in  peace-time  a  nucleus  of 
officers  with  industrial  problems  and  processes  and,  con- 
versely, of  acquainting  manufacturers  with  military  require- 
ments. Coordination  of  requirements  is  being  studied  and 
resources  and  facilities  are  being  classified  with  the  intent 
that  in  another  emergency  every  great  manufacturing  plant 
will  know  what  will  be  required  of  it.  So  far  as  the  present 
officers  of  the  General  Staff  and  the  supply  agencies  are 
concerned,  the  lesson  of  broad  geographical  distribution  of 
requirements  seems  to  be  reasonably  well  understood,  as 
well  as  the  fact  that  all  articles  must  be  translated  into  terms 
of  commodities. 

Considering  the  lack  of  financial  provision  and  the 
civilian  reaction  from  war  and  all  that  pertains  to  war,  it 
appears  that  a  certain  amount  of  progress  is  being  made 
in  that  pre-war  provision  for  military  and  industrial  part- 
nership which  is  the  sine  qua  non  of  the  integration  of  the 
full  military  power  of  the  Nation.  Such  progress,  how- 
ever, will  inevitably  be  restricted  if,  indeed,  not  wholly 
valueless,  unless  qualified  industrial  experts  from  civilian 
life  are  allowed  to  mould  the  programme  of  whatever  indus- 
trial preparedness  may  be  ours.  No  one  who  witnessed  the 
spectacle  of  an  American  war  department,  thrust  unprepared 
into  a  great  modem  conflict,  going  down  for  the  third  time 
in  an  uncharted  sea  of  industrial-military  problems,  could 
come  to  any  other  conclusion.  It  was  the  civilian  experts 
of  the  War  Industries  Board  who  saved  this  situation  from 


'!' 


{ 


S 


I 


h 


f 


m\i 


484    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

actual  tragedy;  they  or  their  like  should  have  the  controlling 
voice  in  making  humanly  possible  the  avoidance  of  a  similar 
condition. 

The  subject  of  industrial  preparedness  should  not  be  left 
without  pointing  out  that  in  another  conflict  methods  must 
be  devised  to  prevent  Federal  post-war  repudiation  of  con- 
tracts entered  into  in  good  faith  by  business  men.  Such 
repudiation  can  be  unnecessarily  cruel  and  is  calculated  to 
reflect  in  an  ugly  way  on  the  honor  of  a  great  country.  And 
it  is  shortsighted  policy,  no  matter  how  loud  the  demands 
for  post-war  retrenchment  may  be. 

It  is  not  easy  to  determine  what  permanent  influences  the 
War  Industries  administration  may  have  on  American 
industrial  practice.  After  a  short  business  lull  the  war  was 
followed  by  a  brief  boom  and  that  by  the  depression  of 
1921-22,  and  neither  condition  was  suitable  to  the  dis- 
closure of  permanent  efi"ects.  The  efl'orts  of  Herbert  Hoover, 
as  Secretary  of  Commerce,  to  promote  the  economic  well- 
being  of  the  country  through  revisions  of  commercial  prac- 
tices, however,  show  that  the  lessons  of  the  experience  of  the 
War  Industries  Board  have  not  been  wholly  forgotten. 

It  is  probable  that  there  will  never  again  be  such  a 
multiplicity  of  styles  and  models  in  machinery  and  other 
heavy  and  costly  articles  as  there  was  before  the  restrictions 
necessitated  by  the  war.  Undoubtedly,  the  discovery  that 
traditional  methods  had  involved  the  excessive  use  of  ma- 
terials for  many  purposes  will  be  remembered  and  applied. 
The  revelation  of  the  possibilities  of  conversion  and  the  ease 
with  which  supplies  of  manufactured  goods  can  be  produced 
to  meet  the  most  extraordinary  demands  will  result  in  satis- 
faction with  profits  that  will  not  be  too  attractive  and  in  a 
better  balance  between  production  and  consumption. 

It  is  also  likely  that,  even  if  some  public  statistical  agency 
does  not  undertake  to  appraise  supply  and  demand  in  the 
whole  field  of  industry,  individual  corporations  and  indus- 
trial groups  will  concern  themselves  much  more  with  the 
gathering  of  data  that  will  make  possible  the  avoidance  of 
periods  of  extreme  surfeit  as  well  as  of  extreme  scarcity.  In 
this  manner  commercial  and  industrial  stability  will  be 
promoted.     It  is  admitted  that  in  many  important  lines 


APPRAISAL 


485 


producers  are  as  deficient  in  their  knowledge  of  future 
requirements  as  the  army  was  in  the  beginning  of  the  war. 
The  efl'orts  of  the  War  Industries  Board  to  ascertain  all 
requirements  —  public  and  private  —  for  the  commodities 
with  which  it  was  concerned,  and  its  complete  survey  of 
production,  was  a  hint  to  thoughtful  business  men  that  some 
such   orderly  counterpoising  might  be  possible   in  peace. 

Industrial  control  for  war  purposes,  like  military  control 
of  fighting  men,  is  of  little  avail  unless  it  is  primarily  stra- 
tegic. The  strategy  of  physical  conflict  was  long  ago 
developed,  but,  prior  to  the  World  War,  industrial  strategy 
was  almost  unknown  except  in  the  crude  form  of  blockades 
by  force.  In  none  other  of  the  Allied  countries  was 
industrial  strategy  in  both  its  domestic  and  external  phases 
so  far  developed  as  it  was  in  the  United  States  toward  the 
end  of  the  war.  The  game  of  commerce,  finance,  and  pro- 
duction was  played  throughout  the  world  in  support  of  the 
armies  of  the  Allies. 

We  are  now  come  upon  a  time  when  it  is  the  business  of 
Government  to  direct  the  strategy  of  industry  for  its 
nationals  in  the  bloodless  contests  of  trade.  If  for  a  time 
war  shall  be  banned,  the  foreign  activities  of  Government 
should  be  directed  to  securing  by  industrial  strategy  what 
in  other  days  was  obtained  by  military  force.  The  flag 
was  formerly  sent  ahead  of  trade.  Now  consolidated 
national  intelligence  must  promote  trade.  The  Department 
of  State  should  work  hand-in-glove  with  the  Department  of 
Commerce  to  open  and  hold  the  markets  that  our  over- 
developed manufacturing  industries  need  for  full-time  pro- 
duction. There  are  substantial  indications  that  this  con- 
ception is  being  adopted  by  those  departments  and  that  the 
beginnings  of  a  settled  policy  of  commercial  strategy  are 
being  made.  The  ideas  conceived  and  applied  by  the  War 
Industries  Board  in  war  are  being  applied  in  peace  by  the 
Department  of  Commerce,  and  some  of  the  executives  of  the 
former  are  assisting  in  the  evolution  of  the  commercial 
strategy  of  peace. 

The  commodity  section  plan  has  been  adapted  to  peace- 
time needs  in  the  Bureau  of  Foreign  and  Domestic  Com- 
merce, and  the  Census  Bureau  has  made  the  beginnings 


11 


M 


•      s 


J! 


•I 


486    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

of  a  continuous  commodity  sun^ey.  As  in  war,  the  com- 
modity sections  stood  between  Government  and  mdustry  — 
that  is,  between  requirements  and  supplies  — so  now  the 
commodity  sections  stand  between  foreign  trade  wants  and 
domestic  sources  of  supply.  All  of  the  lessons  m  the 
advantages  of  cooperation  learned  during  the  war  are  not 
being  forgotten.  The  new  commodity  sections,  so  far  as 
they  have  been  formed,  deal  with  essentially  the  same  com- 
modity  production  groups   as   the  War   Industries   Board 

assembled.  .  - 

Here  we  see  the  beginnings  of  the  application  m  peace  ot 
the  idea  of  nationally  directed  industrial  strategy.  It  is 
plain  that  we  are  to  confront  nationally  directed  commercial 
strategy  by  our  competitors  carried  to  such  an  extent  that 
it  is  doubtful  if  we  can  successfully  meet  it  without  some 
reorganization  of  the  Government  and  a  delegation  of 
authority  that  Congress  will  be  reluctant  to  make.  The  con- 
trol of  shipping,  the  tariflf,  taxes,  railway  tariffs,  foreign 
finance  need  to  be  centralized  in  some  administrative  body, 
as  they  were  more  or  less  centralized  in  the  War  Industries 

Board.  •  •  j 

How  to  maintain  the  price  benefits  of  free  competition,  and 
obtain  the  benefits  of  the  economies  that  can  be  effected 
only  by  association  and  united  effort,  is  a  difficult  problem. 
However  it  may  be  solved,  the  fact  will  remain  that  the 
War  Industries  Board  was  the  pioneer  revealer  of  the 
immense  wastes  of  production  as  generally  conducted,  and 
the  greatest  of  demonstrators  of  the  possibilities  of  econo- 
mies. In  the  long  run  economy  must  find  a  way  to  prevail. 
Tremendous  wastes  of  service  and  material  cannot  be  tol- 
erated in  the  lean  and  laborious  years  that  are  before  the 
world. 

The  War  Industries  Board  died  with  the  war.  It  has  no 
history  worthy  of  mention  after  November  11,  1918. 
Beyond  the  overlapping  periods  of  price-control,  it  had  no 
commitments  and  no  involvements.  To  close  its  doors  it  had 
little  to  do  but  to  complete  its  records.  Within  a  week  the 
commodity  sections  had  dissolved,  and  quiet  reigned  in  the 
rooms  that  had  so  long  been  the  motor  centers  of  the  indus- 


APPRAISAL 


487 


try  of  a  continent.  Its  business  was  to  energize,  accelerate, 
and  order  the  material  productive  forces  of  the  Nation  for 
the  ends  of  war.  It  operated  on  and  through  all  the  depart- 
ments and  agencies  of  Government.  Its  powers  were  fed 
by  what  it  did  in  the  great  emergency;  its  staflF  was  the  whole 
of  Government. 

It  had  no  bureaucratic  organization  to  unravel,  no  post- 
bellum  entanglements  to  dissolve.  Every  department  of 
Government  that  had  participated  in  the  greatest  govern- 
mental activity  of  the  age  was,  for  all  the  Board's  potency  of 
direction,  integral  and  intact.  It  used  and  swayed  them  all, 
but  had  not  organically  infused  itself  into  them.  Itself 
a  loose  federation,  though  functionally  compacted  by  self- 
sacrifice  and  high  endeavor,  it  had  served  as  the  federal 
bond  of  the  statutory  organisms  of  Government,  but  had  not 
absorbed  or  weakened  them.  All  the  formal  business  of 
war  administration  was  in  its  hands,  and  all  the  data  and 
equipment  to  clear  away  the  litter  of  war  and  deal  with  the 
multitudinous  adjustments  that  had  to  be  made  between 
Government  and  industry. 

The  magnificent  war  formation  of  American  industry  was 
dissipated  in  a  day;  the  mobilization  that  had  taken  many 
months  was  succeeded  by  an  instantaneous  demobilization. 
For  the  War  Trade  Board,  the  Shipping  Board,  the  Food 
Administration,  and,  to  some  extent,  the  Fuel  Administration 
and  other  of  the  temporary  agencies,  there  were  problems 
and  duties  of  time-consuming  decontrol.  The  Council  of 
National  Defense,  which  had  worked  out  of  a  morass  of 
internal  pessimism  into  doing  effective  things  for  the  Nation, 
addressed  itself  to  extensive  economic  research  in  questions 
of  reconstruction  and  readjustment,  notably  with  regard  to 
the  high  cost  of  living,  and,  through  its  great  field  machinery, 
to  matters  of  demobilization  and  reemployment  of  service 
men. 

The  War  Industries  Board  might  have  elected  to  remain 
for  a  long  time  on  the  plea  of  its  necessity  in  a  disordered 
world,  but  it  judged  that  it  was  not  geared  or  powered  to 
go  backward,  and  that  American  business  was  competent  to 
resume  without  coddling  and  nursing  the  stubborn  indepen- 
dence it  was  so  loath  to  surrender. 


< 


! 


i 


488    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Yet,  contemplating  the  vastness  of  its  scope,  the  sound- 
ness  of  its  methods,  and  the  sagacity  of  its  measures,  one 
wonders  whether  some  like  controller  of  world  economic 
forces  might  not  have  dealt  as  weU  with  reaction  as  the 
War  Industries  Board  did  with  action. 

However  that  may  be,  we  have  the  certam  knowledge  that 
in  the  War  Industries  Board  American  democracy  superbly 
demonstrated  its  power  to  rise  to  great  eniergencies  m  the 
Nation's  business,  just  as  the  army  and  fleet  reflected  its 
military  adaptability.  The  War  Industries  Board  was  a 
govemmentally  sponsored  committee  of  American  industry 
fo  administer  industry  in  war.  It  was  the  American  business 
man  in  action  for  a  common  end.  Russia  was  torn  to  pieces 
by  its  soviet  of  proletarians;  America  was  united  by  the 
protean  forces  of  its  managers  and  producers. 


THE  END 


APPENDICES 


1 


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4t 

4 


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ir 


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» 


APPENDIX  I 

SECTION  2  OF  THE  ARMY  APPROPRIATION  ACT,  APPROVED 

AUGUST  29,  1916,  CREATING  THE  COUNQL  OF 

NATIONAL  DEFENSE 

Sec.  2.  That  a  Council  of  National  Defense  is  hereby  established  for  the 
coordination  of  industries  and  resources  for  the  national  security  and  welfare, 
to  consist  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  the  Secretary  o£ 
the  Interior,  the  Secretary  of  Agriculture,  the  Secretary  of  Commerce,  and 
the  Secretary  of  Labor. 

That  the  Council  of  National  Defense  shall  nominate  to  the  President,  and 
the  President  shall  appoint,  an  advisory  commission,  consisting  of  not  more 
than  seven  persons,  each  of  whom  shall  have  special  knowledge  of  some 
industry,  public  utility,  or  the  development  of  some  natural  resource,  or  be 
otherwise  specially  qualified,  in  the  opinion  of  the  council,  for  the  performance 
of  the  duties  hereinafter  provided.  The  members  of  the  advisory  commission 
shall  serve  without  compensation,  but  shall  be  allowed  actual  expenses  of 
travel  and  subsistence  when  attending  meetings  of  the  commission  or  engaged 
in  investigations  pertaining  to  its  activities.  The  advisory  commission  shall 
hold  such  meetings  as  shall  be  called  by  the  council  or  be  provided  by  the  rulea 
and  regulations  adopted  by  the  council  for  the  conduct  of  its  work. 

That  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  Council  of  National  Defense  to  supervise 
and  direct  investigations  and  make  recommendations  to  the  President  and  the 
heads  of  executive  departments  as  to  the  location  of  railroads  with  reference 
to  the  frontier  of  the  United  States,  so  as  to  render  possible  expeditious  con- 
centration of  troops  and  supplies  to  points  of  defense;  the  coordination  of 
military,  industrial,  and  commercial  purposes  in  the  location  of  extensive  high- 
ways and  branch  lines  of  railroad;  the  utilization  of  waterways;  the  mobiliza- 
tion of  military  and  naval  resources  for  defense;   the  increase  of  domestic 
production  of  articles  and  materials  essential  to  the  support  of  armies  and 
of  the  people  during  the  interruption  of  foreign  commerce;  the  development 
of  seagoing  transportation;  data  as  to  amounts,  location,  method,  and  means 
of  production,  and  availability  of  military  supplies;  the  giving  of  information 
to  producers  and  manufacturers  as  to  the  class  of  supplies  needed  by  the 
military  and   other   services   of   the   Government,   the   requirements   relating 
thereto,  and  the  creation  of  relations  which  will  render  possible  in  time  of 
need  the  immediate  concentration  and  utilization  of  the  resources  of  the  Nation. 
That  the  Council  of  National  Defense  shall  adopt  rules  and  regulations  for 
the  conduct  of  its  work,  which  rules  and  regulations  shall  be  subject  to  the 
approval  of  the  President,  and  shall  provide  for  the  work  of  the  advisory  com- 
mission, to  the  end  that  the  special  knowledge  of  such  commission  may  be 
developed  by  suitable  investigation,  research,  and  inquiry  and  made  available 
in  conference  and  report  for  the  use  of  the  council;   and  the  council  may 
organize  subordinate  bodies  for  its  assistance  in  special  investigations,  either 
by  the  employment  of  experts  or  by  the  creation  of  committees  of  specially 
qualified  persons  to  serve  without  compensation,  but  to  direct  the  investigations 
of  experts  so  employed. 

That  the  sum  of  |200,000,  or  so  much  thereof  as  may  be  necessary,  is  hereby 
appropriated,  out  of  any  money  in  the  Treasury  not  otherwise  appropriated. 


1 


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H 


I 


II 


492    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

to  be  immediately  available  for  experimental  work  and  investigations  under- 
taken by  the  council,  by  the  advisory  commission,  or  subordinate  bodies,  for  the 
employment  of  a  director,  expert  and  clerical  expenses  and  supplies,  and  for 
the  necessary  expenses  of  members  of  the  advisory  commission  or  subordinate 
bodies  going  to  and  attending  meetings  of  the  commission  or  subordinate 
bodies.  Reports  shall  be  submitted  by  all  subordinate  bodies  and  by  the 
advisory  commission  to  the  council,  and  from  time  to  time  the  council  shall 
report  to  the  President  or  to  the  heads  of  executive  departments  upon  special 
inquiries  or  subjects  appropriate  thereto,  and  an  annual  report  to  the  Congress 
shall  be  submitted  through  the  President,  including  as  full  a  statement  of  the 
activities  of  the  council  and  the  agencies  subordinate  to  it  as  is  consistent  with 
the  public  interest,  including  an  itemized  account  of  the  expenditures  made 
by  the  council  or  authorized  by  it,  in  as  full  detail  as  the  public  interest  will 
permit:  Provided,  however.  That  when  deemed  proper  the  President  may 
authorize,  in  amounts  stipulated  by  him,  unvouchered  expenditures  and  report 
the  gross  sum  so  authorized  not  itemized. 


APPENDIX  II 
THE  OVERMAN  ACT 

[Approved  May  20,  1918.] 
^^.J^li  ^"*''°'!^°«   **»?   President   to   coordinate   or   consolidate    executive   bureaus,    agencle. 

Be  it  enacted  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of  the  United 
States  of  America  in  Congress  assembled.  That,  for  the  national  security  and 
deJense,  for  the  successful  prosecution  of  the  war,  for  the  support  and  main- 
tenance of  the  Army  and  Navy,  for  the  better  utilization  of  resources  and 
industries,  and  for  the  more  eflFective  exercise  and  more  efficient  administration 
toy  the  President  of  his  powers  as  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  land  and  naval 
forces,  the  President  is  hereby   authorized   to   make   such  redistribution   of 
Junctions  among  executive  agencies  as  he  may  deem  necessary,  including  any 
functions,  duties,  and  powers  hitherto  by  law  conferred  upon  any  executive 
department,  commission,  bureau,  agency,  office,  or  officer,  in  such  manner  as 
in  his  judgment  shaU  seem  best  fitted  to  carry  out  the  purposes  of  this  act 
and  to  this  end  is  authorized  to  make  such  regulations  and  to  issue  such  orders 
as  he  may  deem  necessary,  which  regulations  and  orders  shall  be  in  writing 
and  shall  be  filed  with  the  head  of  the  department  aflFected  and  constitute  a 
public  record:  Provided,  That  this  act  shall  remain  in  force  during  the  con- 
tinuance of  the  present  war  and  for  six  months  after  the  termination  of  the  war 
by  the  proclamation  of  the  treaty  of  peace,  or  at  such  eariier  time  as  the 
President  may  designate:  Provided  further.  That  the  termination  of  this  act 
shall  not  affect  any  act  done  or  any  right  or  obligation  accruing  or  accrued 
pursuant  to  this  act,  and  during  the  time  that  this  act  is  in  force:  Provided 
further.  That  the  authority  by  this  act  granted  shall  be  exercised  only  in 
matters  relating  to  the  conduct  of  the  present  war. 

;  /f  *  ^:J^^^  ''?.  ^f.^T'^^e  «"'  *h«  purposes  of  this  act  the  President  is  author- 
ized  to  utilize,  coordinate,  or  consolidate  any  executive  or  administrative  com- 
missions, bureaus,  agencies,  offices,  or  officers  now  existing  by  law,  to  transfer 
any  duties  or  powers  from  one  existing  department,  commission,  bureau,  agency, 
oftce,  or  officer  to  another,  to  transfer  the  personnel  thereof  or  any  part  of  it 
either  by  detail  or  assignment,  together  with  the  whole  or  any  part  of  the 
records  and  public  property  belonging  thereto. 

Sec.  3.  That  the  President  is  further  authorized  to  establish  an  executive 
agency  which  may  exercise  such  jurisdiction  and  control  over  the  production 
of  aeroplanes,  aeroplane  engines,  and  aircraft  equipment  as  in  his  judgment 
may  be  advantageous;  and,  further,  to  transfer  to  such  agency,  for  its  use,  all  or 
any  moneys  heretofore  appropriated  for  the  production  of  aeroplanes,  aeroplane 
engines,  and  aircraft  equipment.  *-        -»         f      ^ 

Sec.  4.  That  for  the  purpose  of  carrying  out  the  provisions  of  this  act,  any 
moneys  heretofore  and  hereafter  appropriated  for  the  use  of  any  executive 
department,  commission,  bureau,  agency  office,  or  officer  shall  be  expended  only 
tor  the  purposes  for  which  it  was  appropriated  under  the  direction  of  such 
other  agency  as  may  be  directed  by  the  President  hereunder  to  perform  and 
execute  said  function. 

Sec.  5.  That  should  the  President,  in  redistributing  the  functions  among  the 


I        » 


'  li 


■  — .  »-•  — » »_ 


41  f 


.t 


! 


4 


I 

i 


^1 


494    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

executive  agencies  as  provided  in  this  act,  conclude  that  any  bureau  should  be 
abolished  and  it  or  their  duties  and  functions  conferred  upon  some  other 
department  or  bureau  or  eliminated  entirely,  he  shall  report  his  conclusions 
to  Congress  with  such  recommendations  as  he  may  deem  proper. 

Sec.  6.  That  all  laws  or  parts  of  laws  conflicting  with  the  provisions  of 
this  act  are  to  the  extent  of  such  conflict  suspended  while  this  act  is  in  force. 

Upon  the  termination  of  this  act  all  executive  or  administrative  agencies, 
departments,  commissions,  bureaus,  offices,  or  officers  shall  exercise  the  same 
functions,  duties,  and  powers  as  heretofore  or  as  hereafter  by  law  may  be 
provided,  any  authorization  of  the  President  under  this  act  to  the  contrary 
notwithstanding. 


APPENDIX  III 

COMMITTEES  UNDER  AND  COOPERATING  WITH  MR.  BARUCH 

In  his  Capacity  of  Member  of  the  Advisory  Commission  of  the 

Council  of  National  Defense 

The  membership  of  these  committees  is  given  as  of  June  30,  1917.    The 
list  is  taken  from  the  First  Annual  Report  of  the  Council  of  National  Defense. 

cooperative   committee   on  alcohol 

Horatio   S.   Rubens,  director  United   States  Industrial  Alcohol   Co.,  27 
William  Street,  New  York  City,  chairman. 

Julius  Kessler,  president  Distillers*  Securities  Corporation,  40  Exchanee 
Place,  New  York  City. 

Carman  N.  Smith,  secretary  Michigan  Chemical  Co.,  Bay  City,  Mich. 

cooperative  committee  on  aluminum 

Arthur  V.  Davis,  president  Aluminum  Co.  of  America,  Pittsburgh,  Pa 
chairman.  ** 

E.  E.  Allyne,  president  Aluminum   Castings  Co.,  Cleveland,  Ohio 
Joseph  A.  Janney,  Jr.,  Morris  Building,   Philadelphia,   Pa.,  partner  in 
Janney,  Steinmetz  &  Co. 

cooperative  committee  on  asbestos,  magnesia,  and  roofing 

Thomas  F.  Manville,  president   H.  W.  Johns-ManviUe  Co.,  New  York 
City,  chairman. 

Philip  Allen,  Bird  &  Son. 

cooperative  committee  on  brass 

Charles   F.    Brooker,   president   American    Brass    Co.,   Ansonia.    Conn., 
chairman.  ^ 

E.  0.  Goss,  assistant  treasurer  ScoviU  Manufacturing  Co.,  Waterbury,  Conn. 
UARTON  Haselton,  Secretary,  treasurer,  and  general  manager  Rome  Brass 
Co.,  Rome,  N.  Y. 

Lewis  H.  Jones,  president  Detroit  Copper  &  Brass  Co.,  Detroit,  Mich. 
*.  J.  Kingsbury,  president  Bridgeport  Brass  Co.,  Bridgeport,  Conn. 

cooperative  committee  on  cement 
^^  John  E.  Morron,  president  Atlas  Portland  Cement  Co.,  New  York  Citj. 

B.  F.  Aftleck,  president   Universal   Portland   Cement   Co.,   Chicago,   lU. 
CtEOrge  T.   Cameron,  president   Santa   Cruz  Portland  Cement   Co..   San 
Francisco,   Cal.  * 

?^i^^°*>r"^^*  president  Dixie  Portland  Cement  Co.,  Chattanooga,  Tenn. 
^^  U)l.  L.  M.  Young,  vice  president  Lehigh  Portland  Cement  Co.,  Allentown, 

R.  J.  Wig,  Bureau  of  standards. 


;* 


11 


V. 


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iV 


i! 


m. 


496    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

COOPERATIVE    COMMITTEE    ON    CHEMICALS 

Dr.  Wm.  H.  Nichols,  General  Chemical  Co.,  25  Broad  Street,  New  York 
City,  chairman. 

Van  H.  Manning,  Bureau  of  Mines,  Washington,  D.  C,  Ex  officio. 
C.  A.  Richards,  Department  of  Commerce,  Washington,  D.  C,  Ex  officio. 
Dr.  M.  T.  BoGERT,  National  Research  Council,  Washington,  D.  C,  Ex  officio. 
Maj.  J.  T.  Crabb,  United  States  Army,  retired;  assistant  to  chairman. 
J.  D.  C.  Bradley,  secretary. 

SUBCOMMITTEE    ON    ACIDS 

H.  R.  Grasselli,  Grasselli  Chemical  Co.,  Cleveland,  Ohio,  chairman. 
Henry  Howard,  Merriman   Chemical   Co.,   Boston. 

SUBCOMMITTEE    ON    ALKALIS 

J.  D.  Pennock,  Solvay  Process  Co.,  Syracuse,  N.  Y.,  chairman. 
T.  N.  Hicks,  Niagara  Alkali  Co.,  Niagara  Falls,  N.  Y. 

SUBCOMMITTEE    ON    ELECTROCHEMICALS 

John  J.  Riker,  19  Cedar  Street,  New  York  City. 

SUBCOMMITTEE    ON    FERTILIZERS 

Horace  Bowker,  2  Rector  Street,  New  York  City,  chairman. 
Charles  H.  MacDowell,  president  Armour  Fertilizer  Works,  Chicago. 
Chas.  G.  Wilson,  Virginia  Iron,  Coal  &  Coke  Co.,  Richmond,  Va. 

SUBCOMMITTEE    ON    MISCELLANEOUS    CHEMICALS 

Edward  Mallinckrodt,  Jr.,  2600  North  Second  Street,  St.  Louis,  chairman. 

SUBCOMMITTEE    ON    COAL-TAR    BY-PRODUCTS 

William  H.  Childs,  president  Barrett  Co.,  17  Battery  Place,  New  York 
City,  chairman. 

SUBCOMMITTEE    ON    PYRITES 

A.  D.  Ledoux,  15  William  Street,  New  York  City. 

SUBCOMMITTEE    ON    SULPHUR 

Henry  Whiton,  president   Union  Sulphur  Co.,  chairman. 

COOPERATIVE    committee    ON    COPPER 

J.  D.  Ryan,  president  Anaconda  Copper  Co.,  42  Broadway,  New  York 
City,  chairman. 

R.  L.  AcASSiz,  president  Calumet  &  Hecla  Mining  Co.,  12  Ashburton  Place, 
Boston,  Mass. 

W.  A.  Clark,  president  United  Verde  Copper  Co.,  20  Exchange  Place,  New 
York  City. 

MuRRY  M.  Guggenheim,  120  Broadway,  New  York  City. 

James  McLean,  vice  president  Phelps-Dodge  Co.,  98  John  Street,  New  York 
City. 


APPENDIX 


497 


Charles  MacNeill,  president  Utah  Copper  Co.,  25  Broad  Street,  New 
York  City. 

Stephen  Birch,  vice  president  Kinnecott  Mines  Co.,  120  Broadway,  New 
York  City. 

cooperative  committee  on  lead 

Clinton  H.  Crane,  president  St.  Joseph  Lead  Co.,  61  Broadway,  New  York 
City,  chairman. 

Fred  Bradley,  president  Bunker  Hill  &  Sullivan  Mining  &  Concentrating 
Co.,  San  Francisco,  Cal. 

Ed.  W.  p.  Brush,  American  Smelting  and  Refining  Co.,  120  Broadway, 
New  York  City. 

E.  J.  Cornish,  vice  president  National  Lead  Co.,  Ill  Broadway,  New  York 
City. 

Harry  L.  Day,  Hercules  Mining  Co.,  Wallace,  Idaho. 

F.  Y.  Robertson,  vice  president  and  general  manager  United  States  Metala 
Refining  Co.,  120  Broadway,  New  York  City. 

cooperatu^  committee  on  lumber 

R.  H.  Downman,  president  National  Lumber  Manufacturers*  Association, 
New  Orleans,  La.,  Munsey  Building,  Washington,  D.  C,  chairman. 

D.  O.  Anderson,  lumber  manufacturer,  Marion  S.  C. 

W.  R.  Brown,  lumber  and  paper  manufacturer,  Berlin,  N.  H. 
W.  E.  Delaney,  president  Kentucky  Lumber  Co.,  Lexington,  Ky. 
J.  F.  Gregory,  logger  and  lumber  manufacturer,  Tacoma,  Wash. 
George  B.  Lewis,  lumber  manufacturer,  Holyoke,  Mass. 

G.  S.  Long,  manager  Weyerhaeuser  Timber  Co.,  Tacoma,  Wash. 

W.  M.  Ritter,  president  W.  M.  Ritter  Lumber  Co.,  Welch,  W.  Va. 

E.  A.  Selfridge,  president  Northwestern  Redwood  Co.,  San  Francisco,  Cal. 
W.  H.  Sullivan,  manager  Great  Southern  Lumber  Co. 

C.  H.  Worcester,  president  C.  H.  Worcester  Lumber  Co.,  Chicago,  111. 

F.  G.  WiSNER,  Eastman  Gardiner  Lumber  Co.,  Laurel,  Miss. 

E.  T.  Allen,  manager  Western  Forestry  and  Conservation  Association,  Port- 
land,  Oreg. 

R.  S.  Kellogg,  National   Lumber  Manufacturers*  Association,   secretary. 

cooperative  committee  on  mica 

L.  W.  KiNGSLEY,  president  Eugene  Munsell  &  Co.,  68  Church  Street,  New 
York  City,  chairman. 

W.  Vance  Brown,  Asheville  Mica  Co.,  Biltmore,  N.  C. 

F.  L.  Watson,  president  Watson  Bros.,  Boston,  Mass. 

w 
cooperative    committee    on    NICKEL 

Ambrose  Monell,  president  International  Nickel  Co.,  43  Exchange  Place, 
New  York  City,  chairman. 

cooperative  committee  on  steel  and  steel  products 

Elbert  H.  Gary,  chairman  United  States  Steel  Corporation,  71  Broadway, 
New  York  City,  chairman. 

James  A.  Farrell,  president  United  States  Steel  Corporation,  71  Broadway, 
New  York  City,  chairman. 

James  A.  Burden,  president  Burden  Iron  Co.,  Troy,  N.  Y. 

Alva  C.  Dinkey,  vice  president  Midvale  Steel  &  Ordnance  Co.,  Philadel- 
phia, Pa. 


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498    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Willis  L.  King,  vice  president  Jones  &  Laughlin  Steel  Co.,  Pittsburgh,  Pa. 
E.  G.  Grace,  president  Bethlehem  Steel  Co.,  Ill  Broadway,  New  York  City. 
Charles  M.  Schwab,  chairman  of  board,  Bethlehem  Steel  Co.,  Ill  Broad- 
way, New  York  City. 

John  A.  Topping,  chairman  Republic  Iron  &  Steel  Co.,  17  Battery  Place 
New  York  City.  * 

H.  G.  Dalton,  Pickands,  Mather  &  Co.,  Cleveland,  Ohio. 
E.  A.  S.  Clarke,  president  Lackawanna  Steel  Co.,  2  Rector  Street,  New 
York  City,  Secretary. 

H.  H.  Cook,  American  Iron  &  Steel  Institute,  New  York  City,  assistant 
secretary. 

SUBCOMMITTEE    ON    ALLOYS 

James  A.  Farrell,  71  Broadway,  New  York  City,  president  United  States 
Steel  Corporation,  chairman. 

E.  A.  S.  Clarke,  president  Lackawanna  Steel  Co.,  New  York  City. 
E.  G.  Grace,  president  Bethlehem  Steel  Co.,  South  Bethlehem,  Pa. 
E.  J.  Lavino,  E.  J.  Lavino  Co.,  Philadelphia,  Pa. 
A.  A.  Fowler,  Rogers  Brown  &  Co.,  New  York  City,  secretary. 

subcommittee  ON  sheet  steel 

W.  S.  Horner,  president  National  Association  of  Sheet  &  Tin  Plate  Manu- 
facturing, Pittsburgh,  Pa.,  chairman. 

Walter  C.  Carroll,  American  Sheet  Tin  Plate,  Pittsburgh,  Pa. 
Charles  Hadley,  Alan-Wood  Iron  &  Steel  Co.,  Philadelphia,  Pa. 

subcommittee  on  pig  tin 

John  Hughes,  assistant  to  president  United  States  Steel  Corporation,  71 
Broadway,  New  York  City,  chairman. 

E.  R.  Crawford,  president  McKeesport  Tin  Plate  Co.,  McKeesport,  Pa. 

John  A.  Frye,  general  purchasing  agent  American  Can  Co.,  120  Broadway. 
New  York  City. 

A.  B.  Hall,  manager  metal  department  National  Lead  Co.,  New  York  City. 

Theodore  Pratt,  assistant  manager  manufacturing  department  Standard 
Oil  Co.  of  New  York,  New  York  City. 

subcommittee  on  steel  distribution 

James  A.  Farrell,  president  United  States  Steel  Co.,  71  Broadway,  New 
York  City,  chairman. 

E.  A.  S.  Clarke,  president  Lackawanna  Steel  Co.,  New  York  City. 

John  A.  Topping,  chairman  Republic  Iron  &  Steel  Co.,  New  York  City. 

subcommittee  on  scrap  iron 

Eli  Joseph,  of  Joseph,  Joseph  &  Bros.,  New  York  City,  chairman. 
Samuel  Deutsch,  Ohio  Iron  &  Metal  Co.,  Chicago. 
Vernon  Phillips,  Perry,  Buxton,  Doane  &  Co.,  Philadelphia,  Pa. 
Jos.  Michaels,  Hyman-Michaels  Co.,  Chicago,  111. 

subcommittee  of  pig  iron,  iron  ore,  and  lake  transportation 

H.  G.  Dalton,  Pickands-Mathers  Co.,  Cleveland,  Ohio,  chairman. 

F.  Billings,  Todd  Stambaugh  Co.,  Qeveland,  Ohio. 

H.  CouLBY,  Pittsburgh  Steamship  Co.,  Cleveland,  Ohio. 
C  T.  Dyer,  W.  P.  Snyder  &  Co.,  Pittsburgh,  Pa. 


APPENDIX 


499 


Leonard  Peckitt,  president  Empire  Iron  &  Steel  Co.,  Philadelphia,  Pa. 

F.  B.  Richards,  M.  A.  Hanna  Co.,  Cleveland,  Ohio. 

W.  T.  Sheppard,  Rogers,  Brown  Co.,  Buffalo,  N.  Y. 

A.  H.  Woodward,  Woodward  Iron  Co.,  Birmingham,  Ala. 

Amasa  S.  Mather,  Pickands-Mather  Co.,  Cleveland,  Ohio,  secretary. 

subcommittee  on  tubular  products 

James  A.  Campbell,  president  Youngstown  Sheet  &  Tube  Co.,  Youngstown, 
Ohio,  chairman. 

Anson  Mark,  Mark  Manufacturing  Co.,  Chicago,  111. 

George  Matheson,  Jr.,  vice  president  Spang  Chalfant  &  Co.,  Pittsburgh, 
Pa. 

W.  H.  Rowe,  president  Pittsburgh  Steel  Co.,  Pittsburgh,  Pa. 

E.  Worcester,  vice  president  National  Tube  Co.,  Pittsburgh,  Pa. 

subcommittee  on  tin   plate 

J.  I.  Andrews,  general  manager  sales  American  Sheet  &  Tin  Plate  Co., 
chairman. 

E.  R.  Crawford,  president  McKeesport  Tin  Plate  Co.,  McKeesport,  Pa. 

E.  T.  Weir,  president  Phillips  Sheet  &  Tin  Plate  Co.,  Weirton,  W.  Va. 

subcommittee   on   wire  rope 

Karl  G.  Roebling,  general  manager  sales  John  A.  Roebling's  Sons  Co., 
Trenton,  N.  J.,  chairman. 

John  J.  Brode^iick,  president  Broderick  &  Bascom  Rope  Co.,  St.  Louis,  Mo. 

Frank  Baackes,  vice  president  and  general  sales  agent  American  Steel  & 
Wire  Co.,  Chicago,  111. 

subcommittee  on  wire  products 

Frank  Baackes,  vice  president  and  general  sales  agent  American  Steel  & 
Wire  Co.,  Chicago,  111. 

George  A.  Mason,  manager  of  sales  Jones  &  Laughlin  Steel  Co.,  Pitts- 
burgh, Pa. 

John  C.  Neale,  vice  president  and  general  manager  of  sales  Midvale, 
Cambria  &  Worth  Bros.  Cos.,  Philadelphia,  Pa. 

J.  E.  Frederick,  secretary  Kokomo  Steel  &  Wire  Co.,  Kokomo,  Ind. 

H.  Sanborn  Smith,  vice  president  and  general  manager  sales  Gulf  States 
Steel  Co.,  Birmingham,  Ala. 

subcommittee  on  cold  rolled  and  cold  drawn  steel  of  the  steel  and 

steel  products  committee 

F.  N.  Beagle,  president  Union  Drawn  Steel  Co.,  Beaver  Falls,  Pa.,  chairman. 
E.  L.  Parker,  president  Columbia  Steel  Shafting  Co.,  Pittsburgh,  Pa. 
Roland  Gerry,  assistant  general  sales  manager  Jones  &  Laughlin  Steel  Co., 

Pittsburgh,  Pa. 

cooperative  committee  on  oil 

A.  C.  Bedford,  president  Standard  Oil  Co.,  26  Broadway,  New  York  City, 
chairman. 


Pa. 


G.  S.  Davison,  president  Gulf  Refining  Co.,  Frick  Building,   Pittsburgh, 


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500    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

E.  L.  DoHENY,  president  Mexican  Petroleum  Co.,  Los  Angeles,  Cal. 

E.  C.  LuFKiN,  president  Texas  Co.,  Whitehall  Building,  New  York  City. 
John  H.  Markham,  Jr.,  Daniels  Building,  Tulsa,  Okla. 

H.  F.  Sinclair,  president  Sinclair  Refining  Co.,  Equitable  Building,  New 
York  City. 

J.  W.  Van  Dyke,  president  Atlantic  Refining  Co.,  3144  Passyunk  Avenue, 
Philadelphia,  Pa. 

William  Muir,  president  National  Petroleum  Association,  Titusville,  Pa. 

H.  G.  James,  president  Western  Refiners*  Association,  Kansas  City,  Mo. 

Joseph  F.  Guffy,  president  Natural  Gas  Association  of  America,  Pitts- 
burgh, Pa. 

John  A.  Moffatt,  26  Broadway,  New  York  City,  secretary. 

COOPERATIVE    committee     ON    RUBBER 

H.  Stuart  Hotchkiss,  president  General  Rubber  Co.,  1790  Broadway,  New 
York  City,  chairman. 

Frederic  C.  Hood,  Hood  Rubber  Co.,  Watertown,  Mass. 

Arthur  Marks,  Bureau  of  Construction  and  Repair,  Navy  Department, 
Washington,  D.  C. 

cooperative  committee  on  wool 

Jacob  F.  Brown,  Brown  &  Adams,  269  Summer  Street,  Boston,  Mass. 

H.  E.  Campbell,  Flagstaff,  Ariz. 

Joseph  R.  Grundy,  Wm.  H.  Grundy,  Bristol,  Pa. 

F.  J.  Hagenbarth,  president  National  Association  Wool  Growers,  Salt  Lake 
Gty,  Utah. 

Sigmund  Silberman,  S.  Silberman  Sons;  Chicago,  111. 
James  M.  Wilson,  McKinley,  Wyo. 

cooperative   committee   on  zinc 

Edgar  Palmer,  president  New  Jersey  Zinc  Co.,  55  Wall  Street,  New  York 
City,  chairman. 

Charles  W.  Baker,  president,  American  Zinc,  Lead  &  Smelting  Co.,  120 
Broadway,  New  York  City. 

A.  P.  Cobb,  vice  president  New  Jersey  Zinc  Corporation,  55  Wall  Street, 
New  York  City. 

Sidney  J.  Jennings,  vice  president  United  States  Smelting,  Refining  & 
Mining  Co.,  120  Broadway,  New  York  City. 

Cornelius  F.  Kelley,  vice  president  Anaconda  Copper  Co.,  42  Broadway, 

New  York  City. 

N.  Bruce  MacKelvie,  president  Butte  &  Superior  Copper  Co.,  25  Broad 

Street,  New  York  City. 

Thomas  F.  Noon,  president  Illinois  Zinc  Co.,  Peru,  111. 

Charles  T.  Orr,  president  Bertha  A.  Mining  Co.,  Webb  City,  Mo. 


APPENDIX  IV 

THE  WAR  INDUSTRIES  BOARD,  WITH  ITS  MAIN  DIVISIONS 


main  divisions 


The  Board: 

BERjifARD  M.  Baruch,  Chairman  (ex 

Alexander  Legge,  Vice  Chairman 

Rear  Admiral  F.  F.  Fletcher,  Navy. 

Maj.  Gen.  George  W.  Goethals,  Army. 

Robert  S.  Brookings,  Chairman  Price- 
Fixing  Committee. 

Hugh  Frayne,  Labor. 

Edwin  B.  Parker,  Priorities  Commis- 
sioner. 

George  N.  Peek,  Commissioner  of  Fin- 
ished Products. 


officio  member  of  all  committees). 

J.  Leonard  Replogle,  Steel  Admin- 
istrator. 

L.  L.  Summers,  Technical  Advisor. 

Albert  C.  Ritchie,  General  Counsel. 

H.  P.  Ingels,  Secretary. 

Herbert  Bayard  Swope,  Associato 
Member. 

Clarence  Dillon,  Harrison  Wil- 
liams, and  Harold  T.  Clark, 
Assistants  to  the  Chairman. 


Price-Fixing  Committee: 

Robert  S.  Brookings,  chairman.  Members:  B.  M.  Baruch,  chairman  War 
Industries  Board;  W.  B.  Colver,  chairman  Federal  Trade  Commission;  Hugh 
Frayne,  labor  representative.  War  Industries  Board;  H.  A.  Garfield,  Fuel 
Administrator;  Commander  John  M.  Hancock,  Navy  representative;  Lieut.  Col. 
Robert  H.  Montgomery,  Army  representative;  Henry  C.  Stuart;  Dr.  F,  W. 
Taussig,  chairman  Tariff  Commission;  W.  W.  Phelps,  secretary. 

Labor  Division. —  Hugh  Frayne,  chairman. 

War  Prison  Labor  and  National  Waste  Reclamation  Section, —  Dr.  E.  Stagg 
Whitin,  chairman  executive  committee.  National  Committee  on  Prisons  and 
Prison  Labor;  W.  J.  Spillman,  chief.  Office  of  Farm  Management,  Department 
of  Agriculture;  Capt.  H.  L.  Baldensperger,  Reclamation  Division,  United 
States  Army;  Anthony  Caminetti,  United  States  Commissioner  of  Immigration 
Department  of  Labor;  John  J.  Manning,  secretary,  union  label  trades  depart 
ment,  American  Federation  of  Labor;  Dr.  Charles  H.  Winslow,  assistant  direc- 
tor of  research.  Federal  Board  for  Vocational  Education;  Edwin  F.  Sweet, 
Assistant  Secretary  Department  of  Commerce;  Lieut.  J.  B.  Goldman,  United 
States  Navy;  Maj.  J.  W.  Riley,  The  Adjutant  General's  Office. 

Allied  Purchasing  Commission: 

Bernard  M.  Baruch,  Robert  S.  Lovett,  Robert  S.  Brookings.  Business 
manager:  Alex  Legge,  succeeded  by  James  A.  Carr;  assistants:  A.  L.  Bostwick, 
James  C  Leddy  and  F.  E.  Penick. 

Requirements  Division: 

Alex  Legge,  chairman.  Members:  Lieut.  CoL  C.  C.  Bolton,  General  Staff; 
George  M.  Brill,  Emergency  Fleet  representative;  James  A.  Carr,  representing 
the  Allies;  Col.  George  H.  Estes,  Army  representative;  James  IngUs;  C.  H. 
MacDowell,  chemicals;  P.  B.  Noyes,  Fuel  Administrator's  representative;  Edwin 


1 

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502    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

B.  Parker,  priority;  George  N.  Peek,  finished  products;  Admiral  C.  J.  Peoples, 
Navy  representative;  M.  B.  Pool,  Red  Cross  representative;  T.  C.  Powell,  Rail- 
road Administrator's  representative;  J.  Leonard  Replogle,  steel;  A.  W.  Shaw, 
conservation;  L.  L.  Summers,  technical  advisor.  War  Industries  Board;  Capt. 
M.  N.  Taylor,  Navy  representative;  T.  F.  Whitmarsh,  Food  Administrator's 
representative;  Maj,  Seth  Williams,  Marine  Corps  representative;  Pope  Yeat- 
man,  nonferrous  metals;  W.  E.  Guylee,  executive  secretary. 

Clearance  Office  —  Requirements  Division. —  J.  C.  Musser,  secretary;  C.  B. 
Hughes,  assistant  secretary. 

Finished  Products  Division: 

George  N.  Peek,  commissioner  of  finished  products;  E.  L.  Crawford, 
assistant  to  commissioner;  W.  M.  Ritter,  assistant  to  commissioner,  certifying 
officer;  Walter  Bobbins,  assistant  to  commissioner. 

Friortties  Division: 

Edwin  B.  Parker,  priorities  commissioner;  Rhodes  S.  Baker,  assistant  pri- 
orities commissioner. 

Priorities  Board. —  Edwin  B.  Parker,  priorities  commissioner;  Edward  Cham- 
bers, director  of  traffic.  United  States  Railroad  Administration;  Admiral  F.  F. 
Fletcher,  United  States  Navy;  Felix  Frankfurter,  labor  representative;  Gen. 
George  W.  Goethals,  United  States  Army;  Alex  Legge,  representative  of  Allied 
Purchasing  Commission;  P.  F.  Noyes,  director  of  conservation,  Fuel  Adminis- 
tration; T.  F.  Whitmarsh,  Food  Administration;  Charles  R.  Piez,  vice  president 
and  general  manager  of  the  Emergency  Fleet  Corporation,  representing  the 
United  States  Shipping  Board  and  Emergency  Fleet  Corporation;  Clarence  M. 
WooUey,  member  of  the  War  Trade  Board;  H.  G.  Phillipps,  secretary. 

Priorities  committee. —  Edwin  B.  Parker,  priorities  commissioner,  chairman; 
Charles  K.  Foster,  vice  chairman.  Members:  George  Armsby;  H.  H.  Barbour; 
W.  W.  Chase;  Percy  Holbrook;  J.  M.  Hopkins;  Henry  Krumb;  F.  H.  Macpher- 
son;  Rear  Admiral  N.  E.  Mason;  Lieut.  Col.  C.  A.  McKenney;  Everett  Morss; 
Lucius  P.  Ordway;  T.  C.  Powell;  Rear  Admiral  A.  V.  Zane.  Maurice  Hirsch, 
secretary,  and  Marcus  B.  Hall,  assistant  secretary. 

Labor  section^  priorities  division. —  A.  W.  Gapp,  chief. 

Nonwar  construction  section,  priorities  division. — D.  R.  McLennan,  chief. 

Conservation  Divisions: 

A.  W.  Shaw,  chairman;  Charles  K.  Foster;  Dr.  E.  F.  Gay;  Lieut.  Col. 
W.  R.  Roberts;  C.  H.  MacDowell;  Admiral  Samuel  McGowan;  George  N.  Peek; 
T.  C  Powell;  Pope  Yeatman;  Melvin  T.  Copeland,  executive  secretary. 

Division  of  Planning  and  Statistics: 

Edwin  F.  Gay,  chairman;  Henry  S.  Dennison,  assistant  chairman;  H.  R. 
Hatfield,  director;  J.  Lee  Coulter,  chief  of  commodity  section;  Wesley  C. 
Mitchell,  chief  of  price  section;  Mills  E.  Case,  chief  of  contract  section;  Leo 
Wolman,  editor  of  Commodity  Bulletin;  William  A.  Barber;  Alice  C.  Boughton; 
Stuart  Daggett;  L.  K.  Frank;  Paul  Willard  Garrett;  Walter  Holsinger; 
Walter  W.  Stewart. 

Employment  Management  Courses: 

James  Inglis,  chairman;  P.  E.  Foerderer,  vice  chairman;  Capt.  Boyd  Fisher, 
Government   supervisor.      (Operated  under  joint   advisory   committee   of   the 


APPENDIX 


503 


Army,   Emergency   Fleet    Corporation,    Labor   Department,    Navy,   and    War 
Industries  Board.) 

Facilities  Division: 

Samuel  P.  Bush,  director;  Capt.  C.  Bamberger;  C.  W.  Carroll;  M.  F.  Chase; 
F.  L.  Dame;  Capt.  W.  B.  Dickinson;  J.  L  Downey;  L.  H.  Kittredge;  G.  E. 
Miller;  L.  B.  Reed;  H.  Williams. 

Division  of  Business  Administration: 

John  Esher  Knobel,  director  and  business  manager;  William  E.  Goodfellow, 
assistant  business  manager;  Charles  H.  Birr,  comptroller;  W.  G.  Scott,  dis- 
bursing officer;  W.  B.  Martin,  chief  clerk;  Charles  J.  Davis,  assistant;  L.  Perry 
Ferguson,  storekeeper;  Mrs.  Mary  Newton,  chief  of  bureau  of  personnel; 
H.  L.  Lambert,  superintendent  of  buildings. 

commodity  and  miscellaneous  divisions  and  sections 

Note. — Each    division    and    section    had    as    members    authorized    representatives    of    the    Army 
and  of  the  Navy  and  of  other  purchasing  departments  interested   in  the  commodity. 

Agricultural  implements  and  wood  products. —  E.  E.  Parsonage,  chief;  P.  B. 
Schravesande,  assistant. 

Automotive  products  section.— C.  C.  Hanch,  chief;  Edward  J.  Hickey, 
assistant. 

Brass  section. —  Everett  Morss,  chief. 

Building  Materials  Division.— Richard  L.  Humphrey,  director. 

Assistants:  W.  A.  R.  Anthony;  Morris  C.  Betts;  A.  L.  Gladding;  Norman 
H.  Hill;  Frank  A.  Kendall;  C.  M.  Lyman;  C.  D.  Morley;  H.  A.  Schaffer; 
Edna  M.  Stangland;  M.  A.  Styles;  U.  F.  Turpin;  F.  W.  Walker;  Capt. 
George  W.  Riddle;  Ira  H.  Woolson,  advisory  engineer. 

New  York  branch:  George  L.  Lucas,  in  charge. 

Philadelphia  branch:  Herbert  B.  Allen,  in  charge. 

Norfolk  branch:  W.  E.  Law,  in  charge. 

Chain  section.— John  C.  Schmidt,  chief;  Arthur  E.  Crockett,  assistant. 

Chemicals  Division.— Chai-les  H.  MacDowell,  director. 

Abrasives.—  See  Electrodes  and  abrasives  section,  chemicals  division. 

Acids  and  heavy  chemicals  section.— Albert  R.  Brunker,  chief;  Russell  S. 
Hubbard,  associate;  A.  E.  Wells,  associate. 

Alkali  and  chlorine  section.—  (Caustic  soda,  soda  ash,  chlorine  and  chlorine 
products,  lime,  potash,  and  salt.)  H.  G.  Carrell,  chief;  Lieut.  E.  A.  Williams, 
associate. 

Asbestos.— See  Chemical  glass  and  stoneware  section,  chemicals  division. 

Chemical  glass  and  stoneware  section.—  (Asbestos  and  magnesia  included.) 
Robert  M.  Torrence,  chief. 

Coal-gas  products  section.—  (Toluol,  benzol,  xylol,  phenol,  solvent  naptha, 
road  oil,  asphaltum,  acetylene,  nitrogen,  calcium  carbide,  rare  gases,  saccharin, 
i\\^^^^'  t"  ^"^ys^"'  including  commandeering  and  allocation  of  toluol.) 
J.  M.  Morehead,  chief;  Ira  C.  Darling,  associate  toluol  distribution. 

Creosote  section.— Ira  C.  Darling,  chief. 

Dye  section  (synthetic  dyes  and  intermediate  section).— Dt.  Victor  L.  Kinir. 
chief;  Dr.  J.  F.  Schoellkopf,  jr.,  chief,  resigned. 

Electric  furnaces,  electrolysis,  electrometallurgy.— See  technical  and  con- 
sulting section,  chemicals  division. 


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504    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Electrodes  and  abrasives  section. —  Capt.  Henry  C.  Du  Bois,  chief. 

Ethyl  alcohol  section. —  William  G.  Woolfolk,  chief;  A.  E.  Wells,  associate. 

Ferroalloys  section. — (Chrome,  manganese,  and  tungsten  ores  and  ferro- 
alloys, such  as  ferro  chrome,  manganese,  vanadium,  titanium,  silicon,  and 
tungsten;  also  spiegeleisen,  manganesite,  and  zirconium.)  Hugh  W.  Sanford, 
chief;  C.  D.  Tripp,  associate. 

Fine  chemicals  section. —  (Miscellaneous  analytical,  photographic,  and  phar- 
maceutical chemicals,  etc.)     A.  G.  Rosengarten,  chief. 

Fire  brick,  chrome  brick,  etc. —  See  Refractories  section,  chemicals  division. 

Magnesia. —  See  Chemical  glass  and  stoneware  section,  chemicals  division. 

Magnesite. — See  Ferroalloys  section. 

Mica  section. —  C.  K.  Leith,  chief. 

Nitrate  section. —  Cliarles  H.  MacDowell,  chief;  J.  A.  Becker,  associate; 
H.  Ray  Paige. 

Paint  and  pigment  section, —  L.  R.  Atwood,  chief;  Russell  S.  Hubbard, 
chief,  deceased. 

Platinum  section. —  (Platinum,  palladium,  iridium.)  C  H.  Conner,  chief; 
R.  H.  Carleton,  associate;  G.  £.  DeNike,  associate. 

Refractories  section, — (Fire  brick,  chrome  brick,  etc.)  Charles  Catlett, 
chief. 

Sulphur  and  pyrites  section. — William  G.  Woolfolk,  chief;  A.  E.  Wells, 
associate;  J.  R.  Townsend,  associate. 

Tanning  material  and  vegetable  dye  section. —  (Including  inedible  oils,  fats, 
and  waxes.)  E.  J.  Haley,  chief;  E.  A.  Prosser,  associate;  Harold  G.  Wood, 
associate. 

Technical  and  consulting  section. —  Dr.  Herbert  R.  Moody,  associate;  Dr. 
E.  R.  Weidlein,  associate;  Dr.  T.  P.  McCutcheon,  associate. 

Toluol, — See  Coal-gas  products  section,  chemicals  division. 

Wood  chemical  section. —  (Including  methyl  alcohol,  methyl  acetone,  ace- 
tone, ethyl  methyl  ketone,  acetate  of  lime,  acetic  acid,  acetic  anhydride,  formal- 
dehyde, aspirin,  methyl  acetate,  etc)  C.  H.  Conner,  chief;  A.  H.  Smith, 
associate;  R.  D.  Walker,  associate. 

Statistics,  chemicals  section — Joint  office  on  chemical  statistics, — Capt. 
Willis  B.  Rice,  associate;  Lieut  M.  R.  Gordon,  associate;  Asst.  Paymaster 
Dunning,  associate;  Arthur  Minnick,  associate. 

Conversion  of  industry. —  See  Resources  and  conversion  section. 

Copper  tubing  —  See  Brass  section  —  Nonferrous  tubing. 

Cotton  and  cotton  linters  section. —  See  Textile  division. 

Crane  section. —  A.  C.  Brown,  chief;  (^pt.  C  E.  Stamp,  assistant  chief; 
Louis  P.  Lipps. 

Electrical  and  power  equipment  section. —  Walter  Bobbins,  chief;  L.  W. 
Grothaus,  John  H.  Waterman,  Allen  P.  Bender,  Max  Greenburg,  Merritt  M. 
Hughes,  Wm.  S.  James,  Thos.  S.  Knight,  Edward  R.  Welles,  J.  A.  Merwin. 
Electric  wire  and  cable  section. — ^Le  Roy  Qark,  chief. 
Emergency  construction  committee. —  Col.  W.  A.  Starrett,  chairman;  Maj. 
Qair  Foster;  John  Donlin,  American  Federation  of  Labor;  Lieut.  J.  B.  Tal- 
madge,  secretary. 

Explosives  Division.— M.  F.  Chase,  director. 

Felt  section. —  See  Textile  division. 

Fiber. —  See  Jute,  hemp,  and  cordage  section. 

Fire  prevention  section.— W.  H.  Merrill,  chief;  Charles  H.  Smith,  associate 
chief  of  section;  George  W.  Booth,  associate  chief  of  section;  Frank  Pierce, 
Wilbur  Mallalieu. 


APPENDIX 


505 


Flax  products  section. —  See  Textile  division. 

Forgings,  guns,  small  arms,  and  small  arm  ammunition. —  Samuel  P.  Bush, 
chief;  Capt.  Clarence  Bamberger;  Charles  W.  Carroll. 

Gold  and  silver  section. —  C.  H.  Conner,  chief. 

Hardware  and  hand  tool  section. —  Murray  Sargent,  chief;  Lawrence  J. 
Stoddard,  gauges;  Thomas  F.  Bailey,  mill  supplies;  Alfred  L.  Lincoln,  drills 
and  reamers;  E.  W.  Lively,  machinists*  precision  tools;  L.  H.  Wetherell, 
cutlery,  needles,  sewing  machines. 

Hide,  Leather  and  Leather  Goods  Division. —  C.  F.  C.  Stout,  director. 

Section  chiefs. —  Thomas  Cover,  jr.,  in  charge  of  sole  leather;  O.  C.  Howe, 
in  charge  of  foreign  skins  and  hides;  L.  B.  Jackson,  in  charge  of  domestic 
skins  and  hides;  F.  A.  Vogel,  in  charge  of  upper  leather;  R.  M.  Pindell,  jr., 
executive  secretary. 

Chiefs  of  bureaus. — C.  D.  P.  Hamilton,  shoe  manufacturers;  Charles  J. 
Cliisholm,  shoe  retailers;  George  Rowbotham,  belting;  Charles  A.  Rogers, 
harness  and  personal  equipment,  except  shoes  and  clothing;  Harry  J.  Louis, 
gloves. 

Assistants. — Robert  D.  Ware,  belting  bureau;  George  R.  Wheeler,  shoe 
manufacturing  bureau;   Thomas  W.  Hughes,  assistant  to  executive  secretary. 

Inland  traffic  section. —  Thomas  C.  Powell,  chief;  Henry  F.  Bell,  assistant. 

Jute,  hemp,  and  cordage  section. —  E.  C.  Heidrich,  jr.,  chief. 

Legal  section.— U.  M.  Channing,  chief;  W.  C.  Saeger;  E.  M.  Dodd,  jr.; 
H.  R.  Gower. 

Linters  and  cotton  goods  section. —  See  Textile  division. 

Lumber  section. —  Charles  Edgar,  director;  Maj.  Armistead  M.  Cooke, 
assistant. 

Machine  tool  section. —  G.  E.  Merryweather,  chief;  Alvin  B.  Einig;  Arthur 
J.  M.  Baker;  Roland. Houck;  Ernest  D.  Crockett;  Floyd  C.  Lowell;  Walter  L. 
Ditforth. 

Medical  section. —  Lieut.  Col.  F.  F.  Simpson,  chief;  David  L.  Kean,  hospital 
furniture  and  equipment,  surgical  instruments;  A.  G.  Rosengarten,  medicinal 
chemicals. 

Mica  section. —  See  Chemicals  division. 

Miscellaneous  commodities  section. — M.  B.  Foster,  chief.  (This  section 
handles  all  commodities  for  which  we  have  no  specially  established  commodity 
section.) 

Nonferrous  metals  section. —  (Antimony,  aluminum,  copper,  lead,  nickel, 
quicksilver,  zinc.)  Pope  Yeatman,  chief;  E.  C.  Thurston,  assistant;  Andrew 
Walz,  assistant;  I.  H.  Cornell,  lead  and  zinc. 

Nonferrous  tubing  section. —  See  Brass  section. 

Optical  glass  and  instruments  section. —  G.  E.  Chatillon,  chief;  Maj.  F.  E. 
Wright;  Lieut.  Commander  H.  A.  Orr. 

Power  section.— Frederick  Darlington,  chief;  Charles  B.  Da\'is,  business 
assistant;  Maj.  Charles  F.  Lacombe;  Maj.  George  S.  Sever;  Maj.  Malcolm 
MacLaren;  Capt.  Carroll  Shaw;  Capt.  Ashton  M.  Tinsley;  Capt.  John  C. 
Damon;  Lieut.  George  K.  Miltenburger;  Lieut.  William  W.  Stanley. 

Production  division. —  See  Special  advisory  committee  on  plants  and 
munitions. 

Pulp  and  Paper  Division.— Thomas  E.  Donnelley,  director. 
Newspaper  section. —  G.  J.  Palmer,  chief. 
Paper  economies  section, —  I.*  W.  Blanchard,  chief. 


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506    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

Manufacturing  section. —  S.  L.  WillsoTi,  chief. 

Fiber  board  and  container  section.— Harold  W.  Nichols,  chief. 

Railway  equipment  and  supplies  section.— J.  Rogers  Flannery,  cl^i^f. 

Resources  and  conversion  section.— Charles  A.  Otis,  chief;  John  A.  Kling, 
assistant  chief;  Charles  H.  Anthony;  Edward  F.  Bulmahn;  W.  T.  Rossiter; 
Irving  H.  Taylor. 

Rubber  section.—See  Textile  division. 

Shipping  —  Mineral  imports  and  exports.— C.  K.  Leith. 

Small  arms  and  small-arms  ammunition.—  See  Forgings,  guns,  etc.,  section. 

Small  tools. —  See  Hardware  and  hand-tool  section. 

Special  advisory  committee  on  plants  and  munitions.— S.  M.  Vauclam, 
chairman;  Capt.  C.  K.  Rockwell,  J.  M.  Hansen,  Henry  R.  Rea,  Frank  W. 
Morse,  E.  F.  Wood,  Admiral  A.  R.  Couden,  G.  M.  Shaw. 

Steel  Division.— J.  Leonard  Replogle,  director  of  steel  supply;  Frank  Pumell, 

assistant  director;  E.  D.  GraflF,  special  agent. 

Steel  products  section.— F.  E.  Thompson,  chief;  G.  M.  Hartley,  cars  and 
locomotives;  D.  A.  Holloran,  emergency  fleet;  J.  A.  McDonald  mill  expert; 
D.  F.  Mann,  wire  products;  R.  I.  Richardson,  chief  clerk;  G.  C.  Shidle,  tubes; 
C.  G.  Thomas,  sheets;  H.  H.  Weaver,  mill  schedules.  r.        n  f 

Projectile  steel,  rails,  alloy  steel,  and  cold-drawn  steel  section.—  Capt.  U.  t.. 
Sawyer,  chief;  John  W.  Horr,  assistant,  alloy  steel  and  cold-drawn  steel; 
R.  L.  Lovell,  assistant,  projectile  steel;  F.  A.  Weymouth,  assistant,  rails. 

Pig  iron  section.— J&y  C.  McLauchlan,  chief;  J.  W.  Dickson,  S.  R.  Leonard, 
L.  R.  Smith,  B.  S.  Stephenson,  L.  W.  Williams. 

Permit  section.— i.  S.  Barclay,  chief;  G.  H.  Pyne,  assistant. 

Bureau  of  warehouse  distribution.— Andieyf  Wheeler,  chief;  Fhilo  B. 
Rhoades,  assistant;  Austin  D.  Smith,  assistant. 

Iron  and  steel  scrap  secriore.— William  Vernon  Phillips,  chief. 

Statistics.— Fercy  K.  Withey,  chief;  Ernest  L.  Selden,  assistant. 

Stored  materials  section.— i.  F.  Wilkins,  chief. 

Textile  Division.— John  W.  Scott,  director;  Henry  B.  Ashton,  assistant. 

Cotton  and  cotton  linters  section.— George  R.  James,  chief;  George  W. 
Naumburg,  assistant;  Sherboume  Prescott,  assistant. 

Cotton  goods  section.— Svencer  Turner,  chief;  Grosvenor  Ely,  assistant; 
George  F.  Smith,  thread;  Burton  Etherington,  yarn;  Ralph  E.  Loper,  mill 
equipment  and  production. 

Felt  section. —  Sylvan  Stroock,  chief. 

Flax  products  section. —  George  F.  Smith,  chief. 

Knit  goods  section.— Lincoln  Cromwell,  chief;  Rufus  W.  Scott,  associate; 
F.  E.  Haight,  associate;  John  McCauley,  associate. 

Rubber  and  rubber  goods  section.—  H.  T.  Dunn,  chief. 

SUk  section.- William  Skinner,  chief.  ^     ,,  rr  „ 

DomestU    wool   section.— Ley/is    Penwell,    chief;    William    D.    McKellar, 

assistant. 

Foreign  wool  section. —  A.  M.  Patterson,  chief. 

fToolens  section.— Herhen  E.  Peabody,  chief;  A.  L.  Gifford,  assistant 

Yarn  section.—  See  Cotton  goods  section. 

Tin  section.— George  N.  Armsby,  chief;   James  W.  Hitchcock,  assistant; 
Lincoln  Hutchinson,  assistant;   Thomas  G.  Cranwell,  assistant. 

Tobacco  section.— A.  I.  Esberg,  chief. 

Wire  and  Cable.—See  Electric  wire  and  cable  section. 


APPENDIX 


507 


Wood  products. —  See  Agricultural  implements,  etc.,  section. 
Woolens  section. —  See  Textile  division. 
Wool  section. —  See  Textile  division. 

Yarn  section. —  See  Textile  division,  cotton  goods  section. 
News  section.  Committee  on  Public  Information. —  Stanley  M.   Reynolds, 
A.  0.  Hayward. 


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APPENDIX  V 


REGIONAL   ADVISORS 


Region 


No.  I.  Boston  Mass. 

No.  2,  Bridgeport,  Conn. . . 
No.  S,  New  York,  N.  Y.  . . 

No.  4,  Philadelphia,  Pa. . . . 
No.  5,  Pittsburgh,  Pa.  . . . . 

No.  6,  Rochester,  N.  Y. . . . 
No.  7,  Cleveland,  Ohio. . . . 

No.  8,  Detroit.  Mich 

No.  9,  Chicago,  III 

No.  10,  Cincinnati,  Ohio  . . 
No.  II,  Baltimore,  Md.  . . . 

No.  12.  Atlanta.  Ga. 

No.  IS,  Birmingham,  Ala.  . 

No.  14,  Kansas  City,  Mo.  . 

No.  15,  St.  Louis,  Mo 

No.  16,  St.  Paul,  Minn.  . . . 
No.  17,  Milwaukee,  Wis.  . . 
No.  18,  Dallas,  Tex 

No.  19,  San  Francisco,  Calif. 

No.  20,  Seattle,  Wash 

No.  21,  Denver,  Colo 


Regional  advisor  —  Address 


Stuart  W.  Webb,  care  of 
chamber  of  commerce. 

B.  D.  Pierce,  jr.,  care  of 
chamber  of  commerce. 

Wm.  Fellowes  Morgan, 
care  of  Merchants'  Asso- 
ciation of  New  York. 

Ernest  T.  Trigg,  1228 
Widener  Building. 

George  S.  Oliver,  care  of 
chamber  of  commerce. 


E.  A  Fletcher,  care  of 
chamber  of  commerce. 

W.  B.  McAllister,  care  of 
chamber  of  commerce. 

Alkm  A.  Templeton,  care 
chamber  of  commerce. 

D.  E.  Felt,  29  South  La 
Salle  Street. 

Edwin  C.  Gibbs,  SI  East 
Fourth  Street. 

F.  S.  Chavannes,  care  Mer- 
chants &  Manufacturers 
Association. 

Edward  H.  Inman,  care  of 
chamber  of  commerce. 

T.  H.  Aldrich,  822  Brown- 
Marx  Building. 

Franklm  D.  Crabbs,  Tenth 
and  Central  Streets. 

Jackson  Johnson,  care  of 
chamber  of  commerce. 

D.  R.  Cotton,  1414  Pioneer 
Building. 

August  H.  Vogel,  fourth 
floor,  city  hall. 

Louis  Lipsitz,407-9  South- 
land Life  Building. 

Frederick  J.  Koster,  care 
of  chamber  of  commerre 

Herbert  Witherspoon,  care 
of  chamber  of  commerce. 

Cass  E.  Herrington,  510 
Symes  Building. 


Territory 


Maine,  New  Ham^hire,  Vermont,  eastern 

Massachusetts,  Rhode  Island.  ^ 
Western  Massachusetts,  Connecticut. 

Nine  southeastern  counties  of  New  York, 
Long  Island,  and  northern  New  Jersey. 

Eastern  Pennsylvania,  southern  New 
Jersey,  Delaware.  _ 

Western  Pennsylvania,  except  Erie,  Craw- 
ford, and  Mercer  Counties;  Jefferson  and 
Belmont  Counties  of  Ohio;  Allegany, 
Garrett,  and  Washington  Counties  of 
Maryland;  West  Virginia. 

New  York  State,  except  Metropolitan  dis- 
trict. New  York  City. 

Erie,  Crawford,  and  Mercer  Counties  of 
Pennsylvania;  northern  Ohio,  excepting 
Jefferson  and  Belmont  Counties. 

Southern  Michigan. 

lowa,^  northern    Illinob,    and    northern 

Indiana. 
Southern   Qhio,   southern   Indiana,    and 

Kentucky. 
Eastern  Maryland,  Virginia. 


North  Carolina,  South  Carolina,  Georgia 
and  Florida,  excepting  western  tier  of 
counties. 

Tennessee,  Mississippi,  Alabama,  western 
tier  of  counties  in  Florida,  and  southern 
Louisiana. 

Utah,  Wyoming,  Colorado,  northern  New 
Mexico,  northern  Oklahoma,  Kansas, 
Nebraska,  and  western  strip  of  Missouri. 

Missouri,  Arkansas,  and  southern  Illinois. 

Montana,  North  Dakota,  South  Dakota, 
Minnesota,  and  northwestern  Michigan. 
Southern  Wisconsin. 

Texas,  northern  Louisiana,  southeastern 
Oklahoma,  southern  New  Mexico,  and 
southeastern  Arizona. 

California,  Nevada,  and  Arizona,  except 
southeastern  counties  in  Dallas  district. 

Washington,  Oregon,  and  Idaho. 

Colorado,  Utah,  Wyoming,  and  northern 
New  Mexico. 


APPENDIX  VI 

MEMBERS  OF  THE  WAR  INDUSTRIES  BOARD  ORGANIZATION 


Name 


Abbott,  Arthur  J. 
AbeU,  Chas.S.... 
Adler,  H.S 


Aldrich,  Lieut.  H.  R.  . 


Aldrich,  H.W 

Aldrich,  Truman  H.. . . 
Alexander,  Maurice  M. 

Allen,  Herbert  B 

Alsberg,  Dr.  Carl  L. . . . 


Anderson,  Chandler  P. , 
Anthony,  Charles  H. . . 
Anthony,  Wm.  A.  R.  . 
Archer,  Maj.  P.  F.  . . . 
Armsby,  George  N. . . . 

Ashton,  Henry  B 

Atwood,  Lewis  R , 

Averill,  William  A . . . , 


Aycock,  Thomas  J 

Baggott,  Capt.  John  C.  . . 


Bailey,  Thomas  F. 


Baker,  A.  J 

Baker,  Rhodes  S. 


Baldensperger,  Capt.  H.  L. 

Bamberger,  Capt.  C 

Barber,  William  A 

Barbour,  Henry  H. 

Barclay,  James  S 

Barlow,  De  Witt  D , 


Barnes,  M.  H 

Barnum,  Harris  W. 


Position  in  War  Industries  Board 


Chief,  questionnaire  section 

Assistant  section  chief,  priorities 
divbion. 

Secretary  of  special  representa- 
tive of  United  States  Railroad 
Administration  with  War  In- 
dustries Board. 

Nonf errous  metals  section 


Staff,  lumber  section . 


Regional  advisor,  Birmingham, 

Ala. 
Assistant  in  platinum  section  . . . 

In  charge  Philadelphia  branch 
building  material  division. 

Advisory  board  on  medicinal 
agents,  section  of  medical  in- 
dustry. 

Special  counsel  on  international 
affairs. 

Staff,  resources  and  conversion 
section. 

Assistant  to  chief,  building  mate- 
rial division. 

Requirements  representative, 
Marine  Corps.^ 

Member  priorities  committee, 
chief  in  charge  of  tin. 

Assistant  to  director,  textile  divi- 
sion. 

Chief,  paint  and  pigment  section 

Expert,  division  of  planning  and 
statistics. 

Lumber^  production  director, 
Georgia  and  Florida. 

Examiner,  Army  section,  priori- 
ties committee. 

Assistant  to  chief,  hardware  and 

hand-tool  section. 
Assistant,  machine-tool  section 
Assistant  priorities  commissioner 

Member  war  prison  labor  and 
national  waste  reclamation 
section. 

Assistant  chief,  forgings,  guns, 
etc.,  section. 

Expert,  price  statistics 


Member  priorities  committee  . . , 

Chief,  permit  section,  steel  divi- 
sion. 
Associate  chief,  dredging  section 

Assistant  machine  tool  section . . 
Gold  and  silver^  section  of  the 
chemical  division. 


Former  business 


Member  law  firm,  Evans,  Abbott  ft 

Pearce,  Los  Angeles,  Calif. 
Baltimore,  Md. 

Secretary  to  vice  president.  Southern 
Ry.  Co.,  Cincinnati,  Ohio. 

Chief  of  field  party  and  petrographer, 
Wisconsin  Geographical  Survey, 
Melrose,  Mass. 

Sales  manager,  Hammond  Lumber 
Co.,  Mill  City,  Oreg. 

Mining  engineer  for  aty  of  Birming- 
ham, Ala. 

In  charge  of  customers*  rooni,  John 
L.  Dunlop  &  Co.,  Louisville,  Ky. 

Secretary,  Eastern  Stone  Producers* 
Association,  Philadelphia,  Pa. 

Chief  Bureau  of  Chemistry,  Depart- 
ment of  Agriculture. 

Law  firm,  Anderson  &  Anderson,  New 

York,  N.  Y. 
Export  salesman,  Detroit,  Mich. 

Assistant  to  secretary.  Master  Build- 

ders  Association,  Boston,  Mass. 
Washington,  D.  C. 

Vice  president,  California  Packing 
Corporation,  San  Francisco,  Cam. 

Credit  mana^r,  Carson,  Pirie,  Scott 
&  Co.,  Chicago,  111. 

President,  Peaslee-Gaulbert  Co.. 
Louisville,  Ky. 

Inspector  in  elementary  education. 
State  Education  Department,  Al- 
bany, N.  Y. 

General  manager,  the  Aycock  Lum- 
ber Co.,  Aycock,  Fla. 

Purchasing  agent  and  factory  mana- 
ager,  McCormick  Manufacturing 
Co.,  Dayton,  Ohio. 

Manager  and  treasurer.  Banks  Sup- 
ply Co.,  Huntington,  W.  Va. 

Moseler  Safe  Co.,  Hamilton.  Ohio. 

Law  firm,  Thompson,  Knight,  Baker 
&  Harris,  Dallas,  Tex. 

Reclamation  division,  U.  S.  Army. 


Mining  engineer.  Salt  Lake  Cibr, 

UUh. 
Professor  of  commercial  education* 

New  York  University. 
Manager  of  sales,  Lackawanna  Steel 

Co.,  New  York,  N.  Y. 
Trustee  of  an  estate,  New  York. 

N.  Y.  , 
Vice  president  and  general  manager, 

Atlantic,  Gulf  &  Pacific  Co.,  New 

York,  N.  Y. 
Henry  Prentice  Co.,  New  York,  N.Y. 
Manager,  Washington  branch  office* 

National  Fireproofing  Co. 


/   V 


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510    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

MEMBERS  OF  THE  WAR  INDUSTRIES  BOARD  ORGANIZATION 

Continued 


Name 


Barsh.  Waldo  A... 
Hartley,  George  M. 


Baruch,  Bernard  M. 
Bates,  Frederic  G. . . 


Bates,  Henry  M. 
Bayliss,  Wm.  G., 
BeaU  James  H... 


Bean.  Charles  A. 


Beatty,  William  T. 


Becker,  John  A. . 
Bell,  Henry  F... 
Bender,  Allan  P. 


Bender,  Maj.  John  L. . 
Bergen.  Charles  Wm. . 


Betts,  Morris  C. 


Bickford,  Robert  S. 
Bingham,  Harry  P. 


Birr,  CharfesH 

Blanchard,  Isaac  H. 


Blankenship,  Lieut.  J.  M. 
Bolt,  Edward  J 


Bolton.  Lieut.  CoL  C.  C. . 


Boniface,  Addison  O. 


Boom,  Eugene  C. . 
Booth,  George  W. 


Bostwick,  A.  L. . . . 
Boughton,  Alice  B. 

Bowler.  Marian . . . 
Boyd,  Henry  W... 
Brand.  Charles  J. .  , 
Brayton,  Edward. . 


BriU,  Geo.  M 

Brooker.  Hubert  H. 


Position  in  War  Industries  Board 


Secretary  to  director  of  chemicals 

Expert,  steel  division 

Chairman  of  the  Board 

Staff,  central  bureau  of  planning 

and  statistics. 
....do 


Elxpert,  fire  prevention  section . . 

Member  advisory  committee  on 
medicinal  agents,  section  of 
medical  industry. 

Statistician,  division  of  planning 
and  statistics. 


Staff,  conservation  division. 


Assistant  chief,  nitrates  section, 
chemical  division. 

A:>sbtant  to  chief,  inland  traffic 
section. 

Expert,  electric  and  power  equip- 
ment section. 

Assistant  in  charge.  Army  sec- 
tion priorities  committee. 

Expert,  electric  and  power 
equipment  division. 

Assistant  to  director,  building 
materials  section. 

Auditor,  domestic  wool  section . . 

Secretary  War  Industries  Board, 
Aug.  1,  1917-Jan  1,  1918. 

Comptroller,  division  of  business 
administration. 

Chief,  paper  economics  section, 
pulp  and  paper  division. 

Naval  assistant 

Assistant  to  chief  clerk,  facilities 
division. 

Secretary  and  a  ssistant  to  chair- 
man. General  Munitions 
Board,  and  chairman  of  clear- 
ance committee. 

Expert  fire  prevention  section . . 


Examiner,  priorities  division . . . , 
Associate  cmef,  fire  prevention 
section. 

Member  purchasing  commission 

Expert,  price  statistics,  division 
planning  and  statistics. 

Research  assistant,  divbion 
planning  and  statistics. 

Expert,  leather  division,  mem- 
ber foreign  mission. 

Chairman  committee  on  cotton 
distribution. 

Expert,  cotton  goods  section . . . . 


Requirements    division,    emer- 
gency fleet  representative. 
Secretary,  foreign  mission 


Former  business 


Private  secretary,  C.  H.  MacDowell, 
Armour  &  Co.,  Chicago,  111. 

Assistant  sales  manager,  Cleveland 
Steel  Co.,  Cleveland,  Ohio 

New  York,  N.  Y. 

Partner,  Bates  &  Gamble,  Toledo, 
Ohio. 

Dean  of  law  school.  University  of 
Michigan.  _  » 

Engineer,  Ohio  Inspection  Bureau, 
Columbus,  Ohio. 

Director  of  pharmacy  research.  Uni- 
versity of  Illinois. 

Salesman  and  office  manager,  Merrill 
Oldham  &  Co.,  bankers,  Boston, 
Mass. 

President  and  general  manager, 
Au  tin  Manufacturing  Co.,  Chi- 
cago. 111. 

Traveling  auditor.  Armour  Fertilizer 
Works,  Chioigo,  111. 

General  agent  in  Cuba  Southern  Ry. 
Co. 

Commercial  engineer,  Westinghouse 
Electric  and  Manufacturing  Co., 
East  Pittsburgh,  Pa. 

President  and  general  manager,  Al- 
toona  Overland  Co.,  Altoona,  Pa. 

New  York  representatives  of  the 
Ford  &  Kendig  Co  ,  Philadelphia, 
Coffin  Valve  Co.,  Boston,  et.  al. 

Architect,  office  of  Public  Roads, 
Washington,  D.  C. 

Broker,  Boston,  Mass. 

Cleveland,  Ohio. 

C.  P.  A.  SUff  of  Baker,  Vawter  & 
Wolf,  Chicago.  111. 

President  Isaac  H.  Blanchard  Co., 
New  York,  N.  Y. 

Washington,  D.  C. 

Sales  manager.  Twentieth  Century 
Publishing  Co.,  Philadelphia,  Pa. 

Secretary  Bourne  Fuller  Co.,  Cleve- 
land, Ohio. 


Superintendent  of  inspections.  Un- 
derwriters Laboratories,  Chicago, 
lU. 

Attorney  at  law,  San  Francisco,  Calif. 

Chief  engineer,  National  Board  of 
Fire  Underwriters.  New  York, 
N.  Y. 

Secretary  Planning  Commission  of 
St.  Louis,  Mo. 

Research  expert,  Home  Economics, 
Bureau  of  Educational  Elxperi- 
ments. 

Instructor  of  French,  Dedham,  Mass. 

President  Armour  Leather  Co., 
Chicago.  111. 

Chief,  Bureau  of  Markets,  Depart- 
ment of  Agriculture. 

Treasurer  and  cotton  buyer,  Towne, 
Brayton   &  Osborn,   Fall  River, 

140  North  Broad  Street,  Philadelphia. 
Pa. 

International  Harvester  Co..  Chi- 
cago, 111. 


APPENDIX 


511 


MEMBERS  OF  THE  WAR  INDUSTRIES  BOARD  ORGANIZATION 

Continued 


Name 


Brookings,  Robert  S. 
Brown,  Alexander  C. 


Brown,  George  S. 


Bruning,  H.  F 

Brunker,  Albert  R. . 


Bryan,  Allen  W. . . 

Bryar,  W.  B 

Buel,  Hillhouse . . . 
Bulkley,  Robert  J. 

Bullard,  Percy ... 

Bulmahn,  E.  F 

Burgess,  William. . 


Burke,  John  H., jr.. 
Burrowes,  John  F 

Burwell,  William  R.. 

Bush,  Samuel  P. . . . . 


Butz,  Theodore  C 

Gallery,  John  B , 

Caminnetti,  Anthony . 


Campbell,  John  James 
Canaday,  Ward  M. . . . 


Carleton,  R.  H. . . . 
Carmalt,  James  W. 


Carpenter.  Gilbert  E. 
Carr,  James  A 


Carrell,  Horace  G. 


CarroU,  Chas.  Wm. 


Case,  Mills  E... 
Catlett,  Charles. 


Chamberlam,  W.  £. 
Chambers,  Edward. 


Position  in  War  Industries  Board 


Chairman,  price  fixing  committee 

Chief,  crane  section,  assistant  to 
commissioner  of  finished  prod- 
ucts. 

Expert,  cotton  goods  section 


Former  business 


Staff,  conservation  division 

Chief  .acids  and  heavy  chemicals 
section. 

Statistician,  division  of  planning 

and  statistics. 
Expert,  hardware  and  hand  tool 

section. 
Expert,  division  of  planning  and 

statistics. 
Chief,  legal  section 


Expert,  nonwar  construction  sec- 
tion. 

Member  resources  and  conver- 
sion section. 

Expert,  hardware  and  hand  tool 
section. 


Reporter 

Expert,  facilities  division . 


Division  of  planning  and  statis- 
tics. 

Director,  facilities  division,  chief 
of  the  forgings.  guns,  etc.,  sec- 
tion. 

Examiner,  priorities  division . . . . 

Assistant,  resources  and  conver- 
sion section. 

Member  of  war  prison  labor  and 
national  waste  reclamation 
section. 

Nonf  errous  metals 

Expert,  nonwar  construction 
section. 

Associate  chief,  platinum  section 

Staff,  central  bureau  of  statistics 


Expert,  manufacturing  section, 
pulp  and  paper  division. 

Business  manager,  purchasing 
commission. 

Chief,  alkali  and  chlorine  section 


Staff,  facilities  division. 


Chief,  contract  section,  division 

planning  and  statistics. 
Chief,  refractories  section 


Lumber  section. 


Priorities  board.  United  States 
Railroad  Administratioo  rep- 
resentative. 


President    Washington    University, 

St.  Ix>uis,  Mo. 
President  Brown  Hoisting  Machinery 

Co.,  Cleveland.  Ohio. 

Cost  and  Production  Accountant, 
Ashland  Cotton  Co.,  Jewett  City, 
Conn. 

10«9  Myrtle  Street,  Oakland,  Calif. 

President  Liquid  Carbonic  Co., 
Chicago,  111.,  and  Atlantic  Steel 
Casting  Co.,  Chester,  Pa. 

Special  Assistant  Committeeon  Pub- 
lic Information.  Washington,  D.C. 

General  manager  Ba'ley-Farrel  Man- 
ufacturing Co.,  Pittsburgh,  Pa. 

Lawyer,  Seattle,  Wash. 

Law     firm,     Bulkley,     Hauxhurst, 

Saeger    &    Jamieson,    Cleveland. 

Ohio. 
Filor,  BuUard  &  Smith.  New  York, 

N.Y. 
Vice  president  David  G.  Fisher  & 

Co.,  Davenport,  Iowa. 
First  vice  president,  U.  S.  Potters' 

Association,  Trenton,  N.  J.,  and 

East  Liverpool,  Ohio. 
Court  Reporter,  Kalamazoo,  Mich. 
Architect   and    Engineer,    John    I. 

Downey  (Inc.),  New  York,  N.  Y. 
Brown  University,  Providence,  R,  I. 

President,   Buckeye  Steel   Castings 
Co..  Columbus,  Ohio. 

Lackner  &  Butz,  Mortgage  Invest- 
ments, Chicago,  111. 

Vice  president,  Duquesne  Fruit  Co.. 
Charter  Oak,  Cafif. 

Commissioner  of  Immigration,  De- 
partment of  Labor. 

Morris  Heights,  New  York,  N.  Y. 

Advertising  manager,  Willys-Over- 
land Co.,  Toledo,  Ohio. 

Member  of  firm.  Blodgett  &  Co., 
bond  dealers.  New  York,  N.  Y. 

Chief  examiner.  Interstate  Com- 
merce  Commission,    Washington. 

Director  and  sales  manager.  Car- 
penter Paper  Co.,  Omaha,  Neb. 

President,  American  Seeding  Ma- 
chine Co.,  Richmond,  Ind.,  and 
Springfield,  Ohio. 

Manager,  technical  service  depart- 
ment, Solvay  Process  Co.,  Syra- 
cuse, N.  Y.  I 

President  and  general  manager. 
Twentieth  Century  PublishingCo., 
Philadelphia,  Pa.  , 

Statistician,  New  York  City.  I 

Economic  geolo^^t  and  chemist;  ex- 
aminer of  mineral  properties,  resi- 
dence Staunton,  Va. 

John  M.  Woods  Lumber  Co.,  East 
Cambridge,  Mass. 

Assistant  Director  General  United 
States  Railroad  Administration. 
Washington,  D.  C. 


i 


\)l 


512     INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

MEMBERS  OF  THE  WAR  INDUSTRIES  BOARD  ORGANIZATION 

Continued 


Name 


Channing,  Henry  M.  . 
Chapin,  Edward  F.,  jr. 

Chappelear,  Edgar  S.  . 

Charlton,  Earfc  P 

Chase,  March  F 


Chase,  "Wendell  W.. 
ChatUlon,  George  £. 


Chavannes,  Frank  S. 
Chisholm,  Charles  K. 

Clapp,  A.  W 

Ckpp,  Henry  H 

Clark,  Arthur  W 


Clark.  Harold  T. 


Clark,  Le  Roy... 
Clark,  Mancel  T. 
Clayton,  Wm.L.. 

Clos.  JeanH 

Cobb,  J.  P 

Coflin,  JohnN... 


Collins.  Walter  G... 

Colver,  W.  B 

Comstodc,  Louis  K. 
Conner,  Charles  H. . 


Cook,  Howard  H.. 
Cooke,  Maj.  A.  M. 
Co<q)er.  Carroll  P. . 


CopeUnd,  Melvin  T. 


Position  in  War  Industries  Board 


Chandler,  Willard  D Expert,  fire  prevention  section 


Corcoran,  Lieut.  Edward  T, 
Corey,  A.  A. 


Cornell,  Irwin  H. . . 
Cotton.  Donald  R.. 


Chief,  legal  section 

Examiner,  priorities  divbion . 


Expert,  division  of  planning  sta- 
tistics. 
Member  of  brass  section 


Direct<».  explosives  division. . . . 

Member,  priorities  committee  . . 
Chief,  mihtary  optical  glass  and 

instrument  section. 
Regional  advisor,  Baltimore . . .  . 

Assistant  to  chief,  boot  and  shoe 
section,  hides,  leather,  and 
leather  goods  division. 

Chief  of  labor  section,  priorities 
division. 

Joint  office  on  chemical  statistics 

Secretary  to  chief  of  nonwar  con- 
struction section. 

Assistant  to  chairman.  War  In- 
dustries Board. 

Chief  of  electric  wire  and  cable 

section. 
Staff,  conservation  division 

Member  of  committee  on  cotton 

distribution. 
Assistant  to  vice  chairman  of  the 

War  Industries^  Board. 
Examiner,  priorities  division . . . . 

Requirements  divbion,  shipping 
board  representative. 

Expert,  division  of  planning  and 

statistics.  ^ 
Member,  price  fixing  committee 

Assistant  to  chief  of  brass  section 

Chief,  platinum  section,  wood 
chemical  section,  and  gold  and 
silver  section. 

Assistant  to  chief,  tin  section  . . . 


Lumber  section. 


Assistant  special  representative 
of  United  States  Railroad  Ad- 
ministration with  War  Indus- 
tries Board. 

Executive  secretary,  conserva- 
tion division. 

Private  secretary,  B.  M.  Baruch 

Expert,  steel  division 


Expert,  nonferrous  metals  sec- 
tion foreign  mission. 

Regional  advisor,  St.  Paul. 
Minn. 


Former  business 


Engineer  and  inspector.  New  Eng- 
land Bureau  of  United  Inspection. 
Boston,  Mass. 

Law  firm,  Channing  &  Frothingham, 
Boston,  Mass. 

District  sales  manager.  Universal 
Portland  Cement  Co.,  Duluth, 
Minn. 

Assistant  general  auditor.  Bankers' 
Trust  Co.,  New  York,  N.  Y. 

Vice  president,  F.  W.  Woolworth  & 
Co..  New  York,  N.  Y. 

Vice  president.  Commercial  Acid  Co., 
St.  Louis,  Mo. 

Consulting  engineer,  Boston,  Mass. 

President,  John  Chatillon  &  Sons, 
New  York,  N.  Y. 

President  and  treasurer,  Chesapeake 
Iron  Works,  Baltimore,  Md. 

President,  Chisholm  Shoe  Co.,  Cleve- 
land, Ohio. 

Attorney,  St.  Paul,  Minn. 

In  charge  paper  section.  Bureau  of 

Stancurds,  \Vashington,  D.  C. 
Private  secretary  to  D.  R.  McLennan 

of  Marsh  &  McLennan,  Chicago, 

lU. 
Attorney,  member  of  firm.  Squire. 

Sanders  &  Dempsey.  Cleveland. 

Ohio. 
President,  Safety  Insulated  Wire  & 

Cable  Co..  New  York,  N.  Y. 
President,  Wadsworth-Howland  Co., 

Chicago,  111. 
Member  of  firm,  Anderson,  Clayton 

&  Co.,  New  York.  N.  Y. 
Advertising  manager.  United  States 

Copper  Co.,  New  York,  N.  Y. 
Salesman,  Ernest  Jacoby  Co.,  Boston. 

Mass. 
Assistant   secretary   and   treasurer, 

Tennessee  Coal,  Iron  &  Railroad 

Co..  Birmingham,  Ala. 
Plant  superintendent.  Union  Lumber 

Co.,  Fort  Bragg,  Calif. 
Chairman,  Federal  Trade  Commis- 
sion. 
President,  L.  K.  Comstock  &  Co.. 

New  York,  N.  Y. 
Associated  with  Kissel  Kinnicut  & 

Co..  New  York,  N.  Y. 

Assistant  secretary,  American  Iron  & 
Steel  Institute,  New  York,  N.  Y. 

John  L.  Roper  Lumber  Co.,  Norfolk, 
Va. 

Assistant  to  vice  president.  Southern 
Railway  Co.,  Cincinnati,  Ohio. 


Director  of  bureau  of  business  re- 
search. Harvard  University. 

Mechanicsville,  N.  Y. 

Assistant  general  superintendent, 
Youngstown  Sheet  &  Tube  Co., 
Youngstown,  Ohio. 

Vice  president,  St.  Joseph  Lead  Co.. 
New  York,  N.  Y. 

District  sales  manager,  Illinois  Steel 
Co.,  St.  Paul,  Minn. 


APPENDIX 


513 


MEMBERS  OF  THE  WAR  INDUSTRIES  BOARD  ORGANIZATION 

Continued 


Name 


Coulter,  John  Lee . 
Cover,  Ralph . . . . , 
Cover,  Thomas,  jr. 


Cowperthwaite,  Mortimer 
T. 


Crabbs,  Franklin  D. . 

Cragin,  B.  A.,  jr 

Craig,  Joseph  W 

Cranwell,  Thomas  G. 
Crawford,  Everett  L. 
Crockett,  Arthur  E. . 


Crockett,  Ernest  D. 
Cromwell,  Lincoln. 


Curran,  John  H. 
Cutter,  John 


Daggett,  Stuart 

Dame,  Frank  L 

Damon,  Maj.  John  C. 
Danforth,  Mary  h.. . . 
Darling,  Ira  C 


Darlington,  Frederick . 
Daughterty,  Paul  R. . 


Davis.  Charles  B. . . 

Davis.  Chas.  J 

Davis.  Leon  K 

Day.  E.  E 

De  Leeuw,  M.  H. . . 
De  Nike,  George  E. 

Dennison,  Henry  S. 
Dickinson,  G.  V. . . , 
Dickson.  George  R. 


Dickson.  J.  W.... 

Dillon.  Clarence  . 

Ditfurth,  W.  L. . . 
Dizer,  Malcolm  C. 


Position  in  War  Industries  Board 


Expert,  divbion  of  planning  and 

statistics. 
Assistant  to  secretary  priorities 

committee. 
Chief,  sole  and  belting  leather 

section,    hides,    leather    and 

leather  goods  division. 
Secretary  to  H.  R.  Rea,  special 

advisory  committee  on  plants 

and  munitions. 
Regional  advisor,  Kansas  City, 

Mo. 
Lumber  section 


Platinum   section   of   chemical 

division. 
Assbtant  to  chief,  tin  section  . . . 

Assistant  to  commissioner  of  fin- 
ished products. 
Assistant  chief,  chain  section  . . . 


Assbtant,  machine  tool  section 
Chief,  knit  goods  section 


Staff,  conservation  divbion . 
...do , 


Expert,  division  of  planning  and 

statistics. 
Member  of  facilities  division 


Expert,  power  section . 


Expert,  divbion  planning  and 

statistics. 
Chief,  creosote  section , 


Chief,  power  section 

Chief,  war  contract  section . 


Assbtant  to  chief,  power  section 

Assistant  to  chief  clerk 

Expert,  fire  prevention  section. . 

Staff  central  bureau  of  planning 

and  statbtics. 
Assistant,  machine  tool  section . . 

Associate  chief,  platinum  section 


Assbtant  chairman,  central  bu- 
reau of  planning  and  statbtics. 
Staff,  conservation  division 


Assistant  to  sea«tary  priorities 
committee. 


Expert,  steel  divbion . 


Assistant  to  chairman.  War  In- 
dustries Board. 
Assistant,  machine  tool  section . . 
Staff,  conservation  divbion 


Former  business 


Dean  of  college  of  agriculture.  Uni- 
versity of  West  Virginia. 
Attorney  at  law,  Baltimore,  Md. 

Partner,  Cover  &  Co.,  sole  leather, 
Philadelphia,  Pa. 

Secretary  to  H.  R.  Rea,  Pittsburgh, 
Pa. 

Owner,  the  Union  Bank  Note  Co., 
Kansas  City,  Mo. 

Watkin-Gray  Lumber  Co.,  Hatties- 
burg.  Miss. 

Southern  Railway  Co.,  Washington, 
D.  C. 

President,  Continental  Can  Co.,  New 
York,  N.  Y. 

Crawford,  Patton  &  Cannon,  bank- 
ers. New  York,  N.  Y. 

Sales  manager,  chain  department, 
Jones  &  Laugblin  Steel  Co..  Pitts- 
burgh, Pa. 

Sales  engineer,  Henry  Prentiss  &  Co., 
Springfield,  Mass. 

Member  of  firm  of  Williams  Iselin  h 
Co.,  New  York,  N.  Y. 

Lawyer,  Chicago,  111. 

Head  of  trading  department.  Harris- 
Forbes  &  Co.,  Boston,  Mass. 

Professor,  University  of  California. 

Consulting  engineer,  Harrison  Wil- 
liams. New  York,  N.  Y. 

Assistant  chief  engineer,  Utah  Power 
&  Light  Co.,  SsHt  Lake  City.  Utah. 

Manufacturer,  Milwaukee,  Wis.,  and 
Indianapolis,  Ind. 

President,  Bartholomay  &  Darling. 
Chicago,  HI. 

Consulting  engineer.  New  York,  N.Y. 

Employment  expert,  Pennsylvania 
State  Department  of  Labor,  Phila- 
delphia, Fa. 

Manager  of  Boston  office,  General 
Electric  Co. 

Democrat  and  Chronicle,  Rochester, 
N.Y. 

Engineer  inspector.  Fireman's  Mutu- 
al Fire  Insurance  Co.,Detroit,Mich. 

Assistant  professor.  Harvard  Uni- 
versity. 

Singer  Manufacturing  Co.,  Elizabeth- 
port,  N.  J. 

Purchase  and  sales  department. 
Graves  Maubert,  George  &  Co.. 
wholesale  lumber.  New  York,  N.Y. 

President,  Dennison  Manufacturing 
Co.,  Framingham,  Mass. 

General  agent,  Elgin  National  Watch 
Co.,  Elgin,  111.  _ 

Sales  and  advertising  manager.  Shan- 
non &  Luchs,  real  estate,  Washing- 
ton, D.  C. 

Salesman,  Edmund  W.  Mudge  Co., 
Pittsburgh,  Pa. 

Member  of  firm,  Wm.  A.  Reed  & 
Co.,  bankers.  New  York,  N.  Y. 

Hill-Clarke  Co.,  Chicago,  111. 

Foreign  sales  manager,  Dennison 
Manufacturing  Co..  Framingham, 
Mass. 


h 


I 


514    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

MEMBERS  OF  THE  WAR  INDUSTRIES  BOARD  ORGANIZATION 

Continued 


Name 


Dodd.E.  Merrick,  jr... 

Doll,  Lieut.  E.  G 

Donlin,  John , . 


Donnelley,  Thomas  E. 
Doten,  Carroll  W...    , 

Dowd,  Charles  F. 

Downey,  James  E.  . . . 
Downey,  John  L . . . . 


Downman,  R.  H 

DuBois,  Capt.  Henry  C. 

Dumm,  A.  A, 


Dunn,  Harry  T. 


Dunning,  Lieut.  Ray  P. . 

Eames,  Frank  W 

Easton,  Harry  M 

Eaves.  Frederidc  B 


Edgar,  Charles 

Edgerly,  Hial  Stephen  . 
Einig,  Alvin  B 


Eisendrath,  William  B. . . . 

Elton,  John  P 

Ely,  Grosvenor 

Ely,  Lieut.  M.  G 

Emerson,  Kenneth  Bales. 


Esberg,  Alfred  I. . 
EstAbrook,  H.  M.. 


Estes,  Col.  George  H. 
Etherington,  Burton. 


Ettinger,  A. .  . 
Evans,  Henry. 


Faroat,  H.  B 

Felt.  Dorr  E 

Fenner.  David  C 

Ferguson,  George  K. . . . 
Ferguson,  L.  Perry 


Position  m  War  Industries  Board 


Member,  legal  section 

Statistics,  chemicals  division . . . . 

Emergency  construction  com- 
mittee. 

Director  of  pulp  and  paper  divi- 
sion. 

Exi)ert,  central  bureau  of  plan- 
ning and  statistics. 

Expert,  nonwar  construction  sec- 
tion. 

Staff,  central  bureau  of  planning 
and  statistics. 

Member,  facilities  division 


Former  business 


Lumber  section 

Chief,  electrodes  and  abrasives 

section. 
Assistant,  priorities  division  . . . , 


Chief,  rubber  section. 


Navy  representative,  joint  office 

on  chemical  statistics. 
Expert,  fire  prevention  section . . 

Assistant  chief  of  tin  section 

Expert,    electrical    and    power 
equipment  section. 


Director  of  lumber . 


Assistant  secretary  War  Indus- 
tries Board 

Assistant  chief,  machine  tool  sec- 
tion. 

Chief,  upper,  harness,  bag,  and 

strap  leather  section. 
Adviser,  brass  section 


Assistant  to  chief  cotton  goods 
section. 

Examiner,  Army  section,  priori- 
ties committee. 

Expert,  division  of  planning  and 
statistics. 

Chief,  tobacco  section , 

Assistant  chief,  railway  equip- 
ment and  supply  section. 

Requirements  division 


Chief,  yam  section. 


Member  legal  section 

Chairman  advisory  committee, 

fire  prevention  section. 
P&<isenger  representative,  inland 

traffic  section. 
Regional  advisor,  Chicago , 


Assistant  chief,  automotive 
product  section. 

Chief  clerk,  pulp  and  paper  divi- 
sion. 

Storekeeper,  division  of  business 
administration. 


Professor  of  law,  Washington  and 
Lee  Umversity,  Lexington,  Va. 

Foreign  exchange  d  partmt  nt.  Na- 
tional City  Bank,  New  York  City. 

Iresid  int ,  building  trades  department 
American  Federation  of  Labor, 
Chicago,  111. 

President,  R.  R.  Donnelley  Sons  Co., 
Chicago.  111. 

Professor,  Massachusetts  Institute  of 
Technology. 

Arkonberg-Machme-Dowd  Co.,  512 

Produce  Exchange,  Toledo.  Ohio. 
Head  master,  Boston  High  School  of 

Co-nmerce. 
President  and  general  manager,  John 

L  Downey  (Inc.).  New  York,  N.Y. 
Cypress,  New  Orleans,  La. 
Assistant  secretary,  E.  J.  Levbo  ft 

Co.,  Philadelphia.  Pa. 
Southwestern    sales    agent,    Sabine 

Lumber  Co.  (St.  Louis),  Houston. 

Tex. 
President  Fisk  Rubber  Co.,  Chicopee 

Falls,  Mass.,  and  Federal  Rubber 

Co.,  Cudahy,  Wis. 
Engineer,  Springfield,  Mass. 

Inspector-engineer,   Factory  Insur- 

ance  Association,  Hartfcrd,  Coan. 
General  sales  iranage  •.  Weirton  Steel 

Co.,  Weirton,  W.  Va. 
Assistant    gereral    sales    manager, 

Bryant  Electrical  Co.,  Bridgeport. 

Conn. 

Retired  from  business,  Essex  Fells, 

N.  J. 

First  vice  president,  the  Theodor 
Kundtz  Co.,  Cleveland,  Ohio. 

Sales  engineer,  Motch  &  Merry- 
weather  Machinery  Co.,  Cleve- 
land, Ohio. 

Secretary,  Monarch  Leather  Co., 
Chicago,  111. 

Vice  president,  American  Brass  Co., 
Waterbiiry,  Conn. 

Treasurer,  Ashland  Cotton  Co.,  Nor- 
wich, Conn. 

Branch  manager,  Horace  S.  Ely  ft 
Co.  (real  estate).  New  York,  N.  Y. 

Statistician,  Sanderson  &  Porter. 
New  York,  N.Y. 

Retired,  Mountain  "^ew,  Calif. 

President  Barney-Smith  Car  Co.. 
Dayton,  Ohio. 

Army  representative,   Washington. 

Member  of  firm,  Franklin  Oliver  ft 

Co.,  New  York,  N.  Y. 
Lawyer,  Cleveland,  Ohio. 
President,  Continental  Insurance  Co. 

Passenger  agent,  Baltimore  ft  Ohio 
R.  R.,  Washington,  D.  C. 

President.  Felt  &  Tarrant  Manufac- 
turing  Co.,  Chicago,  111. 

Sales  engineer.  International  Motor 
Co.,  New  York,  N.  Y. 

Cost  accountant  and  chemist,  Water- 
vhet  Paper  Co.,  Watervliet,  Mich. 

balesman.  Safe  Cabinet  Co.,  Mari- 
etta, Ohio. 


APPENDIX 


515 


MEMBERS  OF  THE  WAR  INDUSTRIES  BOARD  ORGANIZATION 

Continued 


Name 


Field,  Herbert  E. 


Fisher.  Capt.  Boyd. 


Fisher,  Frank  E. . . 
Flanders,  Ralph  E. 


Flannery,   Lieut.    Col.   J. 
Rogers. 

Fleming,  Frances 

Fletcher,  Eston  A 


Fletcher,    Rear    Admiral 

Frank  F. 
Foerderer,  Percival  E.  ... 


FoUansbee,  William  B. 

Foote,  Edith  L. 

Foster,  Charles  K 


Foster,  Maj.  Clair .  . 
Foster,  Mortimer  B. 


Frank,  Lawrence  K. . 
Frankfurter,  Felix. . . 

Eraser,  W.  Hugh 

Frayne,  Hugh 

Freeman,  E.  Stewart. 
Freeman,  M.  B 


Friedberg,  Ralph  J. 

Friedlich,  H.  A.... 
Frost,  Edward  J. . . 


Garfield,  Dr.  H.  A... 

Garrett,  Paul  W. 

Gary,  Julian  Vaughn 

Gault,  P.  B 

Gay,  Edwin  F. 


Gay,  Edward  Randolph. 


Gibbs,  Edwin  C. 
Gibbs.  Louis  D. . 


Gifford,  A.  L. . . . 
GUbert,H.  N... 
Gillen,  Martin  J. 


Position  in  War  Industries  Board 


Assistant  chief,  acids  and  heavy 
chemicals  section,  chemical 
divison. 

Government  supervisor  employ- 
ment management  courses. 
Federal  Board  of  Vocational 
Education. 

Chief,  bureau  applications  and 
i^ue,  priorities  division. 

Assistant,  machine  tool  section. 

Chief,  railway  equipment  ard 

supply  section. 

Secretary  to  H.  P.  Ingels 

Regional    advisor,     Rochester, 

N.Y. 
Member,  War  Industries  Board 

and  priorities  board. 
Vice     chairman,     employment 

management  courses. 

Assistant  to  southern  lumber  ad- 
ministration, lumber  section. 

Assistant  to  secretary  priorities 
committee. 

Vice_  chairman,  priorities  com- 
mittee. 

Emergency  construction  section 

Chief,  miscellaneous  commodi- 
ties section. 


Expert,  division  of  planning  and 
statistics. 

Priorities  board,  labor  represent- 
ative 

Assistant,  facilities  division 

Chiurman,  labor  division 

Expert,  central  bureau  of  plan- 
ning and  statistics. 
Staff,  conservation  division 

Draftsman,    building    material 

division. 

Member  legal  section 

Staff,  central  bureau  of  planning 

and  statistics. 
Member  of  price  fixing  commit- 

Expert,  price  statistics 

Secretary  to  Gov.  H.  C.  Stuart  . 

Secretary,  foreign  mission 

Chairman  of  the  central  bureau 
of  planning  and  statistics. 

Staff,  central  bureau  of  planning 

and  statistics. 
Regional  advisor,  Cincinnati,  Ohio 
Staff,  diybion  of  planning  and 

statistics. 

Assistant  to  chief,  woolen  section 

Expert,  electric  and  power 
equipment  section. 

Assistant  to  commissioner  fin- 
ished products.  j 


Former  business 


President     and     general     manager. 

Wheeling  Mould  ft  Foundry  Co., 

Wheeling,  W.  Va. 
Washington,  D.  C. 


Manufacturing    for    self,    Detroit, 

Mich. 
Jones  ^  &    Lampson    Machine    Co., 

Springfield,  Vt 
President,     Flannery      Bolt       Co., 

Pittsburgh,  Pa. 
Washington,  D.  C. 
Member  of  firm,  Phelps  ft  Fletcher, 

Rochester,  N.  Y. 
Washington,  D.  C. 

President  and  general  manager,  Rob- 
ert H.  Foerderer  (Inc.),  Philadel- 
phia, Pa. 

Part  owner,  Marion  Lumber  Co., 
Hattiesburg,  Miss. 

Yonkers,  N.  x . 

Vice  president,  American  Radiator 
Co.,  Chicago,  111. 

Great  Barrington,  Mass. 

Treasurer  and  director.  Shield  Elec- 
tric Co.,  New  York,  N.  Y.,  and 
Southern  Export  Corporation. 
New  York,  N.Y. 

Accountant,  New  York  Telephone 
Co..  New  York,  N.  Y. 

Labor  Department.  Washington. 
D.  C. 

Traveling  salesman.  Peerless  Motor 
Car  Co.,  Cleveland,  Ohio. 

General  organizer,  American  Feder- 
ation of  Labor,  New  York,  N.  Y. 

Cost  accountant,  Dennison  Manu- 
turing  Co..  Framingham,  Mass. 

General  sales^  manager,  Dennison 
Manufacturing  Co.,  Framingham, 
Mass. 

Architect,  Akron,  Ohio. 

Lawyer,  Des  Moines,  Iowa. 

Vice  president,  Wm.  Filene  Sons  ft 

Co.,  Boston,  Mass. 
Chairman  Fuel  Administration. 

Supervisor  of  researches.  Bureau  of 
State  Research,  Newark,  N.  J. 

Counsel,  State  Tax  Board,  Rich- 
mond, Va. 

City  passenger  agent,  B.  &  O.  R.  R.. 
Louisville,  Ky. 

Dean  of  graduate  school  of  business 
administration.  Harvard  Univer- 
sity. 

Student,  Harvard  Univermty. 

Retired. 

Superintendent  advertising  depart- 
ment, Edision  Electric  Illuminat- 
ing Co.,  Boston,  Mass. 

Sales  agent,  Worumbo  Co..  New 
York,  N.  Y. 

Assistant  to  president,  Rothe  Bros. 
&  Co.,  Chicago,  111. 

President,  Mitchell  Wagon  Co.,. 
Racine.  Wis.,  et  aL 


\J 


»l 


|i 


I 


(i 


!i 


► 


516    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

MEMBERS  OF  THE  WAR  INDUSTRIES  BOARD  ORGANIZATION 

Continued 


Name 


Gillman.  Joseph  W . . . 
Gladding,  Augustus  L. . 


Glenn,  John  F 

Goddard,  Horace  M 

Goethals,  Maj.Gen.  George 

W. 
Goldman,    Lieut.    J.    B., 

U.  S.  Navy. 

Goldsmith.  Margaret  L. . . . 
Goodfellow,  William  £.  . . . 


Goodwinie,  George  L.. 
Gordon,  lieut.  M.  R. . 


Gower,  H.  B. 

Graff,  Everett  D 

Gramlidc,  Howard 

Granger,  Capt.  A.  H 

Greenburg,  Max. , 


Greenbaum,  Charles  Jay. 

Grimes,  Howard  S 

Grothaus,  L.  W. 


Guffey,  Joseph  F. 
Guylee,  W.E.... 


Gwathmey,  J.  Temple. . . , 

Haight.  Frederick  E. 

Hale.  Roberts 


Haley,  Edwm  J. 


Han,JayV. 

Halladay,  Calvin  L... 
Hall,  Marcus  Brown. . 
Hamilton,  CD.  P.. . 
Hamilton,  James. ... 


Handi.  Charles  C. 


Hancodc,  Commander 

John  M. 
Hansen,  John  M 


Position  in  War  Industries  Board 


Division  planning  and  statistics 

Assistant  to  director,  building 
'   material  division. 

Expert,  electric  and  power 
equipment  section. 

Stan,  central  bureau  of  planning 
and  statistics. 

Member  War  Industries  Board 
and  priorities  board. 

Member  war  prison  labor  and 
national  waste  reclamation 
section. 

Expjert,  war  industries  abroad,  di- 
vision planning  and  statistics. 

Assistant  business  manager,  di- 
vision of  business  administra- 
tion. 

Expert,  fire  i»«vention  section . . . 

Army  representative,  joint  office 
on  chemical  statistics. 


Former  business 


Member  legal  section 

Special  agent,  steel  division  . 
Wool  section 


Emergency  construction  com- 
mittee. 

Expert,  electric  and  power 
equipment. 

Assistant  to  secretary.  War  In- 
dustries Board. 

Requirements  division  shipping 
board  representative. 

Electric  and  power  equipment 
section,  in  charge  turbine  divi- 
sion. 

Chief,  petroleum  section 

Executive  _  secretary,  require- 
ments division. 

Member  committee  on  cotton 
disb-ibution. 

Associate  chief,  knit  goods  sec- 
tion. 

Staff,  central  bureau  of  planning 
and  statistics. 

Chief,  tanning  material  and  nat- 
ural dye  section  (including 
oils,  fats,  and  waxes). 

Staff,  centra]  bureau  of  planning 
and  statistics. 

Assistant  chief ,  automotive  prod- 
ucts section. 

Assistant  secretary,  priorities 
committee. 

Chief,  boot  and  shoe  section .... 

Expert,  fire  prevention  section . . 


Chief,  automotive  products  sec- 
tion. 

Navy  representative  on  price  fix- 
ing committee. 

Member  and  secretary  of  ad- 
visory committee  on  planta 

And  mqni^i^qf, 


Emergency  Fleet  Corporation, 
Philadelphia,  Pa. 

Assistant  to  general  superintendent. 
Gladding,  McBean  &  Co.,  Lincoln, 
Calif. 

New  England  sales  manager.  Edge- 
moor  Iron  Co.,  Boston,  Mass. 

President,  Advertiser  Special  Service 
Corporation,  New  York,  N.  Y. 

Consulting    engineer.    New    York, 

Washington,  D.  C. 


Graduate  student.  University  of 
lUinois. 

Manager  personal  estate,  Minneapo- 
lis, Minn. 

Inspector,  Western  Factory  Insur- 
ance Association,  Chicago,  111. 

Manager,  foreira  exchange  purchase 
department.  National  City  Bank. 
New  York,  N.  Y. 

Associate,  law  firm  Hamilton  St 
Hamilton,  Washington,  D.  C. 

Assistant  to  vice  president,  Joseph 
T.  R^erson  &  Son,  Chicago,  IlL 

University  of  Nebraska,  Lincoln, 
Nebr. 

Granger  &  Young,  architects,  Chi- 
cago, III. 

Manager,  erecting  and  service  de- 

Sartment,  Worthingtoa  Pump  & 
lachine  Co..  New  York,  N.  Y. 
Student,  Yale  University;  residence, 

Chica^,  111. 
Catonsville,  Md. 

Sales  en^neer^AIlis-Chalmers  Manu« 
facturmg  Co.,  Milwaukee,  Wis. 

Pittsburgh,  Pa. 

Vice   president.   Cable   Piano   Co., 

Chicago,  111. 
Retired,  New  York,  N.  Y. 

Managing  partner,  A.  S.  Haight  k 

Co.,  New  York,  N.  Y. 
Superintendent  of  special  r^arch, 

Edison"' 


Mass. 


I  Electric  Ilium.  Co.,  Boston, 


President.  Haley-Hammond  Co.. 
New  York,  N.  Y. 

Interests  in  eastern  oil  and  gas  fields, 
Pinehurst,  N.  C. 

Engineer.  Lewis  Spring  &  Axle  Co., 
Chelsea,  Mich. 

Purchasing  agent,  American  Box 
Board  Co.,  Grand  Rapids,  Mich. 

Vice  president.  International  Shoe 
Co.,  St  Louis,  Mo. 

Fire  ^  protection  engineer.  Under- 
writers' Bureau  of  the  Middle  and 
Southern  SUtes,  New  York.  N.  Y. 

Treasurer,  Studebaker  Corporation, 
South  Bend,  Ind. 

Grand  Forks,  N.  Dak. 

F^ident  Standard  Steel  Car  Co.. 
Pittsburgh,  Pa. 


! 


APPENDIX 


517 


MEMBERS  OF  THE  WAR  INDUSTRIES  BOARD  ORGANIZATION 

Continued 


Name 


Hardy,  Maj.  R.  S 

Harrison,  Francb  G. . . 

Harman,  S.  Park 

Hart,  Dudley  N 


Hartigan,  Lieut.  Comman- 
der Charles. 


Hatfield,  Henry  R., 
Hawk,  Judge  M. . . 


Hawley.  H.W... 
Hawley.  John  C. 

Hay,  Richard  C. 


Hayes,  Lieut.  Col.  Henry 
R. 

Hayward,  Nathan 

Heacock,  J.  Linden 

Heibel,  Lieut.  W.  E 

Heidrich,  Edw.  C,  jr 

Henderson.  James  D.  C . . 
Henn,  Lieut.  Ralph  F 


Herbst.  Edith  G 

Hennessey.  William  H.,  jr. 
Herbert,  Edith  G 


Herrington.  Cass  E. 
Hickey,  Edward  J.. 

Hickox,  Raymond . 

Hildreth,  Chas.  E.. 

Hill,  Norman  H. .  . 

Hiller,  George  F... 


Hirsch.  Maurice 

Hitchcock,  James  W., 


Hoagland.  Ira  O. 

Holbrook,  Percy. 
Holloran,  D.  A. . 


Holsinger.  Walter. . 
Hopkins.  James  M. 


Hoiddns,  Louis  Jay. 


Position  in  War  Industries  Board 


Expert,  power  section. 


Assistant  to  secretary,  price  fix- 
ing committee. 

Employment  management  divi- 
sion. ^ 

Domestic  wool  section 

Member  war  prison  labor  and 
national  waste  reclamation 
section. 

Director  of  the  division  of  plan- 
ning and  statistics. 

Assistant  chief,  manufacturing 
section,  pulp  and  paper  divi- 
sion. 

Assistant,  inland  traffic  section . 

Expert,  fire  prevention  section . . 


Staff,  central  bureau  of  planning 
and  statistics. 

Requirements  divbion.  Army 
representative. 

Associate  chief,  dredging  section 

Staff,  conservation  division 

Expert,  power  section 

Chief,  jute,  hemp  and  cordage 
section. 

Expert,  wool  section  .^ 

Examiner.  Army  section,  priori- 
ties committee. 

Bulletins  division  of  planning 
statistics. 

Statistician,  hides,  leather  and 
leather  goods  division. 

Bulletins,  division  of  planning 
and  statistics. 

Regional  advisor.  Denver 

Assistant  ch  ief .  automotive  prod- 
ucts section. 

Exi>ert.  purchasing  committee . . 

Assistant,  machine  tool  section . . 

Assistant  to  director,  building 

and  nuiterials  division. 
Expert,  fire  prevention  section . . 


Secretary  priorities  committee . 
Assistant  to  chief,  tin  section .  . 

Expert,  fire  prevention  section . 


Member  priorities  committee. 
Expert,  steel  division 


Organization  expert 

Member  priorities  committee  . . 

Assistant,  conservation  division 


Former  business 


Electrical  engineer.  Los  Angeles  Gas 

&  Electrical  Co.,  Los  Angeles,  Cal. 
President,  Western  Motor  Car  Co., 

Cincinnati,  Ohio. 
45    Kenwood    Avenue,    Rochester, 

N.  Y. 
Hallowell,  Jones  &  Donald,  Boston, 

Mass. 
Judge    Advocate    General's    Office, 

Navy  Department. 

Professor  of  accounting,  and  dean. 
University  of  California. 

Sales  manager  and  purchasing  agent, 
Gaw  O'Hara  Envelope  Co.,  Chi- 
cago, 111.  -n,  -     -n     -D 

Division  freight  agent,  Erie  R.  R. 
Co.,  New  York,  N.  Y. 

Inspector,  Associated  Factory  Mu- 
tual Fire  Insurance  Co.,  Boston, 

Mass.  T»      -1    » 

Organization  manager.  Retail  Re- 
search   Association,    New    York, 

N.Y.  „      „         . 

In  charge  New  York  office  Stone  & 

Webster,    120    Broadway,    New 

York.  N.  Y.  .       ^ 

President.  American  Dredging  Co., 

Philadelphia,  Pa. 
Member  of  firm,  Heacock  &  Hokab- 

son,  Philadelphia,  Pa. 
Mechanical      engineer,      American 

Blower  Co.,  Detroit,  Mich. 
Vice  president  and  manager,  Peoria 

Cordage  Co.,  Peoria,  1 11. 
Wool  merchant,  Philadelphia,  Pa. 
National  Acme  Co.,  Cleveland,  Ohio. 

Editor,  Official  Bulletin,  University 
of  Minnesota. 

Circulation  manager.  Boot  &  Shoe 
Recorder,  Boston,  Mass. 

Editor  Official  Bulletin,  University 
of  Minnesota. 

Attorney,  Denver,  Colo. 

Assistant  clerk.  Committee  on  Mili- 
tary Affairs,  United  States  Senate. 

Assistant  manager.  Proctor  &  Gam- 
ble, Cincinnati,  Ohio. 
Whitcomb-Blaisdell  Co.,  Worcester 
Mass. 

Graham  &  Hill,  Indianapolis,  Ind. 

Vice  president.  What  Cheer  Mutual 
Fire  Insurance  Co.,  Providence, 
R.L 

Attorney  at  law,  Houston.  Tex. 

General  manager.  I.  Sulzbacher  Co., 
Steubenville.  Ohio. 

Secretary-treasurer.  National  Auto- 
matic Sprinkler  Association.  New 
York,  N.  Y. 

Vice  president,  the  Rail  Joint  Co., 
New  York,  N.  Y. 

Clerk,  sales  department.  La  Belle 
Iron  Works,  Steubenville,  Ohio. 

Attorney,  Minneapolis,  Minn. 

Chairman  of  board,  Camol  Co., 
Chicago,  111. 

Managing  partner.  Swallow  &  Hop- 
kins, lumber  manufacturers,  Du- 
luth,Minn. 


» 


I  i 


518    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

MEMBERS  OF  THE  WAR  INDUSTRIES  BOARD  ORGANIZATION 

Conitnued 


Name 


Horr,  John  W. 

Houdc,  Lieut.  Roland  J. . 

Hough,  Geo.  A.,  jr 

Howe,  Owen  C 


Howell.  Frank  B. 
Hubbard.  G.  M.. 


Hubbard.  Russell  S.^ . 

Hughes,  Claire  B , 

Hughes,  John 

Hughes,  M.  M 

Hughes,  Morgan  O. . . . 
Hughes,  Thomas  W.. . , 
Humphrey,  Richard  L. , 

Hunter,  Lois  B 

Hutchinson,  Lincohi. . . . 

Huyck.  E.  N 

Ingels.  Howard  P. 


Inglis,  James 

Inman.  Edw.  H 

Jackson,  Edwin  E.,  jr., 
Jaduon,  Lewis  B 


James,  A.  E 

James.  Geo.  R. 

James,  Wm.  S 

Jenkins,  Frederick  W. 

Jensen.  A.  G 

Johnson,  Alvin  S 


Johnson.  Brig.  Gen.  Hugh 
S. 

Johnson,  Jackson , 

Jones.  Edw.  D , 


Jones.  Eliot  . . 
Jones.  John  D. 


Position  in  War  Industries  Board 


Expert,  steel  division 

Assistant,  machine  tool  section. . 

Assistant  to  H.  B.  Swope 

Chief,  foreign  skins  and  hides 

section. 
Assistant  to  director,  building 

materials  division. 
Assistant  to  secretary,  priorities 

committee. 

Deceased,  former  chief  of  paint 

and  pigment  section. 
Assistant    secretary,    clearance 

committee. 
Foreign  mission 

Expert,  electric  and  power  equip- 
ment section. 
Wool  section 

Hide,  leather,  and  tanning  sec- 
tion. 

Director,  building  materials  divi- 
sion.^ 

Committee  on  comfort  and  wel- 
fare. 

Foreign  mission 

Expert,  felt  section 

Secretary.  War  Industrial  Board 

Member  requirements  division. . 

Regional  advisor.  Atlanta 

Special  representative,  finbhed 

products  division. 
Chief,  domestic  skins  and  hides . 

Statistician,  division  planning 
and  statistics. 

Chief,  cotton  and  cotton  linters 
section. 

Expert,  electrical  and  power 
equipment  section. 

Stan,  division  planning  and  sta- 
tistics. 

Secretary  to  G.  N.  Peek 

Special  agent,  division  planning 
and  statistics. 

Member  War  Industries  Board, 
Army  representative. 

Regional  advisor,  St.  Louis .... 

Director  of  course  materials,  em- 
ployment management  courses. 

Staff,  cntral  bureau  planning 
and  statistics. 

Executive  secretary,  war  prison 
labor  and  national  waste  recla- 
mation section. 


Former  business 


Assistant  district  manager,  Bethle> 

hem  Steel  Co.,  Boston.  Mass. 
Motch  &  Merryweather  Machinery 

Co.,  Cleveland,  Ohio. 
Writer.  New  York  World. 
Partner,  Sands  &  Lockie,  Boston, 

Mass. 
American  Radiator  Co.,  New  York, 

N.Y. 
Sales  manager.  Howe,  Snow,  Corri- 

gan  &  Bertles,  investment  bankers. 

Grand  Rapids,  Mich. 
Philadelphia.  Pa. 

Attorney.  Marshall  &  Eraser,  Toledo, 

Ohio. 
American  Iron   &  Steel  Institute, 

New  York,  N.  Y. 
Sales  engineer.  General  Electric  Co., 

Schenectady.  N.  Y. 
University   of  Kentucky.    Bowling 

Green,  Ky. 
603  Continental  Building,  Baltimore. 

Md.  , 
Consulting   en^neer.    Philadelphia, 

Washington.  D.  C. 

Professor  of  commerce.  University  of 
California. 

Memt>er  of  firm,  F.  C.  Huyck  & 
Sons,  Albany,  N.  Y. 

Second  vice  president.  Realty  Guar- 
anty &  Trust  Co.,  Youngstown, 
Ohio. 

President,  American  Blower  Co.,  De- 
troit, Mich. 

Inman,  Howard  &  Inman,  Atlanta, 
Ga. 

President  and  treasurer,  Boorum  & 
Pease,  Brooklyn,  N.  Y. 

Chief,  hide  department,  W.  H.  Mc- 
Elwain  Co.,  shoe  manufacturers, 
Boston,  Mass. 

Tax  expert.  Taxpayers'  Association, 
Santa  Fe,  N.  Mex. 

Ptesident,  Wm.  R.  Moore  Dry  Goods 
Co..  Memphis,  Tenn. 

Salesman.  Cfrouse-Hinds  Co..  Syra- 
cuse, N.  Y. 

Director  of  publications,  Russell  Sage 
Foundation,  New  York,  N.  Y. 

Sales  department.  Deere  &  Co., 
Moline,  111. 

Editorial  writer,  the  New  Republic, 
New  York,  N.  Y. 

Washington,  D.  C. 

Retired. 

Professor  of  commerce  and  industry. 

University  of  Michigan. 
Associate  professor  of  economics,  Le- 

land  Stanford  Junior  University. 
Assistant    manager.    International 

Correspondence  Schools.  Scranton, 

Pa. 


» Russell  Sturgis  Hubbard,  chief  of  the  Paint  and  Pigment  Section,  died  in  the  service  of  his 
country  on  November  5,  1918.  He  had  come  to  Washington  with  full  knowledge  that  because 
of  his  health  the  supreme  sacnfioe  was  not  unlikely,  and  he  carried  on  to  the  end  with  the  finest 
courage. 


APPENDIX 


519 


MEMBERS  OF  THE  WAR  INDUSTRIES  BOARD  ORGANIZATION 

Continued 


Name 


Jones.  Walter  Clyde. 

Joy,  Harold  E 

Justus.  Allen  L. . . . . 
Kean,  David  L. . . . . 


Kearns,  Percy  H 

Kellenberger,  Max  W. 


Kelley,  Geo.  E.  C. 
Kendall,  Frank  A.. 
Kerr,  Clarence  D. . 


Kerr,  Karl  S. .  .^ 

Kilpatrick.  Maj.  J.  R. 


King,  Victor  L. . . . . 
Kirkpatrick.  C.  C. . 
Kittredge,  Lewis  H. 

Kling,  John  A 

Klock,  Lena  M. . . . 
Knight,  Thos.  S 


Knight,  W.  Hughes. 
Knobel.  John  E. . . . 
Koch,  William  C.  . . 
Koster.  Frederick  J. 
Kratz,  John  A 


Krohn.  Irwin. . . . 
Krumb,  Henry. . . 
Kurt.  Franklin  T. 


Lacombe,  Maj.  C.  F.  . . 
Lamar.  Capt.  Robt.  W. 


Lambert.  Howard  S 


Lamond,  William  S 

Lamson,  Frederick  L. 

LaWall,  Charles  N 


Lawless.  Matthew  D 

Leddy,  James  C.  ....,.••• 


Position  in  War  Industries  Board 


Counsel  for  nonwar  construction 

section. 
Expert,  rubber  section 


Expert,  lumber  section . 


Assistant  to  chief,  section  on 
medical  industry;  chief,  surgi- 
cal instruments  and  hospital 
equipment,  section  of  medical 
industry. 

Secretary,  legal  section 

Reporter 


Auditor,  rubber  section  . 


Statistician,  building  materials 

division. 
Secretary,  clearance  committee. . 

Crane  section .^ 

Emergency  construction  com- 
mittee. ^ 

Chief,  artificial  dyes  and  inter- 
mediates section. 

Expert,  nonwar  construction  sec- 
tion. 

Member  facilities  division 


Assistant,  resources  and  conver- 
sion section. 

Assistant  business  manager,  di- 
vision planning  and  statistics. 

Electrical  and  power  equipment 
section,  in  charge  of  electrical 
department. 

Assistant  to  secretary,  priorities 
committee. 

Director,  division  of  business 
administrator. 

Assistant,  resources  and  conver- 
sion section. 

Regional  advisor.  San  Francisco 

Assistant  to  vice  chairman.  War 
Industries  Board,  in  charge  of 
cablegrams. 

Expert,  boot  and  shoe  section. . . 

Member  of  priorities  committee. 

Staff,  division  planning  and  sta- 
tistics. 

Expert,  power  section 

....do 


Superintendent  of  buildings,  di- 
vision of  business  administra- 
tion. 

Priorities  committee 


Staff,  central  bureau  of  planning 
and  statistics. 

In  charge  Norfolk  branch  build- 
ing materials  division. 

Member  advisory  committee, 
medical  ^  agents,  section  cf 
medical  industi^. 

Examiner,  priorities  division. . . . 

Assistant  to  business  manager, 
purchasing  committee. 


Former  business 


Law  firm,  Jones,  Addington,  Ames  & 

Seibold.  Chicago,  111. 
Expert.  B.  F.  Goodrich  Co.,  Akron. 

Ohio. 
Partner  manager.  J.  Natwick  &  Co., 

Baltimore,  Md. 
G(>neral  manager,    Chas.   Lentz   & 

Sons,  Philadelphia,  Pa. 


Secretary  to  Oscar  L.  Gray,  M.C. 

Stenotypist,  Galbraith  &  Compton. 
oil  producers.  Independence,  Kan. 

Cost  auditor.Fisk  Rubber  Co.,Chico- 
pee  Falls,  Mass. 

Architect,  45  Bromfield  Street,  Bos- 
ton. Mass. 

Attorney.  6  Nassau  Street.  New 
York.  N.  Y. 

Fort  Myer  Heights,  Va. 

Thompson-Starrett  Co.,  building 
construction.  New  York,  N.  Y. 

Consulting  chemical  engineer,  Wood 
Rid^.  N.  J. 

Publicity  man.  Chicago.  lU. 

President.  Peerless  Motor  Car  Co., 

Cleveland,  Ohio. 
President,  Kelly^  Island  Lime  Co., 

Cleveland,  Ohio. 
Secretary  to  business  manager.  Regal 

Shoe  Co.,  Boston,  Mass. 
Head   of  switchboard   department. 

General    Electric    Co..    Boston, 

Mass. 
Attorney  at  law,  Dallas,  Tex. 

Manager  personal  estate,  Chicago, 

Vice  president  Twin  City  Brick  Co., 

St.  Paul,  Minn.  ^ 
President,  California  Barrel  Co.,  San 

Francisco,  Calif. 
Practicing  attorney.  Charles  Henry 

JSutler,  Washington.  D.  C. 

.Partner  in  Krohn,  Fechtheimer  & 

Co.,  Cincinnati,  Ohio. 
Consulting    mining   engineer.    Sail 

Lake  City.  Utah. 
Owner  of   Chauncey  Hall  School, 

Boston.  Mass. 
Electrical  engineer.  New  York,  N.Y. 
Electrical    superintendent.    Central 

Power  Co.,  Canton,  Ohio. 
Chief  clerk.  Central  Railroad  of  New 

Jersey,  Jersey  City,  N.  J. 

Simplex  "Wire  &  Cable  Co.,  Boston, 


Treasurer.  Norwalk  Tire  &  Rubber 
Co.,  Norwalk,  Conn. 

Sales  manager.  Clinchfield  Portland 
Cement  Co.,  Kingsport.  Tenn. 

Dean,  Philadelphia  College  of  Phar- 
macy. Philadelphia,  Pa. 

Lawless   Bros.,   paper    mills.    East 

Rochester.  N.  Y. 
District   auditor,   Armoxir   b   Co., 

Chicago,  lU. 


t 


''!1 


I 


.  'i 


k 


520    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

MEMBERS  OF  THE  WAK  INDUSTRIES  BOARD  ORGANIZATION 

Continued 


Name 


Lee,  John  W.,  jr. 
Lee.  William  L.. 
Legge.  Alex. 


Leith,  C.K 

Lengel,  Wm.  C 

Lennihan,  Richard  . . 
Leonard,  Geo.  M. . . . 
Leonard,  Stephen  R. . 

Letts,  F.C 

Lewenberg,  Harry  L. 
Lewis,  George 


Lewis,  Henry  S 

Leyden,  Maj.  H.  R. 


Lbcoln,  Alfred  L. . 
Lipps,  Louis  P. . . . 


LipzHz,  Louis. 
Lively,  E.W.. 


Lodge,  David  M. 
Long,  Walter  F.. 
Loper,  Ralph  E.. 
Louis,  Harry  J. . . 


Lovcll,  Raymond  L. . 

Lovett,  Robert  S 

Lowe,  George  A. . . . , 


Lowerf,  Floyd  C. 

Lowery,  Frank  A. 

Lubin.  Isadore , 

Lucas,  George  L. 

Lundoff,  C.  W 

Lyman.  Clarence  M. . . 

Lynn,  Charles  J 

McAllister,  Wdliam  B. 
McCauley.  John  S 


McCullough,  Wm.  E 

McCutcheon,  Thomas  P. . 
McDermott,  Leo  F 


Position  in  War  Industries  Board 


Expert,  nonwar  construction  sec- 
tion. 
Expert,  fire-prevention  section.  . 

Vice  chairman.  War  Industries 
Board;  chairman,  require- 
ments division. 

Chief,  mica  section,  and  advisor 
in  relation  to  mineral  exports 
and  imports. 

Publication  work,  employment 
management  courses. 

Staff,  conservation  division 


Former  business 


Conservation  division 

Expert,  steel  division 

Requirements  division 

Staff,  division  of  planning  and 

statistics. 
Assistant,  gold  and  silver  section 

Priorities  committee 

Expert,  power  section 


Expert,  hardware  and  hand  tool 

section. 
Secretary,  crane  section 


Regional  advisor.  Dallas 

Expert,  hardware  and  hand  tool 

section. 
Assistant,  woolens  section 


Emergency    construction    com- 
mittee. 
Expert,  cotton  goods  section  . . . 

Chief,  gloves  and  leather  cloth- 
ing section,  hide,  leather  and 
leather  goods  division. 

Expert,  steel  division 

Priorities  Commissioner,  retired 

Expert,  fire  prevention  section . . 

Assistant,  machine  tool  section. . 
Deceased;  steel  division 


Expert,  divbion  planning  and 
statistics. 

In  charge  New  York  branch 
building  materials  division. 

Chairman,  emergency  construc- 
tion committee. 

Assistant  to  director,  building 
materials  division. 

Associate  chief,  section  of  medi- 
cal industry. 

Regional  advisor,  Cleveland 

Assistant  chief,  knit  goods  sec- 
tion. 

Member  of  advisory  committee 
on  plants  and  munitions. 

Technical  advisor,  chemical  divi- 
sion, foreign  service. 

Office  manager,  central  bureau, 
planning  and  statistics. 


President  and  manager.  Overland 
Syracuse  Co..  Syracuse,  N.  Y. 

Inspector,  Underwriter  Service  Asso- 
ciation, Chicago,  111. 

Vice  president  and  general  manager. 
International  Harvester  Co..  Chi- 
cago. 111. 

Professor  of  geology.  University  of 
Wisconsin,  Wis. 

Publicity  department,  Hoggson  Bros. 
New  York,  N.  Y. 

Salesman,  Lee.  Higginson  Co..  Bos- 
ton. Mass. 

Ellis  Title  &  Conveyancing  Co., 
Springfield,  Mass. 

Second  vice  president,  Oneida  Com- 
munity  (Ltd.),  Oneida,  N.  Y. 

Red  Cross  representative.  Red  Cross 
Headquarters,  Washington,  D.  C. 

Assistant  to  vice  president,  St.  Louis 
Car  Co.,  St.  Louis,  Mo. 

President,  Shreve  &  Co.,  San  Fran- 
cisco, Calif. 

Pittsburgh,  Pa. 

Consulting  engineer.  New  York, 
N.  I. 

Retired,  Taunton,  Mass. 

Engineer  with  Brown  Hoisting  Ma- 
chinery  Co.,  Cleveland,  Ohio. 

Business  for  self,  Dallas,  Tex. 

Southern  representative,  L.  S.  Star- 
rett  Co.,  Athol,  Mass. 

Treasurer,  John  T.  Lodge  &  Co... 
Boston.  Mass. 

Boston,  Mass. 

Consulting  industrial  engineer.  Fall 

River,  Mass. 
Manager,    Bachner,    Moses,    Louis 

Co.,  Gloversville,  N.  Y. 

Broker.  New  York.  N.  Y. 

Special  inspector  and  engineer.  New 
England  Insurance  Exchange,  Bos- 
ton. Mass. 

Sales  engineer.  Henry  Prentiss  & 
Co..  Buffalo,  N.  Y. 

Bethlehem  Steel  Co..  South  Bethle- 
hem, Pa. 

Instructor  in  economics.  University 
of  Missouri,  Columbia,  Mo. 

Inspector.  Public  Service  Commis- 
sion. New  York,  N.  Y. 

President.  Crowell  Lundoff  -  Little 
Co..  Cleveland,  Ohio. 

Manager,  sales  and  publicity.  Inter- 
national Heater  Co.,  Utica,  N.  Y. 

Secretarv  and  general  manager,  Eli 
LiUv  &  Co  .  Indianapolis,  Ind. 

President,  W.  B.  McAllister  Co., 
Cleveland,  Ohio. 

President  and  manager,  Cumberland 
Dry  Goods  &  Notion  Co.,  Cumber- 
land, Md. 

Cost  clerk.  Standard  Steel  Car.  Co., 
BuUar.  Pa. 

Professor  of  chemistry.  University  of 
Pennsylvania. 

A»Bnt,  Library  Bureau,  New  Yock, 


APPENDIX 


521 


MEMBERS  OF  THE  WAR  INDUSTRIES  BOARD  ORGANIZATION 

Continued 


Name 


McDonald,  Joseph  A. 


McGowan,  Rear  Admiral 

Samuel. 
McKellar.  Wm.  D 


McKelvey,  C.  W 

McKenney,  Col.  Chas.  A. . 

McLain,  Percy 

McLauchlan,  Jay  C 

McLeary,  Frank  B 

McLennan.  Donald  R 

Mc Williams.  Chas.  M. . . . 
MacDowell.  Charles  H.  . . 


Mackall,  Paul 

MacLaren,  Maj.  Malcolm. 
Macpherson,  Frank  H. . . . 


Mahoney,  J.  Bernard. 
MaUalieu.  W.  E 


Mann,  David  F. . 
Manning,  John  J. 


Mansfield,  Wm.  L.. 


Manss.  Wm.  H 

Mapother,  Dillon  E 

Marshall,  Ross  S 

Martin,  Capt.  Andrew  Penn. 
Martin,  Willard  B 


Mason,  Newton  E.,  rear  ad 
niiral,  U.  S.  Navy,  re 
lired. 

Matlack,  John  C. 


Maxwell,  Lloyd  W. 
Mebane,  James  K.. 


Meffert.  Benj.  F.... 
Merchant,  Ely  O.. . 
Mercury,  Chester  C. 


Merrill.  W.H 

Merry  weather,  George  E. . 
Merwin,  John  0 , 


Position  in  War  Industries  Board 


Expert,  steel  division . 


Navy  representative,  conserva- 
tion division. 

Assistant  chief,  domestic  wool 
section. 

Member  legal  section 


Former  business 


Army  representative,  priorities 

committee. 
Examiner,  priorities  division 

Chief,  pig-iron  section , 


Staff,  central  bureau  of  planning 
and  statistics. 

Chief,  nonwar  construction  sec- 
tion. 

Examiner,  priorities  division 

Director  of  chemical  division  . . . 

Foreign  representative,  steel  di- 
vision. 
Expert,  power  section 


Member,  priorities  committee. .  . 

Deceased;  secretary,  B.  M.Baruc! 
Member  fire-prevention  section . . 

Expert,  steel  division 

Member,  war  prison  labor  and  na- 
tional waste  reclamation  sec- 
tion. 

Passenger  representative,  inland 
traffic  section. 

Director,  war  service  committees 

Assistant,  paint  and  pigment  sec- 
tion. 

Staff,  central  bureau  of  planning 
and  statistics. 

Secretary,  B.  M.  Baruch  at 
peace  conference. 

Chief    clerk.    War    Industries 
Board. 

Priorities  committee 


Expert,  rubber  section. 


Statistician,  division  of  planning 
and  statistics. 

Assistant  to  director  textile  divi- 
sion. 

Associate,  cotton  goods  section. , 

Expert,  pulp  and  paper  division . 

Charge  of  reception  room,  priori- 
ties division. 

Chief,  fire  prevention  section . . . . 

Chief,  machine  tool  section 


Expert,  electric  and  power  equip- 
ment sectiozi* 


Vice  president,  Clark  Car  Co.,  Pitta- 
burgh,  Pa. 
Washington,  D.  C. 

Wool  buyer.  Salt  Lake  City.  Utah. 

Member  firm  Stewart  &  Schearer. 

New  York,  N.  Y. 
Consulting    engineer,    Washington 

President  and  treasurer,  J.  H. 
McLain  Co.,  Canton,  Ohio. 

Member  of  firm,  Picklands,  Mather 
&  Co.,  Cleveland,  Oiiio. 

Examiner,  the  Examination  Corpora- 
tion, New  York,  N.  Y. 

Marsh  &  McLennan,  Chicago,  IlL 

Lawyer,  Houston,  Tex. 

President,  Armour  Fertilizer  Works, 
Chicago,  111. 

Assistant  sales  inanager,  Bethlehem 
Steel  Corporation,  Bethlehem,  Pa. 

Professor  of  electrical  engineering, 
Princeton  University. 

President  and  treasurer,  Detroit  Sul- 
phite Pulp  &  Paper  Co.,  Detroit, 
Mich. 

Washington,  D.  C. 

General  manager  National  Board  of 
Fire  underwriters.  New  York,  N.Y. 

Sales  agent,  Pittsburgh  Steel,  Co., 
Pitt3i)urgh,  Pa. 

Secretary,  Union  Label  Trades  De- 
partment, American  Federation  of 
Labor,  Washington,  D.  C. 

Assistant  city  ticket  agent,  Chicago, 
St.  Paul,  Minneapolis  &  Omaha 
Ry.,  Minneapolis,  Minn. 

Chamber  of  Commerce,  Riggs  Buildc 
ing,  Washington,  D.  C. 

Real  estate,  Louisville,  Ky. 

Superintendent,  Seaboard  Air  Line 
Ry.  Co.,  Norfolk,  Va. 

Squire.  Sanders  &  Demsey.  Cleve- 
land. Ohio. 

Private  secretary  to  president  Cen- 
tral R.  R.  Co.  of  New  Jersey, 
Plainfield,  N.  J. 

Washington,  D.  C. 


Treastlrer  and  general  manager,  Ajaz 

Rubber  Co.,  New  Ytjrk,  N.  Y. 
Assistant  educational  director,  Y.  M. 

C.  A.,  New  York,  N.  Y. 
Secretary  and  treasurer,  Scott-Me- 

bane  Manufacturing  Co..  Graham, 
N.  C. 

Partner  of  Amory,  Browne  &  Co., 
New  York,  N.  Y. 

Special  agent.  Federal  Trade  Com- 
mission, Washington  D.  C. 

South  American  representative,  Geo. 

D.  Emery  Co ,  mahogany  and 
mines,  Boston,  Mass. 

President,^  Underwriters   Laborato 
ries,  Chicago,  111. 

President,  the  Motch  &  Merry  weath- 
er Machine  Co.,  Cleveland,  Ohio. 

Assistant  manager,  sales  office,Kurke 
Electric  Co.,  New  York,  N.  Y. 


»*< 


I 


*^ 


1 


1    I 


r 


522     INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

MEMBERS  OF  THE  WAR  INDUSTRIES  BOARD  ORGANIZATION 

Continued 


Name 


Position  in  War  Industries  Board 


Meyer,  A.  J 

Meyer,  Eugene,  jr.. 
Milbank,  Ounlevy. 


Mller,  Ellis 

Miller,  F.  A 

Miller,  George  E 

Milne,  Wm.  D 

Miltenberger,Capt.  Geo.K. 
Minnick,  Arthur , 


Elzpert,  fire  prevention  section , . 

Expert,  nonferrous  metals 

Exi>ert,  fac.lities  division 

Division  planning  and  statistics . 

Expert,  noa  war  construction  sec- 
tion. 
Expert,  facilities  division 


Former  business 


Mitchell.  Andrew  W 

MitcheU,  Maj.  J.  K 

Mitchell,  Dr.  Wesley  C..., 
Montgomery,  Fletcher  H.. . 
Montgomery,    Lieut.     Col 

Moody,  Herbert  R, 

Moore,  Kilburn 

Morehead,  Maj.  John  M.. . 


Expert,  fire  prevention  section . 
Expert,  power  section , 


War  Industries  Board  represen- 
tative in  joint  office  on  chemi- 
cal statistics. 

Expert,  nonwar  construction  sec- 
tion. 

Staff,  conservation  division 


Chief,  price  statistics. 
Expert,  felt  section. . 


Morgan,  Wm.  P. . . 
Morgan,  Wm.  O. .  . 
Morley,  Charles  D. 


Army  representative  on  price- 
fixing  committee. 

Technical  advisor,  chemicals  di- 
vision. 
Expert,  priorities  division 


Morrisey,  James  R. 
Morrison,  John  A. . 
Matae,  Edward  N.., 
Morse.  Frank  W... 


Morss,  Everett. 


Morton,  Ivon  T. 


Moulton,  H.  G.... 


Murchison,     Capt.     Ken- 
neth M. 
Murray,  William  M. 


Chief,  coal  and  gas  products  sec- 
tion. 

Regional  advisor.  New  York,N.Y. 

Expert,  priorities  division 

Assistant  to  chief  building  ma- 
terial section. 
Expert,  fire  prevention  section . . 

Expert,  priorities  division 

Assistant  to  Mr.  S.  P.  Bush 


Member,  special  advisory  com- 
mission on  plants  and  muni- 
tions. 

Chief  .brass  section,  member  pri- 
orities committee. 

Draftsman,  building  material 
section. 

Nonferrous  metals,  chief  abra- 
sives section.  Resigned  May. 
1918. 

Emergency  construction. 


Murto,  Mary  F. . 
Musser,  James  C. 


Naumburg,  George  W. 
Naumberg,  Ruth  M. . . 

Nelson,  Frank  T 

Nawton.  Maty  E 


Section  on  medical  industry 

Secretary,  Mr.  Hugh  Frayne 

Secretary,  clearance  office,  re- 
quirements division. 

Assistant  to  chief,  cotton  and  cot- 
ton linters  section. 

Division  planning  and  statistics . . 

Member,  legal  section 


Chief,  bureau  of  personnel,  divi- 
sion of  business  adminutration. 


Inspector,  Indiana  Inspection  Bu- 
reau, Indianapolis,  Ind. 
New  York,  N.  Y. 
R.>al  estate  and  investments.  New 

York,  N.  Y. 
Professor,  Johns  Hopkins  University, 

Baltimore,  Md. 
Auto  Strop  Safety  Razor  Co.,    New 

York.N.Y. 
Sales  manager,  Cleveland  Electrical 

&IIluminatingCo.,CleveIand,Ohio. 
Inspector,  Underwriters'  Bureau  of 

New  England,  Boston,  Mass. 
Electrical  engineer.  Union  Electric 

Light  &  Power  Co.,  St.  Louis,  Mo. 
First    assistant    examiner.     United 

States  Patent  Office,  Washington. 

D.  C. 
Salesman,  Chicago,  111. 

Philadelphia  Rubber  Works,  Land 

Title  Building,  Philadelphia,  Pa. 
Ptofessor  of  economics,    Columbia 

University. 
President,  Knox  Hat  Co.,  New  York, 

N.  Y. 
Member  of  the  firm  of  Lybrand-Ross 

Bros.  &  Montgomery,  New  York, 

Professor  of  industrial  chemistry. 
College  of  City  of  New  York,  N.Y. 

Member  firm  Moore  &  Goodman, 
Galveston,  Tex. 

Consulting  engineer.  Union  Carbide 
&  Carbon  Corporation  and  People's 
Gas  Co.,  Chicago,  111. 

Attorney.  New  \ork.  N.  Y. 
Do. 

President,  Morley  Bros.  Construc- 
tion Co.,  St.  Louis,  Mo. 

Engineer,  Wisconsin  Inspection  Bu- 
reau, Milwaukee,  Wis. 

General  agent,  Aetna  Life  Insurance 
Co..  Chicago,  III. 

Private  secretary  to  C.  D.  Velie, 
Minneapolis,  Minn. 

Retired.  Atlantic  City,  N.  J. 

President  Morss  &  White  Co.,  Sim- 

tlex  Wire  &  Cable  Co.,  Simplex 
llectric  Heating  Co.,Boston,Mass. 
Drawing  instructor,  school  commis- 
sioners,  Anne  Arundel    County, 
Berwyn,  Md. 
Treasury  Department,  Washington, 
D.  C. 

Architect,  New  York,  N.  Y. 

Purchasing  agent.  Red  Cross,  Wash- 
ington, D.  C. 

Washington,  D.  C. 

Law  firm,  Musser,  Kimber,  Huffman 
&  Musser,  Akron,  Ohio. 

Member  of  firm,  £.  Naumburg  & 
Co.  (bankers),  N.  Y. 

1755  R  Street  NW.,  Washington, 
D.  C. 

Laucking,  Helfman,  Laucking,  Ham- 
Ion,  lawyers,  Detroit,  Mich. 

Appointment  division.  Census  Bu- 
reau, Washington,  D.  C. 


APPENDIX 


523 


MEMBERS  OF  THE  WAR  INDUSTRIES  BOARD  ORGANIZATION 

Continued 


Name 


Nibley.  Alex. 


Nichols,  Harold  W. 


Nixon.  Frederick  K.. . . . , 

Norris.  Henry  M 

x^ oyes.  X .  D. .••....•••, 

Offield,  James  R. 

Oliver.  George  S 

Olmsted.  Frederick  Law. . 


Ordway.  Lucius  P 

Ormsby.  William  J 

Otis.  Charles  A. 

Paige.  H.  Ray 

Paine,  Catherine , 

Palmer,  G.  J , 

Parker,  Edwin  B 

Parmenter,  Vernon  E 

Parsonage.  Edward  E 

Patterson,  Albert  M 


Patton,  James  E 

Paxton,  Jesse  W. 

Peabody,  Herbert  E 

Peek,  George  N 

Penfield,  Frederick   W... 

Pengnet,  Ramsay 

Penick,  Frank  E 

Pennock,  Stanley  A. .... . 


Penwell,  Lewis 

Peoples,    Admiral   C.    J., 

United  States  Naw. 
Percy,  D.  C.  Steward 


Perkins,  Thomas  Nelson. 
Perry,  Harry  W 


Peters.  Richard,  jr.. . , . 

Phelps.  Wm.  Walter. . . 

Phenix,  Capt.  Spencer. 
Philbrick,  Merchant  E. 


Position  in  War  Industries  Board 


Expert,  lumber  section. 


Chief,  fiber  board  and  containers 
section,  pulp  and  paper  divi- 
sion. 

Expert,  foreign  wool  section 

Assistant,  machine  tool  section, 
Cincinnati. 

Fuel  Administration  representa- 
tive on  requirement  division. 

Expert,  priorities  division 


Former  business 


R^onal    advisor.    Pittsburgh. 
Emergency  construction 


Member  priorities  commission. . , 

Assistant  section  chief,  priorities 

committee. 
Chief,  resources  and  conversion 

section. 
Assistant,  nitrate  section 


Expert,  division  planning  and 

statistics. 
Chief,  newspaper  section , 


Priorities  commissioner 

Division  planning  and  statistics . 

Chief,  _  agricultural    implement 

section. 
Chief,  foreign  wool  section 


Associated  chief,  paint  and  pig- 
ment section. 
Priorities  examiner 

Chief,  woolen  section 


Commissioner  of  finished  prod- 
ucts. 

Rating  committee,  priorities 
board. 

Secretary,  silk  section 

Assistant  business  manager,  pur- 
chasing commission. 
Pulp  andpaper  division 

Chief,  domestic  wool  section . . . 
Requirements    division.    Navy 

representative. 
Expert,  fire  prevention  section . 


Member  priorities  committee  . , 
Assistant  chief,  automotive  prod- 
ucts section. 

Assistant  chief,  iron  and  steel 
scrap  section. 

Secretary,  price-fixing  commit- 
tee. 

Division  planning  and  statistics . 

Expert,  lumber  section 


Resident  manager.  Grande  Ronde 
Lumber  Co.,  Perry,  Oreg.;  Utah- 
Idaho  Sugar  Co.,Grand  Pass,  Oreg. 

President,  Fox  Paper  Co.  and  the 
Chesapeake  Pulp  &  Paper  Co.. 
Cincinnati,  Ohio. 

President,  Nixon,  Walker  &  Tracy, 
New  York,  N.  Y. 

Bickford  Tool  Co..  Cincinnati,  Ohio. 

Oneida  Community  (Ltd.),  Oneida, 

President,  Bon  Air  Coal  &  Iron  Cor- 
poration. Chicago,  III. 

President,  the  Newspaper  Printing 
Co.,  Pittsburgh,  Pa. 

Olmsted  Bros.,  Landscape  Archi- 
tects and  City  Planners,  Brookline, 
Mass. 

President,  Crane-Ordway  Co.,  St. 
Paul,  Minn. 

National  bank  examiner.  Farm  Loan 
Board,  Washington,  D.  C. 

Member  of  firm,  Otis  &  Co.,  Cleve- 
land, Ohio. 

President,  H.  Ray  Paige  &  Co.,  New 
York,  N.  Y. 

Business  Administration,  Boston, 
Mass.  _ 

Active  vice  president,  the  Houston 
Post,  Houston,  Tex. 

Law  firm.  Baker,  Botts,  Parker  & 
Garwood,  Houston,  Tex. 

Dennison  Manufacturing  Co.,  Fram- 
ingham,  Mass. 

Secretary  and  manager  of  the  John 
Deere  Wagon  Co.,  Moline,  111. 

Pi-esident,  Textile  Alliance,  New 
York;  Waterloo  Woolen  Manufac- 
turing Co.,  Waterloo,  N.  Y. 

President,  Patton  Paint  Co.,  Pitts- 
burgh, Pa. 

President,  Highland  Glove  Co., 
Washington.  Pa. 

Sales  agent,  Shelbourne  Mills,  New 
York,  N.  Y. 

Vice  president,  Deere  &  Co.,  Moline, 

Treasurer,  Aetna  Powder  Co. 
Chicago,  ni. 

Secretary,  Silk  Association  of  Amer- 
ica, New  York.  N.  Y. 

Auditor  of  sales  in  Russia,  Interna- 
tional Harvester  Co.,  Chicago,  111. 

Advertising  expert,  Philadelphia,  Pa. 
and  Trenton,  N.  J. 

Lewis  Penwell  Co.,  Helena,  Mont. 

Navy     Department.     Washington, 

Inspector,  Philadelphia  Fire  Under- 
writers' Association,  Philadelphia, 

60  State  Street,  Boston,  Mass. 
Secretary,  Good  Roads  and  Motor 
Truck   Committees,    New   York, 

X^  «    X  • 

Representative  of  Rogers.  Brown  & 

Co.,  Philadelphia,  Pa. 
Director  Wm.  Walter  Phelps  estate 

(Inc  ),  New  York,  N.  Y. 
General  Staff,  Washington,  D.  C. 
Secretary,  John  M.  Woods  Lumber 

Co.,  Memphis,  Tenn. 


..  i 


r« 


r 


I  \ 


^lU 


w 


\:\ 


r 


524    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

MEMBERS  OF  THE  WAR  INDUSTRIES  BOARD  ORGANIZATION 

Continued 


Name 


Phillips,  William  Vernon 

Phillipps,  Henry  G 

Picken,  Capt.  James  H. . 
Pierce,  B.  D.,  jr 


Kerce.  Curtis  W 

Pierce,  Dana 

Pierce,  Edward  Allen .  .  . 
Pierce,  Frank  L 


Pierce,  Brig.  Gen.  Palmer 


Pierpont,  Lawrence . 
Piez,  Charles  R. . . . . 


Position  in  War  Industries  Board 


Chief,  iron  and  steel  scrap  section 
Secretary,  priorities  board 

Assistant  to  Army  representa- 
tive, price-fixing  committee. 

Regional  advisor,  Bridgeport, 
Conn. 

Expert,  fire  prevention  section . 
...do 


Pinci,  Anthony  R. 

Pindell,  Robert  M.,  jr. 


Pollak,  W.  H. 


Pond,  Helen  P. 
Pool,  M.  B.... 


Potter,  Arthur  M. 
Potter,  Zenas  L. . . 


Powell,  Thomas  C. , 
Prescott,  Sherburne. 

Prindle,  Arents  L. . . 
Prosser,  E.  A 


Pumell,  Frank . 


Pyne,  Grafton  H.  . 
Radcliff,  George  S. 
Rakestraw,  B.  B. . 
Ransome,  F.  H. . . 
Ransome,  R.  G.. . 
Rea,  Henry  R. . . . 


Reay,  W.  M... 
Reed,  J.  Burns. 


General  business  executive,  for- 
eign mission. 
Expert,  fire  prevention  section 

Member  War  Industries  Board, 
Army,  representing  War  De- 
partment. 

Chief  clerk,  priorities  division . . 

Emergency  Fleet  CorjMjration 
representative  on  priorities 
board. 

Assistant  to  Mr.  Frajoie,  former 
chief  personnel  division. 

Executive  secretary,  hides, 
leather,  and  leather  goods  divi- 
sion. 

Member  legal  section 

Comfort  and  welfare  committee 

Red  Cross  representative,  re- 
quirements division. 

Assistant  chief,  automotive  prod- 
ucts section. 

Expert,  central  bureau,  planning 
and  statistics. 

Member  priorities  committee, 
chief  inland  traffic  section. 

Assistant  to  chief,  cotton  and 
cotton  linters  section. 

Secretary,  automotive  products 
section. 

Associate  chief,  tanning  material 
and  natural  dye  section  (in- 
cluding oils,  fats  and  waxes). 

Assistant  to  director  of  steel 
supply. 


Former  business 


Assistant,  steel  divsion. 


Cut  soles  expert,  hide,  leather, 
and  leather  goods  division. 

Business  manager,  division  plan- 
ning and  statistics. 

Lumber  section 

Assistant  to  secretary,  priorities 
committee.  _ 

Member  special  advisory  com- 
mittee on  plants  and  muni- 
tions. 

Allied  purchasing  commission . . 


Chemicals 


President,  F.  R.  Phillips  &  Sons. 
Philadelphia,  Pa. 

Vice  president,  American  Bottle  Co., 
Chicago,  111. 

Consulting  Advertising  Service,  Chi- 
cago, 111. 

Director  and  executive  committee, 
Bridgeport  Trust  Co.;  president, 
Connecticut  Quarries  Co.,  etc., 
Bridgeport,  Conn. 

Continental  Insurance  Co.,  89 
Maiden  Lane,  New  York  City. 

Vice  president,  Underwriters'  Lab- 
oratories, New  York,  N.  Y. 
Member  firm  A.  A.  Housman,  20 
Broad  Street,  New  York,  N.  Y. 

President,  What  Cheer  Mutual  Fire 
Insurance  Co.,  Providence,  R.  I. 

War  Department,  Washington,  D.  C. 


Poultry  raising,  Bushfield,  Va. 
Vice  president  and  general  manager 

Emergency     Fleet      Corporation, 

Philadelphia,  Pa. 
Writer,  Munsey,   Outlook,   Harpers 

Weekly,  etc.,  Washington,  D.  C. 
Vice  president  Southern  Settlement 
and    Development   Organization. 

Baltimore,  Md. 
Law  firm,  Englehard,  Pollak,  Pitcher 

&  Stein,  New  York,  N.  Y 
Washington,  D.  C. 
Red  Cross  headquarters,  Washington, 

D.  C. 
Manager  car-order  division.  Dodge 

Bros.,  Detroit,  Mich. 
Head  of  publicity  department.  Na- 
tional Cash  Register  Co.,  Dayton, 

Ohio. 
Vice  president.  Southern  Ry.  Co., 

Cincinnati,  Ohio. 
Vice  president,  Anglo-American  Cot- 
ton   Products    Co.,    New    York, 

N.  Y. 
Assistant  to  S.  A.  Miles,  New  York, 

N.  Y.,  and  Chicago,  111. 
Industrial    chemist    and    salesman, 

Born   Scrymser    Co.,   oils.    New 

York,  N.  Y. 
Manager  of  order  and  sales  depart- 
ments, Youngstown  Sheet  &  Tube 

Co.,  Youngstown,  Ohio. 
Member  of  firm  Post  &  Flagg,  New 

York,  N.  Y. 
Member  of  firm  Boston  &  Lynn  Cut 

Sole  Co.,  Lynn,  Mass. 
Assistant  manager,  Weinstock,  Lu- 

bin  &  Co.,  Sacramento,  Calif. 
Eastern   &   Western   Lumber   Co., 

Portland,  Oreg. 
Vice  president  Bostrop  Water,  Light 

&  Ice  Co.,  Bostrop,  Tex. 
Retired,  Pittsburgh,  Pa. 


Chief  of  auditing  department.  Inter- 
national Harvester  Co.,  Chicago, 
111. 

Assistant  professor  of  mining.  Case 
School  Applied  Science,  Cleveland, 
Ohio. 


APPENDIX 


525 


MEMBERS  OF  THE  WAR  INDUSTRIES  BOARD  ORGANIZATION 

Continued 


Name 


Reed,  Lewis  B 

Rees,  Thomas  M 

Replogle,  J.  Leonard 

Reynolds,  Stanley  M 

Rhoades,  Philo  B 

Rice,  Capt.  Willis  B 

Richardson,  David  Robt. . 
Richardson,  Nicholas  .... 

Richardson,  Ralph  I 

Riddle,  Capt.  Geo.  W.  . . . 

Riley,  Charles  W 

Riley,  Maj.  J.  W 

Rippin,  Lieut.  J.  Y 

Ritchie,  Albert  C 

Hitter.  William  M 

Robbins,  Walter 

Robinson,  WiUiam  C 

Rogers,  Charles  A 

Rogers,  Chilnton  L. 

Root,  Charles  T 

Roper,  Frank  A 

Rosenberg,  William  S.  . . . 
Rosengarten,  A.  G 

Rosensohn,  Maj.  S.  J 

Ross,  Harry  C 

Rossiter,  William  S 

Rossiter,  W.  T 

Itoutsong,  Ralph  C 

Rowbotham,  George  B.  . . 

Rowland,  Joseph  W. 

RuUman,  Chas.  Phillip. . . 

Rumbaugh,  R.  L 

Sadler,  Capt.  Harry  M.  . . 


Position  in  War  Industries  Board 


Assistant  to  G.  N.  Peek 

Expert,  machine  tool  section . . 


^Director  of  steel  supply , 
Publicity  work 


Assistant     warehouse     section, 

steel  division. 
Army  representative,  joint  oflSce 

on  chemical  statistics. 
Expert,  priorities  division 

Expert,  fire  prevention  section . 


Accountant,  steel  division 

Temporary  assistant  to  director 
of  building  material  division. 

Assistant,  f  acihties  division .... 

Member  war  prison  labor  and 
national    waste    reclamation 
section. 
•  do 

General  counsel,  War  Industries 
Board. 

Assistant  to  committee  on  fin- 
ished products  (certifying 
officer). 

Assistant  to  committee  on  fin- 
ished products;  chief,  electric 
and  power  equipment  section. 

Expert,  fire  prevention  section. 

Chief,    harness    and    personal 

equipment    section,     leather 

division. 
Auditor,^  division    of    business 

administration. 
Chief,  periodical  section,  pulp 

and  paper  division. 
Staff,  central  bureau  of  planning 

and  statistics. 

Reporter 

Chief,  ^  miscellaneous    chemical 

section. 

Member  war  prison  labor  and 
national  waste  reclamation 
section. 

Assistant  to  chairman,  conserva- 
tion division. 

Staff,  central  bureau  of  planning 
and  statistics. 

Assistant  to  chief,  resources  and 
conversions  section. 

Expert,  central  bureau  of  plan- 
ning and  statistics. 

Chief,  belting  section,  hide, 
leather,  and  leather  goods  divi- 
sion. 

Assistant  to  chief,  rubber  section 

Domestic  wool  section 

Expert,  fire  prevention  section . 

Examiner,  Army  section,  priori- 
ties committee. 


Former  business 


Vice  president.  United  States  Silica 
Co.,  Chicago,  111. 
Sales   engineer,    Motch    &  Merry- 
weather  Machine  Co.,  Cleveland, 
Ohio. 

President  American  Vanadium  Co., 
New  York,  N.Y. 

Committee  on  Public  Information, 
Washington,  D.  C. 

Manager  warehouses  the  Bourne- 
Fuller  Co.,  Cleveland,  Ohio. 

Law  firm  Duell,  Warfield  &  Duell, 
New  York,  N.  Y. 

Secretary,  Richardson  &  Boynton 
Co.,  New  York.  N.  Y. 

Inspecting  Engineer,  Underwriters 
Bureau  of  New  England,  Boston, 
Mass. 

Chief  clerk,  Cambria  Steel  Co., 
Johnstown,  Pa.   ^ 

Construction  Division,  U.  S.  Army, 
Washington,  D.  C. 

Attorney,  Akron,  Ohio. 

Adjutant  General's  office. 


Reclamation  Division,  U.  S.  Army. 

Attorney  general  of  Maryland,  Balti- 
more, Md. 

President,  W.  M.  Ritter  Lumber 
Co.,  Columbus,  Ohio. 

Vice  president,  Wagner  Electric  & 
Manufacturing  Co.,  St.  Louis, 
.Mo. 

Vice  president.  Underwriters'  Lab- 
oratories, Chicago,  III. 

Retired,  Hartford,  Conn. 


Senior  accountant.  Baker,  Vawter  & 
Wolf,  Chicago,  111. 

United  Publishers  Co.,  director.  New 
York,  N.Y. , 

Farm  Economics  Department,  De- 
partment of  Agriculture. 

Reporter,  New  York,  N.  Y. 

Vice  president  and  treasurer,  Powers- 
Weightman  -  Rosengarten  Co ., 
Philadelphia,  Pa. 

War  Department,  Washington,  D.C. 

Care  of  F.  P.  Luther  Co.,  railway 

equipment,  Chicago,  IlL 
President    Rumford   Printing    Co., 

Concord,  N.  H. 
Vice  president  and  general  manager 

of  the  Cleveland  Builders'  Supply 

Co.,  Cleveland,  Ohio. 
Welfare    director.    National    Cash 

Register  Co.,  DaytoB«  Ohio. 
President,  Bay  State  Beltbg  Co., 

Boston,  Mass.;  Southern  Belting 

Co.,  Atlanta,  Ga.,  etc. 
Office  manager,  Fisk  Rubber  Co., 

Chicopee  Falls,  Mass. 
Lambert  Huntington  Co.,  79  Fifth 

Avenue,  New  York,  N.  Y. 
Inspector,  Western   Sprinkler  Risk 

Association,  Chicago,  111. 
Manager,   mail  order   department. 

Spear  &  Co.,  Pittsburgh,  Pa. 


Ill 


H 


or 


I. 


I 


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•    f 


m 


i 


1 


m 


526     INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

MEMBERS  OF  THE  WAR  INDUSTRIES  BOARD  ORGANIZATION 

Continued 


Name 


Saeger.  Wilford  C. 

Salomon,  Joseph. . 
Sanford.  Hugh  W. 


Sargent,  Murray 

Sawyer,  Capt.  Daniel  E. . 
Sawyer,  Harry  A 


Schaaf,  F.  A. 

Schaffer,  Herbert  Allen , 


I   ••••••  I 


Schlosser,  Alexander  L.. , 

Schmidt,  John  C 

Schmuckler,  Jacob 


Schneider,  Albert . . 
Schoelkopf ,  J.  F. .  . 

Schravesende,  P.  B. 


Schubert.  Frank  H. 


Scott,  Frank  A. 


'«•«••«* 


Scott,  John  W. , 
Scott.  LeUnd... 
Scott,  Ruftts  W. 

Scott.  W.G 

Seaman,  Irving. 

Selden,  Ernest  L 

Selfridge,  Edward  A 

Sever,  Maj.  Geo.  F.. 

Seward,  George  N 

Shaw.  A,  W. 

Shaw.Maj.  C,  H 

Shaw,  George  M. 

Shaw.  Jean  M. 


Shepard.  William  P.. . 

Sherman,  Karl  W. , 

Shidle.  Geter  C 

ShotweM,  Edward  C 

Siebenthal  Myrtle  M 

KmpsQDt  Lieut.  CoL  F.  F. . . 


Position  in  War  Industries  Board 


Member  legal  section. 


Secretary,  industrial  adjustment 

committee,  priorities  division. 

Chief,  ferro  alloys  section 

Chief,  hardware  and  hand  tool 

section. 
Chief  of  projectile,  steel  rails, 

etc.,  .section. 
Expert,  chemical  statistics. .... 

Examiner,  priorities  division . . . 
Assistant  to  director,  building 

material  division. 
Assistant  and  secretary  to  H.  B. 

Swope. 
Chief,  chain  section 

Nonferrous  metals  section 


Former  business 


Reporter 

Chief,  artificial  and  vegetable  dye 
section. 

Assistant  chief,  agricultural  im- 
plement section. 

Expert,  electric  and  power  equip- 
ment section. 

Chairman  munitions  board,chair- 
man  War  Industries  Board, 
Aug.  1  to  Nov.  1,  1917. 

Director  of  textile  and  rubber 
division 

Examiner,  inland  traffic  section . 

Associate  chief,  knit-goods  sec- 
tion. 

Disbursing  officer,  division  of 
business  administration. 

Expert,  priorities  division 

Statistician,  division  of  planning 

and  statistics 
Expert,  lumber  section. ....... 

Expert,  power  section 


Statistician,  division  of  planning 

and  statistics. 
Chairman  conservation  division. 

Expert,  power  section 


Member  advertising  committee 
on  plants  and  munitions. 

Expert,  hardware  and  hand-tool 
section. 

Assistant,  conservation  division 

Assistant  chief,  jute,  hemp,  and 

cordage  section. 
Expert,  steel  division ......... 

Expert,  hides,  leather,  and  leath- 
er goods  division. 

In  charge  of  conferences  and  re- 
ports, secretary's  office. 

Oiief ,  section  of  medical  industry 


Law  firm  of  Bulkley,  Hauxhurst, 
Saeger  &  Jamieson,  Cleveland, 
Ohio. 

Lawyer.  Washington,  D.  C. 

Treasurer  and  general  manager,  San- 
ford-Day  Iron  Works,  Knoxville. 
Tenn. 
Secretary,    Sargent    &    Co.,    New 

Haven,  Conn. 
Salesman,   Block  Maloney   &  Co., 

Chicago,  111. 
Assistant  chemical  en^neer,  Amer- 

can  University,  Washington,  D.C. 
Adam  Schaaf,  Chica^,  111. 
Member  of  firm,  Harrison  &  Schaffer, 

Easton,  Pa. 
Assistant  and  secretary  to  H.  B. 

Swope,  New  York  World. 
President,  Schmidt  &  Ault  Paper 

Co..  York,  Pa. 
Care  J.  J.  Cami)bell,  1725  Sedwick 

Avenue,  Morris  Heights,  N.  Y. 
Reporter,  New  York,  N.  Y, 
Vice  president.  National  Aniline  & 

Chemical  Co.,  Buffalo,  N.  Y. 
President,    Grand    Rapids     School 

Equipment   Co.,   Grand  Rapids, 

Mich. 
Production  manager,  Wheeler  Con- 
denser &  Engineering  Co.,  Cataret, 

N.  J. 
Vice  president.  Wamer-Swasey  Co., 

Cleveland,  Ohio. 

Member  of    firm,    Carson,   Pirie, 

Scott  &  Co.,  Chicago,  111. 
Traffic  expert.   Traffic  Association 

Coal  Co.,  Birmingham,  Ala. 
Member  of  firm.  Wm.  F.  Taubel 

(Inc.),  Riverside.  N.  J. 
Examiner,    Naturalization   Service, 

Department  of  Labor. 
Secretary.  W.  D.  Seaman.  Milwau- 
kee, Wis. 
Accountant,    Oliver    Mining    Co., 

Hadlyme,  Conn. 
IVesident.   Northwestern    Redwood 

Co..  Wiflits.  Calif. 
Professor  of  electrical  engineering, 

Columbia  University. 
Accountant  _and_  efficiency    man, 

Minneapolis.  Minn. 
President,  A.  W.  Shaw  Co..  Chicago. 

111.  , 
Electrical  engineer,  Minnesota  Pow- 
er Co.,  Eveleth,  Minn. 
Mechanical  engineer.  Standard  Steel 

Car  Co.,  Butler,  Pa. 
Vice  president,  secretary,  and  gen- 
eral manager.  Geo.  H.   Adams  & 
Co.,  Hill.  N.  H. 
Professor    of    romance    languages. 

Hamilton  College. 
Manager,  hair  department.  Morris 

&  Co.,  Chicago.  111. 
Selling  agent,  Pittsburgh  office.  La. 
BeU  Iron  Works,  Steubenville.Ohio. 
Member  of  firm,  S.  H.  Shotwell  & 

Sons,  Gloversville,  N.  Y. 
Washington.  D.  C. 


Surgeoo,  Pittsburgh,  Fa. 


APPENDIX 


527 


MEMBERS  OF  THE  WAR  INDUSTRIES  BOARD  ORGANIZATION 

Continued 


Name 


Skinner,  William. . 
Sloan,  Harry  M. . , 


Small,  A.  R. 

Smith,  Arthur  H 

Smith,  A.  Homer 

Smith,  Austin  D 

Smith,  Charles  Henry. . . . . 


Smith,  E.  A 

Smith,  George  F. 


Smith,  Harold  O 

Smith,  Lewis  Reading. . . . 

Smithers,  John  F. 

Snowdcn,  Howard  J. 

Sowers,  W.  J 

Spillman,  Dr.  W.  J. 


Staley,  Homer  F. 


Stamp,  Capt.  Charles  E. . 
Stanley,  Capt.  W.W... 

Starrett,  Col.  W.  A , 

Stein,  C.S , 

Steinert,  Jerome 

Stephenson,  Bertram  S.. , 
Stewart,  Oswald  W. 


Stewart,  W.W. 

Stockdale,  Raymond  D. . 
Stoddard,  Lawrence  J.. . . 


Stone,  George  C. . . . 
Stout,  Charles  F.  C. 
Stroock,  Sylvan  I. . . 


Stuart,  Henry  C. . , 
Styles,  Maxwell  A. 


Summers,  Leland  L. . 
Sweet.  Edwin  F. 


Swope,  Herbert  Bayard. . 


Position  in  War  Industries  Board 


Chief,  silk  section. 


Assistant  to  chief,  nonwar  con- 
struction section. 

Expert,  fire  prevention  section . . 

Associate  chief,  wood  chemicals 

section. 
Assistantchief,sectionof  medical 
'industry. 
Assistant,  ^  warehouse    section, 

steel  division. 
Association  chief,  fire  prevention 

section. 

Secretary,  lumber  section 

Chief,  flax  products  section .... 

Assistant  to  chief,  automotive 

prodticts  section. 
Expert  steel  division 

Private  secretary  to  B.M.Baruch 
Member  advisory  commission  on 

plants  and  munitions. 
Southern  lumber  administrator . 

Member  war  prison  labor  and 
national  waste  reclamation 
section. 

Technical  advisor  on  ceramics, 
chemical  division. 

Assistant  chief,  crane  section. .. 

Expert,  power  section 

Chairman   emergency  construc- 
tion committee. 
Member  legal  section 

Expert,  fire  prevention  section . . 

Expert,  steel  division 

Expert,  fire  prevention  section . . 


Staff,  division  of  planning  and 

statistics. 
Secretary  to  W.  M.  Ritter. 

Expert,  hardware  and  hand-tool 
section. 

Expert,  nonferrous  metals  section 

Director  of  hides,  leather,  and 

leather  goods  section. 
Chief,  felt  section 

Member  price-fixing  committee. 

Assistant  to  director,  building 
material  division. 

Technical  advisor,  and  chairman 
foreign  mission. 

Member  war  prison  labor  and 
national  waste  reclamation 
section. 

Associate  member  of  War  Indus- 
tries Board,  assistant  to  chair- 
man. 


Former  business 


President.  Wm.  Skinner  &  Sons, 
New  York,  N.  Y. 

Assistant  to  Federal  manager,  Chi- 
cago Rock  Island  &  Pacific  R.  R. 
Co.,  Chicago,  111. 

Vice  president,^  Underwriters*  Lab- 
oratories, Chicago,  HI. 

Assistant  secretary,  Wm.  S.  Gary  & 
Co.,  New  York.  N.  Y. 

H.  K.  Melford  Co..  PhUadelphia. 
Pa. 

Superintendent  of  warehouse,  David 
H.  Smith  &  Sons,  Brooklyn.  N.  Y. 

Vice  president,  Blackstone  Mutual 
Fire  Insurance  Co., Providence,R.I. 

Wm.  Cady  Lumber  Co.,  Mc\ary,La. 

President,  Smith  &  Dove  Manufac- 
turing Co.,  Andover,  Mass. 

President,  J.  &  D.  Tire  &  Rubber 
Co..  Charlotte,  N.  C. 

Salesman,  Matthew  Addy  Co.,  Phil- 
adelphia, Pa. 

Attorney  at  law.  Providence,  R.  I. 

Draftsman,  the  Baldwin  Locomotive 
Works,  Philadelphia,  Pa. 

Member  of  firm,  Majors-Sowers  Saw- 
mill Co.,  Epley,  Miss. 

Associate  editor,  the  Farm  Journal, 
Washington,  D.  C. 

Technical  director.  Standard  Sani- 
tary Manufacturing  Co.,  Pitts- 
burgh, Pa. 

President  and  treasurer,  C.  E.  Stamp 
Co.,  Cleveland,  Ohio. 

Assistant  to  president,  Wasson  Pis- 
ton Ring  Co.,  New  Brunswick,N.J. 

Starrett  &  Van  Vleek,  architects. 
New  York,  N.  Y. 

Law  firm,  Englehard,  Pollack,  Pit- 
cher &  Stein,  New  York,  N.  _Y. 

National  Board  of  Fire  Underwriters, 
76  William  Street,  NewYork,  N.Y. 

Resident  agent,  M.  A.  Hanna  &  Co., 
Pittsburgh,  Pa. 

Engineer,  Manufacturers  Mutual 
}<ire  Insurance  Co.,  Providence, 
R.  L 

Professor  of  economics,  Amherst 
College. 

Secretary  to  W.  M.  Ritter,  W.  M. 
Ritter  Lumber  Co.,Columbus,Ohio. 

Sales  manager,  gage  division,  Green- 
field Tap  &  Die  Corporation, 
Greenfield,  Mass. 

Metallurgist,  New  Jersey  Zinc  Co., 
New  York,  N.  Y. 

Partner,  John  R.  Evans  &  Co.,  Phil- 
adelphia, Pa. 

Member  of  firm,  S.  Stroock  &  Co., 
NewYork,  N.Y. 

Ex-governor  of  Virginia. 

Purchasing  agent,  Aberthaw  Con- 
struction Co.,  Boston,  Mass. 

L.  L.  Summers  &  Co.,  New  York, 
N.Y. 

Assistant  secretary.  Department  of 
Commerce. 

City  Editor,  New  York  World. 


ir 


d» 


Pi 


I 


i^ 


528    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

IVIEIVIBERS  OF  THE  WAR  INDUSTRIES  BOARD  ORGANIZATION 

Continued 


Name 


Talmage,  Lieut.  J.  B. 
Taussig,  Dr.  F.W... 
Taylor,  H.  K 


Taylor,  Horace  F. 
Taylor,  Irving  H.. 


Taylor,  Capt.  M.  N. . 

Taylor,  Tullie  V 

Taylor,  William  A. . . 


Templeton,  Allen  A. 
Thomas,  Clinton  G.. 


Thomas,  Percy  H. . . . 

Thomas,  Wm.  R 

Thompson,  Frank  E.. , 
Thompson,  Warren  S. 
Thurston,  E.  Coppe. . 

Tim,  John  F 

Tinsley,  Maj.  A.  M. . . 


Torrence,  Robert  M. . . . 
Townsend,  John  R. .    . . 

Trigg,  Ernest  T 

Tripp,  Chester  D 

Turkington,  Everett  E.. 

Tucker,  Maj.  Samuel  A. 

Turner,  Spencer 

Tturpin,  Upshur  F 


Tuttle,M.  C 

UHch,  Ethel  E 

Van  Deventer,  Harry  B.. , 
Van  Doren,  Durand  H.. . , 

I'anduzer,  H.  B , 

Vaudain,  Samuel  M , 


Vaughan,  Victor  C. 

Venard,  Wm.  S 

VogeL  August  H. . . 


Position  in  War  Industries  Board 


Secretary  emergency  construc- 
tion section. 

Member  of  price-fixing  commit- 
tee. 

Staff,  conservation  division .... 

Lumber  section 

Staff,  resources  and  conversion 
section. 

Navy  representative,  require- 
ments division. 

Facilities  division 

Assistant,  optical  glass  and  in- 
strument section. 

Regional  advisor,  Detroit 

Expert,  steel  division 

Expert,  power  section 

Division  planning  and  statistics 

£x];)ert,  steel  division 

Expert,  central  b\u*eau  planning 
and  statistics. 

Assistant  to  chief,  nonferrous 
metals  section. 

Associate  chief,  alkali  and  chlo- 
rine section. 

Expert,  power  section 


Chief,  chemical  glass  and  stone- 
ware section. 

Associate  section  chief,  sulphur, 
pyrites,  and  alcohol  sections. 

Regional  advisor,  Philadelphia, 
Pa. 

Associate  chief,  ferro-alloys  sec- 
tion. 

Expert,  fire  prevention  section . . . 

Technical  advisor,  chemicals  di- 
vision. 
Chief,  cotton  goods  section .... 

Assistant  to  director  building 
material  division. 

Emergency  construction  com- 
mittee. 

Assistant  chief,  harness  and  per- 
sonal equipment  section. 
Examiner,  priorities  division . . . . 

Member,  legal  section 


Pacific  coast  lumber  administra- 
tor. 

Chairman,  special  advisory  com- 
mittee on  plants  and  muni- 
tions. 

Member,  advisory  board  on  me- 
dicinal agents. 

Statistician,  division  planning 
and  statistics. 

Reinonal  advisor,  Milwaukee, 
Wis. 


Former  business 


Crowell-Lundoff-Little  Co.,  general 
contractors,  Cleveland,  Ohio. 

Chairman  United  States  Tariff  Com- 
mission. 

Manager,  Philadelphia  office,  Denni- 
son  Manufacturing  Co. 

Taylor  &  Create,  Buffalo,  N.  Y. 

Traffic  department,  Michigan  Alkali 
Co.,  Wyandotte,  Mich. 

Navy  Ordnance,  Washington,  D.  C. 

Buckeye  Steel  Casting  Co.,  Colum- 
bus, Ohio. 

Student,  Yale  University:  residence. 
New  York,  N.  Y. 

Manufacturer,  Detroit,  Mich. 

President,  the  Western  Reserve  Steel 
Co.  Warren,  Ohio. 

Consulting  electrical  engineer.  New 
York,  N.  Y. 

124  Eleventh  Street  SE.,  Washing- 
ton, D.  C. 

Superintendent,  order  department, 
Cambria  Steel  Co.,  Johnstown,  Pa. 

Professor,  University  of  Michigan. 

Engineer,  with  Pope  Yeatman,  New 
York,  N.  Y. 

Attorney,  special  counsel.  Diamond 
Alkali  Co.,  Pittsburgh,  Pa. 

Manager,  Missouri  Public  Utilities 
Co.  and  Cape  Girardeau-Jackson 
Interurban  Ry.  Co.,  Cape  Girar- 
deau, Mo. 

Secretary,  Highland  Glass  Co., 
Washington,  Pa. 

Executive  engineer,  Sanderson  & 
Porter,  New  York,  N.  Y. 

Vice  president  and  general  rcanager, 
John  Lucas  &  Co.,Philade]phia,Pa. 

Vice  president,  Miami  Metak  Co., 
Chicago,  111. 

Electrical  engineer.  Associated  Fac- 
tory Mutual  Insurance  Co.,  Bos- 
ton, Mass. 

Professor,  Columbia  University  .New 
York,  N.  Y. 

Member  of  firm,  Turner-Halsey  Co., 
New  York,  N.  Y. 

Designing  engineer,  the  Dayton- 
Wright  Aeroplane  Co.,  Dayton, 
Ohio. 

Executive  officer,  Aberthaw  Con- 
struction Co.,  construction  engi- 
neers, Boston,  Mass. 

Smith- Worthington  Co.,  Hartford, 
Conn. 

Professor  of  Latin,  University  of 
Pennsylvania. 

Lawyer,  Raymond,  Mountain,  Van 
Blarcom  &  Marsh,  Newark,  N.  J. 

Chairman  Fir  Production  Board, 
Portland,  Oreg. 

Senior  vice  president,  Baldwin  Loco- 
motive Works,  Philadelphia,  Pa. 

Dean,  medical  department.  Univer- 
sity of  Michigan,  Ann  Arbor,  Mich. 

Paciric  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.,  San  Fran- 
cisco, Calif. 

Vice  president,  Pfister-Vogel  Leather 
Co.,  Milwaukee,  Wis. 


APPENDIX 


529 


MEMBERS  OF  THE  WAR  INDUSTRIES  BOARD  ORGANIZATION 

Continued 


Name 


Position  in  War  Industries  Board 


Vogel,  Fred  A Expert,  hide,  leather,  and  leath- 
er goods  division. 

Staff,  division  of  planning  and 
statistics. 

Assistant  to  chief,  fiber  board 
and  container  section. 

Assistant  to   director   building 
material  division. 

Executive  assistant,  wool  chem- 
ical section. 

Assistant,  nonferrous  metals  sec- 
tion. 

Staff,  conservation  division 


Wadleigh,  Francis  R 

Walker,  Charles  R 

Walker,  F.W 

Walker,  Reginald  D 

Walz,  Andrew 

Ware,  J.  E 

Ware,  Robert  D 

Waring,  Lieut.  Wm.  E.,  jr. . 
Waterman,  John  H 


Weaver,  Herbert  H. 
Webb,  Stuart  W. . . 
Weber,  Orlando  F.. , 


Webster,  Arthur  L. . 
Webster,  Benjamin . 


Webster,  Hosea 

Weeks,  Marian  F. . . . 

Wehle,  L.B 

Weidlein,  Edward  R.. 


Weiss,  L.  S 

Weld,  C.  Minot. 


Wells,  E.  R 

Wells,  Arthur  E. 


Wendt,  Alfred 

Westheimer,  Leo  F 

Wetherell,  Lawrence  H. . 
Weymouth,  Frederick  A. . 

Wheeler,  Andrew 

Wheeler,  George  R 

White,  Carl  H 

Whitin,  Dr.  E.  Stagg 


Whiteside,  Arthur  D. 
Whitmarsh,  T.  F..... 


Whitmore,  Brewer  G. 


Assistant,  belting  section 


Assistant  to  Secretary  price  fix- 
ing committee. 

Chief,  charge  machine  depart- 
ment, electrical  and  power 
equipment  section. 

Expert,  steel  division 


Regional  advisor,  Boston. 


Assistant  nonferrous  metals  sec- 
tion. 

Expert,  hides  and  skins  section  . 

Executive  assistant,  chemical  di- 
vision. 

Expert,  facilities  division , 


Assistant  to  chief  clerk.  War  In- 
dustries Board. 
Member  legal  section 


Technical  advisor,  chemical  di- 
vision. 

Member  legal  section 

Representative  Bureau  of  Mines 
on  ferro-alloys  section. 

Consulting  engineer,  electrical 
and  power  equipment  section. 

Associate  chief,  acids  and  heavy 
chemical  section,  sulphur,  py- 
rites, and  ethyl  alcohol  sections. 

Assistant  chief,  silk  section 


Resources  and  conversion  sec- 
tion. 

Expert,  hardware  and  hand-tool 
section. 

Expert,  steel  division 


Chief,  warehouse  section,  steel 

division. 
Assistant  chief,  boot  and  shoe 

section. 
Staff,  conservation  division .... 


Member  war  prison  labor  and 
national  waste  reclamation 
section. 

Expert,  foreign  wool  section . . . . 

Requirements  division.  Food  Ad- 
ministration representative. 

Dean  of  students,  employment 
management  courses. 


Former  business 


General      manager,      Pfister-Vogcl 
Leather  Co.,  Milwaukee,  V/is. 

Consulting  engineer,  Blair  &  Co., 
New  York,  N.  Y. 

Assistant  to  President  Fox  Pape.' 
Co.,  Lockland,  Ohio. 

Secretary,  Association  cf  Tile  Manu- 
facturers, Beaver  Fall^,  Pa.  ^ 

Engineer,  L.  J.  Husted  Co.,  ITansaa 
City,  Mo.  _  , 

Consulting  mining  engineer,  Guggen- 
heim Bros.,  Nev/  York,  N.  Y. 

M2mber  of  firm,  Maesel-Ware  Co., 
New  York,  N.  Y. 

Salesman,  Bay  State  Belting  Co., 
Boston,  Mass. 

Baltimore,  Md. 

Engineer,  Allis  Chalmers  Manufac- 
turing Co.,  Milwaukee,  Wis. 

With  Citizens  Heat,  Light  &  Power 

Co.,  Johnstown,  Pa. 
President,  Clinton  Wire  Cloth  Co., 

Boston,  Mass.,  etc. 
Eugene  Meyer,  jr.  Co.,  New  York, 

N.Y. 
A.  L.  Webster  &  Co.,  Chicago,  111. 
Engineer  with  Albert  Webster,  New 

York,  N.  Y. 
Engineer  and  sales  manager,  Bab- 

cock-Wilcox  Co.,  New  York,  N.  Y. 
Wellesley  Hills,  Mass. 

Law  firm  Wehle  &  Wehle,  Louisville, 
Ky. 

Acting  director  of  Mellon  Institute, 
Pittsburgh,  Pa. 

Lawyer,  Cleveland,  Ohio. 

Chief,  War  Minerals  Bureau,  Bureau 
of  Mines,  Washington,  D.  C;  resi- 
dence, New  York,  N.  Y. 

Chief  Mechanical  Engineer,  J.  A. 
White  &  Co.,  New  York,  N.  Y. 

With  United  States  Bureau  of  Mines. 


Partner,  Wendt  Bros.,  New  York, 
N.  Y.  . 

President,  Ferdinand  Westheimer  & 
Sons  Co.,  Cincinnati,  Ohio. 

Vice  president  and  treasurer,  Weth- 
erell Bros.  Co.,  Boston,  Mass. 

Sales  metallurgical  engineer,  Bethle- 
hem Steel  Corporation,  South 
Bethlehem,  Pa. 

Senior  partner,  Morris  Wheeler  & 
Co.,  Philadelphia.  Pa. 

Interests  in  several  lumber  and  or- 
chard companies,Cumberland,Md. 

Vice  president,  Jos.  Richard  Co., 
New  York,  N.Y. 

Chairman  executive  committee.  Na- 
tional Commission  on  Prisons  and 
Prison  Labor. 

President,  National  Credit  Office, 
New  York,  N.  Y. 

Francis  H.  Liggett  Co.,  Twenty- 
seventh  Street  and  North  River, 
New  York,  N.  Y. 

Professor  of  English  and  Govern- 
ment, Harvard  University. 


(: 


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;    < 


«ii 


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. 


530    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 

MEMBERS  OF  THE  WAR  INDUSTRIES  BOARD  ORGANIZATION 

Contimied 


Name 


Position  in  War  Industries  Board 


Whitney,  A.  M. 


Whitsit,  Capt.  LykA..... 
Whittier,  Carl  S 


Wimflesworth,  Albert  W. 
Wildman,  M.  S 

Wilhoit,  Frederic  S 


Former  business 


Staff,  conservation  division  . 
Expert,  power  section 


Central  bureau  of  planning  and 
statistics. 


Wilkins,  John  F. .. ... 

Williams,  Ben  P 

Williams,  Lieut.  Edward  A. 


Williams,  Harrison 

Williams,  Leonard  W 

Williams,  Maj.  Seth 

Williamson,  Capt.  Stanley.. 

Willson,  Sidney  L. 

Wilson,  Creede  W. 


Machine  tool  section 

Staff,  division  of  planning  and 

statistics. 
Expert,    electrical    and    power 

equipment  section. 

Chief,  stored  materials  section  . . 
Expert,  steel  division 

Ordnance    department,    U.    S. 

Army,  associated  alkali  and 

chlorine  section. 
Member,  facilities  division. 


Wilson.  John  P 

Winkleman,  Richard 

Winquist,  Rajrmond  V... . 

Winton,  C.  Y 

Winslow,  Dr.  Charles  H. . . 


Wisner,  Frank 

Wisner,  Newlin  M 

Witherspoon,  Herbert. 
Withey,  Percy  King. . 

Wolman,  Leo 

Wood,  EarleD 


Assistance  chief,  pig  iron  section 

Marine  Corps  representative  re- 

quirements  division. 
Assistant   to   commissioner 

finished  products. 
Chie^  manufacturing   section, 

pulp  and  paper  division. 
Secretary  of  knit  goods  section . . . 

Assistant  to  chief  to  tin  section . . 

Draftsman,  building  materials 

division. 
Chief  reporter 


Lumber  section. 


Member  war  prison  labor  and 
national  waste  reclamation 
section. 

Lumber  section 


Wood,  Ezra  F... 
Wood,  Harold  G. 


Wood.  Leslie  D 

Wood,  Richard  L.... 
Woolfolk,  William  G. 
WooL'ey,  Clarence  M. 


Wood  chemical  section 

Regional  advisor,  Seattle 

Statistician,  steel  division 

Staff,  division  of  planning  and 

statistics. 
Inspector,  fire  prevention  section 

Member  advisory  committee  on 
plants  and  munitions. 

Associate  chief,  tanning  material 
and  natural  dye  section  (in- 
eluding  oils,  fats,  and  waxes). 

Jixpert,  fire  prevention  section . . . 

Assistant  to  director,  chemical 
division. 

Chief,  sulphur,  pyrites,  and  alco- 
hol sections. 

Priorities  board,  war  trade  repre- 
sentative. 


Treasurer  and  trustee,  Massachu- 
setts Lighting  &  Power  Co.,  Bos- 
ton, Mass., 

Engineer,  United  States  Forest  Serv- 
ice, Washington,  D.  C. 

Manager,  Foreign  Trade  Bureau. 
American  Cypress  Co.,  New  York, 

Hill-Clarke  Co.,  Chicago,  III. 

Head  of  economics  department,  Le- 
land  Stanford  Junior  University. 

Manager,  printing  and  equipment 
division,  the  Cutler-HammerMan- 
ufactunng  Co.,  Milwaukee,  Wis. 

Treasurer,  VVilkins  Securities  Cor- 
poration, Washington,  D.  C. 

Vice  president,  Hickman,  Williams 
Co.,  St.  Louis,  Mo.  • 

Starkweather,  Williams  &  Co.. 
Providence,  R.  I. 

director  of  various  companies.  New 
York,  N.  Y. 

Vice.president  and  treasurer,  Park& 
WiUiams  (Inc.),Philadelphia.  Pa. 
Navy     Department,     Washington, 

Lawyer,  Land  Title  Bmlding,  Phila- 
delphia, Pa. 

Vice  president,  Graham  Paper  Co., 
St.  Louis,  Mo. 

Superintendent  of  agents.  Mutual 
Life  Insurance  Co.  of  New  York, 
Cumberland,  Md. 

Assistant  manager.  National  Lead 
Co.,  New  York,  N.  Y.  ^^ 

Architect,  1401  Webster  Street. 
Washington,  D.  C. 

Stenotypist,  Navy  Department;  resi- 
dence, Rockford,  111. 

Security  Building,  Minneapolis. 
Minn. 

Assistant  director  of  research.  Feder- 
al Board  for  Vocational  Educa- 
tion. 

Eastman-Gardner  Lumber  Ca, 
Laurel,  Miss. 

Thomas  Mattocks  Son's  Co.,  Tren- 
ton, N.  J. 

Vice  president,  Spokane  &  Eastern 
Trust  Co.,  Spokane,  Wash. 

Sales  department,  Lackawanna  Steel 
Co.,  Lackawanna,  N.  Y. 

Instructor,  Johns  Hopkins  Univer- 
sity. ^ 

Underwriters'  Association  of  New 
York  State,  Syracuse,  N.  Y.  (in- 
spector). 

First  vice  president  and  consulting 
engineer.  International  Nickel  Co., 
New  York,  N.  Y. 

Examiner  of  surveys  and  national 
K>rest  examiners.  United  States 
Forest  Service. 

Inspector,  Michigan  Inspection  Bu- 
reau,  Detroit,  Mich. 

Richard  L.  Wood  Co.,  Buffalo,  N.  Y. 

Mana^r,  Chicago  office,  Sanderson 
«  Porter,  engineers  and  con- 
tractors. 

President,  American  Radiator  Co- 
New  York,  N.  Y. 


APPENDIX 


531 


MEMBERS  OF  THE  WAR  INDUSTRIES  BOARD  ORGANIZATION 

Contimied 


Name 


Woolson,  Prof.  Ira  A 

Worcester,  Chas.  H 

Wyman,  Henry  A 

Wynegar,  Howard  L. . . . . 

Yeatman,  Pope 

Young,  Neil 

Yuengling,  George  W 

Zane,  A.  V.,  rear  admiral 
U.  S.  Navy,  retired. 


Position  in  War  Industries  Board 


Advisory  engineer,  building  ma- 
terials division. 
Lumber  committee 


Member,  brass  section 

Assistant,  nonwar  construction 
section. 

Chief,  nonferrous  metals  section . 

Expert,  electric  and  power  equip- 
ment section. 

Executive  assistant,  miscellane- 
ous commodities  section. 
Priorities  committee 


Former  business 


Consulting  engineer.  National  Board 
Fire  Underwriters,  New  York.N.Y. 

1409  Y.  M.  C.  A.  Building.  Chicago. 
HI. 

Attorney,  Boston,  Mass. 

Vice  president.  Continental  Guar- 
anty Corporation,  New  York,N.Y. 

Consulting  engineer.  New  York.N.Y. 

Assistant    manager,    industrial    de- 

Sirtment,  Westinghouse  E.  &  M. 
o..  East  Pittsburgh,  Pa.  ^ 
Secretary,    Globe    Indemnity    Co. 

New  York,  N.  Y. 
Washington,  D.  C. 


I  I 


ltl 


I, 


k 


i 


«i 


Hi! 


APPENDIX  Vn 

WAR  SERVICE  COMMITTEES  OF  THE  CHAMBER  OF  COMMERCE  OF 
THE  UNITED  STATES,  AND  MEMBERS  THEREOF 


1 

4 

i 


War  Service  Executive 
Committee 

Harry  A.  Wheeler,  chairman. 
Joseph  H.  Defrees,  vice-chair- 
man. 
A.  C.  Bedford. 
William  Butterworth. 
W.  L.  Clause. 
L.  S.  Gillette. 
John  H.  Fahey. 
W.  H.  Manss. 

ACCOUNTINQ 

.  Edw.  L.  Suffem,  chairman. 
A.  P.  Richardson,  secretary. 
W.  Sanders  Davies. 
Chas.  S.  Ludlam. 
Robt.  H.  Montgomery. 
Charles  H.  Nau. 
Henry  A.  Niles. 
J.  E.  Sterrett. 
Arthur  W.  Teele. 

Asbestos  and  Magnesia 

George  D.  Crabbs,  chairman. 
C.  J.  Stover,  secretary. 
W.  A.  Macan. 
Richard  V.  Mattison,  jr. 
C.  B.  Jenkins. 
S.  R.  Zimmerman. 

Automobiles 

Hugh  Chalmers,  chairman. 
John  N.  Willys. 
H.  H.  Rice. 
George  M.  Graham. 
Alfred  Reeves. 

Automobile  Dealers 

F.  W.  A.  Vesper,  chairman. 
Earl  C.  Anthony. 
Chas.  Collier. 
A.  E.  Mitzel. 
A.  E.  Maltby. 

F.  E.  Murphy. 
Dayton  Keith. 
J.  H.  McAlman. 
Geo.  D.  McCutcheon. 
O.  P.  Tyler. 
Fred  J.  Caley. 
Chas.  M.  Browne. 
Finley  L.  MacFarland. 

Baby  Vehicles 

O.  W.  Siebert,  chairman. 

G.  A.  Keyworth. 
Frank  Wissig. 
Hugh  Hill. 
P.  C.  Kendall. 
W.  S.  Ferris. 

Bags  (Burlap  and 
Cotton) 

Exeeutiee  Committee 

Albert  F.  Berais,  chairman. 
Everett  Ames. 


Bags — Continued 

Executive  Commitiee — Con. 
Benj.  Elsas. 
E.  K.  Ludington. 
G.  D.  Adams. 

E.  W.  Mente. 
J.  B.  Morgan. 

Subcommittee  on  Cotton 
Benjamin  Elsas,  chairman. 
Geo.  N.  Roberts. 
Benj.  D.  Riegel. 

F.  P.  Mann. 
A.  S.  Bowen. 

Subcommittee  on  Burlap 

A.  V.  Phillips,  chairman 
W.  N.  Morice. 

J.  W.  Falconer. 
J.  R.  Dewitt. 
Everett  Ames. 

Baking 

Frank  R.  Shepard.  chairman. 

Jay  Burns. 

Robt.  L.  Corby. 

Wm.  Friehofer. 

John  F.  Hildebrand. 

S.  F.  McDonald. 

Wm.  M.  Regan. 

Paul  Schulze. 

B.  Howard  Smith. 
Gordon  Smith. 
Geo.  S.  Ward. 

A.  L.  Taggart. 

Ball  Bearings  and 
Steel  Balls 

W.  M.  Nones,  chairman. 

C.  T.  Treadway. 
F.  M.  Germane. 
H.  K.  Smith. 

L.  J.  Hoover. 
W.  H.  Strom. 
Isaac  Andrews. 

Barbers*  Supplies 

Fred  Dolle,  chairman. 
Joseph  Gibson. 
A.  Edlis. 
Christ  Kohler. 
J.  E.  MiUer. 
Martin  Hanson. 
W.  W.  Page. 
J.  V.  Reed. 
Bernard  DeVry. 

Baskets  and  Fruit 
Packages 

R.  G.  Williams,  chairman. 

M.  O.  Overstreet. 

M.  H.  Stuart. 

J.  H.  Schlegel. 

J.  R.  Jarrell. 

J.  M.  Simmons. 


Bicycles 

E.  J.  Lonn,  chairman. 

Col.  F.  T.  Huffman. 

J.  P.  Fogarty. 

W.  G.  Schack. 

H.  S.  Wise. 

Percy  Pierce. 

I.  Schwinn. 

Biscuits  and  Crackers 

Brooks  Morgan,  chairman. 
John  H.  Wiles. 
R.  E.  Tomlinson. 

Boots  and  Shoes 

John  S.  Kent,  chairman. 
Frank  R.  Briggs. 
Fred  B.  Rice. 
Wm.  S.  McKenzie. 
Henry  W.  Cook. 
Frank  C.  Rand. 
John  W.  Craddock. 
A.  S.  Kreider. 
M.  S.  Florsheim. 
John  R.  Garside. 
L.  H.  Downs. 
Walter  J.  Hallahan. 
Sol  Wile. 

J.  Frank  McEIwain. 
John  A.  Bush. 
A.  N.  Blake. 
Frank  X.  Kelly. 
Mark  W.  Selby. 
F.  L.  Weyenberg. 

Boxes  (Paper) 

A.  G.  Burry,  chairman. 
H.  M.  Hoague. 
Frank  E.  Vincent. 
Ernest  Spaulding. 

E.  P.  Franke. 
W.  W.  Baird. 
W.  B.  Dickerson. 
Geo.  E.  Staebler. 
H.  L.  Stortz. 

C.  M.  Coover. 

Boxes  (Wooden) 

Geo.  L.  Crosman,  chairman. 

B.  F.  Masters. 
R.  W.  Jordan. 

C.  Fred  Yegge. 
Louis  Wuicnet. 

Brass  and  Copper  Roll- 
ing Mills 

A.  P.  Swoyer,  chairman. 
H.  J.  Rowland. 
L.  G.  Kibbe. 
A.  A.  Ainsworth. 

Brass  and  Copper  Tubes 
(Small  Sizes) 

Henry  T.  Smith,  chairman. 

F.  W.  French. 


Brass  and  Copper  Tubes 
(Small  Sizes) — Con. 

Clifford  H.  Wells. 
F.  J.  DeBishop. 
Philip  Smith. 

Brass  and  Copper  Tubes 
(Commercial  Sizes) 

John  P.  Elton,  chairman. 
W.  S.  Eckhert. 
L.  H.  Jones. 
W.  R.  Webster. 
R.  L.  Coe. 


Brewing 

C.  W.  Feigenspan,  chairman. 

E.  A.  Schmidt. 
Edw.  Landsberg. 
Louis  B.  Schram. 
Wm.  Hamm. 
Gustave  Pabst. 
Jas.  R.  Nicholson. 
Julius  Liebmann. 
Hugh  F.  Fox. 

Brick  (Building) 

George  H.  Clippert,  chairman. 

J.  W.  Robb. 

Wm.  K.  Hammond. 

John  W.  Sibley. 

Theo.  A.  RandalL 

Brick  (Face) 

Jos.  W.  Moulding,  chairman. 

F.  W.  Butterworth. 
H.  E.  Stringer. 

R.  D.  T.  Hollowell. 

Brick  (Pa\tng) 

C.  C.  Blair,  chairman. 
Will  P.  Blair,  vice  chairman. 
J.  W.  Sibley. 
W.  G.  D.  Orr. 

A.  L.  Shulthis. 
R.  T.  Hutchins. 

Building  Industry 

B.  P.  Affleck,  chairman. 
Col.  J.  R.  Wiggins. 
John  H.  Kaul. 

A.  M.  Maddock. 
Charles  Gompertz. 
John  A.  Kling. 
W.  L.  Clause. 
Walter  S.  Dickey. 
Rudolph  P.  Miller. 

Metal  Ceiling 

J.  M.  Gleason,  chairman. 
James  P.  Dolan. 

G.  J.  Kohler. 
Louis  Kuehn. 
W.  F.  Norman. 

Metal  Lath 

Zenas  W.  Carter,  chairman. 

W.  H.  Foster. 

Howard  W,  Foote. 

Julius  Kahn. 

A.  R.  Yancy. 

J.  A.  Thomas. 

W.  G.  Hurlburt 


APPENDIX 


Canned  Foods  and  Dried 
Fruits  Brokers 

B.  W.  Housum,  chairman. 
Wm.  H.  Nicholls. 

Jos.  H.  Kline. 

F.  A.  Alpin. 
Jas.  M.  Hobbs. 
Jos.  Keevers. 

Carriages 

Philip  Ebrenz,  chairman. 
W.  H.  Rominger. 

C.  R.  Crawford. 
Frank  Delker. 
E.  J.  Schlamp. 
J.  H.  Poste. 

H.  A.  Crawford. 
J.  D.  Craft. 
W.  G.  Norman. 

Caskets 

P.  B.  Heintz,  chairman. 
William  Mauthe. 
A.  R.  Betts. 
A.  A.  Breed. 

E.  L.  Ewing. 
John  M.  Byrne. 

Cereals 

C.  T.  Lee,  chairman. 
H.  C.  Flint. 
H.  L.  Smith. 
S.  H.  Small. 
Arthur  Dunn. 

G.  G.  Guernsey. 

Chain 

C.  M.  Power,  chairman. 
Staunton  B.  Peck. 
A.  B.  Way. 

Welded  chain 

C.  M.  Power,  chairman. 
Robert  J.  McKay. 
Frank  A.  Bond. 

L.  D.  Cull. 

Transmission   chains    and 
sprockets 
Staunton  B.  Peck,  chairman. 
L.  M.  Wainwright. 
L.  C.  Wilson. 
Edgar  Stilley. 

Weldless  and  hardware 
A.  B.  Way,  chairman. 
T.  B.  Oliver. 
John  M.  Russell. 
Thomas  A.  Troy. 

Chemicals 

Central  Committee 
Horace  Bowker,  chairman. 
Henry  Howard. 
J.  D.  Cameron  Bradley. 
Wm.  Hamlin  Childs. 

F.  R.  Grasselli. 
W.  D.  Huntington. 

D.  W.  Jayne. 
A.  D.  Ledoux. 
F.  A.  Lidbury. 

C.  H.  MacDowell. 

Edward  Mallinckrodt,  jr. 

Wm.  H.  Nichols. 

J.  D.  Pennock. 

C.  L.  Reese. 

John  J.  Riker. 

A.  G.  Rosengarten. 

C.  G.  Wilson. 


533 


Acids 
W.  D.  Huntington,  chairman. 
S.  B.  Fleming^. 
J.  M.  Goetchius. 

C.  F.  Burroughs. 
J.  H.  D.  Rodier. 
Charles  M.  Butterworth. 

Alkali 
J.  D.  Pennock,  chairman. 
E.  H.  Hooker. 
N.  E.  Bartlett. 

E.  Sargent. 

Coal-Tar  By-Products 

D.  W.  Jayne,  chairman. 
W.  D.  Addicks. 

C.  J.  Rarasburg. 
W.  E.  McKay. 
A. A.  Schlesinger. 

Dyestuffs 
C.  L.  Reese,  chairman. 
H.  A.  Metz, 
M.  R.  Poucher. 
R.  W.  Hochstetter. 
August  Merz. 
H.  D.  Ruhm. 
I.  F.  Stone. 

F.  M.  Fargo. 
A.  R.  Curtin. 

J.  M.  Matthews. 

Electro-Chemicals 
F.  A.  Lidbury,  chairman. 
C.  D.  Cohen. 
F.  J.  Tone. 

Fertilizer 
C.  C.  Wilson,  chairman. 
C.  F.  Burroughs. 
W.  D.  Huntington. 
C.  H.  MacDowell. 
A.  C.  Read. 
Albert  French. 
Porter  Fleming. 
Wm.  Prescott. 
Frederick  Rayiield. 

Miscellaneous  Chemicals 
A.  G.  Rosengarten,  chairman. 
C.  P.  Adamson. 
Wm.  Henry  Bower. 

Foreign  Pyrites 
A.  D.  Ledoux,  chairman. 
C.  F.  Burroughs. 
F.  H.  Nichols. 
W.  H.  MiUs. 

Domestic  Pyrites  and  Sulphur 
C.  H.  MacDowell,  chairman. 
W.  N.  Wilkinson. 
H.  P.  Nash. 
C.  G.  Wilson. 


Wood  Chemicals 

John  Troy,  chairman. 
F.  E.  Clawson. 
H.  E.  Gaffney. 

Children's  Vehicles 

J.  F.  Vogel,  chairman. 
C.  R.  Dinkey. 
Wm.  L.  Diemer. 
R.  G.  I^dip. 
F.  £.  Southard. 


«i 


534    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


l»* 


<    1 


.  I 


;  ( 


1  / 


Vitrified  Glazed  Sewek 
Pipe  and  Clay  Prod- 
ucts 

Fred  L.  Dickey,  chairman. 
R.  S.  Rhodes. 
M.  P.  Chumlea. 

Vitrified  Glazed  Sewer 
Pipe 

A.  C.  McCombe,  chairman. 
H.  B.  Manton. 
H.  £.  KUgus. 

Clothing 

Samuel  Weill,  chairman. 
Wm.  Goldman. 
Chas.  W .  Endel. 
Herbert  C.  Ansorge. 
£dw.  Rosenberg. 
Paul  L.  Feiss. 
Eli  Strauss. 
Geo.  M.  Sherman. 
Ludwiff  Stein. 
A.  D.  Peine. 
Henry  X.  Strauss. 
David  Kirschbaum. 

Collapsible  Tubes 

R.  L.  Kenah,  chairman. 
A.  H.  Wirz. 
George  H.  Neidlinger. 
A.  W.  Paull. 

CoNFECnONERT 

V.  L.  Price,  chairman. 
R.  R.  Cleeland. 
H.  H.  Harris. 
Frank  £.  Gillen. 
F.  A.  Chappell. 
W.  C.  Bidlack. 
Geo.  E.  Close. 
J.  K.  Farley,  jr. 
H.  W.  Hoops. 
W.  H.  Belcher. 
Walter  C.  Hughes. 
Paul  F.  Beich. 
A.  S.  Colebrook. 

Cooperage 

Walker   L.  WeUford,  chair- 

man. 
V.  W.  Krafft. 

E.  H.  Defebaugh. 
A.  J.  Poorman. 
Charles  Hudson. 

W.  Palmer  Clarkson. 

F.  S.  Chariot. 
C.  L.  Harrison. 
Geo.  H.  Martin. 
W.  K.  Knox. 

C.  F.  Meyer. 
W.  F.  Wolfner. 

Corn  Products 

W.  G.  Irwin,  chairman. 
C.  D.  Edinburg. 
J.  B.  Reichmann. 

G.  S.  Mahanna. 

Corsets 

J.  M.  Ullman,  chairman. 
Daniel  Kops. 
W.  A.  Marble. 
R.  C.  Sterton. 
L.  T.  Warner. 
Nelson  Gray. 


Cotton  Manufacturing 

National  Council 

Stuart  W.  Cramer,  chairman. 

Edwin  F.  Green,  vice  chair- 
man. 

Winston  D.  Adams,  secre- 
tary, 

Albert  F.  Bemis. 

Fuller  E.  Gallaway. 

D.  Y.  Cooper. 

PhUip  Y.  DeNormandie. 

Arthur  J.  Draper. 

Albert  G.  Duncan. 

Frank  J.  Hale. 

James  D.  Hammett. 

Allen  F.  Johnson. 

Gerrish  H.  Millikin. 

W.  Frank  Shove. 

Ellison  A.  Smith. 

War  Serviee  Committee 

Gerrish  H.  Millikin,  chair- 
man. 

Arthur  J.  Draper,  vice  chair- 
man. 

J.  S.  Rousmanniere,  secre- 
tary. 

Robert  Amory. 

W.  D.  Anderson. 

J.  Arthur  Atwood. 

Howard  Baetjer. 

Walter  C.  Bayliss. 

Harry  H.  Blunt. 

Bertram  H.  Borden. 

Arthur  T.  Bradlee. 

W.  Irving  Bullard. 

J.  W.  Cannon. 

B.  B.  Comer. 

J.  W-  Cone. 
Philip  Dana. 
George  A.  DeForest. 
B.  H.  Bristow  Draper. 
F.  C.  Dumaine. 
H.  R.  Fitzgerald. 

B.  E.  Geer. 

C.  L.  GiUiland. 
Henry  S.  Howe. 
George  H.  Lanier. 
J.  H.  Ledyard. 
Arthur  H.  Lowe. 
A.  W.  McLellan. 
Victor  M.  Montgomery. 
J.  E.  Osborn. 
Andrew  G.  Pierce,  jr. 
John  Skinner. 

Cotton  Thread 

J.  William  Clark,  chairman. 

W.  H.  Hall. 

H.  £.  Locke. 

Chas.  Spicehandlef. 

W.  W.  Orswell. 

L.  B.  Cranska. 

C.  £.  Barlow. 

Cotton  Waste 

Henry    F.  McGrady,  chair- 
man. 
Joseph  F.  Wallworth. 
Samuel  L.  Ayres. 
Michael  F.  Dunn. 
Jas.  F.  McNeel. 

CxmTAINS 

George  J.  Martin,  chairman. 
M.  E.  Wormser. 

D.  C.  Pierce. 


Pocket  Knives 

Chas.    F.    Rockwell,    chair- 
man. 

C.  B.  Butler. 

D.  Divine,  jr. 
Adolph  Kastor. 
C.  W.  SUcox. 

Dental  Manufacturing 

Frank  H.  Taylor,  chairman. 

7^'  k'  «'■'*'■'  secretary. 
C.  U.  Rother. 

J.  R.  Sheppard. 

H.  A.  Slaight. 

£.  £.  Smith. 

S.  Rubin. 

Drugs 

WiUard  Ohliger,  chau-man. 
Frank  G.  Ryan. 
Donald  McKesson. 
Frederick  G.  Rosengarten. 
w.  A.  aailes. 
Burton  T.  Bush. 
Dr.  H.  C.  Lovis. 
Milton  Campbell. 
Dr.  W.  C.  Abbott. 

Drugs  (Proprietary) 

&*?^  ^  Blair,  chairman. 
W.  E.  Weiss. 
A.  H.  Beardsley. 
Z.  C.  Patten,  jr. 

E.  K.  Hyde. 
Loub  Liggett. 

Drugs  (Wholesale) 

F.  £.  Bogart,  chairman. 
Jas.  W.  Morrison. 

H.  D.  Brewer. 
Terry  T.  Greil. 
C.  F.  Michaels. 
J.  M.  Penland. 
H.  D.  Faxon. 
Roblin  H.  Davis. 
W.  V.  Smith. 
C.  S.  Martin. 
C.  E.  Bedwell. 
W.  G.  Noyes. 
Wm.  Scott. 
R.  R.  Ellis. 
C.  P.  Walbridge. 

Drugs  (Retail) 

Eugene  C.  Brokmeyer,  chair- 

man. 
James  F.  Finneran. 
Robert  J.  Frick. 
James  P.  Crowley. 
Theo.  F.  Hagenow.     . 
Charles  H.  Huhn. 
Samuel  C.  Henry. 
Charles  F.  Harding. 

Dry  Goods  (Wholesale) 

Central  Committee 
John  W.  Scott,  chairman. 
Calvin  M.  Smyth. 
James  M.  Easter. 
Ernest  W.  Stix. 
Leon  Smith. 
Arthur  C.  Farley. 
E.  B.  Snydor. 
Frank  S.  Evans. 


Dbt  Goods  (Wholesale) 

—Continued 

Svieommittee  on  Dress  Fabrics 
H.  Clay  Miller,  chairman. 
Colby  Davics. 
R.  B.  Mc  Kenny. 
D.  W.  Jarvis. 
W.  F.  Dalzell. 
Samuel  D.  French. 
Murray  Brown. 
Fred  T.  Howard. 

Subcommittee  on  Knit  Goods 
Chas.  A.  Jobes,  chairman. 
John  £.  McLoughlin. 
D.  J.  Callaghan. 
J.  H.  Emery. 
A.  Chas.  Wilson. 

Subcommittee  on   Salesmen's 
Samples 
Ward  M.  Burgess,  chairman. 
Bentley  P.  NefiF. 
W.R.King. 
Gaylord  W.  Gillis. 
I.  M.  Parsons. 

Subcommittee  on  Notions  and 
Small  Wares 
Jacob  K.  Lessey,  chairman. 
Thos.  C.  Donovan. 
Julius  Baer. 
J.  Dey  Conover. 
Harry  Wheeler. 

Dry  Goods  (Retail) 

Victor  W.  Sincere,  chairman. 
•      M.  L.  Wilkinson. 
Oscar  Webber. 
S.  J.  Schwartz. 
H.  A.  Saks. 


Sanitary  Earthenware 

J.  A.  Campbell,  chairman. 
A.  M.  Maddock. 
Philip  J.  Flaherty. 

Electric  Railways 

Thos.  N.  McCarter,    chair- 
man. 
Arthur  W.  Brady. 
Britton  I.  Budd. 
Philip  H.  Gadsden. 
Lucius  S.  Storrs. 


Electrical  Manufac- 
turing 

Central  Committee 

Clarence  L.  Collens,  2d,  chair- 
man. 
James  C  Hobart. 
J  R.  McKee. 
William  Wallace  Nichols. 
Robert  K.  Sheppard. 
Charles  A.  Terry. 

Electrical  Apparatus 
Clarence  L.  Collens,  2d,  chair- 
man. 
F.  S.  Hunting. 
T.  £.  Barnum. 
H.  C.  Petty. 
Walter  J.  Friedlander. 
H.  G.  Steele. 


APPENDIX 


Electrical  Supplies 
R.  K.  Sheppard,  chairman. 
J.  F.  Kerfin. 
W.  M.  Stearns. 
H.  R.  Holmes. 
W.  W.  Mumma. 
J.  M.  Woodward. 
H.  W.  Bliven. 
J.  B.  Adams. 
Herman  Plaut. 
H.  G.  Lewis. 

C.  £.  Corrigan. 
F.  W.  Hall. 

H.  W.  McCandless. 
R.  W.  Seabury. 
W.  H.  Thornley. 
H.  D.  Betts. 
Chas.  L.  Eidlitz. 

D.  H.  Murphy 
Wallace  S.  Clark. 
J.  C.  Dallam. 
Charles  G.  Rupert. 
W.  Roy  McCanne. 

Electrical  Supply 
Jobbers 

£.  C.  Graham,  chairman. 
J.  G.  Johannesen. 
W.  F.  P.  Mayo. 

E.  W.  Rockafellow. 
£.  F.  Smith. 


Elevators 

Martin  B.  McLauthlin,  chair- 
man. 

/V«  15  •  OCC* 

I.  B.  Houghton. 
George  T.  Marshall. 
F.  A.  Hecht. 
C.  H.  M.  Atkins. 

Enameled  Ware 

George  D.  Mcllvaine,  chair- 
man. 
Jas.  F.  Conran. 
A.  H.  Cline.  jr. 
J.  E.  Murphy. 
T.  R.  Barnes. 

Engineering 

Clemens  Herschel,  chairman. 
Benj.  B.  Thayer. 
I.  E.  Moultrop. 
Calvert  Townley. 

Civil 
Chas.  S.  Churchill,  chairman. 
Prof.  Geo.  F  Swain. 
Prof.  F.  H.  NeweU. 
Alex.  C.  Humphreys. 
C.  F.  Loweth. 

Electrical 
Harold  W.  Buck,  chairman. 
E.  W.  Rice,  jr. 
N.  A.  Carle. 
Prof.  C.  A.  Adams. 
Charles  £.  Skinner. 

Mechanical 
Dr.  Ira  N.  Hollis,  chairman. 
Chas.  Whiting  Baker. 
George  J.  Foran. 
Chas.  T.  Main. 
Dr.  D.  S.  Jacobus. 


535 


Mining 
P.  N.  Moore,  chairman. 
Sidney  J.  Jennings. 
Benjamin  B.  Lawrence. 
J.  Parke  Channing. 
Edwin  Ludlow. 

Photo-Engraving 

Chas.  W.  Beck,  jr.,  chairman. 

E.  W.  Houser. 
Ad.  Schuetz. 

F.  W.  Gage. 

A.  D.  Sher'dan. 
H.  C.  C.  Stiles. 
S.  E.  Blanchard. 
J.  C.  Buckbee. 
Don  Seitz. 
Matthew  Well. 
W.  J.  Lawrence. 

E.  C.  MUler. 

Fabricated  Steel 

John  Sterling  Deans,  chair- 
man. 
Lewis  F.  Rights. 
Geo.  P.  Bard. 
Thomas  Earle. 
Howard  A.  Fitch. 
W.  A.  Garrigues. 
£.  A.  Gilbert. 
J.  L.  Kimbrough. 
C.D.Marshall. 
Wm.  S.  Simpson,  jr. 
H.  A.  Wagner. 
Paul  Willis. 
C.  Edwin  MichaeL 

Farm  Implements 

C.   S.   Brantingham,    chair- 
man. 

F.  R.  Todd. 

G.  A.  Ranney. 
H.  M.  Wallis. 

W.  H.  Stackhouse. 

Wagons  and  Vehicles 

R.  V.  Board,  chairman. 
H.  J.  McCullough. 
T.  A.  White. 
A.  B.  Thielens. 

Felt 

W.  A.  Forman,  chairman. 
H.  M.  NichoUs. 
John  M.  Richardson. 
J.  C.  Collins. 
G.  M.  Graves. 


Fiber  Containers 

Frederick  A.  Norris,    chair- 
man. 
Chas.  R.  White,  secretary. 
J.  P.  Brunt. 
J.  P.  Hummel. 
Thos.  W.  Ross. 
J.  B.  Fenton. 
Geo.  W\  Gair. 

Flavoring  Extracts 

S.  J.  Sherer,  chairman. 
Frank  L.  Beggs. 
Chas.  D.Joyce. 
W.  M.  McCormick. 
T.  W.  Carman. 


ir 


536    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


l"« 


Hi 


^\ 


Food  Specialties 

Wm.  L.  Sweet,  chairman. 

Frank  H.  MiUaxd. 

R.  R.  Moore. 

Walter  H.  Lipe. 

Walter  B.  Cherry. 

Carl  A.  Lautz. 

Fred  Mason. 

A.  M.  Alexander, 

C.  M.  Rich. 

C.  F,  Mueller,  jr. 

A.  C.  Monaglc. 

E.  G.  McDougall. 

C.  T.  Lee. 

Dr.  T.  B.  Wagner. 
Geo.  H.  Carter. 
Arthur  B.  Williams. 
Louis  Runkel. 

D.  O.  Everhard. 


Foundry  Products 

H.  D.  Miles,  chairman. 
G,  H.  Clamer. 
J.  C.  Haswell. 
Ralph  H.  West. 
C.  E.  Hoyt. 

Foundry  Supplies 

Ralph  Ditty,  chairman. 
Theodore  Kauffman. 
W.  F.  Kainc. 
£.  J.  Woodison. 
H.  M.  Bougber. 


Fur 

Samuel  Ullman,  chairman. 

Charles  W.  Gordon. 

A.  B.  Shubert. 

P.  B.  Fouke. 

Antonin  Chapal. 

F.  N.  Monjo. 

Max  Cohen. 

Aaron  Naumburg. 

Otto  J.  PieUcr. 


Garments 

Galbraitb  Miller,  jr.,   chair- 
man. 
A.  T,  Davenport. 
I.  L.  Phillips. 
Ralph  Hunter. 
John  L  McDonald. 
C.  C.  Overton. 


Gas  and  Electric 
Service 

John  W.  Lieb,  chairman. 
Geo.  W.  Llliott,  secretarv. 
W.  IL  Gartlcy. 
Walter  R.  Addicks. 
Philip  P.  Barton. 
H.  G.  Bradlee. 
John  A.  Britton. 
Alex.  Dow. 
Chas.  L.  Edgar. 
'    A.  E.  Forstall. 
Jos.  F.  Guffcy. 
Saml.  Insull. 
D.  C.  Jackson. 
Joa.  B.  McCall. 
Capt.  Wm.  E.  McKay. 
Herbert  A.  Wagner. 
S.  S.  Wyer. 


Gas  Engines 

H.  G.  Diefendorf,  chairman, 

Rufus  K.  Schriber. 

Geo.  W.  Schwer. 

G.  F.  Fithian. 

C.  B.  Segner. 

C.  Hcer. 

Walter  Brown. 

Geo.  Hanson. 

Lester  H.  Keim. 

Lester  S.  Keilholtz. 

C.  E.  Bement. 

G.  L.  Lewis. 

Carl  Velguth. 

Gears 

F.  W.  Sinram,  chairman. 
Henry  E.  Eberhardt. 
Frank  D.  Hamlin. 
Milton  Rupert. 
George  L.  Markland,  jr. 
Frank  Burgess. 
E.  J.  Frost. 
H.  W.  Chapin. 
William  Ganschow. 

Window  Glass 

W.  L.  Monro,  chairman. 
C.  W.  Brown. 
H.  J.  Walter. 
H.  R.  Hilton. 
U.  G.  Baker. 

Grain 

Dealers  and  Exchanges 
C.  B.  Pierce,  chairman. 
G.  F.  Ewe. 
E.  S.  Westbrook. 
John  O.  Ballard. 
John  H.  MacMillan. 
Herbert  Hall. 
Chaa.  D.  Jones. 
Hiram  N.  Sager. 
O.  M.  Mitchell. 
Geo.  E.  Pierce. 
E.  C.  Elkenberry, 
Frank  I.  King. 
E.  M.  Wayne. 
E.  A.  Fitzgerald. 

E.  W.  Crouch. 
U.  F.  demons. 
A.  E.  Reynolds. 

F.  C.  Van  Dusen. 

Granite  Paving  Blocks 

H.  E.  Fletcher,  chairman. 
C.  Harry  Rogers. 
Joseph  Leopold. 
Wm.  Booth. 
W.  F.  Shaffner. 
Alfred  T.  Rhodes. 

Grinding  Wheels 

Carl  F.  Dietz,  chairman. 

Geo.  R.  Rayner. 

L.  T.  Byers. 

E.  Bertram  Pike. 

Frank  R.  Henry. 


Groceries  (Wholesale) 

Wm.  L.  Juhring,  chairman. 

John  C.  Mablan. 

H.  J.  Sills. 

C.  Schuster. 

George  Bochm. 

Frank  Depew. 

John  C.  Dorn. 


Metal  Gauge 

t"  ?•  ^if'^Patrick,  chairman. 
J.  A.  lilden. 
T.  C.  Clifford. 
A.  A.  Ainsworth. 

Hardware 

Hardware  Manufacturers  Or- 
ganizationfor  War  Service 
President 
Charles  W.  Asbury. 

Assistant  Executive  Manager 
".  H.  Robinson. 
Secretarjf-  Treasurer 
F.  D.  Mitchell. 
Executive  Committee 
Fayette  R.  Plumb,  chairman, 
rrank  Baackes. 
A.  W.  Stanley. 

Subcommittee    on    Wire    and 
Heavy  Hardware 
Chas.  E.  Sanders,  chairman. 
James  Hay. 
Wm.  M.  Taussig; 
W.  J.  McCurdy. 
Warren  D.  Chase. 
W.  H.  Remmel. 
W.  D.  Biggers. 
John  A.  Moore. 
H.  F.  Sevnour. 
Frederick  Pease. 
Wm.  Jennings. 
Geo.  H.  Kennedy. 

Subcommittee     on     Builders 
Hardware  and  Small  Cast' 
tngs 

H.  B.  Sargent,  chairman. 

H.  C.  M.  Thomson. 

Albert  Zimmerman.  • 

W.  P.  Benson. 

F.  A.  Searle. 

H.  B.  Plumb. 

E.  H.  Stearns. 

Subcommittee    on    Tools  for 
Woodworking 
H.  B.  Curtis,  chairman. 
Charles  C.  Haselton. 
H.  B.  Curtis. 
W.  C.  Kelly. 
Wm.  M.  Pratt. 
R.  E.  Maher. 
Paul  E.  Heller. 
Wallace  L.  Pond. 
Chas.  F.  Griffith. 
Wm.  Morrill. 
Irving  S.  Kemp. 
Fred  Buck. 
J.  B.  Wilbur,  jr. 
J.  L,  Jennings. 
S.  Horace  Disston. 

Subcommittee    on    Tools  for 
McU.l  Working 

Frederick  L.   Payne,    chair- 
man. 

L.  F.  Fichthorn. 

A.  E.  Woodruff. 

Wm.  M.  Pratt. 

D.  Findlay. 
George  Butterfield. 
F.  G.  Echols. 
Frank  L.  Coes. 

J.  H.  Williams. 
J.  E.  Durham. 
Jas.  Gcddes. 

E.  S.  Miller. 

F.  O.  Wells. 
H.  S.  Ashman. 


Hardware — Continued 

Subcommittee  on  Agricultural 
Tools 
J.  S.  Bonbright,  chairman. 
Ed.  S.  Burt. 
W.  H.  Cowdery. 
C.  S.  Phillips. 

Subcommittee  on  Cutlery 
Chas.  F.  Rockwell,  chairman. 
R.  F.  Chatillon. 
P.  Van  .\lstyne. 
O.  W.  Edwards. 
W.  W.  Page. 
C.  L.  Gairoard. 

Subcommittee  on  General  5tip- 
plies 
E.  Bertram  Pike,  chairman. 
E.  C.  Hough. 
A.  J.  Crandall. 
L.  P.  Smith. 
H.  E.  Smith. 
C.  Heinrich. 

Hardware  Jobbers 

(Southern) 

Charles  H.  Ireland,  chairman. 
Oscar  B.  Barker. 
John  Donnan. 

Men*8  Straw  ELats 

Charles  H.  Watson,  chairman^ 
Daniel  G.  Tenney. 
S.  George  Wolf. 
Fred  G.  Phelps. 
Fletcher  H.  Montgomery. 
Robert  J.  Patterson. 

Hats  (Wholes.\le) 

R.  T.  Langenberg,  chairman 
W.  H.  Ferry. 
Robert  J.  Patterson. 
Charles  Watson. 
Fred  Berg. 

Hosiery 

W.  B.  Davis,  chairman. 

E.  B.  Gaylord. 
C.  L.  Perkins. 
P.  C.  Withers. 
W.  H.  Ziock. 
T.  F.  Theime. 
H.  T.  Rollins. 
W.  H.  McLeUan. 
J.  L.  Johnson. 
J.  O.  Wells. 

F.  A.  Patrick. 
A.  W.  Sulloway. 
C.  W.  Kilbourn. 
F.  L.  Chipman. 
Charles  W.  Adler. 
Jos.  S.  Rambo. 
Edward  Powell. 
Robert  C.  Blood. 
W.  Park  Moore. 
Gustav  Oberlaender. 
George  D.  Horst. 
Chas.  E.  Leippe. 
Shepard  Nicholson. 
Garnett  Andrews. 
C.  A.  Plumley. 
L.  B.  Conway. 
R.  N.  Kimball. 
L.  Heilbronner. 


APPENDIX 


Underwear 

Hewitt    Coburn,  jr.,  chair- 
man. 

A.  C.  Dunhan. 
L.  W.  Tiffany. 

B.  C.  Stephenson. 
J.  C.  Roulette. 

C.  P.  Baker. 
Chas.  L.  Macomber. 

C.  F.  Winship. 

D.  L.  Galbraith. 

E.  A.  Clements. 
Myron  H.  Pi  well. 

F.  M.  Stowell. 
Nathan  Hatch. 
John  K.  Stewart. 
Marshall  Ely. 
F.  B.  Harder. 
S.  Wright,  jr. 
Rodney  W.  Jones. 
Andrew  Frey. 

F.  W.  Kavanaugh. 
W.  C.  Ruffin. 
P.  H.  Hanes,  jr. 
L.F.  Flesh. 

F.  M.  Shipley. 
J.  L.  Black. 
Joseph  Feldenheimer 
Benj.  Gibbs. 

Roy  W.  Lotspeich. 
H.  S.  Cooper. 
S.  D.  Bausher. 

Sweater  Coats 

William  H.  Wye,  chairman. 

A.  W.  Spalding. 

Isaac  Roff. 

C.  T.  Hays. 

H.  Friedman. 

H.  T.  BaUard. 

Frederick  Mayer. 

G.  H.  Packard. 
W.  B.  TyreU. 
Otto  A.  Finck. 

Hospitals 

Dr.  S.  S.  Goldwater,  chair- 
man. 
Richard  P.  Borden,  secretary. 
Daniel  T.  Test. 
A.  A.  Warner. 
Dr.  Wm.  A.  White. 

Ice 

Harry  Hammond,  chairman. 

Wm.  E.  Zieber. 

J.  C.  Kent. 

M.  J.  O'Connell. 


537 


Printing  Ink 

C.  F.  Bower,  chairman. 
L.  A.  Ault. 
James  A.  Ullman. 
K.  W.  Harden. 
Philip  Ruzton. 

Iron  and  Steel 

Central  Committee 
Elbert  H.  Gary,  chairman. 
James  A.  Farrell,  vice  chair- 
man. 
James  A.  Burden. 
Alva  C.  Dinkey. 
Willis  L.  King. 
E.  J.  Grace. 
Charles  M.  Schwab. 
John  A.  Topping. 


Central  Commitlee—Con. 
H.  D.  Dalton. 
A.  F.  Houston. 
J.  A.  Campbell. 
L.  E.  Block. 
£.  A.  S.  Clarke. 
W.  H.  Cook. 

Steel  Distribution 

J.  A.  Farrell,  chairman. 

J.  B.  Bonner,  vice  chairman. 

E.  A.  S.  Clarke. 

John  A.  TopDincr. 

F.J.Hall. 

W.  L.  Hoffman. 

O.  P.  Blake. 

H.  F.  Holloway. 

Alloy* 
James  A.  Farrell,  chairman. 
E.  A.  S.  Clarke. 
E.  G.  Grade. 
£.  J.  Lavino 
A.  A.  Fowler. 

Sheet  Steel 
W.  S.  Horner,  chairman. 
Walter  C.  Carroll. 
Charles  O.  Hadley. 

Pig  Tin 
John  Hughes,  chairman. 
E.  R.  Crawford. 
John  A.  Frye. 
A.  B.  HaU. 
Theodore  Pratt. 

Scrap  Iron  and  Steel 
W.  Vernon  Phillips,    chair- 
man. 

Scrap  dealers 
Charles  Driefus. 
Joseph  Michaels. 
Eli  Joseph. 

C.  A.  Barnes. 

H.  B.  Spackman. 
W.  M.  Tobias. 
Charles  E.  McKiUips. 

Iron  bar  manufaeturert 
John  C.  Brown. 
Walter  C.  Ely. 

Rail  reroUert 

D.  C.  Schonthals. 
Arthur  S.  Hook. 

Steel  foundries  and  electric  fur* 
naees 
Theodore  E.  Morritz. 
Rodney  Thayer. 


Crucible  steel  makers 
J.  S.  Pendleton. 

Gray  iron  and  malleable  foun- 
dries 
Benjamin  D.  Fuller. 

Pig  Iron  Ore  and  Lake  Trant^ 
portation 
H.  G.  Dalton,  chairman. 
D.Billings. 
H.  Coulby. 
C.  D.  Dyer. 
Leonard  Peckitt. 
F.  B.  Richards. 
W.  T.  Sheppard. 
A.  H.  Woodward. 
Amaza  S.  Mather. 


538    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


i    m 


I 


,1 


I  ' 


'»! 


# 


I 


Iron  and  Steel — Con. 

Tin  Plate 
J.  I.  Andrews,  chairman. 
E.  R.  Crawford. 

E.  T.  Weir. 

Malleable  Cariinge 
Frank  J.  Lanahan.  chairman. 
H.  F.  Pope. 
J.  C.  Haswell. 

F.  L.  Sivyer. 
Frederick  Fraser. 

Wire  Roj)e 
Karl  G.  Roebling,  chairman. 
John  J.  Broderick. 
Frank  Baackes. 

Wire  Products 
F.  Baackes,  chairman. 
George  A.  Mason. 
John  C.  Neale. 
J.  E.  Frederick. 
H.  Sandborn  Smith. 

Cold  Rolled  and  Dratcn  Steel 
F.  N.  Beegle,  chairman. 
E.  L.  Parker. 
Roland  Gerry. 

Tubtdar  Products 
Jas.  A.  Campbell,  chairman. 
Anson  Mark. 
George  Matheson. 
W.  H.  Rowe. 
E.  Wircester. 
H.  A.  Beale,  jr. 
L.  M.  Johnson. 

Iron,  Steel  and  Heavy 
Hardware  (Jobbers) 

Samuel  L.  Orr,  chairman. 
Chas.  M.  Roehm. 
Jas.  A.  Coe. 

Jewelers 

Robert  B.  Steele,  chairman. 
George  H.  Wilcox. 
George  E.  Fahys. 
David  Belais. 
Col.  Harry  L.  Brown. 
John  S.  Holbrook. 
W.  F.  Juergens. 
Herbert  L.  Farrow. 
Rolland  G.  Monroe. 
Wilson  A.  Streeter. 
Harold  E.  Sweet. 
Fred  G.  Tbearle. 
J.  S.  Van  Wezel. 
Henry  Wolcott. 

Jewelers  (New  Eng- 
land) 

Louis  Lyons,  chairman. 
Maurice  J.  Baer. 
Harry  Fulford. 
Stephen  H,  Garner. 
Geo.  H.  Holmes. 
Frederick  A.  Howard. 
Harold  W.  Ostby. 
Harold  E.  Sweet. 
Henry  B.  Thresher. 
Chas.  A.  Whiting. 
Henry  Wolcott. 
Woodward  Booth. 


Sterling  Silver  and  Sil- 
ver Plate  Ware 

Geo.  H.  WiJcoz,  chairman. 
H.  B.  Dominick. 
F.  A.  Wallace. 
J.  Wayland  Smith. 
Frederick  Webster. 
John  S.  Holbrook. 
H.  H.  Tredwell. 
W.  A.  Kinsman. 
Andrew  Snow,  jr. 
Cleveland  A.  Dunn. 

Jewelers'    Vigilance 
Committee 

Harry  C.  Larter,  chairman. 
Geo.  E.  Wilcox,   vice  chair- 
man. 
Geo.  E.  Fahys.    - 
David  Belais. 
Col.  Harry  L.  Brown. 
O.  G.  Fessenden. 
John  S.  Holbrook. 
W.  F.  Juergens. 
Herbert  L.  Farrow. 
Rolland  G.  Monroe. 
Wilson  A.  Streeter. 
Harold  E.  Sweet. 
Fred.  G.  Thearle. 
J.  S.  Van  Wezel. 
Henry  Wolcott. 

Lime 

Chas.  C.  Bye,  chairman. 
J.  K.  Barbour. 
£.  R.  Stapleton. 
J.  L.  Durnell. 
Charles  R.  Leo. 
Henry  Angel. 
A.  H.  Lauman. 

Employing  Lithogra- 
phers 

Wm.  S.  Forbes,  chairman. 
Herbert  H.  Bigelow. 
Walter  Clothier. 
Joseph  Deutsch. 
Charles  R.  Frederickson. 
W.  A.  Livingstone. 
Earl  H.  Macey. 
George  R.  Meyercord. 
William  Monasch. 
Alfred  B.  Rode. 
Maurice  Saunders. 
Harry  C.  Stevenson 
Jacob  A.  Voice. 

Lumber 

Oeorgia-Florida  Yellow  Pine 
M.  L.  Fleishel,  chairman. 
J.  E.  Graves. 
E.  V.  Dunlevie. 
R.  M.  Bond. 
R.  H.  Paul. 
D.  G.  Goit. 
H.  R.  Swartz. 

Mieeissippi  and  Alabama 
N.  S.  Curtis,  chairman. 
M.  C.  Lumley. 
S.  S.  Stuckey. 

North  Carolina  Pine 
A.  M.  Cooke,  chairman. 
R.  J.  Clifford. 
Gilbert  L.  Hume. 
J.  W.  Foreman. 
Nathan  O'Berry. 
Claude  Kiser. 


Lumber — Continued 

Northern  Pine 
George   F.    Lindsay,     chair* 

man. 
R.  E.  McLean. 
R.  R.  Bailey. 

Southern  Pine 
W.  H.  Sullivan,  chairman. 
F.  W.  Stevens. 
John  L.  Kaul. 

C.  A.  Buchner. 
R.  M.  HallowelL 
V.  M.  Scanlon. 
M.  B.  Nelson. 

D.  V.  Dierks. 

T.  L.  L.  Temple. 
W.  M.  Cady. 
W.  B.  Patterson. 
F.  L.  Sanford. 

Lumber  (Wholesale) 

Edward  Eiler,  chairman. 
£.  H.  Stoner. 
Max  Meyers. 
Thomas  E.  Coale. 
H.  W.  McDonough. 
R.  R.  Sizer. 

B.  H.  Ellington. 

Machine  Tools 

C.  Wood  Walter,  chairman. 
Chas.  E.  Hildreth. 

A.  £.  Newton. 


Malt 

G.  W.  Hales,  chairman. 
Oscar  J.  Ruh. 
Fred  Vullmahn. 
Albert  Zinn. 
Phil.  A.  Grau. 

Marble  (Dealers) 

Charles  L.  Hilgartner,  chair* 

man. 
Capt.  Ed.  R.  Morse. 
Col.  Sam.  Tate. 
J.  J.  McClymont. 

Surgical     Instruments 
and  Medical  Trade 
Supplies  (Retailers) 

Wm.  Gibson,  chairman. 
J.  F.  Hartz. 
E.  F.  Mahady. 

Mill  and  Mine  Supplies 

and     MACHINERy 

(Dealers) 

Ernest  Howell,  chairman. 

J.  G.  Bel  ding. 

J.  H.  Haslam. 

W.  Marshall  Turner. 

Milling 

Jas.  F.  Bell,  chairman. 
Fred  J.  Lingham. 
E.  M.  Kelly. 
Mark  Mennel. 
Bernard  A.  Eckhart. 
Saml.  L.  Plant. 
A.  J.  Hunt. 
Theodore  B.  Wilc<w. 
A.  C.  Loring. 


Rice  Milling 

J.  R.  Leguenec,  chairman. 

J.  E.  Broussard. 

F.  A.  Godchaux. 

J.  A.  Foster. 

W.  S.  Davis. 

Oak  H.  Rhodes. 

Optical  Goods 

Dr.  Frederick  Willson,  chair- 

man. 
H.  S.  Wherrett. 
Beverly  Chew. 
Wm.  A.  D.  Drescher. 
Channing  M.  Wells. 
Frederick  Willson. 
Carl  M.  Bernegau. 

Opticians  (Wholesale) 

A.  Reed  Mclntire,  chairman. 
George  S.  Johnston. 

B.  W.  King. 
R.  C.  Thompson. 
Max  Zadek. 

Paint 

Thomas  Neal,  chairman. 
E.  T.  Trigg. 
W.  H.  Phillips. 
George  A.  Martin. 
E.  W.  Heath. 
Charles  S.  Kennedy. 

Paint,  Oil  and  Varnish 

E.  J.  Cornish,  chairman. 
W.  H.  Corringham. 
James  B.  Lord. 
Chas.  J.  Caspar. 
Arthur  S.  Somers. 
W.  D.  Foss. 
Howard  Kellogg. 

Varnish 

Arthur  Davis,  chairman. 

J.  H.  McNulty. 

Adrian  D.  Joyce. 

J.  B.  Lord. 

J.  J.  Nicholson. 

A.  C.  Morgan. 

Orrin  S.  Goan. 

Carl  J.  Sobuman 

P.  H.  Callahan. 


Lithophonb 

A.  S.  Krebs,  chairman. 
P.  S.  Tilden. 
F.  S.  Havens. 

Master  House  Painters 

AND  Decorators 

A.  H.  McGhan,  chairman. 
Chas.  Macnichol. 
John  Dewar. 
P.  J.  Collins. 
Jacob  Layendecker. 

Paper  and  Pulp 

A.  B.  Daniels,  chairman. 
A.  D.  Naylor,  secretary. 
F.  L.  Stevens. 
A.  W.  Esleeck. 
C.  W.  Lyman. 
M.  E.  Marcuse. 
L.  E.  Nash. 
F.  S.  Harrison. 


APPENDIX 


Paper  and  Pulp  —  Con. 

W.  J.  Eisner. 
Phillips  Kimball. 
Allison  Dodd. 
G.  F.  Merriam. 
R.  B.  Harbison. 
B.  A.  Van  Winkle. 
D.  A.  Smith. 
W.  A.  Forman. 


539 


Paper  Bags 

M.  B.  Wallace,  chairman. 

H.  E.  Westervelt. 

C  D.  Adams. 

H.  Elsas. 

A.  A.  McIIvain. 

Rope  Paper  and  Rope 
Paper  Sacks 

L.  K.  Southard^  chairman. 
£.  B.  Allen. 
John  A.  Manning. 
R.  T.  Spencer. 
M.  A.  Thomas. 

Petroleum 

[National  Petroleum  War 

Service  Committee.] 
A.  C.  Bedford,  chairman. 
E.  C.  Luf  kin,  vice  chairman. 
E.  L.  Doheny. 
Geo.  S.  Davison. 
H.  F.  Sinclair. 
J.  W.  Van  Dyke. 
J.  H.  Markham,  jr. 
Dr.  Van  H.  Manning. 
W.  C.  Teagle.        ^ 
S.  Messer, 
J.  S.  Cosden. 
Frank  Haskell. 
W.  S.  Parish. 
E.  W.  Clark. 
R.  D.  Benson. 
J.  H.  Barr. 
M.  J.  Byrne. 

A.  G.  Maguire. 
Edward  Prizer. 
J.  Howard  Pew. 
Martin  Carey. 

B.  G.  Dawes. 
H.  L.  Doherty. 
A.  P.  Coombe. 
W.  P.  Cowan. 
H.  E.  Felton. 
J.  F.  Guffey. 
J.  E.  O'Neil 
J.  C.  Donnell. 
H.  M.  Blackmer. 
Geo.  W.  Crawford. 
R.  L.  Welch. 
J.  A.  Moffett,  Jr. 

C.  C.  Smith. 

Pacific  Coatt 

■  E.  W.  Clark,  chairman. 

H.  R.  Gallagher. 

John  Barneson. 

F.  B.  Henderson. 

K.  R.  Kingsbury. 

L.  P.  St.  Clair. 

J.  K.  Firth. 

Rocky  Mountain  Division 
H.  M.  Blackmer,  chairman. 
F.  W.  Freeman,  vice   chair- 
man. 
F.  E.  Hurley. 
P.  L.  Wilson. 
E.  T.  Clark. 


Rocky  Mountain  Division — 
Continued 
Martin  McGrath. 
B.  B.  Brooks. 
E.  T.  Wilson. 
A.  H.  Richardson. 
John  C.  Howard. 
Albert  Kline. 

Midcontinent  Production 
Frank  Haskell,  chairman. 
Art  Walker.  . 

P.  C.  Ding. 
J.  H.  Evans. 
J.  F.  Darby. 
D.  F.  Connolly. 
Frank  Breene. 
Judge  J.  J.  Shea. 
A.  J.  Diescher. 
John  Landon. 
Deering  J.  MarshalL 
J.  Edgar  Pew. 
Dana  H.  Kelsey. 
Henry  McGraw. 
R.  M.  McFarland. 
James  A.  Veasey. 

Gulf  Production 

yf.  S.  Parish,  chairman. 

J.  C.  Wilson. 

M.  Guiterman. 

J.  M.  West. 

C.  O.  Noble. 

W.  C.  Woolf. 

R.  E.  Brooks. 

M.  B.  Sweeney, 

C.  K.  Clarke. 

T.  P.  Lee. 

Underwood  Nazro. 

H.  K.  Arnold. 

Western  Appalachian  Pro- 
duction 
J.  C.  Donnell,  chairman. 
John  A.  Beck. 
Daniel  E.  Jones. 
C.  L.  Casterline. 
John  S.  Abbott. 
J.  D.  Madding. 
L.  G.  Neely. 
E.  R.  Riggs. 
Jas.  H.  Snowden. 
O.  F.  Thompson. 
E.  B.  Cochran. 
Frank  McNeal. 
W.  L.  Parmenter. 
Jas.  K.  Kerr. 
W.  B.  Filson. 

Eastern  Appalachian  Produc- 
tion 
Geo.  W.  Crawford,  chairman. 
T.  W.  Phillips,  jr.,  vice  chair- 
man. 
L.  W.  Young,  jr. 
Thomas  H.  Kennedy. 
Arthur  F.  Corwin. 
E.  P.  Whitcomb. 
John  Davidson. 
J.  E.  Trainer. 
John  Mills. 
Norwood  Johnston. 
R.  W.  McIIvain. 
J.  T.  Hervey. 


^W^. 


Midcontinent    Refining    and 
Marketing 
J.  S.  Cosden,  chairman. 
R.  L.  Welch,  vice  chairman. 
L.  J.  Drake. 
P.  M.  MiskeU. 


i, 


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1 

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540    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


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Petroleum — G)ntinued 

Midcontinent  Refining  and 
Marketing. — Continued. 

E.  E.  Shock. 
Thos.  P.  Melvin. 

F.  H.  Thwing. 
C.  A.  Braley. 
Weston  Atwood. 
Pat.  Malloy. 
Frank  B.  Fretter 
W.  S.  Ayers. 
Geo.  W.  Moore. 
J.  C.  McDonald. 
R.  C.  Holmes. 
Col.  R.  W.  Stewart. 
Dr.  Wm.  M.  Burton, 


Appalachian      Refining      and 
Marketing 

S.  Messer,  chairman. 

Wm.  J.  Patterson,  vice  chair- 
man. 

G.  H.  Stansbury. 

Cbaa.  A.  Sherwood. 

Frank  B.  Fretter. 

F.  S.  Heath. 

Harry  A.  Logan. 

C.  B.  Dallum. 

Jas.  A.  Berry. 

W.  Y.  Cartwrighl. 

T.  J.  WiDiams. 

R.  E.  Goodwin. 


Dittribtdion   in  Allantie   Diri- 

tion 
E.  C.  Lufkin,  churman. 
C.     E.     Woodbridge,     vice 

chairman. 
T.  J.  Williams. 
Henry  Fisher. 
C.  G.  Meinken. 
G.  R.  Nutty. 
Frederic  Ewing. 
J.  L.  Rake. 
W.  D.  Baker. 
Byron  D.  Benson. 
N.  G.  M.  Luyk. 
Harry  C.  Carr. 
O.  E.  Thurber. 
N.  H.  Weber. 
W.  D.  Anderson. 
G.  H.  Stansbury. 


Advisory  Committee  on  Jobbers 

Judge  M.  J.  Bjrrne,  chairman. 
A.  G.   Maguire,  vice  chair- 
man. 
G.  I.  Sweney. 
C.  E.  Mather. 
A.  H.  Caward. 
C.  L.  Maguire. 
E.  C.  Winters. 
H.  E.  Mills. 
W.  H.  Fehsenfeld. 
T.  S.  Black. 


Pipe    Liru$  in  Atlaniie  Diri- 
tion 
R.  D.  Benson,  chairman. 
D.  S.  Busbell,  vice  chairman. 
C.  H.  Kountz. 
Forrest  M.  Towl. 
Daniel  O.  Towl. 
Ward  A.  Miller. 
A.  E.  Watts. 
W.  J.  Higgins. 
Geo.  L.  Webb. 


Pipe  Lines  in  Southern  Divi- 
iion 

Geo.  S.  Davison,  chairman. 

Underwood  Nazro,  vice  chair- 
man. 

C.  H.  Kountz. 

C.  K.  Clarke. 

E.  R.  Brown. 

T.  J.  Donoghue. 

Allan  Towl. 

Henry  McGraw 

Tank  Care 
H.  E.  Felton,  chairman. 

E.  C.  Sicardi,  vice  chairman. 
L.  H.  Benner. 

W.  E.  McEwen. 

F.  W.  Boltz. 
W.  H.  MiUer. 
C.  B.  Ellis. 
Wm.  Jervis. 
David  Copland. 
A.  T.  Stewart. 
H.  W.  Roe. 

L.  F.  Jordan. 
R.  H.  McElroy. 
R.  W.  Ostrander. 
S.  G.  Casad. 

E.  H.  Porter. 

Sttpervisors   of   Rail 
Transportation 

Wettem  District 
W.  E.  McEwen. 

Fastem  Division 

F.  W.  Boltz. 

Oil  Well  Supplies 
J.  H.  Barr,  chairman. 
A.  A.  Moody,  vice  chairman. 
Louis  C.  Sands. 

F.  D.  Clark,  ir. 
WillUm  K.  Hughea. 
M.  L.  Moore. 
J.  H.  McDonald. 
W.  M.  Patterson. 
James  W.  Sloan. 
John  M.  Wilson. 

Natural  Gas 
Jos.  F.  Guffey,  chairman. 
W.  Y.  Cartwright, 
J.  C.  McDowell. 
Geo.  W.  Crawford. 

G.  T.  Braden. 
David  O.  Holbrook. 
James  A.  Veasey. 
T.  O.  Sullivan. 
J.  G.  Peer. 

Pharmact 

Samuel  L.  Hilton,  chairman. 
A.  R.  L.  Dohme. 
Dr.  J.  H.  Beal. 

Phonographs 

H.  L.  Willson,  chairman. 
Ralph  L.  Freeman. 
Charles  Edison. 
Eugene  A.  Widman. 
Jacob  Schechter. 
W.  H.  Alfring. 
Arthur  Cushman. 
L.  Rommell. 
Julius  Balke. 
Louis  Man<kL 


Pickles 

F.  A.  Brown,  churman. 

C.  J.  Sutphen. 
P.  J.  Claussen. 
F.  A.  Vickers. 

Pipe  AND  Supplies 

W.  E.  Clow,  jr.,  chairman. 

W.  W.  Ross. 

F.  M.  Sheldon. 

M.  G.  Barkley. 

W.  P.  Mars. 

Marshall  Turner. 

L.  C.  Huesmann. 

PLUMsma  Supplies 

John  A.  Murray,  chairman. 
John  McC.  Chase. 

Master  Plubibers 

Walter  D.  Nolan,  chairman. 
John  Trainer. 

D.  F.  Durkin. 

SeboporcelainandChina 

W.  E.  Wells,  chairman. 

C.  C.  Ashbaugh. 
Chas.  L.  Sebring. 
H.  D.  Wintringer. 

A.  G.  Dale. 

D.  William  Scammell. 

E.  L.  Torbert. 

POTTERT 

W.  E.  Wells,  chairman. 
Marcus  Aaron. 
C.  C.  Ashbauj^h. 
Chas.  L.  Sebring. 
Joseph  Mayer. 

Pressed  Metals 

C.  H.  L.  Flinterman,  chair- 
man. ^ 
James  Sinyard. 

B.  S.  Gier. 

A.  F.  Schroeder. 
W.  W.  Galbreatb. 

C.  E.  Hunter. 
W.  H.  Hill. 
J.  F.  Savage. 
W.  H.  Oakes. 

J.  R.  Kilbonme. 
C.  L.  Pierce. 
W.  S.  Bailey. 
H.  L.  Green. 

PRiNTiNa  Presses 

Edgar  H.  Cottrell,  chairman. 
Arthur  Bentley. 
Saml.  G.  Goss. 
Geo.  D.  Kirkham. 

Pumps 

J.  W.  Gardner,  chairman. 

G.  R.  Deming. 

L.  B.  Anderson. 

J.  D.  Cone. 

Robert  E.  Hall. 

E.  T.  Fishwick. 

R.  R.  Hicks. 

Railway  Cars 

W.  F.  M.  Goss,  chairman. 

E.  F.  Carry. 
J.  M.  Hansen. 

F.  N.  Hoffstot. 
W.  H.  Woodin. 
W.  C.  Arthurs. 


Refractories 

Porter  S.  Kier,  chairman. 
£.  M.  Allen. 
J.  H.  Cavender. 
R.  D.  Hatton. 
Robt.  A.  B.  Walsh. 

A.  P.  Tayl9r. 

D.  D.  Davis. 
H.  E.  Stuhler. 
C.  C.  Edmunds. 
C.  W.  Keller. 

C.  H.  Claiborne, 
Cyrus  Borgner. 
J.  J.  Brooks,  jr. 
H.  L.  Tredennick. 
F.  E.  Robinson. 

Refrigerators 

B.  F.  Hall,  chairman. 
George  H.  Rice. 

H.  C.  Leonard. 

E.  E.  McCray. 

E.  A.  McKee. 

F.  L.  Northey. 

Rubber 

Central  Committee 

B.  G.  Work,  churman. 
H.  S.  Firestone. 

J.  N.  Gunn. 

G.  B.  Hodgman. 
Paul  W.  Litchfield. 
H.  T.  Dunn. 

C.  T.  Wilson. 

Aircraft 

P.  W.  litcbfield.  diairman. 

A.  E.  Jury. 

V.  Van  der  Linde. 

Bo(As  and  Shoes 
H.  E.  Sawyer,  chairman. 
Francis  S.  Dane. 
J.  A.  Rishel. 
J.  N.  Gunn. 
Wm.  G.  HilL 

Clothinp 
N.  Lincoln  Greene,  chairman. 
S.  T.  Hodgman. 
C.  Kenyon,  jr. 
G.  B.  Hodgman. 
L.  C.  Himebaugh. 

Crude   Rubber  and   Kindred 
Products 
C.  T.  Wilson,  chairman. 

B.  G.  Work. 

G.  B.  Hodgman. 
Henry  Spadone. 
W.  E.  Bruyn. 
W.  J.  Kelly. 
H.  S.  Hotchkiss. 
E.  H.  Huxley. 
H.  T.  Dunn. 

Foreign  Trade 

E.  H.  Huxley,  chairman. 
Henry  G.  Tyler. 

Wm.  B.  Leigbton. 
R.  J.  Owens. 
A.  S.  Hardy. 
R.  H.  Darnels. 

F.  E.  ritus. 

G.  B.  Hodgman. 

Oas  Defense 
Dr.  W.  C.  Geerm,  churman. 
William  Stephens. 
Dr.  Theo.  Whittelsey. 


APPENDIX 


Hard  Rubber 
H.  Weida.  chairman. 
John  Joseph. 
Bruce  Bedford. 
Philip  H.  Campbell. 
Samuel  H.  Doad. 
J.  N.  Gunn. 

Insulated  Wire  and  Cables 
Wallace  S.  Clark,  chairman. 
George  B,  North. 
Fred  K.  Dunbar. 
Edward  Sawyer. 
J.  N.  Gunn. 

Mechanical  Goods  {Commer- 
cial) 
E.  S.  Williams,  churman. 
W.  O.  Rutherford. 
Arthur  F.  Townsend. 
C.  6.  Garretson. 
Guy  E.  Norwood. 
John  A.  Lambert. 
John  J.  Voorhees. 
P.  W.  Litchfield. 

Mechanical  Goods  (Technical) 
Dr.  W.  C.  Geer.  chairman. 
N.  S.  Noble. 
J.  W.  Fellows. 
Chas.  T.  Young. 
S.  R.  Clark. 
Dr.  A.  A.  Somerville. 
W.  H.  Cobb. 
P.  W.  Litchfield. 

Medical  and  Sundries  ^ 

A.  W.  Warren,  chairman. 
W.  S.  Davison. 

W.  0.  Rutherford. 
Chas.  J.  Davol. 
J.  Russell  Parker. 
G.  B.  Hodgman. 

Pneumatic  Tires  (Commercial) 
G.  M.  Stadelman,  chairman. 
J.  C.  Weston. 
W.  O.  Rutherford. 

E.  H.  BroadwelL 
R.  J.  Firestone. 
Seneca  G.  Lewis. 
John  S.  Broughton. 
P.  W.  Litchfield. 

Pneumatic  Tires  (Technical) 
P.  W  Litchfield,  chairman. 
Wm.  McMahan. 

B.  J.  Stokes. 
J.  C.  Tuttle. 
J.  D.  Tew. 
Louis  T.  Vance. 
J.  D.  Anderson. 

Railway  Supply 
H.  E.  Raymond*  diairman. 
J.  H.  Cobb. 
J.  S.  Broughton. 
Guy  E.  Norwood. 
J.  H.  KeUy. 
G.  E.  Hall. 
J.  N.  Gunn. 

Reclaimed  Rubber 

F.  H.  Appleton,  chairman. 
E.  A.  Anderson. 

John  S.  Clapp. 
Rudolph  A.  Low. 
John  S.  Lowman. 
Joseph  F.  McLean. 
J.  N.  Gunn. 


541 


Solid  Tires 
H.  S.  Firestone,  chairman. 
P.  W.  Litchfield. 
C.  J.  Welch. 
Thomas  F.  Walsh. 
W.  H.  Allen. 
H.  T.  Dunn. 

Ohio  Sandstone  Indus- 
try 

W.  A.  C.  Smith,  diairman. 

R.  F.  Mussey. 

George  R.  Murray. 

F.  M.  WaUer. 

F.  C.  O'Connor. 

George  O.  McKelvey. 

C.  W.  Walters. 

Stacey  lifiller. 

R.  C.  Blum. 

A.  C.  Hall. 

L.  Taylor. 

Seeds 

J.  L.  Hunt,  chairman. 
Frank  W.  Bolgiano. 
Kirby  White. 
W.  G.  ScarletL 
C.  C.  Massie. 
H.  M.  EarL 

Sheet  Metal 

Sidney  Detmerg,  chairman. 
W.  H.  Abbott. 
Edward  M.  Blake. 
H.  B.  Fawcett. 
Wm.  H.  Matthai. 
James  H.  Sanders. 
J.  H.  Walbridge. 
Geo.  P.  Benjamin. 

Sheet-Metal  Contrac- 
tors 

W.  A.  Fingles,  chairman. 

E.  L.  Seabrook. 

J.  H.  Hussie. 

A.  B.  Lewliss. 

John  A.  Pierpont. 

H.  C.  Knisely. 

Geo.  Thesmacher. 

T.  P.  Walsh. 

Otto  Goussenheimer. 

John  Bogenberger. 

Silk 

Charles  Cheney,  chairmaa. 

H.  Schniedwind,  jr. 

Louis  Stearns. 

M.  W.  Dippel. 

R.  J.  F.  Scbwarzenbach. 

Advertising  Specialties 

Carroll  H.  Sudler,  Chairman 
C.  S.  Sultzer. 
Theo.  E.  Gerlach. 

Stationery 

Wm.  Pitt,  chairman. 
Eberhard  Faber. 
Chas.  C.  Davis. 
Chas.  S.  Brewer. 
Carl  J.  Weissbrod. 
Wm.  H.  Rodington. 
Henry  S.  Dennison. 
■  Wm.  O.Day. 
Geo.  E.  Parmenter. 
Edwin  C.  Ryals. 


ni 


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lit 
i 


*1 


542    INDUSTRIAL  AMERICA  IN  THE  WORLD  WAR 


Envelopes 

C.  R.  Scudder,  chairman. 
R.  O.  Brigbam. 
Lawrence  £.  Smith. 
H.  W.  Stuart. 
A.  E.  Whiting. 

Steam  and  Hot  Water 
Fittings 

Wm.  H.  Oakes,  chairman. 
N.  Loring  Danlorth. 
J.  E.  Rutzler. 
Juan  A.  Alrairall. 
Henry  B.  Combers. 

Steel  Babbels 

R.  H.  Hackney,  chairman. 
S.  B.  Cochrane. 
George  A.  Moore. 
W.  Manning  Kerr. 
G.  De  F.  Kinney. 
£.  J.  Allen. 

Steel  Tanks 

M.  F.  Moore,  chairman. 
T.  E.  O'Brien. 
F.  C.  Keller. 
A.  M.  Morrison. 

Stoves 

Frederick  Will,  chairman. 
George  H.  Barbour. 
Arthur  W.  Walker. 
H.  J.  Karges. 
Lewia  Moore. 
John  D.  Green. 
Robert  A.  Patton. 
L.  H.  Booch. 
George  Mitchell. 
John  J.  Fisher. 

Wabm  Air  Heaters 

Edward  Norris,  chairman. 
George  D.  Wilkinson. 
John  A.  Howard. 
W.  L.  Daw  barn. 
W.  C.  Williamson. 
Alfred  B.  Moran. 
Allan  W.  Williams. 

Gas  Ranges 

William  M.  Crane,  chairman. 

Joseph  £.  Nason. 

H.D.Schall. 

G.  D.  Roper. 

H.  M.  Leach. 

A.  A.  Ainsworth 


Sugar 

W.  L.  Petrikin,  chairman. 

H.  A.  Douglas. 

W.  H.  Hannam, 

E.  C.  Howe. 

S.  H.  Love.  ^ 

S.  W.  Sinsheimer.' 

W.  P.  Turner. 

Surgical  Dressings 

H.  C.  Lovis,  chairman. 
H.  P.  Kendall. 
Frank  R.  Jones. 
G.T.Bauer. 

E.  T.  Sawtell. 

F.  R.  Davi^. 

Dr.  L.  L.  Walters. 


Surgical  Instruments 

Chas.  J.  Piling,  chairman. 
Richard  Kny. 
J.  A.  Pfarre. 
Edward  Sovatkin. 
Ernest  Stratmann. 

Tanning 

Central  Committee 
T.  Edward  Wilder. 
J.  Clinton  Smoot. 

Bag  and  Strap 
J.  C.  Byron,  chairman. 
Mahlon  R.  Bryan. 
Ed.  McKown. 
E.  C.  Thiers. 

B.  v.  Harrison. 

Calf  and  Kip 
August  H.  Vogel,  chairman. 
Albert  F.  Gallun. 
Morris  S.  Barnet. 

C.  P.  Hall. 

W.  B.  Eisendrath. 

Fancy  Leather 
Louis  J.  Robertson,    chair- 
man. 
W.  H.  Barrett. 
Charles  Drueding. 
G.  B.  Bernbeim. 
J.  W.  Helburn. 

Glased  Kid 
Charles  Reynolds,  chairman. 
Charles  Vaughan. 
Percival  E.  Foerderer. 
John  Blatz. 
James  I.  Ford. 

Glove  Leather 
Richard  M.  Evans,  chairman. 
Henry  Greenebaum. 
Maurice  S.  Miller. 
Joseph  W.  Mendel. 
Arthur  White. 

Ilamesa 
F.  C.  Hoffman,  chairman. 

D.  M.  Hart. 

E.  C.  Thiers. 
F.A.Krehl. 

F.  Carlisle. 

Patent  Uvper 
C.  Q.  Adams,  chairman. 
Albert  F.  Gordon. 
Elisha  W.  Cobb. 
C.  P.  HaU. 
Maxwell  J.  Lowry. 

Sheep  and  Lamb 

W.  R.  Fisher,  chairnoan. 
Frank  G.  Alien. 
Richard  Young. 
£.  L.  Macdonald. 
Hans  Schmidt. 

Side  Umper 
T.  S.  Haight,  chairman. 
Fred  Rueping. 
E.  H.  Foot. 
M.  C.  Weimer. 
T.  S.  Keirnan. 


Sole  c%d  Belting 
H.  Frederick  Lesh,  chairman. 
J.  T.  F.  McGarry. 
Henry  W.  Boyd. 
T.  Edward  Wilder. 
Walter  S.  Hoyt. 


Upholstery 
R.  C.  Good,  chairman. 
William  Hatton. 
H.  N.  Hill. 
Edward  L.  Neilson. 
H.  C.  McBriar. 

Tile 

F.  W.  Walker,  chairman. 
H.  D.  Lillibridge. 
L.  S.  Jones. 
Hamilton  Hazelhurst. 


Tobacco 

Edward  Wise,  chairman. 
Chas.  J.  Eisenlohr. 
Alf.  S.  Rossin. 
Jesse  A.  Bloch. 
J.  L.  Graham. 
Walter  H.  O'Brien. 
Geo.  H.  HummeL 
A.  L.  Sylvester. 
WiUiam  T.  Reed. 
I.  C.  Rosenthal. 
Maximilian  Stem. 

Toys 

Alfred  C.  Gilbert,  chairman. 

G.  S.  Parker. 

H.  C.  Ives. 

C.  H.  Bennett. 

A.  T.  Scharps. 

Leo  Schlesinger.' 

A.  D.  Converse. 

F.  D.  Dodge. 

Bernard  £.  Fleischaker. 

Trunks  and  Traveling 

Goods 

Nathan    Goldsmith,     chair- 

man. 
H.  W.  Raymond. 
Stanley  Klein. 
John  Meisel. 
Wm.  V.  Schnur. 
Henry  Likly. 
Aaron  Belber. 
J.  W.  Seward. 
Geo.  W.  Wheary. 
£.  H.  Davis. 

Vacuum  Cleaners 

H.  W.  Hoover,  chairman. 
A.  J.  Stecker. 
Julius  Tuteur. 
F.  S.  Hunting. 
F.  H.  Jones. 

Wall  Paper 

Henry  Burn,  chairman. 
A.  E.  Lyons. 
Frank  Page. 
W.  D.  Uptegraff. 
W.  A.  Huppuch. 
W.  F.  Bay  Stewart. 
George  Tait. 
I.  Baumgartl. 
Howard  M.  Heston. 
George  H.  Keim. 

Washing  Machines 

H.  W.  Eden,  chairman. 
Sam  T.  White. 
L.  E.  Dietz. 
W.  L.  Rodgers. 
J.  A.  D.  Johnson. 
Raymond  Marsh. 


!«f 


Waste  Material  (Deal- 
ers) 

Louis  Birkenstein,  chairman. 
F.  W.  Reidenbach. 
£.  A.  Salomon. 
Paul  Lowenthal. 
Maurice  Goldstein. 
Newell  J.  Lewis. 
Wm.  Lewin. 
Ivan  Reitler. 

Wheels 

Thos.  A.  Wliite,  chairman. 

E.  H.  Archibald. 
O.  B.  Bannister. 
H.  F.  Harper. 
O.  W.  Mott. 

H.  A.  Long. 

Woodworking 

F.  E.  Shearman. 
C.  F.  Tomlinson. 

FURNITLTIE  AND  FIXTURES 

Robt.  W.  Irwin,  chairman. 
£.  V.  Hawkins. 
A.  H.  Stringe. 
Benj.  J.  Bosse. 
W.  A.  Brolin. 

E.  H.  McQuinn. 

F.  E.  Shearman. 
C.  F.  Luce. 

C.  H.  Burt. 

E.  W.  Schultz. 

C.  F.  Tomlinson. 

A.  W.  Dassler. 

A.  H.  Hall. 

P.  B.  Schravensande. 

C- A.  O'Connor. 


APPENDIX 


Furniture  and  Fixtures 

— Continued 

G.  M.  Hillenbrand. 
Jos.  Peters,  jr. 
H.  A.  Barnard. 
A.  G.  Steinman. 

Commercial  Fixtures 

J.  H.  ServatiuB,  chairman. 
G.  W.  Johnson. 
S.  D.  Young. 
C.  F.  E.  Luce. 

Soda  Fountaina:  A.  R.   Lud- 
low. 

Refrigeratore:  F.  L.  Northey 

Laboratory  Equipment:  C.   G. 
Campbell. 

Drafting    Room    Equipment: 
T.  A.  Dahn. 

Cooling  Botes:  W.  H.   Du- 
Ross. 

Butchers'    Supplies:    A.    D. 
Daemicke. 

Lumber  Millwork 

G.  L.  Curtis,  chairman. 
George  J.  Osgood. 
L.  J.  Bardwell. 
Frank  Stevens. 
P.  F.  Conway. 
W.  M.  Otis. 
E.  R.  Jones. 
M.  B.  Copeland. 
Chas.  v.  Eossert. 
Wm.  H.  Morris. 
S.  S.  King. 
Harry  A.  Gregg. 


543 


Lumber  Millwork 
— Continued 

G.  E.  Morgan. 

E.  C.  NoeDte. 

F.  J.  Moss. 
Herman  T.  Rediske. 
A.  J.  Seigel. 

J.  C.  Owens. 

Executive  Committee 

G.  L.  Curtis,  chairman. 
Harry  A.  Gregg. 

E.  R.  Jones. 
L.  J.  Bardwell. 
W.  M.  Otis. 

Wool  Manufacturing 

Frederick  S.  Clark,  f'tniirmftp^ 

Wm.  M.  Wood. 

Franklin  W.  Hobbs. 

Geo.  H.  Hodgson. 

Nathaniel  Stevens. 

Geo.  B.  Sanford. 

Robt.  T.  Francis. 

John  P.  Stevens. 

A.  L.  Gifford. 

Herbert  E.  Peabod^. 

Winthrop  L.  Marvm. 

J.  J.  Nevins. 

Wool  Stock  Grading 

Edward  A.  Stone,  chairman. 
Edward  N.  Myers. 
Oscar  Gumbinsky. 
Nathan  Kalvin. 
Mark  Shervin. 
Charles  FrankeL 
Albert  D.  Ullman. 
Winsor  H.  Watson. 
Herman  Rawitser. 


I 


i 

I 


NOTE 

Robert  G.  Rhett  and  Harry  A.  Wheeler  were  the  presidents  of  the  Chamber  of  Commerce  of 
the  United  States  during  the  war  period  and  Elliot  H.  Goodwin  was  its  general  secretary.  Wad- 
dill  Catchings  was  chairman  of  the  Chamber's  war  committee  that  issued  interpretative  bulletins  to 
the  business  men  of  the  country  concerning  the  work  of  the  Council  of  National  Defense  and  War 
Industries  Board. 


T'l 


¥ 


4 


'Hll 


INDEX 


I; 


[i 


I 


I 


Abrasives,  war  problem  and  supply, 
417;  Section,  504. 

Accounting,  war  service  committee, 
532. 

Acetate  anhydrin,  priority,  416. 

Acetate  of  lime,  war-time  problem, 
416. 

Acetiphenetidin,  price,  473. 

Acetone,  war-time  problem,  415,  416. 

Acetylene,  war  demand,  415. 

Acids  and  Heavy  Chemicals  Section, 

,  399,  503;  cooperative  committee. 
496. 

Adams,  H.  J.,  Mica  Section,  385; 
Automotive  Products  Section,  466. 

Adler,  H.  S.,  railway  equipment  priori- 
ties, 468  n.,  509. 

Administration  and  statistics,  com- 
mittee in  Council  of  National  De- 
fense, 37.  See  also  Division  of  Plan- 
ning. 

Advertising  specialties,  war  service 
committee,  541. 

Advisory  Commission  of  Council  of 
National  Defense,  purpose,  17,  22; 
first  members,  22;  standing,  power, 
development,  23-26;  first  suggestion 
of  later  war  boards,  26;  division  into 
committees,  28;  first  practical  indus- 
trial contact,  30;  obstacles,  30;  first 
estimate  of  anny  supplies,  warning, 
31-34;     and     General     Munitions 
Board,  34-36;  creation  of  War  In- 
dustries Board,  36;  as  clearing  house 
for  service,  79;  ahd  price-fixing,  161; 
and  Commercial  Economy  Board, 
212;  textile  committees,  440,  441; 
medical  section,  472;  sub-committees 
and  cooperative  committees  of  raw 
materials  committee,  495-500.   See 
also  War  service  committees. 
Advisory  Committee  on  Plants  and 
Munitions,  61,  62,  136;  status,  181, 
'    182;  functions,  personnel,  method, 
191-94,  506. 

i^tna  Company,  smokeless  powder, 
410. 

Agricultural  Instruments  Section,  503. 

Aircraft,  Advisory  Committee,  18; 
germ  of  Production  Board,  29;  pref- 
erences, 142;. spruce  problem,  427; 

*  and  problem  of  machinery  construc- 
tion, 453,  454;  Bureau  and  cranes, 
456;  services  of  automobile  indus- 


try, 465;  eflSciency  of  production 

service,  465. 
Alaska,  tin,  365  n. 

Alcohol,  war  demand  and  manufac- 
ture, 401;  cooperating  committee, 

495;  Section,  504. 
Aldrich,  H.  R.,  Non-Ferrous  Metals 

Division,  352,  509. 
Aldrich,  H.  W.,  Lumber  Division,  427, 

509. 
Aldrich,  T.  H.,  regional  advisor,  508. 

509. 
Aleshire,  J.  B.,  priorities,  146  n. 
Alien  Property  Custodian,  and  Stored 

Materials  Section,  194. 
Alkali  and  Chlorine  Section,  personnel. 

400,  503. 
Alkalis,  cooperative  committee,  496. 
Allen,  E.  T.,  Lumber  Division,  427. 
Allied  Marine  Council,  and  dipping 

for  A.E.F.,  204  n. 
Allied   Munition   Council,   American 

representative,    265;    character    of 

British  committees,  267;  and  price- 
control,    267-69;    Foreign    Mission 

and  committee  chairmanships,  269- 

Allies,  and  character  of  American  par- 
ticipation. United  States  as  reser- 
voir, 6,  104,  109,  122,  250,  251;  pur- 
chases and  common  price,  163,  175, 
177;  and  American  industrial  par- 
ticipation, complementary  or  uni- 
tary, 235-38,  402,  408;  preferences, 
blunder  of  stopping  work  for,  251, 
252;  War  Industries  Board  as  func- 
tionary, 258;  American  economic 
control,  261, 262;  diversion  of  Amer- 
ican war  supplies,  262,  357;  and  ni- 
trates for  United  States,  391;  nitrate 
pool,  392;  cotton  linters  pool,  401; 
dependence  on  American  explosives, 
402,  408;  and  cranes,  456;  locomo- 
tives for,  469;  rescued  from  extor- 
tion, 469;  and  optical  glass,  470. 
See  also  Foreign  Economic  Mission; 
Inter- Allied  Purchase  Conmussion; 
Peace  Conference. 

Allocation.  See  Priorities. 

Alloys,  early  subcommittee,  498.  See 
also  Ferro-alloys. 

Aluminum,  war  control,  price,  355, 
356;  remelting  scrap,  356;  demand, 
priorities,  356;  uses,  357;  threatened 


i: 


546 


INDEX 


!! 


♦^1 


'; 


I- 


I 


shortage,  357;  diversion  in  Europe, 
337;   cooperative   committee,   495. 
bee  also  Non-ferrous  metais. 
Aluminum  Company  of  America,  dur- 

mg  war,  356. 
Amatol,  as  shell  explosive,  403. 
American   Cyanamid   Company,  and 

nitrates,  389. 
American  Expeditionary  Forces,  ques- 
tion of  sending,  6,  34,  104,  109,  122, 
250,  251;  concentration  on  shipping 
troops,   consequent  land  transport 
problem,    132-35;    altered    Enfield 
nfle,  191;  and  French  artillery  types 
192;  shipping  for,  204;  and  need  of 
J oreign    Mission,    262;    munitions 
from  Allies,  236,  238;  British  shoe 
contract,   272;   sidetracked   gantry 
cranes,  455;  locomotives,  469.    See 
also  Army;  Ocean  transportation. 
Amencan  Iron  and  Steel  Institute,  and 
war   industry,    325,    329;   and    tin 
MQport,  366;  and  manganese  price, 
6l\i;  and  vanadium  import,  383 
Amencan  Locomotive  Company   war 

services,  469. 
American  Press  Association,  and  in- 

dustrial  preparedness,  14. 
American  Smelting  and  Refining  Com- 

pany,  and  copper  allocation,  352. 
Amencan  Vanadium  Company,  383 
Amencan  Zinc  Institute,  355. 
-^™onia,  war  demand  and  supply. 

Ammonium  nitrate,  as  shell  explosive, 
403. 

Ammonium   picrate,   American   use, 
403. 

Amory,  Browne  and  Company,  uni- 
form cloth,  447. 

Amoskeag  Manufacturing  Company 
uniform  cloth,  447. 

Anaconda  Copper  Company,  araenic 
plant,  416. 

Anaesthetics,  substitutes,  472. 

Anchor  chains,  swamping  demand,  457 

rnn'^'U  ^•.  ^^  Wa*  Section,  207,* 
509;    Foreign    Mission,    264;    tin 
negotiations,  366. 
^"thony   C.  H.,  Conversion  Section, 

Anti-trust  laws,   and  war  industrial 

conditions,  207,  230,  313,  458. 
Antunony,  source,  357;  uses,  357;  ade- 


quate supply,  no  control,  358;  and 

silver  for  China,  358;  stimulation  of 

domestic  production,  358. 
Armor,  ferro-zirconium  and  light,  383 
Armour     Ogden,  and    carbonate    of 

potash,  396. 
Armour    Fertilizer    Company,    and 

potash,  395,  396.  . 


A"^sby,  George,  Priorities  Committee, 
146  n.,  509;  Foreign  Mission,  264;  tin 
negotiations,  366;  Tin  Section,  367. 
Anny,  first  estimate  of  supplies,  con- 
fusion,   31-34;    representation    in 
War  Industries  Board,  37,  61,  93; 
relations   with   Board,    41-43,    53. 
84,  122,  126,  131,  135;  fniits  of  un- 
preparedness,  47;  unforeseeable  re- 
quirements,  yet  met,    108-11;   in- 
dustnal  inadequacy  of  General  Staff, 
111;  uncoordinated  purchases.  111; 
Requirements  Division,   123,   127* 
purchase  reforms,  128-31;  concen- 
tration on  shipping  troops,  result- 
ing materiel  problem,  133-35;    ac- 
complishment,  134;  preferences  in 
Pyrch^es,    142;    Priorities   Board, 
146;  Price-Fixing  Committee,  170; 
mdustrial  commandeering,  177  n.; 
emergency  cantonment  construction! 
196,  420,  421;  Statistical  Division, 
201;  and  conspectus  periodical,  204; 
goods  and  conservation  movement, 
225,  226:  conversion  in,  232;  sec- 
tional mdustrial  representatives  and 
cooperation,  243;   and  Inter-Allied 
Purchasing    Commission,    254-56; 
reclamation   in,    279;    War   Labor 
Policies  Board,  288;  and  commodity 
sections,  307;  and  ferro-zirconium, 
383;  and  toluol,  402;  blended  han- 
dlmg  of  leather,  433;  textile  admin- 
istration, 441,  451;  textile  require- 
ments, 446-48;  machinery  require- 
ments, 454;  and  cranes,  456.    See 
also  American  Expeditionary  Forces* 
Baker,  N.  D.;  Draft;  General  Staff,* 
Purchases;  Requirements. 
Army  Construction  Division,  196. 
Arsenic,  war-time  problem,  416. 
Artificial    Dyes     and     Intermediates 
S^tion,  413  n.,  503.    See  also  Dyes. 
Artificial  eyes,  scarcity,  473. 
Artillery,  Summers   and,  90;    altera- 
tion of  "75"  shell,   90;   adoption 
of  French  types,  192;  French  shell 
production,  232;  American  depend- 
ence on  AlUed,  236,  238.    See  also 
Explosives. 
Asbestos,  sources,  war-time  adminis- 
tration, 384;  magnesia,  and  roofing, 
cooperative   committee,    495;    war 
service  committee,  532. 
Ashton,  H.  B.,  Textiles  Division,  441, 

Aspirin,  war-time  problem,  416;  pro- 
duction, 472. 

Associated  Advertising  Clubs,  and  in- 
dustrial preparedness,  14. 

Association  of  Southern  Mica  Miners 
and  Manufacturers,  385. 


INDEX 


547 


1 


Atlanta,  regional  advisor,  508. 

Atlas  Company,  sulphuric  acid,  399. 

Attleboro,   Mass.,  and    non-essential 
industries,  186. 

Atwood,  L.  R.,  Paints  and  Pigments 
Section,  415  n.,  509. 

Automotive  products,  and  essentiality 
problem,  186, 340;  and  conservation, 
226,  227;  first  priority  order,  protest, 
332;  conferences,  charges,  alterna- 
tive, 333-43;  capacity  production 
under  conversion,  342  n.,  343,  467; 
final  restrictive  agreement,  343; 
tire  restrictions,  438;  output  and 
supervision  after  restriction,  465; 
trucks,  465;  positive  work  of  Section, 
465,  466;  and  aircraft,  465;  origin 
of  Section,  personnel,  466, 503,  stand- 
ardized heavy  truck,  466,  467;  gov- 
ernmental requirements,  467;  war 
service  committees,  532. 

Aycock,  T.  J.,  regional  lumber  ad- 
ministrator, 424  n.,  509. 

Ayres,  L.  P.,  Facilities  Division,  137; 
Statistical  Division,  201. 


Babbitt  metal,  conservation,  223. 
Baby  vehicles,  war  ^rvice  committee, 

532. 
Bags,  war  service  committees,  532. 
Baker,  A.  J.  M.,  Machine  Tool  Sec- 
tion, 453  n.,  509. 
Baker,  H.  J.,  and  Brother,  and  nitrates, 
392  n. 

Baker,  N.  D.,  and  bill  for  CouncU  of 
National  Defense,  16;  non-partisan- 
ship of  war  machine,  38,  39;  attitude 
toward  War  Industrial  Board,  41, 53, 
84;  and  reorganization  of  Board,  54; 
and  Baruch,  54;  and  altering  En- 
field rifle,  191;  and  smokeless  pow- 
der plants,  407-09.  See  also  Army. 

Baker,  R.  S.,  Industrial  Adjustment 
Committee,  185,  509. 

Baking,  war  service  committee,  532. 

Baldwin  Locomotive  Works,  war 
services,  469. 

Ball  bearings  and  steel  balls,  war 
service  committee,  532. 

Ballard,  S.  T.,  labor  committee,  283. 

Baltimore,  regional  advisor,  508. 

Bamberger,  C,  Facilities  Division, 
199,  509. 

Barbers'  supplies,  war  service  com- 
mittee, 532. 

Barbour,  H.  H.,  priorities,  146  n.,  509. 

Barclay,  J.  S.,  Steel  Division,  326, 509. 

Barksdale,  Wis.,  T.N.T.  plant,  404. 

Baruch,  B.  M.,  in  Advisory  Commis- 
sion, 22;  beginnings  of  industrial 
mobilization,  and  raw  materials,  26, 
27,  29,  30,  67,  89;  sub-committees. 


cooperative  committees,  29,  36,  302, 
495-500;    and    General    Munitions 
Board,  35;  member  War  Industries 
Board,    36,    37;    on   objectives   of 
Board,  46, 104-06;  choice  as  head  of 
Board,  49,  54,  68,  69;  on  effects  of 
decentralization,  51-53;  and  reorgan- 
ization  of  Board,   54-59;   Baker's 
attitude,  54;  and  principle  of  cen- 
tralized  responsibility   and   decen- 
tralized authority,   58,   73-76,   99, 
241,  311;  earlier  plan,  59;  character 
as  head:  industrial  knowledge,  66; 
political  attitude,  67;  war  prescience, 
67;  and  facts,  67;  lack  of  self-pro- 
motion, 68,  69;  factor  of  wealth,  69, 
70;   and   war  profits,   70;   support 
from  above,  71;  singleness  of  pur- 
pose, 71;  patience,  71;  decision,  71; 
simplicity,   72;  hi^h  adventure  of 
task,  72;  and  details,  72;  judgment 
of  men,  73;  and  legality,  73;  integ- 
rity, 76;  specimen  disciplinary  meas- 
ures, 98,  99,  424,  427;  and  military 
supply  departments,  101;  and  Wil- 
son, 102;  on  completeness  of  Board's 
control,  102;  and  transport  problem 
in  France,  135;  priorities,  146  n.; 
and  military  estimates,   153;   and 
price-fixing,  161,  169;  copper  price, 
162,  347;  and  fluid  industrial  con- 
trol, 171;  on  stabilization,  176;   on 
restriction   of  building,    188;    and 
McCormick,  206;  and  overlapping 
functions,  227;  and  Shaw,  227;  and 
Otis,  241;  Inter-Allied  Purchasing 
Commission,  253;  and  lack  of  Brit- 
ish price-reciprocity,  263;  funds  for 
Foreign  Mission,   266;   and   Peace 
Conference,   273;   paramount  con- 
trol, 294,  296;  and  commodity  sec- 
tions, 299;  weekly  meetings,  305;  on 
importance  of  steel,  326;  and  auto- 
mobile industry,  334,  341,  342;  lead 
price,  359;  and  platinum,  370,  371; 
and  War  Minerals  Stimulation  Act, 
374  n.;  and  ferro-zirconium,  383; 
and  nitrates,   390,   391,   393;   and 
toluol,  402;  and  smokeless  powder, 
408,  409;  and  heads  of  other  boards. 
460.  See  also  War  Industries  Board. 
Base  Sorting  Plant,  investigation,  278. 
Baskets  andf  fruit  packages,  war  serv- 
ice committee,  532. 
Bass,    R.    P.,    War    Labor    Policies 

Board,  288. 
Bausch  and  Lomb  Optical  Company, 

optical  glass,  471. 
Beeks,  Gertrude,  labor  executive  com- 
mittee, 282. 
Bell,  H.  F.,  railway  equipment  pri- 
orities, 468  n.,  510. 


t 


I , 


w 


■I 


ll 


III 


•11 


I' 


lllii 


548 


INDEX 


Belting  Section,  434,  505. 

Berg,  Eysten,  and  nitrates,  389. 

Bicycles,  conservation,  222;  war  serv- 
ice committee,  532. 

Bingham,  H.  P.,  in  War  Industries 
Board,  61,  510. 

Birmingham,  regional  advisor,  508. 

Biscuits  and  crackers,  war  service 
committee,  532. 

Black  walnut,  war-time  problem,  428. 

Blanchard,  I.  W.  (H.),  Pulp  and  Paper 
Division,  429  n.,  510. 

Block,  L.  E.,  steel  conmiittee,  325. 

Bloedel,  J.  H.,  Fir  Production  Board, 
427. 

Bogart,  E.  L.,  Fusion  Committee,  205. 

Bogert,  M.  T.,  Technical  Staff  of 
Chemistry  Division,  418. 

Boilers,  war  problem,  464. 

Bolivia,  tin,  365. 

Bolton,  C.  C,  Clearance  Conmiittee, 
118,  510. 

Booth,  G.  W.,  Fire  Prevention  Sec- 
tion, 194,  510. 

Boots  and  shoes.  Section,  434;  war 
service  conunittee,  532.  See  also 
Leather;  Shoes. 

Boston,  regional  advisor,  508. 

Bostwick,  A.  L.,  Inter-Allied  Purchas- 
ing Conunission,  260,  510. 

Boxes,  war  service  committee,  532. 

Boy  Scouts,  and  black  walnut,  428. 

Boyd,  H.  W.,  Foreign  Mission,  265; 
and  A.E.F.'s  British  shoe  contract, 
272;  Sole  Leather  Section,  434,  510. 

Brand,  R.  H.,  Inter-Allied  Purchasing 
Conmiission,  260. 

Brass,  Section,  353,  503;  war  demand 
and  problems,  control,  353,  354;  co- 
operative conmiittee,  495;  war  serv- 
ice conunittees,  532,  533.  See  also 
Copper. 

Brazil,  manganese  ore,  376,  377,  382. 

Bread-return  privilege  elimination, 
213. 

Brewing,  war  service  conmiittee,  533. 
S^  also  Intoxicants. 

Brick,  war  service  committee,  533. 
See  also  Building  materials. 

Bridgeport,  regional  advisor,  508. 

British  Board  of  Trade,  and  tin  and 
rubber,  269. 

Britten,  F.  A.,  bill  for  CouncU  of  Na- 
tional Defense,  19. 

Bromine,  war  demand  and  supply, 
416. 

Brookings,  R.  S.,  in  War  Industries 
Board,  36,  37,  61,  501,  511;  charac- 

•  ter,  services,  88;  Price-Fixing  Com- 
mittee, policy,  169,  175;  Inter- 
Allied  Purchasing  Commission,  253. 

Brown,  A.  C,  Crane  Section,  456,  511. 


Brown,  J.  B.,  at  Peace  Conference, 
274. 

Brunswick,  Ga.,  picric  acid  plant,  406. 

Buell,  G.  F.,  railway  equipment  priori- 
ties, 468  n. 

Buggies,  conservation,  222. 

Bumman,  E.  F.,  Conversion  Section, 
243,  511. 

Building  materials.  Division,  430,  503; 
control,  curtailment  of  production, 
prices  and  allocations,  430;  work  of 
Division,  standardization  of  war 
building  schedules,  431;  contrasts, 
431.  See  also  Construction;  Emer- 
gency Construction;  Non-War  Con- 
struction. 

Bulkley,  R.  J.,  Legal  Section,  207, 
511;  Power  Section,  460. 

Burden,  J.  A.,  steel  committee.  326. 

Bureau  of  Mines,  and  platinum  prob- 
lem, relations  with  War  Industries 
Board,  371;  platinum  licenses,  373; 
and  War  Minerals  Stimulation  Act, 
374  n.;  and  policy  of  artificial  indus- 
trial stimulation,  379-82;  war  serv- 
ices, 385,  386;  and  nitrates,  389; 
services  to  Chemicals  Division,  419. 

Bureau  of  Research  and  Tabulation  of 
Statistics,  201. 

Bureau  of  Standards,  services  to 
Chemicals  Division,  419;  and  optical 
glass,  471. 

Bureaucracy,  German  efficiency,  78; 
fruits,  478. 

Bush,  S.  P.,  as  head  of  Facilities  Divi- 
sion, 198,  247,  511. 

Business  Administration  Division,  per- 
sonnel, 503. 

Business  in  Government,  meed  of  war 
service,  70;  committee  system  and 
use  of  industrial  chiefs,  77-79; 
patriotic  services  and  sacrifices,  77- 
79;  commodity  sections  and,  474; 
War  Industries  Board  as  illustra- 
tion, 311-14.  See  also  Industrial 
mobilization;  War  service  commit- 
tees; War  Industries  Board. 

Butler,  N.  M.,  and  measure  for  Coun- 
cil of  National  Defense,  16. 

Calder,  W.  M.,  and  restriction  on 
building,  188. 

Caminetti,  Anthony,  Labor  Division, 
278, 511. 

Campbell,  J.  A.,  steel  committee,  326. 

Camphor,  war  problem,  416. 

Canada,  method  of  conservation,  229; 
nickel,  361;  asbestos,  384;  and  con- 
servation of  Niagara  Falls  power, 
461. 

Canned  foods  and  dried  fruits  brokers, 
war  service  committee,  533. 


mDEX 


549 


lit 


Cantonments,  building,  lumber  for, 
cost-plus  plan,  171-74,  196,  197, 
420;  order  for  enlargement,  421. 

Capital  Issues  Committee,  and  Re- 
quirements Division,  127;  power 
projects,  461.  ^      ,     . 

Carr,  J.  A.,  Inter-AUied  Purchasmg 
Commission,  256,  511. 

Carriages,  war  service  committee,  533. 

Carroll,  C.  W.,  FacUities  Division, 
199, 5n.  ^  ^     . 

Case,  M.  E.,  War  Contracts  Section, 

Caskets,  war  service  committee,  b66. 
See  also  Coffins. 

Catalogues,  trade,  conservation,  222. 

Catlett,  Charies,  Refractories  Section, 
417  n.,  511.  . 

Caustic  soda,  war  condiUons  of  m- 
dustry,  399,  400. 

Cement,  cooperative  committee,  495. 
See  also  Building  materials. 

Central  Pennsylvania  Hemlock  Emer- 
gency Bureau,  424  5. 

Ceramics,  war  demand  and  clays,  4i  i. 

Cereals,  war  service  committee,  533. 
See  also  Food  Administration. 

Chains,  trace  chains  conservation,  222; 
Section,  anchor  chains  problem,  457; 
war  service  committee,  533. 

Chalmers,  Hugh,  and  automobile 
industry  and  war,  339-41. 

Chamber  of  Commerce  of  the  United 
States,  and  industrial  dictatorship, 
28;  and  trade  committees,  list,  302, 
304,532-43.  ^    _      . 

Chamberlain,  Austen,  and  Foreim 
Mission  of  War  Industries  Board, 

Chamberlain,   G.    E.,    and    bill    for 

Council  of  National  Defense,  16, 19. 

Chamberiain,  W.  E.,  Lumber  Division, 

427. 511.  .  .     T>      J 
Chambers,  Edward,  Pnonties  Board, 

146  n.,  468,  511. 
Channing,  H.  M.,  Legal  Section,  207 

n      'll  2 

Chase,  M.  F.,  FacUities  Division,  199; 
Explosives  Division,  403,  512;  serv- 
ices, 419. 

Chase,  W.  W.,  priorities,  146  n.,  512. 

Chatillon,  G.  E.,  Optical  Glass  SecUon, 

471.512.  .      ,     J  . 
Chavannes,   F.  S.,  regional  advisor, 

508,512.  .  ^       . 

Chemical  Alliance,  as  mdustries  com- 

Chemical  Glass  and  Stoneware  Sec- 
tion, 418,  503.      „      .       ^  , 
Chemical  Warfare  Service,  demands, 

416. 
Chemicals,    cooperaUve    committee, 


496;  early  subcommittee,  496;  war 
service  committees,  533.   iSee  also 
next  title. 
Chemicals  Division,  war  minerals  un- 
der, 377;  Ferro- Alloy  Section,  384; 
mica,  385;  chlorine.  400,  419;  acet- 
ylene and  oxygen,   415;   creosote, 
415;  tanning,  415;  paints  and  pig- 
ments, 415;  wood  distillation  prod- 
ucts,  415,   516;   arsenic,  bromme, 
camphor,  wool  grease,  416;  clays, 
417;  electrodes,  abrasives,  417;  glass 
and  stoneware,  418;  Technical  and 
Consulting  Staff,  research,  418,  419; 
industries    committees,    419,    496, 
533;   services,    419;   sections,   per- 
sonnel, 503,  504.   See  also  Asbestos; 
Dyes;  Explosives;  Nitrates;  Potash. 
Chemistry,  and  World  War,  89. 
Chicago,  and  restriction  of  buildmg, 

188,  339;  regional  advisor,  508. 
Children's  vehicles,  war  service  com- 
mittee, 533. 
Chile,  American  influence  over,  262. 

See  also  Nitrates. 
China,  antimony  from,  and  sdver  for, 

357,  358. 
Chlorine,  war  demand  and  conditions 
of  mdustry,  400,  419;  Section,  503. 
Chloroform,  war-time  problem,  416. 
Christie,  G.  I.,  War  Labor  Pohcies 

Board,  288. 
Chromium,  uses,  foreign  sources,  378; 
domestic   production,    stimulation, 
378-81 ;  prices,  supply,  379. 
Churchill,  Winston,  and  Foreign  Mis- 
sion of  War  Industries  Board,  268, 
270;  and  nitrates,  393. 
Cincinnati,  regional  advisor,  508.  ^ 
Clapp,  A.  W.,  Labor  Priorities  SecUon, 

291  512. 
Clark,'  E.  E.,  committee  on  transporta- 
tion, 81.  .       T.         J 

Clark,  H.  T.,  in  War  Industries  Board, 
61, 501, 512.  ^       ,       . 

Clark,  LeRoy,  clearance  for  electric 
wire  orders,  anomalous  committee, 
115, 116;  Wire  Section,  463,  512. 

Clarke,  E.  A.  S.,  and  steel  prices,  322; 
steel  committee,  325. 

Clarkson,  C.  F.,  Automotive  Products 
^lection  466. 

Clays,  refractory  products,  porcelains, 

417. 

Clearance,  development  by  War  In- 
dustries Board,  45,  61,  62;  auto- 
matic data  for,  114;  first  attempts, 
114;  manufacturers'  volunteer,  114, 
115;  through  commodity  sections, 
116,  117;  failure  of  general  commit- 
tee, 116,  117;  Clearance  Office  as 

I     distributing  center,  value,  117;  ex- 


I 


n       I 

r     I 


550 


INDEX 


]*•'  ' 


tension,  process,  118;  personnel,  118, 
502;    purpose,    results,    efficiency, 
118-20;   interdepartmental  of  sur- 
pluses, 195;  work  of  Facilities  Divi- 
sion, 198.  See  also  Priorities. 
Cleveland,  regional  advisor,  508. 
Clocks,  conservation,  223. 
Clothing,  committee  in  Advisory  Com- 
mission, 29;  conservation,  220,  223 
224;  reclamation,  279;  and  dye  con- 
servation,  414;   war   service   com- 
mittee,  534.  See  also  Dyes;  Textiles. 
Coal,    price-fixing,    167;    war    situa- 
tion described,  336.    See  also  Fuel 
Administration. 
Coal-tar  (gas)  derivatives,  for  explo- 
sives, German  supremacy,  404,  405- 
development,  413,  414;  cooperative 
committee,  496;  Section,  personnel, 
503.   See  also  Dyes;  Explosives. 
Cotlm,  H.  E.,  and  pre-war  industrial 
preparedness,    13;   Advisory   Com- 
mission, committee,  22,  29;  General 
Munitions  Board,  35;  and  cylinder- 
gnnders,  454;  and  aircraft,  465;  and 
automotive  transport,  466. 
Coffins,  conservation,  223. 
Cdke,  price-fixing,   167  n.    See  also 

Coal-tar  derivatives. 
Collapsible  tubes,  conservation,  223, 

368;  war  service  committee,  534. 
Collective  bargaining,  recognition  rec- 
ommendation, 284.  See  also  Labor 


Colombia,  platinum  supply,  370,  373. 
Colver,    W.    B.,    Price-Fixing    Com- 
mittee, 170,  512;  Pulp  and  Paper 
Section,  428. 
Combinations.    See  Anti- trust  laws; 

Industrial  mobilization. 
Commandeering,    abuses.    War    In- 
dustries   Board    and  coordination, 
■    103;  pnce-fixing  and,  177;  industrial, 

by  military  departments,  177  n. 
Commercial  economy,  committee  in 

Council  of  National  Defense,  37. 
Commercial    Economy    Board.     See 

Conservation. 
Commercial     fixtures,     war     service 

committees,  543. 
Committees,  first  of  Advisory  Com- 
mission, 28,  29;  sub-  and  cooperative 
of  raw  materials  committee,  29, 495- 
500;  in  General  Munitions  Board, 
35;  system  as  retard,  36,  51;  under 
Council  of  National   Defense,   37. 
See  also  War  service  industries  com- 
mittees,  and  cross-references  under 
Commodities  sections  and  War  In- 
dustries Board. 
Conunodity    sections,    development, 
system,  45,  61,  301-^5;  and  clear- 
ance, 116,  117;  and  data,  136,  201,  | 


307-09;     and     administration     of 
prices,    178;   specialized   functions, 
182;  clearmg  house  for,  on  building 
and  materials,  196;  Statistical  Sec- 
tion, 202;  and  work  of  conversion, 
240;   as  heart  of  War   Industries 
Board,  240;  character,  importance, 
as  reversible  taps,  299-301;  results, 
and  war  industries  committees,  301- 
03;  assembly,  305;  list,  personnel, 
306  n.,  503-07;  lodgment  of  power, 
composition,    307;   efficiency,    309, 
474;  simplicity,  310;  power,  as  mini- 
atures of  War  Industries  Board,  311; 
and  business  in  Government,  311-14- 
peace  adaption  of  idea,  486;  dis- 
solve, 486.   See  also  Building  mate- 
rials; Chemicals  Division;  Chains; 
Cranes;  Ferro-alloy  metals;  Hard- 
ware;     International      executives; 
Leather;  Lumber;  Machinery;  Med- 
ical mdustry;  Non-ferrous  metals; 
Optical    glass;    Power    and    trans- 
portation; Pulp  and  paper;  Rubber; 
Steel;  Textiles;  Tobacco;  War  In- 
dustries Board;  War  Service  Com- 
mittees. 

Competitive    bidding,    war    discard, 
156. 

Confectionery,  war  service  conmiittee, 
534. 

Congestion,  sectional  industrial,  199 
234,  235,  453.    See  also  FacUities 
Division. 
Congress,    and    public    opinion,    10; 
Council  of  National  Defense^  15-21 
491,    492;    National    Defense   Act 
(1916),  18,  19;  and  power  of  War 
Industries  Board,  19,  20,  94-97;  and 
first  war  estimates,  33,  34;  Overman 
Act,  58,  97, 100,  493;  and  price-fix- 
mg,  166;  and  restriction  of  building, 
188;  platinum  licenses,   373;   War 
Minerals  Stimulation  Act,  374,  380- 
nitrate  plants,  389;  post-war  neglect 
of  industrial  preparedness,  396,  483 
Connor,  C.  H.,  Platinum  Section,  372, 
512;  Wood  Chemicals  Section,  415 
n.,  512. 

Conservation,  development  by  War 
Industries  Board,  45,  61,  62;  and 
priority  demands,  181;  purpose  and 
pohcy  of  Division,  181,  209;  Divi- 
sion and  Division  of  Planning  and 
Statistics,  182;  Division  and  interde- 
partmental clearances,  195;  public 
contact,  210,  213;  origin.  Commer- 
cial Economy  Board,  A.  W.  Shaw, 
210-12,  228;  independence  of  Board, 
212;  personnel,  212,  502;  elimination 
of  br^d-retum  privilege,  213;  princi- 
ple of  voluntary  cooperation,  suc- 


INDEX 


551 


cess,  214,  215,  229;  retail  deliveries 
simplified,  216;  economy  in  packing 
and  transportation,  216,  217;  retail 
store  exchange  abolished,  216;  in- 
dustrial reforms,  elimination  of 
wasteful  methods,  217;  lines  of 
elimination  and  substitution,  219; 
"schedules,"  method,  220;  illustra- 
tions, 220-25;  manufacturers  and 
lesson,  question  of  permanent  gain, 
225,  230;  and  military  goods,  225, 
226;  and  curtailment  of  output, 
automobiles,  226,  227;  and  other 
activities  of  War  Industries  Board, 
227;  efficiency  of  American,  228; 
Exjonomic  Intelligence  Section,  228; 
sanity,  and  "forgodsakers,"  229; 
element  in  Labor  Division,  278; 
steel,  328;  lead,  360;  platinum,  373; 
dyes,  414;  lumber,  426;  paper,  429; 
building  materials,  430;  in  power, 
461-63;  medical  industry,  472.  See 
also  Conversion;  Non-War  Con- 
struction Section;  Priorities. 

Conspectus  periodical,  203,  204. 

Construction,  cantonments,  171-74, 
196,  197,  420,  421;  vastness  of  war, 
422;  standardized  schedules,  431; 
war  service  committee,  533.  See 
also  Building  materials;  Emergency 
Construction  Committee;  Non-War 
Construction  Section. 

Contracts,  post-war  repudiation,  '484. 

Conversion,  industrial  essentiality 
and,  184;  illustration,  193;  military, 
232;  in  French  shell  production,  232; 
reason  for  slowness  of  American, 
233,  234,  452;  survey,  234;  and  sec- 
tional allocation,  234,  235,  241;  and 
question  of  complementary  or  uni- 
tary American  war  participation, 
235-38;  lack  of  system  in  early  at- 
tempts, 239;  Industrial  Representa- 
tive, duties,  239;  work  of  commodity 
sections,  240;  Section  of  Resources 
and  Conversion,  Otis  as  head,  per- 
sonnel, 241, 243,  506;  regional  indus- 
trial integration  and  advisors,  list, 
241-43,  508;  regional  committees  as 
local  war  industries  boards,  243, 
245;  local  and  central  cooperation 
with  other  boards,  243;  scope  of  Sec- 
tion, 244;  service  and  method  of 
Section,  244,  248;  method  and  indus- 
trial support,  245;  and  Facilities 
Division,  245,  246;  and  "organiza- 
tion," 247;  specimen  conversions, 
248;  and  international  centralized 
industrial  control,  275;  in  steel  in- 
dustry, 326;  in  automobile  industry, 
342  n.,  343,  467;  in  textiles,  443, 447, 
450;  in  machinery,  454;  in  crane 


manufacture,  456;  in  making  small 
locomotives,  469. 

Cook,  H.  H.,  steel  committee,  326. 

Cooke,  A.  M.,  Lumber  Division,  427, 
512. 

Cooke,  M.  L.,  and  training  employ- 
ment managers,  290. 

Coolidge,  L.  A.,  labor  committee,  283. 

Coonley,  Howard,  War  Labor  Policies 
Board,  288. 

Cooperage,  war  service  committee, 
534. 

Cooperation,  spirit  in  industrial  mo- 
bilization, 37,  114,  115,  126,  131, 
152,  154,  159,  215,  243,  360,  424. 
455.  See  also  Industrial  mobiliza- 
tion; Price-fixing;  War  Industries 
Board;  War  service  industrial  com- 
mittees. 

Cooperative  committees  of  raw  ma- 
terials under  Advisory  Commission, 
personnel,  29,  495-500. 

Copeland,  M.  T.,  Commercial  Econ- 
omy Board,  212. 

Copper,  voluntary  price-fixing,  162, 
346-48;  war  importance  and  uses, 
345;  contest  between  German  stocks 
and  American  mines,  345,  346;  later 
price  negotiations  and  agreements, 
pool,  349-52;  Trade  Commission's 
report,  350;  later  advance,  352;  co- 
operative committee,  351,  496,  497; 
control  under  agreement,  352;  Non- 
Ferrous  Metals  Division,  personnel, 
352,  505;  no  shortage,  352,  353;  al- 
loys, 353.  See  also  Brass. 

Cordage,  war  problem,  451;  Section, 
505. 

Cork,  war  problem,  451. 

Com  products,  war  service  committee, 
534.  See  also  Food  Administration. 

Cornell,  I.  H.,  Foreign  Mission,  273, 
512;  Non-Ferrous  Metals  Division, 
352,  512;  lead  allocations,  360. 

Coronel,  battle  of,  cause,  388. 

Corsets,  war-time,  221,  328;  war  serv- 
ice committee,  534. 

Cost-plus  policy,  defects,  171-74;  in 
cantonment  building,  196,  197;  and 
steel  prices,  322. 

Cotton,  D.  R.,  regional  advisor,  508, 
512. 

Cotton,  and  price-fixing,  179, 180, 448; 
Section,  personnel,  442  n.,  506;  cot- 
ton waste  war  service  committee, 
534. 

Cotton  goods,  Section,  personnel,  441, 
506;  character  of  problem,  446;  gov- 
ernmental requirements,  446-48; 
early  service  committees,  447,  448; 
trade  and  governmental  orders,  con- 
versions, 447,  448;  period  of  army 


552 


INDEX 


s 


1 


I 


1     ♦ 


•/ 


administration,    448;    price-fixing, 
448;  war  service  committee,  534. 
See  also  Textiles. 
Cotton  linters,  war  demand  and  con- 
[         trol,  international  pool,  401;  Sec- 
tion, personnel,  442  n.,  506.  See  also 
Explosives. 
Couden,  A.  R.,  Advisory  Committee 

on  Plants  and  Munitions,  191. 
Council  of  National  Defense,  develop- 
ment of  idea,  11,  17,  18;  develop- 
ment of  measure,  14-17,  19;  GifTord 
as  director,  17;  original  purpose,  ef- 
fect of  war,  20-22;  and  its  Advisory 
Committee,  23;  and  industrial  dic- 
tatorship, 28;  and  beginning  of  in- 
dustrial conferences,  28;  General 
Munitions  Board,  34-36;  estab- 
lishes War  Industries  Board,  36-38; 
-  committees,  37;  War  Council,  43; 
and  priorities,  143;  on  Price-Fixing 
Conmiittee,  169;  and  conservation, 
210-12;  expenditures,  254  n.;  and 
labor,  280,  283,  285,  286;  and  post- 
war readjustment,  487;  text  of  act 
creating,  491, 492.  See  also  Advisory 
Conmiission. 
Crabbs,  F.  D.,  regional  advisor,  508, 

513. 
Cradock,  Sir  Christopher,  battle  of 

Coronel,  388. 
Crampton,  H.  E.,  and  measure  for 
Council  of  National  Defense,  15, 16. 
Crane,  C.  H.,  lead  industry  committee, 

360. 
Cranes,  story  of  sidetracked  gantry, 
455,  456;  Section,  head,  456,  504; 
demand  and  supply,  allocation,  con- 
version, 456. 
Creosote,  war  problem,  415;  Section. 

503. 
Crockett,  E.  D.,  Machine  Tool  Section, 

453  n.,  513. 
Cromwell,  lincohi.  Knit  Goods  Sec- 
tion, 442,  513;  work  as   head   of 
early  service  committee,  449,  450. 
Crowder,  E.  H.,  and  troop  require- 
ments,  134;  and  priorities,  148,  292. 
Crozier,  William,  and  preparedness, 
11;  and  alteration  of  Enfield  rifle, 
191;  and  nitrates,  389;  and  smoke- 
less powder  manufacture,  408, 409  n. 
Cuba,  manganese,  378. 
Curtains,  war  service  committee,  534. 
Cyclops,  loss,  manganese  cargo,  378. 
Cypress  Emergency  Bureau,  424  n. 
Czecho-Slovak  army  in  Russia,  suo- 
phes  for,  194.  ^ 


Dallas,  r^onal  advisor,  508. 
Dalton,  H.  G.,  steel  conunittee,  326. 
Damages,  through  priorities,  207. 


Dame,  F.  L.,  Facilities  Division,  199. 
513. 

Darling,  I.  C,  Creosote  Section,  415  n., 

513. 
Dariington,  Frederick,  Power  Section. 

460,  513. 
Data,  industrial,  pre-war  inventory, 
13,  14,  136,  137;  inadequate,  effect, 
114,  205;  automatic  provision,  114; 
steel  survey,  125,  326;  function  of 
War   Industries  Board,    136,    137, 
479;  survey  by  Fusion  Committee, 
205;  and  preparedness,  230;  conver- 
sion  survey,   234;   assemblage   by 
commodity  sections,  307-09;  on  knit 
goods,  449;  card  system  in  Machine 
Tool  Section,  454;  section  in  Chemi- 
cals Division,  504.  See  also  Division 
of  Planning. 
Davis,   Arthur,   and   aluminum   war 

industry,  356. 
Davis,  C.  B.,  Power  Section,  460, 513. 
Decentralization,  industrial,  effect,  6, 

51-53. 
Deeds,  E.  A.,  and  cylinder-grinding 
j     machinery,  454. 
Deliveries  by  stores  cut,  216. 
Demand.    See  Requirements;  Supply 

and  demand. 
Dennison,  H.  S.,  Division  of  Planning, 
202,    513;    Conunercial    Economy 
Board,  212. 
Dental    manufacturing,    war   service 

committee,  534. 
Denver,  regional  advisor,  508. 
Department  of  Agriculture,  War  La- 
bor Policies  Board,  288;  and  fer- 
tilizers, 389,  393,  395. 
Department  of  Conunerce,  and  Re- 
quirements Division,   127;  utilizes 
lessons  of  War  Industries  Board. 
484,  485. 
Department  of  the  Interior,  and  war- 
time   mineral    development,    385. 
See  also  Lane,  F.  K. 
Department  of  Justice,  and  conspectus 

periodical,  204. 
Department  of  Labor,  and  conspectus 
periodical,  204;  lack  of  machinery 
for  war  conditions,  284;  new  war- 
time agencies,  289.  See  also  War 
Labor  Administration. 
Department  of  Munitions,  proposed, 

and  War  Industries  Board,  8,  80. 
Designs,    conservation  in    industrial. 

219,  224. 
Detroit,  regional  advisor,  508. 
Dickinson,  W.  B.,  Facilities  Division. 

199. 
Dillon,  Clarence,  in  War  Industries 

Board,  61,  501,  513. 
Dinkey,  A.  C,  steel  conmiittee,  326. 


INDEX 


553 


Director  of  Purchase,  in  army,  130. 

Disarmament,  and  preparedness,  231. 

Disque,  B.  P.,  Fir  Production  Board, 
427. 

Ditforth,  W.  L.,  Machine  Tool  Sec- 
tion, 453  n.,  513. 

Diversion,  of  war  purchases  of  Allies, 
262,357. 

Division  of  Planning  and  Statistics,  in 
War  Industries  Board,  personnel, 
61,  136,  137,  201,  202,  502;  status, 
181,  182;  origin,  200,  201;  purpose, 
sections,  201,  202;  conspectus 
periodical,  value,  203,  204;  and 
marine  facility  and  requirement, 
204;  special  investigations,  205; 
book  on  war  prices,  205;  readjust- 
ment work,  205. 

Division  of  Purchase,  Storage,  and 
Traffic  in  General  Staff,  131. 

Divisions  of  War  Industries  Board, 
list,  personnel,  306  n.,  501-03. 

Dodd,  E.  M.,  Jr.,  Legal  Section,  207 
n.,  514. 

Dodge,  John,  on  automobile  industry 
and  war,  334,  335. 

Dollar-a-year  men,  services,  77,  78. 

Domestic  Hides  and  Skins  Section, 
434. 

Domestic  Wool  Section,  442  n.,  507. 

Donlin,  John,  Emergency  Construc- 
tion Committee,  197,  514. 

Donnelley,  T.  E.,  Pulp  and  Paper 
Division,  429,  514. 

Dorsey,  G.  D.,  Tm  Section,  367. 

Douglas  Spruce  Emergency  Bureau, 
424/1. 

Downey,  J.  I.,  Facilities  Division,  199, 
514. 

Downman,  R.  H.,  and  lumber  price, 
425;  Building  Materials  Division, 
427, 514. 

Draft,  priority  power  and,  148,  292; 
future  industrial,  482. 

Draper,  F.  W.,  platinum  import,  370, 
371. 

Dresses,  Paris  and  conservant  styles, 
220.  iSee  a&o  Textiles. 

Drugs,  war  service  committee,  534. 
iSee  also  Chemicals  Division. 

Dry  goods,  war  service  committees, 
534,  535.  See  also  Textiles. 

Du  Bois,  H.  C,  Electrodes  Section, 
417  71.  514. 

Dunn,  H.  T..  Rubber  Section,  438, 
442  n.,  514. 

Du  Pont  American  Industries,  and 
cotton  linters,  401. 

Du  Pont  Nitrate  Company,  and  im- 
port, 392  n. 

Dupont  Powder  Company,  and  toluol, 
T.N.T.  plant,  91, 404;  and  sulphuric 


acid,  399;  and  smokeless  powder, 
contract,  407-10. 

Durant,  E.  W.,  and  automobile  in- 
dustry and  war,  335. 

Dutch  East  Indies,  tin,  269,  365,  366. 

Dyes,  German  monopoly,  412;  devel- 
opment in  United  States,  413;  and 
intermediates,  control,  413;  Section, 
413  n.,  503;  conservation,  414;  prob- 
lem of  natural,  415. 

Dynamite,  as  war  discard,  406. 

Easley,  R.  M.,  labor  executive  com- 
mittee, 282. 

Elconomic  balance,  world,  upset,  250, 
259;  American  world-wide  control, 
261,  262.  See  also  Foreign  Mission. 

Economic  Intelligence  Section,  work, 
228. 

Edgar,  Charles,  in  early  lumber  sec- 
tion, 421,  424;  Lumber  Division, 
426,  514;  and  crooked  jobbers,  427. 

Edison,  T.  A.,  Naval  Consulting 
Board,  12. 

Editorial  Section  of  Division  of  Plan- 
nmg,  202. 

Education,  committee  in  Advisory 
Commission,  29,  37. 

Einig,  A.  B.,  Machine  Tool  Section, 
453  n.,  514. 

Eisendrath,  W.  B.,  Leather  Division, 
434,  514. 

Eisenman,  Charles,  textile  regulation, 
440,  441. 

Electric  railways,  war  service  com- 
mittee, 535. 

Electric  wire  and  cable,  anomalous 
clearing  committee,  115,  116. 

Electrical  and  Power  Equipment  Sec- 
tion, problems,  461,  463. 

Electrical  supplies,  war  service  com- 
mittees, 535. 

Electricity.  See  Power  and  transporta- 
tion. 

Electrochemicals,  cooperative  com- 
mittees, 496. 

Electrodes  and  Abrasures  Section, 
war  problem,  417;  personnel,  417  n., 
504. 

Electro-Metallurgical  Company,  and 
ferro-zirconium,  383. 

Elevator  manufacture,  conversion  to 
recuperators,  193. 

Elevators,  war  service  committee,  535. 

Elimination  of  industrial  waste,  lines, 
219.  See  also  Conservation;  Conver- 
sion. 

Ellsworth,  E.  K.,  disburser,  254  n. 

Elton,  J.  P.,  brass  industry  committee, 
353,  514. 

Ely,  Grosvenor,  Cotton  Goods  Section, 
442,  514. 


I 


554 


INDEX 


f 


V 


i 


Emergency  Construction  Committee, 
work,  personnel,  182,  196,  197,  504. 

Emergency  Fleet  Corporation.  See 
Shipping  Board. 

Emergency  Shipping  Act,  and  War 
Industries  Board,  96. 

Emery,  war  problem,  418. 

Employment  agencies,  war  time  pri- 
vate, 285;  federal,  rules,  289;  train- 
ing managers,  290. 

Employment  Management  Courses 
Section,  personnel,  208,  290,  502. 

Enameled  ware,  war  service  com- 
mittee, 535. 

Enfield  rifle,  justification  of  alteration. 
191. 

En^neer  Corps,  and  power  construc- 
tion, 460. 

Engineering,  committee  in  Advisory 
Conmaission,  29,  37;  war  service 
conomittees,  535. 

Envelopes,  war  service  committee, 
542. 

Esberg,  A.  I.,  Tobacco  Section,  474, 
514. 

Espionage  Act,  and  War  Industries 
Board,  97. 

Essential  industries.  See  Conversion; 
Priorities;  Requirements. 

Etherington,  Burton,  Cotton  Goods 
Section,  442,  514. 

Ettinger,  A.,  Legal  Section,  207  n.,  514. 

Exchanges  at  retail  stores,  abolished, 
216. 

Explosives,  chemistry  and  modem  war, 
397;  sulphuric  acid  materials,  con- 
trol, 397,  398;  manufacture  of  sul- 
phuric  acid,    prices,    398;    caustic 
soda,  399,  400;  soda  ash,  400;  al- 
cohol,   401;    cotton    linters,    401; 
toluol  and  anmionia,  T.N.T.,  402, 
404,  414;  American  oflTset  contribu- 
tion to  Allies,  402,  408;  interest  of 
War    Industries    Board,    Division, 
403,  410,  504;  high,  for  shells,  403; 
picric  acid,  phenol,  405,  414;  dis- 
card of  dynamite,  406;  propellants, 
smokeless  powder,  development  of 
plants,  407-10;  and  artificial  dye 
mdustry,   413;   silk   bagging,   450. 
See  also  Nitrates. 
Exports.  See  War  Trade  Board. 


Farm  implements,  conservation,  221; 

war  service  conunittee,  535. 
Farrell,  J.  A.,  steel  requirement  sur- 
vey, 125;  and  steel  prices,  317;  steel 
conmiittee,  325;  steel  distribution 
sub-committee,  329;  on  need  of 
manganese,  376. 
Federal  Trade  Conmaission,  and  price- 
fixing,  50  n.,  170,  178;  investiga- 
tions: steel,  320;  copper,  350;  alumi- 
num, 356;  sulphuric  acid,  399;  lum- 
ber, 425;  newsprint,  429. 

Feidman,  E.  N.,  Non-Ferrous  Metals 
Section,  352. 

Felt,  D.  E.,  regional  advisor,  508,  514. 

Felt,  Section,  442  n.,  506;  war  prob- 
lems, 450;  war  service  committee. 
535. 

Ferguson,  Homer,  and  War  Industries 
Board,  44  n. 

Ferro-alloy  metals.  Section,  position, 
384,  504.  See  also  Chromium;  Ferro- 
silicon;  Manganese;  Nickel;  Tung- 
sten; Vanadium;  Zirconium. 

Ferro-silicon,  war  problem,  384. 

Fertilizers,  agricultural  demand  for 
nitrates,  393;  cooperative  commit- 
tee, 496.  iSee  also  Potash. 

Fiber  Board  and  Container  Section. 
429  71.,  506. 

Fiber  containers,  war  service  commit- 
tee,  ooD. 

Finch, ,  Fusion  Committee,  205. 


INDEX 


,555 


Fabricated  steel,  for  shipyards,  330; 
war  service  conmiittee,  535. 

Facilities  Division,  in  War  Industries 
Board,  61,  62, 137;  status,  181;  pur- 
pjose,  personnel,  198-200,  503;  du- 
ties, and  Conversion  Section,  245, 
246;  and  labor,  246;  Bush  as  head, 
247;  and  new  power  construction, 
460. 


Fine  Chemicals  Section,  504. 

Finished  Products  Division,  in  War 
Industries  Board,  36,  37,  61;  sec- 
tions, 181,  182;  germ,  440;  person- 
nel, 502. 

Fir  Production  Board,  424  n.,  427. 

Fire  extinguishers,  scarcity,  458. 

Fire  Prevention  Section,  work,  person- 
nel, 182,  194,  504. 

Fisher,  Boyd,  and  training  employ- 
ment managers,  290,  515. 

Flannery,  J.  R.,  Chief  of  Railway 
Equipment  Section,  work,  saving  to 
allies,  468,  469,  515. 

Flavoring  extracts,  war  service  com- 
mittee, 535. 

Flax,  international  executives,  266; 
Section,  442  n.,  506;  war  problem, 
450.    See  also  Textiles. 

Fletcher,  E.  A.,  regional  advisor,  508, 
515. 

Fletcher,  F.  F.,  member  War  Indus- 
tries Board,  37,  61,  501,  515;  serv- 
ices, 93;  Clearance  Committee,  118; 
and  smokeless  powder,  408. 

Foch,  Ferdinand,  doubts  American 
abUity,  133. 

Food,  reclamation,  279. 

Food  Administration,  germ,  29;  War 


it« 


Council,  43;  and  priority,  49  n.;  and 
War  Industries  Board,  59,  105,  126, 
128,  206;  Requirements  Division, 
123;  and  non-essential  industries, 
184;  Fusion  Board,  205;  public  con- 
tact, 210;  and  voluntary  coopera- 
tion, 215;  sectional  representatives 
and  cooperation,  243;  and  Allied  re- 
quirements, 258;  War  Labor  Policies 
Board,  288;  and  tin  industry,  368; 
and  arsenic,  416. 

Food  and  Fuel  Act.  iSee  Lever  Act. 

Food  specialties,  war  service  commit- 
tee, 536. 

Ford,  Henry,  question  of  favoritism, 
340,  341;  and  ferro-zirconium,  383. 

Foreign  Economic  Mission,  need,  205 
n.,  262;  and  demand  for  British 
price-reciprocity,  263,  267,  271;  and 
need  of  British  price-fixing,  263;  ad- 
venture, 264;  personnel,  264,  272; 
diplomatic  status,  265;  assistance  of 
War  Trade  Board.  265;  direct  ac- 
tion, 265;  funds  266;  and  interna- 
tional commodity  executives,  266; 
reason  for  British  attitude,  267,  269, 
271;  forcing  price-control,  jute, 
267-69;  and  control  over  tin,  269; 
and  chairmanship  of  committees, 
steel,  269-71;  and  diversion  of  sup- 
plies, 271;  peace  prevents  fruition, 
271;  value  as  Board's  European 
agent,  British  shoe  contract  illustra- 
tion, 272;  and  Allied  hoarding,  273; 
French  reparation  data,  273;  and 
economics  at  Peace  Conference,  273. 

Foreign  Hides  and  Skins  Section,  434, 
505. 

Foreign  Wool  Section,  442  n.,  506. 

Forgings,  Guns,  and  Ammunition  Sec- 
tion, 505. 

"Forgodsakers,"  and  conservation, 
183,  229. 

Foster,  C.  K.,  Priorities  Committee, 
146  n.,  515;  and  priorities  relating 
to  power,  460. 

Foster,  Clair,  Emergency  Construc- 
tion Committee,  197,  514. 

Foundries,  war  service  committees, 
536. 

France,  alteration  in  "75**  shell,  90; 
shell  production,  232;  nitrate  pool, 
392.  See  also  Allies;  Foreign  Eco- 
nomic Mission;  Inter- Allied  Pur- 
chasing Commission. 

Frankel,  L.  K.,  labor  executive  com- 
minee,  282. 

Frankfurter,  Felix,  priorities,  146  n.; 

•  committee  on  non-essentials,  184; 
War  Labor  Administration,  286, 
515;  War  Labor  Policies  Board, 
288.  I 


Frayne,  H.  A.,  in  War  Industries 
Board,  37,  61,  62,  501,  515;  char- 
acter, services,  attitude  as  labor 
chief,  91-93,  276-278;  Price-Fixing 
Committee,  170;  War  Labor  Policies 
Board,  288;  in  steel  price-fixing 
meeting,  321. 

Freeport  Sulphur  Company,  and  war- 
time supply,  398. 

Freight  cars,  war  problem,  469. 

Friday,  David,  on  war  and  economi. 
conservation,  218. 

Friedlich,  H.  A.,  L^al  Section,  207  n.. 
515. 

Fuel  Administration,  germ,  29;  War 
Council,  43;  Priorities  Board,  49  n., 
146;  and  price-fixing,  50  n.,  167, 
167  n.,  170;  relations  with  War 
Industries  Board,  60,  68,  97,  105, 
128,  459,  460,  482;  and  non-essen- 
tial industries,  184;  Fusion  Board, 
205;  public  contact,  210;  sectional 
representation  and  cooperation,  243; 
and  Allied  requirements,  258;  and 
labor.  Labor  VVar  Policies  Board, 
284,  288;  and  power  control,  459. 

Fur,  war  service  committee,  536. 

Furniture  and  fixtures,  war  service 
committee,  543. 

Fusion  Committee,  economic  survey, 
205. 

Garfield,  H.  A.,  Price-Fixing  Com- 
mittee, 170,  515;  and  Baruch,  460. 
See  also  Fuel  Administration. 

Garments,  war  service  committee, 
536.    See  also  Textiles. 

Garrison,  L.  M.,  and  measure  for 
Council  of  National  Defense,  16. 

Gary,  E.  H.,  and  steel  price-fixing, 
177,  317,  319,  322;  and  war  industry 
and  anti-trust  laws,  313;  on  steel  in- 
dustry as  war  unit,  325;  steel  in- 
dustry committees,  325;  and  war 
construction,  330;  and  governmen- 
tal overbuying,  339. 

Gas  and  electric  service,  war  service 
committee,  536. 

Gas  engines,  war  service  committee, 
536. 

Gas  ranges,  war  service  committee, 
542. 

Gay,  E.  F.,  and  Baruch,  52;  Division 
of  Planning  and  Statistics,  137,  515; 
committee  on  non-essentials,  184; 
and  coordination  of  shipping  and 
trade,  200,  201;  Commercial  Econ- 
omy Board,  212;  later  services,  213. 
See  also  Division  of  Planning. 

Gears,  war  service  committee,  536. 

Sleneral  Chemical  Company,  sulphuric 
acid,  399. 


"1 


i 


I 


556 


ENDEX 


General  Electric  Company,  war-time 
generators,  463. 

General  Medical  Board  of  Council  of 
National  Defense,  472. 

General  Munitions  Board  of  Council 
of  National  Defense,  origin,  purpose, 
personnel,  34;  sub-committees,  field, 
35, 36;  failure,  superseded,  36. 

General  Staff,  recommends  Council  of 
National  Defense  (1910),  17;  and 
industrial  mobilization  (1916),  19; 
weakness,  industrial  inadeauacy, 
30,  111,  132;  and  control  of  pur- 
chases, 130,  131;  and  Facilities 
Division,  137. 

Geological  Survey,  and  War  Minerals 
Stimulation  Act,  374  n.;  and  policy 
of  artificial  industrial  stimulation, 
379-82;  war  services,  385,  386; 
nitrate  explorations,  389;  and  potash 
development,  395;  services  to  Chem- 
icals Division,  419. 

Geophysical  Laboratory,  and  optical 

flass,  396, 471 ;  services  to  Chemicals 
Hvision,  419. 

Georgia-Florida  Yellow  Pine  Emer- 
gency Bureau,  424  n. 

Germany,  inadequate  preparedness, 
5,  107,  108;  bureaucratic  efficiency, 
78;  collapse  foretold,  228;  copper 
stocks,  346;  potash  monopoly,  394, 
395;  coal-tar  derivatives,  dyes  and 
explosives,  404,  412;  refractory  clay, 
417;  optical  glass,  470. 

Giant,  Cal.,  T.N.T.  plant,  404. 

Gibbs,  Anthony,  and  Company,  and 
nitrates,  392  n. 

Gibbs,  E.  C„  regional  advisor,  508, 515. 

Gilford,  A.  L.,  Woolens  Section,  442, 
515. 

Gilford,  W.  S.,  and  Council  of  National 
Defense,  17;  and  creation  of  War 
Industries  Board,  36;  on  priorities, 
143. 

Glass,  container  problem,  418;  chem- 
ical glass  problems,  418.  See  also 
Optical  glass. 

Gloves  and  Leather  Clothings  Section, 
434. 

Godfrey,  Hollis,  and  measure  for 
Council  of  National  Defense,  15-17; 
on  Advisory  Conmiission,  17;  mem- 
ber of  it,  coDunittee,  22,  29;  Com- 
mercial Economy  Board,  212. 

Goding,  A.  T.,  Domestic  Hides  Sec- 
tion, 434. 

Goethals,  G.  W.,  in  War  Industries 
Board,  61,  501,  516;  and  army  pur- 
chases, 131;  priorities,  146  n.;  on 
wooden  ships,  423;  and  textiles  ad- 
ministration, 441;  woolen  specifica- 
tions, 446. 


Goetz,  G.  B.,  on  leather  demand, 
432  n. 

Gold  and  Silver  Section,  505. 

Gompers,  Samuel,  Advisory  Commis- 
sion, conmiittee,  22,  29;  and  labor 
during  war,  91,  280-82;  and  uni- 
versal service,  92. 

Gordon,  Sir  Charles,  High  Commis- 
sioner, 260. 

Grace,  E.  G.,  steel  committee,  326. 

Grace,  W.  R.,  and  Company,  and 
nitrates,  392  n. 

Graflf,  E.  D.,  Steel  Division,  326,  516. 

Graham,  W.  J.,  on  Advisory  Commis- 
sion, 24r-26. 

Grain,  war  service  committee,  536. 
See  also  Food  Administration. 

Grand  Rapids,  picric  acid  plant,  406. 

Granite  paving  blocks,  war  service 
committee,  536. 

Great  Britain,  naval  preparedness, 
108;  conservation  method,  229;  ex- 
tent of  industrial  mobilization,  263; 
restrictions  on  American  tin  supply, 
366;  mica,  385.  See  also  Allies; 
Foreign  Elconomic  Mission;  Inter- 
Allied  Purchasing  Commission. 

Grinding  wheels,  war  service  com- 
mittee, 536. 

Groceries,  war  service  committee,  536. 

Guggenheim,  Daniel,  and  voluntary 
copper  price-fixing,  347. 

Gypsum,  control,  430. 

Haight,  F.  E.,  Knit  Goods  Section, 
442,  516. 

Haley,  E.  J.,  Tanning  Materials  Sec- 
tions, 415,  516. 

Hall,  M.  B.,  priorities,  146  n.,  516. 

Hamilton,  C.  D.  P.,  Boots  and  Shoes 
Section,  434,  516. 

Hamilton,  Grant,  labor  committee, 
283. 

Hanch,  C.  C,  Automotive  Products 
Section,  464,  516. 

Hancock,  J.  M.,  and  Clark's  com- 
mittee, 115,  116;  Price-Fixing  Com- 
mittee, 170,  516. 

Hand  tools.  See  Hardware. 

Hanson,  J.  M.,  Advisory  Conmiittee 
on  Plants  and  Munitions,  191,  516. 

Hardware,  war  service  conmiittees, 
536,  537. 

Hardware  and  Hand  Tools  Section, 
war  conditions  and  problems,  457, 
458;  personnel,  505. 

Hardwood,  war-time  problems,  428. 

Hsuness,  war  demand,  432. 

Harness  and  Personal  Equipment 
Section,  434. 

Harness,  Bag,  and  Strap  Leather  Sec- 
tion, 434. 


./ 


moEK. 


557 


Harriman,  Mrs.  Borden,  labor  com- 
mittee, 283. 

Hatfield,  H.  R.,  Division  of  Planning, 
202,  517;  Fusion  Committee,  205. 

Hats,  conservation,  224;  war  service 
conmiittee,  537. 

Hawley,  H.  W.,  railway  equipment 
priorities,  468  n.,  517. 

Hay,  James,  and  bill  for  Council  of 
National  Defense,  16,  19. 

Hay  ward,  A.  O.,  News  Section,  507. 

Hemp,  war  problem,  451. 

Hercules  Company,  sulphuric  acid, 
399;  T.N.T.,  404;  smokeless  pow- 
der, 407,  410. 

Herrington,  C.  E.,  regional  advisor, 
508,  517. 

Hides.  See  Leather. 

Hill,  J.  M.,  on  deficit  of  iridium,  372. 

Hines,  W.  D.,  and  War  Industries 
Board,  60. 

Hirsch,  Maurice,  priorities,  146  n., 
517. 

Hoarding,  by  Allies,  273.  See  also 
Stored  Materials  Section. 

Hobson,  R.  P.,  bill  for  Council  of  Na- 
tional Defense,  17. 

Hoffman,  F.  L.,  labor  committee,  283. 

Holbrook,  Percy,  priorities,  146  n., 
517. 

Hoover,  Herbert,  Advisory  Commis- 
sion and,  25;  and  original  War  In- 
dustries Board,  37;  and  voluntary 
cooperation,  215;  and  lesson  of  War 
Industries  Board,  484,  485.  See  also 
Food  Administration. 

Hopewell,  Va.,  pyro-cotton  plant,  410. 

Hopkins,  J.  M.,  priorities,  146  n.,  517. 

Horning,  H.  L.,  Automotive  Products 
Section,  466. 

Horse-shoe  industry,  war-time  com- 
bine, 458. 

Hosiery,  war  service  committee,  537. 
See  also  Knit  goods. 

Hospitals,  war  service  committee,  537. 

Houck,  Roland,  Machine  Tool  Section, 
453  n.,  518. 

House,  E.  M.,  and  measure  for  Coun- 
cil of  National  Defense,  16;  and 
reparation  data,  273. 

Houston,  D.  F.,  and  A.  W.  Shaw,  211. 
See  also  Department  of  Agriculture. 

Houston,  J.  P.,  railway  equipment 
priorities,  468  n. 

Howe,  O.  C.,  Foreign  Hides  Section, 
434,  518. 

Hubbard,  R.  S.,  Paints  and  Pigments 
Section,  death,  415  n.,  518. 

Hughes,  John,  Foreign  Mission,  265, 
518. 

Humphrey,  R.  L.,  Building  Materials 
Division,  430,  518. 


Hurley,  E.  N.,  and  priority,  200;  in- 
consistent optimism,  338;  and  Ba- 
ruch,  460.  See  also  Shipping  Board. 

Huston,  A.  F.,  steel  committee,  326. 

Hutchinson,  Lincoln,  Foreign  Mission, 
265,  518;  tin  negotiations,  366. 

Hydrants  and  valves,  war-time  com- 
bine, 458. 

Hylan,  J.  F.,  and  restriction  of  build- 
ings, 188. 

Ice,  war  service  committee,  537. 

Imports,  reduction  and  shipping  re- 
lease, 200,  204.  See  also  Tariff  Com- 
mission; War  Trade  Board. 

India,  jute  price-control,  268;  mica,  385. 

Indian  Head  plant,  smokeless  powder, 
408,  410. 

Industrial  Adjustments  Committee, 
organized,  policy,  182,  185;  career, 
186. 

Industrial  committees.  See  War  serv- 
ice committees. 

Industrial  Gases  and  Gas  Products 
Section,  414. 

Industrial  Inventory  Section,  61 ;  func- 
tion, 136. 

Industrial  mobilization,  untold  story, 
3;  unpreparedness,  its  advantages, 
6-8;  rise  of  preparedness  movement, 
pre-war  inventory,  13,  14,  137;  Na- 
tional Defense  Act  (1916),  18;  im- 
portance of  raw  materials,  27,  30, 
67,  89;  dictatorship,  28;  non-parti- 
san, 38,  39;  necessity  of  civilian  con- 
trol, 40, 47;  completeness,  40, 63, 98, 
121,  154,  158,  159;  self-control,  73, 
74,  98,  162,  190,  191,  214-16,  287, 
301,  481;  dollar-a-year  men,  77,  78; 
spirit,  patriotic  service  and  sacrifice, 
78,  79,  360,  439-41,  451;  war  need, 
104,  107;  inadequacy  of  General 
Staff  for.  111,  132;  efficiency,  and 
anti-trust  laws,  fewer  laborers  and 
greater  production,  207,  218,  230, 
311-14,  458,  486;  American,  as  com- 
plementary or  unitary,  235-38;  ex- 
tent of  British,  263;  vision  of  inter- 
national centralized  control,  275; 
post-war  neglect  of  preparedness, 
396,  483;  future  draft,  482;  strategy, 
485;  success  of  democratic,  488. 
See  also  Business  in  Government; 
Preparedness;  War  Industries  Board; 
War  service  committees. 

Industrial  Preparedness  Committee  of 
Naval  Consulting  Board,  work,  12- 
14. 

Industrial  relations,  committee  in  Ad- 
visory Commission,  29. 

Industrial  Workers  of  the  World,  war 
activities,  284. 


1 1 


It 


j 


m. 


M 


1. 1 

i 

I 

4 


1 


il 


\  ' 


•/ 


558 


INDEX 


Industry,  and  modern  war,  2,  3;  de- 
centralization, 6;  problem  of  war- 
time stimulation,  379-82.  See  also 
Business  in  Grovemment  Coopera- 
tion; Industrial  mobilization;  War 
Industries  Board;  War  service 
committees. 

Influenza  epidemic,  industrial  prob- 
lems, 416,  458,  472. 

Information.  See  Data. 

Ingels,  H.  P.,  in  War  Industries  Board, 
61,  501,  518. 

Inglis,  J.  A.,  Employment  Manage- 
ment Section,  290,  518. 

Inland  Traffic  Section,  work,  182, 197, 
505. 

Inland  transportation  conmiittee  in 
Council  of  National  Defense,  37. 
•See  also  Transportation. 

Inman,  E.  H.,  regional  advisor,  508, 
518. 

Inter-Allied  Purchasing  Commission, 
development  in  War  Industries 
Board,  45,  61,  62,   105.  256;  Re- 

Sjirements  Division,  123;  Priorities 
oard,  146;  need,  preference  blun- 
ders, 251,  252;  established,  original 
members,  252;  chief  function,  253; 
later  application,  253;  Legge  as 
manager,  253;  simplicity,  253;  lack 
of  authority,  attitude  of  military  au- 
thorities, 254-56;  meetings  with  Al- 
lied representatives,  257;  and  other 
boards,  258;  and  requirements  and 
actual  purchases,  258;  financial 
vastness,  259;  foreign  and  American 
personnel,  260,  501;  integrity,  260. 

International  commodity  executives, 
plan,  commodities,  266;  for  tin,  269, 
366;  steel  chairmanship,  270;  not 
developed,  271;  plan  for  platinum, 
375;  for  nitrates,  392. 

International  Nickel  Company,  mo- 
nopoly, 361. 

Intoxicants,  preliminary  curtailment 
of  manufacture,  184  n. 

Iridium,  deficit,  371,  372. 

Iron  and  steel,  war  service  commit- 
tees, 537,  538.  See  also  Steel. 

Iron  and  Steel  Scrap  Section,  506. 

Insurance  companies  and  Stored  Ma- 
terials Section,  195. 

Italy.  See  Allies:  Foreign  Economic 
Mission;  Inter- Allied  Purchasing 
Conmiission. 

Jackling,  D.  C,  smokeless  powder 
plant,  409. 

Jackson,  L.  B.,  Domestic  Hides  Sec- 
tion, 434,  518. 

James,  G.  R.,  Cotton  Section,  442  n., 
518. 


I  Japan,  kapoc,  450. 

Jewelry,  and  industrial  essentiality 
problem,  186;  war  service  commit- 
tees, 538. 

Joffre,  J.  J.  C,  and  American  partici- 

Eation,  109. 
nson,  H.  S.,  services  in  War  Indus- 
tries Board,  93,  518;  on  clearance, 
119;  cooperative  influence,  126, 131, 
243;  on  priority  problem,  149. 

Johnson,  Jackson,  regional  advisor, 
508,  518. 

Jusserand,  J.  J.,  and  dress  conservation, 
220. 

Jute,  international  executive,  266; 
forcing  price-control  on  British,  268; 
war-problem,  451;  Section,  505. 

Kansas  City,  regional  advisor,  508. 

Kapoc,  war  problem,  451. 

Kean,  D.  L.,  Medical  Industry  Sec- 
tion, 472  n.,  519. 

Keller,  Charles,  and  power  construc- 
tion, 460;  report  on  power  during 
war,  462  n. 

Kelley,  G.  E.  C,  Rubber  Section,  437 
n.,  519. 

Kelly,  M.  C,  Emergency  ConBtruc- 
tion  Conmiittee,  197. 

Kerensky,  A.  F.,  held-up  supplies  for, 
195.  . 

Keman  Report,  utilization,  136. 

Keuffel  and  Elsser  Company,  optical 
glass,  471. 

King,  Stanley,  War  Labor  Policies 
Board,  288. 

King,  W.  L.,  steel  committee,  326. 

Kittredge,  L.  H.,  Facilities  Division, 
199,  519. 

Kling,  J.  A.,  Conversion  Section,  243, 
519. 

Klingenberg  clay,  417. 

Knappen,  T.  M.,  on  Aircraft  Produc- 
tion Board,  465  n. 

Knit  goods.  Section,  personnel,  442, 
506;  work  of  early  service  committee, 
trade  attitude  toward  war  orders, 
449,  450;  control,  problems,  450. 
•See  also  Textiles. 

Koster,  F.  J.,  regional  advisor,  508, 
519. 

Krumb,  Henry,  priorities,  146  n.,  519. 

Kuhn,  J.  E.,  first  estimate  of  army 
supplies,  31. 

Labor,  committee  in  Advisory  Com- 
mission, 29;  in  Council  of  National 
Defense,  37;  Division  in  War  In- 
dustries Board,  development,  atti- 
tude, 37,  45,  61,  92,  276-78;  Gom- 
pers  and  war-time,  91;  in  Price- 
Fixing  Committee,   170;  post-war 


INDEX 


559 


readjustment  studies,  205;  Prior- 
ities Section,  and  draft,  208,  291, 
292;  problem  of  turnover,  employ- 
ment agencies,  strikes,  chaos,  246, 
284;  personnel  of  Division,  278,  501; 
reclamation  of  waste,  278-80;  gov- 
ernmental war  policy,  280,  283;  atti- 
tude and  actions  of  leaders,  280;  pre- 
war conferences  and  special  com- 
mittees, 281;  Department  of  Labor 
and  war  conditions,  284;  I.  W.  W. 
menaces,  284;  Mediation  Commis- 
sion, work,  recommendations,  284; 
governmental  piecemeal  dealings, 
284;  origin  of  War  Labor  Admin- 
istration, duties,  boards,  285-89; 
work  of  War  Labor  Board,  287;  War 
Labor  Policies  Board,  288;  War  In- 
dustries Board  and  labor  boards, 
288,  289;  United  States  Employ- 
ment Service,  rules  of  employment, 
289;  Employment  Management  Sec- 
tion, training  of  managers,  290; 
impermanence  of  war-time  changes, 
reaction,  290,  291;  power  of  War 
Industries  Board  over,  292;  wages 
and  first  steel  price-fixing,  322; 
copper  miners  and  price-fixing,  349. 

Lamont,  T.  F.,  at  Peace  Conference, 
274. 

Landis,  J.  F.  R.,  estimate  of  army 
supplies,  31. 

Lane,  F.  K.,  and  beginning  of  indus- 
trial mobilization,  28;  and  railroads, 
81;  and  A.  W.  Shaw,  211;  and  War 
Labor  Board  Administration,  285, 
286;  and  war-time  mineral  develop- 
ment, 385. 

Lanoline,  war  demand,  416. 

Law,  A.  Bonar,  and  Foreign  Mission, 
270. 

Lead,  price-fixing,  164,  359;  allocation, 
conservation,  360;  cooperative  spirit, 
360;  cooperative  committee,  497. 

Leather  and  hides,  international  execu- 
tive, 266;  Tanning  Materials  Sec- 
tion, 415;  war  demand,  432,  433; 
hide  imports,  supply,  433;  com- 
mittees of  Advisory  Council,  433; 
control  needed,  433;  blended  army- 
War  Industries  Board  handling,  sec- 
tions, personnel,  433,  434,  505; 
sheepskins  control,  434;  price-fixing 
of  hides  and  skins,  435;  trench 
shoes,  435;  control  of  shoe  industry, 
drastic  plan,  435,  436. 

Leddy,  J.  C,  Inter- Allied  Purchasing 
Commission,  260,  519. 

Lee,  Elisha,  labor  executive  com- 
mittee, 282. 

Legal  Section  of  War  Industries 
Board,  207.  505. 


Legge,  Alexander,  in  War  Industries 
Board,  character,  services,  61,  62, 
85,  86,  501;  Requirements  Division, 
123,  520;  priorities,  146  n.;  special 
sections  under,  182;  Inter- Allied 
Purchasing  Commission,  253,  256; 
Foreign  Mission,  272;  at  Peace  Con- 
ference, 273;  and  Trade  Commis- 
sion's steel  report,  320;  steel  price- 
schedule,  320;  on  general  industrial 
situation,  336;  on  Mayor  Thomp- 
son, 339;  and  tin,  376;  and  Railway 
Equipment  Section,  468. 
i  Leith,  C.  K.,  Mica  Section,  385. 

Lever  Act,  and  War  Industries  Board, 
96;  and  priorities,  144;  and  price- 
fixing,  166. 

Lewis,  H.  J.,  Gloves  Section,  434. 

Liberty  Plate  Mill,  construction,  329. 

Light  Armor  Plate  Board,  384. 

Lima  Locomotive  Works,  war  services, 
469. 

Lime,  war  service  committee,  538. 

Lincoln,  Abraham,  and  legality,  73. 

Lind,  John,  labor  advisory  council, 
286. 

Linoleum,  war  problem,  451. 

Linseed  oil,  scarcity,  415. 

Lipsitz,  Louis,  regional  advisor,  593, 
520. 

Lithographers,  war  service  committee, 
538. 

Lithopone,  war  service  committee, 
539. 

Little  Rock,  picric  acid  plant,  406. 

Loans  to  Allies,  and  industrial  prob- 
lem, 251. 

Locomotives,  standardization,  194; 
war  problem  and  supply,  469. 

Loper,  R.  E.,  Cotton  Goods  Section, 
442,  520. 

Lord,  James,  labor  executive  commit- 
tee, 282. 

Lovett,  R.  S.,  member  War  Industries 
Board,  36,  37;  priorities,  145;  and 
legal  basis  of  price-fixing,  177;  Inter- 
Allied  Purchasing  Commission,  253; 
on  distrust  of  trade  committees,  303; 
and  Trade  Commission's  steel  re- 
port, 320;  steel  price-fixing,  322. 

Lowell,  F.  C.,  Machine  Tool  Section, 
543  n.,  520. 

Lumber,  price-fixing,  164,  177,  425, 
426;  status  as  war  industry,  292; 
character  of  industry,  420;  filling 
cantonments  order,  420;  promptness, 
iUustrations,  420-22;  war  demands, 
422;  attitude  toward  regulation, 
423,  424;  cooperation  of  industry 
with  War  Industries  Board,  emer- 
gency bureaus,  424;  regional  admin- 
istrators, 424  n.;  conservation,  re- 


560 


INDEX 


■  ill 


1 


/ 


striction  oT  production,  426;  priori- 
ties, 426;  Division,  personnel,  426, 
427,  505;  crooked  jobbing,  427; 
transportation  problem,  428;  hard- 
wood problems,  428;  cooperative 
committee,  497;  war  service  com- 
mittees, 538,  543.  See  also  Building 
materials;  Pulp  and  paper. 
Lundorff,  G.  W.,  Emergency  Con- 
struction Committee,  197,  520. 


McAdoo,  W.  G.,  and  biU  for  Council 
of  National  Defense,  17;  and  Banich 
and  War  Industries  Board,  54,  60, 
71,  460;  and  railroad  congestion, 
199;  and  Baruch's  Foreign  Mission, 
264;  and  platinum,  370.  See  also 
Railroad  Administration. 

McAllister,  W.  B.,  regional  advisor 
508,  520.  * 

McAneny,  George,  and  industrial  pre- 
paredness, 14. 

McCauley,  John,  Knit  Goods  Section, 
442,  520. 

McCormick,  Cyrus,  and  Legge,  85. 

McCormick,  Vance,  and  Baruch,  206; 

-^as  t»ead  of  War  Trade  Board,  206. 

McDowell,  C.  H.,  at  Peace  Confer- 
ence, 273;  Chemicals  Division,  377- 
and  nitrates,  393,  399;  and  potash 
for  optical  glass,  396;  and  platinum 
substitutes,  419;  services,  419. 

Machines  and  tools,  power  in  modem 
war,  452;  problems  of  war-time  mak- 
mg,  congestion,  452,  453;  method 
of  administration,  personnel  of  Sec- 
tion, 453,  505;  conversions,  illustra- 
tion, 454;  commandeering  exports, 
454;  excessive  standardization  pre- 
vented, 454;  unexpected  requirement 
troubles,  454, 455;  cooperative  of  m- 
dustry,  455;  problems  of  electric  ap- 
paratus, 463;  war  service  committee, 
538. 

Mackall,  Paul,  Foreign  Mission,  264; 
chairman  international  steel  com- 
mittee, 270,  271;  Steel  Division, 
326,  521. 

McKellar,  W.  D.,  Domestic  Wool 
Section,  442  n.,  521. 

McKelvey,  C.  W.,  Legal  Section,  207 
n.,  521. 

McKenney,  C.  A.,  in  War  Industries 
Board,  131;  priorities,  146  n.,  521. 

McKmney,  Price,  and  steel  prices. 
318,  319. 

McLauchlan,  J.  C,  Steel  Division, 
326,  521. 

McLennan,  D.  R.,  Non-War  Construc- 
tion Section,  187,  521. 

Macpherson,  F.  H.,  priorities,  146  n., 
521. 


Macy,  V.  E.,  labor  executive  commit- 

tee,  282. 
Magnesium,  war  demand  and  suddIv 

uses,  385.  ^' 

Malay  States,  tin,  269,  365. 
Mallalieu,    W.    E.,    Fire   Prevention 

Section,  194,  521. 
Malt,  war  service  committee,  538. 
Manganese,    international   executive, 

266;   dependence  on   import,   376, 

377;     Brazilian     supply,     shipping 

problem,   377.   382;  American  d^ 

posits,  character,  stimulation,  377. 

378,  380,  381;  prices,  378;  adminis^ 

tration,  378,  382. 
Manning,  J.  J.,  Labor  Division,  278, 521 
Manmng,  V.  H.,  services  to  Chemical* 

Division,  419. 
Manufacturing  Chemists'  Association, 

as  industries  committee,  419. 
Marble,  war  service  committee,  538. 
March,   P.   C,   and  War  Industries 

Board,  132,  134;  and  concentration 

on  troops  for  France,  133. 
Marine  Corps,  Requirements  Division, 

Marsh,  T.  F.,  committee  on  non-essen- 
tials, 184. 

Martin,  Franklin,  Advisory  Com- 
mission, committee,  22,  29,  472; 
General  Munitions  Board,  35. 

Mason,  N.  E.,  priorities,  146  n.,  521. 

Master  house  painters  and  decorators, 
war  service  committee,  539. 

Master  plumbers,  war  service  com- 
mittee, 540. 

Matiack,  J.  C,  Rubber  Section,  437  n., 

May,  George,  committee  on  non- 
essentials, 184. 

Mediation  Commission  for  labor  ques- 
tions, recommendations,  284. 

Medical  industry,  eariy  committees, 
29, 37, 472;  personnel  of  Section,  472, 
505;  problems,  conservation  and 
standardization,  472;  and  war-time 
readjustments  and  scarcity,  472* 
prices,  473.  * 

Mellon  Institute,  chemical  research. 
418,  419. 

Men's  straw  hats,  war  service  commit- 
tee, 537. 

Merrill,  W.  H.,  Fire  Prevention  Sec- 
tion,  194,  521. 

Merryweather,  G.  E.,  Machine  Tool 
Section,  453,  521;  and  excessive 
standardization,  454;  requirement 
troubles,  455. 

Metal  bed  manufacturers,  problem, 
458. 

Metel  ceiling,  war  service  committee, 
533.. 


INDEX 


561 


Metal  gauges,  war  service  committee, 
536. 

Metal  lath,  war  service  committee, 
533. 

Metals,  committee  in  Advisory  Com- 
mission, 29.  -See  also  Chemicals  Di- 
vision; Ferro-alloy;  Non-ferrous; 
Steel. 

Meyer,  Eugene,  Jr.,  copper  price,  162, 
347;  Non-Ferrous  Metals  Section, 
352,  522;  and  building  materials, 
430. 

Mica,  war  demand  and  supply,  admin- 
istration, 385;  cooperative  commit- 
tee, 497;  Section,  504. 

Michael,  C.  E.,  labor  executive  com- 
mittee, 282. 

Midland,  Mich.,  bromine,  416. 

Mill  and  mine  supplies  and  machinery, 
war  service  committee,  538. 

Miller,  G.  E.,  FacUities  Division,  199, 
522. 

Milling,  war  service  committee,  538. 

Milwaukee,  regional  advisor,  508. 

Minerals,  committee  in  Advisory  Com- 
mission, 29;  war  services  of  Depart- 
ment of  Interior.  385.  See  also  Build- 
ing materials;  Chemicals  Division; 
Explosives;  Non-ferrous;  Steel. 

Minneapolis  Steel  and  Machinery 
Company,  closing,  252. 

Miscellaneous  Chemicals  Section, 
problems,  384,  416. 

Miscellaneous  Commodities  Section, 
505. 

Mitchell,  W.  C,  price-fixing,  202, 522. 

Molybdenum,  as  alloy,  383. 

Monel  metal,  uses,  361. 

Montgomery,  R.  H.,  price-fixing,  170, 
522. 

Moody,  H.  R.,  Technical  Staff  of 
Chemistry  Division,  418,  522. 

Morehead,  J.  M.,  Industrial  Gases 
Section,  414,  522. 

Morgan,  W.  F.,  regional  advisor,  508, 
522. 

Morrison,  Frank,  labor  executive  com- 
mittee, 282;  special  committee,  283. 

Morrow,  Dwight,  and  shipping  for 
A.E.F.,  204  n.,  205  n. 

Morse,  F.  W.,  Advisory  Committee  on 
Plants  and  Munitions,  191,  522. 

Morss,  Everett,  priorities,  146  tu  ;  Brass 
Section,  353,  522. 

Motor-cycles,  conservation,  222. 

Motor-trucks,  war-time  control,  465; 
standardized  heavy,  466,  467. 

Moulton,  H.  B.,  Non-Ferrous  Metals 
Section,  352,  522. 

Munitions,  pre-war  inventory  of  pos- 
sible plants,  13;  committee  on  Ad- 
visory Commission,  29;  strain  and 


complexity  of  demand,  139,  140; 
altering  Enfield  rifle,  191;  adop- 
tion of  French  artillery  types,  192; 
influence  of  Advisory  Committee, 
192,  193;  American  complementary 
or  unitary  supply,  235-38,  402,  408; 
blunder  in  takings  plant  from  work 
for  Allies,  252;  American  accomplish- 
ment in  projectile  steel,  330.  See 
also  Explosives;  General  Munitions 
Board. 

Munitions  Standard  Board,  35. 

Muscle  Shoals,  nitrate  plants,  390, 405. 

Nashville,  powder  plant,  construction, 
399,  407,  410. 

National  Academy,  and  nitrates,  389. 

National  Advisory  Committee  on 
Aeronautics,  creation,  18. 

National  Committee  of  Physicians  for 
Medical  Preparedness,  creation,  18. 

National  Defense  Act  (1916),  war  in- 
dustry powers  from,  18,  19,  95,  96; 
weaknesses,  30. 

National  Electrolytic  Company,  and 
platinum  substitutes,  374. 

National  Fertilizer  Association,  as  in- 
dustry committee,  419. 

Nationed  Research  Council,  creation, 
18;  services  to  Che-nicals  Division, 
419;  and  aspirin,  472. 

National  Waste  Reclamation  Section, 
work,  278,  279. 

Naumburg,  G.  W.,  Cotton  Section, 
442  n.,  522. 

Naval  Consulting  Board,  Industrial 
Preparedness  Committee,  inven- 
tory, 12-14, 136, 137;  creation,  18. 

Naval  Emergency  Act,  and  War  In- 
dustries Board,  96. 

Navy,  programme,  12;  representation 
in  War  Industries  Board,  37,  61,  93; 
relations  with  Board,  41-43,  126, 
127;  Requirements  Division,  123, 
127;  forecasts  of  requirements,  125; 
preference  in  purchases,  142;  Priori- 
ties Board,  146;  in  Price-Fixing 
Committee,  170;  industrial  com- 
mandeering, 177  n.;  railway  mounts 
for  guns,  193;  and  conspectus  peri- 
odical, 203;  sectional  industrial 
representatives  and  cooperation, 
243;  War  Labor  Policies  Board,  288; 
and  commodity  sections,  307;  and 
ferro-zirconium,  383;  and  toluol, 
402;  smokeless  powder  plant,  408, 
410;  textile  requirements,  447,  448; 
and  machinery  requirements,  454. 

Naxos,  emery,  417. 

Needles  shortage,  458. 

Neutral  nations,  power  of  United 
States  over,  261. 


562 


INDEX 


1 


^H 


'■I 


\ 


i 


New   Caledonia,    nickel,    361;    chro- 
mium, 378. 

New     England     Spruce     Emergency 
Bureau,  424  n. 

New  Republic,  on  the  war  and  business 
administration,  79. 

New  York  City,  and  restriction  of 
building,  188;  regional  advisor,  508. 

News  Section,  507. 

Newspaper  Section,  429  n.,  505. 

Newsprint.  See  Pulp  and  paper. 

Niagara  Falls,  power  shortage,  inter- 
national conservation,  461,  462. 

Nichols,  H.  W.,  Pulp  and  Paper  Divi- 
sion, 429  n.,  523. 

Nickel,  supply,  war-time  conditions, 
361;  uses,  conservation,  361;  prices, 
361;  priorities,  362;  cooperative 
committee,  497. 

Nielsen,  F.  K.,  at  Peace  Conference,  273. 

Nitrates  and  nitric  acid,  war  impor- 
tance, use  in  munitions,  30,  387,  388; 
international  executive,  pool,  con- 
trol, 266,  392;  no  American  reserves, 
futile  explorations  for  deposits,  389; 
appropriation  for  plants,  389;  in- 
vestigations and  experiments,  389; 
erection  of  plants,  system,  390,  394, 
405;  prices,  Baruch's  bluflf  made 
good,  German  stocks  confiscated  in 
Chile,  390-92;  attitude  of  Chile, 
special  offer,  392,  393;  agricultural 
demand  and  supply,  393;  develop- 
ment and  character  of  War  Indus- 
tries Board's  control,  393,  394;  wor- 
ries, 394;  manufacture  and  conser- 
vation of  acid,  its  price,  399,  419; 
Section.  504. 

Nitro,  W.Va.,  powder  plant,  construc- 
tion, 399,  407,  409. 

Nitrocellulose.  See  Smokeless  powder. 

Nixon,  F.  K.,  Foreign  Mission,  265; 
wool  expert,  523. 

Non-essential    industries.     See    Con- 
version; Priorities;  Requirements. 
Non-ferrous  metals.  Division,  person- 
nel, 352,  505;  act  to  stimulate  pro- 
duction,  374;  services  of  Depart- 
ment of  the  Interior,  385.   See  also 
Aluminum;     Antimony;     Copper; 
Ferro-alloy;  Lead;  Platinum;  Quick- 
silver; Tin;  Zinc. 
Non-War  Construction  Section,  opera- 
tion, problems,   182,   187-91,  338; 
personnel,  502. 
North  American  Chemical  Company, 

and  platinum  substitutes,  374. 
Northcliffe,  Lord,  High  Commissioner, 

260. 
Northeast,  war-time  industrial  conges- 
tion, 199,  234,  235;  and  machinery 
making,  453. 


Northern  Hardwood  Emergency  Bu- 
reaus, 424  n. 

Norton  Company,  artificial  abrasive, 
418. 

Noyes,  P.  B.,  Requirements  Division, 
committee  on  non-essentials,  184, 
523;  on  coal  situation,  336. 

Noyes,  P.  F.,  priorities,  146  n. 

Ocean  transportation,  problem,  6;  un- 
known factors,  yet  met,  109,  110; 
unexpected  development  of  troop 
carriage,  resulting  materiel  p^o^^^ 
lem,  133-35.  See  also  American  Ex- 
peditionary Forces;  Shipping  Board. 

O'Connell,  James,  labor  executive  com- 
mittee, 282. 

Ohio  Salt  Company,  and  platinum 
substitutes,  374. 

Ohio  sandstone  industry,  war  service 
committee,  541. 

Oil,  cooperative  committee,  499,  500. 

Old  Hickory  Powder  Plant,  construc- 
tion, 407,  409. 

OKve-drab  cloth,  and  sulphide  of  soda 
shortage,  414. 

Oliver,  G.  S.,  regional  advisor,  508, 
523. 

Olmsted,  F.  L.,  Emergency  Construc- 
tion Committee,  197,  523. 

Open  market  prices,  and  war,  171. 

Optical  glass,  and  need  of  carbonate  of 
potash,  395,  396;  and  abrasives,  418; 
German  monopoly.  Allied  shifts, 
470;  development  in  United  States, 
Section,  control,  personnel,  470,  471, 
505. 

Optical  goods,  war  service  committee, 
539. 

Opticians,  war  service  committee,  539. 

Ordway,  L.  P.,  priorities,  146  /i.,  523; 
Foreign  Mission,  265. 

Otis,  C.  A.,  and  commodity  concentra- 
tion, 241,  242;  Resources  and  Con- 
version Section,  241,  523;  regional 
advisors,  241-43;  cooperation  with 
other  boards,  243. 

Overman  Act,  and  reorganization  of 
War  Industries  Board,  58,  97,  100; 
text,  493,  494. 

Oxygen,  war  demand,  415. 

Packing,  simplification,  217. 

Paige,  H.  R.,  Nitrate  Section,  392, 
523. 

Paints  and  pigments.  Section,  prob- 
lems, 415,  504;  war  service  commit- 
tees, 539. 

Palmer,  B.  W.,  at  Peace  Conference, 
273. 

Palmer,  G.  J.,  Pulp  and  Paper  Divi- 
sion, 429  n.,  523. 


INDEX 


563 


«) 


Panama  Canal  Commission,  and  Re- 
quirements Division,  127. 

Paper.  See  Pulp  and  paper. 

Paper  bags,  war  service  committee, 
539. 

Parker,  E.  B.,  in  War  Industries 
Board,  61,  62,  501;  character,  serv- 
ices, 88;  priorities,  145,  146  n.,  523; 
committee  on  non-essentials,  184; 
and  coordination  of  shipping  and 
trade,  200;  and  automobile  indus- 
try, 339,  341. 

Parsons,  C.  L.,  and  nitrates,  389. 

Patterson,  A.  M.,  Foreign  Mission, 
265;  Foreign  Wool  Section,  442  n., 
.523. 

Paxton,  J.  W.,  Mica  Section,  385;  pri- 
orities, 523. 

Peabody,  H.  E.,  Woolens  Section,  442, 
443,  523. 

Peace  Conference,  economic  survey  for, 
205;  American  economic  advisors, 
273. 

Peek,  G.  N.,  in  War  Industries  Board, 
61,  62,  501;  character,  services,  86, 
87;  Fire  Prevention  Section,  182;  In- 
dustrial Representative,  duties,  pol- 
icy, 239,  240;  Conmiissioner  of  Fin- 
ished Products,  240,  501;  and  re- 
gional advisors,  241,  242;  and  com- 
modity sections,  304. 

Penick,  F.  E.,  Inter-Allied  Purchas- 
ing Commission,  260,  523. 

Pennie,  J.  C,  at  Peace  Conference, 
274. 

Pens,  conservation,  223. 

Penwell,  Lewis,  Domestic  Wool  Sec- 
tion, 442  n.,  523. 

Periodicals,  conspectus,  of  Division  of 
Planning,  203;  of  War  Industries 

.     Board,  306. 

Perkins,  T.  N.,  Legal  Section,  207, 523. 

PerryviUe,  Md.,  T.N.T.  plant,  404. 

Permit  Section,  506. 

Pershing,  J.  J.,  on  need  of  transport, 
133;  and  promised  shipping,  204; 
explosives  for  Allies,  408.  See  also 
American  Expeditionary  Forces. 

Peru,  vanadium,  383. 

Petroleum,  war  service  committees, 
539,  540. 

Pharmacy,  war  service  committee, 
540. 

Phenol,  manufacture,  400;  war  de- 
mand and  supply,  405,  414. 

Philadelphia,  regional  advisor,  508. 

Philbrick,  M.  E.,  Lumber  Division, 
427,  523. 

Phillipps,  H.  G.,  priorities,  146  ti.,  524. 

PhUlips,  W.  v..  Steel  Division,  326, 524. 

Phonographs,  war  service  committee, 
540. 


Photo-engraving,  war  service  com- 
mittee, 535. 

Pickles,  war  service  committee,  540. 

Picric  acid,  manufacture,  plants,  388, 
400, 405;  as  shell  explosive,  403;  sup- 
ply of  phenol,  414. 

Pierce,  B.  D.,  Jr.,  regional  advisor,  508. 

Pierce,  E.  A.,  Foreign  Mission,  265. 

Pierce,  F.  E.  (L.),  Fire  Prevention  Sec- 
tion, 194,  524. 

Pierce,  P.  E.,  in  War  Industries  Board, 
37,  524;  Director  of  Purch£ise,  130; 
and  smokeless  powder,  408. 

Piez,  C.  R.,  priorities,  146  n.,  524; 
War  Labor  Policies  Board,  288. 

Pig  Iron  Section,  506. 

Pig  tin,  early  sub-committee,  498.  See 
also  Tin. 

Pigments,  war-time  problem,  415. 

Pipe  and  supplies,  war  service  com- 
mittee, 540. 

Pittman,  Alfred,  Commercial  Econ- 
omy Board,  212. 

Pittsburgh,  Mellon  Institute,  chemical 
research,  418,  419;  power  shortage, 
conservation,  461,  462;  regional  ad- 
visor, 508. 

Pittsburgh  Plate  Glass  Company,  op- 
tical glass,  471. 

Plaster  board,  control,  430. 

Platinum,  international  executive, 
266,  375;  sources,  problem,  364; 
uses,  indispensability,  369;  available 
supply,  prices,  370;  Draper  import, 
370;  departmental  cleavage  over 
problem,  371;  and  deficit  of  iridium, 
371,  372;  Section,  control,  373,  501; 
licenses,  373;  overtures  to  Colom- 
bia, 373;  conservation,  jewelry,  sub- 
stitutes, research,  373,  374,  419; 
efforts  for  domestic  production,  374; 
demand,  374. 

Plattsburgh  plan,  12. 

Plows,  conservation,  221. 

Plumbing  supplies,  war  service  com- 
mittee, 540. 

Pocket-knives,  conservation,  222;  war 
service  conmiittee,  534. 

Politics,  no  place  in  industrial  war 
machine,  38,  39,  189. 

Pollak,  W.  H.,  Legal  Section,  207  n., 
524. 

Post-war  readjustment,  phase  in  policy 
of  War  Industries  Board,  74,  477, 
479;  and  problem  of  essential  indus- 
tries, 182-86;  labor  study,  205;  labor 
conditions,  290;  repudiation  of  con- 
tracts, 484;  War  Industries  Board 
and  carrying  out,  487,  488. 

Potash,  German  monopoly,  394,  395; 
development  of  American  deposits, 
393;  war  uses,  395;  manufacture  of 


564 


mDEK 


i 


\  • 


/ 


carbonate  for  optical  glass,  395,  396; 

Section,  400. 
Pottery,  war  service  committee,  540. 
Powell,  T.  C,  priorities,  146  n.,  468, 

524;   Inland  Traffic  Section,   197, 

524. 

Power  and  transportation,  importance 
in  war,  459;  cooperation  of  boards, 

459,  460;  control  through  priority, 
459;  electric,  and  control  by  War 
Industries  Board,  460;  complex 
administration.  Section,  personnel, 

460,  505;  other  connections  of  Sec- 
tion, 461;  shortage  of  electric,  ap- 
plication of  priorities,  conservation, 

461,  462;  projects  of  governmental 
development,  pools,  valuable  data, 
461 ;  problem  of  new  war  plants,  462, 
464;  machinery,  462;  Keller's  report, 
462  n.;  electric  equipment,  463;  con- 
servation through  diffusion  of  in- 
dustries, 463;  steam  turbines,  463; 
boilers,  464;  other  apparatus,  464; 
importance  of  Section,  464.  See  also 
Railroads. 

Preference,  self-confounding,  139; 
naval,  142;  within  army,  142;  Ship- 
ping Board  and,  143;  and  Allied  pur- 
chases, blunders,  251,  252.  See  also 
Priorities;  Purchases. 

Preparedness,  need  ignored,  4;  general 
inadequate,  for  World  War,  5,  6; 
lack  of  industrial,  6;  unofficial  move- 
ment, influence,  10, 11;  Wilson's  ad- 
vocacy, 14;  preliminary  measures, 
18;  fruits  of,  lack,  price,  47, 255,  293; 
German,  107,  108;  impossibility  of 
adequate,  unknown  requirements, 
108, 109;  lack  of  data,  205;  data  and 
disarmament,  231;  post-war  neglect 
of  industrial,  396,  483;  lack  of  ma- 
chines, 452.  See  also  Council  of 
National  Defense;  Industrial  mobil- 
ization; Requirements;  Resources. 
Prescott,  Sherburne,  Cotton  Section, 
442  n.,  524. 

Pressed  metals,  war  service  conmiittee. 
540. 

Price-fixing,  reorganized  War  Indus- 
tries Board,  and,  45,  49  n.,  50,  61, 
62,  105,  165;  Brookings  as  head,  88; 
and  stabilization  though  priorities, 
156,  163,  168,  175,  176;  as  im- 
plement of  control,  160;  legal  aspect, 
160,  177;  beginning,  161;  field,  con- 
centration on  raw  materials,  161, 
168, 175, 179, 180;  spiritual  purpose, 
and  profiteering,  161,  162,  179;  vol- 
untary copper,  precedent,  162,  163, 
346-48;  attitude  of  industry,  162; 
causes,  suspension  of  law  of  supply 
and  deinaiid,  163, 164,  480;  informal 


n^otiations  and  control,  164;  other 
voluntary  concessions,  164;  need  of 
underlying  drastic  control,  165;  ad- 
vantages of  indirect  legal  basis,  pub- 
lic attitude,  166;  first  steel  schedule, 
conferences,  167,  177,  320-23;  coal, 
167;  other  materials,  167;  presiden- 
tial approval,  168,  169;  establish- 
ment of  Committee,   relations   to 
War   Industries  Board,   personnel, 
168-70,    501;    functions    of   Com- 
mittee, 169  n.;  fluidity,  171,  175; 
and  open  market,  171;  and  cost-plus 
policy,  171, 172;  basis,  and  maximum 
production  and  taxation,  172,  176, 
322,  323,  343,  348,  351;  level-price 
plan,    effect,    arguments,    173-75; 
common  price,  175-77;  and  stabili- 
zation, 175,  176;  method,  negotia- 
tions, 177;  periodical,  178;  review, 
178;  assistance.  Federal  Trade  Com- 
mission, 178;  maximum  price,  178; 
administration,      alignment     with 
basic  prices,  178;  legal  aspects  of 
"fair  price,"  179;  results,  179;  and 
cottpn,   179,   180;  simplicity,   180; 
section  in  Division  of  Planning,  202; 
book  on,  205;  American  interests 
and   need   of  British  control   and 
reciprocity,  263,  267,    271;    inter- 
national tin,  269,  366;  need  of  steel, 
317-19;  later  copper,  349-52;  alu- 
minum, 356;  nickel,  361;  sulphur, 
398;  sulphuric  acid,  399;  nitric  acid, 
399;  caustic  soda,  400;  toluol,  414; 
lumber,  425;  paper,  429:  building 
materials,    430;    hides,    skins,  and 
leather,  435;  plan  for  shoes,  436; 
woolens  and,  445;  cotton  goods,  448; 
achievement,  479,  480. 

Price-Fixing  Section  of  Division  of 
Planning,  202. 

Printing  ink,  war  service  committee, 
537. 

Printing  presses,  war  service  com- 
mittee, 540. 

Projectile  Steel  Section,  506. 

Priorities  and  allocations,  function  of 
Purchase  Board,  34;  Division  in  War 
Industries  Board,  36,  37,  61,  62; 
development  by  Board,  45,  46,  61; 
determination  in  reorganized  Board, 
49  n.;  Parker  as  head,  88;  and 
Board's  industrial  control,  105,  154, 
158,  159,  293;  conditions  causing 
use,  138-40;  principles,  results,  140; 
origin,  143;  definition,  restriction  in 
use,  143,  144;  basis  of  authority, 
"request"  policy,  144;  power,  146- 
48;  bodies,  representation,  146;  per- 
sonnel, 146  n.,  502;  functions,  prob- 
lems, 146-49;  and  selective  draft, 


INDEX 


565 


148;  general  application,  149;  and 
independent  boards,  150;  first  order, 
steel  rating,  150,  324,  328,  329;  rat- 
ing classes  and  sub-divisions,  150, 
151;  automatic  ratings,  151;  classifi- 
cation of  purposes,  classes  of  prefer- 
ence, 151;  voluntary  and  coopera- 
tive working,  152,  154,  480;  com- 
plexity of  administration,  154,  155; 
evasions,  156;  price  stabilizing, 
check  to  profiteering,  156,  163,  168, 
176;  flexibility,  illustrations,  157;  as 
fundamental  principle,  181;  de- 
mands and  conservation,  181;  and 
essentiality  of  industries,  183;  In- 
dustrial Adjustments  Section,  185; 
Non-War  Construction  Section,  187; 
triangular  problem  in  reduction  of 
imports,  200,  204;  and  damages, 
207;  Labor  Priorities  Section,  208; 
international  control,  262;  in  labor, 
290-92;  periodical  of  Division,  306; 
aluminum,  356;  lead,  360;  nickel, 
362;  lumber,  426;  pulp  and  paper, 
429;  building  materials,  430;  hides, 
435;  rubber,  438;  machinery,  453; 
and  hardware,  infiltration  attack, 
457;  cranes,  456;  power  and  trans- 
portation, 459-61, 463, 468;  achieve- 
ment, 480,  481.  See  also  Auto- 
motive products;  Clearance.* 

Production,  as  main  concern  of  War 
Industries  Board,  176,  181,  323; 
effect  of  economic  conservation  on, 
218;  slow  start,  233,  234,  452.  See 
also  Advisory  Conmiittee  on  Plants 
and  Munitions;  Resources;  and 
cross  references  under  War  Indus- 
tries Board. 

Profiteering,  Baruch's  attitude,  70; 
influence  of  priorities  and  price  fix- 
ing, 156, 162,  163,  168,  176,  179. 

Public  opinion,  Congress  and,  10. 

Pulp  and  paper,  early  marked  for  con- 
trol, 428;  proposed  allocation  of 
newsprint,  428;  Division,  sections, 
personnel,  428,  429  n.,  506;  regula- 
tion of  consumption,  428;  price- 
fixing,  429;  conservation,  priority, 
429;  war  service  committee,  539. 

Pumps,  war  service  committee,  540.  ^ 

Purchase  Board.  iSee  General  Muni- 
tions Board. 

Purchases,  War  Industries  Board  and 
actual,  37,  42,  46,  128,  204,  244;  cry 
against  industrial  committees  and, 
37,  42,  77,  302,  303  n.,  304;  unco- 
ordinated, 111,  112,  141;  competi- 
tive demands  on  inadequate  supply, 
111-13,  156;  swamping  confusion, 
138,  139;  war  abnormalities  in  arti- 
cles of  ordinary  use,  139;  complexity 


of  munition  demands,  140;  and  sec- 
tional industrial  congestion,  199, 
234,  235;  agencies  and  conmiodity 
sections,  307;  question  of  govern- 
mental over-buying,  334,  338,  447. 
iSee  also  Inter-Allied  Purchasing 
CoDMnission;  Price-fixing;  Priorities; 
Requirements. 

PumeU,  Frank,  Steel  Division,  326, 524. 

Pyrites,  compensation  of  domestic 
ventures,  381;  supply,  397;  early 
sub-committee,  496;  Section,  504. 

Pyro-cotton,  proposed  Government 
plant,  410. 

Quartermasters  Corps,  reorganization, 

130,  131. 
Questionnaire  Section  of  Division  of 

Planning,  202. 
Quicksilver,  war  demand  and  control, 

prices,  uses,  362,  363. 

Racine,  Wis.,  T.N.T.  plant,  404. 

Railroad  Administration,  germ,  26, 29; 
and  priority,  49  n.;  and  War  In- 
dustries Board,  60, 96, 105, 128, 198, 
459,  467,  468  n.,  482;  Requirements 
Division,  123;  Priorities  Board,  146; 
and  Inland  Traffic  Section,  197;  and 
Facilities  Division,  199;  and  labor, 
284;  War  Labor  Policies  Board,  288; 
and  sulphur,  398;  and  creosote,  415; 
and  cranes,  456. 

Railroads,  war-time  self-unification, 
80-82;  War  Industries  Board  and. 
Section,  control,  197,  198,  467,  468; 
cause  of  breakdown,  199;  saving  car 
space,  217;  attempted  extortion  in 
^ied  purchases,  469;  locomotive 
problem  and  supply,  469;  freight 
cars,  469.  See  also  Railroad  Admin- 
istration. 

Railroads  War  Board,  81. 

Railway  cars,  war  service  committee, 
540. 

Railway  Equipment  and  Supplies 
Section.  See  Railroads. 

Ransome,  F.  H.,  Lumber  Division, 
427,  534. 

Ratings.  See  Priorities. 

Raw  materials,  importance,  oarly  com- 
mittee, and  development  of  War 
Industries  Board,  27,  29,  30,  301; 
sub-committees  and  cooperating 
conamittees,  personnel,  29,  36,  495- 
500;  importation  question,  30;  di- 
vision in  War  Industries  Board,  36, 
37;  results  of  decentralized  control, 
52,  53;  Baruch  and,  67,  89;  price- 
fixing,  161,  172,  175,  179, 180. 

Rea,  H.  R.,  Advisory  Committee  on 
Plants  and  Munitions,  191,  524. 


w 


4ifi^ 


V 


«l 


1 


566 


)  ,- 


#i> 


INDEX 


Reading,  Lord,  and  American  conser- 
vation, 229;  and  War  Industries 
Board's  Foreign  Mission,  263,  264, 
271. 

Readjustment.  See  Post-war. 

Reay,  W.  M.,  Inter-Allied  Purchasing 
Conmiission,  260,  524. 

Reclamation,  of  waste,  278;  of  labor 
waste,  279.  See  also  Conservation. 

Reconstruction.  .See  Post-war  readjust- 
ment. 

Red  Cross,  Requirements  Division, 
123. 

Redfield,  W.  C,  and  measure  for 
Council  of  National  Defense,  16. 

Reed,  L.  B.,  Facilities  Division.  199. 
525. 

Reeves, ,  and  automobfle  industry 

and  war,  339. 
Refractories,  Section,  417,  504;  war 

service  conamittee,  541. 

Refrigerators,  war  service  committee, 
541. 

R^onal    advisors,     of    Conversion 

Section,  241-43;  list,  508. 
Replogle,  J.  H.,  in  War  Industries 
Board,  61,  62,  501,  525;  character, 
services,  87 ;  and  conmiodity  sections, 
304;  and  steel  prices,  schedule,  318, 
320;    and    diminished    production, 
324,  326;  as  head  of  Steel  Division, 
staff,  324,  326,  506;  and  automobile 
industry,  333,  335;  on  Ford's  plant, 
^^  341;  and  ferro-alloys,  384. 
•* Request"  basis,  in  War  Industries 
actions,  20,  94,  in  priorities,  141, 
145. 
Requirements,  unforeseeable  military, 
yet  met,  108-11,  113,  122,  124,  128, 
137;    military    uncoordinated    pur- 
chase    systems,     competitive     de- 
mands,   111-13;   Clearance   Office, 
118;  never  geared  to  resources,  122; 
Division,  value,  weaknesses,  repre- 
sentation, personnel,   123-25,   127, 
128,  204,  501,  502;  naval  forecasts, 
125  ^  army  purchase  reforms,  129-31 ; 
materiel  problenis  of  army  in  France, 
133-35;  priority  problem,  148,  149; 
restrictive    instrumentalities,     181, 
182;  question  of  industrial  essential- 
ity, policy  toward,  182-84;  crusade 
against     non-essential     industries, 
"forgodsakers,"  183,  229;  commit- 
tee on  non-essentials,  report,   184, 
185;  Industrial  Adjustments  Com- 
mittee, curtailment  policy,   career, 
185,   186;  illustrative  elements  in 
non-essentiality  problem,  186;  cur- 
tailment of  building,  187-91;  work 
of  advisory  Committee  on   Plants 
and  Munitions,  191-94;  Emergency 


Construction  Committee,  building 
cantonments,  196;  duties  of  Facili- 
ties Division,  198-200.  See  alsD 
Gbarance;  Inter-Allied  Purchasing 
Commission;  Preference;  Prepared- 
ness; Priorities;  Purchases;  Re- 
sources,  and  commodities  by  name. 

Research,  chemical,  418,  419.  See  also 
National  Research  Council. 

Research  and  inventions,  committee 
m  Council  of  National  Defense,  37. 

Resources,  development  of  appraise- 
ment in  War  Industries  Board,  45, 
61;  lack  of  data,  survey  by  Board, 
114;  husbanding  for  growing  needs, 
121,  122;  never  geared  to  require- 
ments, 122;  special  units  in  War 
Industries  Board,  functions,  136; 
Section,  status,  136,  137,  181;  and 

gnority  problem,  148,  149;  price- 
xing  and  maximum  production, 
176,  181;  promotive  instrumentali- 
ties, 181,  182;  Fire  Prevention  Sec- 
tion, 194;  hoarding.  Stored  Mate- 
rials Section,  194-96;  Inland  Traffic 
Section,  197;  Facilities  Division, 
198-200;  Division  of  Planning  and 
Statistics,  200-06;  achievement,  479. 
See  also  Commodity  sections;  Con- 
servation; Conversion;  Data;  Pre- 
paredness; Production;  Raw  mate- 
rials; Requirements. 
Retail  prices,   and    price-fixing,   161, 

Retail    stores,    exchanges    abolished, 

216;  delivery  cut,  216. 
Reynolds,  S.  M.,  News  Section,  507,525. 
Rhodesia,  chromium,  378. 
Rice  milling,  war  service  conmiittee. 

539. 
Rifle,  alteration  of  Enfield,  191. 
Ritchie,  A.   C,   Legal   Section,   207, 

501,  525;  on  Foreign  Mission  funds, 

266. 

Robbins,  Walter,  Electrical  Section. 
461,  463,  525. 

Rochester,  regional  advisor,  508. 

Rockwell,  J.  C,  Advisory  Committee 
on  Plants  and  Munitions,  191. 

Rogers,  C.  A.,  Harness  Equipment 
Section,  434,  525. 

Roosevelt,  F.  D.,  War  Labor  PoHcies 
Board,  288. 

Root,  Elihu,  and  measure  for  Council 
of  National  Defense,  16;  and  Gen- 
eral Staff,  130. 

Rope  paper  and  rope  paper  sacks,  war 
service  committee,  539.  See  also 
Cordage. 

Rc^engarten,  A.  G.,  Miscellaneous 
Chemicals  Section,  416,  525;  Medi- 
cal Industry  Section,  472  n. 


INDEX 


567 


Rosen wald,  Julius,  Advisory  Commis- 
sion, committee,  22,  29;  General 
Munitions  Board,  35,  36;  and  can- 
tonments, 197  /I.;  and  leather  arti- 
cles, 433. 

Rossiter,  W.  T.,  Conversion  Section, 
243,  525. 

Rowbotham,  G.  B.,  Belting  Section, 
434,  525. 

Rowland,  J.  W.,  Rubber  Section, 
437  n.,  525. 

Rubber,  importation  question,  30, 437; 
international  executive,  266;  British 
control,  269;  stable  price,  explana- 
tion, 436,  437;  Section,  437,  506;  al- 
locations, 438;  move  in  Peace  Con- 
ference to  insure  supply,  438;  coop- 
erative committee,  500;  war  service 
committees,  541. 

Rublee,  George,  and  shipping  for 
American  Expeditionary  Forces, 
204  n.,  205  n. ;  Commercial  Economy 
Board,  212;  later  services,  213. 

Russia,  held  up  supplies  for  Kerensky, 
195;  platinum,  364.  370. 

Ryan,  J.  D.,  and  War  Industries 
Board,  44  n.;  and  voluntary  copper 
price-fixing,  347;  and  later  price, 
350,  351. 

Saccharine  and  toluol,  414. 

Saddlery,  war  demand,  432;  hardware 
shortage,  458. 

Saeger,  W.  C,  Legal  Section,  207  n., 
526. 

St.  Louis,  regional  advisor,  508. 

St.  Paul,  regional  advisor,  508. 

Salvage.  See  Conservation. 

Sample  trunks,  reduction,  217. 

Samples,  conservation,  219,  221. 

San  Francisco,  regional  advisor,  508. 

Sanford,  H.  W.,  Ferro- Alloy  Action, 
384,  526. 

Sanford,  R.  B.,  and  bill  for  Council  of 
National  Defense,  16. 

Sanitary  earthenware,  war  service 
committee,  535. 

Sanitation,  committee  in  Advisory 
Commission,  29. 

Saving  by  producer  rather  than  con- 
sumer, 230.   See  also  Conservation. 

Sawyer,  D.  E.,  Steel  Division,  326, 526. 

Scandinavia,  American  influence  over, 
261. 

Schmidt,  J.  C,  Chains  Section,  457  n., 
526. 

Schoelkopf,  J.  F.,  Jr.,  Artificial  Dyes 
Section,  413  n.,  526. 

Schram,  L.  B.,  labor  executive  com- 
mittee, 282. 

Schwab,  C.  M.,  and  steel  prices,  322; 
steel  committee,  326. 


Scott,  F.  A.,  chairman  General  Muni- 
tions Board,  35;  chairman  War  In- 
dustries Board,  breaks  down,  36,  42, 
44,  526;  character,  services,  82-84; 
war  prescience,  83;  Clearance  Com- 
mittee, 118. 

Scott,  J.  W.,  Textiles  Division,  441, 
526. 

Scott,  R.  W.,  Knit  Goods  Section,  442, 
526. 

Seattle,  regional  advisor,  508. 

Seeds,  war  service  committee,  541. 

Self-control  in  industrial  mobilization, 
73,  74,  98,  162,  190,  191,  214-16, 
287,  301,  481. 

Self  ridge,  E.  A.,  Jr.,  Lumber  Division, 
427,  526. 

Semet-Solvay  Company,  and  nitric 
acid,  389. 

Semiporcelain  and  china,  war  service 
committee,  540. 

Shaw,  A.  W.,  in  War  Industries  Board, 
62;  and  origin  of  conservation  Divi- 
sion, 211,  228,  526;  Commercial 
Economy  Board,  212;  bread-return 
privilege,  213;  and  voluntary  coop- 
eration, 214;  lines  of  elimination, 
219;  and  Baruch,  227. 

Shaw,  Albert,  and  industrial  prepared- 
ness, 14. 

Shaw,  G.  M.,  Advisory  Committee  on 
Plants  and  Munitions,  191,  526. 

Sheepskin,  and  Glove  Leather  Sec- 
tion, 434;  control,  price-fixing,  434. 

Sheet  metal,  war  service  committees, 
541. 

Sheet  steel,  early  sub-committee,  498. 

Sheffield,  Ala.,  nitrate  plant,  390. 

SheUs.  See  Artillery. 

Sherley,  Swagar,  and  periodical,  203. 

Ship  Control  Committee,  and  War  In- 
dustries Board,  204  n. 

Shipping,  committee  in  Council  of  Na- 
tional Defense,  37;  Section,  506. 

Shipping  Board  and  Emergency  Fleet 
Corporation,  War  Council,  43;  and 
priority,  49  n.;  and  War  Industries 
Board,  60,  105,  126,  128,  459;  Re- 
quirements Division,  123,  125;  and 
preferences,  143;  Priorities  Board, 
146;  and  coordination  with  trade, 
200,  204;  Fusion  Committee,  205; 
sectional  representatives  and  coop- 
eration, 243 ;  and  Allied  requirement;, 
258;  and  labor,  284;  War  Labor  Pol- 
icies Board,  288;  and  commodity 
sections,  307;  and  sulphur,  398;  and 
cranes,  456;  and  anchor  chains,  457; 
and  transportation  control,  459. 

Shipyards,  construction,  330. 

Shoddy,  use,  445,  446. 

Shoes,    conservation,    224;    cont^n- 


I 


fW«! 


568 


INDEX 


1 


I 


1) 


\f 


i ; 


i 


h 


! 


plated  price   standardization,  224; 

rJ'i^^^.oo^^?*'"^^*'  2'-'  war  demand, 
462,  433;  for  trenches,  435;  control 
of  industry,  drastic  plan,  435,  436. 

Shotwell,  E.  C,  Sheepskin  Leather 
Section,  434,  526. 

Signal  Services,  preference,  142. 

Silk  tin  conservation,  221;  Section, 
442  n.,  506;  war  problem,  450;  war 
service  committee,  541. 

Simmons,  W.  D.,  Commercial  Econ- 
omy Board,  212;  later  services,  213. 

Simple  life,  and  economic  equality, 
218. 

Simpson,  F.  F.,  Medical  Industry  Sec- 
tion, 472, 526.  ^ 
Skmner,  William,  SUk  Section,  442  ti.. 

Skins.  See  Leather. 

^"Jll?'  ™^'  ^'"^^  Prevention  Section, 
194,  527. 

Smith,  E.  D.,  and  nitrates,  393. 

a\^'  S-  ^'A ^^"^'^  CJoods  Section, 
442;  Flax  Products  Section,  442  n. 
427. 

Smokel^  powder  (NitroceUulose), 
manufacture,  complex  process,  388, 
407;  demand  and  supply,  407,  410- 
constniction  of  governmental  plants,' 
Banich  s  activity,  408-10;  proposed 
pyro-cotton  plant,  410;  price,  410. 

Society    of    Automotive     Engineers 
standard  heavy  truck,  466. 

Soda  ash,  war  conditions  of  industrv 
400.  ^' 

Sodium  nitrate.  -S^e  Nitrates. 

Sole  and  Belting  Leather  Section,  434. 

Southern   Pine   Emergency  Bureaus, 
424  n.;  and  price,  425. 

Sowers,  W.  J.,  regional  lumber  admin- 
istrator,  424  n.,  527. 

Spain,  mules  and  anunonia  sulphate 
72,  158;  cork,  451.  ' 

Spec,  Maxunilian  von,  reason  for  Pa- 
cific cruise,  388. 

Spencer  Lens  Company,  optical  glass 
4/1.  o       . 

SpiHraan,  W.  J.,  Labor  Division,  278, 

Spruce  problem  of  Aircraft  Board  142 
427.  ■'«**v»,  j.-»^. 

Stabilization,  as  policy  of  War  Indus- 

tnes  Board,  156, 175, 176. 
Staley,  H.   F.,  Refractories  SecUon, 

417  n.,  527. 

Standardization,  committee  in  Advi- 
^ry  Commission,  29;  War  Industries 
Board  and,  208;  of  building  material 
schedules,  431;  prevention  of  ex- 
cessive, of  tools,  454;  heavy  dutv 
trucks,  466,  467. 

Stanley,  W.W.,  Power  Section,  461,527. 


Starrett,  W.  A.,  Emergency  Con- 
struction  Committee,  196,  527. 

State  Councils  of  Defense,  and  re- 
striction  of  building,  187. 

State  Department,  and  conspectus 
penodical,  204. 

Stationery,  war  service  committee. 
541. 

Statistical  Division,  taken  over  bv 
arnay,  201.  ^ 

Statistics,   committee  in  Council  of 

National  Defense,  37.  See  also  Data. 

Steam  and  hot  water  fittings,   war 

service  conmiittee,  542. 
Steam  turbines,  war  problem,  463. 
Steel,  priorities,  150,  324,  328,  329- 
pnce-fixmg  conferences,   164,   165 
167, 177,  317-23;  internaUonal  com- 
nuttee,  chairmanship,  267,  270,  271- 
importance  in  war,  315,  316,  326; 
problem  of  war  supply  and  demand, 
316,  317;  report  of  Federal  Trade 
Commission,    disparity    in    costs, 
320;  uniform  price,  322;  industry  as 
governmental  controlled  unit,  323- 
25,  327-30, 344;  reduced  production, 
conference,  324,  327,  328;  discipline, 
rf^5;    industry    cooperative    com- 
mittees, 325,  326,  329,  497-99;  and 
war,    326;   personnel   of   Division, 
sections,  326,  506;  factors  in  success 
of  Division,  326;  conversion  in,  326* 
work  of  industry's  distribution  com- 
mittee,  329;  fabricated  shipyards, 
330;  limitations,  330;  war  accom- 
plishments,   330,    331;    reason   for 
P"ce,    343;    eariy  sub-committees, 
498,  499.   See  also  Automotive  prod> 
nets;  Ferro-alloy. 

Steel  barrels,  war  service  committee. 
542. 

Steel  tanks,  war  service  committee,  542. 
Steriing  silver  and  silver  plate  ware 

war  service  conunittee,  538.  * 

Stettmius    E.   R.,   Surveyor-General 

of  Supplies,  42,  53,  85;  inconsistent 

optimism,  339. 

^^clj^'  ~Z:r^  ^^  s^Ps  for  A.E.F., 
204  n.,  205  n. 

Stone,  W.  S.,  labor  executive  commit- 

tee,  282. 
Stoneware,  chemical,  problem,  418 
Stored  Materials   Section,  182.  506: 

work,  194-96. 
Storrs,  C.  P.,  Mica  Section,  385. 
Stout,  C.  F.  C,  and  leather  control. 

434,  527.  * 

Stores,  war  service  committee,  542 
Strategy,  industrial,  in  peace  and  war, 

485,  486. 

Strong,  Benjamin,  and  measure  for 
Council  of  National  Defense,  16. 


INDEX 


569 


Stroock,  Sylvan,  Felt  Section,  442  n., 
527. 

Stuart,  H.  C,  Price-Fixing  Committee, 
169,  527. 

Subsidy,  war-time  problem  of  indus- 
trial, 379-82. 

Substitution,  in  war-time  conservation, 
219,  224.  See  also  Conservation. 

Sugar,  war  service  committee,  542. 

Sullivan,  J.  W.,  labor  executive  com- 
mittee, 282. 

Sulphide  of  soda,  and  olive-drab  cloth, 
414. 

Sulphur,  domestic  supply.  Section, 
control,  price,  398,  504;  early  sub- 
committee, 496. 

Sulphuric  acid,  war-time  supply  and 
control  of  materials,  397;  manufac- 
ture, price,  399,  419.  See  also  Ex- 
plosives. 

Summers,  L.  L.,  General  Munitions 
Board,  35;  in  War  Industries  Board, 
61,  62,  501,  527;  character,  services, 
and  war  chemistry,  88-91,  419;  and 
toluol,  91,  402;  Foreign  Mission, 
264;  and  jute  price-control,  268; 
and  chairmanship  international  steel 
committee,  270,  271;  at  Peace 
Conference,  273;  and  commodity 
sections,  304;  steel  price-schedule, 
320;  in  automobile  conference,  341; 
and  Draper's  platinum  import,  371 ; 
and  ferro-alloys,  384;  and  nitrates, 
390, 391, 393;  and  smokeless  powder, 
408;  and  Technical  Staff,  418. 

Sunday,  "Billy,"  and  restriction  of 
building,  188. 

Supervisors  of  rail  transportation,  war 
service  committees,  540. 

Supplies,  committee  in  Advisory  Com- 
mission, 29;  War  Industries  Board 
and  general  oversight,  101.  See 
also  Purchases;  Requirements;  Re- 
sources; War  Industries  Board. 

Supply  and  demand,  suspension  of 
law,  164,  480.  See  also  Require- 
ments; Resources. 

Surface,  F.  M.,  Fusion  Committee,  205. 

Surgery,  war  service  committees,  538, 
542. 

Surgical  needles,  manufacture,  472. 

Sweater  coats,  war  service  committee, 
537. 

Sweet,  E.  F.,  Labor  Division,  278,  527. 

Swope,  H.  B.,  in  War  Industries 
Board,  61,  501,  527. 

Taft,  W.  H.,  War  Labor  Board,  287. 

Taft-Walsh  Board.  See  War  Labor 
Board. 

Talmadge,  J.  B.,  Emergency  Con- 
struction Committee,  197,  528. 


Tanning,  war  service  committees,  542. 

Tanning  Materials  and  Natural  Dyes 
Section,  problems,  415,  504. 

Tardieu,  Andre,  High  Commissioner, 
260. 

Tariff  Commission,  and  price-fixing, 
50  n.,  170. 

Taussig,  F.  W.,  Tariff  Commission, 
Price-Fixing  Committee,  170,  528; 
on  level-price  policy,  173,  174;  at 
Peace  Conference,  273. 

Taxation,  and  price-fixing,  172,  323, 
348. 

Taylor,  Alonzo,  and  liaison  of  war 
boards,  206. 

Taylor,  I.  H.,  Conversion  Section,  243, 
528. 

Technical  and  Consulting  Section, 
chemical,  work,  61,  297,  418,  419, 
504. 

Templeton,  A.  A.,  regional  advisor, 
508,  528. 

Tents,  requirements,  447. 

Textiles,  erasing  Civil  War  blot,  439; 
regulating  power  in  hands  of  opera- 
tors, result,  439,  440,  451;  early  ad- 
ministration, sub-committees,  440, 
441;  army  and  administration,  441; 
Division,  sections,  personnel,  441, 
506,  507;  felt,  silk,  flax,  450;  jute, 
hemp,  cordage,  kapoc,  cork,  451; 
service  of  War  Industries  Board, 
451.  See  aho  Cotton  goods;  Knit 
goods;  Woolens. 

Thomas,  P.  H.,  Power  Section,  461, 
528. 

Thompson,  F.  E.,  Steel  Division,  326, 
528. 

Thompson,  W.  H.,  and  war-time  con- 
struction, 338. 

Thread,  spool  conservation,  221;  sec- 
tion chief,  506;  war  service  commit- 
tee, 534. 

Thrift  campaign,  investigation,  205. 

Thurston,  E.  G.,  Non-Ferrous  Metals 
Division,  352,  528. 

Tile,  war  service  committee,  542. 

Tin,  conservation,  221,  223,  367,  368; 
international  executive,  price-fixing, 
success,  266,  366,  368;  Foreign  Mis- 
sion and  control,  269;  American  de- 
mand, 365;  sources,  British  restric- 
tions, 365,  366;  control  of  import, 
allocation,  366;  Section,  367,  506; 
scrap  recovery,  367;  production  of 
tin  plate,  367;  other  uses,  367;  coop- 
erative administration,  368;  early 
sub-committees,  498,  499. 

Tinfoil,  conservation,  221,  223,  368. 

T.N.T.,  supply  and  demand  of  toluol, 
manufacture,  91,  388,  402,  404,  414; 
as  shell  explosive,  403. 


u 


f- 


570 


INDEX 


INDEX 


571 


4 


wl 


#< 


m^ 


/ 


Tobacco,  saccharine  for  chewing,  414; 

miUtary  demand,  473;  Section,  474, 

506;  war  service  committee,  542. 
Toluol,  war  demand  and  supplv,  91 

402,404,414.  ^ 

Tools.  See  Machinery. 
Topping,  J.  A.,  steel  committee,  326. 
Torrence,  R.  M.,  Chemical  Glass  and 

Asbestos  sections,  384,  418  n.,  528. 
Toys,  war  service  conmiittee,  542. 
Tozzi,    ,    Itedian    Commissioner. 

260. 

Trace  chains,  conservation,  222. 

Trading-with-the-Enemy  Act,  and 
War  Industries  Board,  97. 

Transportation,  committee  in  Advis- 
ory Commission,  29;  basic  industry, 
30;  committee  in  Council  of  National 
Defense,  37;  statements  of  problem, 
336-38.  See  also  Aircraft;  Automo- 
tave  products;  Ocean  transportation- 
Power  and  transportation;  RaUroads; 
Shipping  Board. 

Transportation  Priority  Act,  and  War 
Industries  Board,  96;  and  priorities, 
144. 

Trigg  E.  T.,  regional  advisor,  508,  528. 

Trunks  and  traveling  goods,  war  serv- 
ice committee,  542. 

Tubular  products,  eariy  sub-commit- 
tee, 499. 

Tucker,  Samuel,  Technical  Staff  of 
Chemistry  Division,  418,  528. 

Tungsten,  international  executive,  266; 
compensation  of  domestic  ventures, 
381;  war  and  demand  and  produc- 
tion, administration,  382;  uses,  382. 
See  also  Ferro-alloys. 

Turner,  Spencer,  Cotton  Goods  Sec 
tion,  441,  448,  528. 

Tuttle,  M.  C,  Emergency  Construe 
tion  Committee,  197,  528. 

Typewriter  ribbons,  conservation,  221 


Van  Auken,  W.  R.,  Optical  Glass 
Section,  471. 

Van  Doren,  D.  H.,  Legal  Section,  207 
n.,  528. 

Van  Duzer,  H.  B.,  Fir  Production 
Board,  427,  528. 

Vanadium,  sources,  war  problem  and 
administration,  383.  See  also  Ferro- 
alloys. 

Varnish,  war  service  committee,  539. 

Vauclain,  S.  M.,  on  credit  for  war 
success,  190;  Advisory  Committee, 
191,  528;  and  altering  Enfield  rifle, 
191;  and  French  artillery  types,  192; 
method,  193;  and  tanks,  194. 

Vitrified  glazed  sewer  pipe,  war  serv- 
ice committee,  534. 

Vogel,  A.  H.,  regional   advisor,  508, 

Vogel,  F.  A.,  Harness  Leather  Section. 
434,  529. 


Underwear,  war  service  committee,  537. 

Union  Sulphur  Company,  and  war- 
time supply,  398. 

United  Metals  Selling  Company,  and 
copper  allocation,  352. 

United  States  Employment  Service, 
289. 

United  States  Government  Explosive 
Plants  Units,  409. 

United  States  Housing  Corporation, 
and  Emergency  Construction  Com- 
mittee, 196. 

United  States  Steel  Products  Com- 
pany, and  tin  import  and  control, 
269,  366. 

Vacuum  cleaners,  war  service  com- 
mittee, 542. 


Wages.  See  Labor. 

Wagons  and  vehicles,  war  service  com- 
mittee, 535. 

Wah  Chang  Company,  antimony  im- 
ports, 358. 

Wall  paper,  war  service  committee. 

542. 
Walsh,  F.  P.,  War  Labor  Board,  287. 
Waltz,  Andrew,  Non-Ferrous  Metals 

Division,  352,  529. 
War,  modem,  scope,  2,  3,  104,  107, 

387;  and  steel,  315, 326;  and  copper, 

345;  and  chemical  action,  397;  and 

machinery,  452. 
War  Contracts  Section  of  Division  of 

Planning,  202. 
War  Council,  conferences,  results,  43; 

and  periodical,  203. 
War  Department.  See  Army;  Baker, 

War  Finance  Corporation,  and  Re- 
qmrements  Division,  127;  power 
loans,  461. 

War  Industries  Abroad  Section,  202. 

War  Industries  Board,  importance,  4; 
question  of  extrale^ahty,  4,  19,  48, 
58,  59,  94;  evoluUon,  advantages' 
fluidity,  8,  9,  19,  20,  45,  63,  94,  1.32, 
208,  293,  294,  297,  298,  363,  478; 
basis  of  authority,  18-20,  95,  152- 
54;  rule  by  "request,"  spirit  of  co- 
operation, 20,  94,  97, 105,  360;  germ, 
importance  of  raw  materials,  26,  27, 
30,  301 ;  original  committee  and  sub- 
committees   in   Advisory    Council, 
cooperative   committees,   29,   495- 
500;  General  Munitions  Board,  34- 
36;    creation,    first    members,    36; 
Scott,  36,  42,  44,  82;  original  duties 
and  divisions,  37;  and  purchases, 


m\ 


attitude  toward  requirements,  37, 
42,  46,  128,  204,  244;  and  civilian 
control  over  war  industry,  40,  47; 
completeness  of  control  over  in- 
dustry, quiet  character  of  control, 
40,  63,  74,  98,  102,  104,  105,  154, 
158,  159,  292,  368,  466,  475,  481, 
482;  results  of  no  centralized  con- 
trol and  "teeth,"  attitude  of  mili- 
tary boards,  40-43,  51-53,  68,  69; 
Willard,  43,  44,  82;  and  War  Council 
conferences,  43;  centralized  re- 
sponsibility and  divided  authority 
as  energizing  principle,  delay  in 
finding  it,  business  in  Government 
44,  58,  73-76,  99,  241,  311-14,  474 
fundamentals  for  proper  head,  44 
conception  of  objectives,  45,  46 
Executive  reorganization  as  direct 
war  power.  President's  letter,  func- 
tions, centralized  control,  48-51,  58, 
59;  choice  of  Baruch  as  head,  54; 
development  of  plan  of  reorganiza- 
tion, 54-58;  reorganization  or  super- 
session, 58,  59;  Baruch's  earlier  re- 
organization plan,  59;  results  of  in- 
articulation  with  other  boards,  59- 
61;  functional  elements  of  reorgan- 
ized, 61;  industrial  contact,  com- 
modity sections,  61 ;  personnel  of  re- 
organized, divisions,  61,  62,  501; 
range  of  chairman's  power,  62;  char- 
acter of  personnel,  65,  73,  76;  Bar- 
uch's characteristics  as  head,  66-76; 
as  clearing-house  for  self-controlled 
industry,  73,  74,  98,  162,  190,  191, 
214-16,  287,  301,  481;  Legge,  85,  86; 
Peek,  86,  87;  Replogle,  87;  Parker, 
88;  Brookings,  88;  Summers,  88- 
91,  419;  Frayne,  91-93,  276-78; 
Fletcher,  93;  Johnson,  93,  131; 
legislative  sources,  95-97;  Overman 
Act  and,  97,  100,  493,  494;  and 
President's  war  powers,  97;  power 
as  purchasing  agent,  97;  power 
through  patriotic  cooperation,  97, 
105;  disciplinary  measures,  illustra- 
tions, 98,  99;  limitations  of  field  of 
power,  100;  paramount  relations  to 
other  war  boards,  101,  125-28,  206, 
294-96,  310,  459, 468  n.,  487;  Wilson 
and  completeness  of  control,  103; 
and  commandeering,  103;  Baruch's 
outline  of  purposes,  104-06;  as 
equalizer  of  war  strain,  105;  control 
through  priorities,  105,  480,  481; 
through  price-fixing,  105,  106,  479, 
480;  survey  of  resources,  114;  func- 
tions in  brief,  plan  of  attack,  122, 
181,  478;  and  ungeared  supply  and 
demand,  122;  and  army  cooperation 
after  reorganization,  122,  131,  135; 


lack  of  representation  in  other 
boards,  124,  125;  and  aircraft  sup- 
plies, 142;  and  military  estimates, 
153;  decisiveness,  155,  298;  reorgan- 
ization and  price-fixing,  165,  168- 
70;  and  stabilization  and  standard- 
ization, 175,  176,  208;  maximum 
production  as  main  concern,  176; 
and  partisanship,  189;  Legal  Sec- 
tion, 207;  and  public  contact,  210; 
overlapping  and  team  work,  227, 
230;  and  Allied  economic  coopera- 
tion, 238;  virtual  local  boards,  241, 
243,  245;  expenditures,  254  n.;  ab- 
sorptive nature,  256;  as  functionary 
of  Allies,  258;  financial  vastness, 
259;  and  international  economic 
control,  262,  368;  and  purse  strings, 
296;  and  authority  at  the  source, 
296;  and  industries  committees, 
303  n. ;  list  of  divisions  and  sections, 
306  n.;  platinum  problem  and  Bu- 
reau of  Mines,  371 ;  and  War  Min- 
erals Stimulation  Act,  374  n.;  and 
policy  of  artificial  industrial  stim- 
ulation, 379-81;  as  industrial  bel- 
ligerent, 387;  complexity  of  work, 
455;  future  honor,  475-77;  demo- 
cratic domination  and  preserved 
industrial  vitality,  477,  479;  single 
power  versus  bureaucracy,  477; 
achievement  in  resources,  479;  serv- 
ices and  future  industrial  draft,  482; 
question  of  permanency  of  lesson, 
484;  and  industrial  strategy  in  peace, 
485,  486;  quick  disbandment,  486, 
487;  and  post-war  readjustment, 
487,  488;  success  of  democratic 
industrial  mobilization,  488;  person- 
nel of  functional  divisions,  501-03; 
of  commodity  sections,  503-07; 
regional  advisors,  Ust,  508;  person- 
nel, alphabetically  arranged,  509- 
31.  See  also  Clearance;  Commodity 
sections;  Conservation;  Conversion; 
Data;  Division  of  Planning;  Foreign 
Economic  Mission;  Inter- Allied  Pur- 
chasing Commission;  International 
executives;  Labor;  Price-fixing;  Pri- 
orities; Requirements;  Resources; 
War  service  committoes. 

War  Labor  Administration,  germ,  29; 
and  War  Industries  Board,  105; 
origin,  purpose,  285;  divisions,  286- 
90.  See  also  Labor. 

War  Labor  Board,  origin,  chairmen, 
work,  286-88. 

War  Labor  Conference  Board,  286. 

War  Labor  Policies  Board,  committee 
on  non-essentials,  184;  work,  288, 
289. 

War  Minerals  Stimulation  Act,  pro- 


572 


INDEX 


INDEX 


573 


I  ■■   ! 


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•  • 


/ 


H 


visions,  374;  ^nd  manganese,  377; 
problem,  379-82. 
War  powers  of  Executive,  as  source 

for  War  Industries  Board,  97. 
War  Prison  Labor  Section,  personnel, 

278,  501. 
War  service  committees  of  industry, 
beginning  of  early  cooperative  sys- 
tem, 28;  first  conference  of  chiefs 
with  Council,  28;  popular  outcry 
against  early  seller-buyer  conMnit- 
tees,  37,  42,  77,  302,  303  n.,  304; 
later,  and  conmiodity  sections,  301, 
302;  self-control,  301;  appointment 
of  later  through  Chamber  of  Com- 
merce of  the  United  States,  302,  304, 
543;  and  data,  308;  staffs,  310;  steel, 
325,  326,  329;  copper,  351;  brass, 
353;  zinc,  355;  lead,  360;  chemicals, 
419;  lumber,  424;  early  control 
through,  character,  439-41 ;  woolens, 
445;  electrical  industry,  463;  early, 
cooperative,  under  Baruch,  list, 
personnel,  495-500;  list  and  person- 
nel of  later,  532-43.  See  am>  Com- 
modity sections;  Industrial  mobili- 
zation. 

War  Service  Executive  Conmiittee, 
532. 

War  Trade  Board,  and  priorities,  49  /i., 
146;  and  War  Industries  Board,  60, 
206,  482;  and  requirements,  125; 
and  resources,  182;  and  non-essen- 
tial industries,  184;  and  Stored 
Materials  Section,  194;  and  coor- 
dination of  shipping  and  trade,  200, 
201,  204;  Fusion  Committee,  205; 
labor  readjustment  study,  205;  and 
Foreign  Mission,  265;  and  tin  im- 
port, 366,  368;  and  caustic  soda, 
400;  and  hides,  435;  and  rubber, 
437;  and  wool,  443. 

Warehouses.  See  Stored  Materials 
Section. 

Warm  air  heaters,  war  service  com- 
mittee, 542. 

Washing  machines,  war  service  com- 
mittee, 542. 

Waste  reclamation,  278;  war  service 
conmiittee,  543. 

Watches  for  the  A.E.F.,  investigation, 
205. 

Webb,  S.  W.,  regional  advisor,  244, 
508,  529. 

Weber,  O.  F.,  Non-Ferrous  Metals 
Section,  352,  529. 

Webster,  A.  L.,  Domestic  Hides  Sec- 
tion, 434,  529. 

Weeks,  J.  W.,  and  bill  for  Council  of 
National  Defense,  16. 

Weidlein,  E.  R.,  chemical  research, 
418,  529. 


Weiss,  L.  S.,  Legal  Section,  207  n., 

529. 
Wessel,   Duval   and   Company,    and 

nitrates,  392  n. 
Western  Electric  Company,  and  plati- 
num substitutes,  374. 
Westinghouse     Company,     war-time 

generator,  463. 
Wettstein,  J.  R.,  lead  allocation,  360. 
Wheeler,  Andrew,  Steel  Division,  326, 

529. 
Wheels,  war  service  committee,  543. 
White,  J.  L.,  railway  equipment  pri- 
orities, 468  n. 
White,    J.    P.,    War   Labor   Policies 

Board,  288. 
Whiteside,   A.  D.,   Foreign  Mission, 

265;  Foreign  Wool  Section,  529. 
Whitin,  E.  S.,  Labor    Division,  278, 

529. 
Whitmarsh,  T.  F.,   priorities,  146  n.; 

Rwjuirements  Division,  529. 
Wilkins,  J.  F.,  Stored  Materials  Sec- 
tion, 194,  530. 
Willard,  Daniel,   chairman  Advisory 
Commission,  22;  first  step  toward 
Railroad  Administration,  26;  com- 
mittee, 29;  warning  on  situation,  33; 
and    creation    of    War    Industries 
Board,  36;   as  chairman  of  Board, 
43,  44;  and  reorganization  of  Board, 
68;  services,  and  railroad  war-time 
unification,  80-82. 
Williams,  C.  C,  and  Vauclain,  194; 

and  cooperation,  243. 
Williams,  Harrison,  in  War  Industries 
Board,  61,  501;  Facilities  Division, 
199,  530. 
Williams    Harvey    Corporation,    tin 

smelter,  365  n. 
Willson,  S.  L.,  Pulp  and  Paper  Divi- 
sion, 429  M.,  530. 
Wilson,  W.  B.,  labor  executive  com- 
mittee, 282;  Mediation  Commis- 
sion, 284;  War  Labor  Administrator, 
286. 
Wilson,  Woodrow,  and  navy,  12;  and 
preparedness,  14;  and  measure  for 
Council  of  National  Defense,  16; 
on  purpose  of  Council,  21;  non- 
partisan industrial  war  machine, 
38,  39;  and  head  for  War  Industries 
Board,  44  n.,  68;  reorganization  of 
Board,  47-50,  56-59,  68,  100,  101; 
and  Baruch,  68,  69,  71, 102;  grasp  of 
fundamentals,  102;  follow-up  of  re- 
organization of  Board,  103;  warning 
on  prices,  165;  and  price-fixing,  168, 
169,  322,  351;  and  industrial  essen- 
tiality problem,  184;  War  Cabinet 
and  periodical,  202, 203;  and  Depart- 
ment of  Justice,   204;  promise  of 


f 


shipping,  204,  205  n.;  and  bi-lateral 
war  participation,  251;  and  Baruch's 
Foreign  Mission,  264;  Labor  Media- 
tion Commission,  284;  and  nitrates, 
393. 

Window-glass,  war  service  committee, 
536. 

Winslow,  C.  H.,  Labor  Division,  278, 
530. 

Winton,  C.  Y.,  Lumber  Division,  427, 
530. 

Wire,  anomalous  clearing  committee 
for  electric,  115,  116;  demand  for 
copper,  at  the  front,  345;  Section, 
463,  504;  early  sub-committees,  499. 

Wisner,  F.  G.,  Lumber  Division,  427, 
530. 

Witherspoon,  Herbert,  regional  ad- 
visor, 508,  530. 

Withey,  P.  K.,  Steel  Division,  326,  530. 

Wolman,  Leo,  Fusion  Committee, 
205,  530. 

Women's  Defense  Work,  committee 
in  Council  of  National  Defense,  37. 

Wood,  J.  P.,  woolens  committee,  445. 

Wood,  Leonard,  and  preparedness,  11; 
and  Council  for  National  Defense, 
15. 

Wood  chemicals,  Section,  personnel, 
problems,  415,  416,  504;  war  service 
committee,  533. 

Wood  Products  Section,  428,  503. 

Woodworking,  allocation  among  es- 
tablishments, 428;  war  service  com- 
mittee, 543.  See  also  Lumber. 

Wool,  conservation,  223,  224;  interna- 
tional executive,  266;  British  price- 
reciprocity,  271;  governmental  con- 
trol   of    supply,    allocation,    443; 


cooperative  committees,  500,  543. 
See  also  Woolens. 

Wool  grease,  war  demand,  416. 

Woolens,  Section,  personnel,  442,  506; 
war  supply  absorb  output,  army 
control,  442-44;  governmental  con- 
trol of  wool  supply,  allocation,  443- 
45;  prices,  445;  trade  handling  of 
business,  445;  use  of  shoddy,  445, 
446;  war  service  committee,  543. 
See  also  Textiles. 

Woolley,  C.  M.,  and  War  Industries 
Board,  125;  priorities,  146  n.,  530; 
committee  on  non-essentials,  184; 
and  liaison  of  war  boards,  206. 

Worcester,  C.  H.,  Lumber  Division, 
427,  531. 

Wright,  F.  E.,  Optical  Glass  Section, 
471. 

Yarn  Section,  506. 

Yeatman,  Pope,  Foreign  Mission,  272; 

Non-Ferrous  Metals  Division,  352, 

531. 
Young,  All  n,  at  Peace  Conference, 

274. 

Zane,  A.  V.,  priorities,  146  n.,  531. 

Zimmerschied,  K.  W.,  automotive 
transport  committee,  466. 

Zinc,  price-fixing,  pool,  164,  355;  char- 
acter of  war  problem,  354,  355;  co- 
operative committee,  500. 

Zirconium,  development  as  ferro-alloy, 
383.  See  also  Ferro-alloys. 

Zoning  system,  in  War  Industries 
Board's  work,  241-43,  245;  adop- 
tion by  other  boards,  243;  regional 
advisors,  508. 


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Industrial  America  in  the  world 
war. 


A<V'  Ji',  w^CCf 


JAN  2  6  1951 


END  OF 
TITLE 


